[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 17 (Wednesday, February 7, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1126-S1128]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. FEINGOLD:
  S. 272. A bill to rescind fiscal year 2001 procurement funds for the 
V-22 Osprey aircraft program other than as necessary to maintain the 
production base and to require certain reports to Congress concerning 
that program; to the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on 
the Budget, concurrently, pursuant to the order of January 30, 1975, as 
modified by the order of April 11, 1986, with instructions that the 
Budget Committee be authorized to report its views to the 
Appropriations Committee, and that the latter alone be authorized to 
report the bill.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, today I am introducing the Osprey 
Safety, Performance, and Reliability Evaluation Act of 2001. This 
legislation would delay the procurement of the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor 
aircraft for one year, and would require reports from the Secretary of 
the Navy and the Department of Defense's Inspector General regarding 
the program.
  The Osprey is an experimental tilt-rotor aircraft that takes off and 
lands like a helicopter, but flies like an airplane by tilting its 
wing-mounted rotors forward to serve as propellers. The premise for the 
aircraft is to combine the operational flexibility of a helicopter with 
the speed, range, and efficiency of a fixed-wing aircraft.
  The Marines, Air Force, and Navy all want to purchase versions of 
this aircraft. The MV-22 would be used by the Marines for missions such 
as troop and cargo transport and amphibious assault; the CV-22 would be 
used by the Air Force for special operations; and the HV-22 would be 
used by the Navy for search and rescue missions.
  I want to be very clear. This bill does not terminate the V-22 
program. It does not affect the Marine Corps' ability to continue the 
research, development, testing, and evaluation of this aircraft.
  This bill delays the start of full-rate procurement of the MV-22 
Osprey, the Marines' version of this aircraft, for one year. It also 
delays the procurement of four CV-22s, the Air Force's version of this 
aircraft, for one year.
  There are serious allegations and serious questions surrounding the 
V-22 program. Thirty Marines have died in Osprey crashes since 1991. 
Many questions regarding the validity of maintenance records and the 
safety and viability of this aircraft remain unanswered.
  We cannot, in good conscience, move forward with the full-scale 
procurement of the MV-22 until these allegations have been investigated 
fully and until these questions have been answered.
  We should not move forward with the procurement of this aircraft 
until further testing has been done to address potentially serious 
design flaws that could continue to endanger the lives of our military 
personnel.
  We owe it to our men and women in uniform to put their safety first. 
They are willing to go into harm's way while serving their country. 
That service should not include being put into harm's way by a 
potentially unsafe aircraft. We should not move forward with the 
procurement of an aircraft that crashed as recently as December. We 
should not procure this aircraft until the Department of Defense is 
absolutely certain that all major design flaws have been corrected.
  The legislation that I am introducing today will delay full-rate 
production of the MV-22 for one year. This delay is prudent given the 
ongoing controversy that has loomed over this program during the last 
weeks and months.
  I want to reiterate that this legislation does not require the 
Department of Defense to terminate the Osprey program. I appreciate the 
importance of this program to the Marine Corps. I agree that they need 
to replace the aging CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters that they currently 
have. However, I am not sure that the Osprey is the safest and most 
cost-effective alternative to the Sea Knight.
  I know that the leaders of the Marines and the Air Force have the 
greatest concern for the safety of their personnel who are and who will 
be assigned to the Osprey program. I share that concern. My bill would 
require the Marine Corps to wait one year to move to full-rate 
production of the MV-22. Because the airframes for the MV-22 and the 
CV-22 are 90 percent similar, it follows that the four CV-22s the Air 
Force plans to buy this year may be subject to many of the same design 
flaws that have been found in the MV-22. For that reason, my bill would 
also require the Air Force to wait one year to procure the four CV-22s, 
which would be used to train their pilots.
  I realize that an effort is being made to address the design flaws 
found during testing of this aircraft resulting in some changes in the 
new planes that are scheduled to go into production in fiscal year 
2001. However, I remain concerned about the many unanswered questions, 
and the potentially costly retrofits that these aircraft would require 
as more information about the safety and reliability of the Osprey 
continues to come to light. In my view, it would be more prudent and 
more cost effective to wait to move to full-rate production until these 
questions have been answered.
  For those reasons, my bill rescinds most of the fiscal year 2001 
procurement funds for the MV-22 and the CV-22, but leaves enough 
funding in place to maintain the integrity of the production line. 
These rescissions would return to the taxpayers more than $1.2 billion 
dollars. This kind of investment should not go forward until we are 
sure that the Osprey is safe.
  The bill does not affect the $148 million in research and development 
funding for this program. During the next year, vigorous research and 
testing on the problems that remain should continue once the decision 
has been made to resume test flights.

