[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 140 (Monday, October 30, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11353-S11358]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                       U.S. OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENTS

  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, the pace of U.S. deployments and the use 
of force overseas has been a hot issue in policy debates in Congress 
and on the campaign trail. Presidential candidate, Governor George W. 
Bush, says that he will put an end to the Clinton Administration's 
``vague, aimless and endless deployments;'' that he would replace 
``uncertain missions with well-defined objectives.''
  So the question is: Has the President improperly committed our forces 
overseas in major missions and at an unprecedented rate compared to his 
predecessors? I don't think so. I want to take some time today to look 
at the deployments in question and at deployment statistics. I ask 
unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the lists of 
deployments, so Americans can judge for themselves if they think there 
were missions that the military should not have undertaken.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibit 1.)
  Mr. DURBIN. I want to look at why a deployment of between 10,000 and 
30,000 soldiers to the Balkans, or deployments of several thousand 
military personnel at a time for disaster relief or humanitarian aid 
could disrupt a military that has a combined force of about 2.2 million 
active and reserve personnel.
  The hardships suffered by our men and women in uniform are painfully 
real and should not be understated. I salute the sacrifices our 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are making everyday to defend 
our national security. Many of these hardships have arisen because the 
world has changed drastically and so has our military.
  Our military has changed from a post-World War II forward-based force 
to much more of a projection force. When we talk about deployments 
going up, we are talking about times when we send our forces away from 
their home bases and their families. After World War II, we had a half 
million troops stationed in Europe, but with their families, if they 
had families. Those troops were not considered ``deployed,'' because 
they were based there. So when people talk about a massive increase in 
deployments, they are generally not counting those who are stationed in 
overseas bases.
  That is how having 10,500 soldiers in the Balkans today can be 
considered and counted as a major deployment, but stationing a half 
million troops in Europe from the end of World War II through the 1980s 
is not even counted as a deployment by classic definition.
  Our military has also changed drastically. It used to be a force of 
mainly single, young men. Today, our forces are filled with married men 
and women, many of whom also have children. So deploying them on 
repeated missions overseas, along with frequent job changes, as well as 
being over-worked at their home bases, creates serious hardships for 
family life.
  I submit today that many of the problems encountered by our men and 
women in uniform are related to the ways our military is organized and 
managed, based on the assumptions developed following our experience in 
World War II. I recommend to my colleagues an excellent, thoughtful 
paper, entitled ``It's The Personnel System,'' by John C. F. Tillson of 
the Institute for Defense Analysis. His paper explores the personnel 
and organizational assumptions that underlie the military, as well as 
the intersection of deployment tempo, personnel, or job-changing tempo, 
and operating tempo at home bases.

  These are complex problems that require serious thought. I think it 
is very sad that these issues would be reduced to a conclusion that the 
United States must pull out of our leadership role in the world instead 
of addressing those problems head-on.
  What are those unending missions that the Clinton Administration has 
gotten us into? Most of them were inherited from the Bush 
administration or Ronald Reagan's administration, or even earlier ones.
  Of the 100,000 troops currently deployed long-term away from home, 
only 10,500 or a little over 10 percent are deployed by the Clinton 
Administration--to the Balkans. The rest of the major long-term 
deployments were inherited, including deployments in Japan, the Korean 
peninsula, the Persian Gulf, and Navy deployments in the Western 
Pacific and the Mediterranean, as well as the mission that went wrong 
in Somalia. The only other major mission that the Clinton 
Administration took on that it did not inherit was to Haiti; and 
contrary to what Governor Bush said during the second Presidential 
debate, that mission is over.
  I have seen many figures bandied about claiming that the Clinton 
Administration has used force at a much greater pace than Presidents 
Bush and Reagan before him. Where do these claims come from?
  For example, an op-ed in The Wall Street Journal on October 18th by 
Mackubin Thomas Owens from the Naval War College and the Lexington 
Institute, says that:

       Deployments have increased three-fold during the Clinton 
     years.

  He further stated:

       These deployments have included some combat missions, but 
     have consisted primarily of open-ended peacekeeping and 
     humanitarian operations--48 missions, to be precise, from 
     1992 to 1999.

  Apparently, a 1999 Congressional Research Service report, Instances 
of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798--1999, was used to 
substantiate these claims. Specifically, the CRS report shows that 
during the Reagan and Bush administrations there were 17 and 16 uses of 
force overseas respectively. This compares to 49 uses of force overseas 
during the first 7 years of the Clinton administration.
  Unfortunately, reading the CRS report this way is a gross 
misrepresentation of the facts and an absurd misuse of the CRS report, 
which was intended

[[Page S11354]]

only to be a compendium or rough survey of the range of uses of force. 
CRS and its fine analysts should not be blamed for the poor analysis of 
others who used the report as a source.
  For instances of use of force in recent years, the CRS report is just 
a list of times when the President and Defense Secretary reported to 
Congress consistent with the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the report 
notes that the instances of use of force listed vary greatly in size 
and significance. The degree to which each President reports to and 
consults with Congress on war powers matters varies greatly. The 
Clinton Administration has reported to Congress diligently. To simply 
add up each instance without reading and analyzing them inevitably 
leads to a gross misinterpretation of the facts and to conclusions that 
cannot survive serious scrutiny.

