[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 22 (Thursday, February 15, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1532-S1536]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
RECONCILIATION PROCESS REFORM
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, one of the most significant pieces of
legislation ever enacted by Congress was the Congressional Budget Act
of 1974. In my capacity as Majority Whip, as well as Chairman of the
Senate Rules Committee's Subcommittee on the Standing Rules of the
Senate, I was deeply involved in the preparation of the Senate version
of that bill, S. 1541. I assembled a staff working group to make
extensive revisions to a bill that had been reported out of the
Committee on Government Operations. That staff group consisted of
representatives of the chairmen of the ten standing committees of the
Senate, four joint committees, the House Appropriations Committee, the
Congressional Research Service, and the Office of Senate Legislative
Counsel, and the parliamentarian of the Senate--at that time, Robert
Dove.
On March 19, 1974, we took S. 1541 to the Senate Floor. At that time
I stated that, ``when Senators look back some years in the future, many
may be able to say that this was among the most important measures
acted upon during our entire service in Congress.''
As I pointed out in my remarks on March 19, 1974, ``In the fifty
years subsequent to the enactment of the Budget and Accounting Act,
Congress had permitted its `power of the purse' under The Constitution
to slip away, or diminish.'' That trend, as I further pointed out, had
been magnified during the previous five years. While presidents over
many decades had occasionally seen fit to withhold funds appropriated
by Congress, in the years leading up to the enactment of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the President had expanded this
practice to cover programs throughout the Government. Many billions of
dollars had been withheld, not because of any changes in circumstances
after the action of the Congress in approving the funding, but merely
because the President did not agree with the priorities or the
judgments made by the Congress. As a consequence, the confidence of the
public in its Government processes had been diminished.
In order to give force, then, to Congress's spending choices, and in
order to stop this arbitrary withholding by the executive branch, it
was necessary to put into place a new Budget and Impoundment Control
Act. S. 1541 established a comprehensive congressional budget process.
Under that act, a budget reconciliation process was established as an
optional procedure to enhance Congress's ability to change current law
in order to bring revenue and spending levels into conformity with the
targets of the budget resolution.
Let me repeat that sentence. There are probably Senators who wonder,
why do we have a reconciliation process? Why was it created in the
first instance? Let me say again, under that act, a budget
reconciliation process was established as an optional procedure to
enhance Congress's ability to change current law in order to bring
revenue and spending levels into conformity with the targets of the
budget resolution.
At the time of the enactment of the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, it was thought that Congress would
pass its first budget resolution at the beginning of the session,
followed by the annual appropriation bills and any other spending
measures.
Perhaps I should say that again, just to show how far we have
wandered from the course originally conceived by the Congress as the
reconciliation process. At the time of the enactment of the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, it was
thought that Congress would pass its first budget resolution at the
beginning of the session, followed by the annual appropriation bills--
all of them; today that would be 13 annual appropriation bills--
followed by the annual appropriation bills and any other spending
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measures. Then Congress would issue any reconciliation instructions
that might be necessary to bring the spending and the revenues in line
with the budget resolution. That process was to then involve the
passage of a second budget resolution.
Reconciliation involves a two-stage process in which reconciliation
instructions are included in the budget resolution in order to direct
appropriate committees to achieve the desired budgetary results, and
then to incorporate those results into an omnibus bill which is
considered under expedited procedures in the House and the Senate.
In its report entitled, ``The Budget Reconciliation Process: Timing
of Legislative Action,'' updated October 24, 2000, the CRS states that
reconciliation was first used during the administration of President
Carter in calendar year 1980 for fiscal year 1981. According to the
Congressional Research Service, then, reconciliation was not used at
all from the time of enactment of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974
until 6 years later, in calendar year 1980. During the period since
1980, for fiscal years 1981 through 2001, there have been 14
reconciliation measures enacted into law and three that have been
vetoed.
As was contemplated by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the
reconciliation process has been a very important and powerful tool with
which to enforce the policies of annual budget resolutions. As a
properly used deficit-fighting tool, reconciliation bills that have
been enacted have resulted in well over a trillion dollars in budgetary
savings in the past two decades.
I have often--at least in recent years--referred to the
reconciliation process as a ``bear trap.'' It is a bear trap because of
the fast-track procedures that were included in the Congressional
Budget Act to help Congress enact quickly necessary changes in spending
or in revenues to ensure the integrity of the budget resolution
targets.
