[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 151 (Friday, December 8, 2000)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E2159-E2160]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                        ELECTIONS IN AZERBAIJAN

                                 ______
                                 

                       HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

                             of new jersey

                    in the house of representatives

                        Friday, December 8, 2000

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, on November 5, parliamentary 
elections were held in Azerbaijan. In anticipation of those elections, 
the Helsinki Commission--which I chair--held hearings in May, at which 
representatives of the government and opposition leaders testified. 
While the former pledged that Baku would conduct a democratic contest, 
in accordance with OSCE standards, the latter warned that Azerbaijan's 
past record of holding seriously flawed elections required the 
strictest vigilance from the international community and pressure from 
Western capitals and the Council of Europe--to which Azerbaijan has 
applied for membership.
  Subsequently, I introduced a resolution, H. Con. Res. 382, which 
called on the Government of Azerbaijan to hold free and fair elections 
and to accept the recommended amendments by the OSCE's Office of 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to the law on 
elections.
  From the start, there was pressure to withdraw the resolution from 
the Azerbaijani government and others. They argued that President Aliev 
had made, or would make, the necessary changes to ensure that the 
election met international standards, claiming to render the resolution 
either irrelevant or out of date. That pressure intensified as the 
election drew near; in fact, the resolution never came to a vote before 
Congress went out of session in early November.
  It is worth recalling this brief history in light of what actually 
happened during Azerbaijan's pre-election period and on November 5. 
With respect to the election law, one of ODIHR's concerns was 
ultimately addressed by a decision of Azerbaijan's constitutional 
court, but on other important issues, Baku rejected any concessions and 
refused to incorporate ODIHR's suggested changes. From the beginning, 
therefore, the election could not have met OSCE standards, as ODIHR 
made plain in several statements.
  During the registration period, the Central Election Commission (CEC) 
rejected several leading opposition parties. Claiming that government 
experts could tell which signatures were forged, fraudulent or 
otherwise invalid merely on the basis of a visual examination, the CEC 
maintained the Musavat and the Azerbaijan Democratic Party had failed 
to get 50,000 valid signatures. The same thing happened to Musavat in 
the 1995 parliamentary election. At that time, the OSCE/UN observation 
mission emphasized the need to amend or get rid of this obviously 
flawed method of determining the validity of signatures, but 
Azerbaijan's authorities did not heed that advice.
  The exclusion of leading opposition parties drew strong criticism, 
both inside and outside the country, including the OSCE and the U.S. 
Government. In early October, in apparent reaction to international 
concern, President Aliev ``appealed'' to the CEC to find some way of 
registering excluded opposition parties. Some CEC members objected, 
arguing there was no constitutional basis for such a presidential 
appeal or a changed CEC ruling, but the Commission moved to include 
opposition parties. Though their participation certainly broadened the 
choice available to voters, the manner of their inclusion demonstrated 
conclusively that President Aliev controlled the entire election 
process.
  ODIHR welcomed the decision by the CEC and urged a reconsideration of 
the exclusion of over 400 individual candidates--about half of those 
who tried to run in single-mandate districts. But the CEC did not do 
so, and only in very few cases were previously excluded candidates 
allowed to run. As 100 of parliament's 125 seats were determined in 
single mandate districts, where local authorities exercise considerable 
power, the rejection of over 400 candidates signaled the government's 
determination to decide the outcome of the vote.
  Though coverage of the campaign on state media favored the ruling 
party, opposition leaders were able to address voters on television. 
They used the opportunity--which they had not enjoyed for years--to 
criticize President Aliev and offer an alternative vision of governing 
the country. Their equal access to the media marked progress with 
respect to previous elections, as noted in the ODIHR's election report.
  However, the voting and vote count on election day itself, according 
to the ODIHR's election
  This would be bad enough, considering that the election was the 
fourth since 1995 that failed to meet OSCE standards, even if some 