  Let me provide that scrutiny using CRS' numbers.
  Of the 49 instances of use of force cited in the CRS report, 14 were 
either evacuations of U.S. citizens from Third World countries or minor 
increases in security at U.S. embassies. This is hardly the troop 
deployment depicted by the critics of the Clinton administration. 
Moreover, 24 other uses of force were merely continuing operations or 
simply status reports about continuing operations, 5 of those separate 
entries for status reports on peacekeeping operations in the Balkans.
  There are 7 separate citations regarding air attacks on Iraqi ground 
targets after the gulf war.
  The analysis suggests the numbers have been misused. Frankly, it 
raises a question of whether or not the military has been used 
effectively over the past 8 years. I certainly think it has.
  There were 4 entries regarding the deployment of troops in Haiti--3 
of which were reporting on the number of troops coming home! But those 
``counted'' as uses of force by the Clinton Administration. So did 
reductions in US forces from Bosnia.
  The largest deployment under President Clinton--some 30,000 troops to 
Bosnia for peacekeeping missions--is dwarfed by the 600,000+ troops 
sent to the Persian Gulf during Desert Shield/Storm under President 
Bush, yet the deployment to Bosnia counts for 15 entries in the CRS 
report, and the entire Gulf War, only one. The invasion of Grenada with 
8,800 US troops has but a single entry.
  The entries for the Clinton years included many instances of rescuing 
American citizens or humanitarian aid. Yet there were very few such 
instances for the Reagan-Bush years. It seems unlikely that hardly any 
U.S. citizens needed rescuing during those years, so I suspect such 
entries are simply missing.
  How do we make sense of these numbers?
  If we sort out all the multiple entries for the same deployment, as 
well as the minor deployments for embassy security and evacuations, it 
becomes clear that the number of distinct uses of force by the Clinton 
Administration is not that different from the Bush or Reagan years.
  Deconstructing the CRS instances of use of force to include only 
distinct uses of force, we find that: over 8 years, there were 16 
distinct uses of force by President Reagan, the major one the invasion 
of Grenada; 13 uses of force over the 4 years of the Bush 
Administration, the major ones being Panama, the Persian Gulf, and 
Somalia; and 13 uses of force for 7 years of the Clinton 
Administration, the major ones being Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo.
  The misuse of the CRS report was an egregious distortion of the 
Clinton Administration's record. To set the record straight, I asked 
the Defense Department what its numbers show.
  First, I should note that there is no uniform method for counting 
deployments at the Defense Department; some count training and 
exercises as deployments, and some count domestic missions, like 
fighting the fires in the West or helping with Hurricane Andrew clean-
up.

  In March 1999, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen sent a report to 
Congress entitled, ``U.S. Military Involvement in Major Smaller-Scale 
Contingencies Since the Persian Gulf War.'' In that report, Secretary 
Cohen notes that:

       . . . since the end of the Persian Gulf War in February 
     1991, U.S. military forces have conducted or participated in 
     approximately 50 named, overseas SSCs [small-scale 
     contingencies] involving the deployment of 500 or more 
     military personnel at any one time. This includes three 
     crisis response/show of force operations, three limited 
     strike operations, ten noncombatant evacuation operations, 
     four no-fly zone enforcement operations, three maritime 
     sanctions enforcement operations, six migrant operations, ten 
     peace operations, ten humanitarian assistance operations, and 
     one operation to provide emergency overseas assistance to 
     other U.S. government agencies.

  I asked the Defense Department for more detail, so DoD also sent me 
supporting data for the Secretary's report, showing 60 contingencies 
from 1980-1999--26 from 1980-1992, the Reagan-Bush years, and 34 during 
the Clinton Administration. Instead of 50 since February 1991 mentioned 
in the Secretary's report, it lists 44 contingencies since then.
  The 34 contingencies during the Clinton Administration are those 
missions that have a ``name,'' like ``Avid Response'' or ``Sustain 
Hope.'' The sources of this information are the reports to Congress 
consistent with the War Powers Resolution, just like the CRS report. 
However, the data doesn't suffer from repetition, since it only uses 
named missions, so multiple reports were consolidated. These 
contingencies also include many instances of rescuing Americans or 
humanitarian aid missions.
  However, almost all the data from 1980-1991 uses that same CRS 
report, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-
1999, as its source, which may suffer from undercounting smaller 
deployments for that time period. I would like to ask the Defense 
Department today to look at its own internal data for the period on 
which it relied on the CRS report.
  I also asked the Army to provide me with deployment data, which I 
would like to submit for the Record. The Army lists 38 deployments 
since 1989, including humanitarian assistance, noncombatant 
evacuations, and domestic disaster relief in Florida, Hawaii, 
California, Midwest floods, and Western fire-fighting.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a document entitled 
``Major Overseas Smaller-Scale Contingency Operations'' and another 
entitled ``Operational Deployments'' be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record as follows:

           MAJOR OVERSEAS SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
 [Involving the deployment of 500 or more U.S. Armed Forces personnel--
                        March 1991-February 1999]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Location                   Operation             Dates
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      CRISIS RESPONSE/SHOW OF FORCE
 
Kuwait..........................  Vigilant Warrior...  Oct-Dec 94.
                                    Vigilant Sentinel  Aug-Dec 95.
Iraq............................  Desert Thunder.....  Oct 97-Nov 98.
 
