Congressional Record, Volume 147 Issue 3 (Friday, January 5, 2001)

[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 3 (Friday, January 5, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S44-S46]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I want to comment briefly on an issue that
is important to our national security: the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, or CTBT, that would ban all nuclear weapon tests. This is an
issue that the new President and the new Senate should think about
carefully and deliberately during the 107th Congress.
Today General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, presented a report to President Clinton on his findings and
recommendations on the CTBT. President Clinton had asked General
Shalikashvili to conduct a comprehensive and independent study of the
CTBT after the Senate voted against a resolution of ratification in
October of 1999.
The CTBT negotiations were completed in 1996, and the United States
was the first nation to sign the Treaty. To date, 160 nations have
signed it and 69 have ratified it, including all our NATO allies,
Japan, South Korea and Russia. However, to enter into force, it must be
ratified by 44 specified nations that have nuclear reactors, including
the United States.
The Treaty would prohibit all nuclear explosive tests. In so doing,
it would make it much harder for nations to develop nuclear weapons,
thus putting in place an important roadblock to nuclear weapon
proliferation. The treaty provides for an expanded and improved
international monitoring system that would improve our ability to
detect and deter nuclear tests by other nations--but only if we ratify
the treaty and it enters into force.
Secretary of Defense Cohen and the Joint Chiefs of Staff all support
ratification of the CTBT, as do four former Chairmen of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, including General Shalikashvili and Gen. Colin Powell.
When the Senate took up the CTBT in October 1999, it did so in haste
and without the traditional bipartisan deliberation we have accorded
other arms control treaties. On the eve of the vote, 62 Senators signed
a letter urging the Senate leadership to delay that vote and to
postpone final consideration of the CTBT until the 107th Congress.
Unfortunately, that request, which was made by nearly two-thirds of the
Members of the Senate, to delay the vote, was not heeded, and the
result was that the resolution of ratification was defeated by a vote
of 51-48, with one Senator voting present.
Again, General Shalikashvili was asked to review the entire
situation, and in conducting his review, he met with a number of
Senators from both sides of the aisle to discuss their concerns and
their suggestions. He also met with many other experts on this issue,
and he visited the nuclear weapons labs.
General Shalikashvili's report is a valuable contribution to this
important topic. This report, which was just filed today, places the
CTBT in the broader context of our nuclear nonproliferation goals and
efforts and

