[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 39 (Thursday, March 22, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2700-S2717]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




           BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT OF 2001--Continued

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I will be supporting the Nickles amendment 
because I think it is the wiser course to leave this issue at this time 
to the courts and to the NLRB.
  I will say a few things about the Beck provision in the bill. I 
believe this is a different perspective than what we have heard from 
the Senator from Kentucky. However, we reached the same conclusion, 
that it is best to leave Beck to the courts and to the NLRB rather than 
to try to see if we can distill or characterize the Beck decision at 
this time.
  Mr. President, it was said that the codification of Beck or the Beck 
provision in this bill is the opposite of a codification. But, Section 
304 of McCain-Feingold goes to the heart of the Beck decision, that is, 
whether a nonunion member can opt out of paying dues for political 
activities. The Supreme Court says ``yes'' in Beck, and section 304 
would make that right to opt out statutory law. That is the technical 
holding in Beck that a nonunion member in a bargaining unit can opt 
out. It is that holding which is at the heart of Beck which is also at 
the heart of the provision in section 304.
  We don't believe section 304 would make it harder for nonunion 
members to exercise their Beck right; that, we believe, is not the case 
and we know it is not the intent.
  The National Labor Relations Board has told unions how they can and 
should implement Beck. The NLRB said in the California Saw and Knife 
Works case, in 1995, the following: First, before a union can require a 
nonunion member to pay what is called an agency fee, which is similar 
to union dues for a union member, the union must tell the nonmember 
employee of his or her right to object to paying for activities ``not 
germane to the union's duties as bargaining agent,'' and his or her 
right to ``obtain a reduction in fees for such act.''
  The nonmember employee can then file an objection, and the union must 
then charge the nonmember objecting employee an agency fee reflecting 
only that portion of the agency fee that represents the cost of 
activities related to collective bargaining.
  The NLRB also requires that the nonmember objecting employee must 
also be given an explanation of the calculation made by the union, an 
opportunity to challenge the calculation, and an independent arbiter to 
determine the challenge.
  These requirements have been in force since 1995 and have been 
vigorously enforced.
  The McCain-Feingold bill incorporates both the Beck decision and that 
NLRB decision. The McCain-Feingold bill, first, makes it an unfair 
labor practice for a union not to provide the ``objection procedure'' 
laid out in the bill for nonmember employees. The objection procedure 
in the bill includes the same elements required by the NLRB, including 
annual notice to nonunion employees about the objection procedure; the 
persons eligible to invoke the procedure; and how, when, and where an 
objection can be filed. The bill provides an opportunity to file an 
objection to paying for union expenses ``supporting political 
activities unrelated to collective bargaining.'' One opportunity must 
include filing an objection by mail and, if an objection is filed, the 
reduction in the amount of the agency fee by an amount that 
``reasonably reflects the ratio that the organization's expenditures 
supporting political activities unrelated to collective bargaining 
bears to such organization's total expenditure.''
  The union must also provide, as the NLRB decisions have required, an 
explanation of the calculations made by the union, including 
calculating the amount of union expenditures supporting political 
activities unrelated to collective bargaining.
  That is the provision in the McCain-Feingold bill.
  Separate from the provision in the McCain-Feingold bill, any union 
employee who doesn't want to pay for a union's political activity 
through his or her membership dues can terminate his or her membership 
with the union and, like an objecting nonunion employee, seek a 
reduction in the agency fee of that sum which represents the amount 
spent on political activity.
  So I wanted to clarify the provision in this bill. But our conclusion 
on the amendment of Senator Nickles is really the same. It is best to 
leave this determination of the rights of nonunion members, and the 
meaning and fleshing out of the Beck decision relative to those rights, 
to the courts and to the NLRB. It doesn't belong on this bill.
  So we reach the same conclusion. We don't have the same analysis of 
the wording of the bill and the meaning and the completeness of it or 
the accuracy of it, obviously. We have differences on that. But the 
conclusion is the same. The intent of the bill was to incorporate Beck, 
but, I think we will be better served if in fact the bill, then, is 
silent on this subject and we leave it up to the NLRB and the courts to 
make that determination, as to the meaning and implementation steps for 
Beck.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I believe after discussions with 
Senator Dodd we are ready to announce that there will be a vote at 
3:30. I ask unanimous consent that the time between now and 3:30 be 
equally divided and that a vote occur on the Nickles amendment at that 
time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, let me yield 4 minutes to my colleague from 
Wisconsin.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I also have no problem with the 
amendment proposed by the Senator from Oklahoma. I appreciate the 
opportunity to meet with him today. He made his case, and, in a spirit 
that I hope will continue to permeate this Chamber, we listened to what 
he had to say and agreed that perhaps the best course, as the Senator 
from Michigan suggested, is to delete this provision from the bill.
  I also appreciate the fact the Senator from Oklahoma has indicated to 
me, at least in terms of his amendments on the bill, that this will 
conclude the so-called paycheck protection part of this debate on 
campaign finance reform. It is in recognition of the fact that the 
votes are not there to include a paycheck protection provision that 
would be directed only at labor or even ones that would include both 
labor and corporations. I appreciate that assurance from the Senator 
from Oklahoma because I know he feels very strongly about this. But 
this is the nature of the process. We do need to move on to other 
issues.

[[Page S2701]]

  There really is no need to debate the question of whether section 304 
does or does not codify the Beck decision. The only reason this 
language is in the bill is that the Senator from Kentucky and the 
majority leader in the past have insisted for years that campaign 
finance reform legislation was not complete without a provision to deal 
with the activity of organized labor.
  Proponents of that view, of course, offered the so-called paycheck 
protection provision as their solution. In fact, I remember a few years 
ago when we reached an agreement to debate campaign finance reform, the 
majority leader introduced a base bill for that debate, and his entire 
bill was the paycheck protection provision that is not prevailing in 
this discussion today.
  No changes to our current corrupt soft money system were proposed--
just paycheck protection. Paycheck protection--or, as I like to call 
it, paycheck deception--has always been a poison pill for reform. It is 
an unfair and unnecessary attack on organized labor. But we were 
willing to include in the bill a provision that purported to reflect 
current law with respect to fees paid by nonunion members in lieu of 
dues. So we added section 304.
  Even though this has been in the McCain-Feingold bill for 3\1/2\ 
years, we are told that from the point of view of those who favor 
paycheck protection, the current law is preferable to this section in 
our bill.
  In light of that history, I have no problem with removing the 
provision because the issue really doesn't belong, and never really 
belonged, in the campaign finance legislation. The whole question of 
how labor unions collect and use dues money from their members is a 
matter of Federal labor law, really, not Federal election law.
  I am pleased to support the amendment of the Senator from Oklahoma. I 
think and hope this will bring an end to the amendments we have seen 
for years and years that are aimed at interfering with the internal 
workings of labor unions and the relationship between a union and its 
membership.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I support the amendment. I think it is a 
good thing to happen. I think maybe we have taken way too much time on 
it since basically everybody is in agreement.
  I point out to my colleagues again, we still have a lot of pending 
amendments. We would like to get through them. There are some of them 
that will not take a maximum of 3 hours. There are some we can complete 
in a relatively short period of time.
  The worst of all worlds is for us to continue to make the steady 
progress we have been making but run out of time because there are 
various commitments next week that people have. So I hope we can not 
only move forward with the amending process--we have spent a heck of a 
lot of time in quorum calls, and also with, albeit important, speeches 
and comments that do not have anything to do with the bill, the 
legislation we are addressing.
  Again, I urge my colleagues who have amendments, please let Senator 
McConnell and Senator Dodd know so we can try to set up an orderly 
process for completion of the legislation at the appropriate time next 
week.
  I thank my colleagues.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I wish to thank Senator McCain and 
Senator Feingold for their acceptance of this amendment. I think it is 
important to strike this language, that section 304 which purports to 
codify the Beck decision. I will just read a direct quote from the Beck 
decision. It says:

       The statutory question presented in this case, is whether 
     this ``financial core'' includes the obligation to support 
     union activities beyond those germane to collective 
     bargaining, contract administration, and grievance 
     adjustment.

  We think it does not. In other words, what Beck says is the only 
thing somebody would have to pay for--have their dues taken away from 
them without their consent--is to pay for negotiation for contract 
collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance 
procedures, if someone has a grievance. That is the only thing. They 
were very clear what the language was. And the reason I and Senator 
Gregg--who, I might mention, is a key sponsor--objected was because 
this language went much further.
  I didn't want people to misunderstand and say, well, we are codifying 
Beck, or we are clarifying and codifying Supreme Court decisions where 
basically we would be rewriting the Supreme Court decision. That is the 
reason I raised it. I very much appreciate the comments of our 
colleagues who have said that wasn't the intent and we can drop this 
language.
  My colleague from Wisconsin asked me how many more paycheck 
amendments there would be. I wrote the paycheck protection amendment 
originally because a union person came to me and said: I don't want my 
money taken away from me and used for political purposes for which I 
totally disagree.
  It happens to be that 40 percent of union members vote Republican who 
don't agree with some of the national agenda of their party. This 
individual from Claremore, OK, brought it to my attention. That is the 
reason I sponsored the amendment.
  Yesterday there was an amendment proposed that had a paycheck 
protection provision, and, according to the media, it was completely 
unworkable. As Senator Kennedy pointed out, dealing with corporations 
and shareholders is not the same thing. Being a shareholder is not the 
same thing as being a wage earner having money--maybe $25 a month--
taken away from their paycheck. It is not the same thing, whether you 
buy shares of General Electric or Cisco, which may not have been a good 
idea the last few months. But, anyway, there is a difference in being a 
shareholder.
  I didn't think that amendment was workable. Regretfully, I voted 
against it. I didn't want to, but I felt compelled to because I didn't 
think it was workable.
  I am trying to look at bite-size improvements that can be made in 
this bill. I think removing this one section is an improvement in the 
bill, and I very much appreciate the cooperation of my colleagues to 
support this amendment. It is not my intention to offer any other 
paycheck-related amendments on this bill.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, my colleague, Senator Nickles, has 
proposed that we remove Section 304 from McCain-Feingold. Senator 
Nickles has further committed that this will be the last amendment he 
will offer on questions relating to union use of dues or fees for 
political purposes.
  Section 304 of McCain-Feingold, entitled ``Codification of Beck 
Decision,'' would require unions to establish procedures for workers to 
object to paying dues that would go toward political activity. Unions 
would be required to notify workers of their rights; to reduce the fees 
paid by any worker who makes an objection; and to provide an 
explanation of their calculations.
  Some of my colleagues claim that Section 304 expands upon and does 
not, in fact, codify Beck. My colleague, Senator McConnell, for 
example, asserts that McCain-Feingold goes beyond Beck by authorizing 
unions to charge objecting non-members for things that Beck clearly 
prohibited, such as community service projects, charitable donations, 
lobbying activities, and union organizing. Beck, however, did nothing 
of the sort.
  The precise holding of Beck, and I quote, is that the National Labor 
Relations Act ``authorizes the exaction of only those fees and dues 
necessary to `performing the duties of an exclusive representative of 
the employees in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues.' 
'' That is it. Consistent with standard practice under Supreme Court 
labor law holdings, Beck left development of all the details including 
which expenses are related to the ``duties of an exclusive 
representative,'' or what procedures unions must develop to the 
National Labor Relations Board and the courts. It did not hold that a 
union's charitable contributions, organizing expenses and the like are 
not related to collective bargaining. Nor did it say that lobbying 
activities could not be related to collective bargaining. In fact, in a 
case called Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, decided in 1991, the 
Supreme Court held precisely the opposite. It stated that, even under 
the strict first amendment standards that apply to Government 
employment, objectors

[[Page S2702]]

may be charged for ``lobbying activities relate[d] . . . to the 
ratification or implementation of'' a collective bargaining agreement. 
My Republican colleagues cannot codify their view of what the law 
should be by saying that Beck made it the law. That is simply not what 
Beck did.
  Some of my colleagues across the aisle also claim that there is a 
difference between the Beck holding--that unions may require only those 
dues necessary to support collective bargaining--and the McCain-
Feingold formulation--that unions may not require dues for political 
activities unrelated to collective bargaining. This is a distinction 
without a difference.