                             LIMITED STRIKE
 
Bosnia..........................  Deliberate Force...  Aug-Sep 95.
Iraq............................  Desert Strike......  Sep 96.
                                    Desert Fox.......  Dec 98.
 
                   NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS
 
Liberia.........................  ITF Liberia........  Oct 92.
Rwanda..........................  Distant Runner.....  Apr 94.
Liberia.........................  Assured Response...  Apr-Aug 96.
Central African Republic........  Quick Response.....  May 96.
Zaire...........................  Guardian Retrieval.  May-Jun 97.
Albania.........................  Silver Wake........  Mar-Jul 97.
Sierre Leone....................  Noble Obelisk......  May-Jun 97.
Cambodia/Thailand...............  Bevel Edge.........  Jul 97.
Indonesia.......................  Bevel Incline......  May 98.
 
                         NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT
 
Iraq............................  Northern Watch.....  Aug 92-present.
Persian Gulf....................  Southern Watch.....  Aug 92-present.
Bosnia..........................  Deny Flight........  Apr 93-Dec 95.
                                    Deliberate Guard.  Dec 96-Apr 98.
 
                     MARITIME SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT
 
Adriatic Sea....................  Maritime Monitor...  Jun-Dec 92.
                                    Maritime Guard...  Dec 92-Jun 93.
                                    Sharp Guard......  June 93-Sep 96.
                                    Decisive           Dec 95-Dec 96.
                                   Enhancement.
 
                           MIGRANT OPERATIONS
 
Cuba (Guantanamo)...............  Safe Harbor........  Nov 91-Jun 93.
Cuba (Haitian/Cuban)............  Sea Signal.........  May 94-Feb 96.
Carbbean (Haitian)..............  Able Vigil.........  Aug-Sep 94.
Panama (Cuban)..................  Safe Haven.........  Sep-Feb 95.
Cuba (Cuban)....................  Safe Passage.......  Jan-Feb 95.
Guam (Kurds)....................  Pacific Haven......  Sep 96-Apr 97.
 
                            PEACE OPERATIONS
 
Sinai...........................  Multinational Force  Apr 82-present.
                                   & Observers.
Macedonia.......................  Able Security        Jun 93-present.
                                   (UNPREDEP).
Somalia.........................  Continue Hope        May 93-Mar 94.
                                   (UNOSOM II).
                                    United Shield....  Dec 94-Mar 95.
Haiti...........................  Uphold Democracy     Sep 94-present.
                                   (MNF/USSPTGP).
                                    Restore Democracy  Mar 95-Apr 96.
                                   (UNMIH).
Bosnia..........................  Joint Endeavor       Dec 95-Dec 96.
                                   (IFOR).
                                    Joint Guard \2\    Dec 96-Jun 98.
                                   (SFOR).
                                    Joint Forge \3\    Jun 98-present.
                                   (SFOR/FOF).
Kosovo..........................  Eagle Eye..........  Oct 98-Mar 99.
 
              HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS (OVERSEAS)
 
Iraq............................  Provide Comfort....  Apr 91-Dec 96.
Bangladesh......................  Sea Angel..........  May-Jun 91.
Former Soviet Union.............  Provide Hope.......  Feb 92-Apr 92.
Bosnia..........................  Provide Promise....  Jul 92-Feb 96.
Somalia.........................  Provide Relief.....  Aug 92-Dec 92.
                                    Restore Hope.....  Dec 92-May 93.
Zaire...........................  Support Hope.......  Jul-Oct 94.
Rwanda/Zaire....................  Guardian Assistance  Nov-Dec 96.

[[Page S11355]]

 
Central America.................  Strong Support.....  Oct 98-Mar 99.
 
    EMERGENCY OPERATIONS OVERSEAS IN SUPPORT OF OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT
                                AGENCIES
 
Tanzania/Kenya..................  Resolute Response..  Aug 98-present.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                                       
                                  ____
             Operational Deployments Since 1989 and Ongoing


                 multinational force and observer (mfo)

       Peacekeeping--Sinai. Established by Protocol 26 Mar 79 to 
     Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. MFO assumed duties Apr 
     82. MFO is a peacekeeping operation under the auspices of the 
     U.N. MFO operates checkpoints, reconnaissance patrols & 
     observation posts to observe, report and periodically verify 
     the implementation of the Peace Treaty. U.S. participation 
     consists of an Infantry Battalion & the 1st Support 
     Battalion. Soldiers on individual permanent change of station 
     order man to Support Battalion, while battalion-sized task 
     forces of approx. 530 personnel, rotate about every six 
     months.


                      joint task force (jtf) bravo

       Regional Cooperative Security--Honduras. Conducts and 
     supports joint, combined and interagency operations to 
     enhance regional security and stability in the U.S. Southern 
     Command Joint Operations Area. Established in Aug 84, at Soto 
     Cano Air Base, Honduras, the task force coordinates the 
     presence of U.S. forces in Belize, Guatemala, El Salvador, 
     Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica.