[[Page S1127]]

  This program has a troubled history. Thirty Marines have been killed 
in Osprey crashes since 1991, twenty-three of them in the past eleven 
months alone. The Osprey program has been grounded since the December 
crash that killed four Marines. Following that crash, former Secretary 
of Defense William Cohen appointed a blue ribbon panel to study the 
Osprey program. That panel's report is due to be presented to Secretary 
of Defense Rumsfeld in March or April of this year. In addition, two 
investigations on the December crash are ongoing.
  The safety of our men and women in uniform should be the top priority 
every time the Department of Defense develops and procures new 
technology, whether it be weapons, ships, or aircraft.
  During his tenure as Secretary of Defense, Vice President Cheney 
tried to cancel the V-22 program in each of his budget requests from 
fiscal year 1990 through 1993 because he believed the program was too 
costly. Congress disagreed, and the program continued to receive funds.
  When asked about the Osprey program last month, the Vice President 
said, ``Given the track record and the loss of life so far, it would 
appear to me that there are very serious questions that can and should 
be--and I hope will be--raised about the Osprey.''
  I agree with Vice President Cheney's statement, and I hope that this 
legislation will help to get answers to these serious concerns.
  One additional concern about this program is its cost. The Marines, 
the Air Force, and the Navy each want to buy a version of this 
aircraft, for a total of 458 aircraft at a cost of $38.1 billion, or 
about $83 million per Osprey. Some defense observers have argued that 
the mission of the Osprey could be performed by less costly 
helicopters.
  Another concern is the safety of the aircraft. One of the newspapers 
in my home state of Wisconsin, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, has 
called the Osprey a ``lemon with wings.'' Is that a fair description? 
There is reason to pause and take a good look at the program and find 
out. In addition to the four crashes that have occurred since 1991, 
there are also a number of unanswered questions regarding the design 
and performance of the aircraft.
  The MV-22 underwent operational evaluation, OPEVAL, between October 
1999 and August 2000. During OPEVAL, in June 2000, a draft DoD 
Inspector General's report cited 23 major operational effectiveness and 
suitability requirements that would not be met prior to the scheduled 
December 2000 Milestone III decision on whether to enter into full-rate 
production of the MV-22 in June 2001. The Marine Corps conceded that 
these problems exist, and said they had been aware of these 
deficiencies prior to the beginning of the OPEVAL.
  In October 2000, the Navy announced that the MV-22 had been judged 
operationally effective and suitable for land-based operations. In 
November 2000, the MV-22 was also judged operationally effective and 
suitable for sea-based operations.
  Following the completion of OPEVAL, the Department of Defense's 
Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation, Philip Coyle, released 
his report on the MV-22. This report, which was issued on November 17, 
2000, makes a number of recommendations regarding further testing that 
should be conducted on this aircraft, including testing on a number of 
requirements for the aircraft that were waived during OPEVAL.
  Particularly troubling are the MV-22's Mission Capable, MC, and Full 
Mission Capable, FMC, rates at the end of OPEVAL. These ratings 
demonstrate the availability of the aircraft--the amount of time that 
each MV-22 is able to fly versus the amount of time that each MV-22 is 
unavailable due to maintenance needs.
  The Mission Capable rating represents the percentage of time that the 
test aircraft were able to perform at least one of their assigned 
missions. The Marine Corps' objective for the MC rate is between 82 and 
87 percent. At the end of OPEVAL, the MC rate for the MV-22 was 49 
percent. That means, Mr. President, that the MV-22 test fleet was 
capable of performing at least one of its missions only 49 percent of 
the time during OPEVAL. From 1995-1999, the entire CH-46 fleet Sea 
Knight fleet, which the Osprey is supposed to replace, was rated 
Mission Capable 79 percent of the time.
  The Full Mission Capable rate, FMC, is defined as the percentage of 
time that the aircraft could perform all of its assigned missions. The 
Marine Corps' objective for FMC is 75 percent. At the end of OPEVAL, 
the MV-22 had a FMC rate of only 20 percent. From 1995-1999, the CH-46 
fleet had a FMC rate of 74 percent.
  I want to say this again--at the end of OPEVAL, the MV-22 test fleet 
was capable of performing all of its assigned missions only 20 percent 
of the time. The Coyle report says that part of this low rating can be 
attributed to problems with the blade fold wing stow, BFWS, system, and 
that measures to address this problem will be incorporated into all new 
MV-22s.