  The effects of Beck and McCain-Feingold are exactly the same. The 
NLRB and the courts will interpret the requirements of the law--and 
their results will be the same--whether Section 304 is included in the 
bill or not. Thus, the NLRB and the courts will determine whether 
payments made by a union are related to collective bargaining or not. 
If they are, all employees must pay for them. If they are not, then 
employees who object may opt out of paying for those costs. Beck sets 
this rule and McCain-Feingold codifies it.
  For these reasons, I do not believe that the Nickles amendment is 
necessary. Beck will be the law with or without Section 304 of McCain-
Feingold. And since the Beck decision, close to 13 years ago, every 
union has created a procedure to ensure that dues-paying workers can 
opt out of a union's political expenditures. These procedures 
universally involve notice to workers of the opt-out rights provided 
under Beck; establishment of a means for workers to notify the union of 
their decision to exercise these rights; an accounting by the union of 
its spending so that it can calculate the appropriate fee reduction; 
and the right of access to an impartial decisionmaker if the worker who 
opts out disagrees with the union's accounting or calculations.
  So why was Section 304 included in McCain-Feingold in the first 
place? It was included only because my Republican colleagues wanted 
additional insurance that unions would obey the law. But as the scores 
of court cases and NLRB decisions addressing Beck issues attest, there 
are ample means under existing law to ensure that unions follow the 
dictates of the Beck decision. These means will exist with or without 
McCain-Feingold. Unions will conduct themselves in precisely the same 
way whether or not Section 304 of McCain-Feingold is enacted. Whether 
we choose McCain-Feingold as written or Senator Nickles' amendment to 
McCain-Feingold is irrelevant.
  So what will happen if we remove this provision? Absolutely nothing. 
Nothing, that is, unless some of my Republican colleagues use this 
action as an excuse to introduce yet more amendments that would prevent 
unions from representing the voices of working families in the 
political process. Senator Nickles has committed that he will introduce 
no such amendments, and I thank him for that. As my friend Senator 
Feingold has stated, we have amply debated--and resoundingly rejected--
any such paycheck deception amendments, and we should not waste this 
body's time by endlessly debating, and rejecting, similar bills.
  So let me be clear. If the Senate votes for the Nickles amendment 
today, it will not in any way change the law that governs union 
collection of dues for political purposes. Paycheck deception 
supporters may claim that the Nickles amendment shows that supporters 
of McCain-Feingold have abandoned dissenting workers or shown their 
unwillingness to enforce Beck rights. This is patently false.
  If it is adopted, the Nickles amendment will show that we acknowledge 
as all in this body must that unions are already bound by the same 
rules that would govern them if Section 304 were enacted. My colleagues 
should not allow paycheck deception supporters to twist this basic 
understanding into an excuse for advancing their pro-business, anti-
worker agenda.
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I rise today in support of this amendment 
to strike Section 304 of this bill, which pretends to codify the Beck 
decision. It does not.
  This section must be stricken for the following reasons. First, it 
eliminates the ability of nonunion workers to pursue their claims in 
court. Under Section 304 of this bill, the courthouse doors will be 
closed for nonunion members seeking relief from confiscation of their 
dues for purposes unrelated to collective bargaining, contract 
negotiation, and grievance adjustment. In order to seek recourse 
through the National Labor Relations Board, nonmembers would be 
required to navigate a tedious, complex, and often hostile process that 
takes years.
  Second, it will legislatively overrule almost 40 years of decisions 
of the U.S. Supreme Court by diminishing the scope of the refund the 
Supreme Court directed for objecting nonmembers required to pay agency 
fees. Section 304 limits nonmembers to a reduction in their agency fees 
equal only to the activities that a union decides are unrelated to 
collective bargaining. In this case, a union could decide that all of 
its activities dealing with legislation at the State and Federal level, 
as well as executive and judicial appointments or State ballot 
initiatives, are related to collective bargaining. Under Section 304, 
unions could use nonmember dues for these purposes, which is forbidden 
under current law.
  Finally, Section 304 would provide nonmembers with far less 
protection and information than under procedural safeguards that unions 
have been required to adopt by the Federal courts. In this case, 
Section 304 requires unions to provide financial information about its 
expenditures only to employees who file an objection. The courts have 
held that all nonmembers, not just objectors, must be provided adequate 
disclosure of the basis for the agency fee that they are required to 
pay before they object--not after as under this bill. The courts have 
also held that adequate disclosure includes verification by an 
independent auditor, a requirement that S. 27 omits.
  This section may have been drafted with the best of intentions. 
Nevertheless, I believe it would do more harm than good. Striking it 
and keeping the status quo would be more beneficial to American workers 
than this section as written. Section 304 is not a true codification of 
the Beck decision, and this amendment should be adopted overwhelmingly.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I thank my colleague and friend from 
Oklahoma.
  As the Senator from Michigan pointed out, this may be not unlike the 
amendment yesterday where we are arriving at the same result with maybe 
a slightly different rationale for doing so but the end result produces 
the same answer, and this is probably better out of the bill than in 
the bill.
  Despite the good intentions of Senator Feingold and Senator McCain, 
in their view and in mine, there needs to be some clarification or 
codification of what the Beck decision said. But rather than debate 
that, that is what is going on at the NLRB.
  The Supreme Court decisions are not unlike where we craft legislation 
and then usually have boilerplate language that leaves to the 
respective agencies the right to make decisions pursuant to legislative 
intent. Many times they do that and we object to what they do; that it 
goes beyond what the congressional intent was. That is how Supreme 
Court decisions are written, and then it is up to the NLRB, in this 
particular case, to deal with the myriad questions that come to it as 
to whether or not something is in order under the Beck decision.
  The Beck decision says: supporting political activities unrelated to 
collective bargaining. I think that is the language of the Beck 
decision.
  All of these various requests come to them as to whether or not 
something falls within that particular sentence. There is a rich 
history since the adoption of the Beck decision made by the NLRB when 
such questions have come to them. That is where it belongs.
  I think that is what my colleague from Wisconsin is saying and my 
colleague from Oklahoma is saying--in effect, that we are not really 
the best venue for making those decisions. We best leave it to those 
who deal with these matters every day rather than trying to legislate 
it.
  I agree with the proposal of the Senator from Oklahoma to take this 
section out of the bill. But I wouldn't want to characterize this as 
being either bogus Beck or absolutely Beck. I

[[Page S2703]]

think we have all come to the conclusion those decisions are best left 
to the NLRB.
  Some might claim that McCain-Feingold is a bogus-Beck bill. It is 
not. McCain-Feingold codifies the Beck holding, which has been 
interpreted through scores of NLRB and court decisions. As Chief Judge 
Edwards of the District of Columbia Circuit has observed, this is 
appropriate, and precisely what the Beck court intended; in his words, 
``[i]t is hard to think of a task more suitable for an administrative 
agency that specializes in labor relations.'' Thomas v. NLRB, 213 F.3d 
651, 675 (D.C. Cir. 2000). NLRB decisions implementing Beck have 
generally been upheld in the courts.
  Beck held that objecting nonmembers have the right to object to the 
payment of a portion of their contractually required agency fees. 
McCain-Feingold says the same thing. Whether they implement Beck or 
McCain-Feingold, therefore, the NLRB and the courts will be free to 
reach the same results. Nothing in our vote on the Nickles amendment 
today should change their analysis.
  I wouldn't want the Record to show what I hope will be overwhelming 
support for the amendment of the Senator from Oklahoma as anything but 
that.
  Lastly, let me say to my friend from Oklahoma that I appreciate his 
statement that we have come to an end, I hope, of the so-called 
paycheck protection amendments. I think we have had good debates on 
them. The Senator from Oklahoma and I agreed yesterday--I think he was 
right--as well that we are getting much too complicated in some of 
these efforts dealing with shareholders, and we felt the same on the 
second Hatch amendment where someone owns a stock for 15 minutes, and 
all of a sudden they are going to be deluged with information about the 
campaign's activities with that particular company going beyond what we 
intend to achieve in legislation.
  With that, unless there are others who want to be heard on this 
amendment, I am prepared to yield back the couple of minutes we have. 
We said 3:30 we would start the vote. We have one other amendment we 
are going to consider this afternoon by Senator Landrieu, if that is 
appropriate with my friend from Kentucky.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, it is appropriate, as the Senator from 
Kentucky just discussed, for Senator Landrieu to come next.
  I am perfectly prepared to yield back the time on this side, and we 
will go to a vote.
  Mr. DODD. Do we want a recorded vote on this?
  Mr. NICKLES. A recorded vote.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  All time is yielded, and the question is on agreeing to the Nickles 
amendment No. 139.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant bill clerk called the roll.
  Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. 
Kennedy) is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Allen). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 99, nays 0, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 45 Leg.]

                                YEAS--99

     Akaka
     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Cantwell
     Carnahan
     Carper
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Clinton
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Corzine
     Craig
     Crapo
     Daschle
     Dayton
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Nickles
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Torricelli
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Kennedy
       
  The amendment (No. 139) was agreed to.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, may we have order in the Senate?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.
  The Senator from Kentucky is recognized.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, the next amendment will be on the 
Democratic side, offered by Senator Landrieu. We are in the process of 
looking at it now. We think it may well be accepted. Shortly, Senator 
Landrieu will send that amendment to the desk and make her statement 
about it.
  Let me say that after that, Senator Specter will be recognized to 
offer an amendment, and Senator Dodd and I are talking about the 
possibility of Senator Specter being followed by Senator Helms. I 
believe the majority leader would like for us to vote a couple more 
times tonight. Senators may expect additional votes.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, the Senator from Kentucky has described 
appropriately and properly that Senator Landrieu has an amendment. It 
might only take 10 minutes to explain the amendment. We might even hope 
for a voice vote rather than having a recorded vote on that amendment. 
I can tentatively tell my colleague from Kentucky that with respect to 
the Specter amendment, there has been some discussion about having an 
hour's worth of debate on that.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I have not yet spoken to Senator Specter about that. I 
will do that shortly.
  Mr. DODD. There is an indication and perhaps a willingness to support 
that arrangement, along with the recommendation of having Senator Helms 
propose an amendment and maybe debate it this evening and make it the 
first vote tomorrow. We are discussing it on this side. I am using the 
opportunity to let people know with what I am going to ask them to 
agree. It sounds like a good schedule to me. If Members have some 
objection, they ought to let us know. In the meantime, we can go to 
Senator Landrieu.
  Ms. LANDRIEU. Mr. President, I really appreciate the leadership the 
Senator from Connecticut has brought to this issue. I thank him for 
providing time for me to offer this amendment.


                           Amendment No. 124

  Ms. LANDRIEU. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Louisiana [Ms. Landrieu] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 124.

  The amendment reads as follows:

(Purpose: To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to provide 
    for weekly reporting by candidates and for prompt disclosure of 
 contributions, and to make software for filing reports in electronic 
                            form available)

       On page 37, between lines 14 and 15, insert the following:

     SEC. 305. ENHANCED REPORTING AND SOFTWARE FOR FILING REPORTS.

       (a) Enhanced Reporting for Candidates.--
       (1) Weekly reports.--Section 304(a)(2) of the Federal 
     Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434(a)(2)) is amended 
     to read as follows:
       ``(2) Principal campaign committees.--If the political 
     committee is the principal campaign committee of a candidate 
     for the House of Representatives or for the Senate, the 
     treasurer shall file a report for each week of the election 
     cycle that shall be filed not later than the 5th day after 
     the last day of the week and shall be complete as of the last 
     day of the week.''.
       (2) Prompt disclosure of contributions.--Section 
     304(a)(6)(A) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 
     U.S.C. 434(a)(6)(A)) is amended--
       (A) by striking ``of $1,000 or more'';
       (B) by striking ``after the 20th day, but more than 48 
     hours before any election'' and inserting ``during the 
     election cycle''; and

[[Page S2704]]

       (C) by striking ``within 48 hours'' and inserting ``within 
     24 hours''.
       (b) Software for Filing of Reports.--Section 304(a) of the 
     Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434(a)) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(12) Software for filing of reports.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Commission shall--
       ``(i) develop software for use to file a designation, 
     statement, or report in electronic form under this Act; and
       ``(ii) make a copy of the software available to each person 
     required to file a designation, statement, or report in 
     electronic form under this Act.
       ``(B) Required use.--Any person that maintains or files a 
     designation, statement, or report in electronic form under 
     paragraph (11) or subsection (d) shall use software developed 
     under subparagraph (A) for such maintenance or filing.''.
       (c) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Section 304(a)(3) of the Federal Election Campaign Act 
     of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434(a)) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(C) The reports described in this subparagraph are as 
     follows:
       ``(i) A pre-election report, which shall be filed no later 
     than the 12th day before (or posted by registered or 
     certified mail no later than the 15th day before) any 
     election in which such candidate is seeking election, or 
     nomination for election, and which shall be complete as of 
     the 20th day before such election.
       ``(ii) A post-general election report, which shall be filed 
     no later than the 30th day after any general election in 
     which such candidate has sought election, and which shall be 
     complete as of the 20th day after such general election.
       ``(iii) Additional quarterly reports, which shall be filed 
     no later than the 15th day after the last day of each 
     calendar quarter, and which shall be complete as of the last 
     day of each calendar quarter: except that the report for the 
     quarter ending December 31 shall be filed no later than 
     January 31 of the following calendar year.''.
       (2) Section 304 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
     1971 (2 U.S.C. 434(a)) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)(3)(A)--
       (i) in each of clauses (i) and (ii)--

       (I) by striking ``paragraph (2)(A)(i)'' and inserting 
     ``subparagraph (C)(i)''; and
       (II) by striking ``paragraph (2)(A)(ii)'' and inserting 
     ``subparagraph (C)(ii)''; and

       (ii) in clause (ii), by striking ``paragraph (2)(A)(iii)'' 
     and inserting ``subparagraph (C)(iii)'';
       (B) in each of paragraphs (4)(B) and (5) of subsection (a), 
     by striking ``paragraph (2)(A)(i)'' and inserting ``paragraph 
     (3)(C)(i)''; and
       (C) in subsection (a)(4)(B), by striking ``paragraph 
     (2)(A)(ii)'' and inserting ``paragraph (3)(C)(ii)'';
       (D) in subsection (a)(8), by striking ``paragraph 
     (2)(A)(iii)'' and inserting ``paragraph (3)(C)(iii)'';
       (E) in subsection (a)(9), by striking ``(2) or''; and
       (F) in subsection (c)(2), by striking ``subsection (a)(2)'' 
     and inserting ``subsection (a)(3)(C)''.
       (3) Section 309(b) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
     1971 (2 U.S.C. 437g(b)) is amended--
       (A) by striking ``304(a)(2)(A)(iii)'' and inserting 
     ``304(a)(3)(C)(iii)''; and
       (B) by striking ``304(a)(2)(A)(i)'' and inserting 
     ``304(a)(3)(C)(i)''.

  Ms. LANDRIEU. Mr. President, the Members are going to be discussing 
the details of this amendment because there seems to be some confusion 
with the text. I want to take a few minutes to explain it as staff is 
working on it, and we may need a little bit more time.
  Generally, there is broad consensus, both on the Republican side and 
the Democratic side, that one of the best things we could do to improve 
our current system is to try to provide for greater disclosure. One of 
the great tools we now have for disclosure is the electronic medium, 
the electronic opportunity, the tools the Internet and new technologies 
have provided.
  My amendment really embraces this new technology. It is quite a 
simple amendment. It requires the FEC to develop a standardized 
software package that any Federal candidate running for Federal office 
would be required to use in our reporting requirements. The report 
would basically go on line. Instead of waiting a quarter, or 6 months, 
or a year, or 48 hours, whatever the current waiting period is, a 
candidate or a political committee that is required to report would 
basically enter the data as if he were making deposits--which we all 
do--into a bank account. Those deposits would become transparent. The 
report is like a report in progress, and people would have access to 
what contributions were being made to the candidate--in this case--or 
to a committee, basically instantaneously.
  That is the essence of my amendment. There is no new reporting 
requirement. It will hopefully not be onerous on us because the FEC 
will be required to come up with this new software. We will allow them 
the time to develop it because we don't want to rush the process. We 
want them to do it correctly. They would give us the software, and we 
would download it onto our computer, and as checks came in, as expenses 
were released by the campaign, it would be available instantaneously on 
the Internet.
  That is the essence of my amendment. We are having a few problems 
with the drafting of the amendment.

  That is what I offer as an improvement to our current system. We have 
reports that we must file. They are quarterly or annually or, sometimes 
when one is close to an election, daily. This would be instantaneous 
reporting with no new work required of the candidate or the committees 
using software that will be developed.
  That is what I submit for consideration. I am hoping we can voice 
vote this amendment as soon as the technical difficulties are worked 
out.
  I yield back the remainder of my time, and I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Smith of Oregon). The clerk will call the 
roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, what is the pending business? I believe the 
pending business is the Landrieu amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is the Landrieu 
amendment.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Landrieu 
amendment be temporarily laid aside. I say to my colleagues, there are 
efforts at crafting the language in such a way as to bring bipartisan 
support to this amendment. We think it is a very good proposal, and we 
are working on some of the specifics of it.
  While we are doing that, we will go to the Specter amendment, which I 
think is the intention of the manager, the Senator from Kentucky.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request? Without 
objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, the Senator from Pennsylvania is unavoidably 
going to be absent from the floor for a few minutes, so I am going to 
suggest the absence of a quorum and we will proceed to the Specter 
amendment, I presume, in about 10 or 15 minutes. I suggest the absence 
of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 140

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Specter] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 140.

