[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 146 (Tuesday, November 14, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11537-S11544]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      COUNTERTERRORISM ACT OF 2000

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Judiciary 
Committee be discharged from further consideration of S. 3205 and, 
further, the Senate proceed to its consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will report the bill by title.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 3205) to enhance the capability of the United 
     States to deter, prevent, thwart, and respond to 
     international acts of terrorism against United States 
     nationals and interests.

  There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.


                           Amendment No. 4358

  Mr. WARNER. Senators Kyl and Feinstein have an amendment at the desk, 
and I ask for its consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Kyl, for 
     himself and Mrs. Feinstein, proposes an amendment numbered 
     4358.

  The amendment is as follows:
       In section 2(a), strike paragraph (3) and insert the 
     following:
       (3) Seventeen United States sailors were killed in the 
     attack, and thirty-nine were injured.
       In section 2(b)(1), strike ``take immediate actions'' and 
     insert ``continue to take strong and effective actions''.
       In section 3, strike paragraph (8) and redesignate 
     paragraphs (9), (10), (11), (12), and (13) as paragraphs (8), 
     (9), (10), (11) and (12), respectively.
       In section 3(10), as so redesignated, strike ``There are 28 
     organizations'' and all that follows through the end and 
     insert the following: ``There are currently 29 FTOs. The 
     National Commission on Terrorism recommended that the 
     Secretary of State ensure that the list of FTO designations 
     is credible and updated regularly.''.

[[Page S11539]]

       In section 3(12), as so redesignated, strike ``Such 
     controls were designed to prevent accidents, not theft.''.
       In section 7(c)(1), strike subparagraphs (A) and (B) and 
     insert the following:
       (A) The Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and 
     the Judiciary and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     Senate.
       (B) The Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, 
     International Relations, and the Judiciary and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives.
       In section 9(a), strike ``the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the House of Representatives'' and insert 
     ``the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary 
     and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives''.
       In section 10(a), strike ``Congress'' and insert ``the 
     Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary 
     and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives''.
       In section 12(a)(2)(A), insert after ``the Secretary of 
     Defense,'' the following: ``the Secretary of Health and Human 
     Services,''.
       In 12(a), add after paragraph (3) the following:
       (4) The Attorney General shall consult with the Secretary 
     of Health and Human Services in preparing any recommendations 
     under paragraph (2)(B), and shall include in the report under 
     paragraph (1) a detailed description of the methodology and 
     criteria used to define and determine the types and classes 
     of pathogens covered by such recommendations.
       In section 12(b), add at the end the following: ``The 
     report shall include a detailed description of the 
     methodology and criteria used to define and determine the 
     types and classes of pathogens covered by the report.''.