  While both the MC and the FMC both improved over the course of 
OPEVAL, both rates are still well below the Marines' own requirements. 
By delaying the full rate production of the MV-22 for one year, the 
Marines will have the opportunity to further improve these crucial 
rates, including testing the modifications to the BFWS system, and 
potentially save countless maintenance hours and costs over the life of 
this program.
  In addition to the problems outlined in the Coyle report, a General 
Accounting Office report released last month titled ``Major Management 
Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense'' also expresses 
concern about the Osprey program. The report states that ``the DoD . . 
. begins production on many major and nonmajor weapons without first 
ensuring that the systems will meet critical performance 
requirements.'' The report cites a number of examples, including the 
Osprey. GAO reports that ``the Navy was moving toward a full-rate 
production decision on the MV-22 Osprey aircraft without having an 
appropriate level of confidence that the program would meet design 
parameters as well as cost and schedule objectives.''
  This finding is just another of the many reasons why the full-rate 
procurement of the MV-22 and the procurement of four CV-22s should be 
delayed. I share GAO's concern about the frequency with which DoD moves 
into full-rate production of systems that may not have been adequately 
tested. This rush to production often raises safety concerns and costs 
the taxpayers large sums for costly retrofits to address problems that 
were often evident--but not fixed--before full-rate production began. 
And even if the Osprey is proven to be safe, questions still remain 
about its cost.
  I am also deeply troubled by the allegations that the Commander of 
the Marine Tilt-Rotor Training Squadron 204 may have ordered his team 
to falsify maintenance records for the MV-22. An anonymous DoD whistle 
blower released a letter and documentation, including an audio tape on 
which it is reported that the Commander is heard telling his squadron 
to ``lie'' about maintenance reports on the MV-22 until the Milestone 
III decision to move into full-rate production of the aircraft had been 
made. This decision was scheduled to be made in December 2000, but has 
been postponed indefinitely. The Commander has been relieved of his 
command pending a full investigation by the DoD Inspector General's 
office.
  There have been reports that high-ranking Marine Corps officers may 
have known about the low MC and FMC rates for the MV-22 in November 
2000, and that one of them may have released inaccurate information to 
the press regarding the Mission Capable rates of the MV-22.
  An electronic mail message from one of these officers to a superior 
officer dated November 11, 2000, states that the information regarding 
the MV-22 MC and FMC rates for November contained in the message should 
be ``close held'' and that the MC and FMC rates for Squadron 204 were 
26.7 percent and 7.9 percent, respectively. The message also said that 
the sender ``had hoped to be able to use some recent numbers next month 
when [his superior] meet[s] with Dr. Buchanan for his Milestone III/FRP 
decision in December . . . this isn't going to help.''
  Later that month, on November 30, 2000, the officer who reportedly 
sent that electronic mail message participated in a DoD press briefing 
at which

[[Page S1128]]