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points out that the CTBT is an important component of this enduring
national security priority of nuclear nonproliferation. He concludes
that the CTBT remains in our national interest and that the Senate
should reconsider the treaty in a bipartisan manner, hopefully with the
result that ratification is approved by the Senate.
General Shalikashvili's report reviews the major concerns which were
expressed about the CTBT during our debate, and it offers
recommendations in each of these areas, including ways to improve our
monitoring and verification of foreign nuclear testing efforts and ways
to improve our nuclear weapons Stockpile Stewardship Program. These
recommendations address concerns raised about the CTBT and provide some
commonsense and balanced steps to improve our security while bringing
the CTBT into force.
Specifically, General Shalikashvili's report examines the larger
nonproliferation context of the CTBT and concludes that the CTBT has a
genuine nonproliferation value for our national security. His report
studies the question of monitoring and verification and concludes that
the monitoring system under the treaty will significantly enhance U.S.
national monitoring capabilities and that cheating will be much harder
and less useful than some fear. He evaluates our ability to maintain
the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons and determines that
we can do so without nuclear testing if we fully support the Stockpile
Stewardship Program and manage it prudently.
Finally, General Shalikashvili's report looks at the question of
whether CTBT should be of indefinite duration and recommends that in
addition to the safeguards accompanying the treaty, the Senate and the
executive branch should conduct a joint review of the treaty 10 years
after ratification and at 10-year intervals thereafter.
One of the key points made by General Shalikashvili is that the CTBT
is conditioned on a safeguard that will assure our ability to maintain
a safe and reliable stockpile. Under safeguard F, the United States
would maintain the right and the ability to withdraw from the treaty
and to conduct any testing necessary if that were required to certify
the safety and reliability of a nuclear weapon type critical to our
nuclear deterrent. General Shalikashvili's recommendation on the joint
review would strengthen this safeguard by saying that if, after that
joint review, grave doubts remained about the treaty's value for our
national security, the President would be prepared to withdraw from the
treaty.
I know General Shalikashvili's report will be considered carefully
and seriously by the Senate and by the new administration. I hope we
and the new administration will review his report and think through our
CTBT position in a deliberate manner, and I will be making this point
personally to President-elect Bush next Monday at a meeting in Austin
for congressional defense and security leaders.
We owe General Shalikashvili a national debt of gratitude for serving
our Nation and its security once again. He has taken a great deal of
his time since retiring to review the CTBT and to craft recommendations
that I hope we will implement. I recommend his report to all Senators
and to the new administration, and I hope we will reconsider the treaty
in the best bipartisan spirit of the Senate as his report recommends.
I ask unanimous consent that General Shalikashvili's letter to the
President, accompanying his report, and his introduction and
recommendations from the report be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of
State for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
January 4, 2001.
Hon. William Jefferson Clinton,
President of the United States, The White House.
Dear Mr. President: Last year, you and the Secretary of
State requested that I serve as your Special Advisor for the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In this capacity, I met with
senators from both sides of the aisle to discuss their
concerns and suggestions for any additional steps that could
be taken to build bipartisan support for ratification. I was
deeply appreciative of their willingness to engage in
serious, substantive discussions about the Test Ban Treaty.
In addition to talking with senators, I have also discussed
the Treaty with senior members of your administration,
leading national security experts from former
administrations, representatives of non-governmental
organizations, and numerous scientific and diplomatic
experts. I have visited the three nuclear weapon
laboratories, met with their directors, and talked with a
number of senior nuclear designers. My representatives have
traveled to the Air Force Technical Applications Center,
which operates U.S. national technical means for monitoring
compliance with nuclear test ban treaties, and to Vienna,
where work is underway on the international verification
system. I asked several think tanks to provide a ``second
opinion'' about verification and the Treaty's impact on other
countries' nuclear ambitions. I have also reviewed numerous
reports by external expert groups.
At the end of my review of the Treaty's potential impact on
U.S. national security, I support the Treaty, just as I did
when I served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. My
discussions over the last ten months have only strengthened
my view that the Treaty is a very important part of global
non-proliferation efforts and is compatible with keeping a
safe, reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent. I believe that an
objective and thorough net assessment shows convincingly that
U.S. interests, as well as those of friends and allies, will
be served by the Treaty's entry into force.
The nation's nuclear arsenal is safe, reliable, and able to
meet all stated military requirements. For as far into the
future as we can see, the U.S. nuclear deterrent can remain
effective under the Test Ban Treaty, assuming prudent
stockpile stewardship--including the ability to remanufacture
aging components. While there are steps that should be taken
to better manage the long-term risks associated with
stockpile stewardship, I believe that there is no good reason
to delay ratification of the Treaty pending further advances
in the Stockpile Stewardship Program as long as we have a
credible mechanism to leave the Treaty should a serious
problem with the deterrent make that necessary. I fear that
the longer entry into force is delayed, the more likely it is
that other countries will move irrevocably to acquire nuclear
weapons or significantly improve their current nuclear
arsenal, and the less likely it is that we could mobilize a
strong international coalition against such activities.
In my consultations with senators, I have found broad
bipartisan support for strengthened U.S. leadership of a
comprehensive international response to the dangers posed by
the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The overarching
question has been whether the contributions that the Test Ban
Treaty can make to national and international security
outweigh any potential risks. I have recommended a number of
steps that do not involve renegotiating the Treaty and that
would go a long way toward addressing specific concerns. I am
confident that there would be broad bipartisan support for
those of my recommendations that deal with developing a more
integrated non-proliferation policy, enhancing U.S.
capabilities to track nuclear proliferation and monitor
nuclear testing, and strengthening stockpile stewardship. I
urge their early implementation because these actions are
important for national security without regard to the
immediate fate of the Test Ban Treaty. Since these steps
would also strengthen the U.S. position under the Treaty, I
hope that the next Administration and the Senate will re-
evaluate the Test Ban Treaty as part of a bipartisan effort
to forge an integrated non-proliferation strategy for the new
century.
I hope that the attacked report will prove useful in
charting a course for future reconsideration and eventual
ratification of the Test Ban Treaty. Should developments at
home or abroad ever cast doubt on our ability to maintain a
safe, reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent, however, we
should withdraw from the Treaty if a resumption of nuclear
testing would make us more secure. My recommendations would
reduce the likelihood of such problems and provide additional
reassurances that, if they did occur, the United States would
take the appropriate actions. As additional insurance, I am
also recommending a joint ten-year Executive-Legislative
review of the full range of issues bearing on the Treaty's
net value for national security in response to concerns about
the Treaty's indefinite duration.
The rest of the world is looking to us for continued
leadership of global efforts to stop proliferation and
strengthen the nuclear restraint regime. Nothing could be
more important to national security and international
stability.
Very respectfully,
John M. Shalikashvili,
General, USA (Ret.)
____

