[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 20 (Tuesday, February 13, 2001)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E166-E167]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                     

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. TOM LANTOS

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, February 13, 2001

  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, one of the most important foreign policy and 
defense issues the 107th Congress will consider is National Missile 
Defense. Our nation is indeed vulnerable to ballistic missile attack, 
and it is imperative that we take steps to protect ourselves from this 
threat.
  As we address this threat, however, it is critical that we adopt a 
cautious and comprehensive approach. In an article in today's 
Washington Post, our former National Security Advisor, the Honorable 
Samuel R. Berger, makes a compelling case for such an approach. As he 
asserts, we must be careful not to overlook the danger of attack by 
less conventional means, such as a terrorist strike or a weapon of mass 
destruction smuggled across our borders. We must also be careful not to 
undermine our defensive alliances, such as NATO, or needlessly provoke 
a new arms race with our former Cold War adversaries. As we move 
forward on these important issues, Mr. Speaker, it is critical that we 
not allow ourselves as a nation to be lulled into a false sense of 
security or let our guard down in other areas of our national defense.
  Mr. Speaker, I submit the entire text of the insightful article by 
Mr. Berger entitled ``Is This Shield Necessary?'' be placed in the 
Congressional Record. I urge my colleagues to review this article and 
to join me in engaging

[[Page E167]]

all aspects of the National Missile Defense debate in the coming months 
to ensure that whatever course we choose truly strengthen our national 
security and advance our national interests.

                       Is This Shield Necessary?

               [From the Washington Post, Feb. 13, 2001]

                           (Samuel R. Berger)

       In the first weeks of the Bush administration, national 
     missile defense has risen to the top of the national security 
     agenda. Having wrestled with this issue over the last years 
     of the Clinton administration, I believe it would be a 
     mistake to proceed pell-mell with missile defense deployment 
     as though all legitimate questions about the system had been 
     answered. They have not.
       While the United States maintains strength unmatched in the 
     world, the vulnerability of the American people to attack 
     here at home by weapons of mass destruction is greater than 
     ever. Dealing with our vulnerability to chemical, biological 
     and nuclear weapons requires an ambitious, robust, 
     comprehensive strategy.
       But 20 years and tens of billions of dollars later, 
     national missile defense is still a question-ridden response 
     to the least likely of the threats posed by these weapons: a 
     long-range ballistic missile launched by an outlaw nation.
       President Clinton last year decided to continue research 
     and development of national missile defense, but deferred a 
     decision on deployment. In part, this was based on a judgment 
     that we do not yet know whether it will work reliably. The 
     Bush administration should reject arbitrary deadlines and, as 
     part of Secretary Rumsfeld's laudable defense review, take a 
     fresh look at the overall threat we face.
       Without question we need to broaden America's defenses 
     against weapons of mass destruction. But plunging ahead with 
     missile defense deployment before critical questions are 
     answered is looking through the telescope from the wrong end: 
     from the perspective of bureaucratically driven technology 
     rather than that of the greatest vulnerabilities of the 
     American people.
       President Reagan's global shield (SDI) has evolved into a 
     more limited system aimed at defeating long-range missiles 
     launched not by a major nuclear rival but by an irrational 
     leader of a hostile nation, particularly North Korea, Iraq or 
     Iran. Its premise is that an aggressive tyrant such as Saddam 
     Hussein is less likely to be deterred than were the leaders 
     of the Soviet Union by the prospect that an attack on us or 
     our friends would provoke devastating retaliation.
       It is further suggested that lack of a defense could 
     intimidate U.S. leadership: We might have hesitated to 
     liberate Kuwait if we knew Saddam could have delivered a 
     chemical, biological or nuclear weapon to the United States 
     with a long-range ballistic missile.
       But why do we believe Saddam or his malevolent counterparts 
     would be less susceptible to deterrence than Stalin or his 
     successors? Indeed, dictators such as Saddam tend to stay in 
     power so long because of their obsession with self-
     protection. And is it likely we would not use every means at 
     our disposal to respond to a vital threat to our economic 
     lifeline, even if it meant preemptively taking out any long-
     range missiles the other side might have?
       The fact is that a far greater threat to the American 
     people is the delivery of weapons of mass destruction by 
     means far less sophisticated than an ICBM: a ship, plane or 
     suitcase. The tragedies of the USS Cole and sarin gas in the 
     Tokyo subway show that lethal power does not need to ride on 
     a long-range missile.
       We know that we increasingly are the target of a widespread 
     network of anti-American terrorists. We know they are seeking 
     to obtain weapons of mass destruction. If deterrence arguably 
     doesn't work against hostile nations, it is even less so for 
     fanatical terrorists with no clear home address.
       The real issue is what is the most cost-effective way to 
     spend an additional 100 billion or more defense dollars to 
     protect this country from the greatest WMD threats. In that 
     broader context, is national missile defense our first 
     priority?
       Is it wiser to continue research and development and 
     explore alternative technologies while we invest in 
     substantially intensifying the broad-scale, long-term effort 
     against terrorist enemies? (Such an effort would include 
     increased intelligence resources, heightened border security, 
     even training of local police and public health officials to 
     recognize a deadly biological agent.)
       The ultimate question is whether Americans will be more 
     secure with or without a national missile defense. The answer 
     is not self-evident. We can't build the system that is 
     farthest along in development--a land-based one--without 
     cooperation from our allies.
       Their misgivings derive in significant part from the 
     prospect of abrogating the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with 
     Russia; that could unravel the global arms control and 
     nonproliferation system.
       It has been suggested that we could address Europeans' 
     concerns by including them in our missile defense system or 
     helping them build their own. But such an amalgamation would 
     be more capable against Russia and thus more likely to 
     stiffen its resistance to change in the ABM; it could also 
     increase the chance Russia would respond in ways that would 
     reduce strategic stability--for example by retaining 
     multiple-warhead ICBMs it has agreed to eliminate.
       Of course no other country can ever have a veto over 
     decisions we must take to protect our national security. But 
     in making that judgment, we must understand that the basic 
     logic of the ABM has not been repealed--that if either side 
     has a defensive system the other believes can neutralize its 
     offensive capabilities, mutual deterrence is undermined and 
     the world is a less safe place.
       Then there is China. It is suggested that we can work this 
     out with China by at least implicitly giving it a ``green 
     light'' to build up its ICBM arsenal to levels that would not 
     be threatened by our national missile defense.
       This strategy fails to take into account the dynamic it 
     could unleash in Asia: Would China's missile buildup 
     stimulate advocates of nuclear weapons in Japan? How would 
     India view this ``separate peace'' between the United States 
     and China? What effect would that have on Pakistan and the 
     Koreas?
       Will we be more secure as Americans with a missile defense 
     system or less secure? It is not a question that answers 
     itself. But it is a question that requires answers.

     

                          ____________________