[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 32 (Monday, March 12, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2140-S2141]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[[Page S2140]]
THE STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM AND THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY 
                               REVISITED

  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss a subject of major 
importance to the national security of the United States--the 
maintenance of our nuclear weapons stockpile.
  For most of the nuclear age, the United States has relied on nuclear 
testing to ensure that our nuclear weapons remained safe, secure, and 
reliable. Our country conducted more than one thousand nuclear tests in 
furtherance of these goals. In July 1992, President George Bush 
announced that the United States would suspend underground testing. We 
initiated the Stockpile Stewardship Program, which was designed to 
replace detonations at the Nevada Test Site with computer simulations.
  In 1999, concerns about the Stockpile Stewardship Program were a 
critical element of the Senate debate over ratification of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It was unfortunate that the Senate was 
forced to take up the treaty in a highly politicized atmosphere. The 
CTBT was not a new subject, but in 1999, the Senate was not prepared to 
develop the consensus necessary to ratify a major treaty with far-
reaching consequences for U.S. security.
  I opposed ratification of the CTBT, because I did not believe that 
the treaty's verification and enforcement provisions would be 
successful. Equally important, I was concerned about our ability to 
maintain the integrity and safety of our nuclear arsenal under the 
conditions imposed by the treaty.
  The United States must maintain a reliable nuclear deterrent for the 
foreseeable future. The end of the cold war provided tremendous 
national security benefits, but the necessity of our nuclear deterrent 
did not disappear. The transformation of the former Soviet Union has 
permitted the United States to consider lower numbers of nuclear 
weapons, but the current security atmosphere does not permit us to 
consider their elimination.
  Our nuclear arsenal continues to play a critical role in ensuring the 
security of the American people. It also plays a role in the security 
calculations of friends and allies around the world. Many of them have 
foregone potentially destabilizing arms build-ups and weapons 
procurement programs because of the nuclear umbrella provided by the 
United States.
  During the CTBT debate, I expressed my concern that the Senate was 
being asked to trust the reliability of our nuclear stockpile to a 
Stockpile Stewardship Program that was both unproven and unlikely to be 
fully operational for a decade or more.
  There remains strong disagreement among many nuclear experts and 
national security leaders about the efficacy of maintaining a nuclear 
stockpile without testing. As Senators, we do not have the luxury of 
taking a chance on the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The restrictions 
imposed by the CTBT could have harmed the national security of the 
United States if we could not ensure the safety and reliability of our 
nuclear weapons stockpile without testing. We cannot allow our nuclear 
weapons to fall into disrepair or permit their safety to be 
jeopardized.
  Now unfortunately, little progress in advancing the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program appears to have occurred since the 1999 Senate 
debate. Our new Secretary of Energy, Spencer Abraham, recently 
testified before the Armed Services Committee that:

       The Department of Energy has allowed its nuclear-weapons 
     production plants to degrade over time, leaving a tremendous 
     backlog of deferred maintenance and modernizations. The 
     deterioration of existing facilities is a very serious 
     threat.

  Under the Stockpile Stewardship Program, the United States will 
depend on these facilities to inspect our nuclear arsenal and to 
replace degraded weapons.
  I am particularly concerned by the uncertainty surrounding the 
construction of the National Ignition Facility, the NIF, which was 
profiled in a recent episode of the ``Jim Lehrer Newshour.'' The NIF is 
intended to play a key role in the Stockpile Stewardship Program and 
the annual certification of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The National 
Academy of Sciences and others recommended the construction of the NIF, 
which will simulate thermonuclear conditions. This facility would be 
critical to evaluating our nuclear weapons arsenal in the absence of 
testing. The Academy stated that such a facility was necessary because 
nearly all of the 6,000 parts of a nuclear weapon change with age.
  Yet at present, the NIF is 4 years behind schedule and approximately 
$1 billion over budget. These are dismal omens. Even more disconcerting 
is that the National Science Foundation and others have estimated the 
NIF's chances of success at only about 50 percent. It is alarming to 
learn that the possibility of success for a critical component of our 
Stockpile Stewardship Program can only be characterized as 50/50.
  Some supporters of the CTBT, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, have 
suggested that the stockpile could be maintained without the NIF by 
replacing old warheads with new warheads manufactured to the same 
specifications as the originals. They also have posited that current 
warheads could be rebuilt with fresh nuclear material.
  Yet many nuclear experts regard these strategies as unreliable. This 
is why both the former Bush and Clinton administrations moved forward 
on the Stockpile Stewardship Program. According to the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory, it is impossible to guarantee that new 
warheads manufactured to old specifications will work reliably. Neither 
is replacing the nuclear core of existing weapons a viable option. 
Nuclear material contained within weapons changes with age. As the 
nuclear material changes, so does its effects on the other components 
of the warhead. If one attempted to maintain weapons by periodically 
replacing their nuclear cores, the older warhead components around the 
pits would not be matched to the new nuclear material. Under these 
conditions, the warheads would not necessarily function as originally 
designed.
  Even many proponents of the CTBT do not believe that U.S. nuclear 
weapons can be maintained in the absence of an effective Stockpile 
Stewardship Program. Most notably, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, who conducted extensive review of 
the CTBT following the Senate's rejection of the treaty, outlined the 
need for an effective Stockpile Stewardship Program. His review 
emphasized that the program was needed to provide the people, 
knowledge, equipment, and facilities necessary to accomplish three 
tasks: First of all, to enhance surveillance of weapons in the 
stockpile to monitor for age-related changes and to identify other 
defects; second, to deepen the scientific understanding of how nuclear 
weapons work and how they age so that we are better able to spot 
potential defects; and, third, to remanufacture components and 
refurbish warheads using an updated nuclear weapons complex. General 
Shalikashvili offered his strong support for the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program and reiterated its necessity in the absence of testing.
  But if we are going to depend on the Stockpile Stewardship Program, 
it must be reliable and accurate, Recently, the Panel to Assess the 
Reliability, Safety and Security of the U.S. Nuclear Stockpile found:

