[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 21 (Wednesday, February 14, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1384-S1386]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                    NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I take this time to respond to those who 
are suggesting we put off, or even cancel, the deployment of a national 
missile defense system.
  One reason the critics of the program are giving for delay is the 
alleged opposition of our allies, particularly those in Europe. Earlier 
this month at the Munich Conference on International Security, 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made a forceful case for 
deployment of a defense against strategic ballistic missiles. He 
explained the rationale for our missile defense program, and he also 
made it clear that this administration intends to deploy such a system 
as soon as possible.
  He told those attending the conference that deploying a missile 
defense system was a moral issue because ``no U.S. President can 
responsibly say his defense policy is calculated and designed to leave 
the American people undefended against threats that are known to 
exist.''
  Former Secretary of State Kissinger, who negotiated the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, also spoke at the conference. He said a U.S. 
President cannot allow a situation in which ``extinction of civilized 
life is one's only strategy.''
  The response from our European allies was very encouraging. For 
months, critics have been saying that our allies firmly oppose our 
plans to deploy missile defenses and would never go along with them. 
But the Secretary General of NATO, George Robertson, said:


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       Now the Europeans have to accept that the Americans really 
     intend to go ahead. . . . Now that the question of 
     ``whether'' it's going to happen has been settled, I want an 
     engagement inside NATO between the Americans and other allies 
     about the ``how'' and the ``when.''

  With respect to the threat, Secretary General Robertson said:

       The interesting point is that there is now a recognition by 
     leaders--American, European, and even Russian--that there is 
     a new threat from the proliferation of ballistic missiles 
     that has got to be dealt with. The Americans have said how 
     they're going to deal with it. The Europeans are being 
     offered a chance to share in that.

  Robertson also added:

       The concept of mutually assured destruction is obsolete. 
     The old equation no longer works out: Russia and the United 
     States in a balance of terror. Now there are groups and 
     States acquiring missile technology and warheads with great 
     facility. We are living in a dangerous new world.

  Germany's views are also changing. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, 
addressing fellow Social Democratic Party members, said recently, ``We 
should be under no illusions that that there will be no difference of 
opinion with the new American leadership under President George W. 
Bush. First and foremost, it won't be about the planned National 
Missile Defense program but about trade policy issues. Differences over 
NMD are not the decisive factor in the German-American relationship.'' 
German Foreign Minister Fischer said that NMD ``above all is a national 
decision for the United States.'' In Moscow this week, he said, ``in 
the end, the Russians are going to accept it somehow.''
  Here in Washington last week, Britain's Foreign Secretary said, ``On 
the question of what happens if national missile defense proceeds; if 
it means the U.S., feels more secure and therefore feels more able to 
assert itself in international areas of concern to us, we would regard 
that as a net gain in security.'' And the Prime Minister of Canada, who 
just a few months ago had joined Russian President Putin in calling for 
preservation of the ABM Treaty, said last week after consulting with 
President Bush, ``Perhaps we are in a different era.''
  The Australian Foreign Minister noted last week that until now,

       A lot of the debate has been directed at the United States. 
     I frankly think an awful lot of the debate should instead be 
     directed not only toward those countries that have got or are 
     developing these missile systems but the countries that have 
     been transferring that missile technology to others. . . . If 
     there were no missiles, there would be no need for a missile 
     defense system.

  Dr. Javier Solana of Spain, former Secretary-General of NATO and now 
the director of foreign policy for the European Union, said ``The 
United States has the right to deploy'' an NMD system. Of the ABM 
Treaty, the so-called ``cornerstone of strategic stability,'' Dr. 
Solana said, ``It is not the Bible.''
  The words we now hear from our European and other important allies 
are signaling changed attitudes. I think they have been influenced by 
the Bush administration's willingness to confront the NMD issue 
squarely, to consult fully with our allies, and to make clear a 
determination to protect this nation and its allies from long-range 
ballistic missile attack. The best ally is a strong one, and the 
actions of the Bush administration are an overdue reassurance that the 
United States will indeed be a strong alliance partner.
  Of course, not every nation welcomes our NMD plans. France still has 
not embraced the concept, and Russia and China continue their 
opposition. But this shouldn't change our plans to deploy missile 
defenses. Our action threatens no nation, although it will create an 
obstacle for those who would threaten the U.S. Those who mean us no 
harm have nothing to fear from this purely defensive system; those who 
do mean us harm will learn that the United States will no longer commit 
itself to continuing vulnerability.
  Another reason for proceeding as soon as possible to deploy missile 
defenses to protect the United States was highlighted last week in 
testimony presented to the Senate by the Director of Central 
Intelligence, George Tenet.
  He said, ``we cannot underestimate the catalytic role that foreign 
assistance has played in advancing . . . missile and WMD programs, 
shortening the development times, and aiding production.'' He noted 
that it is increasingly difficult to predict those timelines, saying 
``The missile and WMD proliferation problem continues to change in ways 
that make it harder to monitor and control, increasing the risks of 
substantial surprise.'' Director Tenet went on to say, ``It is that 
foreign assistance piece that you have to have that very precise 
intelligence to understand, and sometimes you get it and sometimes you 
don't.'' Because of the difficulty monitoring foreign assistance, 
Director Tenet added that ``these time lines all become illusory.''