Findings and Recommendations Concerning the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty

(By General John M. Shalikashvili (USA, Ret.), Special Advisor to the
President and Secretary of State, January 2001)

i. introduction

A decade after the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons are
still important to U.S. and allied security, a silent giant
guarding against a catastrophic miscalculation by a potential
adversary. The United States has the safest, most reliable,
most capable arsenal of nuclear weapons in the world. It will

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need a credible deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist.
Equally important to our security are global non-
proliferation efforts. For the past half century, the United
States has led the campaign to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons to additional countries or terrorist groups, and to
reduce the chances that such weapons would ever be used.
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty places obstacles
in the path of nuclear weapon development by states that
could some day threaten the United States or its allies. The
question associated with Treaty ratification is whether the
security benefits from the Treaty outweigh any risks that a
ban on all nuclear explosions could pose to the U.S.
deterrent.
Four types of concerns have been most prominent in the
debate on advice and consent to ratification in October 1999
and in my subsequent investigations:
1. Whether the Test Ban Treaty has genuine non-
proliferation value;
2. Whether cheating could threaten U.S. security;
3. Whether we can maintain the safety and reliability of
the U.S. nuclear deterrent without nuclear explosive testing;
and
4. Whether it is wise to endorse a Test Ban Treaty of
indefinite duration.
After examining these issues, I remain convinced that the
advantages of the Test Ban Treaty outweigh any disadvantages,
and thus that ratification would increase national security.
In each area, though, I am recommending additional actions to
address concerns and further strengthen the U.S. position
under the Treaty. I believe that we can go a long way toward
bridging differences on these issues if they receive a level
of sustained bipartisan attention equal to their high
importance for national security.
The broad objectives of my specific recommendations are to:
1. Increase bipartisan and allied support for a carefully
coordinated comprehensive non-proliferation;
2. Enhance U.S. capabilities to detect and deter nuclear
testing and other aspects of nuclear proliferation;
3. Improve the management of potential risks associated
with the long-term reliability and safety of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent; and
4. Address concerns about the Test Ban Treaty's indefinite
duration through a joint Executive-Legislative review of the
Treaty's net value for national security to be held ten years
after ratification and at regular intervals thereafter.
Test Ban Treaty supporters, skeptics, and opponents all
agree that the United States needs to revitalize support for
an integrated non-proliferation strategy, enhance its
monitoring capabilities, and develop a bipartisan consensus
on stewardship of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. I urge early
implementation of my recommendations on these issues because
they would strengthen U.S. security regardless of the
immediate fate of the Test Ban Treaty. Action on these steps
would also go a long way toward addressing concerns that have
been voiced about the Treaty. Together with my recommendation
on the ten-year joint review procedure, these steps offer a
way to build bipartisan support for Test Ban Treaty
ratification as an integral component of an overarching
strategy to stop nuclear proliferation and strengthen the
nuclear restraint regime.