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, Senators Kyl and Feinstein introduced S. 
3205, the Counterterrorism Act of 2000, on October 12, 2000. They base 
their bill on recommendations made in a report called ``Countering the 
Changing Threat of International Terrorism,'' issued on June 5, 2000 by 
the National Commission on Terrorism chaired by former Ambassador L. 
Paul Bremer III and Maurice Sonnenberg. The sponsors seek to have the 
Senate consider and pass the bill unanimously without hearings on its 
legislative language, without Committee consideration, without Senate 
debate and without amendment. In my efforts to be supportive of them I 
have shared with them concerns I have had about earlier versions of 
this legislation. In light of the improvements and corrections that the 
sponsors have now made, I am pleased to remove my objection to passage 
of the bill. I commend the sponsors for heeding constructive comments 
to improve the bill.
  At the outset, I note that I have worked to help Senator Kyl clear a 
number of matters of importance to him in this Congress. Most recently, 
the Senate passed on November 19, 1999, S. 692, the Internet Gambling 
Prohibition Act, and on September 28, 2000, repassed S. 704, the 
Federal Prisoner Health Care Copayment Act. Moreover, in the past few 
months, we have worked together to confirm three more judges for 
Arizona.
  In past Congresses, I have also worked closely with Senator Kyl. For 
example, in the 104th Congress, Senators Kyl, Grassley and I worked 
together to enact the National Information Infrastructure Protection 
Act. This law increased protection under federal criminal law for both 
government and private computers, and addressed the emerging problem of 
computer-age blackmail in which a criminal threatens to harm or shut 
down a computer system unless certain extortion demands are met.
  The NII Protection Act that I worked on with Senator Kyl was intended 
to help law enforcement better address the problem of computer crime, 
in which cyber attacks are an important component. The Bremer-
Sonnenberg Commission noted that, ``[r]easonable experts have published 
sobering scenarios about the potential impact of a successful cyber 
attack on the United States. Already, hackers and criminals have 
exploited some of our vulnerabilities.'' In short, the Commission found 
that, ``cyber security is a matter of grave importance.''
  As technology advances, the Congress must remain vigilant to ensure 
that our laws remain up to date and our local, State and federal law 
enforcement resources are up to the job posed by new technological 
challenges. That is why I have continued to work over this Congress 
with the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee and Senator Schumer on S. 
2448, which the Senate Judiciary Committee unanimously reported 
favorably on October 5th for consideration by the Senate as the 
Internet Security Act amendment on another bill. This legislation would 
make changes to the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse statute and 
provide significant new resources to federal law enforcement for 
forensic computer crime work.
  I have also been pleased to work with Senator DeWine on S. 1314, the 
Computer Crime Enforcement Act, to help provide the necessary funding 
for training and equipment for state and local law enforcement to deal 
with computer crimes. The Senate Judiciary Committee unanimously 
reported this bill favorably to the Senate on September 21, 2000. 
Although he is not a cosponsor of these bills, I appreciate Senator 
Kyl's support for both S. 2448 and S. 1314 as those bills moved through 
Committee. These complementary pieces of legislation reflect twin-track 
progress against computer crime: More tools at the federal level and 
more resources for local computer crime enforcement.
  In addition, the Senate Judiciary Committee has considered and 
reported unanimously on May 18, 2000, S. 2089, the Counterintelligence 
Reform Act, which I was pleased to cosponsor with Senators Specter, 
Torricelli, and others. Senator Kyl did not cosponsor this bill.
  The Counterintelligence Reform Act is intended to improve the 
coordination within and among federal agencies investigating and 
prosecuting espionage cases and other cases affecting national 
security. Specifically, this legislation amends the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act to state explicitly that past activities 
of a target may be considered in determining whether there is probable 
cause to believe that the target of electronic surveillance is an 
``agent of a foreign power.'' This particular provision appears to 
address a criticism subsequently raised in the Bremer-Sonnenberg 
Commission report that the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, 
which is the Justice Department unit responsible for preparing and 
presenting FISA applications to the FISA court, ``does not generally 
consider the past activities of the surveillance target relevant in 
determining whether the FISA probable cause test is met.''
  The Bremer-Sonnenberg Commission report recommended that ``the 
Attorney General should substantially expand'' OIPR in order ``[t]o 
ensure timely review of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
applications.'' I concur with this recommendation. In fact, even before 
the Commission report was released and during Judiciary Committee 
consideration of S. 2089, I offered an amendment to S. 2089, which was 
approved by the Judiciary Committee, that would authorize an increase 
in the budget for OIPR from its current funding level of $4,084,000 to 
$7,000,000 for FY 2001, with increases up to $8,000,000 over the 
following two years, for expanded personnel and technology resources. 
The Select Committee on Intelligence also approved this budget increase 
for OIPR upon consideration of S. 2089, which subsequently was passed 
by the Congress as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act, S. 2507.
  Recently, the Congress passed as part of the conference report on the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act, H.R. 3244, the Justice for Victims 
of Terrorism Act with an amendment that Senator Feinstein and I 
authored dealing with support for victims of international terrorism. 
Senator Kyl did not cosponsor this amendment. This amendment is 
intended to enable the Office for Victims of Crime to provide more 
immediate and effective assistance to Americans who are victims of 
terrorism abroad--Americans like those killed or injured in the embassy 
bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and in the Pan Am 103 bombing over 
Lockerbie, Scotland. These victims deserve help, and the Leahy-
Feinstein amendment will permit the Office for Victims of Crime 
to serve these victims better by expanding the types of assistance for 
which the VOCA emergency reserve fund may be used, and the range of 
organizations to which assistance may be provided. The amendment allows 
OVC greater flexibility in

[[Page S11540]]

using existing reserve funds to assist victims of terrorism abroad, 
including the victims of the Lockerbie and embassy bombings.

