[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 35 (Thursday, March 15, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2419-S2420]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[[Page S2419]]
                 YUGOSLAV FORCES ENTER THE BUFFER ZONE

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the agreement 
concluded this week under which NATO is allowing limited, selected 
units of the armed forces of Yugoslavia to reenter a part of the so-
called Ground Safety Zone in extreme southern Serbia, opposite the 
southeastern tip of Kosovo.
  This decision, which I consider to be a wise one, was prompted by the 
escalating violence of three loosely organized ethnic Albanian guerilla 
groups, which collectively call themselves the ``Liberation Army of 
Presevo, Medvedja, and Bujanovac'', or UCPMB.
  These insurgents have taken advantage of the unintended military 
vacuum in the GSZ to operate with virtual impunity and take control of 
much of the small border area.
  In this context, it is important to note that NATO's decision was 
quickly followed by a one-week cease-fire agreement between the rebels 
and the Yugoslav Government.
  The Ground Safety Zone was created in the Presevo Valley as part of 
the Military-Technical Agreement concluded in June 1999 at the end of 
Operation Allied Force, the Kosovo Air War. It is a five-kilometer-wide 
strip, which was intended to separate the NATO-led troops occupying 
Kosovo from the Yugoslav Army and Serbian police in Serbia proper.
  In the last half-year the situation has changed fundamentally. 
Slobodan Milosevic, the authoritarian war-criminal who was responsible 
for starting four bloody wars in eight years, was deposed last October 
after he tried to thwart the will of the Yugoslav electorate.
  Although some of his successors have extreme nationalist backgrounds 
of their own and, in the case of Yugoslav President Kostunica, often 
voice rather other-worldly anti-American pronouncements, they are 
democrats and represent a significant break with Milosevic.
  Therefore, NATO believes that the troops under its command in Kosovo 
no longer must fear attacks from Yugoslav units across the border in 
Serbia proper. In short, NATO, through this week's agreement, has given 
an important, if limited, vote of confidence in the new administration 
in Belgrade.
  Again, this ground security zone, which coincidentally, as I know the 
Presiding Officer knows, is an area of southern Serbia bordering Kosovo 
which is predominantly Albanian. We did not put that ground security 
zone there because we were worried about the Albanian extremists, 
although we worry about them. We put it there so you wouldn't have the 
Serbian Army under Milosevic's command facing off border to border with 
NATO forces. That is why it was put there.
  In the meantime, there is no evidence that the KLA, the Kosovo 
Liberation Army, and its former leaders, Mr. Hashim Thaci and Mr. 
Ramush Haradinaj, are involved in these raids going on in that area of 
the Presevo Valley.
  In light of that, when I spoke to Major General George W. Casey, who 
is in charge of Camp Bondsteel and the KFOR forces in that sector, 
about a month ago, he proposed two things: One, that the Serbs have to 
come up with a political solution to deal with the plight of the 
Albanians living in Serbia who are denied political representation. In 
the meantime, we had to think about working out an agreement whereby in 
at least part of the Ground Safety Zone, we would allow patrols by the 
Serbian military to stop the infiltration of these renegade Albanian 
guerrilla forces who are seemingly not united, but who could cause the 
spark for a new war in the region.
  Meanwhile, the UCPMB attacks have grown bolder, and small groups of 
ethnic Albanian gunmen have begun attacks in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, just across from southern Kosovo.
  This latter outbreak of violence stems from local conditions, not the 
least of which is common criminality. Although the two insurgencies are 
fundamentally different--the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia have full 
rights and are represented in the highest levels of the national 
government--there has been a steady stream of smuggling of arms between 
the two areas. Moreover, this smuggling route goes directly through the 
sector of the GSZ that is to be re-occupied. NATO obviously hopes that 
one beneficial aspect of this week's agreement will be the interdiction 
of this smuggling route.
  Incidentally, I believe that the Bush Administration made a mistake 
by refusing to go along with the proposal by our British allies for 
entry of KFOR troops into the Groud Safety Zone to help pacify the 
area.
  Here I must underscore that the overall plan for the Presevo Valley 
is not a purely military one. It has an important civilian component, 
worked out by Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Covic. I will return to 
that aspect in a few minutes.
  Several articles in today's press have given sketchy outlines of what 
has been agreed upon. I believe, however, that since American troops 
are directly involved in this new situation, it would be wise to go 
into greater detail for the benefit of the Members of this chamber and 
for American citizens.
  First of all, the GSZ, Ground Safety Zone, has not been narrowed or 
otherwise reduced. The Commander of KFOR intends to permit certain 
forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, popularly known as the 
FRY, to enter the small Sector C, East, of the GSZ on specified dates 
and times.
  The presence of FRY forces is subject to the authorization of the 
KFOR Commander, who retains the right to revoke his authorization in 
the event of a violation of the specified terms and conditions. Now to 
the most important specific military conditions in the agreement.
  First, no FRY forces or authorities will be permitted to enter 
Kosovo. The agreement applies only to the GSZ in Serbia proper.
  Second, no FRY or Serbian irregular or paramilitary forces are to 
enter the GSZ. Only regular forces are involved.
  I will not take the time, but there is a gigantic difference between 
the regular FRY forces and the paramilitary forces that were 
responsible for the horrible damage and the horrible atrocities in 
Kosovo and other places.
  Third, several categories of equipment and weapons systems are 
prohibited from the sector to be re-occupied by FRY units, and are not 
to be used to fire into Kosovo.
  They include: tanks, helicopters, towed and self-propelled artillery, 
multiple launch rocket systems, mortars greater than eighty-two 
millimeters, anti-tank guns and guided missiles, and cannon greater 
than thirty millimeter caliber, anti-aircraft and air defense weapons 
systems, and mines and booby-traps of all types.
  I am sorry to go into such detail, but it is important that this be 
in the Record.
  Fourth and finally, FRY forces and authorities will at all times 
respect and ensure fundamental human rights and will abide by the 
provisions of all international humanitarian law conventions and 
covenants and the Geneva Convention. Monitoring of FRY forces will be 
conducted by the European Union.
  NATO has insisted that the commanding officers of the FRY forces 
going back into the GSZ must not have been involved in any of the 
atrocities committed in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999.
  Nonetheless, today's New York Times reported that the returning 
forces included General Pavkovic, the Chief of the General Staff of the 
Yugoslav Army, and General Lazarevic, the head of the national 
paramilitary police, both of whom compiled a record of brutality in 
Kosovo two years ago.
  Upon hearing this, my staff contacted U.S. Ambassador William 
Montgomery, who was on the scene in the Presevo Valley, to ascertain 
what had happened.
  His report illustrates both the progress in democratization that 
Serbia and Yugoslavia have made, and also how much more there is to do 
in that regard.
  Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Covic--as I said, who I met with for 
hours and is a democrat and a decent man--had been given authority to 
set up a special military unit to conduct the reentry of Yugoslav 
forces into the small southernmost area of the Ground Safety Zone.
  He placed in charge a general, with loyal subordinates, all of whom 
were not associated with the brutality in Kosovo 2 years ago.
  And, in fact, as of this morning there has not been any real 
violations of the cease-fire by either side.

