[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 30 (Thursday, March 8, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2055-S2056]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              NORTH KOREA

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I was briefly downstairs in a meeting with 
President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea. I will take a few moments to 
share with my colleagues some thoughts about our policy with respect to 
North Korea, which obviously has profound implications for the region, 
as well as for the United States.
  Mr. President, one of the major questions facing the United States 
and its South Korean and Japanese allies is how to deal with the 
ballistic missile threat posed by North Korea. Pyongyang has already 
demonstrated its capacity to launch a 500 kilogram warhead to a range 
of at least 1000 kilometers. The failed test of the Taepo Dong-2 
missile in August 1999 clearly shows North Korea's interest in 
developing a longer range missile capability. North Korea's 
proliferation of missiles, missile components, technology and training 
to states such as Pakistan and Iran further magnifies the need to get 
Pyongyang to end its missile program.
  The Clinton administration left a framework on the table which could, 
if pursued aggressively by the Bush administration, go a long way 
toward reducing the threat posed by North Korean missiles and missile 
exports. Our South Korean allies clearly want us to continue the 
discussions that the Clinton administration began with North Korea on 
the missile question. Two days ago Secretary of State Colin Powell 
stated that the Bush administration would ``pick up'' where the Clinton 
administration left off. Apparently not. Yesterday, President Bush told 
visiting South Korean President Kim Dae Jung that the administration 
would not resume missile talks with North Korea any time soon. I 
believe this is a serious mistake in judgment. I will suggest why.
  Our South Korean allies are on the front line; they are under no 
illusions about the regime in North Korea or its leader Kim Jong II. 
President Kim firmly believes that Washington and Seoul must continue 
their efforts to open up North Korea, and that the United States should 
move quickly to resume the missile talks. We should listen to him 
carefully. I and others raised this issue with Secretary Powell earlier 
today, when he testified before the Foreign Relations Committee. The 
Secretary indicated that some of the things put on the table by the 
Clinton administration are ``promising'' but that monitoring and 
verification ``are not there.'' He said that the Bush administration 
intended to do a comprehensive policy review and then would decide when 
and how to engage North Korea.
  I don't think any of us in the Senate would second-guess the right or 
even the good sense of a new administration conducting a thorough 
review of a particular area of the world or a particular policy. That 
makes sense. However, I am deeply concerned that by sending the message 
we will not even engage in a continuation of talks where the Clinton 
administration left off, that we wind up potentially offering an 
opportunity to see a window closed or for people to misinterpret the 
long-term intentions of the United States and perhaps make it more 
difficult to pick up where the Clinton administration left off when and 
if the administration resumes.
  We need to reflect on the fact that North Korea took some remarkable 
steps, heretofore unimaginable steps, and under the 1994 agreed 
framework, North Korea set about to freeze its existing nuclear energy 
program under the IAEA supervision to permit special inspections to 
determine the past operating history of its reactor program just prior 
to the delivery of key components of light-water reactors.
  A few years ago when the United States was concerned that North Korea 
was violating the agreed framework by possibly building a new reactor 
in an underground site at Kumchangi-ri, North Korea ultimately allowed 
a team of Americans to inspect the site, first in May of 1999 and each 
year thereafter.
  This showed, clearly, that monitoring and verification agreements can

[[Page S2056]]

be negotiated with North Korea. By the 11th hour of the Clinton 
administration, the United States and North Korea were discussing 
further proposals that would, indeed, prevent North Korea from 
developing missiles capable of striking the United States and bring a 
halt to North Korea's lucrative missile exports.
  In my view, at this moment, now, we should still be encouraging 
progress in those particular areas. We should be particularly 
encouraging Pyongyang to continue down that path, not sending them a 
message that may, in fact, make it months later and far more difficult 
before we can do so. Delaying missile talks will not enhance the 
security of the United States or of the region about which we care. In 
fact, delay, coupled at this morning's hearing with Secretary Powell's 
somewhat lukewarm endorsement of the agreed framework could send a very 
negative signal about the nature and direction of United States policy 
toward North Korea.
  The Clinton administration, in many people's judgment, may well have 
moved faster than some believed was prudent. But the reality is that 
negotiations have begun and proposals are on the table for discussion. 
Nothing has been agreed upon yet. There is no reason this 
administration could not pick up where the Clinton administration left 
off, even as it makes the decision to review and discuss alternative 
proposals. Nothing will preclude them from ensuring adequate monitoring 
and verification.
  The issue of North Korea's missile capability is fundamental not only 
to security on the Korean peninsula but also to our own long-term 
security and also to the debate on national missile defense. The North 
Korean missile threat has been offered by the Bush administration and 
others as a major reason why the United States needs to move more 
rapidly with the National Missile Defense System. Given that, I am 
somewhat confused by the administration's go-slow approach on the 
missile talks with Pyongyang. If we can reduce or eliminate the threat 
posed by North Korea's missile program, not only to us but to others, 
we are going to be on a very different playing field. We will have 
greater security, on the one hand, and we will be able to look at other 
national missile defense options that may be less costly and less 
damaging to the arms control regime established by the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile treaty. With all of this in the balance, it seems to me that 
there is little to lose--and potentially much to gain--by getting back 
to the table with Pyongyang and seeing where the negotiations go.

  It is my hope that this administration will rapidly move to do so.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.

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