Congressional Record, Volume 146 Issue 128 (Friday, October 13, 2000)

[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 128 (Friday, October 13, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10546-S10550]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

PRESIDENTIAL THREAT PROTECTION ACT OF 2000

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate
proceed to Calendar No. 775, H.R. 3048.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 3048) to amend section 879 of title 18, United
States Code, to provide clearer coverage over threats against
former Presidents and members of their families, and for
other purposes.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Amendment No. 4319

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, Senator Hatch has an amendment at the desk,
and I ask for its consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Lott], for Mr. Hatch, for
himself, Mr. Leahy, and Mr. Thurmond, proposes an amendment
numbered 4319.

The amendment is as follows:

On page 3, strike lines 19 through 24 and insert the
following:
``(e)(1) When directed by the President, the United States
Secret Service is authorized to participate, under the
direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, in the planning,
coordination, and implementation of security operations at
special events of national significance, as determined by the
President.
``(2) At the end of each fiscal year, the President through
such agency or office as the President may designate, shall
report to the Congress--
``(A) what events, if any, were designated special events
of national significance for security purposes under
paragraph (1); and
``(B) the criteria and information used in making each
designation.''.
On page 7, line 6, after ``offense'' insert ``or
apprehension of a fugitive''.
On page 8, strike lines 17 through 19.
On page 9, strike line 14 and insert the following:
issuance.
``(11) With respect to subpoenas issued under paragraph
(1)(A)(i)(III), the Attorney General shall issue guidelines
governing the issuance of administrative subpoenas pursuant
to that paragraph. The guidelines required by this paragraph
shall mandate that administrative subpoenas may be issued
only after review and approval of senior supervisory
personnel within the respective investigative agency or
component of the Department of Justice and of the United
States Attorney for the judicial district in which the
administrative subpoena shall be served.''.
At the end of the bill, insert the following:

SEC. 6. ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS TO APPREHEND FUGITIVES.

(a) Authority of Attorney General.--Section 3486(a)(1) of
title 18, United States Code, as amended by section 5 of this
Act is further amended in subparagraph (A)(i)--
(1) by striking ``offense or'' and inserting ``offense,'';
and
(2) by inserting ``or (III) with respect to the
apprehension of a fugitive,'' after ``children,''.
(b) Additional Basis for Nondisclosure Order.--Section
3486(a)(6) of title 18, United States Code, as amended by
section 5 of this Act, is further amended in subparagraph
(B)--
(1) by striking ``or'' and the end of clause (iii);
(2) by striking the period at the end of clause (iv) and
inserting ``; or''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(v) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or
undue delay of a trial.''.
(c) Definitions.--Section 3486 of title 18, as amended by
section 5 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the
end the following:
``(g) Definitions.--In this section--
``(1) the term `fugitive' means a person who--
``(A) having been accused by complaint, information, or
indictment under Federal law of a serious violent felony or
serious drug offense, or having been convicted under Federal
law of committing a serious violent felony or serious drug
offense, flees or attempts to flee from, or evades or
attempts to evade the jurisdiction of the court with
jurisdiction over the felony;
``(B) having been accused by complaint, information, or
indictment under State law of a serious violent felony or
serious drug offense, or having been convicted under State
law of committing a serious violent felony or serious drug
offense, flees or attempts to flee from, or evades or
attempts to evade, the jurisdiction of the court with
jurisdiction over the felony;
``(C) escapes from lawful Federal or State custody after
having been accused by complaint, information, or indictment
of a serious violent felony or serious drug offense or having
been convicted of committing a serious violent felony or
serious drug offense; or

[[Page S10547]]

``(D) is in violation of subparagraph (2) or (3) of the
first undesignated paragraph of section 1073;
``(2) the terms `serious violent felony' and `serious drug
offense' shall have the meanings given those terms in section
3559(c)(2) of this title; and
``(3) the term `investigation' means, with respect to a
State fugitive described in subparagraph (B) or (C) of
paragraph (1), an investigation in which there is reason to
believe that the fugitive fled from or evaded, or attempted
to flee from or evade, the jurisdiction of the court, or
escaped from custody, in or affecting, or using any facility
of, interstate or foreign commerce, or as to whom an
appropriate law enforcement officer or official of a State or
political subdivision has requested the Attorney General to
assist in the investigation, and the Attorney General finds
that the particular circumstances of the request give rise to
a Federal interest sufficient for the exercise of Federal
jurisdiction pursuant to section 1075.''.