  He also noted that it is a mistake to think of nations who aspire to 
obtain missiles as technologically unsophisticated: ``We are not 
talking about unsophisticated countries. When you talk about Iraq and 
Iran, people need to understand these are countries with sophisticated 
capabilities, sophisticated technology, digital communications.''
  And the danger does not stop when one of these nations acquires the 
technology that is now so freely available. Mr. Tenet warned about what 
he termed ``secondary proliferation'':

       There is also great potential for secondary proliferation, 
     for maturing state-sponsored programs such as those in 
     Pakistan, Iran and India. Add to this group the private 
     companies, scientists and engineers in Russia, China and 
     India who may be increasing their involvement in these 
     activities taking advantage of weak or unenforceable national 
     export controls and the growing availability of technologies. 
     These trends have continued, and in some cases have 
     accelerated over the past year.

  The Director of Central Intelligence added, ``So you know, the kind 
of technology flows that we see from big states to smaller states and 
then the inclination of those people who do the secondary proliferation 
I think is what's most worrisome to me.''
  Some who oppose missile defense deployment point to diplomatic 
initiatives and political change as evidence that the threat is 
diminishing. For example, they point to recent efforts by North Korea's 
leader Kim Jong Il to present a more open face to the world. But 
according to the Director of Central Intelligence, little has actually 
changed with respect to North Korea's proliferation activities. For 
example, he testified,

       Pyongyang's bold diplomatic outreach to the international 
     community and engagement with South Korea reflect a 
     significant change in strategy. The strategy is designed to 
     assure the continued survival of Kim Jong Il by ending 
     Pyongyang's political isolation and fixing the North's 
     failing economy by attracting more aid. We do not know how 
     far Kim will go in opening the North, but I can report to you 
     that we have not yet seen a significant diminution of the 
     threat from North to American and South Korean interests.
       Pyongyang still believes that a strong military, capable of 
     projecting power in the region, is an essential element of 
     national power. Pyongyang's declared military-first policy 
     requires massive investment in the armed forces, even at the 
     expense of other national objectives . . . [T]he North Korean 
     military appears, for now, to have halted its near decade-
     long slide in military capabilities. In addition to the 
     North's longer-range missile threat to us, Pyongyang is also 
     expanding its short- and medium-range missile inventory, 
     putting our allies at risk.

  Similar claims about diminishing threats have been made about Iran. A 
year ago, those who oppose missile defense were suggesting that because 
of the election of reform-minded leaders we need no longer worry about 
that country obtaining more capable missiles. Here is what the Director 
of Central Intelligence had to say about Iran in his testimony last 
week:

       Iran has one of the largest and most capable ballistic 
     missile programs in the Middle East. It's public statements 
     suggest that it plans to develop longer-range rockets for use 
     in a space-launch program. But Tehran could follow the 
     North Korean pattern and test an ICBM capable of 
     delivering a light payload to the United States in the 
     next few years . . .
       Events in the past year have been discouraging for positive 
     change in Iran. . . . Prospects for near-term political 
     reform in the near term are fading. Opponents of reform have 
     not only muzzled the open press, they have also arrested 
     prominent activists and blunted the legislature's powers. 
     Over the summer, supreme leader Khamenei ordered the new 
     legislature not to ease press restrictions, a key reformist 
     pursuit, that signaled the narrow borders within which he 
     would allow the legislature to operate.

  I hope that reformers do make gains in Iran, although senior CIA 
officials have testified that Iranian ``reformers''--such as President 
Khatemi--are enthusiastic about acquiring ballistic missiles. I hope 
Iran will one day be a thriving democracy. But that day has not 
arrived, and our security policy cannot be based on hope.

[[Page S1386]]

  We need missile defense not just because of the capabilities of 
particular countries, but because of the larger problem: The 
proliferation of missile technology has created a world in which we can 
no longer afford to leave ourselves vulnerable to an entire class of 
weapons. Remaining vulnerable only guarantees that some nation will 
seize upon this vulnerability and take the United States and our allies 
by surprise.
  The Bush administration's resolve to deploy missile defenses is an 
essential first step in modernizing our national security assets. 
Because of the neglect our missile defense program has suffered over 
the last eight years, we now face a threat against which we will have 
no defense for several years. Because of decisions made by the previous 
administration, the only long-range missile defense we have in the 
near-term will be the ground-based system planned for initial 
deployment in Alaska. Additional resources must be provided so that 
other technologies and basing modes can be developed and tested. But 
now, we must move forward as fast as we can with the technology we have 
today. We must not prolong our vulnerability by waiting for newer and 
better technology. Therefore, it is important that the administration 
immediately begin construction of the NMD radar at Shemya, AK. 
Construction of the national missile defense radar at Shemya, AK, 
should begin immediately.
  Construction of this radar was to have begun this May, but last 
September President Clinton postponed the decision to proceed, citing 
delays with other elements of the system and a lack of progress in 
convincing Russia to modernize the ABM Treaty to permit NMB deployment. 
However, construction of the Shemya radar is the so-called ``long-
lead'' item in deployment of the NMD system; it is the step that takes 
the longest and must begin the soonest. Delaying construction of the 
NMD radar means delaying deployment of the entire system, and we cannot 
afford more unnecessary delays in this program.
  There is still time to recover from the delays caused by President 
Clinton's postponement last fall. The radar design is complete, the 
funds have been appropriated, and any missile defense system we build 
will have to begin with an X-band radar at Shemy. So we should get on 
with it.
  Beginning construction of the Shemya radar will be a demonstration of 
the determination of our government to fulfill its first constitutional 
duty, which is to provide for the security of our Nation. It will send 
an unmistakable signal to all--friend or potential foe--that the United 
States will not remain vulnerable any longer to those who threaten us 
with ballistic missiles.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, before I propound a unanimous consent 
request, I want to make some brief comments on the bill that I expect 
to call up.

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