[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 25 (Wednesday, February 28, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1708-S1711]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. HOLLINGS (for himself, Mr. McCain, Mr. Dorgan, and Mr. 
        Grassley):
  S. 415. A bill to amend title 49, United States Code, to require that 
air carriers meet public convenience and necessity requirements by 
ensuring competitive access by commercial air carriers to major cities, 
and for other purposes; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, the time has come for the Congress to 
really understand what is going on in the airline industry. It is an 
industry that no longer competes. Passengers no longer matter. We are 
like cattle in a stockade.
  Today, I am introducing legislation to restore the public's interest 
in our aviation system, to reclaim it from the carriers. Senator McCain 
joins me in sponsoring this bill.
  We have spent countless hearings listening to various airline 
executives, government officials and expert witness talk about the 
problems confronting the traveling public. it is time we put all of 
that information and knowledge together to benefit the traveling 
public.
  Let's start with the hubs. There are twenty major airports, essential 
facilities, where 1 carrier has more than fifty percent of the total 
enplaned passengers. Study after study has told us, warned us, that 
concentrated hubs lead to higher fares, particularly for markets to 
those hubs with no competition. Average fares are higher by 41 percent 
according to DOT, and even higher for smaller, shorter haul markets, by 
as much as 54 percent. DOT estimates that for only 10 of the hubs, 24.7 
million people are overcharged, and another 25 to 50 million choose not 
to fly because of high fares.
  We have got to take a can opener and pry open the lids to the hubs, 
for without competition, whatever benefits deregulation has brought, 
will quickly fade away. Our legislation will ensure that other air 
carriers have the ability to compete, the ability to provide people 
with options, and the ability to threaten to serve every market out of 
the dominated hubs. Gates, facilities and other assets will need to be 
provided where they are unavailable, or where competition dictates a 
need for such facilities. Dominant air carriers have relied upon 
Federal dollars to expand these facilities, and they have taken 
advantage of those monies by establishing unregulated local monopolies. 
It is time to use the power and leverage of the Federal government to 
restore a balance to the marketplace.

  Right now, the air carriers are attempting to dictate what the 
industry will look like. If they are successful, all of the concerns 
raised by countless studies, will not only be realized, but they will 
be exacerbated. The public's needs, the public's convenience, are 
something that must be first and foremost as we watch this industry 
evolve.
  Airline deregulation forced the carriers to compete on price for a 
while, but not on service. Congress had to threaten legislation in 1999 
before the airlines even began to even understand the depth of consumer 
anger towards the airlines. Today though, they no longer compete on 
price. Instead, they seek to acquire one another to create massive 
systems, perhaps only three will survive, leaving us all far worse 
tomorrow than we are today. And clearly today, we are not getting what 
is needed.
  What are the facts: United wants to buy US Airways, and create DC 
Air. American want to buy TWA, a failing company with a hub in St. 
Louis, and then American wants to buy a part of US Airways. Continental 
and Delta have a 25 year marketing relations, and Delta, Continental 
and Northwest are all eying other deals.
  Right now there are 20 major cities where one carrier effectively 
controls airline service. Department of Transportation, General 
Accounting Office, National Research Council and others have all 
documented abuses, high fares, market dominance, hoarding of facilities 
at airports so other carriers can not enter, and let's not forget poor 
service. It must stop. It is not enough for the antitrust laws to look 
at each transaction in a vacuum. The public's interest, its needs, and 
its convenience must be reasserted.
  DOT, in its January 2001 study, made three key observations:

       The facts are clear. Without the presence of effective 
     price competition, network carriers charge much higher prices 
     and curtail capacity available to price sensitive passengers 
     at the hubs. . . . With effective price competition, 
     consumers benefit from both better service and lower fares, 
     citing Atlanta and Salt Lake City as examples where a low 
     cost carrier is able to provide competition to a dominant hub 
     carrier.
       The key to eliminating market power and fare premiums is to 
     encourage entry into as many uncontested markets as possible.
       . . . barriers to entry at dominated hubs are most 
     difficult to surmount considering the operational and 
     marketing leverage a network carrier has in it hub markets.