SEC. 7. FUGITIVE APPREHENSION TASK FORCES.

(a) In General.--The Attorney General shall, upon
consultation with appropriate Department of Justice and
Department of the Treasury law enforcement components,
establish permanent Fugitive Apprehension Task Forces
consisting of Federal, State, and local law enforcement
authorities in designated regions of the United States, to be
directed and coordinated by the United States Marshals
Service, for the purpose of locating and apprehending
fugitives.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the Attorney General for the United
States Marshals Service to carry out the provisions of this
section $30,000,000 for the fiscal year 2001, $5,000,000 for
fiscal year 2002, and $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2003.
(c) Other Existing Applicable Law.--Nothing in this section
shall be construed to limit any existing authority under any
other provision of Federal or State law for law enforcement
agencies to locate or apprehend fugitives through task forces
or any other means.

SEC. 8. STUDY AND REPORTS ON ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS.

(a) Study on Use of Administrative Subpoenas.--Not later
than December 31, 2001, the Attorney General, in consultation
with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall complete a study on
the use of administrative subpoena power by executive branch
agencies or entities and shall report the findings to the
Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Such report shall include--
(1) a description of the sources of administrative subpoena
power and the scope of such subpoena power within executive
branch agencies;
(2) a description of applicable subpoena enforcement
mechanisms;
(3) a description of any notification provisions and any
other provisions relating to safeguarding privacy interests;
(4) a description of the standards governing the issuance
of administrative subpoenas; and
(5) recommendations from the Attorney General regarding
necessary steps to ensure that administrative subpoena power
is used and enforced consistently and fairly by executive
branch agencies.
(b) Report on Frequency of Use of Administrative
Subpoenas.--
(1) In general.--The Attorney General and the Secretary of
the Treasury shall report in January of each year to the
Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of
Representatives on the number of administrative subpoenas
issued by them under this section, whether each matter
involved a fugitive from Federal or State charges, and the
identity of the agency or component of the Department of
Justice or the Department of the Treasury issuing the
subpoena and imposing the charges.
(2) Expiration.--The reporting requirement of this
subsection shall terminate in 3 years after the date of
enactment of this section.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, the Presidential Threat Protection Act,
H.R. 3048, is a high priority for the Secret Service and the Service's
respected Director, Brian Stafford, and I am pleased that this
legislation is passing the Senate today, along with legislation that
Senators Thurmond, Hatch and I have crafted to assist the U.S. Marshals
Service in apprehending fugitives.
The Presidential Threat Protection Act, H.R. 3048, would expand or
clarify the Secret Service's authority in four ways. First, the bill
would amend current law to make clear it is a federal crime, which the
Secret Service is authorized to investigate, to threaten any current or
former President or their immediate family, even if the person is not
currently receiving Secret Service protection and including those
people who have declined continued protection, such as former
Presidents, or have not yet received protection, such as major
Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates and their families.
Second, the bill would incorporate in statute certain authority,
which is currently embodied in a classified Executive Order, PDD 62,
clarifying that the Secret Service is authorized to coordinate, design,
and implement security operations for events deemed of national
importance by the President ``or the President's designee.''
Third, the bill would establish a ``National Threat Assessment
Center' within the Secret Service to provide training to State, local
and other Federal law enforcement agencies on threat assessments and
public safety responsibilities.
Finally, the bill authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to issue
administrative subpoenas for investigations of ``imminent'' threats
made against an individual whom the service is authorized to protect.
The Secret Service has requested that the Congress grant this
administrative subpoena authority to expedite investigation procedures
particularly in situations where an individual has made threats against
the President and is en route to exercise those threats.
``Administrative subpoena'' is the term generally used to refer to a
demand for documents or testimony by an investigative entity or
regulatory agency that is empowered to issue the subpoena independently
and without the approval of any grand jury, court or other judicial
entity. I am generally skeptical of administrative subpoena power.
Administrative subpoenas avoid the strict grant jury secrecy rules and
the documents provided in response to such subpoenas are, therefore,
subject to broader dissemination. Moreover, since investigative agents
issue such subpoenas directly, without review by a judicial officer or
even a prosecutor, fewer ``checks'' are in place to ensure the subpoena
is issued with good cause and not merely as a fishing expedition.
H.R. 3048 addresses these general concerns with the following
procedural safeguards, some of which would apply not only to the new
administrative subpoena authority of the Secret Service but also to
current administrative subpoena authority granted to the FBI to issue
administrative subpoenas in cases involving child abuse, child sexual
exploitation, and Federal health care offenses.
The new administrative subpoena authority in threat cases may only be
exercised by the Secretary of the Treasury upon determination of the
Director of the Secret Service that the threat is imminent, and the
Secret Service must notify the Attorney General of the issuance of each
subpoena. I should note that this requirement will help ensure that
administrative subpoenas will be used in only the most significant
investigations since obtaining the authorization for such a subpoena
from senior Treasury and Secret Service personnel may take longer than
simply going to the local U.S. Attorney's office to get a grand jury
subpoena.
The bill would limit the scope of both current and new administrative
subpoena authority of the FBI for obtaining records in child sex abuse
and exploitation cases from Internet Service Providers to the name,
address, local and long distance telephone billing records, telephone
number or services used by a subscriber.
The bill would also expressly allow a person whose records are
demanded pursuant to an administrative subpoena to contest the
administrative subpoena by petitioning a federal judge to modify or set
aside the subpoena.
The bill would authorize a court to order non-disclosure of the
administrative subpoena for up to 90 days (and up to a 90 day
extension) upon a showing that disclosure would adversely affect the
investigation in an enumerated way.
Upon written demand, the agency must return the subpoenaed records or
things if no case or proceedings arise from the production of records
``within a reasonable time.''
The administrative subpoena may not require production in less than
24 hours after service so agencies may have to wait for at least a day
before demanding production.
The Senate amendment to H.R. 3048 would modify the House-passed
version, which provides that violation of the administrative subpoena
is punishable by fine or up to five years' imprisonment. This penalty
provision in the House version of the bill is both unnecessary and
excessive since current law already provides that failure to comply
with the subpoena may be punished as a contempt of court--which is