  Mr. SPECTER. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To provide findings regarding the current state of campaign 
     finance laws and to clarify the definition of electioneering 
                             communication)

       On page 7, line 24, after ``and'', insert the following: 
     ``which, when read as a whole, in the context of external 
     events, is unmistakable, unambiguous and suggestive of no 
     plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or 
     against a specific candidate.''
       On page 15, line 20, insert the following:
       ``(iv) promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or 
     attacks or opposes a candidate for that office (regardless of 
     whether the communication expressly advocates a vote for or 
     against a candidate) and which, when read as a whole, and in 
     the context of external events, is unmistakable, unambiguous 
     and suggestive of no plausible meaning other than an 
     exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate.''
       On page 2, after the matter preceding line 1, insert:

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) In the twenty-five years since the 1976 Supreme Court 
     decision in Buckley v. Valeo, the number and frequency of 
     advertisements

[[Page S2705]]

     increased dramatically which clearly advocate for or against 
     a specific candidate for Federal office without magic words 
     such as ``vote for'' or ``vote against'' as prescribed in the 
     Buckley decision.
       (2) The absence of the magic words from the Buckley 
     decision has allowed these advertisements to be viewed as 
     issue advertisements, despite their clear advocacy for or 
     against the election of a specific candidate for Federal 
     office.
       (3) By avoiding the use of such terms as ``vote for'' and 
     ``vote against,'' special interest groups promote their views 
     and issue positions in reference to particular elected 
     officials without triggering the disclosure and source 
     restrictions of the Federal Election Campaign Act.
       (4) In 1996, an estimated $135 million was spent on such 
     issue advertisements; the estimate for 1998 ranged from $275-
     $340 million; and, for the 2000 election the estimate for 
     spending on such advertisements exceeded $340 million.
       (5) If left unchecked, the explosive growth in the number 
     and frequency of advertisements that are clearly intended to 
     influence the outcome of Federal elections yet are 
     masquerading as issue advocacy has the potential to undermine 
     the integrity of the electoral process.
       (6) The Supreme Court in Buckley reviewed the legislative 
     history and purpose of the Federal Election Campaign Act and 
     found that the authorized or requested standard of the 
     Federal Election Campaign Act operated to treat all 
     expenditures placed in cooperation with or with the consent 
     of a candidate, an agent of the candidate, or an authorized 
     committee of the candidate as contributions subject to the 
     limitations set forth in the Act.
       (7) During the 1996 Presidential primary campaign the 
     Clinton Committee and the Dole Committee both spent millions 
     of dollars in excess of the overall Presidential primary 
     spending limit that applied to each of their campaigns, 
     and in doing so, used millions of dollars in soft money 
     contributions that could not legally be used directly to 
     support a Presidential campaign.
       (8) The Clinton and Dole Committees made these campaign 
     expenditures through their respective national political 
     party committees, using these party committees as conduits to 
     run multi-million dollar television ad campaigns to support 
     their candidacies.
       (9) These television ad campaigns were in each case 
     prepared, directed, and controlled by the Clinton and Dole 
     campaigns.
       (10) Former Clinton adviser Dick Morris said in his book 
     about the 1996 elections that President Clinton worked over 
     every script, watched each advertisement, and decided which 
     advertisements would run where and when.
       (11) Then-President Clinton told supporters at a Democratic 
     National Committee luncheon on December 7, 1995, that, ``We 
     realized that we could run these ads through the Democratic 
     Party, which meant that we could raise money in $20,000 and 
     $50,000 blocks. So we didn't have to do it all in $1,000 and 
     run down what I can spend, which is limited by law so that is 
     what we've done.''
       (12) Among the advertisements coordinated between the 
     Clinton campaign and the Democratic National Committee, yet 
     paid for by the DNC as an issue ad, was one which contained 
     the following:
       [Announcer] ``60,000 felons and fugitives tried to buy 
     handguns but couldn't because President Clinton passed the 
     Brady bill--five day waits, background checks. But Dole and 
     Gingrich voted no. 100,000 new police--because President 
     Clinton delivered. Dole and Gingrich? Vote no, want to repeal 
     'em. Strengthen school anti-drug programs. President Clinton 
     did it. Dole and Gingrich? No again. Their old ways don't 
     work. President Clinton's plan. The new way. Meeting our 
     challenges, protecting our values.''
       (13) Another advertisement coordinated between the Clinton 
     campaign and the DNC contained the following:
       [Announcer] ``America's values. Head start. Student loans. 
     Toxic cleanup. Extra police. Protected in the budget 
     agreement; the President stood firm. Dole, Gringrich's latest 
     plan includes tax hikes on working families. Up to 18 million 
     children face health care cuts. Medicare slashed $167 
     billion. Then Dole resigns, leaving behind gridlock he and 
     Gringrich created. The President's plan: Politics must wait. 
     Balance the budget, reform welfare, protect our values.''
       (14) Among the advertisements coordinated between the Dole 
     campaign and the Republican National Committee, yet paid for 
     by the RNC as an issue ad, was one which contained the 
     following:
       [Announcer] ``Bill Clinton, he's really something. He's now 
     trying to avoid a sexual harassment lawsuit claiming he is on 
     active military duty. Active duty? Newspapers report that Mr. 
     Clinton claims as commander-in-chief he is covered under the 
     Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act of 1940, which grants 
     automatic delays in lawsuits against military personnel until 
     their active duty is over. Active duty? Bill Clinton, he's 
     really something.''
       (15) Another advertisement coordinated between the Dole 
     campaign and the RNC contained the following:
       [Announcer] ``Three years ago, Bill Clinton gave us the 
     largest tax increase in history, including a 4 cent a gallon 
     increase on gasoline. Bill Clinton said he felt bad about 
     it.''
       [Clinton] ``People in this room still get mad at me over 
     the budget process because you think I raised your taxes too 
     much. It might surprise you to know I think I raised them too 
     much, too.''
       [Announcer] ``OK, Mr. President, we are surprised. So now, 
     surprise us again. Support Senator Dole's plan to repeal your 
     gas tax. And learn that actions do speak louder than words.''
       (16) Clinton and Dole Committee agents raised the money 
     used to pay for these so-called issue ads supporting their 
     respective candidacies.
       (17) These television advertising campaigns, run in the 
     guise of being DNC and RNC issue ad campaigns, were in fact 
     Clinton and Dole ad campaigns, and accordingly should have 
     been subject to the contribution and spending limits that 
     apply to Presidential campaigns.
       (18) After reviewing spending in the 1996 Presidential 
     election campaign, auditors for the Federal Election 
     Commission recommended that the 1996 Clinton and Dole 
     campaigns repay $7 million and $17.7 million, respectively, 
     because the national political parties had closely 
     coordinated their soft money issue ads with the respective 
     presidential candidates and accordingly, the expenditures 
     would be counted against the candidates' spending limits. The 
     repayment recommendation for the Dole campaign was 
     subsequently reduced to $6.1 million.
       (19) On December 10, 1998, in a 6-0 vote, the Federal 
     Election Commission rejected its auditors' recommendation 
     that the Clinton and Dole campaigns repay the money.
       (20) The pattern of close coordination between candidates' 
     campaign committees and national party committees continued 
     in the 2000 Presidential election .
       (21) An advertisement financed by the RNC contained the 
     following:
       [Announcer] ``Whose economic plan is best for you? Under 
     George Bush's plan, a family earning under $35,000 a year 
     pays no Federal income taxes--a 100 percent tax cut. Earn 
     $35,000 to $50,000? A 55 percent tax cut. Tax relief for 
     everyone. And Al Gore's plan: three times the new spending 
     President Clinton proposed, so much it wipes out the entire 
     surplus and creates a deficit again. Al Gore's deficit 
     spending plan threatens America's prosperity.''
       (22) Another advertisement financed by the RNC contained 
     the following:
       [Announcer] ``Under Clinton-Gore, prescription drug prices 
     have skyrocketed, and nothing's been done. George Bush has a 
     plan: add a prescription drug benefit to Medicare.''
       [George Bush] ``Every senior will have access to 
     prescription drug benefits.''
       [Announcer] ``And Al Gore? Gore opposed bipartisan reform. 
     He's pushing a big government plan that lets Washington 
     bureaucrats interfere with what your doctors prescribe. The 
     Gore prescription plan: bureaucrats decide. Bush prescription 
     plan: seniors choose.''
       (23) An advertisement paid for by the DNC contained the 
     following:
       [Announcer] ``When the national minimum wage was raised to 
     $5.15 an hour, Bush did nothing and kept the Texas minimum 
     wage at $3.35. Six times the legislature tried to raise the 
     minimum wage and Bush's inaction helped kill it. Now Bush 
     says he'd allow states to set a minimum wage lower than the 
     Federal standard. Al Gore's plan: Make sure our current 
     prosperity enriches not just a few, but all families. 
     Increase the minimum wage, invest in education, middle-class 
     tax cuts and a secure retirement.''
       (24) Another advertisement paid for by the DNC contained 
     the following:
       [Announcer] ``George W. Bush chose Dick Cheney to help lead 
     the Republican party. What does Cheney's record say about 
     their plans? Cheney was one of only eight members of Congress 
     to oppose the Clean Water Act * * * one of the few to vote 
     against Head Start.
       He even voted against the School Lunch Program * * * 
     against health insurance for people who lost their jobs. 
     Cheney, an oil company CEO, said it was good for OPEC to cut 
     production so oil and gasoline prices could rise. What are 
     their plans for working families?''
       (25) On January 21, 2000, the Supreme Court in Nixon v. 
     Shrink Missouri Government PAC noted, ``In speaking of 
     `improper influence' and `opportunities for abuse' in 
     addition to `quid pro quo arrangements,' we recognized a 
     concern to the broader threat from politicians too compliant 
     with the wishes of large contributors.''
       (26) The details of corruption and the public perception of 
     the appearance of corruption have been documented in a flood 
     of books, including:
       (A) Backroom Politics: How Your Local Politicians Work, Why 
     Your Government Doesn't, and What You Can Do About It, by 
     Bill and Nancy Boyarsky (1974);
       (B) The Pressure Boys: The Inside Story of Lobbying in 
     America, by Kenneth Crawford (1974);
       (C) The American Way of Graft: A Study of Corruption in 
     State and Local Government, How it Happens and What Can Be 
     Done About it, by George Amick (1976);
       (D) Politics and Money: The New road to Corruption, by 
     Elizabeth Drew (1983);
       (E) The Threat From Within: Unethical Politics and 
     Politicians, by Michael Kroenwetter (1986);
       (F) The Best Congress Money Can Buy, by Philip M. Stern 
     (1988);
       (G) Combating Fraud and Corruption in the Public Sector, by 
     Peter Jones (1993);
       (H) The Decline and Fall of the American Empire: 
     Corruption, Decadence, and the American Dream, by Tony Bouza 
     (1996);

[[Page S2706]]

       (I) The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity: How Corruption 
     Control Makes Government Ineffective, by Frank Anechiarico 
     and James B. Jacobs (1996);
       (J) The Political Racket: Deceit, Self-Interest, 
     and Corruption in American Politics, by Martin L. Gross 
     (1996).
       (K) Below the Beltway: Money, Power, and Sex in Bill 
     Clinton's Washington, by John L. Jackley (1996);
       (L) End Legalized Bribery: An Ex-Congressman's Proposal to 
     Clean Up Congress, by Cecil Heftel (1998);
       (M) Year of the Rat: How Bill Clinton Compromised U.S. 
     Security for Chinese Cash, by Edward Timperlake and William 
     C. Triplett, II (1998);
       (N) The Corruption of American Politics: What Went Wrong 
     and Why, by Elizabeth Drew (1999);
       (O) Corruption, Public Finances, and the Unofficial 
     Economy, by Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann, and Pablo Zoido-
     Lobatoon (1999); and
       (P) Party Finance and Political Corruption, edited by 
     Robert Williams (2000);
       (27) The Washington Post reported on September 15, 2000 
     that a group of Texas trial lawyers with whom former Vice 
     President Gore met in 1995, contributed thousands of dollars 
     to the Democrats after President Clinton vetoed legislation 
     that would have strictly limited the amount of damages juries 
     can award to plaintiffs in civil lawsuits.
       (28) According to an article in the March 26, 2001 edition 
     of U.S. News and World Report, labor-related groups--which 
     count on their Democratic allies for support on issues such 
     as the minimum wage that are important to unions--spent more 
     than $83.5 million in the 2000 elections, with 94 percent 
     going to Democrats, prompting some labor figures to brag that 
     without labor's money, the election would not have been 
     nearly as close.
       (29) A New York Times editorial from March 16, 2001, 
     observed that ``Business interests generously supported 
     Republicans in the last election and are now reaping the 
     rewards. President Bush and Republican Congressional leaders 
     have moved to rescind new Labor Department ergonomics rules 
     aimed at fostering a safer workplace, largely because 
     business considered them too costly. Congress is also 
     revising bankruptcy law in a way long sought by major 
     financial institutions that gave Republicans $26 million 
     in the last election cycle.''
       (30) A New York Times article, from March 13, 2001, noted 
     that ``A lobbying campaign led by credit card companies and 
     banks that gave millions of dollars in political donations to 
     members of Congress and contributed generously to President 
     Bush's 2000 campaign is close to its long-sought goal of 
     overhauling the nation's bankruptcy system.''
       (31) According to a Washington Post article from March 11, 
     2001, when congressional GOP leaders took control of the 
     final writing of the bankruptcy bill, they consulted closely 
     with representatives of the American Financial Services 
     Association and the Coalition for Responsible Bankruptcy, 
     which represented dozens of corporations and trade groups. 
     The 442-page bill contained hundreds of provisions written or 
     backed by lobbyists for financial industry giants.
       (32) It has become common practice to reward big campaign 
     donors with ambassadorships, with an informal policy dating 
     back to the 1960s allocating about 30 percent of the nation's 
     ambassadorships to non-career appointees. According to a 
     Knight Rider article from November 13, 1997, former President 
     Nixon once told his White House Chief of Staff that ``Anybody 
     who wants to be an ambassador must at leave give $250,000.''

