[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 7 (Monday, January 22, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S383-S385]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself, Mr. Harkin, Mr. Wellstone, and Mr. 
        Wyden):
  S. 113. A bill to terminate production under the D5 submarine-
launched ballistic missile program and to prohibit the backfit of 
certain Trident I ballistic missile submarines to carry D5 submarine-
launched ballistic missiles; to the Committee on Armed Services.


                          DEFENSE LEGISLATION

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, today I am introducing two bills that I 
hope will be a first step in helping to change fundamentally the way we 
think about our national defense.
  As I have said time and again, I strongly support our Armed Forces 
and the excellent work they are doing to combat the new threats of the 
21st century and beyond. I am concerned, however, that we are not 
giving our forces the tools they need to combat these emerging threats. 
Instead, a Cold War mentality continues to permeate the United States 
defense establishment and we still cling to the strategies and weapons 
that we used to fight--and win--the Cold War.
  We have an historic opportunity, Mr. President. There is a new 
President, a new Congress, and a pending Quadrennial Defense Review--
all at the dawn of a new millennium. We should take advantage of this 
opportunity by restructuring our national defense policy to combat the 
threats of the new century instead of continuing to guard against the 
long-defeated perils of the last one.
  In the coming months, I will introduce and support a number of 
initiatives that I hope will help to turn the focus of our national 
defense policy away from the Cold War that has already been won and 
toward fielding a strong, agile force that can meet the emerging 
threats of the new century head on.
  The two bills I am introducing today are a first step toward this 
goal. One of these bills would terminate the operation of the Navy's 
Extremely Low Frequency communications system (Project ELF). The other 
would end production of the Navy's Trident II submarine-launched 
ballistic missile and would prohibit certain back-fits of Trident I 
submarines.

[[Page S384]]