                               just cause

       Limited Conventional Conflict--Panama. In December 1989, 
     the National Assembly of Panama declared that a state of war 
     existed with the U.S. On 20 December 1989, U.S. forces 
     launched attacks. Objectives were to protect U.S. lives and 
     key sites and facilities; capture and deliver Noriega; 
     neutralize Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) forces and command 
     and control; support establishment of U.S.-recognized 
     government in Panama; and restructure the PDF.


                       desert shield/desert storm

       Regional Conventional Conflict--Persian Gulf. Restoration 
     of Kuwait's sovereignty by military force from Saddam 
     Hussein. The ensuing war and economic embargo decimated 
     Iraq's military infrastructure, severed communication and 
     supply lines, smashed weapons arsenals and destroyed morale.


                             desert falcon

       Force Protection--Saudi Arabia/Kuwait. Began 1991. Air and 
     missile defense of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. JFCOM and EUCOM 
     provide Patriot Air Defense Task Forces (750 soldiers) on a 
     rotational basis for contingency employment in the Central 
     Command area of responsibility. Task forces rotate 
     approximately every four to six months and every third 
     rotation is a U.S. Army Europe responsibility.


                               sea angel

       Humanitarian Assistance--Bangladesh. Supported 
     international relief and rescue effort and deployment forces 
     to Bangladesh in order to conduct humanitarian assistance and 
     disaster relief.


                            provide comfort

       Humanitarian Assistance--Northern Iraq. Establish a 
     Combined Task Force, at the conclusion of the Gulf War, to 
     enforce the no-fly zone in Northern Iraq and to support 
     coalition humanitarian relief operations for the Kurds and 
     other displaced Iraqi civilians.


                     joint task force (jtf) liberia

       Noncombatant Evacuation Operations--Liberia. Protection and 
     evacuation of American citizens and designated third country 
     nationals in support of a State Department evacuation 
     directive that reduced the number of at risk American 
     citizens.


                         restore/continued hope

       Humanitarian Assistance--Somalia. Military transports 
     supported the multinational UN relief effort in Somalia. 
     Restore Hope--Dec. 92-May 93: Deployed large U.S. and 
     multinational U.N. force to secure major airports, seaports, 
     key installation and food distribution points, and to provide 
     open and free passage of relief supplies, with security for 
     convoys and relief organizations and those supplying 
     humanitarian relief. Continue Hope--1993-1994: Provided 
     support to UN Operation In Somalia (UNOSOM II) to establish a 
     secure environment for humanitarian relief operations by 
     provided personnel, logistical, communications, intelligence 
     support, a quick reaction force and other elements with 60 
     Army aircraft and approx. 1,000 aviation personnel.


                             southern watch

       Sanctions Enforcement--Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait. 
     Multinational, joint operation with forces deployed 
     throughout SWA. CENTCOM forward-deployed HQ, JTF-SWA, is 
     located in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The mission is to enforce 
     the No-Fly Zone in Southern Iraq. ARCENT maintains a forward 
     presence in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar in support of 
     OSW. ARCENT began its support of OSW in Apr. 91. During the 
     Jan-Feb 98 crisis, CENTCOM activated another forward HQ, C/
     JTF-KU, to command and control the operational forces 
     deployed to Kuwait and maintain a forward presence HQ in 
     Kuwait.


                            provide promise

       Humanitarian Assistance--Balkans. Humanitarian relief 
     operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, entailing 
     airlift of food and medical supplies to Sarajevo, airdrop of 
     relief supplies to Muslim-held enclaves in Bosnia and 
     construction of medical facilities in Zagreb.


                            hurricane andrew

       Domestic Disaster Relief--Florida and Louisiana. U.S. 
     military provided disaster relief to victims of Hurricane 
     Andrew, which ravaged portions of South Florida and Morgan 
     City, LA.


                             typhoon iniki

       Domestic Disaster Relief--Hawaii. U.S. Army provided 
     disaster relief to victims of Hurricane Iniki which battered 
     the island of Kauai, Hawaii, with winds up to 165 miles per 
     hour in September 1992.


             joint task force (jtf) los angeles (la riots)

       Domestic Civil Support--California.


                              provide hope

       Humanitarian Assistance--Former Soviet Union. Delivery of 
     food and medical supplies to 11 republics of the former 
     Soviet Union, using military airlift, as well as sealift, 
     rail and road transportation. Personnel provided surplus Army 
     medical equipment to hospitals and delivered, installed 
     and instructed medical personnel on the use of the 
     equipment.


                              deny flight

       Sanctions Enforcement--Bosnia. NATO enforcement of a No-Fly 
     Zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina from April 1993 to December 
     1995. U.S. soldiers deployed to Brindisi, Italy to support 
     Operation Deny Flight. During operation CPT Scott O'Grady was 
     shot down and was rescued by the combined efforts of the 
     Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines.