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, this amendment does two things. It sets 
forth findings which I believe are indispensable in order to have 
legislation which will pass review by the Supreme Court of the United 
States. In recent years, the Supreme Court has stricken a great deal of 
congressional legislation starting with Lopez in 1995, upsetting 60 
years of solid precedents for Federal legislation under the Commerce 
Clause, and has invalidated on constitutional grounds, substantial 
legislation--the Disabilities Act, the provision of the Violence 
Against Women Act--on the basis that there is insufficient factual 
foundation. This amendment seeks to provide findings to pass 
constitutional muster. I shall deal with them in detail in this floor 
statement. Second, this amendment deals with the definition of what is 
an advocacy ad contrasted with an issue ad.
  The provision in the pending legislation, McCain-Feingold, says it is 
the purpose of this provision to try to establish a test which will 
pass constitutional muster under the decision of the Supreme Court in 
Buckley v. Valeo. It may be that this definition is sufficient to pass 
constitutional muster. It is arguable.
  It may be that this definition is not sufficient to pass 
constitutional muster. That is also arguable.
  The Supreme Court of the United States in Buckley, in 1976, said 
this:

       In order to preserve the provision against invalidation on 
     vagueness grounds, section 601(e)(1) must be construed to 
     apply only to expenditures for communications that, in 
     express terms, advocate the election or defeat of a clearly 
     identified candidate for Federal office.

  Then the Supreme Court drops a footnote which says:

       This construction would restrict the application of 
     608(e)(1) to communications containing express words of 
     advocacy of election or defeat such as ``vote for,'' 
     ``elect,'' ``support,'' ``cast your ballot for,'' ``Smith for 
     Congress,'' ``vote against,'' ``defeat,'' ``reject.''

  On its face, it seems difficult to see how the language from McCain-
Feingold, in and of itself, would satisfy the mandate articulated by 
the Supreme Court of having language such as ``vote for, elect, 
support,'' et cetera, which is straightforward and unequivocal in 
expressing a view for the election of a candidate or the defeat of a 
candidate.
  Constitutional interpretation is complicated because different 
members of the nine-person Supreme Court see the issues differently, 
and especially at different times. A great deal has happened in the 
electoral process, with hard money and soft money and so-called issue 
ads, so that it is possible that a court, looking at this language in a 
different era and in a different context, might say that it is 
constitutional.

  From my view of the Constitution, it is hard to see that that would 
happen just on the face of the language which I have read.
  There is one opinion in a court of appeals, ninth circuit. Of course, 
the courts of appeals are right under the Supreme Court. It is a case 
which has articulated a different definition. The case is the Furgatch 
case, and that case said that the ad is an advocacy ad if the ``message 
is unmistakable, unambiguous, suggestive of only one plausible 
meaning.''
  This is a very complicated field and unless you have read the cases 
and/or followed this debate very closely, it is hard to put all the 
pieces in place to understand the statutory and constitutional 
structure. But the rule has been if you have an advocacy ad, then it 
can be regulated by legislation. But if you have an issue ad, it cannot 
be regulated by legislation. Even with some advocacy ads--according to 
the Supreme Court decision in F.E.C. v Massachusetts Citizens For Life 
Committee--regulation doesn't pass constitutional muster because it is 
too much of an infringement on freedom of speech. The Court has set the 
ground rules to say that there must be corruption or the appearance of 
corruption which would warrant an infringement on first amendment 
rights of freedom of speech. And the Court has equated money with 
speech.
  To my thinking, that is a far stretch. I agree with Justice Stevens 
that the conclusion that money is speech is unreasonable because it so 
elevates money and what money can do in the electoral process.
  But, in any event, unless you have express advocacy under the Buckley 
decision, you cannot have any regulation at all.
  The amendment which I am offering today would take the Furgatch 
language and add it as an additional definition of what constitutes an 
advocacy ad. This language builds upon and does not in any way change 
the provisions of McCain-Feingold. And we do not address any other 
issue in this amendment as to who is covered or what the circumstances 
are, so that we have all the controversy about individuals, 
corporations, labor unions, or whatever--McCain-Feingold is left 
untouched. All we are doing is adding to the definition of an 
electioneering message to provide a solid basis for Supreme Court 
review to conclude that this legislation would deal with advocacy ads.
  The language in the amendment traces the language of Furgatch, and 
provides that there is an electioneering message which ``promotes or 
supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate 
for that office (regardless of whether the communication expressly 
advocates a vote for or against the candidate.)''
  The language I just read is existing in McCain-Feingold. The 
additional language is ``and which, when read as a whole, and in the 
context of external events''--that means what is happening in an 
election--``is unmistakable, unambiguous, and suggestive of no 
plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a 
specific candidate.''

[[Page S2707]]

  What does that mean in the context of what has happened in the 
Presidential elections of 1996 and the year 2000?
  In 1996, the Democratic National Committee--I am going to come to 
Republican ads because this amendment is balanced between what 
Republicans have done and what Democrats have done in a way which is 
critical on all sides.
  I start first with the President Clinton advertisements run by 
Democratic National Committee. The announcer comes on and says:
       60,000 felons and fugitives tried to buy handguns but 
     couldn't because President Clinton passed the Brady bill--
     five day waits, background checks. But Dole and Gingrich 
     voted no. 100,000 new police--because President Clinton 
     delivered. Dole and Gingrich? Vote no, want to repeal 'em. 
     Strengthen school anti-drug programs. President Clinton did 
     it. Dole and Gingrich? No again. Their old ways don't work. 
     President Clinton's plan . . .

  As that advertisement is being read, any person listening would say 
that is an ad which advocates the election of President Clinton and 
advocates the defeat of Robert Dole.
  But under the interpretations of Buckley v. Valeo, because the magic 
words ``vote for'' or ``vote against'' are not used, that is deemed to 
be an issue ad and is not subject to the limitations of the Federal 
election campaign laws.
  Then turning to one of the advertisements coordinated between Senator 
Dole and the Republican National Committee, the announcer comes on:
       ``Three years ago, Bill Clinton gave us the largest tax 
     increase in history, including a 4 cent a gallon increase on 
     gasoline. Bill Clinton said he felt bad about it.''
       [Clinton] ``People in this room still get mad at me over 
     the budget process because you think I raised your taxes too 
     much. It might surprise you to know I think I raised them too 
     much, too.''
       [Announcer] ``OK, Mr. President, we are surprised. So now, 
     surprise us again. Support Senator Dole's plan to repeal your 
     gas tax. And learn that actions do speak louder than words.''

  Obviously, anybody listening to that advertisement would say it 
advocates the election of Senator Dole and it advocates the defeat of 
President Clinton. But that is not the result.
  The result under Buckley is that it is an issue ad, even though 
coordinated between the Clinton campaign and the Democratic National 
Committee; and then the other ad coordinated between Senator Dole's 
campaign and the Republican National Committee. They are issue ads and 
not subject to Federal regulation.
  Then the same pattern emerges in the election in the year 2000. An 
advertisement paid for by the Democratic National Committee said the 
following:
       George W. Bush chose Dick Cheney to help lead the 
     Republican party. What does Cheney's record say about their 
     plans? Cheney was one of only eight members of Congress to 
     oppose the Clean Water Act . . . one of the few to vote 
     against Head Start. He even voted against the School Lunch 
     Program . . . against health insurance for people who lost 
     their jobs. Cheney, an oil company CEO, said it was good for 
     OPEC to cut production so oil and gasoline prices could rise. 
     What are their plans for working families?

  Anybody listening to that television ad would say conclusively that 
the purpose of the ad was to defeat Mr. Cheney, and to elect the Gore-
Lieberman ticket. But, under the Supreme Court decision in Buckley, 
that is considered to be an issue ad and not subject to regulation.
  How in the world can there be issue advocacy in advertisements which 
take up the Clean Water Act passed many years ago, or the Head Start 
Program, which is no longer in issue, or the school lunch program, or 
health insurance for people who lost their jobs? Those matters long 
since ceased to be issues. But, notwithstanding that, they are 
categorized as issue ads and not advocacy ads where the only purpose 
would be to advocate the defeat of Dick Cheney for Vice President and 
the defeat of the Bush-Cheney ticket.
  Under my amendment and the language of Furgatch, there would be no 
doubt that that message is ``unmistakable, unambiguous, and suggestive 
of only one plausible meaning.''
  The ads of the Republican National Committee were similarly directed 
to defeat the Gore-Lieberman ticket.
  This is an illustrative ad by the Republican National Committee.
       [Announcer] ``Under Clinton-Gore, prescription drug prices 
     have skyrocketed, and nothing's been done. George Bush has a 
     plan: add a prescription drug benefit to Medicare.''
       [George Bush] ``Every senior will have access to 
     prescription drug benefits.''
       [Announcer] ``And Al Gore? Gore opposed bipartisan reform. 
     He's pushing a big government plan that lets Washington 
     bureaucrats interfere with what your doctors prescribe. The 
     Gore prescription plan: bureaucrats decide. Bush prescription 
     plan: seniors choose.''

  Obviously, that is an ad which advocates the election of George Bush 
and advocates the defeat of Vice President Gore. But under the Buckley 
decision, that would be an issue ad and not subject to Federal 
regulation.
  The findings set forth in my amendment recite the essential facts of 
how the candidates coordinated these advertisements with their parties.
  Findings 7, 8, and 9, starting on page 2, line 29, recites:

       During the 1996 Presidential primary campaign the Clinton 
     Committee and the Dole Committee both spent millions of 
     dollars in excess of the overall Presidential primary 
     spending limit that applied to each of their campaigns, and 
     in doing so, used millions of dollars in soft money 
     contributions that could not legally be used directly to 
     support a Presidential campaign.
       The Clinton and Dole Committees made these campaign 
     expenditures through their respective national political 
     party committees, using these party committees as conduits to 
     run multi-million dollar television ad campaigns to support 
     their candidacies.
       These television ad campaigns were in each case prepared, 
     directed, and controlled by the Clinton and Dole campaigns.

  And finding 10, page 3, line 13:

       Former Clinton adviser Dick Morris said in his book about 
     the 1996 elections that President Clinton worked over every 
     script, watched each advertisement, and decided which 
     advertisements would run where and when.

  Finding 11, page 3, line 17:

       Then-President Clinton told supporters at a Democratic 
     National Committee luncheon on December 7, 1995, that, ``We 
     realized that we could run these ads through the Democratic 
     Party, which meant that we could raise money in $20,000 and 
     $50,000 blocks. So we didn't have to do it all in $1,000 and 
     run down what I can spend, which is limited by law so that is 
     what we've done.''

  There is no doubt about the fact of coordination when it comes from 
the mouth of the Presidential candidate, President Clinton, running for 
reelection and from Dick Morris, his campaign manager.
  Findings 18, 19, and 20, starting on page 5, line 9, recites:

       After reviewing spending in the 1996 Presidential election 
     campaign, auditors for the Federal Election Commission 
     recommended that the 1996 Clinton and Dole campaigns repay $7 
     million and $17.7 million, respectively, because the national 
     political parties had closely coordinated their soft money 
     issue ads with the respective presidential candidates and, 
     accordingly, the expenditures would be counted against the 
     candidates' spending limits. The repayment recommendation for 
     the Dole campaign was subsequently reduced to $6.1 million.
       On December 10, 1998, on a 6-0 vote, the Federal Election 
     Commission rejected its auditors' recommendation that the 
     Clinton and Dole campaigns repay the money.
       The pattern of close coordination between candidates' 
     campaign committees and national party committees continued 
     in the 2000 Presidential election.

  The Supreme Court of the United States, in Buckley v. Valeo, made a 
conclusive finding that such controlled or coordinated expenditures are 
treated as contributions rather than expenditures under the Act.
  But notwithstanding that clear-cut statement of law, when the Federal 
Election Commission picked up the issue and had a decision to make, the 
Federal Election Commission said that there was not a violation of the 
Federal election law.
  The findings go into some detail about the experience of the 25 years 
since the 1976 decision of Buckley v. Valeo on the number and frequency 
of advertisements which avoid being advocacy ads because they leave out 
the magic words.

  We recite the finding that in 1996 there was an estimated $135 
million spent on these so-called issue advertisements. The estimate for 
1998 ranged from $275 to $340 million. And for the 2000 election, the 
estimate for spending on such advertisements exceeded $340 million.
  In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court of the United States said that 
legislation affecting campaign contributions would be based on 
corruption or the appearance of corruption. Since the Buckley decision 
was decided, there have been many books written documenting the details 
of corruption and the public perception of the appearance of 
corruption. It is not

[[Page S2708]]

a cottage industry; it is a major national industry.
  Last year, the year 2000, a book was edited by Robert Williams 
entitled ``Party Finance and Political Corruption.''
  In 1999, a book was published ``Corruption, Public Finances, and the 
Unofficial Economy,'' by Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatoon.
  In 1999, an incisive book entitled ``The Corruption of American 
Politics: What Went Wrong and Why'' was written by Elizabeth Drew, 
tracing the Governmental Affairs hearings in 1997.
  In 1998, a book was written by Timperlake and Triplett entitled, 
``Year of the Rat: How Bill Clinton Compromised U.S. Security for 
Chinese Cash.''
  In 1998, a book was written by Cecil Heftel, entitled, ``End 
Legalized Bribery: An Ex-Congressman's Proposal to Clean Up Congress.''
  The findings recite a great many books, including Philip Stern's 1988 
book, trenchantly entitled, ``The Best Congress Money Can Buy.''
  There is an unmistakable basis for this kind of legislation and the 
tightening of legislation that reaches these issue ads.
  The reports on the appearance of corruption are as fresh as 
yesterday's newspaper. The New York Times reported on March 13--finding 
No. 30--

       A lobbying campaign led by credit card companies and banks 
     that gave millions of dollars in political donations to 
     members of Congress and contributed generously to President 
     Bush's 2000 campaign is close to its long-sought goal of 
     overhauling the nation's bankruptcy system.

  On March 16, a New York Times editorial observed:

       Business interests generously supported Republicans in the 
     last election and are now reaping the rewards.

  On a bipartisan basis--the Washington Post, on September 15, 2000, 
criticized the Democrats, noting that--finding number 27, at page 8 of 
this amendment--

       A group of Texas trial lawyers with whom former Vice 
     President Gore met in 1995, contributed thousands of dollars 
     to the Democrats after President Clinton vetoed legislation 
     that would have strictly limited the amount of damages juries 
     can award to plaintiffs in civil lawsuits.

  Finding 28, page 8, line 21:

       According to an article in the March 26, 2001 edition of 
     U.S. News and World Report, labor-related groups--which count 
     on their Democratic allies for support on issues such as the 
     minimum wage that are important to unions--spent more than 
     $83.5 million in the 2000 elections, with 94 percent going to 
     Democrats, prompting some labor figures to brag that without 
     labor's money, the election would not have been nearly as 
     close.