  Both of these systems were designed to protect the United States 
against an attack by the Soviet Union. Trident submarines, and the 
deadly submarine-launched ballistic missiles they carry, were designed 
specifically to attack targets inside the Soviet Union from waters off 
the continental United States. Project ELF was designed to send short 
one-way messages to ballistic and attack submarines that are submerged 
in deep waters.
  The first bill I am introducing today would terminate operations 
under Project ELF, which is located in Clam Lake, Wisconsin, and 
Republic, Michigan. I would like to thank the senior Senator from 
Wisconsin [Mr. Kohl] and the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Wyden] for 
cosponsoring this bill.
  This bill would terminate operations at Project ELF, while 
maintaining the infrastructure in Wisconsin and Michigan in the event 
that a resumption in operations becomes necessary. If enacted, this 
bill would save taxpayers nearly $14 million per year.
  Project ELF is ineffective and unnecessary in the post-Cold War era. 
Since ELF cannot transmit detailed messages, it serves as an expensive 
``beeper'' system to tell submarines to come to the surface to receive 
messages from other sources, and the subs cannot send a return message 
to ELF in the event of an emergency. It takes ELF four minutes to send 
a three-letter message to a deeply submerged submarine.
  With the end of the Cold War, Project ELF becomes harder and harder 
to justify. Our submarines no longer need to take that extra precaution 
against Soviet nuclear forces. They can now surface on a regular basis 
with less danger of detection or attack. They can also receive more 
complicated messages through very low frequency (VLF) radio waves or 
lengthier messages through satellite systems. It is hard to understand 
why the taxpayers continue to be asked to pay $14 million a year for 
what amounts to a beeper system that tells our submarines to come to 
the surface to receive orders from another, more sophisticated source.
  Further, continued operation of this facility is opposed by most 
residents in my state. The members of the Wisconsin delegation have 
fought hard for years to close down Project ELF; I have introduced 
legislation during each Congress since taking office in 1993 to 
terminate it; and I have even recommended it for closure to the Defense 
Base Closure and Realignment Commission.
  Project ELF has had a turbulent history. Since the idea for ELF was 
first proposed in 1958, the project has been changed or canceled 
several times. Residents of Wisconsin have opposed ELF since its 
inception, but for years we were told that the national security 
considerations of the Cold War outweighed our concerns about this 
installation in our state. Ironically, this system became fully 
operational in 1989--the same year the tide of democracy began to sweep 
across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Now, twelve years later, 
the hammer and sickle has fallen and the Russian submarine fleet is in 
disarray. But Project ELF still remains as a constant, expensive 
reminder to the people of my state that the Department of Defense 
remains focused on the past.
  There also continue to be a number of public health and environmental 
concerns associated with Project ELF. For almost two decades, we have 
received inconclusive data on this project's effects on Wisconsin and 
Michigan residents. In 1984, a U.S. District Court ordered that ELF be 
shut down because the Navy paid inadequate attention to the system's 
possible health effects and violated the National Environmental Policy 
Act. Interestingly, that decision was overturned because U.S. national 
security, at the time, prevailed over public health and environmental 
concerns.
  Numerous medical studies point to a possible link between exposure to 
extremely low frequency electromagnetic fields and a variety of human 
health effects and abnormalities in both animal and plant species.
  In 1999, after six years of research, the National Institute of 
Environmental Health Sciences released a report that did not prove 
conclusively a link between electromagnetic fields and cancer, but the 
report did not disprove it, either. Serious questions remain, Mr. 
President, and many of my constituents are rightly concerned about this 
issue.
  In addition, I have heard from a number of dairy farmers who are 
convinced that the stray voltage associated with ELF transmitters has 
demonstrably reduced milk production. As we continue our efforts to 
produce a sustainable balanced federal budget and reduce the national 
debt, and as the Department of Defense continues to struggle to address 
readiness and other concerns, it is clear that outdated programs such 
as Project ELF should be closed down.
  The second bill I am introducing today would terminate production 
under the Navy's Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile 
program. It would also prohibit the Navy from moving forward with the 
planned back-fits of two Trident I submarines to carry Trident II 
missiles, which are currently scheduled for 2005 and 2006.
  I am pleased to be joined in this effort by the Senator from Iowa 
[Mr. Harkin], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. Wellstone], and the 
Senator from Oregon [Mr. Wyden].
  Let me say at the outset that my bill will in no way prevent the Navy 
from maintaining the current arsenal of Trident II missiles. Nor will 
it affect those Trident II missiles that are currently in production.
  Mr. President, the Navy currently has ten Trident II submarines, each 
of which carries 24 Trident II (D5) missiles. Each of these missiles 
contains eight independently targetable nuclear warheads, for a total 
of 192 warheads per submarine. Each warhead packs between 300 to 450 
kilotons of explosive power.
  By comparison, the first atomic bomb that the United States dropped 
on Hiroshima generated 15 kilotons of force. Let's do the math for just 
one fully-equipped Trident II submarine.
  Each warhead can generate up to 450 kilotons of force.
  Each missile has eight warheads, and each submarine has 24 missiles.
  That equals 86.4 megatons of force per submarine. That means that 
each Trident II submarine carries the power to deliver devastation 
which is the equivalent of 5,760 Hiroshimas.
  And that is just one fully equipped submarine. As I noted earlier, 
the Navy currently has ten such submarines.
  Through fiscal year 2001, the Navy will have been authorized to 
purchase 384 Trident II missiles for these submarines. Even taking into 
account the 78 Trident II missiles that have been expended through 
testing through calendar year 2000 and the four more that are scheduled 
to be expended this year, the Navy will still have 302 missiles in 
stock once those authorized to be purchased during FY2001 are 
completed.
  The Navy needs 240 missiles to fully equip ten Trident II submarines 
with 24 missiles each. That leaves 62 ``extra'' missiles in the Navy's 
inventory. And the Navy still plans to buy 41 more missiles over the 
next four years, for a total purchase of 425 missiles. My bill would 
terminate production of these missiles after the currently authorized 
384.
  In addition to the ten Trident II submarines, the Navy also has eight 
Trident I submarines. The Navy plans to remove four of these submarines 
(the Ohio, the Florida, the Michigan, and the Georgia) from strategic 
service in 2003 and 2004 in order to comply with the provisions of the 
START II treaty. Current plans call for the other four Trident I 
submarines to be back-fitted to carry Trident II missiles. One of these 
back-fits began in May 2000 (the Alaska); another is scheduled to begin 
in February 2001 (the Nevada). The Navy wants to back-fit the last two 
Trident I submarines (the Henry M. Jackson and the Alabama) in 2005 and 
2006. My bill would prohibit those last two back-fits. It would not 
affect the back-fits of the Alaska and the Nevada.
  Thus, once the back-fits of the Alaska and the Nevada are completed, 
the Navy will have a fleet of twelve submarines capable of carrying 
Trident II missiles. This is more than enough firepower to be an 
effective deterrent against the moth-balled Russian submarine fleet and 
against the ballistic missile aspirations of rogue states including 
China and North Korea.
  I recognize that there is still a potential threat from rogue states 
and from independent operators who seek to acquire ballistic missiles 
and other weapons of mass destruction. I also recognize that our 
submarine fleet and our