     . . . growing deficiencies in the nuclear weapons production 
     complex, deep morale and personnel problems, continued 
     slippage of program milestones, and unacceptably high risks 
     to the completion of needed weapons refurbishments.

  The panel, established by Congress in the 1999 Defense authorization 
bill, was tasked with providing an assessment of the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program. The panel's concerns led to numerous 
recommendations, including: one, stopping the slippage in stockpile 
life-extension programs; two, restoring missing production capabilities 
and refurbishing the production complex; three, stopping the slippage 
in development of tools needed to make future assessment of the 
stockpile's safety and reliability; and four, responding to the low 
morale at the weapons laboratories. The panel concluded that the 
problems within our nuclear weapons complex are ``unacceptable,'' and 
they warned that the situation could decline further. The report states 
that:

       Worrisome deterioration of nuclear components has already 
     been found. Moreover, the history of the stockpile has 
     demonstrated many surprises, and weapons are entering an

[[Page S2141]]

     age regime for which we have no prior experience.

  Furthermore, the Stockpile Stewardship Program simply will not be 
ready in the near term, even if its deficiencies can be fixed. Dr. 
Michael Anastasio, the associate director of defense and nuclear 
technologies at the Livermore Lab, has stated that we will not know for 
``at least ten years'' whether the Stockpile Stewardship Program can be 
a viable replacement for testing.
  I am concerned that while our country's nuclear experts are still 
debating the composition and efficacy of the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program, we not rush into another ill-prepared attempt to ratify the 
CTBT. It is difficult to envision how the Senate could be asked to 
reverse its position of 2 years ago by placing its faith in a program 
that not only is incomplete, but whose exact components are still a 
source of debate.
  Some proponents of the treaty have argued that the United States can 
ratify the CTBT regardless of potential stockpile problems, because the 
United States has the ability to withdraw from the treaty should we 
lose confidence in our stockpile. I disagree. First, the Clinton 
administration originally cited withdrawal as an emergency escape 
hatch, not an option on which to base nuclear policy. And 
second, withdrawing from the treaty would send a damaging signal to our 
allies and foes around the world on the status of our nuclear 
stockpile.

  If the U.S. were to abrogate the CTBT, citing the safety and 
reliability of the stockpile, our friends and allies would question the 
credibility of the nuclear umbrella itself that plays a vital role in 
their security. Enemies and foes would question America's strength and 
confidence in the status of our nuclear arsenal.
  Secretary of State Colin Powell stated during his confirmation 
hearing that the administration ``will not be asking for the Congress 
to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in this next session.'' I 
believe this is a wise course of action. The United States may be in a 
position to ratify the CTBT at some point in the future, but not today.
  I understand the impulse of proponents of the CTBT to express United 
States leadership in another area of arms control. Inevitably, arms 
control treaties are accompanied by principles that envision a future 
in which international norms prevail over the threat of conflict 
between nations. However, while affirming our desire for international 
peace and stability, the U.S. Senate is charged with the constitutional 
responsibility of making hard judgments about the likely outcomes of 
treaties. This requires that we examine the treaties in close detail 
and calculate the consequences of ratification for the present and the 
future. Viewed in this context, I could not support the treaty's 
ratification in 1999, nor for the reasons I have just expressed could I 
support ratification now.
  The Bush administration's position not to request immediate Senate 
consideration of this treaty is prudent. I am hopeful that proponents 
and opponents alike will not force the Senate into another 
counterproductive debate, particularly when prospects for a different 
outcome in the Senate have not improved since 1999.
  Instead, we should reinvigorate bipartisan efforts on the broader 
question of arms control and non-proliferation, as well as explore 
improvements in technology. Even during the fractious CTBT debate in 
the Senate, many of us on both sides of the issue, including Senators 
Warner, Levin, and Moynihan, were working together to delay treaty 
consideration and build a consensus on arms policy for the short term.
  Our goal now should be to achieve sufficient technological progress 
to permit confidence in the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Both 
proponents and opponents of the CTBT have a mutual interest in this 
goal, because the safety and reliability of our weapons depend on it. I 
have urged the Bush administration to maintain a strong commitment to 
the program and support the funding necessary to correct problems.
  In addition, the United States should work with allies to develop 
technological means through which we might improve verification 
techniques and capabilities. The current shortcomings of the CTBT's 
verification regime are very serious, but we should remain open to 
diplomatic or technological developments in the long run.
  I am confident that there does exist within the Senate a strong 
desire to work toward a consensus on arms policies. I urge my 
colleagues to join in this effort.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, the managers are not on the floor. I 
will wait to offer my amendment until there is a manager on the other 
side. I want to speak for 10 minutes as in morning business. I ask 
unanimous consent that I be allowed to speak for 10 minutes as in 
morning business and then be allowed to lay down my amendments.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair.

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