This fast-track procedure limits Senate debate on reconciliation
bills to 20 hours, and that time can be further limited by a
nondebatable motion approved by a majority vote so that there being 20
hours on the resolution, a majority at any time could yield back its 10
hours, leaving only 10 hours, and then can proceed to move that the
remaining 10 hours be reduced to 2 hours or 1 hour or a half hour or
zero. That would be a nondebatable motion, and it needs only a majority
to carry. Only germane amendments are allowed to reconciliation bills.
Time on reconciliation bills, as I have already said, may be further
limited by nondebatable motion. A determined majority could, in fact,
as I have indicated, limit Senate consideration of reconciliation bills
to no more than 1 hour, no more than 10 minutes, or no time at all.
Reconciliation bills, unfortunately, have proven to be almost
irresistible vehicles for Senators to use to move all manner of
legislation because of these fast-track procedures. At times, the
misuse has been gross. On June 22, 1981, when the Senate was
considering S. 1377, the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, then-
majority leader, Howard Baker, called up amendment No. 171, which was
cosponsored by me--I was then the minority leader--and by Senator
Domenici of New Mexico, who is chairman of the Budget Committee, and by
Senator Fritz Hollings of South Carolina, the then-ranking member of
that committee.
Let me read a brief excerpt from a colloquy that occurred during the
debate on that amendment:
Mr. Baker. Aside from its salutary impact on the budget,
reconciliation also has implications for the Senate as an
institution. So long as a preponderance of its subject matter
has a budgetary impact, a reconciliation bill could contain
non-budgetary amendments to substantive law, and still be
protected under the Budget Act. That notwithstanding, I
believe--
This is Senator Howard Baker talking--
that including such extraneous provisions in a
reconciliation bill would be harmful to the character of the
Senate. It would cause such material to be considered
under time and germaneness provisions that impede the full
exercise of minority rights.
That was the then-majority leader, a Republican, Howard
Baker, speaking with reference to the protection of minority
rights. His party was not in the minority. His party was in
the majority at that time. But he spoke out on behalf of
minority rights.
Senator Baker further said:
It would evade the letter and spirit of Rule XXII.
It would create an unacceptable degree of tension between
the Budget Act and the remainder of Senate procedures and
practices. Reconciliation was never meant to be a vehicle for
an omnibus authorization bill. To permit it to be treated as
such is to break faith--
This is Republican majority leader, Howard Baker, speaking now --
with the Senate's historical uniqueness as a forum for the
exercise of minority and individual rights.
For principally these reasons, I have labored with the
distinguished minority leader--
Referring to Senator Robert C. Byrd--
with the chairmen and ranking minority member of the Budget
Committee, and with other committee chairmen to develop a
bipartisan leadership amendment. This amendment would strike
from the bill subject matter which all these parties can
agree is extraneous to the reconciliation instructions set
forth last month in House Concurrent Resolution 115. What
will remain in the bill is directly responsive to these
instructions, has a budgetary savings impact, and plainly
belongs in a reconciliation measure.
That is the end of my excerpt of Senator Baker's remarks.
Mr. President, I followed Senator Baker's comments in 1981, as
follows:
Mr. Byrd. Mr. President, if the reconciliation bill is
adopted in its present form, it will do violence to the
budget reform process. The reconciliation measure contains
many items which are unrelated to budget savings. This
development must be viewed in the most critical light, to
preserve the principle of free and unfettered debate that is
the hallmark of the United States Senate.
The ironclad parliamentary procedures governing the debate
of the reconciliation measure should by no means be used to
shield controversial or extraneous legislation from free
debate. However, language is included in the reconciliation
measure that would enact routine authorizations that have no
budget impact whatsoever. In other cases, legislation is
included that makes drastic alterations in current policy,
yet, has no budgetary impact.
The reconciliation bill, if it includes such extraneous
matters, would diminish the value of Rule XXII. The Senate is
unique in the way that it protects a minority, even a
minority of one with regard to debate and amendment. The
procedures that drive the reconciliation bill set limits
on the normally unfettered process of debate and amendment
because policy matters that do not have clear and direct
budgetary consequences are supposed to remain outside its
scope, talking about the scope of a reconciliation bill.