[[Page S10548]]

either civil or criminal. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3486(c). Under current
law, the general term of imprisonment for some forms of criminal
contempt is up to six months. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. Sec. 402. The Senate
amendment would strike that provision in the House bill.
Secret Service protective function Privilege. While passage of this
legislation will assist the Secret Service in fulfilling its critical
mission, this Congress is unfortunately coming to a close without
addressing another significant challenge to the Secret Service's
ability to fulfill its vital mission of protecting the life and safety
of the President and other important persons. I refer to the misguided
and unfortunately successful litigation of Special Counsel Kenneth
Starr to compel Secret Service agents to answer questions about what
they may have observed or overheard while protecting the life of the
President.
As a result of Mr. Starr's zealous efforts, the courts refused to
recognize a protective function privilege and required that at least
seven Secret Service officers appear before a federal grand jury to
respond to questions regarding President Clinton, and others. In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 W.L. 272884 (May 22, 1998 D.C.), affirmed
1998 WL 370584 (July 7, 1998 D.C. Cir) (per curiam). These recent court
decisions, which refused to recognize a protective function privilege,
could have a devastating impact upon the Secret Service's ability to
provide effective protection. The Special Counsel and the courts
ignored the voices of experience--former Presidents, Secret Service
Directors, and others--who warned of the potentially deadly
consequences. The courts disregarded the lessons of history. We cannot
afford to be so cavalier; the stakes are just too high.
In order to address this problem, I introduced the Secret Service
Protective Privilege Act, S. 1360, on July 13, 1999, to establish a
Secret Service protective function privilege so Secret Service agents
will not be put in the position of revealing private information about
protected officials as Special Prosecutor Kenneth Starr compelled the
Secret Service to do with respect to President Clinton. Unfortunately,
the Senate Judiciary Committee took no action on this legislation in
this Congress.
Few national interests are more compelling than protecting the life
of the President of the United States. The Supreme Court has said that
the nation has ``an overwhelming interest in protecting the safety of
its Chief Executive and in allowing him to perform his duties without
interference from threats of physical violence.'' Watts v. United
States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969). What is at stake is not merely the
safety of one person: it is the ability of the Executive Branch to
function in an effective and orderly fashion, and the capacity of the
United States to respond to threats and crises. Think of the shock
waves that rocked the world in November 1963 when President Kennedy was
assassinated. The assassination of a President has international
repercussions and threatens the security and future of the entire
nation.
The threat to our national security and to our democracy extends
beyond the life of the President to those in direct line of the Office
of the President--the Vice President, the President-elect, and the Vice
President elect. By Act of Congress, these officials are required to
accept the protection of the Secret Service--they may not turn it down.
This statutory mandate reflects the critical importance that Congress
has attached to the physical safety of these officials.
Congress has also charged the Secret Service with responsibility for
protecting visiting heads of foreign states and foreign governments.
The assassination of a foreign head of state on American soil could be
catastrophic from a foreign relations standpoint and could seriously
threaten national security.