  This provision will also authorize OVC to raise the cap on the VOCA 
emergency reserve fund from $50 million to $100 million, so that the 
fund is large enough to cover the extraordinary costs that would be 
incurred if a terrorist act caused massive casualties, and to replenish 
the reserve fund with unobligated funds from its other grant programs.
  At the same time, the provision will simplify the presently-
authorized system of using VOCA funds to provide victim compensation to 
American victims of terrorism abroad, by permitting OVC to establish 
and operate an international crime victim compensation program. This 
program will, in addition, cover foreign nationals who are employees of 
any American government institution targeted for terrorist attack. The 
source of funding is the VOCA emergency reserve fund, which we 
authorized in an amendment I offered to the 1996 Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act.
  The Leahy-Feinstein provision also clarifies that deposits into the 
Crime Victims Fund remain available for intended uses under VOCA when 
not expended immediately.
  As is apparent from the work we have done both in this Congress and 
in prior Congresses, we all share the interest and concern of the 
sponsors of S. 3205 in protecting our national security from the threat 
and risks posed by terrorists determined to harm this country and its 
citizens and helping victims of terrorist acts. Yet, I have been 
concerned that earlier versions of this bill posed serious 
constitutional problems and risks to important civil liberties we hold 
dear. Unlike the secret holds that often stop good bills from passing 
often for no good reason, I have had no secret holds on S. 3205 or 
earlier versions of this legislation. On the contrary, when asked, I 
have made no secret about the concerns I had with this legislation.
  An earlier version of this legislation, which Senator Kyl tried to 
move as part of the Intelligence Authorization bill, S. 2507, prompted 
a firestorm of controversy from civil liberties and human rights 
organizations, as well as the Department of Justice. For example, the 
Department of Justice opposed the amendment on myriad grounds, 
including that (1) the provision amending the wiretap statute to permit 
law enforcement officers to share foreign intelligence or 
counterintelligence information obtained under a title III wiretap with 
the intelligence community ``could have significant implications for 
prosecutions and the discovery process in litigation''; (2) the 
provision giving the FBI sixty days to report on the feasibility of 
establishing a dissemination center within the FBI on international 
terrorism raised sufficiently significant issues that ``do not avail 
themselves of resolution in this very short time frame''; (3) the 
provision requiring the creation of a task force to disrupt the 
fundraising activities of international terrorist organizations would 
impose a ``rigid, statutory mandate" that ``would interfere with the 
need for flexibility in tailoring enforcement strategies and mechanisms 
to fit the enforcement needs of the particular moment''; and (4) the 
provision requiring the Attorney General to make legislative language 
recommendations on matters relating to biological pathogens were 
``invalid under the Recommendations Clause'' and ``interferes with the 
President's efforts to formulate and present his own recommendations 
and proposals and to control the policy agenda of his Administration.''
  Similarly, the Center for Democracy and Technology, the Center for 
National Security Studies and the American Civil Liberties Union, 
described in detail their concerns that ``provisions in the Act pose 
grave threats to constitutional rights.''
  I shared many of the concerns of those organizations and the Justice 
Department, and note that the version of S. 3205 that we consider today 
addresses those concerns with substantial revisions to the original 
legislation. For example, no longer does the bill require a change in 
the wiretap statute allowing the permissive disclosure of information 
obtained in a title III wiretap to the intelligence agencies. No longer 
does the bill direct the Central Intelligence Agency to make 
legislative recommendations to enhance the recruitment of terrorist 
informants, without any countervailing considerations. Instead, the 
bill now requests a more balanced picture of the policy considerations 
that prompted the 1995 guidelines on the use of terrorists as 
informants and the limitations that may be necessary to assure that the 
United States does not encourage human rights abuse abroad.
  After the bill was introduced, I first advised the sponsors of the 
bill and then the Senate about the remaining areas of concern that 
should be fixed in the bill before Senate passage.
  In this regard, I note that Senator Kyl suggested to the Senate on 
October 25th that if the Justice Department was satisfied with his 
legislation, I or my staff had earlier indicated that I would be 
satisfied. I respect the expertise of the Department of Justice and the 
many fine lawyers and public servants who work there and, where 
appropriate, seek out their views, as do many Members. That does not 
mean that I always share the views of the Department of Justice or 
follow the Department's preferred course and recommendations without 
exercising my own independent judgment. I would never represent that if 
the Justice Department were satisfied with his bill, I would 
automatically defer to their view. Furthermore, my staff has advised me 
that no such representation was ever made.
  I am pleased that the further corrections to and refinements of this 
bill have now been made and that the version of the bill that the 
Senate is now being asked to consider and pass has been improved. 
First, the bill now contains the correct numbers of sailors killed and 
injured in the sense of the Congress concerning the tragic bombing 
attack on the U.S.S. Cole. I believe that each of the 17 sailors killed 
and 39 sailors injured deserve recognition and that the full scope of 
the attack should be properly reflected in this Senate bill. I commend 
the sponsors of the bill for correcting this part of the bill.
  Second, the sense of the Congress originally urged the United States 
Government to ``take immediate actions to investigate rapidly the 
unprovoked attack on the'' U.S.S. Cole, without acknowledging the fact 
that such immediate action has been taken. In fact, the Navy began 
immediate investigative steps shortly after the attack occurred, and 
the FBI established a presence on the ground and began investigating 
within 24 hours. The Director himself went to Yemen to guide this 
investigation. That investigation is active and ongoing, and no Senate 
bill should reflect differently, as this one originally did. The 
corrected bill now urges the government ``to continue to take strong 
and effective actions'' to investigate this attack. I commend the 
Administration for the swift and immediate actions it has taken to 
investigate this attack and the strong statements made by the President 
making clear that no stone will be left unturned to find the criminals 
who planned this bloody attack.