[[Page S385]]

arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons still have an important role to 
play in warding off these threats. Their role, however, has diminished 
dramatically from what it was at the height of the Cold War. Our 
missile procurement and equipment upgrade decisions should reflect that 
change and should reflect the realities of the post-Cold War world.
  Our current ballistic missile capability is far superior to that of 
any other country on the globe. And the capability of the Russian 
military--the very force which these missiles were designed to 
counter--is seriously degraded.
  I cannot understand the need for more Trident II missiles and more 
submarines to carry them at a time when the Governments of the United 
States and Russia are in negotiations to implement START II and are 
also discussing a framework for START III. These agreements call for 
reductions in our nuclear arsenal, not increases. To spend scarce 
resources on building more missiles now and on back-fitting two more 
submarines to carry them in the coming years is short-sighted and could 
seriously undermine our efforts to negotiate further arms reductions 
with Russia.
  In conclusion, Mr. President, we should reexamine our national 
defense policy at the earliest possible date. The forthcoming 
Quadrennial Defense Review presents an excellent opportunity to do just 
that. We should not miss this opportunity to begin to transform our 
Armed Forces from the structure and strategies that won the Cold War to 
a fiscally responsible force that is adequately trained and equipped to 
combat the new challenges of the 21st century and beyond. The 
legislation I am introducing today is a step in that direction.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that both of these bills be 
printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  There being no objection, the bills were ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                 S. 112

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. TERMINATION OF OPERATION OF THE EXTREMELY LOW 
                   FREQUENCY COMMUNICATION SYSTEM.

       (a) Termination Required.--The Secretary of the Navy shall 
     terminate the operation of the Extremely Low Frequency 
     Communication System of the Navy.
       (b) Maintenance of Infrastructure.--The Secretary shall 
     maintain the infrastructure necessary for resuming operation 
     of the Extremely Low Frequency Communication System.

                                 S. 113

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. TERMINATION OF D5 SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC 
                   MISSILE PROGRAM.

       (a) Termination of Program.--The Secretary of Defense shall 
     terminate production of D5 submarine-launched ballistic 
     missiles under the D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile 
     program.
       (b) Payment of Termination Costs.--Funds available on or 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act for obligation 
     for the D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile program may 
     be obligated for production under that program only for 
     payment of the costs associated with the termination of 
     production under this Act.

     SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON D5 TRIDENT II BACKFIT SCHEDULED TO 
                   COMMENCE IN 2005 AND 2006.

       (a) Prohibition on Backfit of Certain Submarines.--The 
     Secretary of Defense may not carry out the modifications of 
     two Trident I submarines to enable such submarines to be 
     deployed with Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic 
     missiles that are currently scheduled to commence in 2005 and 
     2006, respectively.
       (b) Prohibition on Use of Funds.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, no funds appropriated or otherwise made 
     available to the Department of Defense may be obligated or 
     expended for purposes of carrying out the modifications of 
     Trident I submarines described in subsection (a).

     SEC. 3. CURRENT PROGRAM ACTIVITIES.

       Nothing in sections 1 and 2 shall be construed to prohibit 
     or otherwise affect the availability of funds for the 
     following:
       (1) Production of D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
     in production on the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (2) Maintenance after the date of the enactment of this Act 
     of the arsenal of D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles in 
     existence on such date, including the missiles described in 
     paragraph (1).
                                 ______