[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 34 (Wednesday, March 14, 2001)]
[House]
[Pages H893-H898]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
MULTIDISTRICT, MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM TRIAL JURISDICTION ACT OF 2001
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass
the bill (H.R. 860) to amend title 28, United States Code, to allow a
judge to whom a case is transferred to retain jurisdiction over certain
multidistrict litigation cases for trial, and to provide for Federal
jurisdiction of certain multiparty, multiforum civil actions, as
amended.
The Clerk read as follows:
H.R. 860
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Multidistrict, Multiparty,
Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2001''.
SEC. 2. MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION.
Section 1407 of title 28, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in the third sentence of subsection (a), by inserting
``or ordered transferred to the transferee or other district
under subsection (i)'' after ``terminated''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(i)(1) Subject to paragraph (2) and except as provided in
subsection (j), any action transferred under this section by
the panel may be transferred for trial purposes, by the judge
or judges of the transferee district to whom the action was
assigned, to the transferee or other district in the interest
of justice and for the convenience of the parties and
witnesses.
``(2) Any action transferred for trial purposes under
paragraph (1) shall be remanded by the panel for the
determination of compensatory damages to the district court
from which it was transferred, unless the court to which the
action has been transferred for trial purposes also finds,
for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the
interests of justice, that the action should be retained for
the determination of compensatory damages.''.
SEC. 3. MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT
COURTS.
(a) Basis of Jurisdiction.--
(1) In general.--Chapter 85 of title 28, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``Sec. 1369. Multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction
``(a) In General.--The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action involving minimal diversity
between adverse parties that arises from a single accident,
where at least 25 natural persons have either died or
incurred injury in the accident at a discrete location and,
in the case of injury, the injury has resulted in damages
which exceed $150,000 per person, exclusive of interest and
costs, if--
``(1) a defendant resides in a State and a substantial part
of the accident took place in another State or other
location, regardless of whether that defendant is also a
resident of the State where a substantial part of the
accident took place;
``(2) any two defendants reside in different States,
regardless of whether such defendants are also residents of
the same State or States; or
``(3) substantial parts of the accident took place in
different States.
``(b) Limitation of Jurisdiction of District Courts.--The
district court shall abstain from hearing any civil action
described in subsection (a) in which--
``(1) the substantial majority of all plaintiffs are
citizens of a single State of which the primary defendants
are also citizens; and
``(2) the claims asserted will be governed primarily by the
laws of that State.
``(c) Special Rules and Definitions.--For purposes of this
section--
``(1) minimal diversity exists between adverse parties if
any party is a citizen of a State and any adverse party is a
citizen of another State, a citizen or subject of a foreign
state, or a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of
this title;
``(2) a corporation is deemed to be a citizen of any State,
and a citizen or subject of any foreign state, in which it is
incorporated or has its principal place of business, and is
deemed to be a resident of any State in which it is
incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business;
``(3) the term `injury' means--
``(A) physical harm to a natural person; and
``(B) physical damage to or destruction of tangible
property, but only if physical harm described in subparagraph
(A) exists;
``(4) the term `accident' means a sudden accident, or a
natural event culminating in an accident, that results in
death or injury incurred at a discrete location by at least
25 natural persons; and
``(5) the term `State' includes the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or
possession of the United States.
``(d) Intervening Parties.--In any action in a district
court which is or could have been brought, in whole or in
part, under this section, any person with a claim arising
from the accident described in subsection (a) shall be
permitted to intervene as a party plaintiff in the
action, even if that person could not have brought an
action in a district court as an original matter.
``(e) Notification of Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation.--A district court in which an action under this
section is pending shall promptly notify the judicial panel
on multidistrict litigation of the pendency of the action.''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of chapter 85 of title 28, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end the following new item:
``1369. Multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction.''.
(b) Venue.--Section 1391 of title 28, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(g) A civil action in which jurisdiction of the district
court is based upon section 1369 of this title may be brought
in any district in which any defendant resides or in which a
substantial part of the accident giving rise to the action
took place.''.
(c) Multidistrict Litigation.--Section 1407 of title 28,
United States Code, as amended by section 2 of this Act, is
further amended by adding at the end the following:
``(j)(1) In actions transferred under this section when
jurisdiction is or could have been based, in whole or in
part, on section 1369 of this title, the transferee district
court may, notwithstanding any other provision of this
section, retain actions so transferred for the determination
of liability and punitive damages. An action retained for the
determination of liability shall be remanded to the district
court from which the action was transferred, or to the State
court from which the action was removed, for the
determination of damages, other than punitive damages, unless
the court finds, for the convenience of parties and witnesses
and in the interest of justice, that the action should be
retained for the determination of damages.