The bill I introduced, S. 1360, would enhance the Secret Service's
ability to protect these officials, and the nation, from the risk of
assassination. It would do this by facilitating the relationship of
trust between these officials and their Secret Service protectors that
is essential to the Secret Service's protective strategy. Agents and
officers surround the protectee with an all-encompassing zone of
protection on a 24-hour-a-day basis. In the face of danger, they will
shield the protectee's body with their own bodies and move him to a
secure location.
That is how the Secret Service averted a national tragedy on March
30, 1981, when John Hinckley attempted to assassinate President Reagan.
Within seconds of the first shot being fired, Secret Service personnel
had shielded the President's body and maneuvered him into the waiting
limousine. One agent in particular, Agent Tim McCarthy, positioned his
body to intercept a bullet intended for the President. If Agent
McCarthy had been even a few feet farther from the President, history
might have gone very differently.
For the Secret Service to maintain this sort of close, unremitting
proximity to the President and other protectees, it must have their
complete, unhesitating trust and confidence. Secret Service personnel
must be able to remain at the President's side even during confidential
and sensitive conversations, when they may overhear military secrets,
diplomatic exchanges, and family and private matters. If our Presidents
do not have complete trust in the Secret Service personnel who protect
them, they could try to push away the Secret Service's ``protective
envelope'' or undermine it to the point where it could no longer be
fully effective.
This is more than a theoretical possibility. Consider what former
President Bush wrote in April, 1998, after hearing of the independent
counsel's efforts to compel Secret Service testimony:

The bottom line is I hope that [Secret Service] agents will
be exempted from testifying before the Grand Jury. What's at
stake here is the protection of the life of the President and
his family and the confidence and trust that a President must
have in the [Secret Service]. If a President feels that
Secret Service agents can be called to testify about what
they might have seen or heard then it is likely that the
President will be uncomfortable having the agents nearby. I
allowed the agents to have proximity first because they had
my full confidence and secondly because I knew them to be
totally discreet and honorable. . . . I can assure you that
had I felt they would be compelled to testify as to what they
had seen or heard, no matter what the subject, I would not
have felt comfortable having them close in. . . . I feel very
strongly that the [Secret Service] agents should not be made
to appear in court to discuss that which they might or might
not have seen or heard. What's at stake here is the
confidence of the President in the discretion of the [Secret
Service]. If that confidence evaporates the agents, denied
proximity, cannot properly protect the President.

As President Bush's letter makes plain, requiring Secret Service
agents to betray the confidence of the people whose lives they protect
could seriously jeopardize the ability of the Service to perform its
crucial national security function.
The possibility that Secret Service personnel might be compelled to
testify about their protectees could have a particularly devastating
affect on the Service's ability to protect foreign dignitaries. The
mere fact that this issue has surfaced is likely to make foreign
governments less willing to accommodate Secret Service both with
respect to the protection of the President and Vice President on
foreign trips, and the protection of foreign heads of state traveling
in the United States.
The security of our chief executive officers and visiting foreign
heads of state should be a matter that transcends all partisan politics
and I regret that this legislation does not do more to help the Secret
Service by providing a protective function privilege.
The Fugitive Apprehension Act. The Senate amendment to H.R. 3048
incorporates into the bill the substance of the Thurmond-Biden-Leahy
substitute amendment to S. 2516, the Fugitive Apprehension Act, which
passed the Senate unanimously on July 26, 2000. That substitute
amendment reconciled the significant differences between S. 2516, as
introduced, and S. 2761, ``The Capturing Criminals Act,'' which I
introduced with Senator Kohl on June 21, 2000. The Senate amendment to
H.R. 3048 makes certain changes to S. 2516 to ensure that the authority
granted is consistent with privacy and other appropriate safeguards.
As a former prosecutor, I am well aware that fugitives from justice
are an important problem and that their capture is an essential
function of law enforcement. According to the FBI, nearly 550,000
people are currently fugitives from justice on federal, state, and
local felony charges combined. This means that there are almost as many