I went on to say at that time:
The amendment offered by the majority leader--
Meaning Mr. Baker--
and me omits several nonbudget related authorizations which
should also be stricken from this bill. The fact that they
were not included in this amendment should not be construed
as accepting their inclusion in the bill.
We have gone as far as we can go in this amendment, but we
have not gone as far as we should go.
And then, Mr. President, the amendment was agreed to by voice vote.
The Senate's first several years' experience with reconciliation was
described in a Congressional Research Service report entitled ``The
Senate's Byrd Rule Against Extraneous Matters in Budget Reconciliation
Bills,'' updated July 9, 1998. In that report, CRS states that
reconciliation legislation often contained many provisions that were
extraneous to implementing budget resolution policies. Reconciliation
submissions by committees have included things that had no budget
effect, that increased spending or reduced revenues when the
reconciliation instructions called for reduced spending or increased
revenues, or that violated another committee's jurisdiction. It was for
this reason that I put forth what has come to be known as the ``Byrd
rule'' as a means of curbing such practices.
The Byrd rule has been extended and modified several times over the
years and in 1990 was incorporated into the Congressional Budget Act of
1974 as section 313 and made permanent, 2 U.S.C. 644.
I will not take the time of the Senate to go into great detail about
the operations of the Byrd rule as applied to reconciliation measures.
Suffice it to say, however, that, in general, a point of order
authorized under the Byrd rule
[[Page S1534]]
may be raised in order to strike extraneous matter already in the bill
as reported or discharged--or in the conference report--or to prevent
the incorporation of extraneous matter through the adoption of
amendments or motions.
A motion to waive the Byrd rule or to sustain an appeal of the ruling
of the Chair on a point of order raised under the Byrd rule requires an
affirmative vote of three-fifths of the membership of the Senate. It
takes 60 votes to waive that Byrd rule.
That Byrd rule has been criticized up one side and down the other. It
has been criticized by the other body, by Members of the other body
critical of the Byrd rule, but they should be thankful for the Byrd
rule.
What I am attempting to lay out for the Senate today is the fact that
this reconciliation process, while being very effective in enabling
Congress to meet its deficit reduction targets over the past two
decades, is fraught with opportunities for abuse because of its fast-
track procedures.
When we created this reconciliation bill process, it was unthinkable
that it would be used in ways that it has come to be used. The
procedures have been abused. The abuse consists in the fact that those
procedures take away from Senators the opportunity to offer their
amendments and to debate them fully. That is the Senate's raison
d'etre, its reason for being.
Reconciliation is a nonfilibusterable ``bear trap'' that should be
used very sparingly and, I believe, only for purposes of fiscal
restraint. That was the intention in the beginning. It was not intended
to be used as a fast track in order to ram through very controversial,
very costly tax cuts or to ram through authorization measures that
otherwise might entail long and vigorous debate. In other words,
reconciliation should be used only for reducing deficits or for
increasing surpluses in years when no deficits are projected.
Relevant to this matter is a statement made on the Senate floor by
the distinguished chairman of the Budget Committee, Mr. Domenici, and
repeated in the ``Budget Process Law Annotated, 1993 edition,'' on page
204. Here is what he said:
Mr. President, will the distinguished minority leader--
Senator Byrd--
permit me to respond to what ``extraneousness'' means thus
far in its evolution in the Senate? Let me suggest that,
going back to 1981, we have evolved these four definitions,
and I believe they are used by minority and majority members
of the committee now. I would just read them quickly:
One, provisions that have no direct effect on spending and
which are not essential to achieving the savings.
Two, provisions which increase spending and are not so
closely related to saving provisions that they cannot be
separated.
Three, provisions which extend authorizations without
saving money, and which are not so closely related to saving
provisions that they cannot be separated.
Four, provisions which invade another committee's
jurisdiction, whether or not they save money.
And I am not saying that is all inclusive, but, up to this
point, that is what we have been using.''
So, Mr. President, there we have it, the statement in 1985 of Mr.
Domenici, our distinguished Budget Committee chairman, as to what
should be considered ``extraneous'' in reconciliation bills going back
to 1981.