the Osprey was discussed in some detail. During this press briefing, 
the officer said the following regarding the Mission Capable rates of 
the MV-22s being tested by Squadron 204: ``. . . as I was walking down 
here [to the briefing], I pulled the first 13 days of November, 
mission-capable rate on those airplanes, and the average is 73.2 
percent for the first 13 days in November of those nine airplanes. So 
when we start talking about the airplane, even since OPEVAL, improving 
and getting better, the answer is it is absolutely a resounding yes.''
  This information is contrary to the electronic mail message that the 
officer in question reportedly sent to a superior officer only nine 
days before, which stated that the MC rate for the MV-22s being tested 
by Squadron 204 for November 2000 was only 26.7 percent. That is a 
difference of 46.5 percent. News reports last week said that the 
officer admitted sending the message and attributes the discrepancy in 
the MC rate figures to a new software system.
  I understand that these very serious allegations are still being 
investigated, and I agree that all of those involved deserve a fair and 
impartial investigation. We should not rush to judgement about the 
alleged conduct of any of these personnel, all of whom who have 
dedicated their lives to serving and protecting this country. However, 
we must remain cognizant of the fact that the outcome of this 
investigation could have an enormous impact on the Osprey program.
  This still unfolding situation is another reason why the full rate 
procurement of the MV-22 should be delayed. Until these disturbing 
allegations have been fully investigated to determine whether records 
were falsified in order to make the Osprey appear safe and reliable, 
the Department of Defense should not move ahead with this program.
  Because of the safety concerns outlined above, Mr. President, my bill 
requires the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the Congress 
on the V-22 program that includes: a description of the planned uses 
for the fiscal year 2001 research and development funding for the 
Osprey program; a description of the actions taken as a result of the 
Coyle report; and a description of the manner in which the Navy and the 
Marine Corps have responded to the allegations of the falsification of 
maintenance records at Squadron 204. The bill also requires the DoD 
Inspector General to report to the Congress on the results of its 
investigation into the alleged falsification of maintenance records at 
Squadron 204. It would require that these reports be submitted three 
months after the enactment of this legislation or on the date of the 
Milestone III decision regarding full-rate production of the MV-22 
Osprey, whichever is earlier.
  The safety of our men and women in uniform should be the principle 
that guides this important decision. We should not begin to procure the 
MV-22 in mass quantities until we know for certain that this aircraft 
is safe, that its maintenance records are accurate, and that the design 
flaws described in the Coyle report have been adequately addressed.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                 S. 272

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Osprey Safety, Performance, 
     and Reliability Evaluation Act of 2001''.

     SEC. 2. RESCISSIONS.

       (a) In General.--Of the funds made available in the 
     Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2001 (Public Law 
     106-259), the following amounts are rescinded from the 
     following accounts:
       (1) ``Aircraft Procurement, Navy'', $856,618,000, of which 
     $776,760,000 shall be derived from ``V-22 (Medium Lift)'' and 
     $79,858,000 shall be derived from ``V-22 (Medium Lift) (AP-
     CY)''.
       (2) ``Aircraft Procurement, Air Force'', $358,440,000, of 
     which $335,766,000 shall be derived from ``V-22 Osprey'' and 
     $22,674,000 shall be derived from ``V-22 Osprey (AP-CY)''.
       (b) Limitation on Use of Remaining Funds.--Following the 
     rescission made by subsection (a)(1), the balance of the 
     funds remaining available for obligation in the account 
     involved for ``V-22 (Medium Lift)'' may be used only to carry 
     out activities necessary to maintain the production base for 
     such aircraft program.

     SEC. 3. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

       (a) Secretary of the Navy Report.--The Secretary of the 
     Navy shall submit to Congress a report on the V-22 Osprey 
     aircraft program. The report shall include the following:
       (1) A description of the activities carried out, and 
     programmed to be carried out, using funds appropriated for 
     that program for research, development, test, and evaluation 
     for fiscal year 2001.
       (2) A description of the actions taken by the Secretary as 
     a result of the report on that program issued by the Director 
     of Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of 
     Defense dated November 17, 2000.
       (3) A description of the manner in which the Marine Corps 
     and the Department of the Navy have responded to the reports 
     of data falsification concerning the Osprey aircraft by 
     Marine Corps personnel assigned to Marine Medium Tilt-Rotor 
     Training Squadron 204.
       (b) Inspector General Report.--The Inspector General of the 
     Department of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on 
     the results, as of the submission of the report, of the 
     investigation of the Inspector General into the V-22 Osprey 
     aircraft program.
       (c) Time for Submission of Reports.--The reports under 
     subsections (a) and (b) shall each be submitted not later 
     than the earlier of the following:
       (1) The date that is three months after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.
       (2) The date of the Milestone III decision for the V-22 
     Osprey aircraft program approving the entry of that program 
     into full-rate production.
                                 ______