[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 45 (Friday, March 30, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3208-S3211]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                        CHINA'S MILITARY POLICY

  Mr. KYL. Madam President, I rise today to express concern about the 
direction of Chinese military policy vis-a-vis the United States.
  America's relationship with China is one of the key foreign policy 
challenges facing our nation in the 21st Century. It is hard to 
understate the importance of our relationship with China. It is the 
world's most populous nation, has the world's largest armed forces, and 
is a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Its economic and 
military strength has grown a great deal in recent years, and is 
projected to continue to grow significantly in the coming decades. And 
most significantly, it is intent on gaining control over Taiwan, even 
by military force if necessary.
  For some time now, I have been concerned that, out of a desire to 
avoid short-term controversies in our relationship with China that 
could prove disruptive to trade, we have overlooked serious potential 
national security problems.
  As Bill Gertz noted in his book, The China Threat, the former 
administration believed that China could be reformed solely by the 
civilizing influence of the West. Unfortunately, this theory hasn't 
proven out--the embrace of western capitalism has not been accompanied 
by respect for human rights, the rule of law, the embrace of democracy, 
or a less belligerent attitude toward its neighbors. Indeed, serious 
problems with China have grown worse. And continuing to gloss over 
these problems for fear of disrupting the fragile U.S.-China 
relationship, primarily for trade reasons, only exacerbates the 
problems.
  We must be more realistic in our dealings with China and more 
cognizant of potential threats. As Secretary of State Colin Powell said 
in his confirmation hearing:

       A strategic partner China is not, but neither is it our 
     inevitable and implacable foe. China is a competitor, a 
     potential rival, but also a trading partner willing to 
     cooperate in areas where our strategic interests overlap . . 
     .  Our challenge with China is to do what we can do that is 
     constructive, that is helpful, and that is in our interest.

  I believe it is in our best interest to seriously evaluate China's 
military strategy, plans for modernization of its People's Liberation 
Army, including the expansion of its ICBM capability, and buildup of 
forces opposite Taiwan. Let us not risk underestimating either China's 
intentions or capabilities, possibly finding ourselves in the midst of 
a conflict we could have prevented.
  I would like to begin by answering a seemingly obvious question: Why 
isn't China a strategic partner? Among other things, China is being led 
by a communist regime with a deplorable human rights record and a 
history of irresponsible technology sales to rogue states. Furthermore, 
Beijing's threatening rhetoric aimed at the United States and Taiwan, 
as well as its military modernization and buildup of forces opposite 
Taiwan, should lead us to the conclusion that China potentially poses a 
growing threat to our national security. While it is true that

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China is one of the United States' largest trading partners, we must 
not let this blind us to strategic concerns. Strategically, we must 
consider China a competitor--not an enemy, but certainly a cause for 
concern that should prompt us to take appropriate steps to safeguard 
our security.
  Chinese government officials and state-run media have repeatedly 
threatened to use force against Taiwan to reunite it with the mainland; 
and further, have warned the United States against involvement in a 
conflict in the Taiwan Strait. For example, in February 2000, the 
People's Liberation Army Daily, a state-owned newspaper, carried an 
article which stated, ``On the Taiwan issue, it is very likely that the 
United States will walk to the point where it injures others while 
ruining itself.'' The article went on to issue a veiled threat to 
attack the U.S. with long-range missiles, stating, ``China is neither 
Iraq or Yugoslavia . . . it is a country that has certain abilities of 
launching a strategic counterattack and the capacity of launching a 
long-distance strike. Probably it is not a wise move to be at war with 
a country such as China, a point which U.S. policymakers know fairly 
well also.''
  This treat, and countless others like it, have been backed by China's 
rapid movement to modernize its army. The immediate focus of the 
modernization is to build a military force capable of subduing Taiwan, 
and capable of defeating it swiftly enough to prevent American 
intervention. According to the Department of Defense's Annual Report on 
the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, released in last 
June, ``A cross-strait conflict between China and Taiwan involving the 
United States has emerged as the dominant scenario guiding [the Chinese 
Army's] force planning, military, training, and war preparation.''