  Finding 32, page 9, line 19:

       It has become common practice to reward big campaign donors 
     with ambassadorships, with an informal policy dating back to 
     the 1960s allocating about 30 percent of the nation's 
     ambassadorships to non-career appointees. According to a 
     Knight Ridder article from November 13, 1997, former 
     President Nixon once told his White House Chief of Staff that 
     ``Anybody who wants to be an ambassador must at least give 
     $250,000.''
  That, in essence, sets forth findings which, in my legal opinion, 
warrant the legislation being considered today, although, candidly, it 
may be wise to add even more findings in the face of what the U.S. 
Supreme Court has done recently in invalidating congressional 
legislation on constitutional grounds, notwithstanding very strong 
findings, as I believe these findings are.
  The essence of the legislation goes to a standard which would satisfy 
the U.S. Supreme Court, although, realistically, the language of 
McCain-Feingold and even the language of Furgatch does not come 
directly in line with what the Supreme Court said in Buckley when they 
talked about a ``vote for'' or ``vote against.'' I believe that in the 
context of what has happened with money and elections, with the 
language of Furgatch supplementing the language of McCain-Feingold, 
this bill would definitely pass constitutional muster.
  I refer to an extensively quoted bit of language from the opinion of 
Justice Robert Jackson in a case captioned United States v. Five 
Gambling Devices, decided in 1953, where Justice Jackson said the 
following at page 449 of volume 346 of U.S. Reports:

       This court does and should accord a strong presumption of 
     constitutionality to Acts of Congress. This is not a mere 
     polite gesture. It is a deference due to deliberate judgment 
     by constitutional majorities of the two Houses of Congress 
     that an Act is within their delegated power or is necessary 
     and proper to execution of that power. The rational and 
     practical force of the presumption is at its maximum only 
     when it appears that the precise point in issue here has been 
     considered by Congress and has been explicitly and 
     deliberately resolved.

  What we are doing in this bill is seeking to overturn the direct 
holding in Buckley v. Valeo which has required the magic words ``vote 
for'' or ``vote against.'' But as Justice Jackson has noted and as 
constitutional doctrine has evolved, the court will give special 
consideration to what the Congress does in a specific context where it 
appears that ``the precise point in issue has been considered by 
Congress and has been explicitly and deliberately resolved.''
  I submit that if you take the underlying language of McCain-Feingold 
on the definition of an electioneering communication and add to it the 
language of Furgatch, that Congress is coming to grips explicitly and 
deliberately with what the court has done and that, building upon the 
strong presumption which Justice Jackson notes is present, the strong 
presumption of constitutionality to Acts of Congress, and then looking 
to Buckley itself, which said their concern arose that there not be 
constitutional invalidity because of vagueness, I do not believe there 
is any realistic way it can be said that there is anything vague about 
a standard which is ``unmistakable, unambiguous, and suggestive of no 
plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a 
specific candidate.''
  That certainly satisfies the court's requirement that the legislation 
not be vague. With this language, we will end the charade of having 
these extraordinary ads which, on their face and in the context of 
their substance, urge the election of a candidate and the defeat of 
another but, because of the absence of the magic Buckley words, are 
held to be issue ads and outside the purview of Federal control.
  This language will end that charade, will end the trauma caused by 
soft money in enormous sums, and put some sense back into the campaign 
finance laws.
  I inquire how much time is left of the 3 hours allocated to the 
sponsor of the amendment.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 54 minutes remaining.
  Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I find myself in the curious position 
of opposing the amendment of the Senator from Pennsylvania but 
controlling the time on this side. How much time is left?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The opponents have 90 minutes.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I commend my friend from Pennsylvania 
for his understanding of the dilemma in which we find ourselves. The 
underlying bill, in the opinion of this Senator, will dramatically 
weaken the parties' ability to get their message out. By definition, 
this will only increase the power of third party groups who already 
outspend the parties by a factor of two to one.
  I commend the Senator from Pennsylvania for his efforts to create a 
fair and balanced approach by restricting outside groups as well as 
parties. A year and a half or so ago, when this issue was last on the 
floor, the Senator from Pennsylvania cast, in my view, a very 
principled vote by joining me in opposition to cloture on McCain-
Feingold at that time because McCain-Feingold at that particular year 
was only a party soft money ban. The Senator from Pennsylvania 
expressed his concern that by not passing anything that impacted 
outside groups, we would put the parties at a particular disadvantage. 
What he is doing today is entirely consistent with the vote he cast 
back in 1999 on a party soft money ban only.
  The problem with the solution my friend from Pennsylvania proposed is 
that it can't be accomplished without violating the First Amendment. 
This is clear from case law. Senator Specter's amendment would allow 
the Government to regulate the speech of citizens groups far beyond the 
constitutionally permissible express advocacy by including speech which 
a person believes is candidate advocacy.
  In the first place, this formulation seems fine. But the problem is 
that reasonable people can, and often do,

[[Page S2709]]

disagree on a speaker's intent. When it comes to political speech--the 
core of the First Amendment--we can't tolerate such uncertainty.
  Indeed, the Supreme Court, in Buckley versus Valeo, recognized this 
fact and therefore rejected a test for speech regulation that went 
beyond express advocacy. Specifically, in Buckley, it was noted that:

       Whether words intended and designed to fall short of 
     invitation would miss that ``mark,'' [and by that ``mark'', 
     Mr. President, the court meant some form of candidate 
     advocacy] is a question of both intent and of effect. No 
     speaker, in such circumstances, safely could assume that 
     anything he might say upon the general subject would not be 
     understood by some as an invitation [to vote for or against a 
     candidate]. In short, the supposedly clear-cut distinction 
     between discussion, laudation, general advocacy, and 
     solicitation puts the speaker in these circumstances wholly 
     at the mercy of the varied understanding of his hearers and 
     consequently of whatever influence may be drawn as to his 
     intent and meaning. Such a distinction offers no security for 
     free discussion. In these conditions it blankets with 
     uncertainty whatever may be said. It compels the speaker to 
     hedge and trim.

  Mr. President, an illustration might be helpful. In 1996, the 
National Right to Life Committee ran an ad strongly criticizing 
President Clinton for vetoing Congress's ban on partial-birth abortion. 
Senator Specter might very reasonably conclude that this was a form of 
candidate opposition. Knowing the passion that Right to Life has on 
this issue, I, however, might just as reasonably conclude that these 
efforts were an ad by a citizens group to rally public and/or official 
opinion about an issue of the utmost concern to it in order to convince 
Congress to override the veto.
  The reason why this very reasonable difference of opinion between my 
friend and me on this ad is so critical is that if I am the Government 
regulator, Right to Life gets to speak. But if my friend from 
Pennsylvania is the speech regulator, Right to Life doesn't get to 
speak. And because National Right to Life or the Sierra Club, or the 
ACLU or whomever, knows that speech, like beauty, is in the eye of the 
beholder, it will be chilled from speaking. This is a result that we 
don't want in a democracy. We don't want the ``marketplace of ideas'' 
to be bereft of commodities.
  I commend my friend for his understanding of the dilemma and for his 
good intentions; but I strongly disagree with him, however, on the 
proposed solution.
  The problem with relying on Furgatch, the case to which Senator 
Specter referred, besides the fact that it is at odds with about two 
dozen other cases, is that the Ninth Circuit in Furgatch failed to cite 
the Supreme Court's decision in Federal Election Commission v. 
Massachusetts Citizens For Life, which was decided a mere 3 weeks 
before Furgatch. In Massachusetts Citizens For Life, the Supreme Court 
squarely affirmed its express advocacy test from the Buckley case. It 
seems that a law clerk in Furgatch was asleep on the job, and we should 
not ignore Supreme Court precedent simply because of that. In fact, the 
Ninth Circuit cited the First Circuit's opinion in Massachusetts 
Citizens For Life, not the Supreme Court's opinion in that case.

  Furthermore, the amendment of the Senator from Pennsylvania would 
allow the Government to regulate the speech of its citizens based on 
``external events.'' The Fourth Circuit not only ruled against the FEC 
when it tried to do this, but it actually awarded attorneys fees 
against the Federal Government for taking a legal position that was not 
``substantially justified,'' meaning that it did not have a good-faith 
basis in the law.
  If this amendment, coupled with the underlying bill, passes, the 
Secretary of the Treasury better get out his checkbook.
  I understand what the Senator from Pennsylvania is trying to do. He 
is frustrated that the parties will be reduced and influenced under the 
underlying bill and concerned that the outside groups will simply fill 
the vacuum. I understand that and share that concern. Unfortunately, 
there is simply no case law that will lead us to believe that such 
restrictions are likely to be upheld. Therefore, it is with 
considerable reluctance that I have to say I will oppose the amendment 
of the Senator from Pennsylvania.
  How much time does the Senator from Tennessee wish to have?
  Mr. THOMPSON. Ten minutes.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. THOMPSON. I thank my friend.
  I want to make a couple comments, partly in the nature of inquiring 
of my friend from Pennsylvania to make sure I understand his remarks. 
We had an opportunity to talk briefly about this. I tried to listen to 
his explanation.
  First of all, I commend him for his good lawyering in recognizing 
that findings of fact are certainly official in a situation such as 
this in helping to create a record. From my perusal, I think that is 
certainly well done. I do have a concern with regard to the other 
provision of the amendment.
  Buckley pretty clearly established that we could only regulate 
express advocacy under certain conditions or in certain ways. Buckley 
set forth the so-called magic words. In other words, if you have words 
in there saying ``vote for'' or ``vote against'' somebody, that is an 
express ad, and you can require people to have contribution limits, or 
notice, or disclosure, and whatnot, with regard to those kinds of ads.
  Clearly, time has proven that to be inadequate in many respects, and 
what Snowe-Jeffords does--and we will debate that later on--is it comes 
along and says, in addition to those magic words, we think that also, 
if within 60 days of an election --and you know an election is around 
the corner--you use the likeness of a candidate, that that also, in 
effect--and these are my words--is express advocacy. In other words, it 
applied its own bright-line test.
  The Court in Buckley was concerned that people know what the rules of 
the game were before they started speaking and that they not 
inadvertently get caught up in something not of their own making which 
would penalize them in some way. They said you will certainly know if 
the rule is words such as ``vote for'' or ``vote against.'' Anybody can 
understand that. Those are the rules. You know what you can and cannot 
do.
  I think the same thing applies to Snowe-Jeffords. You certainly know 
if you are running an ad within so many days, and if you are running 
the likeness of someone. In either of those cases, I think you have a 
bright-line test. The average person can look at those situations and 
decide whether or not to put themselves in the middle of that or not.
  My concern is the language that is used. I understand that what I 
would refer to as the unmistakable and unambiguous language of the 
current amendment would be in addition to the Snowe-Jeffords 
requirement. In other words, you would still have the likeness and 60-
day requirement and, in addition to that, under this amendment, you 
would have this:

       . . .when read as a whole, and in the context of external 
     events, is unmistakable, unambiguous and suggestive of no 
     plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or 
     against a specific candidate. . . .

  And so forth. That is my understanding. I think that is done in 
addition to tightening up Snowe-Jeffords, perhaps, in some way, to lay 
an additional requirement on Snowe-Jeffords to make it even tighter in 
some ways.
  That is a laudable goal, if it can be done. The only problem is that 
this language being used to do that in and of itself is pretty clearly 
unconstitutional, it seems to me. We have a vagueness problem because 
when you ask yourself, do you have the bright line that you had in 
Buckley, such as ``vote for'' or ``vote against,'' or do you have the 
bright line, as in Snowe-Jeffords, such as you must use the likeness 
within 60 days, the answer must be no. The line here is unambiguous and 
suggestive of no other meaning.

  I think the Senator from Pennsylvania and I could agree probably on 
just about any ad as to whether or not it fit this bill, but certainly 
it is not definite enough, it seems to me, so that there could be no 
reasonable disagreement as to whether something was really a campaign 
ad or not.
  I sympathize with the effort, and I discussed this matter with my 
friend and we jointly discussed what might and might not be done about 
it.
  As I understand the explanation, and as I look at it, it seems to me 
this misses the mark substantially in trying to apply some bright-line 
test so the Supreme Court might arguably or

[[Page S2710]]

possibly uphold this as being, in effect, express advocacy and, 
therefore, subject to regulation.
  Obviously, I am going to listen with great care to my friend from 
Pennsylvania, but those are my concerns.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sessions). The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Tennessee for 
his analysis and observations and the question he raises. I respond by 
noting that where you have the likeness issue or requirement in Snowe-
Jeffords, that does not deal with the Buckley requirement of the magic 
words ``vote for'' or ``vote against,'' and the likeness factor of 
Snowe-Jeffords is very similar to the language of McCain-Feingold which 
has ``refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office.''
  Buckley has said you have to do something more, and what you have to 
do is be more explicit on voting for or against.
  Furgatch comes to grips with that issue on the language of its 
holding by the Ninth Circuit that it meets the Buckley test, although 
it does not use the magic words because it refers to a message being 
unmistakable, unambiguous, and suggestive of no plausible meaning.
  The ads which I read saying Clinton was wonderful and Dole was 
terrible were viewed as being issue ads--you have a clearly identified 
candidate, which is McCain-Feingold, and you could have a likeness, 
which would satisfy Snowe-Jeffords, but that does not meet the Buckley 
test.
  I argue as strenuously as I can that if the standard is 
``unmistakable, unambiguous, and suggestive of no plausible meaning 
other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific 
candidate,'' that comes to grips directly--directly--with the issue of 
vagueness.
  Let's discuss it for a minute or two, I say to Senator Thompson. How 
can the Senator say there is anything vague about a standard which is 
unmistakable?
  Mr. THOMPSON. May I respond to my friend? I think the difference here 
is the difference between something being unambiguous and something 
being called unambiguous.

