[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 53 (Wednesday, April 25, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3930-S3931]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                 TAIWAN

  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I want to say a word about what President 
Bush said this morning with respect to Taiwan because if what the 
President said is, in fact, what he means, or if it is indeed the new 
policy of the United States, it has profound implications for our 
country. He made a far-reaching comment this morning on the American 
defense of Taiwan, a comment which suggests that without any 
consultation with Congress, without any prior notice to the Congress, a 
policy that has been in place for 30 years is now summarily being 
changed with implications that I believe are serious.
  When asked by Charles Gibson, on ABC's ``Good Morning America,'' 
whether the United States had an obligation to defend Taiwan if Taiwan 
were attacked by China, President Bush said:

       Yes, we do, and the Chinese must understand that.

  Charles Gibson then asked:

       With the full force of the American military?

  President Bush responded:

       Whatever it took to help Taiwan defend theirself.

  For almost 30 years, through Republican and Democrat administrations 
alike, the cornerstone of our approach to policy toward China and 
Taiwan has been the so-called ``one China'' policy: There is but one 
China; Taiwan is a part of China, and the question of Taiwan's future 
must be settled peacefully.
  This policy was laid out in the 1972 Shanghai Communique issued by 
the United States and China at the end of President Nixon's historic 
visit. It was reaffirmed in subsequent bilateral communiques--in 1979, 
when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China and 
again in 1982 on the question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
  A consistent tenet of this policy is the U.S. expectation that the 
question of reunification of China and Taiwan will be settled 
peacefully. We have never stated what the United States would do if 
Beijing attempted to use force to reunify Taiwan with the mainland--
until today. We have not stated it in the course of Republican and 
Democrat administrations alike because we understood the danger of 
doing so.
  We have been deliberately vague about what the circumstances might be 
under which we would come to Taiwan's defense, not only to discourage 
Taiwan from drawing us in by declaring independence but also to deter a 
Chinese attack by keeping Beijing guessing as to what the response 
might be.
  Sometimes some people have talked about trying to reduce that 
ambiguity and simplify it and simply say, of course we would come to 
their defense. But if you do that, you invite a set of consequences 
that might carry with it its own set of dangers, and you may lose 
control of the capacity to make a determination about what has happened 
and what the circumstances really are to which you need to respond.
  President Bush's comments this morning on ``Good Morning America'' 
suggest that the administration has decided to abandon the so-called 
strategic ambiguity. If so, the President has made a major policy 
change with absolutely no consultation with the Foreign Relations 
Committee, the Armed Services Committee, the Intelligence Committee, or 
the leadership of the Congress.

  In my view, it is a policy change that serves neither our interests 
nor Taiwan's. Any situation which results in the use of force across 
the Taiwan Strait is unlikely to be simply black and white, as clear as 
can be. The Tonkin Gulf is a classic example of that.

[[Page S3931]]

To this day, people debate over whether or not there really was an 
attack on the Maddox and the Turner Joy, and whether or not there was 
an appropriate response under those circumstances.
  The scenarios which could lead to the use of force and the conditions 
under which the United States might respond are simply too variable to 
lend themselves to a simple, clear declaration such as the declaration 
made by the President this morning.
  For example, if China attacked in response to what it sees as a 
Taiwanese provocation, would we then respond? Apparently so, according 
to President Bush. Or if Taiwan declared independence, and China 
responded militarily, would we then come to Taiwan's defense? Have we 
given Taiwan a card it wanted all along, which is the capacity to know 
that no matter what it does, the United States would, in fact, be there 
to defend it?
  The answer to that question is the reason that we have carried this 
ambiguity through President Ford, President Carter, President Reagan, 
President Bush, the President's father, and President Clinton.
  In a subsequent interview on CNN, the President reiterated that we 
maintain the ``one China'' policy, and he hopes Taiwan will not declare 
independence. But he remained vague as to what we would do if Taiwan 
did declare independence and China attacked.
  To remove the strategic ambiguity runs the risk of decreasing 
Taiwan's security rather than increasing it and of eliminating the 
flexibility that we will need to determine how to respond in any given 
situation.
  Notwithstanding President Bush's efforts to clarify that the United 
States does not want Taiwan to declare independence, the new policy has 
the automatic impact, if it is in place, and if it is the declaration 
that was made, of emboldening Taiwan and, frankly, reducing our control 
over events.
  Although I have argued that we need to inject more clarity into our 
engagement with China, I personally believe that on this question our 
interests and Taiwan's are better served by the ambiguity that has 
existed and would be better served by maintaining it. It not only 
deters a Chinese attack, but it discourages Taiwan from misreading what 
the United States might do.
  President Bush has said that the United States has an obligation to 
defend Taiwan. Certainly we want to help Taiwan preserve its thriving 
democracy and robust, growing economy. I have said previously that I 
think this is enough of a message to the Chinese, that no American 
President could stand idly by and watch while that democracy that has 
been gained is set back, by force or otherwise. Nevertheless, we need 
to press both Taipei and Beijing to reinvigorate the cross-strait 
dialogue, without any misinterpretations about our role.
  So let us be clear: The Taiwan Relations Act does not commit the 
United States to come to the defense of Taiwan in the event of an 
attack. The Taiwan Relations Act commits us to provide Taiwan with the 
necessary military equipment to meet its legitimate self-defense needs. 
The arms package that the Bush administration just approved for Taiwan, 
I believe, is the right mix and the right measure, and it will 
significantly increase the Taiwanese defensive capacities. I support 
that package.
  It may be the case that we would send American forces ultimately to 
Taiwan's defense if there were an attack, but that decision should not 
be made by an American President in advance during a television 
interview.
  A decision of this magnitude, which holds the potential for risking 
the lives of American military men and women, should be made in 
response to the circumstances at the moment, on the ground, in the air, 
and, most importantly, in consultation with the Congress of the United 
States in the due performance of its responsibilities with respect to 
the engagement of our forces overseas.
  Madam President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.
  Mrs. LINCOLN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for 
15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The remarks of Mrs. Lincoln pertaining to the introduction of S. 775 
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills 
and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mrs. LINCOLN. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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