  We should also be concerned with China's desire to project power in 
other parts of the Far East. According to a recent Washington Post 
article, China announced that it will increase its defense spending 
this year by 17.7 percent--its biggest increase in the last 20 years. 
China's publicly-acknowledged defense budget of over $17 billion for 
next year is higher than the defense budgets of neighboring countries 
like India, Taiwan, and South Korea. Most analysts estimate China's 
real spending on defense is at least three times as great as the 
publicly disclosed figure. For example, according to the Secretary of 
Defense's January 2001 report, Proliferation: Threat and Response, 
China's military funding levels are expected to average between $44 and 
$70 billion annually between 2000 and 2004. Chinese Finance Minister 
Xiang Huaicheng, in a speech to China's National People's Congress, 
stated that the increase would go, in part ``. . . to meet the drastic 
changes in the military situation around the world and prepare for 
defense and combat given the conditions of modern technology, 
especially high technology.'' This is consistent with the Department of 
Defense's assessment in the Annual Report on the Military Power of the 
People's Republic of China, that ``China's military planners are 
working to incorporate the concepts of modern warfare . . . and have 
placed a priority on developing the technologies and tactics necessary 
to conduct rapid tempo, high technology warfare . . .'' Defense 
Department assessment, an invasion of the island would likely be 
preceded by ``a naval blockade, air assaults and missile attacks on 
Taiwan.'' Furthermore, it states:

       Airborne, airmobile, and special operations forces likely 
     would conduct simultaneous attacks to the rear of Taiwan's 
     coastal defenses to seize a port, preferably in close 
     proximity to an airfield. Seizing a beachhead would likely 
     constitute a support attack. An airborne envelopment would 
     facilitate amphibious operations by cutting off Taiwan's 
     coastal defenders from supply lines and forcing them to fight 
     to two directions. China would likely seek to suppress 
     Taiwan's air defenses and establish air superiority over an 
     invasion corridor in the Taiwan Strait . . .

  To solidify is ability to launch such an attack. China is expected to 
continue to increase its force of short-range ballistic missiles. 
According to an article in the Far Eastern Economic Review, Taiwan 
estimates that the Chinese Army currently has 400 short-range missiles 
deployed opposite that island. More recently, the Washington Times 
reported that a U.S. satellite detected a new shipment of short-range 
missiles to Yongan, in Fujian province, opposite Taiwan. The Washington 
Times had previously reported ``that China had deployed nearly 100 
short-range ballistic missiles and mobile launchers'' at this 
particular base. Bill Gertz's book, the China Threat, cites a 1999 
internal Pentagon report that indicates China plans to increase its 
force of short-range M-9 and M-11 missiles to 650 by 2005. In addition, 
China has also deployed medium-range CSS-5 missiles, with a range of 
1,800 kilometers, which cannot be stopped by Taiwan's Patriot missile 
defense batteries.
  China's continued development of its ICBM force, which directly 
threatens U.S. cities, is also troubling. The Defense Department's 
report, Proliferation: Threat and Response, states:

       China currently has over 100 nuclear warheads . . . While 
     the ultimate extent of China's strategic modernization is 
     unknown, it is clear that the number, reliability, 
     survivability, and accuracy of Chinese strategic missiles 
     capable of hitting the United States will increase during the 
     next two decades.
       China currently has about 20 CSS-4 ICBMs with a range of 
     over 13,000 kilometers, which can reach the United States. 
     Some of its ongoing missile modernization programs likely 
     will increase the number of Chinese warheads aimed at the 
     United States. For example, Beijing is developing two new 
     road-mobile solid-propellant ICBMs. China has conducted 
     successful flight tests of the DF-31 ICBM in 1999 and 2000; 
     this missile is estimated to have a range of about 8,000 
     kilometers. Another longer-range mobile ICBM also is under 
     development and likely will be tested within the next several 
     years. It will be targeted primarily against the United 
     States.

  Another study completed by the National Intelligence Council, 
presenting the consensus views of all U.S. intelligence agencies, 
echoed these concerns stating, Beijing ``will have deployed tens to 
several tens of missiles with nuclear warheads targeted against the 
United States'' in the not too distant future. The intent of this 
deployment is obvious--to preclude the United States from intervening 
in any Chinese military actions against Taiwan.
  China's advances in its air and naval forces are also weighing upon 
the growing imbalance in the Taiwan Strait. Russian transfers of 
military equipment and technology are accelerating China's efforts in 
these areas. According to a February article in Jane's Intelligence 
Review,

       Between 1991 and 1996 Russia sold China an estimated $1 
     billion worth of military weapons and related technologies 
     each year. That figure doubled by 1997. In 1999 the two 
     governments increased the military assistance package for a 
     second time. There is now a five-year program (until 2004) 
     planning $20 billion worth of technology transfers.

