[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 7 (Monday, January 22, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S383-S385]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
By Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself, Mr. Harkin, Mr. Wellstone, and Mr.
Wyden):
S. 113. A bill to terminate production under the D5 submarine-
launched ballistic missile program and to prohibit the backfit of
certain Trident I ballistic missile submarines to carry D5 submarine-
launched ballistic missiles; to the Committee on Armed Services.
DEFENSE LEGISLATION
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, today I am introducing two bills that I
hope will be a first step in helping to change fundamentally the way we
think about our national defense.
As I have said time and again, I strongly support our Armed Forces
and the excellent work they are doing to combat the new threats of the
21st century and beyond. I am concerned, however, that we are not
giving our forces the tools they need to combat these emerging threats.
Instead, a Cold War mentality continues to permeate the United States
defense establishment and we still cling to the strategies and weapons
that we used to fight--and win--the Cold War.
We have an historic opportunity, Mr. President. There is a new
President, a new Congress, and a pending Quadrennial Defense Review--
all at the dawn of a new millennium. We should take advantage of this
opportunity by restructuring our national defense policy to combat the
threats of the new century instead of continuing to guard against the
long-defeated perils of the last one.
In the coming months, I will introduce and support a number of
initiatives that I hope will help to turn the focus of our national
defense policy away from the Cold War that has already been won and
toward fielding a strong, agile force that can meet the emerging
threats of the new century head on.
The two bills I am introducing today are a first step toward this
goal. One of these bills would terminate the operation of the Navy's
Extremely Low Frequency communications system (Project ELF). The other
would end production of the Navy's Trident II submarine-launched
ballistic missile and would prohibit certain back-fits of Trident I
submarines.
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Both of these systems were designed to protect the United States
against an attack by the Soviet Union. Trident submarines, and the
deadly submarine-launched ballistic missiles they carry, were designed
specifically to attack targets inside the Soviet Union from waters off
the continental United States. Project ELF was designed to send short
one-way messages to ballistic and attack submarines that are submerged
in deep waters.
The first bill I am introducing today would terminate operations
under Project ELF, which is located in Clam Lake, Wisconsin, and
Republic, Michigan. I would like to thank the senior Senator from
Wisconsin [Mr. Kohl] and the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Wyden] for
cosponsoring this bill.
This bill would terminate operations at Project ELF, while
maintaining the infrastructure in Wisconsin and Michigan in the event
that a resumption in operations becomes necessary. If enacted, this
bill would save taxpayers nearly $14 million per year.
Project ELF is ineffective and unnecessary in the post-Cold War era.
Since ELF cannot transmit detailed messages, it serves as an expensive
``beeper'' system to tell submarines to come to the surface to receive
messages from other sources, and the subs cannot send a return message
to ELF in the event of an emergency. It takes ELF four minutes to send
a three-letter message to a deeply submerged submarine.
With the end of the Cold War, Project ELF becomes harder and harder
to justify. Our submarines no longer need to take that extra precaution
against Soviet nuclear forces. They can now surface on a regular basis
with less danger of detection or attack. They can also receive more
complicated messages through very low frequency (VLF) radio waves or
lengthier messages through satellite systems. It is hard to understand
why the taxpayers continue to be asked to pay $14 million a year for
what amounts to a beeper system that tells our submarines to come to
the surface to receive orders from another, more sophisticated source.
Further, continued operation of this facility is opposed by most
residents in my state. The members of the Wisconsin delegation have
fought hard for years to close down Project ELF; I have introduced
legislation during each Congress since taking office in 1993 to
terminate it; and I have even recommended it for closure to the Defense
Base Closure and Realignment Commission.
