[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 121 (Tuesday, October 3, 2000)]
[House]
[Pages H8706-H8710]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
TRUTH IN REGULATING ACT OF 2000
Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and
pass the Senate bill (S. 1198) to establish a 3-year pilot project for
the General Accounting Office to report to Congress on economically
significant rules of Federal agencies, and for other purposes.
The Clerk read as follows:
S. 1198
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Truth in Regulating Act of
2000''.
SEC. 2. PURPOSES.
The purposes of this Act are to--
(1) increase the transparency of important regulatory
decisions;
(2) promote effective congressional oversight to ensure
that agency rules fulfill statutory requirements in an
efficient, effective, and fair manner; and
(3) increase the accountability of Congress and the
agencies to the people they serve.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act, the term--
(1) ``agency'' has the meaning given such term under
section 551(1) of title 5, United States Code;
(2) ``economically significant rule'' means any proposed or
final rule, including an interim or direct final rule, that
may have an annual effect on the economy of $100,000,000 or
more or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a
sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the
environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or
tribal governments or communities; and
(3) ``independent evaluation'' means a substantive
evaluation of the agency's data, methodology, and assumptions
used in developing the economically significant rule,
including--
(A) an explanation of how any strengths or weaknesses in
those data, methodology, and assumptions support or detract
from conclusions reached by the agency; and
(B) the implications, if any, of those strengths or
weaknesses for the rulemaking.
SEC. 4. PILOT PROJECT FOR REPORT ON RULES.
(a) In General.--
(1) Request for review.--When an agency publishes an
economically significant rule, a chairman or ranking member
of a committee of jurisdiction of either House of Congress
may request the Comptroller General of the United States to
review the rule.
(2) Report.--The Comptroller General shall submit a report
on each economically significant rule selected under
paragraph (4) to the committees of jurisdiction in each House
of Congress not later than 180 calendar days after a
committee request is received. The report shall include an
independent evaluation of the economically significant rule
by the Comptroller General.
(3) Independent evaluation.--The independent evaluation of
the economically significant rule by the Comptroller General
under paragraph (2) shall include--
(A) an evaluation of the agency's analysis of the potential
benefits of the rule, including any beneficial effects that
cannot be quantified in monetary terms and the identification
of the persons or entities likely to receive the benefits;
(B) an evaluation of the agency's analysis of the potential
costs of the rule, including any adverse effects that cannot
be quantified in monetary terms and the identification of the
persons or entities likely to bear the costs;
(C) an evaluation of the agency's analysis of alternative
approaches set forth in the notice of proposed rulemaking and
in the rulemaking record, as well as of any regulatory impact
analysis, federalism assessment, or other analysis or
assessment prepared by the agency or required for the
economically significant rule; and
(D) a summary of the results of the evaluation of the
Comptroller General and the implications of those results.
(4) Procedures for priorities of requests.--The Comptroller
General shall have discretion to develop procedures for
determining the priority and number of requests for review
under paragraph (1) for which a report will be submitted
under paragraph (2).
(b) Authority of Comptroller General.--Each agency shall
promptly cooperate with the Comptroller General in carrying
out this Act. Nothing in this Act is intended to expand or
limit the authority of the General Accounting Office.
SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated to the General
Accounting Office to carry out this Act $5,200,000 for each
of fiscal years 2000 through 2002.
SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE AND DURATION OF PILOT PROJECT.
(a) Effective Date.--This Act and the amendments made by
this Act shall take effect 90 days after the date of
enactment of this Act.
(b) Duration of Pilot Project.--The pilot project under
this Act shall continue for a period of 3 years, if in each
fiscal year, or portion thereof included in that period, a
specific annual appropriation not less than $5,200,000 or the
pro-rated equivalent thereof shall have been made for the
pilot project.