                             midwest floods

       Domestic Disaster Relief--Midwestern States.


                              able sentry

       Peacekeeping--Macedonia. Part of the UN Preventive 
     Deployment (UNPREDEP) force and responsible for surveillance 
     and patrol operations for the FYROM border and force 
     protection. The UN mandate for the UNPREDEP force expired 
     without renewal on 28 Feb 99. In late Mar 99, TFAS 
     transferred 3 of 4 outposts to the FYROM Army. Refugees from 
     Kosovo were beginning to come across the border into 
     Macedonia in large numbers. On 31 Mar 99, while engaged in 
     routine activities inside the FYROM, a three man 1-4 CAV 
     patrol came under fire and was abducted.


                              sharp guard

       Sanction Enforcement--Former Republic of Yugoslavia. 
     Enforced compliance with the U.N. sanctions against the 
     former Republic of Yugoslavia to help contain the conflict in 
     the region and to create conditions for a Peace Agreement in 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina. U.S. military operations were amended 
     by law (Nunn-Mitchell Act) to exclude enforcement of the arms 
     embargo against Bosnia. U.S. forces continued to provide air 
     deconfliction and command and control to NATO.


                           western U.S. fires

       Domestic Disaster Relief--Western United States.


                            vigilant warrior

       Show of Force--Kuwait. In October 1994, when Iraq began 
     moving ground forces toward Kuwait, the President ordered an 
     immediate response. Within days, the USCENTAF Commander and 
     staff deployed to Riyadh, SA and assumed command of JTF-SWA. 
     Operation involved ``plus up'' of air assets to more than 170 
     aircraft and 6,500 personnel. Objectives were to prohibit the 
     further enhancement of Iraqi military capabilities in 
     southern Iraq, to compel the redeployment of Iraqi forces 
     north of the 32d parallel and to demonstrate U.S. coalition 
     resolve in enforcing U.N. resolution. Iraq recalled its 
     troops and crisis passed.


                              support hope

       Humanitarian Assistance--Rwanda/Zaire. Establishment of 
     refugee camps and provision of humanitarian relief to Rwandan 
     refugees in Eastern Zaire following the genocide in Rwanda.


                               Sea signal

       Migrant Operations--Cuba. Establishment of Joint Task 
     Force--160, a combined service task force that managed 
     migrant caps for Haitians initially, and later Cubans as 
     well, at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. U.S. military personnel 
     oversaw housing, feeding and medical care for over 20,000 
     Haitians and 30,000 Cubans. Majority of Haitians migrants 
     were safely repatriated following the restoration of 
     President Aristide (Operation Uphold Democracy). Cuban 
     migrants at Guantanamo prior to the change in migration 
     policy in May 1995 were eventually brought into the U.S.


                            Uphold Democracy

       Peacekeeping Operations--Haiti. Movement of forces to Haiti 
     to support the return of Haitian democracy. Most of the force 
     was airborne when Haitian officials agreed to peaceful 
     transition of government and permissive entry of American 
     forces in Sep 94. U.S. transferred the peacekeeping 
     responsibilities to U.N. functions in Mar 95.


                        U.S. Support Group Haiti

       Humanitarian Assistance--Haiti. Southern Command conducted 
     civil and military operations in Haiti by exercising command 
     and

[[Page S11356]]

     control and providing administrative, medical, force 
     protection and limited logistical support to deployed-for-
     training units conducting humanitarian and civic assistance 
     projects. Forces were initially deployed under the authority 
     of Operation Uphold Democracy to restore Haitian President 
     Jean Bertrand Aristide to power. In Mar 95, Operation Uphold 
     Democracy continued as USSPTGRP-Haiti. HQDA provided approx 
     60 soldiers on six month rotation and a 150 man infantry 
     company for security operations. Mission ended Jan 00.


                           Vigilant Sentinal

       Show of Force--Kuwait. In August 1995, Hussein tested U.S. 
     resolve by moving a significant military force close to his 
     country's border with Kuwait. Included protecting the 
     physical security of U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf and on 
     the Arabian Peninsula, deterring aggression, countering 
     threats to the peace and stability of the Gulf region and 
     maintaining U.S. access to key oil resources.


                 Joint Endeavor/Joint Guard/Joint Forge

       Peacekeeping--Bosnia-Herzegovina. U.S. deployed forces to 
     Bosnia-Herzegovina in Dec 95 to monitor and enforce the 
     Dayton Peace Agreement (now the General Framework Agreement 
     for Peace or GFAP). Operation renamed Joint Guard in FY97. 
     Joint Forge (OJF) is NATO's follow-on operations to Operation 
     Joint Guard. OJF is the operational plan to the Supreme 
     Allied Command Europe for Stabilization of the Peace in 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under the general framework for 
     peace, the Army's mission is to provide continued military 
     presence to deter renewed hostilities, to continue to promote 
     a self-sustaining, safe and secure environments and to 
     stabilize and consolidate the peace in Bosnia. The 
     Stabilization Force (SFOR) supports the Dayton peace Accords 
     through reconnaissance and surveillance patrols, monitoring 
     border crossing points per UN Security Council Resolution 
     1160, enhancing security for displaced persons and refugees 
     and professionalizing the military. Task Force Eagle (TFE) 
     Multinational Division, North (MND(N)) is the U.S. lead 
     division of the SFOR.