Project ELF has had a turbulent history. Since the idea for ELF was
first proposed in 1958, the project has been changed or canceled
several times. Residents of Wisconsin have opposed ELF since its
inception, but for years we were told that the national security
considerations of the Cold War outweighed our concerns about this
installation in our state. Ironically, this system became fully
operational in 1989--the same year the tide of democracy began to sweep
across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Now, twelve years later,
the hammer and sickle has fallen and the Russian submarine fleet is in
disarray. But Project ELF still remains as a constant, expensive
reminder to the people of my state that the Department of Defense
remains focused on the past.
There also continue to be a number of public health and environmental
concerns associated with Project ELF. For almost two decades, we have
received inconclusive data on this project's effects on Wisconsin and
Michigan residents. In 1984, a U.S. District Court ordered that ELF be
shut down because the Navy paid inadequate attention to the system's
possible health effects and violated the National Environmental Policy
Act. Interestingly, that decision was overturned because U.S. national
security, at the time, prevailed over public health and environmental
concerns.
Numerous medical studies point to a possible link between exposure to
extremely low frequency electromagnetic fields and a variety of human
health effects and abnormalities in both animal and plant species.
In 1999, after six years of research, the National Institute of
Environmental Health Sciences released a report that did not prove
conclusively a link between electromagnetic fields and cancer, but the
report did not disprove it, either. Serious questions remain, Mr.
President, and many of my constituents are rightly concerned about this
issue.
In addition, I have heard from a number of dairy farmers who are
convinced that the stray voltage associated with ELF transmitters has
demonstrably reduced milk production. As we continue our efforts to
produce a sustainable balanced federal budget and reduce the national
debt, and as the Department of Defense continues to struggle to address
readiness and other concerns, it is clear that outdated programs such
as Project ELF should be closed down.
The second bill I am introducing today would terminate production
under the Navy's Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile
program. It would also prohibit the Navy from moving forward with the
planned back-fits of two Trident I submarines to carry Trident II
missiles, which are currently scheduled for 2005 and 2006.
I am pleased to be joined in this effort by the Senator from Iowa
[Mr. Harkin], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. Wellstone], and the
Senator from Oregon [Mr. Wyden].
Let me say at the outset that my bill will in no way prevent the Navy
from maintaining the current arsenal of Trident II missiles. Nor will
it affect those Trident II missiles that are currently in production.
Mr. President, the Navy currently has ten Trident II submarines, each
of which carries 24 Trident II (D5) missiles. Each of these missiles
contains eight independently targetable nuclear warheads, for a total
of 192 warheads per submarine. Each warhead packs between 300 to 450
kilotons of explosive power.
By comparison, the first atomic bomb that the United States dropped
on Hiroshima generated 15 kilotons of force. Let's do the math for just
one fully-equipped Trident II submarine.
Each warhead can generate up to 450 kilotons of force.
Each missile has eight warheads, and each submarine has 24 missiles.
That equals 86.4 megatons of force per submarine. That means that
each Trident II submarine carries the power to deliver devastation
which is the equivalent of 5,760 Hiroshimas.
And that is just one fully equipped submarine. As I noted earlier,
the Navy currently has ten such submarines.
Through fiscal year 2001, the Navy will have been authorized to
purchase 384 Trident II missiles for these submarines. Even taking into
account the 78 Trident II missiles that have been expended through
testing through calendar year 2000 and the four more that are scheduled
to be expended this year, the Navy will still have 302 missiles in
stock once those authorized to be purchased during FY2001 are
completed.
The Navy needs 240 missiles to fully equip ten Trident II submarines
with 24 missiles each. That leaves 62 ``extra'' missiles in the Navy's
inventory. And the Navy still plans to buy 41 more missiles over the
next four years, for a total purchase of 425 missiles. My bill would
terminate production of these missiles after the currently authorized
384.
In addition to the ten Trident II submarines, the Navy also has eight
Trident I submarines. The Navy plans to remove four of these submarines
(the Ohio, the Florida, the Michigan, and the Georgia) from strategic
service in 2003 and 2004 in order to comply with the provisions of the
START II treaty. Current plans call for the other four Trident I
submarines to be back-fitted to carry Trident II missiles. One of these
back-fits began in May 2000 (the Alaska); another is scheduled to begin
in February 2001 (the Nevada). The Navy wants to back-fit the last two
Trident I submarines (the Henry M. Jackson and the Alabama) in 2005 and
2006. My bill would prohibit those last two back-fits. It would not
affect the back-fits of the Alaska and the Nevada.