[[Page S10549]]

fugitive felons as there are citizens residing in my home state of
Vermont.
The fact that we have more than one half million fugitives from
justice, a significant portion of whom are convicted felons in
violation of probation or parole, who have been able to flaunt court
order and avoid arrest, breeds disrespect for our laws and poses
undeniable risks to the safety of our citizens.
Our Federal law enforcement agencies should be commended for the job
they have been doing to date on capturing federal fugitives and helping
the states and local communities bring their fugitives to justice. The
U.S. Marshals Service, our oldest law enforcement agency, has arrested
over 120,000 federal, state and local fugitives in the past four years,
including more federal fugitives than all the other federal agencies
combined. In prior years, the Marshals Service spearheaded special
fugitive apprehension task forces, called FIST Operations, that
targeted fugitives in particular areas and was singularly successful in
arresting over 34,000 fugitive felons.
Similarly, the FBI has established twenty-four Safe Streets Task
Forces exclusively focused on apprehending fugitives in cities around
the country. Over the period of 1995 to 1999, the FBI's efforts have
resulted in the arrest of a total of 65,359 state fugitives.
Nevertheless, the number of outstanding fugitives is too large. The
Senate amendment to H.R. 3028 will help make a difference by providing
new but limited administrative subpoena authority to the Department of
Justice to obtain documentary evidence helpful in tracking down
fugitives and by authorizing the Attorney General to establish fugitive
task forces.
Unlike initial criminal inquiries, fugitive investigations present
unique difficulties. Law enforcement may not use grand jury subpoenas
since, by the time a person is a fugitive, the grand jury phase of an
investigation is usually over. Use of grand jury subpoenas to obtain
phone or bank records to track down a fugitive would be an abuse of the
grand jury. Trial subpoenas may also not be used, either because the
fugitive is already convicted or no trial may take place without the
fugitive.
This inability to use trial and grand jury subpoenas for fugitive
investigations creates a gap in law enforcement procedures. Law
enforcement partially fills this gap by using the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. Sec. 1651(a), which authorizes federal courts to ``issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.'' The procedures,
however, for obtaining orders under the Act, and the scope and non-
disclosure terms of such orders, vary between jurisdictions.
Authorizing administrative subpoena power will help bridge the gap in
fugitive investigations by providing a uniform mechanism for federal
law enforcement agencies to obtain records useful for tracking a
fugitive's whereabouts.
The Thurmond-Biden-Leahy substitute amendment, which previously
passed the Senate, incorporated a number of provisions from the Leahy-
Kohl ``Capturing Criminals Act'' and made significant and positive
modifications to the original version of S. 2516. These improvements
are largely incorporated into the current Hatch-Leahy-Thurmond
amendments to H.R. 3048, which the Senate considers today. First, as
introduced, S. 2516 would have limited use of an administrative
subpoena to those fugitives who have been ``indicted,'' and failed to
address the fact that fugitives flee after arrest on the basis of a
``complaint'' and may flee after the prosecutor has filed an
``information'' in lieu of an amendment. The prior substitute amendment
and the current Hatch-Leahy-Thurmond amendment to H.R. 3048, by
contrast, would allow use of such subpoenas to track fugitives who have
been accused in a ``complaint, information or indictment.''
Second, S. 2516, as introduced, would have required the U.S. Marshals
Service to report quarterly to the Attorney General (who must transmit
the report to Congress) on use of the administrative subpoenas. While a
reporting requirement is useful, the requirement as described in the
original S. 2516 was overly burdensome and insufficiently specific. The
prior substitute amendment and the current Hatch-Leahy-Thurmond
amendment to H.R. 3048 would require, as set forth in the Capturing
Criminals Act, that the Attorney General report for the next three
years to the Judiciary Committees of both the House and Senate on the
following information about the use of administrative subpoenas in
fugitive investigations: the number issued, by which agency,
identification of the charges on which the fugitive was wanted and
whether the fugitive was wanted on federal or state charges.