  Third, the ``Findings'' section of this bill contained several 
factual errors or inaccuracies that are now corrected. For example, the 
original bill stated that there are ``38 organizations'' designated as 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) when there are currently 29, 
which has been corrected. The original bill stated that ``current 
practice is to update the list of FTOs every two years'' when in fact 
the statute requires redesignation of FTOs every two years. This 
statement has been corrected. The original bill stated that current 
controls on the transfer and possession of biological pathogens were 
``designed to prevent accidents, not theft,'' which according to the 
Justice Department is simply not accurate. This inaccurate statement 
has been eliminated.
  Fourth, the original bill required reports on issues within the 
jurisdiction of the Senate Judiciary Committee without any direction 
that those reports be submitted to that Committee. For example, section 
9 of the bill required the FBI to submit to the Select Committees on 
Intelligence of the Senate and the House a feasibility report on 
establishing a new capability within the FBI for the dissemination of 
law enforcement information to the Intelligence community. My 
suggestion that these reports also be required to

[[Page S11541]]

be submitted to the Judiciary Committees has been adopted.
  Fifth, the bill requires reports, with recommendations for 
appropriate legislative or regulation changes, by the Attorney General 
and the Secretary of Health and Human Services on safeguarding 
biological pathogens at research labs, pharmaceutical companies and 
other facilities in the United States. No definition of ``biological 
pathogen'' is included in the bill and the scope of these reports could 
therefore cover a vast array of biological materials. To address this 
concern over the potentially broad focus of this provision, the bill 
has been amended to include a direction to the Attorney General and the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services to define and determine the type 
and classes of pathogens that should be covered by any recommendations.
  Finally, the bill would require reimbursement for professional 
liability insurance for law enforcement officers performing official 
counterterrorism duties and for intelligence officials performing such 
duties outside the United States. I scoured the record in vain for 
explanatory statements by the sponsors of this bill about their views 
on the need for this provision. Current law curiously provides for 
payments of only half the costs of professional liability insurance for 
law enforcement officers and federal judges to cover the costs of legal 
liability for damages resulting from any tortious act, error of 
omission while in the performance of the employee's duties and the 
costs of legal representation in connection with any administrative or 
judicial proceeding relating to such act, error or omission. 5 U.S.C. 
Sec.  5941 prec. note. The Bremer-Sonnenberg Commission report 
recommended that the Congress amend current law to mandate full 
reimbursement of the costs of personal liability insurance for FBI and 
CIA counterterrorism agents. In light of this explanation, I am 
prepared to proceed while noting that this is an area that deserves 
more comprehensive review. The same reasons for providing full 
reimbursement for counterterrorism officers may apply to other law 
enforcement and intelligence officers.
  The bill has been greatly improved since its first iteration, and I 
am pleased to withdraw my objection.
  Mr. WARNER. I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 4358) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. I ask unanimous consent the bill be read a third time and 
passed, as amended, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, 
and any statements relating to this bill be printed in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The bill (S. 3205), as amended, was read the third time and passed, 
as follows:

                                S. 3205

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Counterterrorism Act of 
     2000''.

     SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE ATTACK ON THE U.S.S. COLE.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) On October 12, 2000, the United States naval vessel 
     U.S.S. Cole was attacked in Aden, Yemen.
       (2) The attack occurred while the U.S.S. Cole was 
     refueling, and was unprovoked.
       (3) Seventeen United States sailors were killed in the 
     attack, and thirty-nine were injured.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the United States Government should--
       (1) continue to take strong and effective actions to 
     investigate rapidly the unprovoked attack on the United 
     States naval vessel U.S.S. Cole;
       (2) ensure that the perpetrators of this cowardly act are 
     swiftly brought to justice; and
       (3) take appropriate actions to protect from terrorist 
     attack all other members and units of the United States Armed 
     Forces that are deployed overseas.

     SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Commission on National Security in the 21st 
     Century, chaired by former Senators Hart and Rudman, 
     concluded that ``[s]tates, terrorists, and other disaffected 
     groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction and mass 
     disruption, and some will use them. Americans will likely die 
     on American soil, possibly in large number.''.
       (2) United States counterterrorism efforts must be improved 
     to meet the evolving threat of international terrorism 
     against United States nationals and interests. The bipartisan 
     National Commission of Terrorism chaired by Ambassador Paul 
     Bremer and Maurice Sonnenberg was mandated by Congress to 
     evaluate current United States policy and make 
     recommendations on improvements. This Act stems from the 
     findings and recommendations of that Commission.
       (3) The face of terrorism has changed significantly over 
     the last 25 years. With the fall of the Soviet Union, many 
     state-sponsored terrorist groups have been replaced by more 
     loosely knit organizations with varying motives. These 
     transnational terrorist networks are more difficult to track 
     and penetrate than state sponsored terrorist groups, and 
     their actions are more difficult to predict.
       (4) State support of terrorism has not disappeared. Despite 
     political change in Iran, the country continues to be the 
     foremost state sponsor of terrorism in the world. In April 
     2000, the Department of State issued ``Patterns of Global 
     Terrorism'', which provides a detailed account of Iran's 
     continued support of terrorism.
       (5) According to the report of the National Commission on 
     Terrorism, there are indications of Iranian involvement in 
     the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers complex in Saudi 
     Arabia, in which 19 United States soldiers were killed and 
     more than 500 injured. In October 1999, President Clinton 
     officially requested cooperation from Iran in the 
     investigation of the bombing. Thus far, Iran has not 
     responded to this request.
       (6) Terrorist attacks are becoming more lethal. A growing 
     number of terrorist attacks are designed to kill the maximum 
     number of people. Although conventional explosives have 
     remained the weapon of choice, terrorist groups are investing 
     in the acquisition of unconventional weapons such as nuclear, 
     chemical, and biological agents.
       (7) Syria was placed on the first list of state-sponsors of 
     terrorism by the United States Government in 1979, due to its 
     long history of using terrorism to advance its interests. 
     Syria continues to support terrorist training and logistics.
       (8) According to the National Commission on Terrorism, the 
     1995 guidelines of the Central Intelligence Agency on the use 
     of terrorists as informants set up complex procedures for 
     seeking approval to recruit as informants terrorists who have 
     been involved in human rights violations. That Commission 
     found that these guidelines have inhibited the recruitment of 
     essential, if sometimes unsavory, terrorist informants. As a 
     result, that Commission concluded that the United States has 
     relied too heavily on foreign intelligence services in 
     attempting to uncover information about terrorist 
     organizations.
       (9) No other country, much less any subnational 
     organization, can match United States scientific and 
     technological prowess (including quality control) in 
     biotechnology and pharmaceutical production, electronics, 
     computer science, and other pursuits that could help overcome 
     and defeat the technologies used by future terrorists.
       (10) Currently, the United States focuses its efforts to 
     discourage private financial support to terrorists on 
     prosecutions under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and 
     Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132) and 
     the amendments made by that Act. Under an amendment made by 
     that Act, section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
     (8 U.S.C. 1189) requires the Secretary of State to designate 
     groups that threaten United States interests and security as 
     Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). There are currently 
     29 FTOs. The National Commission on Terrorism recommended 
     that the Secretary of State ensure that the list of FTO 
     designations is credible and updated regularly.
       (11) It is in the interest of the United States that the 
     Federal Government take a broader approach to cutting off the 
     flow of financial support for terrorism from within the 
     United States. Anyone providing to terrorist organizations 
     funds that he or she knows will be used to support terrorist 
     acts should be prosecuted under all relevant statutes, 
     including statutes addressing money laundering, conspiracy, 
     and tax or fraud violations. In addition, Federal agencies 
     such as the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the 
     Internet Revenue Service and the Customs Service should be 
     better utilized to thwart terrorist fundraising. Such 
     activities should not violate constitutional rights and 
     values.
       (12) Current controls on the transfer and possession of 
     biological pathogens that could be used in biological weapons 
     are inadequate. Controls on the equipment needed to turn such 
     pathogens into weapons are virtually nonexistent. The 
     National Commission on Terrorism concluded that the standards 
     for the storage, transport, and handling of biological 
     pathogens should be as rigorous as the current standards for 
     the physical protection and security of critical nuclear 
     materials.

     SEC. 4. SYRIA.

       It is the sense of Congress that the United States should 
     keep Syria on the list of countries who sponsor terrorism 
     until Syria--
       (1) shuts down training camps and other terrorist support 
     facilities in Syrian-controlled territory; and
       (2) prohibits financial or other support of terrorists 
     through Syrian-controlled territory.

[[Page S11542]]

     SEC. 5. IRAN.

       It is the sense of Congress that the United States should 
     keep Iran on the list of countries who sponsor terrorism, and 
     make no concessions to Iran, until Iran--
       (1) demonstrates that it has stopped supporting terrorism; 
     and
       (2) cooperates fully with the United States in the 
     investigation into the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers 
     complex in Saudi Arabia.

     SEC. 6. GUIDELINES ON RECRUITMENT OF TERRORIST INFORMANTS.

       (a) Report on Guidelines.--Not later than six months after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress, including the 
     Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of 
     Representatives, a report on the Director's response to the 
     findings of the National Commission on Terrorism regarding 
     the recruitment of terrorist informants.
       (b) Report Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall 
     set forth the following:
       (1) A detailed response to the findings referred to in that 
     subsection, and a detailed description of any other policy 
     considerations that prompted the 1995 guidelines of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency on the use of terrorists as 
     informants.
       (2) Recommendations, if any, for legislation to enhance the 
     recruitment of terrorist informants, including any 
     limitations that may be necessary to assure that the United 
     States does not encourage human rights abuse abroad.

     SEC. 7. REVIEW OF AUTHORITY OF FEDERAL AGENCIES TO ADDRESS 
                   CATASTROPHIC TERRORIST ATTACKS.

       (a) Review Required.--The Attorney General shall conduct a 
     review of the legal authority of various Federal agencies, 
     including the Department of Defense, to respond to, and to 
     prevent, pre-empt, detect, and interdict, catastrophic 
     terrorist attacks.
       (b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall submit to 
     the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the review 
     conducted under subsection (a). The report shall include any 
     recommendations that the Attorney General considers 
     appropriate, including recommendations whether additional 
     legal authority for particular Federal agencies is advisable 
     in order to enhance the capability of the Federal Government 
     to respond to, and to prevent, pre-empt, detect, and 
     interdict, catastrophic terrorist attacks.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
     ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means the following:
       (A) The Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and 
     the Judiciary and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     Senate.
       (B) The Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, 
     International Relations, and the Judiciary and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (2) Catastrophic terrorist attack.--The term ``catastrophic 
     terrorist attack'' means a terrorist attack against the 
     United States perpetrated by a state, substate, or nonstate 
     actor that involves mass casualties or the use of a weapon of 
     mass destruction.