(c) Report.--Before the conclusion of the 3-year period,
the Comptroller General shall submit to Congress a report
reviewing the effectiveness of the pilot project and
recommending whether or not Congress should permanently
authorize the pilot project.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan) and the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich) each
will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan).
General Leave
Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all
Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend
their remarks on S. 1198.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Wisconsin?
There was no objection.
{time} 1915
Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, S. 1198 is Truth in Regulating Act of 2000. It is a
bipartisan good government bill. It establishes a regulatory analysis
function with the General Accounting Office. This function is intended
to enhance congressional responsibility for regulatory decisions
developed under the laws Congress enacts. It is the product of the
leadership over the past few years of the gentlewoman from New York
(Mrs. Kelly), the chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform
and Paperwork Reduction, who will be joining us here in a few minutes.
The most basic reason for supporting this bill is constitutional, as
Congress needs a Congressional Budget Office to check and balance the
executive branch in the budget office, so too does it need an analytic
capability to check and balance the executive branch in the regulatory
process. GAO is a logical location since it already has some
[[Page H8707]]
regulatory review responsibilities under the Congressional Review Act.
Mr. Speaker, article 1, section 1 of the U.S. Constitution vests all
legislative powers in the U.S. Congress. While Congress may not
delegate its legislative functions, it routinely authorizes executive
branch agencies to issue rules that implement laws passed by Congress.
Congress has become increasingly concerned about its responsibility to
oversee agency rulemaking, especially due to the extensive costs and
impacts of Federal Rules.
During the 105th Congress, the House Government Reform Subcommittee
on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs
chaired by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. McIntosh) held a hearing on
the earlier Kelly regulatory analysis bill, H.R. 1704. This bill sought
to establish a new, freestanding congressional agency. The subcommittee
then marked up and reported her bill, H.R. 1704, and called for the
establishment of a new legislative branch, Congressional Office of
Regulatory Analysis commonly referred to as CORA, to analyze all major
rules and report to Congress on potential costs, benefits, and
alternative approaches that could achieve the same regulatory goals at
lower costs.
This agency was intended to aid Congress in analyzing Federal
regulations. The committee report stated Congress needs the expertise
that CORA would provide to carry out its duty under the CRA. Currently
Congress does not have the information it needs to carefully evaluate
regulations. The only analyses it has to rely on are those provided by
the agencies which promulgate the rules.
There is no official, third-party analysis of new regulations.
Unfortunately, CORA supporters in the 105th Congress could not overcome
the resistance of the defenders of the regulatory status quo. Opponents
argued that creating a new congressional agency would be fiscally
irresponsible. But by this logic, Congress ought to abolish CBO, as an
even more heroic demonstration of fiscal conservatism in action. Of
course, most of us recognize that disbanding the CBO, however, penny-
wise would be pound foolish.
In this Congress, 106th Congress, the chairman of the Subcommittee on
National Economic Growth, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs, the
gentleman from Indiana (Chairman McIntosh), and myself, as vice
chairman, and the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Kelly), chairwoman of
Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform and Paperwork Reduction, seeking to
accommodate the prejudice against a freestanding agency, introduced
separate bills, H.R. 3021 and H.R. 3669 respectively, to establish a
CORA function within the GAO, which is an existing legislative branch
agency capable of performing such functions.
The MacIntosh and Kelly bills were introduced in January and
February. On May 9, the Senate passed its own regulatory analysis
legislation, S. 1198, which we are now considering by unanimous
consent, I might add.
Like the McIntosh and Kelly bills, the Senate legislation would also
establish a regulatory analysis function within the GAO.
During the 106th Congress, the Committee on Government Reform did not
hold a hearing specifically on one of the CORA bills. However, the
subcommittee did hold a June 14 hearing entitled, does Congress
delegate too much power to agencies and what should be done about it?
Witnesses testified that Congress needs its own, in-house, regulatory
analysis capability so that Members could especially provide timely
comment on proposed rules, while there is still an opportunity to
influence the costs, the scope, and the content of final agency action.