                            Assured Response

       Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations--Liberia. U.S. deployed 
     forces on 7 Apr 96 to conduct evacuation of U.S. and foreign 
     national citizens from Liberia. Joint Special Operations Task 
     Force deployed additional security forces to the U.S. embassy 
     in Monrovia and evacuated over 2,000 personnel including 
     over 400 U.S. citizens.


                            Taiwan Maneuver

       Show of Force--Taiwan.


                             Dakota Floods

       Domestic Disaster Relief--Western United States.


                        Desert Thunder I and II

       Show of Force--SWA. Provided military presence and 
     capability during negotiations between the UN and Iraq over 
     weapons of mass destruction. In late 1997 and early 1998, 
     Iraq demonstrated an unwillingness to cooperate with UN 
     weapons inspectors. In Feb and Mar 98 troops were deployed to 
     SWA in response to Saddam Hussein's defiance of UN 
     inspectors. During this large scale contingency deployment of 
     Allied Forces into the theater in the spring of 1998, the 
     size of U.S. Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT), Third U.S. 
     Army increased while at the same time relocated their HQ from 
     the Eastern Province to its present location in Riyadh, Saudi 
     Arabia.


                     Strong Support/Hurricane Mitch

       Humanitarian Assistance--South America. On 5 Nov 98, 
     Secretary of Defense ordered deployment of forces to support 
     relief operations in Southern Command. Hurricane Mitch caused 
     extensive flooding and mud slides. The countries most 
     seriously affected were Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala and El 
     Salvador, with over two million displaced people and 
     significant infrastructure damage. Deployed forces provided 
     aviation, logistics, emergency evacuation, engineer 
     assessment, road repair, communications and medical care. 
     Deployed forces reached a peak of 4,000+ in Dec 98. 
     Operations continued until mid-April 1999. Ongoing work was 
     continued under USAR & NG New Horizon exercises beginning in 
     mid-Feb 99.


                               Desert Fox

       Sanctions Enforcement--Kuwait. Bombing campaign in Iraq. 
     Operation DESERT FOX was launched in response to Iraq's 
     repeated refusals to comply with UN Security Council 
     resolutions. Two task forces from Exercise Intrinsic Action 
     were operationalized.


       Allied Force (Joint Task Force-Noble Anvil/Task Force Hawk

       Limited Conventional Conflict--Kosovo. Joint Task Force-
     Noble Anvil was the U.S. portion of NATO's Operation Allied 
     Force (the air operations directed against the Federal 
     Republic of Yugoslavia). Headquarters were in Naples, Italy, 
     In Jun 99, JTF-NA became the U.S. share of Operation Joint 
     Guardian, NATO's Kosovo peace implementation operation and 
     exercised U.S. command of Task Force Hawk in Albania and Task 
     Force Falcon in Kosovo. JTF-NA was disestablished on 20 Jul 
     99. In Apr 99, U.S. Army Europe deployed a task force of 
     approximately 2,000 V Corps soldiers to Albania as part of 
     Operation Allied Force. Task Force Hawk provided NATO with a 
     deep strike capability out of Albania into Kosovo. Additional 
     combat, combat support and combat service support units 
     increased the task force to about 5,000. TF HAWK consisted of 
     Apache helicopters, MLRS artillery, force protection assets 
     and necessary support and command and control elements. With 
     end of hostilities on 10 Jun 99, TF Hawk furnished forces 
     to TF Falcon to support the U.S. portion of Operation 
     Joint Guardian. Until end of Jun 99, TF Hawk also provided 
     limited support of, and security for, Operation Shining 
     Hope (the U.S. military effort to establish and sustain 
     Kosovar refugee camps in Albania.


                   joint guardian (task force falcon)

       Peacekeeping Operations--Kosovo. U.S. portion of NATO's 
     Operation Joint Guardian, the Kosovo Peace Implementation 
     Force (KFOR). Task Force Falcon is responsible for Operation 
     Joint Guardian operations in the U.S. designated sector of 
     southeastern Kosovo. On 9 Jun 99, 1st Inf Div (M) assumed 
     responsibility for the U.S. portion of KFOR. TFF's Army 
     elements entered Kosovo from the FYROM on 13 Jun 99 and 
     established control over its assigned areas and established 
     security checkpoints. TFF's major subordinate units include a 
     BDE HQ, one mechanized task force, one armor task force, one 
     light battalion (from the 82d ABD) and numerous combat 
     support and combat service support units.


           operation stabilise/u.s. support group east timor

       Peacekeeping--East Timor. U.N. resolution 1264, 15 Sep 99, 
     authorized establishment of a multinational force under a 
     unified command structure to restore peace and security in 
     East Timor. Soldiers were located in Darwin, Australia and in 
     Dili, East Timor and performed critical tasks in the medical, 
     intelligence, communications and civil affairs arena. 
     INTERFET (International Force East Timor) is the Australian-
     led multinational peacekeeping force. U.S. Support Group-East 
     Timor (USGET) provides Continuous Presence Operations. U.S. 
     Army Pacific directed to support effort with staff 
     augmentees; a logistics support detachment; periodic engineer 
     and medical civic-action projects.