     SEC. 8. LONG-TERM RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO ADDRESS 
                   CATASTROPHIC TERRORIST ATTACKS.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) there has not been sufficient emphasis on long-term 
     research and development on technologies useful in fighting 
     terrorism; and
       (2) the United States should make better use of its 
     considerable accomplishments in science and technology to 
     prevent or address terrorist attacks in the future, 
     particularly attacks involving chemical, biological, or 
     nuclear agents.
       (b) Establishment of Program.--Not later than one year 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 
     shall establish a comprehensive program (including a 
     comprehensive set of requirements for the program) of long-
     term research and development relating to science and 
     technology necessary to prevent, pre-empt, detect, interdict, 
     and respond to catastrophic terrorist attacks.
       (c) Report on Proposed Program.--Not later than 30 days 
     before the commencement of the program required by subsection 
     (b), the President shall submit to Congress a report on the 
     program. The report on the program shall include the 
     following:
       (1) A description of the proposed organization and mission 
     of the program.
       (2) A description of the current capabilities of the 
     Federal Government to rapidly identify and contain an attack 
     in the United States involving chemical or biological agents, 
     including any proposals for future enhancements of such 
     capabilities that the President considers appropriate.
       (d) Catastrophic Terrorist Attack Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``catastrophic terrorist attack'' means a 
     terrorist attack against the United States perpetrated by a 
     state, substate, or nonstate actor that involves mass 
     casualties or the use of a weapon of mass destruction.

     SEC. 9. DISSEMINATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION TO THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Report on Establishment of Intelligence Reporting 
     Function.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary 
     and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and 
     the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a 
     report on the feasibility of establishing within the Bureau a 
     comprehensive intelligence reporting function having the 
     responsibility for disseminating among the elements of the 
     intelligence community information collected and assembled by 
     the Bureau on international terrorism and other national 
     security matters.
       (b) Report Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall 
     include the following:
       (1) A description of the requirements applicable to the 
     creation of the function referred to in that subsection, 
     including the funding required for the function.
       (2) A discussion of the legal and policy issues, including 
     any reasonable restrictions on the sharing of information and 
     the potential effects on open criminal investigations, 
     associated with disseminating to the elements of the 
     intelligence community law enforcement information relating 
     to international terrorism and other national security 
     matters.

     SEC. 10. DISCLOSURE BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF CERTAIN 
                   INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED BY INTERCEPTION OF 
                   COMMUNICATIONS.

       (a) Report on Authorities Relating to Sharing of Criminal 
     Wiretap Information.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to 
     the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary 
     and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives a report on the legal authorities 
     that govern the sharing of criminal wiretap information under 
     relevant United States laws, including section 104 of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4). The report 
     shall include--
       (1) a description of the type of information that can be 
     shared by the Department of Justice or other United States 
     law enforcement agencies with elements of the United States 
     intelligence community, including a description of all such 
     information that the Department of Justice or other such law 
     enforcement agencies currently share with elements of the 
     United States intelligence community and the legal 
     limitations if any, that apply to the use of such information 
     by elements of the intelligence community; and
       (2) recommendations, if any, for such legislative language 
     as the President considers appropriate to improve the 
     capability of the Department of Justice, or other law 
     enforcement agencies, to share foreign intelligence 
     information or counterintelligence information with elements 
     of the United States intelligence community on matters such 
     as counterterrorism.
       (b) Definitions.--As used in this section, the terms 
     ``foreign intelligence'' and ``counterintelligence'' have the 
     meanings given those terms in paragraphs (2) and (3), 
     respectively, of section 3 of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a).

     SEC. 11. JOINT TASK FORCE ON TERRORIST FUNDRAISING.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress 
     that--
       (1) many terrorist groups secretly solicit and exploit the 
     resources of international nongovernmental organizations, 
     companies, and wealthy individuals;
       (2) the Federal Government could do more to utilize all the 
     tools available to the Federal Government to prevent, deter, 
     and disrupt the fundraising activities of international 
     terrorist organizations; and
       (3) the employment of any such tools to combat terrorism 
     must not violate speech, association, and equal protection 
     rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.
       (b) Establishment of Joint Task Force.--Not later than six 
     months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     President shall establish a joint task force for purposes of 
     developing and implementing a broad approach toward 
     discouraging the fundraising activities of international 
     terrorist organizations. The approach shall utilize all 
     criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions available under 
     Federal law, including sanctions for money laundering, tax 
     and fraud violations, and conspiracy. The approach shall not 
     infringe upon constitutional and civil rights in the United 
     States.
       (c) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the joint task force established under 
     subsection (b) shall submit to Congress a report on the 
     activities of the joint task force. The report shall include 
     any findings and recommendations (including recommendations 
     for modifications of United States law or policy) that the 
     joint task force considers appropriate regarding United 
     States efforts to thwart the fundraising activities of 
     international terrorist organizations while protecting 
     constitutional and civil rights in the United States.