On June 26, the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Kelly) and the
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. McIntosh) introduced H.R. 4744, which
included several needed improvements to S. 1198, along the lines
suggested by the witnesses at this June 14th hearing. For example,
whereas S. 1198 merely permits GAO to assist Congress in submitting
timely comments on proposed regulations during the public comment
period. H.R. 4744 would require GAO to provide such assistance. This is
a critical improvement, because it is only by commenting on proposed
rules during the public comment period that Congress has any real
opportunity to influence the costs, the scope and the content of
regulation.
In addition, unlike S. 1198, H.R. 4744 would require GAO to review
not only the agency's data but also the public's data to assure a more
balanced evaluation, analyze not only rules costing $100 million or
more, but also rules with a significant impact on small businesses, and
examine whether alternatives not considered by the agencies might
achieve the same goal in a more cost-effective manner or with greater
net benefits.
On June 29, the Committee on Government Reform favorably reported
H.R. 4744 with a very thorough discussion of issues in its accompanying
report, but on June 24, the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Kelly) and
the gentleman from Indiana (Chairman McIntosh), along with the
gentleman from California (Mr. Condit) and the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. Turner) introduced H.R. 4924.
This bill included only a few of H.R. 4744's improvements to S. 1198,
the inclusion within the scope of GAO's purview of agency rules with a
significant impact on small businesses, a directive to GAO to submit
its independent evaluation of proposed rules within the public comment
period, albeit only when doing so is practicable. House Report 106-772
explains the basis for these improvements.
Mr. Speaker, H.R. 4924 was, in my judgment, inferior to H.R. 4744,
which in itself is a watered-down version of the complete reform that
is needed to implement Congress' Constitutional responsibility for
regulatory oversight, but it was a step in the right direction.
On June 29, the House passed H.R. 4924. Unfortunately, the Senate has
not yet considered H.R. 4924. Since we are at the close of the 106th
Congress, we now, however, urge the House's favorable consideration of
S. 1198.
Mr. Speaker, S. 1198 does not require or expect GAO to conduct any
new regulatory impact analyses or cost benefit analyses, or other
impact analyses. However, GAO's independent evaluation should lead the
agencies to prepare any missing cost/benefit analysis, small business
impact, federalism impact, or any other missing analysis. For example,
after the MacIntosh subcommittee insisted that the Department of Labor
prepare a missing RIA for its ``Baby UI'' rule, Labor finally prepared
one.
Here is basically in a nutshell, Mr. Speaker, how S. 1198 works. A
chairman or a ranking member of a committee of jurisdiction may request
that GAO submit an independent evaluation to the committee of a major
proposed or final rule within 180 days. GAO's analysis shall include an
evaluation of the potential benefits of the rule, potential costs of
the rule, alternative approaches in the rulemaking record, and various
impact analyses.
Congress currently has two opportunities to review agency regulatory
actions. Under the Administrative Procedures Act, Congress can comment
on an agency proposed and interim rules during the public comment
period. The APA's fairness provisions require that all members of the
public, including Congress, be given an equal opportunity to comment.
Late congressional comments cannot be considered by an agency unless
all other late comments are equally considered. Agencies can ignore
comments filed by Congress after the end of the public comment period,
as the Department of Labor did during its Baby UI period in its rule.
Therefore, since GAO cannot be given more time than other members of
the public to comment, GAO should complete its review of agency
regulatory proposals during the public comment period.
Under the CRA, Congress can disapprove an agency final rule after it
is promulgated but before it is effective. Unfortunately, Congress has
been unable to carry out its responsibility under the CRA because it
neither has had all of the information it needs to carefully evaluate
agency regulatory proposals nor sufficient staff for this function.
In fact, since the March 1996 enactment of the CRA, there has been no
completed congressional resolutions of disapproval. To assume oversight
responsibility for Federal regulations, Congress needs to be armed with
an independent evaluation, that is why we are doing this.