  In Buckley and in Snowe-Jeffords, standards are set out that one can 
look at and conclude they are ambiguous or unambiguous. I do not 
believe we can in a statute just say that it must be unambiguous. In 
the eyes of whom? In the eyes of a judge ultimately, I assume. That is 
like saying your behavior will be legal and you will be punished, in a 
criminal statute, behavior that is not legal. That begs the question. 
What behavior is allowed, and what behavior is disallowed? In this 
case, it seems to me under the Supreme Court you have to have a bright 
line in the statute itself. You have to have something that you can 
look at and conclude that it is unambiguous. You cannot just write in 
the statute that this is unambiguous or it must be unambiguous to pass 
muster in the eyes of a judge later. That is the distinction I make.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I disagree forcibly with my colleague 
from Tennessee. I do not think you have a bright line, you have a dull 
line. You have a definition which does not come to grips with what 
Buckley has said.
  When the Senator from Tennessee makes an argument that it begs the 
question to say something is legal or not, that is a fact that turns on 
a great many considerations as to whether something is legal or not. It 
involves a judgment and inferences.
  When you are talking about a factual matter, about ``no plausible 
meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific 
candidate,'' I again direct a question to the Senator from Tennessee: 
In dealing with the standard of vagueness, how can you have language 
which is more definitive on its face?
  Obviously, it is going to have to be applied. There is no question 
about that. I read at some length, if the Senator from Tennessee had an 
opportunity to listen to the Dole ads, the Clinton ads, the Bush ads, 
or the Gore ads--let me start with that question.
  Mr. THOMPSON. And a good deal of them would come under Snowe-
Jeffords, I believe, for starters.
  Mr. SPECTER. Why would they come under Snowe-Jeffords?
  Mr. THOMPSON. They mentioned the name of the candidate and came 
within 60 days of the election. Some of them can.
  Let me get back, if I may, to the original issue. My question is, 
when the statute says that the words must be unambiguous, I ask: 
Unambiguous in whose eyes? Unambiguous to whom?
  Mr. SPECTER. If I may respond, that is always going to be a matter of 
application, no matter what legal standard you have. However specific 
it is, it has to be applied.
  When you refer, if I may direct this question to the Senator from 
Tennessee, to Snowe-Jeffords covering the Dole ads, the Clinton ads, 
the Gore ads, or the Bush ads, I think Snowe-Jeffords would cover the 
clearly identified candidate within a time limit, but it would not 
satisfy Buckley. Those are viewed as issue ads. They do not satisfy 
Buckley.
  With Furgatch, you advance the definition very substantially. You 
advance the definition with as much precision as the English language 
can give you. If you want to stick in ``vote for'' or ``vote against,'' 
OK, that is the language of Buckley.
  My own legal judgment--and this is a legal issue which is susceptible 
to different interpretations; it is not like being unambiguous or 
susceptible to no other interpretation--my view is that the language of 
a specified candidate and a time limit and a likeness has not come to 
grips with the specificity that Buckley looks for. They want something 
which is not vague.
  Perhaps the challenge is to come up with language which satisfies the 
Senator from Tennessee that it is not vague. I am open to suggestions, 
but I think we are not coming to grips with that clear-cut core issue 
on avoiding vagueness with what you have absent a definition such as 
Furgatch.
  Mr. THOMPSON. If my friend would yield for a moment.
  Mr. SPECTER. I do.
  Mr. THOMPSON. I suppose my thinking is that the Snowe-Jeffords 
language is much closer to the bright line requirement than this 
language would be.
  Mr. SPECTER. May I ask my friend from Tennessee what language he 
refers to specifically?
  Mr. THOMPSON. The language requiring the likeness of candidate used 
within 60 days of an election. That is an objective standard.
  The Supreme Court in Buckley didn't say you must have an ad that is 
unambiguously a campaign ad. They said in that case, words such as 
``vote for'' or words such as ``vote against.'' Anybody can look at 
that, even the Members of this body would have to all agree whether or 
not that was in a particular ad.
  That is a bright line.
  Now Snowe-Jeffords comes along and provides its own bright line. We 
will be debating that, as to whether or not it is sufficient, whether 
or not it complies with Buckley, or whether or not the Supreme Court 
might take a look at it again and say it was unconstitutional in light 
of other circumstances.
  Again, one can objectively look at an ad and tell whether or not it 
has a likeness of a candidate. But you can't look at an ad and tell 
whether or not it is unambiguous unless you get to court.
  Mr. SPECTER. If I may direct this question to my colleague from 
Tennessee, if the Clinton ads don't have the likeness but simply talk 
about Gore, then would that satisfy the Snowe-Jeffords test?
  Mr. THOMPSON. I think it would--no, it would not. It requires the 
likeness, as I recall--or does it require both?
  It says ``refers to a clearly identified candidate.''
  The answer is yes. I was wrong.
  Mr. SPECTER. If I may reclaim the floor for the argument, if it 
refers to a clearly identified candidate, it does not advance the issue 
beyond the face of McCain-Feingold, which has ``refer to a clearly 
identified candidate for Federal office.''
  You have all of these ads which extol Clinton and defame Dole or vice 
versa, or extol Gore and defame Bush, which are held to be issue ads. 
But you have a clearly identified candidate.
  So I ask my friend, the Senator from Tennessee, how does that meet 
the Buckley test, which was not met by these horrendous ads on both 
sides which, in any event, advocated the

[[Page S2711]]

election of Clinton and the defeat of Dole? How does this language of 
Snowe-Jeffords, with a clearly identified candidate--which is the same 
as McCain-Feingold--advance to any extent the ads in the 1996 or 2000 
election which were viewed as issue ads?
  Mr. THOMPSON. If I may respond to my friend, I am not suggesting they 
advance those ads. What I am suggesting is in McCain-Feingold, in the 
Snowe-Jeffords provisions of McCain-Feingold, it requires clear 
reference to mention of a fact that would be undisputable; that is, 
whether or not a fellow's name, a person's name, is mentioned.
  I believe that is closer to the Buckley standard, which says you have 
to have something objective. That is closer to the Buckley standard 
than language which says ``in the context of external events, is 
unmistakable, unambiguous, and suggestive of no plausible meaning, 
other than an exhortation to vote.''
  Again, that begs the question. Here is something that is unambiguous. 
Here is something you call unambiguous. That is the difference to me.

  Mr. SPECTER. If I may refocus to the Senator from Tennessee: Put 
aside the language of Furgatch, assume you are right about the language 
of Furgatch--and maybe we need some other language--how does Snowe-
Jeffords or language of a clearly identified candidate for Federal 
office satisfy Buckley when the ads extolling Clinton and defaming 
Dole, where there was a clearly identified candidate and you were 
within the time-frame and they were issue ads--would Snowe-Jeffords 
cover the Clinton ads in 1996?
  Mr. THOMPSON. I see what the Senator is getting at.
  I think if this were passed and this were considered in the light of 
a similar ad, this would catch it. Yes, I do. Because they would be 
referring to a clearly identified candidate. If and when the Court 
considers the Snowe-Jeffords language, I think there is a reasonably 
good chance they will uphold it as constitutional. If that becomes the 
operative language, or some operative language, along with the language 
they had in Buckley--if all of that now is permissible and such an ad 
is run which mentions a clearly identified candidate, then it will be 
applicable at that time.
  Mr. SPECTER. If I may further pinpoint the question, does the Senator 
say if Snowe-Jeffords had been in the Act, that the advertisement 
extolling Clinton and defaming Dole would have been held an advocacy ad 
in 1996?
  Mr. THOMPSON. I think so.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, that draws the issue.
  My own view is that it is conclusive that Snowe-Jeffords would not 
satisfy Buckley, that we are looking for an avoidance of a vagueness 
standard, that simply having a clearly identified candidate for Federal 
office and a time parameter would not meet the requirement of Buckley 
which talks about ``vote for'' or ``vote against,'' that in the long 
history of many cases since 1976, over a 25-year-period, the best 
language which has come forward is the Furgatch language. I believe 
that, on its face, it passes constitutional muster.
  There are a lot of decisions by the courts throwing out legislation 
on the ground that the legislation is vague and, if legislation is 
vague, it doesn't satisfy requirements of due process of law. Many 
courts have struggled mightily for 25 years, and the only court which 
has come up with language is the Supreme Court of the United States. 
And as I say that, I know the Hornbook rule is you are supposed to not 
be able to tell anybody if the Supreme Court denies cert. But it is 
always mentioned the Supreme Court did not cert, and it is mentioned 
the Supreme Court does not cert because of the impossible inference, 
because if the Supreme Court did not like Furgatch, it would have taken 
cert.
  I know there is a contrary doctrine that says the Supreme Court is so 
busy one cannot draw an inference, but I think in a practical sense you 
can. So in 25 years of litigation and a lot of cases, the best that has 
evolved is this language which I submit to my colleagues is not vague 
when it says ``no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote 
for or against a specific candidate.'' That is not vague. But if we 
stand pat and pass this bill, there is a big risk of 
unconstitutionality. And if somebody has a way to eliminate vagueness 
more precisely, I am open.

  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I stand in support of the amendment of the 
Senator from Pennsylvania.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator from Delaware withhold? Who 
yields time to the Senator from Delaware?
  Mr. BIDEN. I am on the side of the Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. How much time would the Senator from Delaware like?
  Mr. BIDEN. How much time does the Senator have? If he only has a few 
minutes--
  Mr. DODD. How much time does my colleague need?
  Mr. BIDEN. Five minutes.
  Mr. DODD. I am happy to yield.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am a supporter of McCain-Feingold, so I 
am not inclined to be supportive of anything that is going to make the 
effort that is underway less effective in controlling these kinds of 
ads. The distinguished Senator from Wisconsin indicated to me while the 
Senator from Pennsylvania was speaking--and I apologize; I did not 
catch the intervention of the Senator from Tennessee because I was not 
on the floor, so I may be being redundant, but it was indicated to me 
that at least some who support this legislation, McCain-Feingold, fear 
that if the standard being proposed by the Senator from Pennsylvania, 
which I support, is adopted, we will have inadvertently put in a two-
test hurdle.
  I see the distinguished Senator from Maine. Maybe she can be 
helpful--that it would require, not only that you reach the Snowe-
Jeffords standard but that you then have to meet a second standard, 
thereby making it even more difficult to control the kinds of ads we 
are trying to get at here.
  I wonder if the Senator from Maine or the Senator from Wisconsin--or 
anyone--could tell me why they think the Snowe-Jeffords standard would, 
in fact, capture the kinds of ads that the Senator from Pennsylvania 
has been speaking to, which do not mention the name by name, or they 
mention by name but do not advocate whether to vote for or against that 
candidate. Why would such ads be captured by the language of the Snowe-
Jeffords amendment? Would anybody wish to respond to that for me?
  Mr. THOMPSON. If I may, while the Senator from Maine has just 
arrived, my own view is that Snowe-Jeffords captures all that it can, 
constitutionally.
  Mr. BIDEN. I ask the Senator, it would not capture an ad that said:

       This is the NRA. The distinguished Senator from Tennessee 
     wishes to take away your shotgun. We think you have a right 
     to keep your shotgun. I hope you will consider this when you 
     vote.

  It would not capture such an ad, would it?
  Mr. THOMPSON. If they make specific reference to me as a candidate, 
and I am running and they do it within 60 days of the election, Snowe-
Jeffords would capture that to the extent of requiring disclosure.
  Mr. BIDEN. Even if they do not suggest whether to vote for or against 
that Senator?
  Mr. THOMPSON. Yes. Yes.
  Mr. BIDEN. So if a name is mentioned--it is the assertion of the 
sponsors and supporters of Snowe-Jeffords that if the name is mentioned 
in an ad, 60 days before election, by an advocacy group, that that 
would be subject to regulation under this legislation?
  Mr. THOMPSON. Yes.
  Mr. BIDEN. Can my colleague explain to me why is that?
  Mr. THOMPSON. It is in the bill. It is in the statute. It reads that 
way.
  Why I think it is constitutional is that the Supreme Court for some 
time now has said you can regulate express ads, express advocacy. What 
the Court did in Buckley is define express advocacy--words such as 
``vote for, vote against.'' And it said the reason we are setting this 
out, in effect, is because you need a bright line. A person needs to be 
able to tell whether or not they are going to run afoul of the statute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 5 minutes have expired.

[[Page S2712]]


  Mr. THOMPSON. That is what you get for asking me a question.
  Mr. DODD. This is an important debate. I certainly yield 10 minutes 
or so, whatever.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. BIDEN. I will continue. Maybe the Senator moves on his time. It 
doesn't matter. Continue, if the Chair will allow it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time is under the control of the Senator 
from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. How much time does the Senator from Delaware require? 
Five minutes?
  Mr. BIDEN. I really don't know.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. And I will yield to the Senator from Tennessee to continue 
his answer.
  Let me back up. If I can say to my friend from Tennessee, the 
language in the McCain-Feingold bill on page 15 says:

       In General.--The term ``electioneering communication'' 
     means any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication 
     which--[subsection] (i) refers to a clearly identified 
     candidate for elective office[.]

  Is the interpretation of those who put that language in that it must 
mention the candidate by name?
  Mr. THOMPSON. I am going to defer to the Senator from Maine for that. 
I intruded on the time of the author of that provision enough on this. 
I will refer that question to her, if I may.
  Ms. SNOWE. Thank you. I thank the Senator from Tennessee and I will 
be glad to respond to the Senator from Delaware.
  In drafting this language, we attempted, obviously, to draw a very 
bright line, building upon the Buckley v Valeo decision back in 1976, 
that was issued by the Supreme Court.
  At that time, the Supreme Court was obviously responding to the law 
that was on the books that was passed by Congress in 1974. And it used 
as examples the words, ``vote for or against'' as ways in which to 
define express advocacy.
  Obviously that decision, nor their suggestions for examples, weren't 
limited and Congress since that time has not passed legislation with 
respect to campaign finance. So, therefore, there is nothing for the 
Supreme Court to react to.

  So we looked at the various Court decisions and decided that the way 
in which we can carefully calibrate legislation that would allow for 
disclosure and would require disclosure--and banning advertisements by 
unions and corporations within that 60-day period before a general 
election, 30-day period before the primary--would be a way of avoiding 
any constitutional questions. And that bright line is referring to a 
clearly identified candidate for Federal office, that this 
communication is done 60 days before the general, 30 days before the 
primary.
  Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield, because I don't have much time, 
I understand how it comes in. What I don't understand, on whatever time 
I have remaining, and I thank the Senator for her response--I do not 
understand why that standard, A, would require redundancy, to have two 
standards to be met--if the language was added by the Senator from 
Pennsylvania which says--which when read as a whole in the context of 
external events is ``unmistakably unambiguous and suggestive of no 
plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a 
specific candidate.''
  Granted three other circuits or four other circuits ruled differently 
than the ninth circuit, but it seems to me the most damaging decision--
the most damaging thing that has happened to the electoral process has 
been Buckley. The single most damaging thing that has occurred in our 
effort to clean up the glut of money and the hemorrhaging of influence 
in the electoral process has been the Buckley decision.
  Things were going relatively well until that decision occurred and 
then the dam broke.
  So I just want to say I think it is more appropriate to err on the 
side of being more specific and more inclusive, so that everyone 
understands that if it says ``vote against the Republican candidate'' 
but doesn't mention the Republican candidate for the Senate, that in 
fact it is covered. If it says vote against the person who said the 
following but doesn't name the person who said the following--if those 
ways are used to get around what is now the attempt of having a 
prohibition on such activity and the hemorrhaging of money, it seems to 
me that is well captured by the ninth circuit language.
  I would rather run the risk of seeing that happen because this is the 
most damaging thing I have seen happen.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I wonder if I can direct a question to 
the Senator from Wisconsin. We were discussing this issue.
  Is it the intent of this amendment to make it easier to identify an 
advocacy ad, and to see to it that what has been seen as an issue ad, 
which clearly urges the election of a candidate and the defeat of an 
opponent, is classified as an advocacy ad?
  I believe the language of Snowe-Jeffords would be consistent, and 
this language would supplement. But if there is any doubt, the thought 
occurs to me that we might turn to page 15 where we find electioneering 
communications. It is i.ii.iii put into the disjunctive ``or'', and 
pick up Furgatch, so that if you satisfy either standard you have an 
advocacy ad.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. That clearly would be a very different amendment. That 
is why I engaged in the conversation with the Senator from Delaware.
  The relative process of this amendment is we have been looking at 
this as clearly a conjunctive setup where you first have to meet the 
standards of Snowe-Jeffords, and then you would have to meet the 
standards of the Furgatch-like test.
  There would be two obstacles to get over in order to be able to catch 
one of these ads, which we like to call ``phony issue ads.''
  I would be happy to consider it. The theory will not be how we work 
if it said ``or'', but this clearly says ``and''.
  The Senator from Tennessee expressed it absolutely correctly.
  The result will be that it will actually end up perhaps inadvertently 
causing more of these phony issue ads to be unavailable for our desire 
to try to make them honest for what they are, which is electioneering 
ads.