  China's Air Force is continuing its acquisition of Russian fighters 
and fighter bombers. For example, China now has at least 50 Russian Su-
27 fighters, and has started co-producing up to 200 more. Furthermore, 
according to a 1999 Defense News article, Russia and China signed a 
preliminary agreement in 1999 calling for the transfer to China of 
approximately 40 Su-30MKK fighter-bombers, which are comparable to the 
U.S. F-15E Strike Eagle. According to a 1999 article in the Russian 
publication Air Fleet (Moscow), these aircraft will be equipped with 
precision-guided bombs and missiles, as well as an anti-radar missile. 
Delivery has not yet occurred, but is expected within the next three 
years.
  The June 2000 Defense Department report predicted that by 2020, the 
``. . . readiness rates, the distances over which China can project air 
power, and the variety of missions which China's air forces can perform 
also can be expected to improve.'' Furthermore, it states that after 
2005, ``. . . if projected trends continue, the balance of air power 
across the Taiwan Strait could begin to shift in China's favor.'' This 
shift will undoubtedly be accelerated by Russia's assistance.

  Additionally, the report estimates that, by 2005, China will have 
developed the capability for aerial refueling and airborne early 
warning. Also, the development of a new Chinese active-radar air-to-air 
missile similar to the U.S. AMRAAM for China's fourth-generation 
fighters is likely to be complete.
  In an effort to increase its ability to place a naval blockade around 
Taiwan, the Chinese Navy is in the process of acquiring new submarines, 
anti-ship missiles, and mines. According to the Defense Department's 
June 2000 report,

[[Page S3210]]

``China's submarine fleet could constitute a substantial force capable 
of controlling sea lanes and mining approaches around Taiwan, as well 
as a growing threat to submarines in the East and South China Seas.'' 
Furthermore, a January 2001 Jane's Defense Weekly article states that 
the core of China's future naval plans calls for the acquisition of an 
aircraft carrier capability and the incorporation of nuclear-powered 
attack submarines into its fleet. According to this article, the 
Chinese Navy recently acquired two Russian Sovremenny-class destroyers 
armed with Sunburn anti-ship missiles that were developed by Russia to 
attack U.S. carrier battle groups. It is also continuing to buy Kilo-
class submarines from Russia, and has discussed purchasing an aircraft 
carrier from Russia.
  Faced with China's moves to increase its ability to blockade Taiwan 
or to disrupt sea lanes near the island, its steps to develop the 
ability to establish air superiority over the Taiwan Strait, and its 
moves to increase its missile force facing the United States and 
Taiwan, we must contend with the question of how to deter an attack on 
Taiwan, and how to defend our forces which would be deployed in the 
area.
  The obvious answer is to supply Taiwan with the defensive weaponry it 
has sought to buy from the United States and to be able to defend the 
United States against missile attack threatened by China. Taiwan has 
submitted its official defense request list to the United States, and 
next month, the Administration will make its final decision as to which 
items will be sold.
  According to the Washington Times, Taiwan has requested approximately 
30 different weapons systems from the United States this year. Though 
the official list is classified, a recently released Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee staff report discussed Taiwan's current defense 
needs, mentioning some of the items that it is interested in acquiring. 
I would like to highlight just a few of these items.
  According to this Senate report, Taiwan has, once again, expressed 
its need for four Aegis destroyers--a request that was repeatedly 
denied by the Clinton Administration. These destroyers would, according 
to the Foreign Relations Committee report, provide Taiwan ``with an 
adequate sea-based air defense and C4I system to deal with rapidly 
developing [Chinese] air and naval threats.'' Because final delivery 
will take 8 to 10 years, however, Taiwan will need an interim solution 
to deal with these threats. Thus, it may be necessary to sell Taiwan 
four used Kidd-class destroyers, which do not have a radar system as 
capable as Aegis, but are more advanced than what Taiwan currently 
possesses.