``(2) Any remand under paragraph (1) shall not be effective
until 60 days after the transferee court has issued an order
determining liability and has certified its intention to
remand some or all of the transferred actions for the
determination of damages. An appeal with respect to the
liability determination of the transferee court may be taken
during that 60-day period to the court of appeals with
appellate jurisdiction over the transferee court. In the
event a party files such an appeal, the remand shall not be
effective until the appeal has been finally disposed of. Once
the remand has become effective, the liability determination
shall not be subject to further review by appeal or
otherwise.
``(3) An appeal with respect to determination of punitive
damages by the transferee court may be taken, during the 60-
day period beginning on the date the order making the
determination is issued, to the court of appeals with
jurisdiction over the transferee court.
``(4) Any decision under this subsection concerning remand
for the determination of damages shall not be reviewable by
appeal or otherwise.
``(5) Nothing in this subsection shall restrict the
authority of the transferee court to transfer or dismiss an
action on the ground of inconvenient forum.''.
(d) Removal of Actions.--Section 1441 of title 28, United
States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (e) by striking ``(e) The court to which
such civil action is removed'' and inserting ``(f) The court
to which a civil action is removed under this section''; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new
subsection:
``(e)(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b)
of this section, a defendant in a civil action in a State
court may remove the action to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the
place where the action is pending if--
``(A) the action could have been brought in a United States
district court under section 1369 of this title; or
``(B) the defendant is a party to an action which is or
could have been brought, in whole or in part, under section
1369 in a United States district court and arises from the
same accident as the action in State court, even if the
action to be removed could not have been brought in a
district court as an original matter.
The removal of an action under this subsection shall be made
in accordance with section 1446 of this title, except that a
notice of removal may also be filed before trial of the
action in State court within 30 days after the date on which
the defendant first becomes a party to an action under
section 1369 in a United States district court that arises
from the same accident as the action in State court, or at a
later time with leave of the district court.
[[Page H894]]
``(2) Whenever an action is removed under this subsection
and the district court to which it is removed or transferred
under section 1407(j) has made a liability determination
requiring further proceedings as to damages, the district
court shall remand the action to the State court from which
it had been removed for the determination of damages, unless
the court finds that, for the convenience of parties and
witnesses and in the interest of justice, the action should
be retained for the determination of damages.
``(3) Any remand under paragraph (2) shall not be effective
until 60 days after the district court has issued an order
determining liability and has certified its intention to
remand the removed action for the determination of damages.
An appeal with respect to the liability determination of the
district court may be taken during that 60-day period to the
court of appeals with appellate jurisdiction over the
district court. In the event a party files such an appeal,
the remand shall not be effective until the appeal has been
finally disposed of. Once the remand has become effective,
the liability determination shall not be subject to further
review by appeal or otherwise.
``(4) Any decision under this subsection concerning remand
for the determination of damages shall not be reviewable by
appeal or otherwise.
``(5) An action removed under this subsection shall be
deemed to be an action under section 1369 and an action in
which jurisdiction is based on section 1369 of this title for
purposes of this section and sections 1407, 1697, and 1785 of
this title.
``(6) Nothing in this subsection shall restrict the
authority of the district court to transfer or dismiss an
action on the ground of inconvenient forum.''.
(e) Service of Process.--
(1) Other than subpoenas.--(A) Chapter 113 of title 28,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``Sec. 1697. Service in multiparty, multiforum actions
``When the jurisdiction of the district court is based in
whole or in part upon section 1369 of this title, process,
other than subpoenas, may be served at any place within the
United States, or anywhere outside the United States if
otherwise permitted by law.''.
(B) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 113
of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the
end the following new item:
``1697. Service in multiparty, multiforum actions.''.
(2) Service of subpoenas.--(A) Chapter 117 of title 28,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``Sec. 1785. Subpoenas in multiparty, multiforum actions
``When the jurisdiction of the district court is based in
whole or in part upon section 1369 of this title, a subpoena
for attendance at a hearing or trial may, if authorized by
the court upon motion for good cause shown, and upon such
terms and conditions as the court may impose, be served at
any place within the United States, or anywhere outside the
United States if otherwise permitted by law.''.