  In its 1999 study, the Department stated most clearly what we are 
trying to achieve:

       Moreover, unless there is reasonable likelihood that a new 
     entrant's short term and long term needs for gates and other 
     facilities will be met, it may simply decide not to serve a 
     community.--FAA/OST Task Force Study, October 1999, at page 
     iii.

  I urge my colleagues to cosponsor this legislation.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                 S. 415

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of American in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Aviation Competition 
     Restoration Act''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The airline industry continues to evolve into a system 
     dominated by a few large air carriers and a handful of 
     smaller, niche air carriers. Absent Congressional action, 
     access to critical markets is likely to be foreclosed.
       (2) In testimony before the Commerce Committee in 1978, the 
     then-President of Eastern Airlines testified that the top 5 
     air carriers had 68.6 percent of the domestic market. If the 
     mergers and acquisitions proposed in 2000 and 2001 are 
     consummated, the 5 largest network airlines in the United 
     States will account for approximately 83 percent of the air 
     transportation business (based on revenue passenger miles 
     flown in 1999).
       (3) According to Department of Transportation statistics, 
     taking into account the proposed mergers of United Airlines 
     and US Airways, and of American Airlines and TWA, there will 
     be at least 20 large hub airports in the United States where 
     a single airline and its affiliate air carriers would carry 
     more than 50 percent of the passenger traffic.
       (4) The continued consolidation of the airline industry may 
     inure to the detriment of public convenience and need, and 
     the further concentration of market power in the

[[Page S1709]]

     hands of even fewer large competitors may lead to unfair 
     methods of competition.
       (5) A more concentrated airline industry would be likely to 
     result in less competition and higher fares, giving consumers 
     fewer choices and decreased customer service.
       (6) The Department of Transportation has documented that 
     air fares are relatively higher at those main hub airports 
     where a single airline carries more than 50 percent of the 
     passenger traffic, and studies indicate that unfair methods 
     of competition are more likely to occur at such airports, 
     thus inhibiting competitive responses from other carriers 
     when fares are raised or capacity reduced.
       (7) The General Accounting Office has conducted a number of 
     studies that document the presence of both high fares and 
     problems with competition in the airline industry at 
     dominated hub airports.
       (8) The National Research Council of the Transportation 
     Research Board has recognized that higher fares exist in 
     short haul markets connected to concentrated hub airports.
       (9) A Department of Transportation study indicates that the 
     entry and existence of low fare airline competitors in the 
     marketplace has resulted in a reported $6.3 billion in annual 
     savings to airline passengers.
       (10) While the antitrust rules generally govern mergers and 
     acquisitions in the air carrier industry, and will continue 
     to do so, the public concern about the importance of air 
     transportation, the impact of over scheduling, increasing 
     flight delays and cancellations, poor service, and continued 
     hub domination requires the Department of Transportation to 
     assert its authority in analyzing proposed transactions among 
     air carriers that affect consumers.

     SEC. 3. PUBLIC INTEREST REVIEW OF AIR CARRIER ACQUISITIONS 
                   AND MERGERS.

       (a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 417 of title 49, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof 
     the following:

     ``Sec. 41722. Mergers and acquisitions

       ``(a) Protection of Public Interest; Competition Test.--
       ``(1) In general.--An air carrier may not acquire, directly 
     or indirectly, any voting securities or assets of another air 
     carrier if, after the acquisition, the air carrier resulting 
     from the acquisition would have more than 10 percent of the 
     passenger enplanements in the United States (based on 
     projections from the most recent annual data available to 
     the Secretary of Transportation) if the Secretary 
     determines that the effect of the acquisition--
       ``(A) would be substantially to lessen competition, or
       ``(B) would result in reasonable industry concentration, 
     excessive market domination, monopoly powers, or other 
     conditions that would tend to allow at least 1 air carrier 
     unreasonably to increase prices, reduce services, or exclude 
     competition in air transportation at any large hub airport 
     (as defined in section 47134(d)(2)) or in at least 10 percent 
     of the top 500 markets for passenger air transportation in 
     the United States.
       ``(2) Exception.---Notwithstanding paragraph (1), such an 
     acquisition may proceed if the Secretary finds that--
       ``(A) the anticompetitive effects of the proposed 
     transaction are outweighed in the public interest by the 
     probable effect of the acquisition in meeting significant 
     transportation conveniences and needs of the public; and
       ``(B) those significant transportation conveniences and 
     needs of the public may not be satisfied by a reasonably 
     available alternative having materially less anticompetitive 
     effects.
       ``(b) Dominant Carriers Required To Relinquish Some Gates, 
     Facilities, and Assets at Hub Airport.--
       ``(1) In general.--An air carrier may not acquire, directly 
     or indirectly, any voting securities or assets of another air 
     carrier if, after the acquisition, the air carrier resulting 
     from the acquisition would be a dominant air carrier at any 
     large hub airport (as defined in section 47134(d)(2)) unless 
     the Secretary of Transportation finds that--
       ``(A) the air carrier resulting from the acquisition will 
     provide gates, facilities, and other assets at the hub 
     airport on a fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory basis to 
     another air carrier that--
       ``(i) holds a certificate issued under chapter 411 
     authorizing it to provide air transportation for passengers;
       ``(ii) has fewer than 15 percent of the average daily 
     passenger enplanements at that airport; and
       ``(iii) is able, or will be able, to utilize the gate, 
     facility, or other asset provided to it at a reasonable level 
     of utilization; or
       ``(B) gates, facilities, and other assets are available, or 
     will be made available in a timely manner, on a fair, 
     reasonable, and nondiscriminatory basis to accommodate 
     competitive access to that airport by other air carriers.
       ``(2) Limitation.--Paragraph (1) does not require an air 
     carrier to relinquish control, or otherwise dispose, of more 
     than 10 percent of the gates, facilities, and other assets 
     controlled by that air carrier at any airport, as determined 
     by the Secretary.
       ``(3) Plan required.--Before the Secretary may make a 
     finding under paragraph (1), the acquiring air carrier and 
     the air carrier being acquired shall file a joint plan in 
     writing with the Secretary that states with such specificity 
     as the Secretary may require exactly how the air carrier 
     resulting from the acquisition will comply with the 
     requirements of paragraph (1).
       ``(4) Enforcement of plan.--If the Secretary determines, 
     more than 90 days after the date on which an acquisition 
     described in paragraph (1) is completed, that the air carrier 
     has failed substantially to carry out the plan submitted 
     under paragraph (3), the Secretary may--
       ``(A) withdraw approval of the acquisition;
       ``(B) withdraw authority for the air carrier to serve 
     international markets; or
       ``(C) take such other action as may be necessary to compel 
     compliance with the plan.
       ``(c) Notification; Waiting Period; Final Rule.--
       ``(1) In general.--In order for the Secretary to be able to 
     make the determination required by subsection (a)--
       ``(A) each air carrier (or in the case of a tender offer, 
     the acquiring air carrier) shall submit a notification to the 
     Secretary, in such form and containing such information as 
     the Secretary may require; and
       ``(B) wait until the waiting period described in paragraph 
     (2) has expired before effecting the acquisition.
       ``(2) Waiting period.--
       ``(A) In general.--The waiting period begins on the date of 
     receipt by the Secretary of a completed notification required 
     by paragraph (1)(A) and ends on the thirtieth day after that 
     date, or (in the case of a cash tender offer) the fifteenth 
     day after that date.
       ``(B) Waiver; modification.--The Secretary may waive the 
     notification requirement, shorten the waiting period, or 
     extend the waiting period (by not more than 180 days), in 
     order to coordinate action under this subsection with the 
     Department of Justice under the antitrust laws of the United 
     States.
       ``(3) Coordination with doj.--The Secretary and the 
     Attorney General may enter into a memorandum of understanding 
     to ensure that the determination required by subsection (a) 
     is made within the same time frame as any Department of 
     Justice review of a proposed acquisition under section 7A of 
     the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 18a).
       ``(4) Final action within 180 days.--The Secretary shall 
     take final action with respect to any acquisition requiring a 
     determination under subsection (a) within 180 days after the 
     date on which the Secretary receives the notification 
     required by paragraph (1)(A).
       ``(d) AIR 21 Competition Plan Review.--The Secretary shall 
     examine any hub airport affected by a proposed acquisition 
     described in subsection (a) to determine whether that airport 
     has complied with the competition plan requirement of 
     sections 47106(f) or 40117(k) of title 49, United States 
     Code, and whether gates and other facilities are being 
     made available at costs that are fair and reasonable to 
     air carriers in accordance with the requirements of 
     section 41712(c)(3). The sponsor (as defined in section 
     47102(19)) of any hub airport shall cooperate fully with 
     the Secretary in carrying out an examination under this 
     subsection.
       ``(e) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Dominated hub airport.--The term `dominated hub 
     airport' means an airport--
       ``(A) that each year has at least .25 percent of the total 
     annual boardings in the United States; and
       ``(B) at which 1 air carrier accounts for more than 50 
     percent of the enplaned passengers.
       ``(2) Dominant air carrier.--The term `dominant air 
     carrier' means an air carrier that accounts for more than 50 
     percent of the enplaned passengers at an airport.
       (3) Control.--With respect to whether a corporation or 
     other entity is considered to be controlled by another 
     corporation or other entity, the term `control' means that 
     more than 10 percent of the ownership, voting rights, capital 
     stock, or other pecuniary interest in that corporation or 
     entity is owned, held, or controlled, directly or indirectly, 
     by such other corporation or entity.
       ``(4) Enplanements.--The term `passenger enplanements' 
     means the annual number of passenger enplanements, as 
     determined by the Secretary of Transportation, based on the 
     most recent data available.
       ``(5) Asset.--The term `asset' includes slots (as defined 
     in section 41714(h)(4)) and slot exemptions (within the 
     meaning of section 41714(a)(2)).''.
       (b) Special Rule.--For the purpose of applying section 
     41722 of title 49, United States Code, to an acquisition or 
     merger involving major air carriers proposed after January 1, 
     2000, that has not been consummated before February 15, 
     2001--
       (1) subsection (c) of that section shall not apply; but
       (2) the Secretary of Transportation shall require such 
     information from the acquiring air carrier and the acquired 
     air carrier, or the merging air carriers, as may be necessary 
     to carry out that section, and shall complete the review 
     required by that section within a reasonable period that is 
     not to exceed 180 days from the date on which the Secretary 
     receives the requested information from all parties.
       (c) Conforming Amendment.--The chapter analysis for chapter 
     417 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding at 
     the end the following;