[[Page H8708]]
What is needed is an analysis of legislative history to see if there
is a nondelegation problem, such as in the Food and Drug
Administration's proposed rule to regulate tobacco products, which was
struck by the Supreme Court in FDA v. Brown & Williamson, or backdoor
legislating, such as in the Department of Labor's Baby UI rule, which
provides paid family leave to small business employees, even though
Congress in the Family and Medical Leave Act said no to paid family
leave and any coverage of small businesses.
Sometimes the quickest or the only way to find that an agency has
ignored a congressional intent or failed to consider less costly or
nonregulatory alternatives, is to examine nonagency or public data and
analysis. It is for that reason that, under H.R. 4744, GAO would be
required to consult the public's data in the course of evaluating
agency's rules. Although S.1198 does not require GAO to review public
data, it does not forbid it. And I bring this up, because some hope
that S.1198 implicitly contains a gag order, forbidding GAO to consult
any analyses of data except those supplied by the agency. That is an
incorrect reading, however, and the purpose and hope of this bill is to
enable Congress to comment knowledgeably about agency rules from the
standpoint of a truly independent evaluation of those rules, including
the consumption and evaluation of public outside data.
Instructed by GAO's independent evaluations, Congress then will be
better equipped to review final agency rules under the CRA. More
importantly, Congress will be better equipped to submit timely and
knowledgeable comments on proposed rules during the public period. Some
CORA foes hope that all GAO analyses of proposed rules will be untimely
and, therefore, have no effect on the substance of rules, which I am
confident that GAO will want to please, rather than annoy its
customers, those of us serving in Congress and will help submit timely
regulatory analysis.
Thus, even though this bill is a far cry from the original Kelly idea
of a CORA legislation, this legislation, S.1198, will increase the
transparency of important regulatory decisions. It will promote
effective congressional oversight, and it will increase the
accountability of Congress.
The best government is a government that is accountable to the
people. For America to have an accountable regulatory system, the
peoples elected representatives must participate in and take
responsibility for the rules promulgated under the laws Congress passes
and by the executive branch agencies, that is why I urge my colleagues
to support this meaningful step.
Mr. Speaker, I went through this exhaustive legislative history on
this bill because I think it is important that those who are
researching and realizing the debate here in Congress know the intent
as we pass this bill.
S. 1198, the ``Truth in Regulating Act of 2000,'' is a bi-partisan,
good government bill. It establishes a regulatory analysis function
within the General Accounting Office (GAO). This function is intended
to enhance Congressional responsibility for regulatory decisions
developed under the laws Congress enacts. It is the product of the
leadership over the last few years of Small Business Subcommittee
Chairwoman on Regulatory Reform and Paperwork Reduction, Sue Kelly.
The most basic reason for supporting this bill is Constitutional:
Just as Congress needs a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to check and
balance the Executive Branch in the budget process, so it needs an
analytic capability to check and balance the Executive Branch in the
regulatory process. GAO is a logical location since it already has some
regulatory review responsibilities under the Congressional Review Act
(CRA).
Article I, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution vests all legislative
powers in the U.S. Congress. While Congress may not delegate its
legislative functions, it routinely authorizes Executive Branch
agencies to issue rules that implement laws pass by Congress. Congress
has become increasingly concerned about its responsibility to oversee
agency rulemaking, especially due to the extensive costs and impacts of
Federal rules.
During the 105th Congress, the House Government Reform Subcommittee
on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs,
chaired by David McIntosh, held a hearing on Mrs. Kelly's earlier
regulatory analysis bill (H.R. 1704), which would sought to establish a
new, freestanding Congressional agency. The Subcommittee then marked up
and reported her bill (H. Rept. 105-441, Part 2). H.R. 1704 called for
the establishment of a new Legislative Branch Congressional Office of
Regulatory Analysis (CORA) to analyze all major rules and report to
Congress on potential costs, benefits, and alternative approaches that
could achieve the same regulatory goals at lower costs. This agency was
intended to aid Congress in analyzing Federal regulations. The
Committee Report stated, ``Congress needs the expertise that CORA would
provide to carry out its duty under the CRA. Currently, Congress does
not have the information it needs to carefully evaluate regulations.