Nevertheless, in recent years, regrettably, the Republican
congressional leadership has chosen to stray from the definitions set
forth by Mr. Domenici. In fact, our distinguished Democratic Leader,
Mr. Daschle, came to the Senate Floor on May 21, 1996, during
consideration of the fiscal year 1997 budget resolution, and delivered
very eloquent remarks concerning the fact that the budget resolution
then before the Senate contained reconciliation instructions which in
our distinguished leader's view should not have been in order,
essentially because that budget resolution for fiscal year 1997
instructed a committee to produce a reconciliation measure that
actually increased the deficit. At that time, Mr. Daschle pointed out
what I believe most Senators felt in their hearts was the proper use of
the reconciliation process, namely, that reconciliation instructions
should be used to ensure that authorizing committees achieved their
deficit- reducing targets and that they should be used as a way of
forcing deficit reduction on committees. That should be the sole reason
for using the highly restricted vehicle called reconciliation.
As our Democratic leader, Mr. Daschle, stated, ``We deprive Senators
of their normal right to debate and amend only because we seek to
ensure that the committees follow through in the crucial business of
exercising fiscal responsibility.'' Nevertheless, the Chair ruled that
the reconciliation instructions in question were in order, and the vote
on the appeal of that ruling sustained the chair by a party-line vote
of 57 yeas to 43 nays. And, so, those reconciliation instructions were
included in the fiscal year 1997 budget resolution. It bears noting
that the conference report on the budget resolution for 1997, on pages
82-83, contained a discussion concerning that year's reconciliation
process. I quote from page 82 of that conference report as follows,
``Notwithstanding the fact that the authors of the 1974
Budget Act were neutral as to the policy objectives of
reconciliation, since 1975, reconciliation and reconciliation
legislation has been used to reduce the deficit. The
conferees note that, while this resolution includes a
reconciliation instruction to reduce revenues, the sum of the
instructions would not only reduce the deficit, but would
result in a balanced budget by 2002.''
So, Mr. President, the fiscal year 1997 reconciliation instructions,
according to the conference report, resulted in deficit reduction,
despite the fact that one of those reconciliation instructions allowed
for a tax cut.
Now that brings us to the problem we have faced in the last two
years. In 1999, the reconciliation process was used by the Republican
leadership to allow for a $792 billion tax cut to be brought to the
Senate using fast-track budget reconciliation procedures, taking away
the rights of Senators to debate fully and amend that tax cut bill. I
believe this was the first time (or at least one of the rare times)
that reconciliation instructions were issued that mandated a worsening
of fiscal discipline for the Federal Government. Unlike the fiscal year
1997 budget resolution, I do not believe that the budget reconciliation
instructions in 1999 resulted in improving the fiscal status of the
Federal budget. Again, in the year 2000, the reconciliation process was
used to allow for major tax cuts to be brought before the Senate in
reconciliation bills. In short, we have, in my view, abused and
distorted beyond all recognition the original, very limited purpose for
the optional reconciliation procedure.
Now, Mr. President, we have reason to believe the majority will again
this year, put together a budget resolution which will contain
reconciliation instructions to the Senate Finance and House Ways and
Means Committees directing them, this time, to bring forth a $2
trillion tax cut bill. Bad habits tend to perpetuate, it seems.
In a recent article entitled, ``Budget Battles, Government by
Reconciliation,'' in the National Journal on January 9, 2001, the
author, Mr. Stan Collender, states that, ``. . . At this point, there
is talk about at least five different reconciliation bills--three for
different tax proposals and two for various entitlement changes. Still
more are being considered. Taking advantage of the reconciliation
procedures in this way would not be precedent-shattering, though it
would clearly be an extraordinary extension of what has been done
previously. Nevertheless, it would be the latest in what has become a
steady degradation of the congressional budget process.''
Amen. Amen. A steady degradation of the congressional budget process.
``Reconciliation, which was created to make it easier to impose budget
discipline, would instead be used to make it easier to get around other
procedural safeguards with the result being more spending and lower
revenues.'' We have virtually turned reconciliation on its head.
Mr. President, there is no reason whatever to consider the
President's tax cut proposal as a reconciliation bill. The Senate
should take up that massive tax cut proposal, which could result in
loss of revenues to the Federal Treasury of over $2 trillion over the
coming decade, as a freestanding measure, and today I'm writing to the
two leaders urging that be done. It should be fully debated and
amended. That is what was done in 1981 when Howard Baker was majority
leader and I was minority leader.