  Mr. SPECTER. I don't know if the Senator from Tennessee made that 
point.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I think the Senator from Tennessee would agree with 
that.
  Mr. SPECTER. But in any event, Mr. President, I can modify the 
amendment--we haven't asked for the yeas and nays yet--to put in the 
``or'', the disjunctive instead of ``and'', the conjunctive so that 
there is severability. And where one is decided to be inefficient to 
satisfy the vagueness standards of Buckley, the other might be 
sufficient--picking up on what the Senator from Delaware said, having 
the safeguard.
  I am glad to yield to the Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I was wondering if we would not be 
really worse off in that situation because under the Senator's original 
amendment the language would be added to the Snowe-Jeffords language. 
So we would still have the Snowe-Jeffords clearly identified candidate 
language, which I think is going in the right direction. We would be 
adding that to that language.
  Under the Senator's latest suggestion--if it was either/or--you might 
have a situation where you would not have the Snowe-Jeffords language 
but only the new language ``unmistakable, unambiguous,'' et cetera, 
which we have been discussing.
  If I am correct this is a constitutional problem in terms of 
vagueness, then we would be less likely to have that upheld than if it 
were coupled with what I believe is constitutionally permissible 
language under Snowe-Jeffords.
  Mr. SPECTER. If I may respond, if you have an ``or'', and you have 
severability, then, if the Senator from Tennessee is correct, the 
statute would be upheld under the Snowe-Jeffords language.
  If the Senator from Pennsylvania is correct, and either is possible, 
if Snowe-Jeffords were stricken as being insufficient under a Buckley 
case, but Furgatch and ``or'' was sufficient, and they are severable, 
and one was satisfactory to pass constitutional muster, we would be 
able to have the one which survived constitutional challenge.

[[Page S2713]]


  Mr. THOMPSON. If my friend will yield for a question.
  Mr. SPECTER. I do.
  Mr. THOMPSON. Could it be severable at that level? When we are 
talking about severability, we are usually talking about provisions, or 
sections, and so forth. I don't have the answer to this. The Senator 
from Pennsylvania might have the answer to this. The answer may be yes. 
But I wonder whether or not within this very specific provision we 
could actually have a provision where that would be severed so that 
either/or language would come under the severability provision.
  Mr. SPECTER. If I may respond, I believe that is exactly what 
severability means. That is when the Congress tries to figure out what 
the Court is going to do. It is pretty hard to do. We really can't 
tell. We just had an extensive debate as to whether Snowe-Jeffords 
language is constitutional, and whether Furgatch is constitutional. If 
we put both of them in, and we make a legislative record that we are 
looking for one or the other to be satisfactory, I believe that the 
language of severability means just that.
  If you have a long statute, and the Court strikes down one part of it 
saying it is wrong, it leaves the rest of it. If the rest of it passes 
constitutional muster, then it is constitutional. The severability 
issue really turns on constitutional doctrine as to whether the 
legislation makes sense if it is severed. The Court will strike it down 
if by striking down a certain clause the rest of it doesn't carry out 
congressional intent.

  Congress tries to avoid that by the severability clause. But putting 
in a severability clause isn't an absolute guarantee that the Court 
might not say it is non-severable, notwithstanding the severability 
clause, because a part was stricken leaving the rest of it as 
unintelligible, or insufficient, or not really meaningful.
  But in this context if we say in this legislation we have Snowe-
Jeffords, or Furgatch, and if one of them measures up, then the statute 
survives.
  Mr. THOMPSON. Assuming for a moment that the Senator is correct--and 
he may be--is my colleague going in this direction?
  Knowing that we are going to have a severability vote a little bit 
later on, knowing that as of this moment we don't know how that vote is 
going to turn out, would it be wise or appropriate to put this 
amendment off until after that vote?
  Mr. SPECTER. I am willing to do that.
  Ms. SNOWE. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. SPECTER. I do.
  Ms. SNOWE. I appreciate what the Senator is trying to do with respect 
to the language. I hope we can defer in terms of the impact and what 
effect it would have on the overall language in Snowe-Jeffords. We are 
concerned about being substantially too broad and too overreaching. The 
concern that I have is it may have a chilling effect. The idea is that 
people are designing ads, and they need to know with some certainty 
without inviting the constitutional question that we have been 
discussing today as to whether or not that language would affect them 
as to whether or not they air those ads.
  That is why we became cautious and prudent in the Senate language 
that we included and did not include the Furgatch for that reason 
because it invites ambiguity and vagueness as to whether or not these 
ads ultimately would be aired or whether somebody would be willing to 
air them because they are not sure how it would be viewed in terms of 
being unmistakable and unambiguous. That is the concern that I have.
  In terms of severability, again, I would like to know whether or not, 
in the Senator's view, the Court would consider that idea of having 
layers of criteria, and if you do and say it is severable, in the 
meantime there may have been an impact or a deterrent to individuals or 
groups airing ads that are considered to be legitimate, but weren't 
certain because of the ambiguity of the language that you are seeking 
to insert in McCain-Feingold.
  Mr. SPECTER. Let me respond very briefly.
  The thrust of Buckley is to require that there be a strong statement 
for or against. You may have a sufficient standard when you have 
identified a candidate within a given period of time. Or you may not 
because that may not be sufficiently forceful to meet what Buckley is 
looking for as not being vague on ``for or against,'' for somebody or 
against somebody.

  Then you pick up an alternative standard, which Furgatch had, where 
the circuit court thought that was a sufficient statement: That you are 
for a candidate or against a candidate. Then I think you have both 
lines.
  When the Senator from Tennessee suggests deferring the vote, I am 
agreeable to that. It may lend more weight to having severability 
adopted if it has been to some specific reason in the statute.
  I yield to the Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. First of all, this has been a very valuable discussion. 
While I think initially there was some concern about the Senator's 
amendment, for the reasons articulated by the Senator from Tennessee, 
the Senator from Kentucky, the Senator from Maine, the Senator from 
Wisconsin, and others, the suggestion that the Senator from 
Pennsylvania has made is a valuable one. The debate has been valuable.
  There are some very serious issues that need to be thought through. 
The Senator from Maine has raised a very worthwhile question. I would 
strongly suggest that we lay this aside until the severability debate 
occurs. I think the Senator from Delaware agrees with that as well.
  In the meantime, we can see if we can work on some language as well. 
Some of us may have some additional suggestions with the findings of 
fact. I say to my colleague, I could talk about some of those. I 
appreciate the need for findings of fact, but there may be a way of 
doing this a little less graphically than he has in some instances. We 
can see if we can reach an agreement on this, pending the outcome of 
the severability debate. That is a very good suggestion.
  But the Senator from Pennsylvania has made a very valuable 
contribution to this debate this afternoon.
  Mr. SPECTER. I thank my friend from Connecticut.
  Mr. President, I am prepared to accede to the suggestion made by the 
Senate from Tennessee.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. DODD. The Senator from North Carolina has an amendment.
  Why don't you make that motion then, ask unanimous consent to lay it 
aside?
  Mr. SPECTER. I ask unanimous consent that this amendment be laid 
aside until the vote has occurred on the severability amendment, and 
that at that time the motion recur for debate. Should we set a time 
limit at that time?
  Mr. DODD. Why not just lay it aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Reserving the right to object, I am wondering if it 
would be more appropriate to simply withdraw the amendment and offer it 
again later.
  Mr. SPECTER. I prefer to have it set aside. It has a certain status 
value. I will not object to any request to set it aside to offer other 
amendments.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. That is satisfactory.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, this has been a very valuable debate, 
as others have suggested. It demonstrates the complexity of regulating 
issue advocacy. I thank everyone who participated in this very 
enlightening amendment.


                           Amendment No. 124

  Now, we have Senator Landrieu on the floor with an amendment that has 
been cleared on both sides. And if she will call that amendment back 
up----
  Mr. DODD. Might I inquire of my colleague, is there going to be a 
requirement for a recorded vote on this amendment?
  Ms. LANDRIEU. No. I am prepared to have a voice vote.
  Mr. DODD. We might be able to inform our colleagues----
  Mr. McCONNELL. If I may, Senator Helms is here and prepared to offer 
an amendment. We would like to lock in Senator Helms' vote. We can't 
say ``no more votes tonight'' unless we lock in Senator Helms' vote. He 
is prepared to

[[Page S2714]]

offer his amendment at the conclusion of the Landrieu amendment.
  Mr. DODD. If I might make a unanimous consent request, I ask 
unanimous consent that when the Senate convenes at 9 a.m. tomorrow, 
there be up to 15 minutes of debate on the pending Helms amendment, 
equally divided in the usual form, with a vote on or in relation to the 
amendment to occur at the use or yielding back of that time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DODD. Then we can debate that amendment tonight. I understand 
there will be no further rollcall votes tonight; is that correct?
  Ms. LANDRIEU addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana.
  Ms. LANDRIEU. Would I be in order to ask unanimous consent that for 
this amendment there be a voice vote tonight? Of course, I will abide 
by the wishes of the chairman and ranking member. I believe this 
amendment has been cleared.
  Mr. McCONNELL. My understanding is there is no requirement for a 
rollcall vote on this side. So if the Senator would call up her 
amendment, and tell us what it is, it is my understanding it will be 
cleared, and a voice vote would be appropriate.
  Ms. LANDRIEU. I am resubmitting the amendment. The staff has been 
working on it. Basically, as I described earlier, this amendment would 
not require any additional recording, no additional work on behalf of 
the candidates. It would simply direct the FEC to come up with 
standards for software so that our recording would basically be done 
electronically, totally transparent and basically almost instantaneous.
  There would be no changes of reports, no requirements for new 
reports, no requirements for new work, just basically instantaneous 
transparency.
  I think both sides have argued--and I definitely agree--that full 
disclosure is one of the things we could do to improve it. That is what 
this amendment does.
  I offer it at this time.
  Mr. DODD. Is this a modification?
  Ms. LANDRIEU. Yes.
  Mr. DODD. It is a modification?
  Ms. LANDRIEU. It is a modification of the original amendment. Senator 
McConnell had some excellent points that were incorporated. We wanted 
to leave adequate time for the FEC to develop these new rules and 
procedures. There is no deadline basically. It does not mandate the FEC 
to develop the software, but it allows them, I say to the Senator, to 
develop the standards. Industry develops the software and then makes it 
available to us.
  So for our constituents, for interested parties, and for journalists, 
our reporting will basically be as if you were accessing a Web site.
  Mr. DODD. The Senator earlier temporarily laid aside the amendment. I 
think the Senator needs to ask unanimous consent to modify her 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. DODD. And that would be the amendment under consideration.
  Ms. LANDRIEU. I thank the Senator.


                     Amendment No. 124, As Modified

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to modify my amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment is modified.
  The amendment (No. 124), as modified, is as follows:

       On page 37, between lines 14 and 15, insert the following:

     SEC. 305. SOFTWARE FOR FILING REPORTS AND PROMPT DISCLOSURE 
                   OF CONTRIBUTIONS.

       Section 304(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
     (2 U.S.C. 434(a)) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(12) Software for filing of reports.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Commission shall--
       ``(i) promulgate standards to be used by vendors to develop 
     software that--

       ``(I) permits candidates to easily record information 
     concerning receipts and disbursements required to be reported 
     under this Act at the time of the receipt or disbursement;
       ``(II) allows the information recorded under subclause (I) 
     to be transmitted immediately to the Commission; and
       ``(III) allows the Commission to post the information on 
     the Internet immediately upon receipt; and

       ``(ii) make a copy of software that meets the standards 
     promulgated under clause (i) available to each person 
     required to file a designation, statement, or report in 
     electronic form under this Act.
       ``(B) Additional information.--To the extent feasible, the 
     Commission shall require vendors to include in the software 
     developed under the standards under subparagraph (A) the 
     ability for any person to file any designation, statement, or 
     report required under this Act to be filed in electronic 
     form.
       ``(C) Required use.--Notwithstanding any provision of this 
     Act relating to times for filing reports, each candidate for 
     Federal office (or that candidate's authorized committee) 
     shall use software that meets the standards promulgated under 
     this paragraph once such software is made available to such 
     candidate.
       ``(D) Required posting.--The Commission shall, as soon as 
     practicable, post on the Internet any information received 
     under this paragraph.''.

  Mr. DODD. I commend our colleague from Louisiana. She worked very 
hard on this issue. I think it is very timely. I believe it is going to 
be of great assistance to Members as well as the expediting of the 
information that will contribute significantly to the McCain-Feingold 
bill. She has made a significant and worthwhile contribution to this 
process. I commend her for it.
  Ms. LANDRIEU. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. McCONNELL. As I indicated, we have reviewed the amendment with 
the Senator from Louisiana. It has been approved by us. There is no 
need for a rollcall vote. We would be happy to have the amendment 
adopted on a voice vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Do the Senators yield back their time?
  Ms. LANDRIEU. I yield back whatever time I have remaining.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I believe we are now ready for a vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Has all time been yielded back?
  Mr. DODD. The time is yielded back.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 
124, as modified.
  The amendment (No. 124), as modified, was agreed to.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. DODD. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, the Senator from North Carolina is 
here, and before yielding the floor so he may offer an amendment, I 
want to make a couple of observations about what he is trying to do, 
very briefly.
  With regard to union members' rights, we have had a vote on getting 
the consent of members with regard to their dues and how it may be 
spent. That has been called a poison pill. That has been voted down. We 
have had a vote on consent.
  We have had a vote on disclosure, trying to get the unions to 
disclose how they spend their money, the biggest player in American 
politics. There was an effort made on the floor of the Senate to get 
simple disclosure of how the money is spent. That was described as a 
poison pill. That went down.
  The Senator from North Carolina is now, I am told, going to offer an 
amendment regarding notification. If union members are denied the right 
to consent, they are denied the opportunity to learn from disclosure, 
now the Senator from North Carolina is going to give the Senate an 
opportunity to see whether at least they can be notified when something 
is going to happen with their money.
  Before he offers the amendment and takes the floor, I appreciate the 
good work of the Senator from North Carolina and I look forward to 
supporting his amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order 
for me to make my remarks seated at my desk
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.