                              focus relief

       Peacekeeping--Nigeria/Sierra Leone. Part of the National 
     Command Authority's decision to provide bilateral assistance 
     to Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal to augment training and provide 
     equipment for battalions scheduled to deploy for peacekeeping 
     duties with the U.N. Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone.


                             western fires

       Domestic Disaster Relief--Montana and Idaho. Active duty 
     soldiers deployed to Montana and Idaho to assist with and 
     support firefighting efforts.

  Mr. DURBIN. As a point of comparison, the Institute for Defense 
Analysis (IDA), under contract from the Defense Department, completed a 
study in February 1998 entitled, Frequency and Number of Military 
Operations. Contained within the study are a number of databases 
detailing the deployment of U.S. forces overseas. One data set from an 
earlier IDA study covering U.S. military overseas deployments from 
1983-1994 showed that President Reagan averaged 9 deployments per year, 
President Bush averaged 9.5 deployments per year, while Clinton 
averaged 5.5 deployments per year.
  Another data set from Defense Forecasts, Inc. listed U.S. Air Force 
deployments from 1983-1996. It showed the following number of average 
annual Air Force deployments: 19 per year under President Reagan, 37 
per year under President Bush, and 27 per year under President Clinton.
  For all those critics of the pace of the use of military force under 
President Clinton, I would like to ask, which missions of those in the 
lists I have submitted for the Record should this country not have 
done? Governor Bush mentioned only one in the second Presidential 
debate--the mission to Haiti.
  Of the missions listed in the table from the Defense Secretary's 
report, which should we have skipped? Should we have said no to the 9 
missions evacuating noncombatants and Americans in trouble? Should the 
United States have said ``sorry we can't help'' to those in the 9 
humanitarian assistance missions? Should the military have been 
prevented from helping stem the flow on illegal immigrants or not 
helped give safe haven to the Kurds, as in the 6 missions listed under 
``migrant operations''? How about enforcing the no-fly zone and the 
sanctions against Iraq, or perhaps the shows of force and limited 
strikes to keep Iraq in check?
  Looking at the Army's list, perhaps critics would like to show where 
the Army was over-reaching? Was it when it helped the residents of my 
state of Illinois and of Iowa, Wisconsin and Minnesota during the 
massive flooding in 1993? Maybe we shouldn't have asked soldiers to 
help put out the fires all over the West last August? Maybe we 
shouldn't have helped the victims of Hurricane Mitch in Central America 
in

[[Page S11357]]

1998, or perhaps we should have turned down the humanitarian mission to 
the survivors of the Rwandan genocide in 1994? Some say we shouldn't 
have even tried to restore democracy in Haiti.
  When I read these lists, it makes me proud of what our soldiers, 
sailors, airmen, and marines have done for our country and for the 
world, at great cost to themselves and their family lives.
  Clearly there is a national consensus that we have been over-working 
our troops and we need to look deeply into what assumptions and 
management systems we need to change to fix these problems--rather than 
decide that we must pull back from the world and from the vital 
national security missions those men and women have been so ably 
undertaking.
  But where on these lists are those ``vague, aimless and endless 
deployments'' that Governor Bush referred to? Which ``uncertain 
missions'' would he ``replace with well-defined objectives''?
  There's only one major long-term peacekeeping mission on those lists, 
and that's the U.S. mission to the Balkans--the only major deployment 
still in place that President Clinton did not inherit from Governor 
Bush's father.

