[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 10 (Thursday, January 25, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Page S565]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




             DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board 
recently completed a review of the Department of Energy's (DOE) 
nonproliferation programs with Russia and released a report card 
assessing the contributions and needs of those programs. Two renowned 
Americans, former Senator Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler, served as co-
chairmen of a bipartisan task force comprised of technical experts, 
respected academicians and distinguished Congressmen and Senators from 
both political parties representing both chambers of the Congress. My 
colleagues will be interested to know that former Senators on the task 
force included Senators Baker, Boren, Hart, McClure, Nunn, and Simpson. 
Former House Members included Representatives Derrick, Hamilton, and 
Skaggs. In short, this task force brought together an experienced 
bipartisan group of esteemed experts whose views are well respected to 
examine the status of DOE's nonproliferation programs with Russia. The 
report they have produced should be required reading for everyone 
concerned about what the nation needs to do to meet our most important 
national security requirements.
  No one could question that the greatest risks of proliferating 
weapons and materials of mass destruction (WMD) come from the massive 
WMD infrastructure left behind when the Soviet Union dissolved. Experts 
estimate that the former Soviet Union produced more than 40,000 nuclear 
weapons and left behind a huge legacy of highly enriched uranium (HEU) 
and plutonium---enough to build as many or more than 40,000 additional 
nuclear weapons. We are just now beginning to comprehend the vast 
quantities of chemical and biological weapons produced in the former 
Soviet Union. We have learned much about the stockpiles of nuclear, 
biological, and chemical materials that still exist in today's Russia. 
We have a fuller understanding of the extensive industrial 
infrastructure in Russia which is still capable of conducting research 
and producing such weapons. We are anxiously aware of the thousands of 
experienced Russian scientists and technicians who worked in that 
complex, many of whom are in need of a stable income.
  Those huge numbers assume frightening implications when one considers 
that two years ago, conspirators at a Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy 
facility were caught trying to steal nuclear materials almost 
sufficient to build a nuclear weapon. At the same time, the mayor of 
Krasnoyarsk, a closed ``nuclear city'' in the Russian nuclear weapons 
complex, warned that a popular uprising was unavoidable in his city 
since nuclear scientists and other workers had not been paid for many 
months and that basic medical supplies were not available to serve the 
population. In December, 1998, Russian authorities arrested an employee 
at Russia's premier nuclear weapons laboratory in Sarov for espionage 
and charged him with attempting to sell nuclear weapon design 
information to agents from Iraq and Afghanistan. I am certain that many 
of my colleagues in the Senate have heard the stories regarding 
attempted smuggling of radioactive materials by Russian Navy personnel 
aboard their decaying submarine fleet. There are numerous other 
incidents that bring the Russian proliferation threat from 
incomprehensible quantities to real life threats of massive 
destruction.
  In reviewing those threats and the various DOE programs underway to 
meet those dangers, the task force drew several major conclusions and 
recommendations on how we should proceed to reduce and ultimately 
eliminate the proliferation threats posed by Russia. Mr. President and 
colleagues of the Senate, let me cite those findings and 
recommendations for you.
  The task force found that the ``most urgent unmet national security 
threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass 
destruction or weapons--usable material in Russia could be stolen and 
sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American 
troops abroad or citizens at home.'' They noted that ``current 
nonproliferation programs in the Department of Energy, the Department 
of Defense (DoD), and related agencies have achieved impressive results 
(in supporting nonproliferation objectives) . . ., but their limited 
mandate and function fall short of what is required to address 
adequately the threat.''
  The task force calls for the new Administration and the 107th 
Congress to increase our efforts to meet the proliferation threat, the 
dimensions of which we are only beginning to fully understand. In so 
doing, the report recommends that we undertake a net assessment of the 
threat, develop a strategy to meet it using specific goals and 
measurable objectives, establish a centralized command of our financial 
and human resources needed to do the job, and identify criteria for 
measuring the benefits to the United States of expanded 
nonproliferation programs. In particular, the task force urges the 
President in consultation with the Congress and in cooperation with the 
Russian Federation to quickly formulate a strategic plan to prevent the 
outflow of Russian nuclear weapons scientific expertise and to secure 
or neutralize all nuclear weapons-usable material in Russia during the 
next eight to ten year period. The task force estimates that it would 
take less than one percent of the U.S. defense budget or less than $30 
billion over the next decade to do the job.
  In short there is no more cost effective way to achieve our own 
national security goals than by investing in the DOE and DoD 
nonproliferation programs being conducted in cooperation with Russia. I 
urge the President, members of his administration, and my colleagues in 
the Senate to understand the importance of these programs to the 
nation. As we proceed in the uncharted waters of relations between the 
United States and Russia in the coming months and years, I hope we will 
be mindful of the central importance of these programs to our national 
security and to their great significance to cooperative relationships 
between our countries. I urge all of you to read this report carefully 
and support its recommendations during the forthcoming legislative 
cycle.

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