[[Page S1535]]
President Reagan sent to Congress his tax cut proposal, as well as
numerous proposals to cut spending. Appropriately, Congress used the
reconciliation process to accomplish the spending cuts in the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, but the Reagan tax cuts were brought
before the Senate as a freestanding bill and were fully debated without
depending on reconciliation fast-track procedures. More than one
hundred amendments were disposed of and the Reagan tax cut bill was
debated for twelve days prior to its passage. The Senate Republican
leadership chose to do the right thing by bringing the Reagan tax cut
bill to the Senate as a freestanding measure, rather than to use fast-
track reconciliation procedures. It was thoroughly aired and the
President's leadership was strengthened in the process. Taking the easy
way, doing the expedient thing rarely requires much leadership. The
Republican Leader, Howard Baker, did the right thing for his President,
for the Senate, and for the country.
In 1994, my own leadership pleaded with me--my own Democratic
leader--at length to agree to support the idea that the Clinton health
care bill should be included in that year's reconciliation package. Not
only did then Majority Leader Mitchell attempt to persuade me to go
along, President Clinton also pressed me to allow his massive health
care bill to be insulated by reconciliation's protections. And
particularly the request to me was, ``don't make a point of order under
the Byrd rule.'' That would require 60 votes to overcome. There was the
key: the Byrd rule.
Mr. President, I could not--and I stated so to my own majority
leader, and I stated so to my own party leader in the White House--I
could not in good conscience look the other way and allow what was
clearly an abuse of congressional intent to occur. I intended, if
nobody else did, to make that point of order under the Byrd rule.
So confronted with that situation, our majority leader and the others
who were calling on me to go along accepted in good grace the fact that
there was no point in pursuing that course.
I felt the changes, as dramatic as the Clinton health care package
which would dramatically affect every man, woman, and child in this
Nation, had to be subject to scrutiny by the people of this country
through amendment and debate. I said to the President, and I said to my
majority leader, and I said to others who importuned me to go along, I
said I cannot in good conscience allow the rule to be abused. The
people of this country are entitled to know what is in the bill. It is
a very complicated bill. It will be a very costly bill, a very far-
reaching bill. Not only the people of this country but also the
Senators who are voting on the bill need to know what is in it. They
have a right to know what is in it. So I could not and I would not and
I did not allow that package to be handled in such a cavalier manner.
That wasn't easy to do. I stood up against my own majority leader. I
stood up against the President of my own party and the White House.
It was the threat--the threat--of the use of the Byrd rule that
bolstered my position. I had 60 votes; that 60-vote provision was in my
hand. In other words, I make the point of order, and if the Senate
waives it, it takes 60 votes. It would be pretty hard to do. So my view
prevailed, and ultimately, the Clinton health care proposal was not
passed.
It is time for this abuse of the reconciliation process to cease. We
should not be using tight expedited procedures to take up measures that
worsen the fiscal discipline of the Federal budget and that have far
reaching, profound impacts on the people of this Nation.
Take up measures of that kind and debate them for only 20 hours, if
the full 20 hours allowed should be taken? Or debate them for half that
long? Is that the way to fulfill our obligation to the people of this
country? Is that the way that we live up to the oath we take to support
and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic?
It is an undermining of the legislative process to use the
reconciliation instrument in order to enact a huge tax bill which is
very controversial. There will be a lot of division of opinion on it.
There are Senators who would want to offer amendments. But that
beartrap of reconciliation measures, if that instrument is used,
Senators will be denied the right to stand on their feet and debate at
length and to offer amendments to that huge tax bill.
It is not just the Senators who would be denied the right to debate
and amend, it is the people, the people who send Senators here, the
people back there on the Plains and the prairies and on the stormy
deep, in the coal mines of this country, in the factories, in the
offices. They are the people who would be denied the opportunity. They
are going to pay for whatever mistake or mistakes such a huge tax cut
measure will promote.
The Bush tax cut bill should be brought up and debated as a
freestanding bill, just as all appropriations bills are handled. Even
emergency supplemental bills, to provide assistance to those who are
hit by natural disasters, are fully debatable and amendable by the
Senate.
If any proposal ever did, the President's tax proposal requires
extensive debate, thought, and caring concern. There are too many
issues, too many unanswered questions. We are finding that out in the
Budget Committee, which is chaired by Mr. Domenici and the ranking
member of which is Senator Kent Conrad. We have had good hearings, good
witnesses, good questions.