(B) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 117
of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the
end the following new item:
``1785. Subpoenas in multiparty, multiforum actions.''.
SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE.
(a) Section 2.--The amendments made by section 2 shall
apply to any civil action pending on or brought on or after
the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) Section 3.--The amendments made by section 3 shall
apply to a civil action if the accident giving rise to the
cause of action occurred on or after the 90th day after the
date of the enactment of this Act.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr.
Conyers) each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr.
Sensenbrenner).
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
As the author of H.R. 860, I am grateful for the opportunity to
consider it on the floor today. The bill before us has had a long
legislative life, having been considered in one form or another since
the 101st Congress in 1991.
This legislation addresses two important issues in the world of
complex multidistrict litigation. Section 2 of the bill would reverse
the effects of the 1998 Supreme Court decision in the so-called Lexecon
case. It would simply amend the multidistrict litigation statute by
explicitly allowing a transferee court to retain jurisdiction over
referred cases for trial for the purpose of determining liability and
punitive damages or refer them to other districts as it sees fit. In
fact, section 2 only codifies what had constituted ongoing judicial
practice for nearly 30 years prior to the Lexecon decision.
Section 3 addresses a particular species of complex litigation, so-
called disaster cases, such as those involving airline accidents. The
language set forth in my bill is a revised version of a concept which,
beginning in the 101st Congress, has been supported by the Department
of Justice, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, two previous
Democratic Congresses, and one previous Republican Congress.
Section 3 will help reduce litigation costs as well as the likelihood
of forum shopping in single-accident mass tort cases. All plaintiffs in
these cases would ordinarily be situated identically, making the case
for consolidation of their actions especially compelling. These types
of disasters, with their hundreds or thousands of plaintiffs and
numerous defendants, have the potential to impair the orderly
administration of justice in Federal courts for an extended period of
time.
This committee and the full House unanimously passed the precursor to
H.R. 860 last term. During eleventh hour negotiations with the other
body, I offered to make three changes in an effort to generate greater
support for the bill. As a show of good faith, I have incorporated
those changes into the bill we are considering today. They consist of
the following:
First, a plaintiff must allege at least $150,000 in damages, up from
$75,000, to file in U.S. district court.
Second, an exception to the minimum diversity rule is created. A U.S.
district court may not hear a case in which a substantial majority of
plaintiffs and the primary defendants are citizens of the same State
and in which the claims asserted are governed primarily by the laws of
that same State. In other words, only State courts may hear such cases.
Third, the choice-of-law section is stricken. Upon further
reflection, I believe it confers too much discretionary authority on a
Federal judge to select the relevant law that will apply in a given
case.
In sum, this legislation speaks to process, fairness, and judicial
efficiency. It will not interfere with jury verdicts or compensation
rates for litigators. I therefore urge my colleagues to join me in a
bipartisan effort to support the Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum
Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2001.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I rise in support of the bill. I am willing to support the bill as
described by the gentleman from Wisconsin with the understanding that
section 3 pertaining to disaster litigation would expand Federal court
jurisdiction in a very narrowly defined category of cases in order to
improve the manageability of complex litigation.
My support of the bill does not in any way serve as a precedent for
support of broader expansion of diversity jurisdiction that can be
found in the class action reform bill which I do not support.
Section 3 of the bill expands Federal court jurisdiction for single
accidents involving at least 25 people having damages in excess of
$150,000 per claim and establishes new Federal procedures in these
narrowly defined cases for selection of venue, service of process and
issuance of subpoenas. I agree and thank the gentleman from Wisconsin
for making the kinds of concessions that have made this measure more
palatable.
As introduced in the Congress, this bill includes an additional
safeguard to the limited expansion of Federal court jurisdiction. A
United States District Court may not hear any case in which a
``substantial majority'' of plaintiffs and the primary defendants are
all citizens of the same State and in which the claims asserted are
governed primarily by the laws of that same State, another provision
that the gentleman from Wisconsin provided us that we agreed to.
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It is my understanding that under the bill, mass tort injuries that
involve the same injury over and over again like asbestos cases, breast
implant cases, would be excluded, and that the type of cases that would
be included would be plane, train, bus, boat accidents, environmental
spills, many of which may already be brought in Federal court.