  Additionally, the report indicates that Taiwan has stated its need 
for submarines. It currently has only four, while China has sixty-five. 
They could prove particularly important should Taiwan need to defend 
itself against a Chinese blockade of the island.
  Taiwan also needs our help to deal with the growing imbalance of air 
power across the Taiwan Strait. According to the report, Taiwan's Air 
Force has indicated its need to be able to counter China's long-range 
surface-to-air missiles, and to counterattack its aircraft and naval 
vessels from long distances. In order to counter China's surface-to-air 
missile sites that can threaten aircraft over the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan 
has expressed interest in obtaining High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles 
(HARM). Taiwan reportedly would also like to purchase Joint Direct 
Attack Munitions (JDAM), and longer-range, infra-red guided missiles 
capable of attacking land targets.
  The United States should approve all of Taiwan's requests, provided 
they are necessary for Taiwan to defend itself, and provided they do 
not violate technology transfer restrictions. Section 3(b) of the 
Taiwan Relations Act states, ``The President and Congress shall 
determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services 
based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan . . .'' 
(Emphasis added) Taiwan clearly needs to upgrade its capabilities in 
several key areas and should act to address these shortfalls.
  We must also deal with a broader question. Since the approach adopted 
by the Clinton Administration clearly did not move China in the right 
direction, how can we positively influence China to act responsibly and 
eschew military action against Taiwan?
  One way is to be unambiguous in our dealings with China. During the 
cold war, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher took a principled stand 
against the Soviet Union, which contributed to one of the greatest 
accomplishments in history: the West's victory without war over the 
Soviet empire. The time has come for the United States to take a 
similarly principled, firm approach to our dealings with China. We 
should hold China to the same standards of proper behavior we have 
defined for other nations, and we should work for political change in 
Beijing, unapologetically standing up for freedom and democracy.
  We should begin by assuring that the United States is not susceptible 
to blackmail by China--to freeze the United States into inaction by 
threat of missile attack against the United States. In this regard, we 
need to work toward the development and deployment of a national 
missile defense system. The United States currently has no defense 
against a ballistic missile attack from China, or any of the countries 
that it has assisted in developing a long-range missile capability. 
Missile defense will allow us to abandon the cold war policy of 
mutually assured destruction.
  China has threatened that NMD deployment will lead to destabilization 
and to an arms race with that country. I disagree. As former Secretary 
of Defense William Cohen testified to the Senate in July of last year, 
``I think it's fair to say that China, irrespective of what we do on 
NMD, will in fact, modernize and increase its ICBM capability.''
  And this is why president George W. Bush is correct to remain firm in 
his decision to deploy an NMD system as soon as possible.
  Secondly, we need to maintain strong U.S. military capabilities in 
Asia and improve ties to our allies in the region. As Secretary of 
State Colin Powell recently said about these relationships, 
particularly with Japan, ``Weaken those relationships and we weaken 
ourselves. All else in the Pacific and East Asia flows from those 
strong relationships.''
  The United States can promote democracy, free-markets, and the rule 
of law by standing by our democratic allies in Asia, like Japan and 
Taiwan. The preparedness of Taiwan's defense forces is questionable. 
Increasing this preparedness will decrease the chances that the United 
States will need to become involved in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, 
or that such a conflict will occur in the first place. As I mentioned 
earlier, not only do we need to sell Taiwan the necessary military 
equipment for defense against China, our defense officials and military 
personnel need to be able to work with their Taiwanese counterparts to 
ensure that they know how to use the equipment. Without this training, 
the equipment we provide will be far less useful.
  As stated in the Defense Department's report:

       The change in the dynamic equilibrium of forces over the 
     long term will depend largely on whether Taiwan is able to 
     meet or exceed developments on the mainland with programs of 
     its own. Its success in deterring potential Chinese 
     aggression will be dependent on its continued acquisition of 
     modern arms, technology and equipment, and its ability to 
     integrate and operate these systems effectively . . .

  President Bush recently stated that China, our ``strategic 
competitor'' needs to be ``faced without ill will and without 
illusions.'' Our long-term goal is to live in peace and prosperity with 
the Chinese people, as well as to promote democratic transition in that 
country. China's far-reaching ambitions in Asia, coupled with efforts 
to modernize and strengthen its military force, however, require the 
United States to exercise leadership. There is no doubt that China will 
and should play a larger role on the world stage in the coming years. 
The challenge before us is to deal with this emerging power in a way 
that enhances our security by dealing candidly and strongly with some 
of the troubling facts and trends. It is time to take a more clear-eyed 
approach to dealing with China.

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