     SEC. 12. IMPROVEMENT OF CONTROLS ON PATHOGENS AND EQUIPMENT 
                   FOR PRODUCTION OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.

       (a) Report on Improvement of Controls.--(1) Not later than 
     one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Attorney General shall submit to Congress a report on the 
     means of improving United States controls of biological 
     pathogens and the equipment necessary to develop, produce, or 
     deliver biological weapons.

[[Page S11543]]

       (2) Subject to paragraph (3), the report under paragraph 
     (1) should include the following:
       (A) A list of the equipment identified by the Attorney 
     General, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the 
     Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Director of 
     Central Intelligence, other appropriate Federal officials, 
     and other appropriate members of public and private 
     organizations, as critical to the development, production, or 
     delivery of biological weapons.
       (B) Recommendations, if any, for such legislative language 
     as the Attorney General considers appropriate to make illegal 
     the possession of the biological pathogens by anyone who is 
     not properly certified for the possession of such pathogens, 
     or for other than a legitimate purpose.
       (C) Recommendations, if any, for such legislative language 
     as the Attorney General considers appropriate to control the 
     domestic sale and transfer of the equipment identified under 
     subparagraph (A), including any appropriate steps to track, 
     tag, or otherwise mark or monitor such equipment.
       (3) The recommendations of the Attorney General under 
     paragraph (2) shall take into consideration the impact of 
     additional controls on legitimate industrial or medical 
     activities, and shall include an assessment of the economic 
     and scientific effects of such controls on such activities.
       (4) The Attorney General shall consult with the Secretary 
     of Health and Human Services in preparing any recommendations 
     under paragraph (2)(B), and shall include in the report under 
     paragraph (1) a detailed description of the methodology and 
     criteria used to define and determine the types and classes 
     of pathogens covered by such recommendations.
       (b) Improved Security of Facilities.--Not later than one 
     year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Secretary of Health and Human Services, in consultation with 
     other appropriate Federal officials and appropriate members 
     of public and private organizations, shall submit to Congress 
     a report with detailed analysis and recommendations for 
     appropriate regulations, or modifications to current law, to 
     enhance the standards for the physical protection and 
     security of the biological pathogens described in subsection 
     (a) at research laboratories and other facilities in the 
     United States that create, possess, handle, store, or 
     transport such pathogens in order to protect against the 
     theft or other diversion for illegitimate purposes of such 
     pathogens from such laboratories and facilities. The report 
     shall include a detailed description of the methodology and 
     criteria used to define and determine the types and classes 
     of pathogens covered by the report.

     SEC. 13. REIMBURSEMENT OF PERSONNEL PERFORMING 
                   COUNTERTERRORISM DUTIES FOR PROFESSIONAL 
                   LIABILITY INSURANCE.

       (a) Requirement for Full Reimbursement.--(1) 
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law and subject to 
     paragraph (2), the head of an agency employing a qualified 
     employee shall reimburse the qualified employee for the costs 
     incurred by the qualified employee for professional liability 
     insurance.
       (2) Reimbursement of a qualified employee under paragraph 
     (1) shall be contingent on the submission by the qualified 
     employee to the head of the agency concerned of such 
     information or documentation as the head of the agency 
     concerned shall require.
       (3) Amounts for reimbursements under paragraph (1) shall be 
     derived from amounts available to the agency concerned for 
     salaries and expenses.
       (b) Qualified Employee.--For purposes of this section, the 
     term ``qualified employee'' means an employee of an agency 
     whose position is that of--
       (1) a law enforcement officer performing official 
     counterterrorism duties; or
       (2) an official of an element of the intelligence community 
     performing official counterterrorism duties outside the 
     United States.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' means any Executive 
     agency, as that term is defined in section 105 of title 5, 
     United States Code, and includes any agency of the 
     Legislative Branch of Government.
       (2) Element of the intelligence community.--The term 
     ``element of the intelligence community'' means any element 
     of the intelligence community specified or designated under 
     section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     401a(4)).
       (3) Law enforcement officer; professional liability 
     insurance.--The terms ``law enforcement officer'' and 
     ``professional liability insurance'' have the meanings given 
     those terms in section 636(c) of the Treasury, Postal 
     Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1997 (5 
     U.S.C. prec. 5941 note).