  Governor Bush has called for a U.S. withdrawal from the Balkans and 
for a ``new division of labor'' between the United States and its NATO 
allies--this at a time when the U.S. strategy is bearing fruit with the 
fall of the Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, and when United 
States forces make up less than 15 percent of the troops on the ground 
in the Balkans.
  Bush's intent to reduce the United States' role in Europe and NATO 
has been greeted with alarm and dismay across Europe.
  Following two world wars, history has shown us the importance of the 
U.S. role in keeping peace and promoting stability in Europe; of 
stopping racist, ultra-nationalist dictators. After the United States 
and Europe alike spent years wringing its hands about the 
ultranationalist policies that ripped Yugoslavia to shreds, the United 
States led to step in and stop the ethnic cleansing. Was that the wrong 
policy? Should we have just watched while Southeastern Europe went to 
pieces? It was painful and messy, and it took time, but I think we did 
the right thing. The new leaders in Croatia, and now, I hope, in 
Serbia, are ready for a new, democratic path.
  Our experience with the Kosovo campaign showed just how important 
American leadership and American defense capability is to the NATO 
alliance. Europe has said it's ready to do more to beef up its defense 
and peacekeeping capabilities, but it's a long way from being able to 
undertake a Kosovo-like campaign without the United States. That 
reality became painfully clear to European leaders during the Kosovo 
campaign, and they have determined to do something about it.
  Just a few years ago, I was proud to vote in the United States Senate 
to enlarge NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. 
This enlargement was to help integrate the states that had thrown off 
the yoke of the Warsaw Pact into Western European institutions. It 
helped to cement democracy and give those countries a stake in the 
defense of Europe. I want to see more East European countries join 
NATO, particularly the long-suffering Baltic countries of Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia. I am afraid that will not happen if the United 
States pulls back from its commitment to NATO.
  After the United States led Europe and NATO to stop the Yugoslavian 
wars, are we to pull back? After the United States led NATO to expand 
the fold of democratic, market-oriented states committed to Europe's 
defense, are we to leave?
  I believe the answer to those questions is a resounding no.
  It is time to address the hardships of those in the military as the 
management issues that they are and stop claiming that the United 
States can no longer handle vital national security missions like our 
involvement in the Balkans because of those hardships.
  Let's stop hiding behind the many differing deployment statistics and 
debate policy. This Administration has kept our commitment to NATO and 
to Europe, while it has continued to contain Saddam Hussein, and 
protected our vital interests in protecting Japan, South Korea, and the 
Taiwan Strait. Those aren't ``vague, aimless, or uncertain'' missions. 
These missions are at the heart of our national security and our 
leadership role in the world today.
  I close by pointing to one particular thing that has come up in the 
last 2 weeks in the Presidential campaign. For months, Governor Bush's 
senior foreign policy advisers have been complaining that the U.S. 
military is overextended and engaged in too many peacekeeping 
operations. It is this last deployment in the Balkans that has drawn 
Governor Bush's ire, even though the 10,000 troops represent, as I said 
earlier, less than 1 percent of the U.S. military.
  Recently, Governor Bush's foreign policy adviser, Condoleeza Rice, 
called for withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Balkans as a ``new 
division of labor'' under which the United States would ``handle a 
showdown in the Gulf, mount the kind of force needed to protect Saudi 
Arabia and deter a crisis in the Taiwan Strait,'' while Europe would be 
asked to do peacekeeping on its own.
  I have always been in favor of burden sharing, and I believe the 
Europeans and every other group across the world who need our 
assistance should not only pay for that and defer the costs to American 
taxpayers but put the lives of their young men and women on the line.
  I believe it is naive of Governor Bush to suggest that America's 
commitment to NATO is just a statistical commitment. America's 
commitment to NATO makes it work, and the suggestion that Governor 
Bush, if he had the chance, would diminish the American role in NATO, 
has raised concerns all across Europe because for over 60 years now, 
NATO has been a source of stability and pride and defense for our 
European allies.
  The U.S. involvement is much more than just bringing men and women to 
the field. It is a symbol of the force and commitment of the United 
States. I am proud of the fact, as I stand here, that in modern times 
the United States has never engaged in these military conflicts hoping 
to gain territory or treasure. We are there for what we consider the 
right reasons: to protect democratic values, to provide opportunity for 
the growth of business opportunities, and free trade. That has 
basically been the bedrock of our policy in NATO for many years and 
will continue to be. I hope we can continue to make that commitment in 
years to come.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. DURBIN. I ask for 3 additional minutes under the time allotted on 
the Democratic side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 3 minutes.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I close this segment by saying if we are 
going to maintain the superiority of the United States in the world, we 
must maintain a military force second to none, and that is a fact. For 
those who suggest we have somehow diminished our power, I suggest to 
them: Which military would you take in place of the United States? It 
is not just our technological advantage--that is amazing--what is 
amazing is the commitment of the men and women in this military to this 
country and to the defense of our values. I am proud of the fact that 
as a Member of Congress, in the House and the Senate, I have been able 
to support this buildup of military strength, which has meant we have 
conquered communism, we have allowed countries to see their freedom for 
the first time in decades, and we have built alliances, like NATO, into 
the envy of the world.
  For those who suggest the American military is somehow understaffed, 
overmanned, underutilized, overutilized--whatever the criticism may 
be--I do not think that is a fact. I also think those who want to 
rewrite the history of the last 50 or 60 years and try to define a new 
role for NATO are causing undue concern among our allies in Europe. 
NATO is important. I know this because of my own experience dealing 
with the Baltics.
  My mother was born in Lithuania. I followed the arrival of democracy 
in Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. I know they are concerned about 
their future and security. They are counting on NATO. They are praying 
for the day when they can become part of it.

  When Governor Bush suggests we are somehow going to diminish 
America's

[[Page S11358]]

role in NATO, it raises serious questions not only in the United States 
but around the world. It goes back to the point I made earlier: If 
being the President of the United States and Commander in Chief of our 
forces was an easy job then many people could fill it. If it is a tough 
job demanding experience and good solid judgment, then I think the 
American people should best look to someone involved in that. Vice 
President Gore has tried to stand not only for the strength of NATO in 
the past but in the future. I believe as leader, if he is elected on 
November 7, he will continue in that proud tradition.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Iowa, 
Mr. Harkin.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa is recognized for 10 
minutes.

                          ____________________