progress was registered in opposition participation and representation 
in the CEC. Much more interesting and disturbing, however, were the 
words used in a post-election press conference by two key international 
observers: Gerard Stoudman, the Director of ODIHR, who generally 
employs measured, diplomatic language, said he had not expected to 
witness ``a crash course in various types of manipulation,'' and 
actually used the phrase ``primitive falsification'' to describe what 
he had seen. Andreas Gross, the head of the observer delegation of the 
Council of Europe--an organization to which Azerbaijan has applied for 
membership and which is not particularly known for hard-hitting 
assessments of election shenanigans--amplified: ``Despite the positive 
changes observed in Azerbaijan in recent years, the scale of the 
infringements doesn't fit into any framework. We've never seen anything 
like it.''
  Mr. Speaker, in the context of international election observation, 
such a brutally candid assessment is simply stunning. As far as I know, 
representatives of ODIHR or the Council of Europe have never expressed 
themselves in such terms about an election that they decided to 
monitor. One senses that the harshness of their judgment is related to 
their disappointment: Azerbaijan's authorities had promised to conduct 
free and fair elections and had long negotiated with the ODIHR and the 
Council of Europe about the legal framework and administrative 
modalities but, in the end, held an election that can only be described 
as an embarrassment to all concerned.
  According to Azerbaijan's CEC, in the party list voting, only four 
parties passed the six-percent threshold for parliamentary 
representation: President Aliev's governing party, the New Azerbaijan 
Party; the Communist Party; and two opposition parties, the Popular 
Front [Reformers] and Civil Solidarity. Other important opposition 
parties allegedly failed to break the barrier and apart from a few 
single mandate seats won no representation in parliament.
  In the aftermath of the election and the assessments of the OSCE/
ODIHR and the Council of Europe, the international legitimacy of 
Azerbaijan's legislature is severely undermined. Within Azerbaijan, the 
ramifications are no better. All the leading opposition parties have 
accused the authorities of massive vote fraud, denounced the election 
results, and have refused to take the few seats in parliament they were 
given. Though some governing party representatives have claimed that 
opposition representation is not necessary for the parliament to 
function normally, others--perhaps including President Aliev--
understand that a parliament without opposition members is ruinous for 
Azerbaijan's image. New elections are slated in 11 districts, and 
perhaps President Aliev is hoping to tempt some opposition parties to 
abandon their boycott by offering a few more seats. Whether opposition 
parties, which are bitterly divided, will participate or eventually 
agree to take up their deputies' mandates remains to be seen.
  What is clearer from the conduct of the election and its outcome is 
that President Aliev, who is preparing the succession of his son as 
Azerbaijan's next president, was determined to keep opposition leaders 
out of parliament and ensure that the body as a whole is supportive of 
his heir. If the only way to guarantee the desired outcome was 
wholesale vote fraud, so be it. Prognoses of possible accommodation 
with the opposition, or possibly even some power sharing arrangements, 
to facilitate a smooth and peaceful transfer of power, have proved 
unfounded. Indeed, President Aliev reportedly has told the new UK 
Ambassador to Baku that Azerbaijan does not need to join the Council of 
Europe, indicating that he is not prepared to make any concessions when 
it comes to maintaining his grip on power and passing it on to his 
chosen heir, whatever the international community thinks.

[[Page E2160]]

  Even more worrisome is that by depriving the opposition of the 
possibility to contend for power through parliamentary means, Aliev has 
seriously reduced the chances of a ``soft landing'' in Azerbaijan. When 
he eventually leaves the scene, anything could happen. This is not only 
a frightening prospect for the citizens of Azerbaijan, its neighbors 
and hopes for resolving regional disputes, especially the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict--it is a scenario that should alarm policymakers in 
Washington as well.
  Mr. Speaker, it is not my intention to say ``I told you so'' to those 
colleagues who argued against my resolution. I would much have 
preferred to make a statement congratulating Azerbaijan on having held 
exemplary elections and making substantial steps towards 
democratization. Alas, I cannot do so, which should sadden and concern 
all of us. But I fear the consequences will be far more serious for the 
citizens of Azerbaijan.

                          ____________________