``41722. Mergers and acquisitions''.

     SEC. 4. COMPETITIVE ACCESS TO GATES, FACILITIES, AND OTHER 
                   ASSETS.

       (a) Subchapter I of chapter 417, as amended by section 3, 
     is further amended by adding at the end thereof the 
     following:

[[Page S1710]]

     ``Sec. 41723. Competitive access to gates, facilities, and 
       other assets

       ``(a) DOT Review of Gates, Facilities, and Assets.--Within 
     90 days after the date of the enactment of Aviation 
     Competition Restoration Act, the Secretary of Transportation 
     shall investigate the assignment and usage of gates, 
     facilities, and other assets by major air carriers at the 
     largest 35 airports in the United States in terms of air 
     passenger traffic. The investigation shall include an 
     assessment of--
       ``(1) whether, and to what extent, gates, facilities, and 
     other assets are being fully utilized by major air carriers 
     at those airports;
       ``(2) whether gates, facilities, and other assets are 
     available for competitive access to enhance competition; and
       ``(3) whether the reassignment of gates, facilities, and 
     other assets to, or other means of increasing access to 
     gates, facilities, and other assets for, air carriers (other 
     than dominant air carriers (as defined in section 
     41722(e)(2)) would improve competition among air carriers at 
     any such airport or provide other benefits to the flying 
     public without compromising safety or creating scheduling, 
     efficiency, or other problems at airports providing service 
     to or from those airports.
       ``(b) Authority of Secretary To Make Gates, Etc., 
     Available.--The Secretary shall require a major air carrier, 
     upon application by another air carrier or on the Secretary's 
     own motion to make gates, facilities, and other assets 
     available to other air carriers on terms that are fair, 
     reasonable, and nondiscriminatory to ensure competitive 
     access to those airports if the Secretary determines, on the 
     basis of the investigation conducted under subsection (a), 
     that such gates, facilities, and other assets are not 
     available and that competition would be enhanced thereby at 
     those airports.
       ``(c) Definitions.--
       ``(1) Major air carrier.--In this section the term `major 
     air carrier' means an air carrier certificated under section 
     41102 that accounted for at least 1 percent of domestic 
     scheduled-passenger revenues in the 12 months ending March 31 
     of each year, as reported to the Department of Transportation 
     pursuant to part 241 of title 14, Code of Federal 
     Regulations, and identified as a reporting carrier 
     periodically in accounting and reporting directives issued by 
     the Office of Airline Information.
       ``(2) Asset.--The term `asset' includes slots (as defined 
     in section 41714(h)(4)) and slot exemptions (within the 
     meaning of section 41714(a)(2)).''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--The chapter analysis for chapter 
     417 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by inserting 
     after the item relating to section 41722 the following:

``41723. Competitive access to gages, facilities, and other assets''.

     SEC. 5. UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION IN AIR TRANSPORTATION.

       (a) Unfair Competition Through Use of Gates, Facilities, 
     and Other Assets.--Section 41712 of title 49, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(c) Underutilization of Gates, Facilities, or Other 
     Assets.--
       ``(1) In general.--It is an unfair method of competition in 
     air transportation under subsection (a) for a dominant air 
     carrier at a dominated hub airport--
       ``(A) to fail to utilize gates, facilities, and other 
     assets fully at that airport; and
       ``(B) to refuse, deny, or fail to provide a gate, facility, 
     or other asset at such an airport that is underutilized by 
     it, or that will not be fully utilized by it within 1 year, 
     to another carrier on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory 
     terms upon request of the airport, the other air carrier, or 
     the Secretary.
       ``(2) Requesting carrier must file with dot.--An air 
     carrier making a request for a gate, facility, or other asset 
     under paragraph (1) shall file a copy of the request with the 
     Secretary when it is submitted to the dominant air carrier.
       ``(3) Availability of gates and other essential services.--
     The Secretary shall ensure that gates and other facilities 
     are made available at costs that are fair and reasonable to 
     air carriers at covered airports where a `majority-in-
     interest clause' of a contract or other agreement or 
     arrangement inhibits the ability of the local airport 
     authority to provide or build new gates or other essential 
     facilities.
       ``(4) Definitions.--In this subsection:
       ``(A) Dominant air carrier.--The term `dominant air 
     carrier' has the meaning given that term by section 
     41722(e)(2).
       ``(B) Dominated hub airport.--The term `dominated hub 
     airport' has the meaning given that term by section 
     41722(e)(1).
       ``(C) Covered airport.--The term `covered airport' has the 
     meaning given that term by section 47106(f)(3).
       ``(D) Asset.--The term `asset' includes slots (as defined 
     in section 41714(h)(4)) and slot exemptions (within the 
     meaning of section 41714(a)(2)).''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 155 of the Wendell H. 
     Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act of the 21st Century 
     (49 U.S.C. 47101 nt) is amended by striking subsection (d).

     SEC. 6. AIP COMPETITION FUNDING.

       (a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 471 of title 49, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:

     ``Sec. 47138. Competition enhancement program

       ``(a) In General.--The Secretary of Transportation shall 
     make project grants under this subchapter from the Airport 
     and Airway Trust Fund for gates, related facilities, and 
     other assets to enhance and increase competition among air 
     carriers for passenger air transportation.
       ``(b) Secretary May Incur Obligations.--The Secretary may 
     incur obligations to make grants under this section.
       ``(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are 
     authorized to be appropriated from the Airport and Airway 
     Trust Fund $300,000,000 for fiscal year 2002, such amount to 
     remain available until expended.''.
       (b) AIP Grants.--Section 47107 of title 49, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(q) Gates, Facilities, and Other Assets.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary of Transportation may 
     approve an application under this subchapter for an airport 
     development project grant at a dominated hub airport only if 
     the Secretary--
       ``(A) receives appropriate assurances that the airport will 
     provide gates, facilities, and other assets on fair, 
     reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms to air carriers, 
     other than a dominant air carrier, to ensure competitive 
     access to essential facilities; or
       ``(B) determines that gates, facilities, and other assets 
     are available at that airport on a fair, reasonable, and 
     nondiscriminatory basis to air carriers other than a dominant 
     air carrier.
       ``(2) Definitions.--In this subsection:
       ``(A) Dominant air carrier.--The term `dominant air 
     carrier' has the meaning given that term by section 
     41722(e)(2).
       ``(B) Dominated hub airport.--The term `dominated hub 
     airport' has the meaning given that term by section 
     41722(e)(1).
       ``(C) Asset.--The term `asset' includes slots (as defined 
     in section 41714(h)(4)) and slot exemptions (within the 
     meaning of section 41714(a)(2)).''.
       (c) PFC Funds.--Seciton 40117 of title 49, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(l) Facilities for Competitive Access.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary may approve an application 
     under subsection (c) for a project at a dominated hub airport 
     only if the Secretary--
       ``(A) receives appropriate assurances that the airport will 
     provide gates, facilities, and other assets on fair, 
     reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms to air carriers, 
     other than a dominant air carrier, to ensure competitive 
     access to essential facilities; or
       ``(B) determines that gates, facilities, and other assets 
     are available at that airport on a fair, reasonable, and 
     nondiscriminatory basis to air carriers other than a dominant 
     air carrier.
       ``(2) Definitions.--In this subsection:
       ``(A) Dominant air carrier.--The term `dominant air 
     carrier' has the meaning given that term by section 
     41722(e)(2).
       ``(B) Dominated hub airport.--The term `dominated hub 
     airport' has the meaning given that term by section 
     41722(e)(1).
       ``(C) Asset.--The term `asset' includes slots (as defined 
     in section 41714(h)(4)) and slot exemptions (within the 
     meaning of section 41714(a)(2)).''.
       (d) Conforming Amendment.--The chapter analysis for 
     subchapter I of chapter 471 of such title is amended by 
     inserting after the item relating to section 47137 the 
     following:

``47138. Competition enhancement program''.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, today I join my colleague, Senator 
Hollings, in introducing the Aviation Competition Restoration Act. This 
legislation would give the Department of Transportation additional 
authority to review airline industry mergers and to enhance competition 
and access at dominated hub airports. If Congress does not act quickly 
to address the problems of industry consolidation and the reduction in 
meaningful competition, consumers will suffer as air fares inevitably 
increase and choices decline.
  Not since deregulation of the airline industry have we faced such a 
critical point in the history of air transportation in this country. We 
are closer than ever to seeing an industry totally dominated by three 
mega-airlines. Last year, United proposed purchasing US Airways. 
Earlier this year, American Airlines announced that it would purchase a 
faltering TWA and join with United to carve up US Airways. Since then, 
Delta and Continental have talked about some type of combination if the 
other mergers occur. These developments do not bode well for consumers.
  I recognize that there may be some benefits to these mergers. But the 
harm that will be inflicted on consumers far outweighs any gains. As 
the number of competitors dwindles, air travelers are almost certain to 
get squeezed. The Commerce Committee has held numerous hearings since 
the first deal was announced. I continue to believe that these 
proposals are not good for the consumer.
  Last year, the Commerce Committee approved a Senate Resolution 
expressing deep concern about the proposed United-US Airways deal. 
Expressions of

[[Page S1711]]

concern are no longer enough. We must act to ensure that the Executive 
Branch has the tools to thoroughly evaluate these proposals and their 
effect on competition. We must also give them the tools to effectuate a 
more competitive environment. The Airline Competition Restoration Act 
would give the Department the authority to ensure that carriers have 
competitive access to critical airport markets by reallocating gates, 
facilities and other assets used or controlled by an air carrier prior 
to approving a merger or in other non-competitive circumstances.
  This bill is just one piece of a potential solution to the tremendous 
problems that air travelers face on a daily basis. More people are 
flying now than ever before. That means that more people are affected 
by the lack of capacity, antiquated air traffic control, and over 
scheduling that continue to plague aviation travel. We had 674 million 
people fly last year. That number is expected to reach one billion 
within 10 years. One billion air travelers in a system that has 
basically reached gridlock today should be of great concern to all of 
us.
  This is not a partisan issue. This is not a rural or urban issue. 
This is an issue that affects the business traveler and the leisure 
traveler. We must act to enhance competition and prevent further 
gridlock and delay in our aviation system. I look forward to working 
with my colleagues to try and address these issues in the coming 
months.
                                 ______