So while I have traditionally opposed having Federal courts decide
State tort
[[Page H895]]
issues and disfavor the expansion of the jurisdiction of the already
overloaded district courts, I will support the bill because unlike the
class-action bill, it only expands Federal court jurisdiction in a much
narrower class of actions, with the objective of judicial expedience.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman
from North Carolina (Mr. Coble).
Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time. The distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner)
and the distinguished gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) have very
adequately explained this bill, Mr. Speaker, so I will be brief.
I have endorsed this bill during the preceding two Congresses, and I
welcome the opportunity to voice my support for it today. I will not
repeat what has already been said about it; but I would note, Mr.
Speaker, that the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), the
chairman of the committee, did add three additional features to this
year's version in an effort to compromise, and I think this good-faith
gesture ought to be acknowledged.
I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 860. It will help the
multidistrict litigation panel discharge its responsibilities and will
ultimately streamline the adjudication of complex multidistrict cases
in a manner that is fair to all litigants.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Berman), our ranking member on the
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, one does not have to be an intellectual to
be on that subcommittee.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of House passage of H.R. 860, the
Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiplatform Trial Jurisdiction Act of
2001.
Mr. Speaker, H.R. 860 is a narrow bill designed to improve judicial
efficiency. Last Congress, the House passed a virtually identical bill,
H.R. 2112, by voice vote under suspension. In three previous
Congresses, the House-passed bills were comprised of section 3 of H.R.
860. The bill has two operative sections.
Section 2 overturns the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1998, Lexecon
v. Milberg, Weiss. Section 2 will improve judicial efficiency by
allowing a transferee court to retain a case for purposes of deciding
liability and punitive damages as well as for hearing pretrial motions.
Through language I worked out with the chairman of the committee during
committee consideration of a nearly identical bill last Congress, H.R.
860 creates a presumption that cases will be sent back to transferee
courts for the purposes of determining compensatory damages.
Section 3 of this bill gives the Federal courts minimal diversity
jurisdiction to hear cases arising out of single accidents involving
death or injury to at least 25 persons where damages of $150,000 or
more are claimed by each of those persons. Section 3 applies in very
narrow, strictly circumscribed circumstances. As such, it is not a
significant increase of Federal court jurisdiction, and it is justified
by the judicial efficiencies it will occasion.
My colleagues should not confuse section 3 with the proposed class-
action legislation which would cause a much greater and, to my way of
thinking, more troubling increase in Federal court jurisdiction; nor
should my colleagues see this bill as establishing a precedent in
support of class-action legislation. Quite to the contrary, support for
this bill is in no way an exception of support for class-action
legislation.
With this understanding about the narrow reach of H.R. 860, I
encourage my colleagues to vote in support of it.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise
and extend her remarks.)
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the chairman and
the ranking member.
I am certainly pleased that we have legislation on the floor that
hopefully creates an opportunity to open the doors of the courthouse to
plaintiffs and litigants in a manner that is expansive. There are a few
parts of the legislation I would like to comment on and I think merit
attention.
One provision of the bill allows a transferee court in multidistrict
litigation to retain jurisdiction over all of the consolidated cases
with the presumption that compensatory damages will be remanded to the
transfer court. It also expands Federal court jurisdiction by requiring
only minimal diversity as opposed to complete diversity for mass torts
arising from a single incident. Lastly, the bill establishes new
Federal procedures in these narrowly defined cases for the selection of
venue, service of process, and issuance of subpoenas.
I am concerned, however, that this bill was marked up by the full
committee only 2 days after it was introduced and received no
consideration at the subcommittee level. I am aware, however, that this
bill has traveled through many Congresses.
Currently, this bill could impact plaintiffs who file suit in a State
court, because H.R. 860 could allow for that case to be involuntarily
sent to a Federal court that may be hundreds of miles from his or her
home. In this case, there is no reason to force a plaintiff into
Federal court where the defendant resides or has a place of business in
a State where the applicable law is the State law.
I am supportive, however, of the bill's expansion of jurisdiction
over civil actions arising out of a single accident that resulted in
death or injury of 25 or more persons, if the damages exceed $150,000
per claim and minimal diversity exists. While the bill contains a
number of details, I am reassured that this bill would not apply to
mass tort injuries that involve the same injury over and over again,
such as asbestos or breast implants. This issue has been of real
concern to me, having worked on these issues over the last couple of
Congresses.
