[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 14 (Thursday, February 1, 2001)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E92-E93]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




    DAVID A. HARRIS GIVES THOUGHTFUL INSIGHT ON ISRAEL'S DIFFICULT 
                     POLITICAL AND SECURITY CHOICES

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. TOM LANTOS

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                      Wednesday, January 31, 2001

  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, finding a peaceful solution to the problems 
in the Middle East has long been an important concern of the United 
States. Attempts to reach a resolution of these difficulties, 
unfortunately have thus far failed.
  While workable solutions have been found in short supply, a number of 
extremely helpful insights have been put forward. In this regard, I 
would like to call the attention of my colleagues to a particularly 
insightful article by David A. Harris, Executive Director of the 
American Jewish Committee. Although it was written before the 
inauguration of the new American President and prior to the latest of 
peace negotiations ending in a stalemate, the insights that Mr. Harris 
provides are still timely and important.
  Mr. Speaker, I commend David Harris' thoughts to my colleagues and 
urge them to give his article careful attention.

                                    

  As Israel Makes Fateful Political and Security Choices, Its Friends 
                Abroad Also Are Confronting Hard Truths

(By David A. Harris, Executive Director, The American Jewish Committee, 
                             Jan. 4, 2001)

       In recent months, like many friends of Israel, I've had my 
     share of sleepless nights. With only a few brief moments of 
     either hope or respite, the news has been unremittingly 
     disturbing and depressing. Israel is once again under siege. 
     Every corner of Israel, every Israeli is a potential target. 
     There is no distinction between soldier and civilian, between 
     adult and youth, between dove and hawk, between believer and 
     atheist, or between those living within and those living 
     beyond the Green Line. It may not be all-out war as we saw in 
     1967 or 1973, but it is a calculated Palestinian strategy to 
     obtain through violence what they have heretofore failed to 
     achieve by negotiation.
       Some Israelis and their friends abroad react to this 
     volatile situation by beating their breasts and asking yet 
     again what more Israel might do to meet demands of the 
     Palestinians. Others, at the opposite end of the political 
     spectrum, conclude that not only is the pursuit of peace a 
     dangerous dream but, even more, a risk to the very existence 
     of the state.


                       Decisions on War and Peace

       As I see it, Israel has no clear option, no obvious way to 
     turn, and its predicament is further exacerbated by its 
     complex and polarized domestic situation. In saying this, I 
     do not wish to second-guess the Israeli government and 
     people. I have always taken the view that it is for them, 
     first and foremost, to make the fateful decisions about war 
     and peace and the steps that can lead in either direction. 
     And the sheer survival of Israel over 52 years, not to 
     mention its remarkable growth and development, adequately 
     attests to its uncanny ability to overcome the odds, confound 
     the skeptics, and disprove the doomsayers. Even as I openly 
     worry about the future, then, I am inspired and reassured by 
     Israelis' determination to go on, to fight when necessary, to 
     negotiate for peace whenever possible.
       Today we are confronted with a situation that few, 
     especially in the West, might have predicted. A dovish 
     Israeli government--prepared to cross its own red lines, 
     especially regarding the future status of Jerusalem, in the 
     pursuit of an historic peace agreement with the 
     Palestinians--is faced with violence in the streets, calls 
     for jihad, and terrorist attacks in the heart of the country, 
     while the Arab world lines up foursquare behind the 
     Palestinians and seeks to isolate Israel by depicting it as 
     the trigger-happy-aggressor, the Nazi reincarnation.
       Thus, instead of grasping Israel's outstretched hand and 
     seeking to resolve outstanding issues, however challenging, 
     at the bargaining table, the Palestinians perceived instead a 
     weakened Israel. If proof was needed, it came for them in the 
     unilateral decision to withdraw from Southern Lebanon after 
     Israeli mothers led a campaign to bring their sons home 
     before more were killed at the hands of Hizbullah; in Prime 
     Minister Barak's determination to make peace before the end 
     of the Clinton presidency, which was, in the final analysis, 
     an artificial deadline; and in Israel's perceived 
     vulnerability to the sting of international censure, given 
     Barak's efforts to undo the global public relations impact of 
     the Netanyahu years.
       In effect, Arafat, though the weaker party by far, has 
     skillfully leveraged his position, emerging stronger than 
     might have been imagined. He has, for example, already 
     managed to prove once again that violence does pay--the 
     current deal being brokered by the White House and given 
     tentative approval by Barak appears to go beyond the package 
     on the table at Camp David in July. If so, why should Arafat, 
     from his point of view, stop here?