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, today the Senate passed by unanimous 
consent important legislation Senator Kyl and I sponsored that seeks to 
improve the United States' ability to prevent and respond to terrorist 
attacks. This bill, S. 3205, the Counterterrorism Act of 2000--together 
with a Kyl-Feinstein amendment making a few technical changes--
implements major recommendations from a bipartisan, blue-ribbon 
commission on terrorism.
  Let me describe what the bill would do. First, it urges that the U.S. 
government continue to take strong and effective actions to investigate 
the recent attack on the U.S.S. Cole and ensure that the perpetrators 
are brought to justice. The assault on the Cole is the worst against 
the U.S. military since the bombing of an Air Force barracks in Saudi 
Arabia killed 19 airmen in 1996. It is also the worst attack on a Navy 
ship since an Iraqi missile struck an American guided-missile frigate 
in 1987, killing 37 sailors.
  Second, the bill requires the Department of Justice to review legal 
authority of federal agencies responsible for responding to a 
catastrophic terrorist attack and determine whether additional legal 
authority is necessary.
  Third, the bill requires the president to establish a program for 
long-term research and development to counter catastrophic terrorist 
attacks and submit a report to Congress on this program. It also 
expresses the sense of Congress that there should be more long-term 
research and development in this area.
  Fourth, the bill mandates that the attorney general issue a report on 
how to improve U.S. controls on biological pathogens and the equipment 
necessary to produce biological weapons, and requires the Health & 
Human Services secretary to issue a report on any appropriate actions 
that should be taken to protect against unlawful diversion of 
pathogens.
  Fifth, the bill requires that the president establish a joint task 
force to develop a broad approach toward discouraging the fundraising 
activities of international terrorist organizations and that the task 
force issue a report.
  Sixth, the bill requires the FBI to report on whether it can set up a 
central mechanism to distribute intelligence information it gleans 
about international terrorists to other members of the intelligence 
community.
  Seventh, the bill directs the president to review the type of 
information shared by U.S. law enforcement agencies and intelligence 
agencies as well as legal limitations on the sharing of this 
information. The president shall provide any recommendations regarding 
the sharing of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence information 
between such agencies.
  Eighth, the bill mandates that the CIA shall issue a report 
responding to the Commission on Terrorism's finding that the CIA should 
scrap a internal classified guideline requiring CIA agents to get 
approval from headquarters before recruiting unsavory individuals to 
act as informants about terrorism.
  Ninth, the bill expresses the Sense of Congress that Syria and Iran 
should remain on the list of countries that sponsor terrorism.
  Finally, the bill would ensure that federal counterintelligence 
personnel be fully reimbursed for buying insurance they purchase to 
protect themselves from liability if they are sued for their officially 
authorized activities. Currently, the government reimburses federal 
criminal law enforcement officers, supervisors, and management 
officials for one-half of their insurance expenses. These individuals 
purchase professional liability insurance because government 
representation may not be available to them.
  However, FBI special agents and CIA officers who do counterterrorism 
work may not be reimbursed at all when they buy such insurance. This is 
particularly unfortunate because counterterrorism work is so risky--
especially when the work occurs overseas. There can be few more 
dangerous tasks than infiltrating a terrorist cell in, say, Yemen or 
Afghanistan.
  The Kyl-Feinstein Counterterrorism Act of 2000 is not a panacea for 
the problem of terrorism. Rather, it seeks to implement a number of 
specific improvements to our counterterrorism policy unanimously 
suggested by the Commission on Terrorism, a bipartisan group of 
experts.
  The bill also lays the groundwork for a number of further 
improvements. We will be revisiting many of the issues covered by the 
bill in the next Congress once we receive more detailed information and 
recommendations from the Executive Branch. I look forward to working 
with my colleagues in Congress and with the next Administration to 
implement S. 3205.
  I believe that we need to take strong action to combat terrorism. 
There is no question that terrorist attacks will

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continue and that they will become more deadly. Terrorists today often 
act out of a visceral hatred of the U.S. or the West and seek to wreak 
maximum destruction and kill as many people as possible.
  At the same time, I believe that our counterterrorism policy must be 
conducted in a way that remains consistent with our democratic values 
and our commitment to an open, free society.
  In many ways, the Kyl-Feinstein Counterterrorism Act of 2000 is a 
counterpart bill to the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act that 
recently passed the Senate 95 to 0. That legislation, which I 
cosponsored, will make it easier for American victims of terrorism 
abroad to collect court-awarded compensation and ensure that the state 
sponsors of terrorism pay a price for their crimes.
  While I strongly support assisting terrorist victims, I also believe 
that we need to do more to prevent Americans from becoming victims of 
terrorism in the first place. Thus, I am glad that the Senate has acted 
to pass S. 3205 with such dispatch. It is crucial to act now before 
terrorists strike again, killing and injuring more Americans and 
leaving more families grieving. I urge the House to pass S. 3205 before 
we adjourn.
  In conclusion, I want to thank my good friend Senator Kyl for his 
tireless efforts to get this bill passed. His work, as always, has been 
invaluable.
  I also thank my other colleagues for their assistance in helping us 
pass this bill. I know Senator Leahy, for instance, initially had a 
number of concerns with the legislation. I am grateful for the time he 
spent working through these issues with us, and I am glad that we can 
move this bill forward unanimously.

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