The only analyses it has to rely on are those provided by the agencies
which promulgate the rules. There is no official, third-party analysis
of new regulations'' (p. 5).
Unfortunately, CORA supporters in the 105th Congress could not
overcome the resistance of the defenders of the regulatory status quo.
Opponents argued that creating a new Congressional agency would be
fiscally irresponsible. By this logic, Congress ought to abolish CBO,
as an even more heroic demonstration of fiscal conservatism in action.
Of course, most of us recognize that dismantling CBO, however penny
wise, would be pound foolish.
In the 106th Congress, Government Reform Subcommittee Chairman David
McIntosh and Small Business Subcommittee Chairwoman Sue Kelly, seeking
to accommodate the prejudice against a freestanding agency, introduced
bills (H.R. 3521 and H.R. 3669, respectively) to establish a CORA
function within GAO, which is an existing Legislative Branch agency.
McIntosh and Kelly introduced their bills in January and February 2000.
On May 9th, the Senate passed its own regulatory analysis legislation,
S. 1198, by unanimous consent. Like the McIntosh and Kelly bills, the
Senate legislation would also establish a regulatory analysis function
within GAO.
During the 106th Congress, the Government Reform Committee did not
hold a hearing specifically on one of the CORA bills. However, the
Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and
Regulatory Affairs did hold a June 14th hearing, entitled ``Does
Congress Delegate Too Much Power to Agencies and What Should be Done
About It?'' Witnesses at the hearing included Senator Sam Brownback,
Representative J.D. Hayworth, former Administrator of the Office of
Management and Budget's (OMB's) Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs Dr. Wendy Lee Gramm, former OMB General Counsel Alan Raul, and
New York Law School Professor David Schoenbrod.
Witnesses stressed that Congress needs its own, in-house, regulatory
analysis capability so that Members could especially provide timely
comment on proposed rules, while there is still an opportunity to
influence the cost, scope and content of the final agency action.
Witnesses stated that a regulatory analysis function should: (a) take
into account Congressional legislative intent; (b) examine other, less
costly regulatory and nonregulatory alternative approaches besides
those in an agency proposal; and (c) identify additional, non-agency
sources of data on benefits, costs, and impacts of an agency's
proposal.
Dr. Gramm testified that, ``there's clearly a need for more and
better analysis that is independent of the agency writing the
regulation . . . In my view, Congress cannot carry out its
responsibilities effectively without such analysis.'' She continued by
recommending, ``a shadow OIRA . . . to perform independent, high-
quality analysis of agency regulations at the proposal stage . . .
whether or not the agency has considered the different alternatives,
what might be other alternatives . . . I would suggest that all this
analysis be done at the proposal stage so that this information can be
put into the rulemaking record.''
On June 26th, Chairwoman Kelly and Chairman McIntosh introduced H.R.
4744, which included several needed improvements to S. 1198, along the
lines suggested by the witnesses at the June 14th hearing. For example,
whereas S. 1198 merely permits GAO to assist Congress in submitting
timely comments on proposed regulations during the public comment
period, H.R. 4744 would require GAO to provide such assistance. This
was a critical improvement, because it is only by commenting on
proposed rules during the public comment period that Congress has any
real opportunity to influence the cost, scope, and content of
regulation. In addition, unlike S. 1198, H.R. 4744 would require GAO to
review not only the agency's data but also the public's data to assure
a more balanced evaluation, analyze not only rules costing $100 million
or more but also rules with a significant impact on small businesses,
and examine whether alternatives not considered by the agencies might
achieve the same goal in a more cost-effective manner or with greater
net benefits.