In this sense, H.R. 860 is a sharp distinction from the Interstate
Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999. Unlike H.R. 860, the class-
action bills require only minimal diversity for all civil actions
brought as class actions in Federal court, regardless of the individual
amounts in controversy, the number of separate incidents or injuries
that may give rise to a class action or the state-based nature of the
claim. Rather than providing a reasonable, limited modification to
diversity jurisdiction, the class action bill, which I strongly oppose,
represents a radical rewrite of the class-action rules and would ban
most forms of State class actions. Not the bill today.
Mr. Speaker, in closing, let me say I know that this legislation is
not a radical rewrite of existing law. It is my sincere hope that H.R.
860 will permit a genuine commitment to provide meaningful access to
the courts as all Americans should have. Access to our courts and
justice is simply the right thing to happen for everyone in America.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 860, the
``Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1999.'' I
supported the legislation in a Judiciary Committee markup last week,
with a few observations.
Clearly, consideration of H.R. 860 comes at a time where court
dockets continue to rise yet pay salaries for federal judges appear
inadequate to deal with the important questions that confront
Americans. H.R. 860 is intended to improve the ability of federal
courts to handle complex multidistrict litigation arising from a common
set of facts. Last Congress the House passed a virtually identical
bill, H.R. 2112, by voice vote under suspension of the rules; however,
it stalled in the Senate.
There are a few parts of the legislation which merit attention. One
provision of the bill allows a transferee court in multidistrict
litigation to retain jurisdiction over all of the consolidated cases
which the presumption that compensatory damages will be remanded to the
transferor court. It also expands federal court jurisdiction by
requiring only minimal diversity (as opposed to complete diversity) for
mass torts arising from a single incident. Lastly, the bill establishes
new federal procedures in these narrowly defined cases for the
selection of venue, service of process and issuance of subpoenas.
I am concerned, however, that this bill was marked up by the full
Committee only two days after it was introduced and received no
consideration at the subcommittee level. Currently this bill could
impact plaintiffs who file suit in a state court, because HR 860 could
allow for that case to be involuntarily to a Federal court that may be
hundreds of miles from
[[Page H896]]
his home. In this case, there is no reason to force a plaintiff into
Federal court where the defendant resides or has a place of business in
the state and where the applicable law is the state law.
I am supportive however, of the bills expansion of jurisdiction over
civil actions arising out of a single accident that result in the death
or injury of 25 or more persons, if the damages exceed $150,000 per
claim and minimal diversity exists. While the bill contains a number of
details, I am reassured that this bill would not apply to mass tort
injuries that involve the same injury over and over again, such as,
asbestos or breast implants. This issue has been of real concern to me.
In this sense, H.R. 860 is a sharp distinction from the ``Interstate
Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999.'' Unlike H.R. 860, the class
action bill requires only minimal diversity for all civil actions
brought as class actions in federal court, regardless of the individual
amounts in controversy, the number of separate incidents or injuries
that may give rise to a class action, or the state-based nature of the
claim. Rather than providing a reasonable, limited modification to
diversity jurisdiction, the class bill--which I strongly oppose--
represents a radical rewrite of the class action rules and would ban
most forms of state class actions. Such a bill is not before us today.
Mr. Speaker, I know that this legislation is not a radical rewrite of
existing law. It is my sincere hope that H.R. 860 will permit a genuine
commitment to providing meaningful access to our courts. Access to our
courts is simply essential for every American.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield the remaining time to
the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt).
Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, certainly I will not consume
the remaining time that we have on this side, but I appreciate the
opportunity to speak and I appreciate the gentleman yielding time to
me.
I was one of several people in the committee who actually voted
against reporting this bill favorably to the floor; and while I am not
personally planning to ask for a vote on the floor if somebody else
does not ask for it, if a vote is requested, I intend to vote against
the bill again.
I think what has been said up to this point is correct. This bill is
better in a number of respects than it was when it was originally
introduced, and I want to applaud the chairman of the full committee
and others who have worked to improve the bill.
I do believe, however, that the bill continues to have one blind spot
in it, and the blind spot could have been addressed if the bill had
received subcommittee attention or more thorough attention in the full
committee; and I am hopeful that this blind spot will be addressed if
this bill moves forward in the process, because I think it is a serious
blind spot.
The blind spot really approaches this issue from a different end of
the spectrum than the bill itself does, because the bill really talks
about kind of a majority rule in big cases where the majority of the
plaintiffs in a case can really control where the case is tried.