                       Violence and Negotiations

       Eager to see his long-sought Palestinian state emerge from 
     the ``honor and blood'' of the martyred, ever mindful of the 
     most radical elements among the Palestinians, and determined 
     not to demand less than Anwar Sadat, King Hussein, or Hafaz 
     el-Assad in insisting on Israeli compliance with all his 
     territorial demands. Arafat continues his complete juggling 
     act of encouraging violence and talking peace at one and the 
     same time.
       At the very least, we can expect from Arafat more of the 
     same brinksmanship through the last days of the Clinton 
     Administration, though we don't know what, if anything, will 
     come of it. Knowing how eager the American leader is to leave 
     the political scene with substantial progress to show in the 
     Middle East given his extraordinary investment of time, 
     energy, and the prestige of the presidency, and aware of how 
     committed the Israeli leader has been to making this possible 
     on Clinton's watch, Arafat will squeeze the moment for all 
     it's worth, and then some,
       Not quite, some observers will note. Arafat doesn't hold 
     all the cards. After all, there's an Israeli election around 
     the corner and, without a peace deal, the conventional wisdom 
     is that Barak will fall and Arafat will then have to face his 
     old nemesis, Ariel Sharon, who will make the Palestinian 
     leader's life a lot more difficult. Maybe, but then again, 
     maybe not.
       We in the West make a living out of failing to understand 
     the Middle East. We're so busy superimposing our own deeply 
     ingrained ways of thinking on the region--based in large 
     measure on our rationalism, pragmatism, willingness to 
     compromise, and tendency to mirror-image (``surely they're 
     like us and want the very same things in life as we do'')--
     that we too often end up surprised and puzzled when things 
     don't go as we might expect.
       We don't speak Arabic; we have little contact with Arab 
     culture; we have minimal understanding of the nature of Islam 
     and its pervasive role in the life of the Arab world; we 
     spend too little time reading the writings of Judith Miller, 
     Bernard Lewis, Fouad Ajami, and other knowledgeable observers 
     of the region; and we embrace too quickly as representative 
     those selected Arab voices that sound reassuring to us.
       Yet none of this stops us from thinking we know enough 
     about the region to offer grounded views on diplomacy and 
     strategy. Indeed, the U.S. Government, with its far greater 
     resources and expertise, has stumbled more than once, with 
     fatal consequences, trying to make its way across the Middle 
     East minefields.
       Isn't it just possible that the prospect of a Prime 
     Minister Sharon not only doesn't frighten Arafat but actually 
     appeals to him? Taking a page from Leon Trotsky--the worse it 
     gets, the better it becomes--Arafat may, in fact, perceive 
     advantages in such an outcome: with Sharon demonized in the 
     international news media and sharply criticized in world 
     capitals, Israel could face new international pressures, 
     including renewed calls for UN intervention and increased 
     sympathy for a unilateral declaration of independence.


                       Tests for Barak and Sharon

       And this brings us back to Israel's domestic predicament. 
     Barak, the pollsters say, needs a peace deal before February 
     6 if he is to have a chance at winning the election. Without 
     it, he is saddled with negative images--accusations of 
     political ineptness, willingness to yield to the demands of 
     religious parties despite his calls to marginalize them, and 
     inexperience and imprudence in dealing with the Palestinians. 
     Thus, no matter what he says between now and February 6, no 
     matter how tough his language may be at times, the prevailing 
     assumption is that he needs Arafat to bail him out and both 
     men know it.
       On the other hand, Sharon is a known quantity who is a 
     deeply polarizing figure in Israel. He is seen as 
     representing a return to the Shamir years of a ``fortress 
     Israel'' in eternal conflict with the enemies of the Jewish 
     people. That will not sit well, not for long, I suspect, with 
     many Israelis living in a prospering first-world country that 
     longs for regional stability and even a chilly peace with its 
     neighbors, so that it can finally one day turn to the future 
     and away from the endless cycles of violence of the past.
       After all, if the Israeli left was revealed to be the 
     victim of its own illusions about creating a new Middle East, 
     the Israeli right, illustrated by Sharon, has been the victim 
     of its own illusions about the possibility of maintaining an 
     indefinite status quo of occupation. If Barak is found 
     wanting by the Israeli electorate in his ability to provide 
     answers and solutions, then it's equally likely Sharon, if 
     elected prime minister, will face the same prospect within 
     short order, unless he is able to turn in entirely new policy 
     directions.
       Of course, whoever is elected, Barak or Sharon, will face 
     the very same unruly and

[[Page E93]]

     fractionated Knesset, which further clouds the outlook for 
     stable governance. This is precisely what Benjamin Netanyahu 
     is counting on. Although polls showed him leading both Barak 
     and Sharon, he chose not to run this time around unless the 
     Knesset dissolved itself and also stood for new elections. It 
     was a statesmanlike position, praised by many, including some 
     who do not normally count themselves among Netanyahu's most 
     fervent admirers; it was also a position calculated to 
     elevate his standing in the expectation that whoever is 
     elected in February will not be able to lead for long before 
     yet another round of voting, including parliamentary 
     elections, is needed. At that time, Netanyahu, seeking to 
     cast himself as the true centrist, would almost surely step 
     into the political fray.