On June 29th, the Government Reform Committee favorably reported H.R.
4744, with a thorough discussion of issues in its accompanying report
(H. Rept. 106-772).
[[Page H8709]]
On July 24th, Chairmen Kelly and McIntosh with Messrs. Condit and
Turner introduced H.R. 4924. This bill included only a few of H.R.
4744's improvements to S. 1198: (a) inclusion, within the scope of
GAO's purview, of agency rules with a significant impact on small
businesses; and (b) a directive to GAO to submit its independent
evaluation of proposed rules within the public comment period, albeit
only when doing so is ``practicable.'' House Report 106-772 explains
the basis for these improvements. H.R. 4924 was, in my judgment,
inferior to H.R. 4744, which was itself a watered down version of the
complete reform needed to implement Congress' Constitutional
responsibility for regulatory oversight. But, it was a step in the
right direction.
On July 29th, the House passed H.R. 4924. Unfortunately, the Senate
has not yet considered H.R. 4924. Since we are at the close of the
106th Congress, we now urge the House's favorable consideration of S.
1198.
S. 1198 does not require or expect GAO to conduct any new Regulatory
Impact Analyses (RIAs), cost-benefit analyses, or other impact
analyses. However, GAO's independent evaluation should lead the
agencies to prepare any missing cost/benefit, small business impact,
federalism impact, or any other missing analysis. For example, after
the McIntosh Subcommittee insisted that the Department of Labor prepare
a missing RIA for its Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation
(``Baby UI'') proposed rule, Labor finally prepared one.
Here's how S. 1198 works. The Chairman or Ranking Member of a
Committee of jurisdiction may request that GAO submit an independent
evaluation to the Committee of a major proposed or final rule within
180 days. GAO's analysis shall include an evaluation of the potential
benefits of the rule, the potential costs of the rule, alternative
approaches in the rulemaking record, and the various impact analyses.
Congress currently has two opportunities to review agency regulatory
actions. Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Congress can
comment on agency proposed and interim rules during the public comment
period. The APA's fairness provisions require that all members of the
public, including Congress, be given an equal opportunity to comment.
Late Congressional comments cannot be considered by the agency unless
all other late public comments are equally considered. Agencies can
ignore comments filed by Congress after the end of the public comment
period, as the Department of Labor did after its proposed ``Baby UI''
rule. Therefore, since GAO cannot be given more time than other members
of the public to comment, GAO should complete its review of agency
regulatory proposals during the public comment period.
Under the CRA, Congress can disapprove an agency final rule after it
is promulgated but before it is effective. Unfortunately, Congress has
been unable to fully carry out its responsibility under the CRA because
it has neither all of the information it needs to carefully evaluate
agency regulatory proposals nor sufficient staff for this function. In
fact, since the March 1996 enactment of the CRA, there has been no
completed Congressional resolutions of disapproval.
In recent years, various statutes (such as the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 and the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996) and executive orders (such as President Reagan's
1981 Executive Order 12291, ``Federal Regulation,'' and President
Clinton's 1993 Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and
Review'') have mandated that Executive Branch agencies conduct
extensive regulatory analyses, especially for economically significant
rules having a $100 million-or-more effect on the economy or a
significant impact on small businesses. Congress, however, does not
have the analytical capability to independently and fairly evaluate
these analyses.
To assume oversight responsibility for Federal regulations, Congress
needs to be armed with an independent evaluation. What is needed is an
analysis of legislative history to see if there is a non-delegation
problem, such as in Food and Drug Administration's proposed rule to
regulate tobacco products, which was struck down by the Supreme Court
in FDA v. Brown & Williamson, or backdoor legislating, such as in the
Department of Labor's ``Baby UI'' rule, which provides paid family
leave to small business employees, even though Congress in the Family
and Medical Leave Act said no to paid family leave and any coverage of
small businesses.