VIII. Compilation of Recommendations

Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation, and the Test Ban Treaty
A. Working closely with the Congress and with U.S. friends
and allies, the next Administration should implement on an
urgent basis an integrated non-proliferation policy targeted
on, but not limited to, countries and groups believed to have
an active interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.
B. To increase high level attention and policy coherence,
the next Administration should appoint a Deputy National
Security Advisor for Non-Proliferation, with the authority
and resources needed to coordinate and oversee implementation
of U.S. non-proliferation policy.
C. As part of its effort to build bipartisan and allied
support for an integrated non-proliferation policy, the next
Administration should review at the highest level issues
related to the Test Ban Treaty. There should be a sustained
interagency effort to address senators' questions and
concerns on these issues of great importance to national
security.
D. The United States should continue its testing moratorium
and take other concrete actions to demonstrate its commitment
to a world without nuclear explosions, such as continuing
leadership in building up the International Monitoring System
(IMS) being established for the Treaty.
Monitoring, Verification, and Foreign Nuclear Programs
A. Higher funding and intelligence collection priorities
should be assigned to monitoring nuclear test activities and
other aspects of nuclear weapon acquisition or development by
other states.
B. Collaboration should be increased among U.S. government
officials and other experts to ensure that national
intelligence, the Treaty's international verification regime,
and other scientific stations are used as complementary
components of an all-source approach to verification.
C. The transition from research to operational use should
be accelerated for new verification technologies and
analytical techniques.
D. The United States should continue working with other
Test Ban Treaty signatories to prepare for inspections and
develop confidence-building measures.
E. Additional steps should be taken unilaterally or
bilaterally to increase transparency regarding the nature and
purpose of activities at known nuclear test sites.
Stewardship of the U.S. Nuclear Stockpile
A. Working with the Department of Defense, other Executive
Branch agencies, and the Congress, the Administrator of the
NNSA should complete as soon as possible his comprehensive
review of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The review will
clarify objectives and requirements, set priorities, assess
progress, identify needs, and develop an overarching program
plan with broad-based support.
Highest priority should be given to aspects of stockpile
stewardship that are most urgently needed to assure the near-
term reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, i.e.
surveillance, refurbishment, and infrastructure
revitalization.
Enhance surveillance and monitoring activities should
receive full support and not be squeezed by higher profile
aspects of the SSP.
The NNSA should make a decision about the need for a large-
scale plutonium pit remanufacturing facility as soon as
possible after the next Administration has determined the
appropriate size and composition of the enduring stockpile,
including reserves.
A dedicated infrastructure revitalization fund should be
established after the NNSA has completed a revitalization
plan for its production facilities and laboratories.
B. The NNSA, working with Congress and the Office of
Management and Budget, should place the SSP on a multi-year
budget cycle like the Department of Defense's Future Years
Defense Program. Some increase in funds for the SSP is likely
to be necessary
C. Steps to improve interagency management of stockpile
stewardship matters, such as the revitalization of the
Nuclear Weapons Council, are essential and should be
continued.
D. Appropriate steps should be taken to ensure that the
performance margins of various weapon types are adequate when
conservatively evaluated.
E. Strict discipline should be exercised over changes to
existing nuclear weapon designs to ensure that neither an
individual change nor the cumulative effect of small
modifications would make it difficult to certify weapons
realiability or safety without a nuclear explosion.
F. The Administrator of the NNSA should establish an on-
going high level external advisory mechanism, such as a panel
of outstanding and independent scientists.
Minimizing Uncertainty with a Treaty of Indefinite Duration
A. The Administration and the Senate should commit to
conducting an intensive joint review of the Test Ban Treaty's
net value for national security ten years after U.S.
ratification, and at ten-year intervals thereafter. This
review should consider the Stockpile Stewardship Program's
priorities, accomplishments, and challenges; current and
planned verification capabilities; and the Treaty's
adherence, implementation, compliance, and enforcement
record. Recommendations to address concerns should be
formulated for domestic use and to inform the U.S. position
at the Treaty's ten-year review conference. If, after these
steps, grave doubts remain about the Treaty's net value for
U.S. national security, the President, in consultation with
Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the Test Ban
Treaty under the ``supreme national interests'' clause.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.

____________________