[[Page S2420]]

  Now comes the intrigue that illustrates the split in the Belgrade 
Government. Without informing anyone in advance, General Pavkovic went 
down to the Presevo Valley and went into the Ground Safety Zone in a 
white jeep--in a white jeep, like some tinhorn dictator--stayed about 
an hour to assert his authority as Chief of the General Staff of the 
Army, and then left.
  Deputy Prime Minister Covic, a decent man about whom I will shortly 
speak, was apparently livid. In a press interview he snapped: ``The 
dogs of war must go, no matter how important the positions they 
occupy''--obviously referring to the Chief of the General Staff of the 
Army who rode around in his white jeep like some tinhorn dictator.
  We should not kid ourselves. Milosevic is gone from power, but many 
of his most important henchmen in the military and the police are 
trying to hang on to their posts.
  I hope, and expect, that President Kostunica--who personally 
emphasized his commitment to constitutional government to me 2 months 
ago in Belgrade--will shortly dismiss General Pavkovic, and General 
Lazarevic, and other military leaders who have Kosovar blood on their 
hands. President Kostunica must realize that this is a litmus test for 
Yugoslav democracy.
  Mr. President, earlier I mentioned the so-called Covic Plan, drawn up 
by the Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia.
  In January, I had a lengthy meeting with Mr. Covic and his senior 
advisors. I judge him to be a genuine democrat who can be trusted.
  In fact, he already has won the grudging confidence of most ethnic 
Albanians in the Presevo Valley with whom he has been in negotiations.
  The Covic Plan has six fundamental elements, which are intended to 
create long-term stability, but keep the Presevo Valley as part of 
Serbia.
  First, Serbia and the FRY commit to solving the crisis by political 
and diplomatic means.
  Second, there will be no special status or border changes for 
Presevo, Medvedja, and Bujanovac. I am getting good at these names, but 
not good enough, Mr. President.
  Third, there will be no constitutional changes. Ethnic Albanians in 
the area will be integrated into the existing system.
  Fourth, representatives of human rights organizations and the media 
will have free access to the area.
  Fifth, both the Serbian and ethnic Albanian sides in the area will 
demilitarize.
  And sixth, and most important, the ethnic Albanians will be 
integrated into the political, economic, and social systems of the 
Presevo Valley--in other words, the new government in Belgrade pledges 
to reverse the shameful discrimination and persecution of ethnic 
Albanians in the area carried out by Milosevic and his thugs.
  Mr. President, NATO's move this week was calculated, and it was a 
two-part gamble. First, we are betting that the new government in 
Belgrade has made a clean break with the ruthless, racist, and 
exploitative policies of Milosevic.
  Second--and this is probably more of a stretch--we are hoping that 
the majority of ethnic Albanian guerillas will permanently lay down 
their weapons if they see that Covic and his plan are being implemented 
in good faith and is producing tangible results.
  I should add that if the Serbian and Yugoslav authorities meet their 
part of the bargain, we should be ready to provide economic and 
humanitarian assistance to the Presevo Valley.
  Mr. President, one, or even both of these gambles may not pan out. If 
that happens, we, in concert with our allies, will have to recalibrate 
our policies.
  But in the highly complex and emotionally charged current situation, 
this agreement is, I believe, a risk necessary to take.
  As I have said innumerable times on this floor and elsewhere, the 
stakes for the United States in creating stability in the Balkans are 
too high for us to walk away from this problem.
  Either we remain intimately engaged politically, militarily, and 
economically or, I am firmly convinced, at some future date we will 
have to go back into a newly devastated Balkan area with a much higher 
cost.
  I thank the Chair, and I thank the pages. I thank the staff. I thank 
everybody for indulging me until 7:20 at night. But, Mr. President, I 
think it is vitally important that we all know what we are undertaking 
in the Presevo Valley and what we are undertaking in Kosovo. I am 
convinced we have no choice but to proceed as we have.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. I thank the Senator from Delaware.

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