[[Page S2715]]




                           Amendment No. 141

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
that it be stated.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Helms] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 141.
  Mr. HELMS. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bennett). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To require labor organizations to provide notice to members 
 concerning their rights with respect to the expenditure of funds for 
             activities unrelated to collective bargaining)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. __. DISCLOSURE OF EXPENDITURES BY LABOR ORGANIZATIONS.

       Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 
     158) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(i) Notice to Members and Employees.--A labor 
     organization shall, on an annual basis, provide (by mail) to 
     each employee who, during the year involved, pays dues, 
     initiation fees, assessments, or other payments as a 
     condition of membership in the labor organization or as a 
     condition of employment (as provided for in subsection 
     (a)(3)), a notice that includes the following statement: `You 
     have the right to withhold the portion of your dues that is 
     used for purposes unrelated to collective bargaining. The 
     United States Supreme Court has ruled that labor 
     organizations cannot force dues-paying or fees-paying non-
     members to pay for activities that are unrelated to 
     collective bargaining. You have the right to resign from the 
     labor organization and, after such resignation, to pay 
     reduced dues or fees in accordance with the decision of the 
     Supreme Court.' ''.

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I certainly thank the distinguished Senator 
from Kentucky. He is doing a masterful job under rather difficult 
circumstances. I congratulate him.
  Mr. President, a healthy and meaningful political system must rest 
upon two obvious democratic principles: (1) the political freedom 
guaranteed by the first amendment must be premised on the notion of 
voluntary participation and free association, and (2) the only 
constitutional restraint the federal government should place upon 
political discourse is full disclosure of donations to assure political 
accountability of and by candidates for contributions they receive.
  The McCain-Feingold bill before the Senate, with all due respect to 
both Senators--and I admire both of them--fails to uphold either of 
those essential ideals.
  In regards to the new restraints placed upon both candidates and 
their supporting interest groups, the able Senator from Kentucky, Mr. 
McConnell, and others are making the case that the McCain-Feingold bill 
fails to pass constitutional muster.
  I certainly agree that the limitations on free speech in the McCain-
Feingold bill are antithetical to any reasonable notion of political 
freedom, and further, they make mockery of our time-honored tradition 
of free political discourse. I add only that limitations on the 
opportunity for citizens to participate in political debates, 
especially during federal elections, serves only to enhance the power 
of the major news media, which consistently demonstrates their built-in 
bias against conservative candidates.
  However, my purpose today is to focus the Senate's attention on, 
arguably, a more pernicious violation of democratic principles 
countenanced--and, in fact, in some ways, exacerbated, by the well-
intentioned McCain-Feingold legislation before us. The problem I shall 
address is this: the unapologetic practice by labor unions in using 
dues taken from their members as a condition of employment and the use 
of those dues for political purposes without approval of those working 
people--indeed, without their knowledge.
  In the context of campaign-finance reform debate, we've heard many 
times the words of Thomas Jefferson, who declared, ``To compel a man to 
furnish contributions for the propagation of opinions which he 
disbelieves is sinful and tyrannical.'' But Mr. Jefferson's declaration 
cries out for repeated repetition, less we forget it has continued to 
happen year after year, election after election, as labor union bosses 
continue to spend the membership dues paid by union workers--spent on 
political causes bearing absolutely no relation to the collective 
bargaining process for which the union exists.
  The amendment I propose makes certain that union members have full 
access to their rights regarding political spending by union bosses. 
This amendment will end the disgraceful attempt by the union bosses to 
hide the Supreme Court-guaranteed rights of union workers, making sure 
they have clear notice of their right to object to expenditures not 
related to collective bargaining.
  The workers who are forced to pay the dues to get their jobs are 
entitled to this information, Mr. President. They are also entitled to 
know that national labor unions are pouring money into the political 
system at enormously unprecedented rates.
  In fact, the unions have extensive involvement in political affairs. 
Testifying before the Senate Rules Committee, Laurence Gold, a 
representative of the AFL-CIO said this about union activities:

       Specifically, the AFL-CIO, its 68 national and 
     international union affiliates, and their tens of thousands 
     of local union affiliates engage in substantial legislative 
     and issue advocacy at the federal, state and local levels on 
     matters of particular concern to working families, such as 
     Social Security, Medicare, education, labor standards, health 
     care, retirement plans, workplace safety and health, trade 
     immigration, the right to organize, regulation of union 
     governance and the role of unions and corporations in 
     electoral politics.

  That's a broad range of issues, Mr. President, and the union presumes 
to speak for its membership on each and every one.
  But that's just the tip of the iceberg. Labor union activity in the 
realm of politics goes far beyond the advocacy mentioned by Mr. Gold. 
According to the Americans for Tax Reform, Big Labor has mobilized for 
an array of left-wing causes, including opposition to the balanced 
budget amendment, opposition to ending racial preferences, opposition 
to tax relief, and opposition to welfare reform. In fact, Mr. 
President, the Teamsters union spent almost $200,000 lobbying for a 
ballot initiative in the State of California to legalize marijuana.
  It turned out, Mr. President, that one of the reasons that the 
Teamsters had given money in support of that particular ballot 
initiative was to further a money laundering scheme to pay for the re-
election of Teamsters President Ron Carey.
  And these examples don't begin to describe the daily activities that 
union bosses can engage in to further its political agenda. So-called 
``in-kind'' contributions, including get-out-the-vote phone banks; 
communications with union members; assignment of workers to precincts; 
distribution of literature; and other unregulated union expenditures 
make up the vast majority of union political activity.
  Small wonder, then, that many employees forced to pay union dues as a 
condition of employment are unhappy that they are forced to finance the 
political activities of the union.
  These union workers who object to the blatant use of coerced dues 
being used for political speech were finally given a ray of hope in a 
series of Supreme Court decisions that began to clarify the 
constitutional and statutory problems with such a scheme.
  The constitutional problem with using forced dues for political 
speech was addressed directly in 1977, when the Supreme Court decided 
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. The Supreme Court held in this 
case that the first amendment guaranteed an individual ``the freedom to 
associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs and ideas'' as well as a 
corresponding right ``to refrain from doing so, as he sees fit.''
  Mr. President, Abood is a landmark case debunking the notion that 
compelled political speech is consistent with constitutional rights. 
The Court had developed the right of freedom from coerced speech in a 
number of cases, the most prominent of which is Communications Workers 
of America v. Beck. In that case, a group of telephone workers 
petitioned to withhold the amount of their union dues that supported 
activities outside the collective bargaining context.
  The Supreme Court decided in favor of the workers, holding that an 
employee who is compelled to join a union in order to get a job, under 
a union security clause, could lawfully withhold

[[Page S2716]]

the portion of his or her dues supporting activities not germane to 
collective bargaining, contract administration or grievance adjustment. 
The Court also held that if unions ignored an employee's objection to 
the use of agency fees for such purposes, the union was in violation of 
its duty of fair representation.

  Unfortunately, the Beck case applies only to employees who pay so-
called ``agency fees,'' and a worker hoping to exercise his 
constitutional right to free speech must first resign from a union to 
petition for the return of dues used for union activities unrelated to 
collective bargaining.
  This places the worker in the unenviable position of having to decide 
whether retaining his political integrity is worth giving up any voice 
in the union decision-making process.
  I deeply admire the courage of employees who seek to exercise their 
political freedom in the face of union hostility, and I believe they 
deserve honest, timely information about the rights guaranteed to them 
by the Supreme Court. But all too often, workers may be unaware that 
they even have such rights. Because, Mr. President, unions continue to 
hide the rights guaranteed by Beck despite clear direction from the 
NLRB that both agency-fee paying nonmembers and union members alike 
were entitled to notification.
  What's worse, the NLRB often acts as a collaborator with union 
bosses, issuing a line of decisions making it easier for unions to hide 
Beck rights. In California Saw and Knife Works--the main administrative 
decision implementing the Beck case--the Board gave unions broad leeway 
to (1) bury notification of Beck rights in the back pages of monthly 
newsletters; (2) pool its expenses in such a way as to hide costs to 
local bargaining units; and (3) rely on internal auditors instead of 
independent examiners.
  To understand how far the union is willing to go in order to hide 
union worker rights from its members, one has to look no farther than 
the case of Keith Thomas. v. Grand Lodge of International Association 
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers. Here's what happened in that case: 
In 1959, Congress passed the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure 
Act of 1959 LMRDA. At that time, the IAM notified its members of their 
rights under the new law.
  And that's it. During the next forty years, the union bosses at the 
IAM never lifted another finger to provide notice of rights guaranteed 
by Congress under LMRDA. As the Court put it, ``The union argues that 
Congress was only interested in informing 1959 union members of their 
LMRDA rights, but was perfectly willing to let ignorance reign for the 
next forty years.'' The Court rightly noted that such a proposition was 
absurd and went on to hold that this one-time notice was insufficient 
to guarantee worker rights.
  So my amendment, Mr. President, proposes that what happened to Keith 
Thomas and his fellow union workers not be allowed to happen to any 
union member in regards to their rights under the Beck case. It simply 
provides that unions be required to provide annual notice, by mail, of 
the rights guaranteed to them by the Supreme Court.
  Specifically, the notice states the following:

       You have the right to withhold the portion of your dues 
     that is used for purposes unrelated to collective bargaining. 
     The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that labor organizations 
     cannot force dues-paying or fees-paying non-members to pay 
     for activities that are unrelated to collective bargaining. 
     You have the right to resign from the labor organization and, 
     after such resignation, to pay reduced dues or fees in 
     accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court.

  The Senate has already voted to deny workers financial information 
about the activities of the union. But even if the Senate is unwilling 
to provide reasonable disclosure of union expenditures, it can at least 
allow workers to know the rights guaranteed them by the Supreme Court.
  Mr. President, I am absolutely convinced that adoption of this 
amendment is the only way to make sure that union members know the 
rights guaranteed by the Supreme Court. I hope the Senate will go on 
record as supporting full and fair access to information for American 
workers.
  Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  At the moment, there is not a sufficient second.
  Mr. HELMS. I understand. I will try again later.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator from New Mexico.
  (The remarks of Mr. Domenici are located in today's Record under 
``Morning Business.'')
  (The remarks of Mr. Domenici pertaining to the introduction of S. 602 
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills 
and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, many of us have advanced or supported 
campaign finance reform legislation for many years, but without having 
the votes to prevail or even to obtain a full debate. Successful 
legislation to reform campaign finance laws usually has had to follow 
on the heels of particular campaign finance scandals, such as the 
Watergate affair.
  It is different this time. The reason that campaign finance reform 
has been given a prominent and early place on the Senate's calendar is 
that sufficient support has risen up from the grassroots to ensure that 
this debate takes place. Hundreds of thousands of Americans have signed 
petitions or called their representatives in Congress. Rallies have 
been mounted in cities and towns from coast to coast. And Senators 
McCain and Feingold have built enough political capital for this bill 
that, in a very real sense, on this issue they have become the public's 
messengers to the Congress.
  I commend our Senate leaders, as well as Senators McCain and 
Feingold, for creating a framework for this debate that has contributed 
to its constructiveness. This is the kind of open debate that was usual 
when I joined the Senate 26 years ago but that has become rarer in 
recent years. The Senate tends to be at its best in open debate like 
this.
  Washington has spent much of the first 3 months of this year 
fulfilling President Bush's perceived mandate to make the Nation safer 
for huge corporations. Let us count some of the ways. First, Congress 
rushed to make its first order of business the repeal of the Department 
of Labor's 10-year quest to refine and implement ergonomics regulations 
to make workplaces safer for the American people. Next Congress spent 
weeks on a bankruptcy bill that lobbyists had convinced us to skew so 
that it would further increase the record profits of credit card 
companies. And now, in rapid-fire succession, the White House is 
rolling back one environmental protection after another, affecting the 
very air we breathe and the water we drink.
  At last, with this debate, we are finally tackling one of the true 
priorities of the American people: the mandate that Senator McCain 
earned with his extraordinary grassroots campaign to reform the way we 
finance our elections. We all owe Senators McCain and Feingold a debt 
for their dedicated and persistent support of such an important and 
necessary improvement to our election process, and I am proud to be a 
cosponsor of their bill.
  The main component of the McCain-Feingold bill is a giant step toward 
eliminating soft money from the electoral process. The raising and 
spending of soft money proliferated tremendously since we last amended 
the Federal Election Campaign Act in 1979. In 1984, both political 
parties raised $22 million in soft money. In the 2000 election cycle, 
they raised $463 million in soft money alone. The political parties 
raised more than 20 times as much in soft money last year than they did 
in 1984. The hundreds of millions of dollars that flow into campaigns 
without any accountability increase the likelihood that money will have 
a corrupting influence on our electoral system.
  The American people are being bombarded with television 
advertisements, mailings and newspaper ads funded by soft money. Often, 
the

[[Page S2717]]

amount of money being spent by candidates themselves is dwarfed by the 
amount of soft money spent by others in their own races.
  The ban on soft money that the McCain-Feingold bill demands is an 
essential step to diminish the tremendous amount of money pouring into 
campaigns. Some opponents of the bill claim that banning soft money is 
unconstitutional. Senators McCain and Feingold have taken extra 
measures to ensure that the provisions in this bill comply with the 
Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo. The court ruled that 
the Constitution permits the Government to regulate the flow of money 
in politics to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption.
  Political service remains a worthy calling, but anyone who enters it 
these days encounters a campaign fundraising system that is 
debilitating and demeaning and distasteful. The fact that we so clearly 
have ineffective checks on the spiraling cost of campaigns and on the 
way campaigns are financed has tarnished our institutions of Government 
as well as the people we elect to those institutions.
  It is important to bring our election process and Government back to 
the time when elected officials felt accountable to all of the people 
they represent, not disproportionately to the wealthy few. Our present 
system gives the wealthy a huge megaphone for expressing their views, 
while other Americans--the ``financially inarticulate''--are left 
without an effective voice. That is why I have felt it important to 
take steps on my own to increase Vermonters trust in how I conduct my 
campaigns. Though not required by law I have disclosed every nickel in 
contributions I have ever received since I first ran for the Senate in 
1974, and I used no political action committee money in my last two 
election campaigns. Passing the McCain-Feingold bill--without any 
amendments designed to weaken it or destroy it--is a fundamental step 
all of us can take to fix a system that is in dire need of repair. 
Vermonters and all Americans want to have faith in the campaign and 
election process. They want to believe that their Government is working 
in the public's interest, not on behalf of the special interests. 
Eliminating unregulated soft money will help to give elections and the 
Government back to the people.
  I hope the Senate will not let this opportunity for reform slip away. 
I hope the Senate will approve this important and long-awaited bill and 
will refrain from adding any amendments that would jeopardize or kill 
this important effort.

                          ____________________