Sometimes the quickest (or only) way to find out that an agency has
ignored Congressional intent or failed to consider less costly or non-
regularly alternatives, is to examine non-agency (i.e., ``public'')
data and analyses. It is for that reason that, under H.R. 4744, GAO
would be required to consult the public's data in the course of
evaluating agency rules. Although S. 1198 does not require GAO to
review public data, neither does it forbid or preclude GAO from doing
so. I bring this up, because some hope that S. 1198 implicitly contains
a gag order, forbidding GAO to consult any analyses or data except
those supplied by the agency to be reviewed. This reading of S. 1198
would defeat a key purpose of the bill, which is to enable Congress to
comment knowledgeably about agency rules from the standpoint of a truly
independent evaluation of those rules.
Instructed by GAO's independent evaluations, Congress will be better
equipped to review final agency rules under the CRA. More importantly,
Congress will be better equipped to submit timely and knowledgeable
comments on proposed rules during the public comment period. Some CORA
foes hope that all GAO analyses of proposed rules will be untimely and,
therefore, have no effect on the substance of rules. I am confident
that GAO will want to please rather than annoy its customers, and will
not fail to help Members of Congress submit timely comments on
regulatory proposals.
Thus, even though a far cry from the original idea of an independent
CORA agency, and although inferior to the Kelly-McIntosh bill reported
by the Government Reform Committee, S. 1198 will increase the
transparency of important regulatory decision, promote effective
Congressional oversight, and increase the accountability of Congress.
The best government is a government accountable to the people. For
America to have an accountable regulatory system, the people's elected
representatives must participate in, and take responsibility for, the
rules promulgated under the laws Congress passes. S. 1198 is a
meaningful step towards Congress' meeting its regulatory oversight
responsibility.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan)
for taking the time to review the legislative history and also thank
the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Kelly) for the work that she has
done on this issue over the years, and to thank the gentleman from
Indiana (Mr. McIntosh) for his efforts.
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak in support of S.1198. S.1198 was
passed by unanimous consent in the Senate on May 9, 2000 without
opposition from the Government Accounting Office, public interest
groups or industry representatives. The gentleman from California (Mr.
Condit) introduced the text of S.1198 in the House as H.R. 4763.
However, the House Committee on Government Reform did not consider
H.R. 4763. Instead, it considered its own version of the bill, H.R.
4744. Unfortunately, H.R. 4744 did not enjoy the same support that
S.1198 did.
The GAO expressed serious concerns about the scope of the analyses,
the timing provided for conducting the reviews and the certainty of
funding; also public interest groups expressed concerns and opposed
passage. Therefore, the gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman) and I
offered the text of the Senate bill, S. 1198, which addressed these
concerns, as an amendment to H.R. 4744.
Our amendment, unfortunately, was rejected by the committee on a
party-line vote. I am pleased to see that we worked all of these things
out, and the House now has the opportunity to vote on this proposal. It
is nice to be able to come here before the Congress and show how at
long last we have an opportunity to work together on something.
Furthermore, on July 25, 2000, the House passed H.R. 4924 under
suspension of the rules, that bill was substantially similar to S.1198.
Now, S.1198 creates a 3-year pilot project in which, at the request of
a committee of jurisdiction, GAO, the General Accounting Office, would
analyze economically significant proposed and final rules.
{time} 1930
GAO would evaluate the agency's analyses of costs, benefits,
alternatives, regulatory impact, federalism impact, and any other
analysis prepared by the agency or required to be prepared by the
agency. All of this analysis would be completed within 180 days of the
committee's request.
Under this bill, GAO would retain its traditional role as auditor and
evaluate only the agencies' work. It would not be required to conduct
its own independent analyses. Furthermore, it would not require the
agency to conduct any new analysis. It only requires GAO review of
agency analyses that are required by separate statute or executive
order.