               Overriding Political and Strategic Factors

       In the meantime, as Israeli politics seeks to sort itself 
     against the backdrop of the deep and seemingly irreconcilable 
     fissures in Israeli society, certain things seem clear and 
     best not be forgotten.
       First, many of the claims of the Israeli right, especially 
     since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, have proved 
     accurate, though they were largely ignored by those on the 
     left who reflexively dismissed anything said by spokesmen on 
     the right. For example, incitement to hatred among 
     Palestinians has continued unabated and with devastating 
     consequences. Moreover, the accumulation of weapons and the 
     build-up of the Palestinian police and militia, in direct 
     contravention of the Oslo Accords, have created a deadly 
     adversary for Israel. And the wink and nod to Palestinian 
     extremists--many arrested with great fanfare only to be 
     released as soon as no one was paying attention--has 
     undermined the chances for a peaceful settlement with Israel.
       Second, many of the claims of the Israeli left have also 
     proved strikingly accurate, despite attempts by those on the 
     right to dismiss them. Palestinians who not docilely remain 
     under Israeli occupation forever. Neither could Israel expect 
     occupation to continue without some corrosive effects on its 
     democratic values, nor could it absorb the Palestinians in 
     the territories without undoing the Jewish character of the 
     state. And sooner or later, Jewish settlers in remote 
     outposts in Gaza, for example, would become flashpoints for 
     violence between Israelis and Palestinians.
       Third, as a consequence, no one school of thought has a 
     monopoly of wisdom on what is best for Israel. Ideologues, 
     whether of the left or right, become prisoners of their own 
     preset views, and, as a result, tend to adjust the facts to 
     their doctrinal thinking rather than the other way around.
       Fourth, regardless of what happens in the short run 
     respecting Israeli-Palestinian issues, the sad reality is 
     that Israel will continue to face severe challenges in the 
     region, requiring a powerful military, eternal vigilance, and 
     close coordination with the United States.
       Iran and Iraq pose dangerous, and growing, threats, 
     particularly in the nonconventional field. Islamic extremist 
     groups operating in the region will not soon go away. Syria 
     possesses missiles and chemical warheads. Disturbingly, Egypt 
     has embarked on a broad modernization program of its 
     conventional forces and is known to be engaged in research on 
     some nonconventional weapons systems as well. An emerging 
     Palestinian state will alter the political and security 
     landscape for Jordan, with unknown consequences.


                      Pressures on the Arab World

       And, of course, the larger problems of the need for a true 
     reformation in the Arab world, of the glaring absence of 
     democracy and the rule of law, of governmental lack of 
     accountability to its citizens, of endemic corruption and 
     nepotism, of high birth rates and insufficient jobs, of 
     economic stagnation and fear of opening to the world, of the 
     Islamists influence on society, all continue to plague this 
     vast and important region of the world.
       A few pertinent statistics illustrate the dimensions of the 
     problems faced by the Arab world. Fouad Ajami of Johns 
     Hopkins University has pointed out, for example, that 
     Finland, with a population of 5 million, exports more 
     manufactured goods than the entire Arab world combined, with 
     its 22 countries and its population well over 200 million. 
     Israel has a higher per capita GNP than its five contiguous 
     neighbors--Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, 
     and Egypt--combined, and more Internet users by far than all 
     five put together. And impoverished Gaza has a higher 
     birthrate by a multiple of nine than prosperous Bologna, 
     Italy.
       Fifth, we should be under little illusion about such 
     notions as a ``demilitarized Palestinian state'' or ``an end 
     to the conflict.'' A Palestinian state is coming, one way or 
     another, and the debate about whether it is good or bad for 
     Israel seems largely irrelevant. It will happen, and Israel 
     no doubt will do its utmost to establish harmonious ties, but 
     it must also recognize, as a recent CIA report looking ahead 
     to the year 2015 predicted, that ``chilly'' relations are 
     likely to prevail and surveillance and monitoring will be 
     required.
       That Palestinian state will not be demilitarized, I 
     believe, regardless of agreements signed, which could pose a 
     threat both to Israel and Jordan. And there will remain those 
     Palestinians who will seek to continue the struggle with 
     Israel, either because they see Israel proper as their real 
     home, or because they see the Zionists as ``infidels'' and 
     ``modern-day Crusaders'' who have no right to be there, or 
     both.
       Sixth, we need to take very seriously anti-Semitism 
     emanating from the Arab world. Not only is it pernicious and 
     contrary to the promotion of peaceful relations in the 
     region, but it also fuels anti-Semitic attacks against Jews 
     and Jewish targets throughout the world, as we have 
     tragically seen in recent months.
       And finally, we need to remind ourselves of the importance 
     of our own role in making a difference on Israel's behalf. 
     Both in our public education and advocacy efforts in the 
     United States, in which we stress the mutual benefits of 
     close U.S.-Israel ties as well as America's vital national 
     interest in Israel's security in a stable Middle East, and in 
     our diplomatic, exchange and public affairs programs around 
     the world, the American Jewish Committee is making a unique 
     contribution to Israel's well-being and its quest for peace 
     and security. The political and security challenges that lie 
     ahead for Israel will doubtless only heighten the importance 
     of that work.

     

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