The problem with that is that cases by their very nature are
individual cases, and so this bill leaves us with this kind of
situation: we have an individual plaintiff who has been injured by a
defendant who has a residence in the State in which the accident
occurred. There is no diversity of jurisdiction between that plaintiff
and that defendant. Yet, if it were a big accident and there were 25
people injured in the accident, they can take that case and it becomes
a Federal issue under this bill, whereas if it were a small case, it
would continue to be the case of the individual plaintiff and the
plaintiff would have the right to litigate that case either in his own
State court or in the jurisdiction that the plaintiff chooses to
litigate the case in.
Now, for urban communities, this may not have significant
implications, but there are some States in which the closest Federal
district court is hundreds of miles away. While this bill does a good
job of taking into account the convenience of the court and the
expediency of cases on a gross basis, our courts were not made for the
gross basis; our courts were made for individual litigants and for the
convenience of individual litigants. In this rare circumstance where we
have one plaintiff who is part of a bigger group, a defendant, who is
resident in the same State as that one defendant, that plaintiff ought
to be able to litigate that case in his home community, even though
everybody else is moving to a Federal court, because the underlying
proposition of our courts is that the courts are for the convenience of
litigants, not for the convenience of judges or even for judicial
efficiency. When judicial efficiency comes into conflict with the
interests of an individual plaintiff or the individual parties in a
case, the rights of the individual parties in that case should prevail.
So this is a small thing; it is not a Federal issue. This bill is
better than it started off with. I am not at odds with anybody on this.
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But I am hopeful that the people in control of this bill, between now
and the time that it passes into law, can figure out a way, and it
would be simple to do, I think, by changing one or two words in this
bill, figure out a way to allow an individual plaintiff in the
situation that I have described to continue to be able to litigate his
case in the State courts in the community in which they live, and not
have to travel miles away and become part of a big class action lawsuit
that the plaintiff may not want to be associated with in the first
place.
So I am hopeful that the spirit in which I am offering this, and I am
not trying to be adverse to anybody, will be heard, and that somebody
will try to correct this blind spot in the bill before this bill
becomes law.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, I disagree with the arguments made by my friend, the
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt), because I think that the
purpose of this bill is to make the process of adjudicating a common
disaster lawsuit, such as one arising from a plane crash or a train
wreck, more convenient to all of the litigants concerned.
That provides for the consolidation of these cases in a manner that
has been described for determining liability and punitive damages, but
not for determining compensatory damages. So overall, it makes the
system fairer for all litigants, although it might make the system a
bit inconvenient to some litigants. So I think we have a balancing
effect here.
I am just concerned over a common disaster case bringing about a huge
plethora of lawsuits that would be filed in courts all over the
country. Given where the plaintiffs would live who were injured or
killed in the plane crash, or where the airline was located, where the
crash occurred, or the manufacturer of the plane and its component
parts were situated, we could have lawsuits on the same disaster going
on in every court.
Sooner or later there would be appeals which would be expensive, that
would have to be consolidated so there would be a single law that would
be applicable to everybody.
We can short-circuit that problem by the type of consolidation that
is being proposed in this bill. The administrative office of the U.S.
courts and the multidistrict litigation panel of the judicial
conference of the United States have supported this bill. They do not
like to see an expansion of Federal jurisdiction, but they see this as
necessary for the streamlining of the adjudication of these claims.
Someone said, ``Justice delayed is justice denied.'' Whenever we have
a complex case like this, there are delays that are in and of the
nature of the litigation. But I believe that this will speed up the
final resolution in bringing to closure any litigation that may arise
as a result of one of these disasters. I would hope that the bill would
be passed for that reason.
Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record two letters related to this
matter.
The letters referred to are as follows:
Judicial Conference of
the United States,
Washington, DC, March 13, 2001.
Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, Rayburn House Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: On behalf of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, I write to express the support of the
federal judiciary for H.R. 860, the ``Multidistrict,
Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2001.'' This
bill was reported favorably on March 8, 2001, by the
Committee you chair. H.R. 860 will facilitate the resolution
of claims by citizens and improve the administration of
justice.
[[Page H897]]
Section 2 of the bill amends 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1407, the
multidistrict litigation statute, to allow a judge with a
transferred case to retain it for trial or to transfer it to
another district. Presently, section 1407(a) authorizes the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer civil
actions pending in multiple federal judicial districts with
common questions of fact ``to any district for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings.'' It also requires the
Judicial Panel to remand any such action to the district
court in which the action was filed at or before the
conclusion of such pretrial proceedings, unless the action is
terminated before then in the transferee court.