The tax proposal could sap the budget of the resources needed to
solve the Social Security and Medicare crises that loom just over the
horizon, due to the impending retirement of the baby boom generation. I
am talking about those people who are sitting out there in front of me;
that is the baby boom generation. I was around a long time before the
baby boom generation came along. A long time. After just 4 years of
surpluses, this bill could put us back on a course towards deficits,
returning us to the days when we had to spend the Social Security
surplus for day-to-day Federal operations. Do you want to go back to
that? Is that where we want to go back to?
This bill would allocate over 42 percent of the tax cuts to the
highest 1 percent of the taxpayers; over 42 percent of the tax cuts to
the highest 1 percent of the taxpayers. One might say they are the
people who pay that, pay most of the taxes. Well, wouldn't you like to
be among that group? I would like to be in that group that pays most of
the taxes. So shouldn't we have a discussion about this? Shouldn't we
have a debate about it?
Hear me, shouldn't we have a debate on this matter? I urge the
leaders of this body to consider this. Give us a debate on this matter.
Let the Senate work its will, after thoughtful debate and with Senators
having an opportunity to offer amendments.
If this bill undermines the financial markets' confidence that our
Government is committed to long-term fiscal discipline, it could return
us to the days of high interest rates, making the average wage earner's
mortgage, education, and automobile more expensive. I think that
possibility deserves a little debate. Don't you? How about you, who are
watching through those cameras up there?
Mr. President, the Budget Committee, to the credit of the chairman
and ranking member of that committee, has held numerous thought-
provoking hearings, and the testimony from those hearings has provoked
excellent questions from the members of that committee. But the
testimony has been, by no means, conclusive about the wisdom of huge
tax cuts.
I will support a tax cut. I like to vote for tax cuts. That is the
easiest vote that one can cast. I have cast 15,877 rollcall votes in my
tenure here in this body, and what an easy matter it is to vote to cut
taxes. It doesn't take any courage. It doesn't take any backbone to
vote to cut taxes. That is easy.
But the testimony has not been conclusive about the wisdom of huge
tax cuts, about the size of the surplus, about the accuracy of 10-year
projections--and they are all over the lot, those projections, believe
me. It is like predicting the weather. To predict what a surplus will
be a year from now, 2 years from now, 10 years from now?--the efficacy
of large tax cuts as a tool for stimulating the economy; the wisdom of
having some sort of trigger mechanism before proceeding with these tax
cuts; the ability to protect Social Security and Medicare in light
[[Page S1536]]
of giant tax cuts; or the ability of our economy to continue its
present rate of growth. Serious doubts have been expressed by many of
those testifying and in the Budget Committee, itself, by members on
both sides of the aisle.
Yet I believe that the majority fully intends to bring the budget to
the Senate floor with the President's tax proposal shrouded in this
protective armor of reconciliation, virtually shutting out debate and
precluding amendments by the full membership of this body--by the full
membership of this body.
Why hold these excellent, thought-provoking hearings at all, if that
is the plan? Why do we have to have hearings, if that is the plan from
the beginning?
Hearings are intended to try to discover the flaws in a proposal, and
to help Members make an informed judgment about the wisdom of
proceeding with a matter. We who serve on the Budget Committee may have
our chance to exercise our judgment on the budget, but what about the
rest of the body? There are many, many views in this Senate on both
sides of the aisle, and these views deserve to be heard.
We are talking about a gargantuan tax cut--a behemoth, which
threatens to eat up the surplus, drain the Social Security and Medicare
trust funds, cripple domestic discretionary spending, siphon off needed
defense dollars, and leave us fully unprepared to deal with natural
disasters or foreign upheavals. We are talking about making very
dramatic changes in our fiscal policies based on--what? Based on
projections. And your projection is as good as her projection or as
good as his or as good as mine--projections which are admitted by the
projectors, themselves, to be very, very tenuous, indeed.