[[Page H8710]]
In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I support S. 1198 because it sheds light
on the adequacy and usefulness of the agencies' analyses. Yet, it
ensures that the GAO has adequate time and resources to fulfill its new
responsibilities, and it preserves GAO's traditional role as auditor.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may
consume to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Kelly), the champion of
small business, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform
and Paperwork Reduction, and the champion of CORA.
Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Speaker, the Truth in Regulating Act represents the
culmination of nearly 4 years of hard work and an effort that will
provide Congress with a new resource for reviewing new government
regulations before they take effect.
I first introduced this legislation during the 105th Congress, Mr.
Speaker, with the goal of giving Congress the tools it needs to oversee
the steady stream of new and often costly regulations coming from the
Federal government.
Government regulations have an impact on every American. We see an
average of close to 4,000 new regulations promulgated every year.
In most cases, regulations speak to a noble purpose, and can often be
viewed as a measure of the value that we place in protecting such
things as human health, workplace safety, or the environment. Yet, too
often the government oversteps its bounds in its attempt to achieve
these goals, and we all pay the price as a consequence.
The price of regulations poses a particularly heavy burden on small
businesses and manufacturers. They drive our economy forward. They need
our help.
Estimates vary on the annual cost of government regulations from a
range of $300 billion a year to $700 billion every year. Congress has a
special entity, the Congressional Budget Office, or CBO, to help it
grapple with our enormous Federal budget. There is growing sentiment
that a similar office is needed within the legislative branch to review
and analyze the numerous government regulations that are developed and
issued every year.
To address this need, in 1997 I first introduced legislation to
create the Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis, or CORA.
Today's legislation is the culmination of that effort.
As the vice chairman of the Committee on Small Business and the
Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform and Paperwork
Reduction, and as a small businesswoman myself, I know that small
business owners are very familiar with the burdens that Federal
regulations place on them.
Some studies have shown that for small employers, the cost of
complying with Federal regulations is more than double what it cost
their larger counterparts. Mr. Speaker, we do not need any study to
reach that conclusion. Common sense says that if a regulation costs a
company with a $5 billion revenue stream the same as it does a company
with a $5 million revenue stream, the overall impact on the smaller
company will be significantly more on a per unit basis.
S. 1198 creates an office within GAO that would focus solely on
conducting independent regulatory evaluations of regulations to help
determine whether the agencies have complied with the law and executive
orders. The fact is, Congress cannot obtain unbiased information from
the participants in the rulemaking because each participant, including
the Federal agency, has a particular viewpoint and bias.
This legislation will fill the information gap and assist Members in
Congress in determining whether action is warranted. The purpose of the
bill is to ensure Congress exercises its legislative powers in the most
informed manner possible. Ultimately, this will lead to better and more
finely tuned legislation, as well as more effective agency regulations.
The office will provide Congress with reliable, non-partisan
information, levelling the playing field with the executive branch and
improving Congress' ability to understand the burdens that are placed
on small businesses and the economy by excessive regulation.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr.
Ryan) for his work on this issue, the gentleman from Indiana (Mr.
McIntosh) for his strong support, as well as the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Barcia) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Condit)
for their longstanding support for this legislation.
I would also like to thank the ranking member of the Committee on
Government Reform, the gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman), as well
as the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich), for their support in moving
this legislation forward.
Finally, I would like to thank especially the gentleman from Indiana
(Mr. Burton) for moving this legislation quickly to the floor today,
and for his leadership on this issue. I strongly urge my colleagues to
join me in supporting this effort.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I want to echo the gentlewoman's remarks with respect to
the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton) and the gentleman from
California (Mr. Waxman).
Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back
the balance of my time.
Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, I also just want to thank everybody who put a lot of
hard work into this bill. I think we have a good bipartisan compromise.
Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back
the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Ose). The question is on the motion
offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan) that the House
suspend the rules and pass the Senate bill, S. 1198.
The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor
thereof) the rules were suspended and the Senate bill was passed.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
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