Thus, once the back-fits of the Alaska and the Nevada are completed,
the Navy will have a fleet of twelve submarines capable of carrying
Trident II missiles. This is more than enough firepower to be an
effective deterrent against the moth-balled Russian submarine fleet and
against the ballistic missile aspirations of rogue states including
China and North Korea.
I recognize that there is still a potential threat from rogue states
and from independent operators who seek to acquire ballistic missiles
and other weapons of mass destruction. I also recognize that our
submarine fleet and our
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arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons still have an important role to
play in warding off these threats. Their role, however, has diminished
dramatically from what it was at the height of the Cold War. Our
missile procurement and equipment upgrade decisions should reflect that
change and should reflect the realities of the post-Cold War world.
Our current ballistic missile capability is far superior to that of
any other country on the globe. And the capability of the Russian
military--the very force which these missiles were designed to
counter--is seriously degraded.
I cannot understand the need for more Trident II missiles and more
submarines to carry them at a time when the Governments of the United
States and Russia are in negotiations to implement START II and are
also discussing a framework for START III. These agreements call for
reductions in our nuclear arsenal, not increases. To spend scarce
resources on building more missiles now and on back-fitting two more
submarines to carry them in the coming years is short-sighted and could
seriously undermine our efforts to negotiate further arms reductions
with Russia.
In conclusion, Mr. President, we should reexamine our national
defense policy at the earliest possible date. The forthcoming
Quadrennial Defense Review presents an excellent opportunity to do just
that. We should not miss this opportunity to begin to transform our
Armed Forces from the structure and strategies that won the Cold War to
a fiscally responsible force that is adequately trained and equipped to
combat the new challenges of the 21st century and beyond. The
legislation I am introducing today is a step in that direction.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that both of these bills be
printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
There being no objection, the bills were ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 112
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. TERMINATION OF OPERATION OF THE EXTREMELY LOW
FREQUENCY COMMUNICATION SYSTEM.
(a) Termination Required.--The Secretary of the Navy shall
terminate the operation of the Extremely Low Frequency
Communication System of the Navy.
(b) Maintenance of Infrastructure.--The Secretary shall
maintain the infrastructure necessary for resuming operation
of the Extremely Low Frequency Communication System.
S. 113
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. TERMINATION OF D5 SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC
MISSILE PROGRAM.
(a) Termination of Program.--The Secretary of Defense shall
terminate production of D5 submarine-launched ballistic
missiles under the D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile
program.
(b) Payment of Termination Costs.--Funds available on or
after the date of the enactment of this Act for obligation
for the D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile program may
be obligated for production under that program only for
payment of the costs associated with the termination of
production under this Act.
SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON D5 TRIDENT II BACKFIT SCHEDULED TO
COMMENCE IN 2005 AND 2006.
(a) Prohibition on Backfit of Certain Submarines.--The
Secretary of Defense may not carry out the modifications of
two Trident I submarines to enable such submarines to be
deployed with Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic
missiles that are currently scheduled to commence in 2005 and
2006, respectively.
(b) Prohibition on Use of Funds.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no funds appropriated or otherwise made
available to the Department of Defense may be obligated or
expended for purposes of carrying out the modifications of
Trident I submarines described in subsection (a).
SEC. 3. CURRENT PROGRAM ACTIVITIES.
Nothing in sections 1 and 2 shall be construed to prohibit
or otherwise affect the availability of funds for the
following:
(1) Production of D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles
in production on the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) Maintenance after the date of the enactment of this Act
of the arsenal of D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles in
existence on such date, including the missiles described in
paragraph (1).
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