I believe that the American people, those people out there, out in
the mountains, in the coastal areas, those to the Pacific, to the
Atlantic, from the Canadian-U.S. line to the Gulf of Mexico--all of you
ought to have the benefit of a full and thorough debate about the
choices before us. Do we pay down the debt with surplus monies? Do we
reserve some of the surplus to protect the solvency of the Social
Security and Medicare Trust Funds? How do we go about creating a wise
and thoughtful plan concerning prescription drugs? Do we spend more on
education, and public infrastructure? Do we allow more for Defense
abroad and anti-terrorism at home? These are questions which need to be
put before the full membership of the Senate and the House, and,
through spirited debate and the offering of amendments, before the
American people.
This Senator just strenuously, strenuously objects to having these
far-reaching, critical matters swathed in the protective bandages of a
reconciliation process and ramrodded through this body like some self-
propelled missile. Nobody who has listened to the testimony in the
Budget Committee could possibly claim that the right choices are clear.
They are not clear. There is vast uncertainty and disagreement about
nearly every aspect of our future budget policy.
The President's proposals are not an edict, and the Senate is not a
quivering body of humble subjects who must obey under any and all
circumstances.
I suggest that, if the faint dream of effecting some sort of true
bipartisanship in Washington for a time is ever to jell into something
tangible, reliance on reconciliation as the torpedo to deliver a knock-
out punch for the President is a tactic which must be abandoned.
It is not a fair course. It is not a wise course. And, it is a course
which shortchanges the American people.
We must not shackle the intellects of one hundred Members of the
Senate in this way.
That is what we would be doing. We would shackle, hand and foot, the
intellects of 100 Members. One-hundred representatives of 280 million
people would be shackled in this body, and shackled, as well, on the
other side of the Capitol in the House.
We must not ignore the viewpoints of millions of Americans. We should
not fear the wisdom of open and free-ranging debate about a proposal
which is, at best, risky business. Now is no time to circle the wagons.
Now is the time to hear all the voices and build consensus among
ourselves and among our people.
There will be no victory here, if we make the wrong choices and
plunge this Nation back to deficit status. I implore the Leadership to
bring whatever tax bill we write to the full Senate as a freestanding
non-reconciliation bill for a thorough examination by this body. The
President has said that he wants bipartisanship. He has said that he
has faith in his plan. There is no need to hide behind the iron wall of
reconciliation. Let us not damage the President's leadership with the
ruthless misuse of a process in this body, which may hand him a very
hollow victory, indeed.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I had the opportunity to hear a good part
of the statement by the Senator from West Virginia. As on so many
important occasions, he has spoken for this institution and for our
country. He has reminded us once more that as we care about the sum and
substance of an issue, the process can be a more powerful factor and
force as it is in this particular case almost on the substance because
what we are looking at is a process and a procedure which will deny
this Senate its true role as defined by the Founding Fathers when they
met in Philadelphia and devised this institution of the Senate to be a
place where ideas clash and where the Nation's business is to be
considered in an open and deliberate way. That was going to permit the
opportunity for the fashioning and the shaping of the legislation after
adequate debate and consideration.
He is reminding us once again about our responsibilities to meet our
Founding Fathers' intentions for this institution and how their
definition is actually being corrupted by a procedure which is known as
the reconciliation process, which is a phrase that is probably not well
understood in terms of its significance and importance in the
consideration of this tax reduction but will have a very dramatic
effect on the opportunity for the American people's will to be
expressed by a good debate and by the opportunity for the Senate to
work its will.
This is one of the most important speeches we will hear this year.
I commend the Senator for taking the Senate's time in making it. I
have listened to him as he has studied the propositions during the past
several weeks. I watched him on CNN the other night while he was in
attendance at the Budget Committee and listening to those talking about
providing adequate defense of our country. I watched him for several
hours listening to those presentations. I watched him, as well, in the
Budget Committee when he was listening to those who spoke about the
economic conditions in this country and about the details of the
President's budget. As always, no one studies these issues more deeply
and more thoroughly or more comprehensively.
His speech today is not one of partisanship but one of statesmanship
in reminding the Senate and, most importantly, also the leadership
about its responsibilities to the American people. I thank him for
making it.
I hope, although this Chamber is not well occupied at this moment,
all of our colleagues will take the time to examine this speech in the
Record tomorrow.
I hope he will continue to press these points as we go through this
process in the days and weeks ahead because it is in the interest of
this institution and our country.
I thank the Senator for the time he has taken and for the thoughtful
presentation.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I thank the
Senator from Massachusetts for his time, for his waiting, and for his
very wise words.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
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