Third, although the original S. 2516 outlined the procedures for
enforcement of an administrative subpoena, it was silent on the
mechanisms for contesting the subpoena by the recipient. The procedures
outlined in H.R. 3048 address this issue in a manner fully consistent
with those I originally outlined in the Capturing Criminals Act by
allowing a person, who is served with an administrative subpoena, to
petition a court to modify or set aside the subpoena.
Fourth, the original S. 2516 set forth no procedure for the
government to command a custodian of records to avoid disclosure or
delay notice to a customer about the existence of the subpoena. This is
particularly critical in fugitive investigations when law enforcement
does not want to alert a fugitive that the police are on the person's
trail. Both the prior substitute amendment to S. 2516, which passed the
Senate last July, and H.R. 3048, which the Senate considers today,
provide express authority for law enforcement to apply for a court
order directing the custodian of records to delay notice to subscribers
of the existence of the subpoena on the same terms applicable in
current law to other subpoenas issued, for example, to telephone
companies and financial institutions. This procedure is consistent with
provisions I originally proposed in the Capturing Criminals Act.
Fifth, S. 2516, as introduced, would have authorized use of an
administrative subpoena in fugitive investigations upon a finding by
the Attorney General that the documents are ``relevant and material,''
which is further defined to mean that ``there are articulable facts
that show the fugitive's whereabouts may be discerned from the records
sought.'' In my view, changing the standard for issuance of a subpoena
from ``relevancy'' to a hybrid of ``relevant and material'' would set a
confusing precedent. Accordingly, the current Hatch-Leahy-Thurmond
amendment to H.R. 3048 amendment would authorize issuance of an
administrative subpoena in fugitive investigations based on the same
standard as for other administrative subpoenas, i.e., that the
documents may be relevant to an authorized law enforcement inquiry.
Sixth, the original S. 2516 authorized the Attorney General to issue
guidelines delegating authority for issuance of administrative
subpoenas in fugitive investigations only to the Director of the U.S.
Marshals Service, despite the fact that the FBI, and the Drug
Enforcement Administration also want this authority to find fugitives
on charges over which they have investigative authority. The substitute
amendment to S. 2516, which previously passed the Senate, and the
current Hatch-Leahy-Thurmond amendment to H.R. 3048, which we consider
today, would authorize the Attorney General to issue guidelines
delegating authority for issuance of administrative subpoenas to
supervisory personnel within components of the Department. In addition,
the current Hatch-Leahy-Thurmond amendment to H.R. 3048 would require
that the Attorney General's guidelines require that administrative
subpoenas in fugitive investigations be issued only upon the review and
approval of senior supervisory personnel within the respective
investigating agency and of the U.S. Attorney in the judicial district
in which the subpoena would be served.

Seventh, the original S. 2516 did not address the issue that a
variety of administrative subpoena authorities exist in multiple forms
in every agency. The substitute amendment to S. 2516, which previously
passed the Senate, and the Hatch-Leahy-Thurmond amendment to H.R. 3048,
which we consider today, incorporates from the Capturing Criminals Act
a requirement that the Attorney General provide a report on this issue.

[[Page S10550]]

Eighth, the current Hatch-Leahy-Thurmond amendment to H.R. 3048 would
limit the use of administrative subpoenas in fugitive investigations to
those fugitives who have been accused or convicted of serious violent
felony or serious drug offenses.
Finally, as introduced, S. 2516 authorized the U.S. Marshal Service
to establish permanent Fugitive Apprehension Task Forces. By contrast,
the substitute amendment to S. 2516, which previously passed the
Senate, and the Hatch-Leahy-Thurmond amendment to H.R. 3048, which we
consider today, would authorize $40,000,000 over three years for the
Attorney General to establish multi-agency task forces (which will be
coordinated by the Director of the Marshals Service) in consultation
with the Secretary of the Treasury and the States, so that the Secret
Service, BATF, the FBI and the States are able to participate in the
Task Forces to find their fugitives.
The Hatch-Leahy-Thurmond amendment to H.R. 3048 will help law
enforcement--with increased resources for regional fugitive
apprehension task forces and administrative subpoena authority--to
bring to justice both federal and state fugitives who, by their
conduct, have demonstrated a lack of respect for our nation's criminal
justice system.
I urge that the Senate pass H.R. 3048 with the Hatch-Leahy-Thurmond
amendment without delay.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment
be agreed to, the bill, as amended, be read the third time and passed,
the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and any statements
relating to the bill be printed in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment (No. 4319) was agreed to.
The bill (H.R. 3048), as amended, was read the third time and passed.

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