Although the federal courts had for nearly 30 years
followed the practice of allowing a transferee court to
invoke the venue transfer provision (28 U.S.C. Sec. 1404(a))
and transfer the case to itself for trial purposes, the
Supreme Court in Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes
& Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998), held that statutory authority
did not exist for a district judge conducting pretrial
proceedings to transfer a case to itself for trial. The Court
noted that the proper venue for resolving the desirability of
such self-transfer authority is ``the floor of Congress.''
A proposal to amend section 1407 in response to the Lexecon
decision was approved by the Judicial Conference at its
September 1998 session and is supported by the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation. As experience has shown, there
is wisdom in permitting the judge who is familiar with the
facts and parties and pretrial proceedings of a transferred
case to retain the case for trial. Also, as with most federal
civil actions, multidistrict litigation cases are typically
resolved through settlement. Allowing the transferee judge to
set a firm trial date promotes the resolution of these cases.
Section 3 of H.R. 860 adds a new section 1369 to title 28,
United States Code, entitled ``multiparty, multiforum
jurisdiction.'' It essentially provides that the United
States district courts shall have jurisdiction over any civil
action that arises from a single accident or event in which
at least 25 persons have died or been injured at a particular
location, where any such injuries result in alleged damages
exceeding $150,000 by each plaintiff and which involves
minimal diversity between adverse parties. The legislation
also requires that one defendant must reside in a state that
is different from the location of the accident or the
residence of any other defendant or that substantial parts of
the event took place in different states. The transferee
court would be authorized to determine issues of liability
and punitive damages and would remand cases to the transferor
court for determinations of compensatory damages, unless the
court finds, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and
in the interest of justice, that the action should be
retained for the determination of damages. The district
court, however, must abstain from hearing an action under the
bill if a substantial majority of all plaintiffs are citizens
of a single state of which the primary defendants are also
citizens and the claims asserted will be governed primarily
by the laws of that state.
Upon consideration of related proposals during the 100th
Congress, the Judicial Conference in March 1988 approved in
principle the creation of federal jurisdiction that would
rely on minimal diversity to consolidate multiple litigation
in state and federal courts of cases involving personal
injury or property damage and arising out of a single event.
The Conference endorsed the idea of redirecting diversity
jurisdiction to serve a purpose that state courts are not
able to serve, namely to facilitate the consolidation of
scattered actions arising out of the same accident or event
and thereby ``to promote more expeditious and economical
disposition of such litigation.''
Today, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation can
transfer to one judge for pretrial proceedings those cases
involving common questions of fact that are pending in
federal courts throughout the country. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1407.
Section 3 of H.R. 860 would expand federal jurisdiction by
allowing state cases arising from a single event (such as a
plane crash or hotel fire) to be brought into such process as
a result of filing, removal, or intervention. Section 3 of
the bill would avoid multiple trials on common issues,
minimize litigation costs, and ensure that litigants are
treated consistently and fairly. Thus, this legislation will
promote the resolution of litigants' claims in these unique
and related cases.
Thank you for taking prompt action on this important and
necessary legislation. If you or your staff have any
questions, please contact Mike Blommer, Assistant Director,
Office of Legislative Affairs (202-502-1700).
Sincerely,
Leonidas Ralph Mecham,
Secretary.
____
Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation,
March 13, 2001.
Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, Rayburn House Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: On behalf of the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation, I am writing to urge support of
H.R. 860, the Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Trial
Jurisdiction Act of 2001. As you know, my predecessor as
Chairman of the Panel, Judge John F. Nangle, testified in
favor of the previous version of this legislation on June 16,
1999, before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual
Property.
Section 2 of this legislation, to restore the options
available to the litigants and the federal judiciary prior to
the 1998 Supreme Court Lexecon decision, passed unanimously
word-for-word in both the House of Representatives and the
Senate in the last Congress. The previous version of Section
3 of the legislation, aimed at streamlining adjudication of
single accident litigation, has passed the House of
Representatives in bipartisan fashion on four prior
occasions--twice when the Democrats were in the majority in
the 101st and 102nd Congresses, and twice when the
Republicans were in the majority in the 105th and 106th
Congresses.
Surely the time has come to enact this clearly beneficial
legislation for the reasons stated in Judge Nangle's
testimony. Your continued leadership in this area is highly
valued and appreciated.
Sincerely,
Wm. Terrell Hodges,
Chairman.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Berman).
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman from California
1 minute.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Shimkus). The gentleman from California
(Mr. Berman) is recognized for 6 minutes.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member and the gentleman
from Wisconsin for their generous yielding of time to me.
Mr. Speaker, I just want to make a few comments in response to the
gentleman from North Carolina, because he makes legitimate and accurate
points about this legislation. But in response, I would make a few
points.
Mr. Speaker, concerning H.R. 860, the circumstances which this bill
applies to are so narrow and unique, and because so many civil actions
which arise out of a single action are already subject to Federal
jurisdiction, there really are in a practical sense very few plaintiffs
who will find themselves in a Federal court who would not have already
been there.
But even if they do, this bill has protection, because the bill
preserves the ability of the transferee court, the Federal court to
which this multi-party litigation has been assigned, it preserves the
ability of that court to transfer back or dismiss an action on the
ground of an inconvenient forum.
So that plaintiff has the ability to make his case that even though
it is a result of that single accident, even though I am alleging
$150,000, in my particular situation, notwithstanding the efficiencies
that would justify a single trial, for purposes of liability and other
issues, we should go back to the State court.
The gentleman from North Carolina says, but he has to get to that
court in order to make that request. That is true.
Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BERMAN. I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina.
Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman
yielding. I appreciate him taking seriously the comments that I am
making.
I would just point out to him two things. Yes, this bill will make
the system more efficient, but from 22 years of the practice of law, I
will tell the gentleman that every single case is a unique case for the
parties in that case.
So when we say that this applies only to a small number of cases, the
gentleman is absolutely right. I do not argue that. But for that
individual plaintiff who is coming into court, we ought to make the
courts as conveniently available to that one individual as we can.
The gentleman says that this person can show up in the Federal court,
make a motion to move it back, but here he is sitting there with 16
other plaintiffs who say, Please do not move this case. All I am saying
is, that person ought to be allowed to go and litigate their case in a
forum that is convenient to them, not have their case and the placement
of it decided on the basis of some majority rule theory.
I understand efficiency of the court. I understand why the Judicial
Conference would favor this. But in the interest of individual
plaintiffs, I think it is important to have another exception in this
bill, and it would be used so infrequently that it would not be an
imposition. It could be done very easily in the context of this bill.
[[Page H898]]
Mr. BERMAN. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Speaker, this is not just about
efficiency. This is also about convenience of the parties.
We had a horrible accident recently with a private plane taking the
Oklahoma State basketball team. That may not be applicable, because
this requires 25 people. But think of a similar situation where a huge
number of those passengers are from one State. The defendant is from
some other State.
This allows the multi-party committee, the panel that decides these
multi-district multi-party cases where they should be tried, to
consider the convenience of the plaintiffs in this kind of a case, not
simply the question of efficiency. So there are some real positive
benefits from this legislation, as well.
Moreover, on the issue of damages, which can be particularly a matter
to be determined by local communities and peers in the community where
that plaintiff resides, this creates the presumption that that issue,
the compensatory damages issue, will go back, in the case of the
hypothetical that you cited, to the State court for determination.
Yes, the bill will cause some plaintiffs to find themselves in
Federal court, while without the bill those plaintiffs would have been
able to remain in State courts. I think there are several policy
considerations. I have mentioned them. As the chairman said earlier, we
have to draw a balance. Having the very complicated and complex issue
of liability tried in one place makes sense.
As we balance these things, Mr. Speaker, I come down on the side of
having the complicated, expensive, and controversial issue litigated in
one court.
And I might just add in the remaining seconds I have that from what I
understand from plaintiff's attorneys involved in these accident cases
and other cases like this that this bill addresses, that the problem
is, sometimes that guy who wants to file in the State court, the lawyer
who wants to file in the State court because it is an in-State
defendant, he really wants to be the free rider in this. He wants the
whole thing tried and all the discovery, all that done by others. Then,
after that issue is settled, he will come in with a State action, not
having put up his share of the costs and his efforts, and cash in. I am
told that is one aspect of why some plaintiff's lawyers, no one in this
room, I am sure, would actually prefer to file in the State court.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time,
and I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner) that the House suspend the
rules and pass the bill, H.R. 860, as amended.
The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor
thereof) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________