[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 121 (Tuesday, October 3, 2000)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1656-E1658]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


       INTRODUCTION OF H.R. 5361, THE PIPELINE SAFETY ACT OF 2000

                                 ______
                                 

                         HON. JAMES L. OBERSTAR

                              of minnesota

                    in the house of representatives

                        Tuesday, October 3, 2000

  Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, before we adjourn we need to pass 
legislation to improve pipeline safety. The recent explosions in 
Bellingham, Washington (three fatalities) and Carlsbad, New Mexico (12 
fatalities) are the most visible indications of a serious, long-term

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problem. Today I am introducing H.R. 5361, the Pipeline Safety Act of 
2000, a bill that I believe will help us to go forward quickly and pass 
this badly needed legislation. The bill is cosponsored by Congressmen 
Dingell, Inslee, Udall (NM), Pascrell, Lewis (GA), Pallone, Smith (WA), 
and Tierney; many of the cosponsors represent citizens in States that 
have had serious pipeline accidents.
  Our Nation has 2.2 million miles of pipeline carrying 617 million 
ton-miles of oil and refined oil products, and 20 trillion cubic feet 
of natural gas. The pipeline system and the volume of products 
transported continue to grow. In the last ten years, pipeline mileage 
has grown by ten percent--at the same time that our Nation's 
suburbanization continues to bring more families near pipelines.
  Regrettably, as the industry has grown, safety has declined. In the 
last decade, there were 2,241 major pipeline accidents resulting in 
death, serious injury, or substantial property damage. These explosions 
killed 226 people and caused more than $700 million of damage to 
property and the environment. And pipeline safety is deteriorating: the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) has found that the rate of pipeline 
accidents is increasing by four percent a year.
  To exacerbate the problem, we are dealing with an aging pipeline 
system. About 24 percent of gas pipelines are now more than 50 years 
old. The section of pipeline involved in the recent Carlsbad, New 
Mexico tragedy was almost 50 years old and had suffered substantial 
internal corrosion.
  Congress and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) have 
long been aware of the unacceptable state of pipeline safety. A series 
of laws and NTSB recommendations have given the responsible federal 
agency, the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) of the Department of 
Transportation, direction as to the steps that need to be taken. 
Regrettably, OPS has not been responsive.
  A recent GAO study found that OPS has failed to implement 22 
statutory directives for regulations and studies. Twelve of these 
provisions date from 1992 or earlier. OPS has the lowest rate of any 
transportation agency for compliance with NTSB recommendations. In 
addition, GAO has challenged OPS'new policy of reduced reliance on 
enforcement fines.
  During the past year, we have made progress in developing legislation 
to improve pipeline safety. The Senate has passed a bill, S. 2438, that 
includes some provisions that would enhance safety but, at the same 
time, the bill fails to deal satisfactorily with the most important 
safety issues. It is my judgment that it would be a serious mistake to 
adopt the Senate bill unchanged. The minimal contributions that the 
bill would make to safety are outweighed by the legislative reality 
that passage of this bill would make it extremely difficult to pass 
additional pipeline safety legislation during the period of the three-
year authorization Provided by the bill.
  The Senate bill, as passed, is opposed by the families of the victims 
of the Bellingham, Washington, pipeline explosion, and the following 
organizations: the National Pipeline Reform Coalition; League of 
Conservation Voters; Environmental Defense; Clean Water Action; 
National Environmental Trust; Natural Resources Defense Council; 
Physicians for Social Responsibility; U.S. Public Interest Research 
Group; AFL-CIO Transportation Trades Department; the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters; and the AFL-CIO Building and Construction 
Trades Department.
  I believe that the House should go forward with its own legislation 
and then work with the Senate to develop a joint product that would 
make an effective contribution to pipeline safety.
  Until a few weeks ago, this was the path we were following in the 
House. Several good pipeline safety bills had been introduced, 
including H.R. 4792, a bill sponsored by Congressman Inslee and 15 
other Members. Within the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, 
the Committee with primary jurisdiction over this issue, there had been 
extensive bipartisan discussions and staff work, and draft legislation 
had been prepared and was within days of being ready for a markup in 
early
  I find the industries' assessment of the legislative situation to be 
obviously selfserving. When was the last time we heard an industry 
demand that a ``tough'' bill be passed to Improve its safety? How could 
anyone, three weeks ago, say with a straight face that the last five 
weeks, or the last two weeks, of this Congress provide insufficient 
time for negotiations on this relatively limited issue, when during the 
last two weeks the House and the Senate will have to resolve all the 
major issues associated with 11 of the 13 appropriation bills?
  The bill I am introducing today does not include all the provisions 
that I would like to see included in a pipeline safety bill. In the 
interest of facilitating prompt House action on pipeline safety, my 
bill is based largely on the House bipartisan staff draft bill that had 
been developed for an early September markup.
  I believe that this bill is a major improvement over the Senate 
product and can make important contributions to pipeline safety. In 
accordance with a joint statement of principles for improving pipeline 
safety endorsed by Congressman John Dingell, Ranking Democratic Member 
of the Committee on Commerce which also has jurisdiction over pipeline 
safety, and me, the bill requires pipeline integrity management 
programs; requires periodic pipeline inspections; ensures that pipeline 
employees are qualified, well trained, and certified; expands the 
public's right to know; provides environmental accountability and 
increases enforcement; expands States' role in pipeline safety; enables 
more citizen involvement; and increases funding to improve pipeline 
safety. A summary of the bill may be found at the end of this 
statement. Although the Senate bill includes provisions on some of 
these issues, in most cases they are not effective to deal with the 
problem.
  Let me just focus on a couple of issues to illustrate the difference 
between my objectives and the Senate bill. I believe that any pipeline 
safety bill must require pipeline operators to adopt integrity 
management programs and must require periodic inspections of pipelines 
at least once every five years.
  Why is that so important?--two reasons: First, required inspections 
will prevent tragedy. The need for regular inspections is particularly 
acute because of the age of our pipeline system. As I have already 
said, about 24 percent of gas pipelines are now more than 50 years old. 
The section of pipeline involved in the recent Carlsbad, New Mexico 
tragedy was almost 50 years old, and the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) has found that the failed sections had significant 
internal corrosion and pipe wall loss in some areas of more than 50 
percent. The NTSB stated that, based on their initial investigation, 
the 50-year-old pipeline was never properly tested. The company never 
conducted an internal inspection of the pipeline involved in the 
explosion. I believe that inspections probably would have uncovered 
these corrosion problems before they led to a tragedy. Without 
requiring pipeline inspections, there will be more tragedies. We don't 
need another Carlsbad, New Mexico, Bellingham, Washington, Edison, New 
Jersey or Mounds View, Minnesota.
  Second, a subtle, but important, distinction between this bill and 
the Senate bill is that the Senate bill does not require the pipeline 
companies to do anything. The Senate bill only requires the Office of 
Pipeline Safety to adopt regulations dealing with the issue. This 
approach has been tried and failed. In 1992, Congress passed 
legislation that directed OPS to adopt regulations requiring 
inspections by 1995. Now, 13 years after the NTSB recommended required 
periodic inspections and eight years after the statutory mandate, the 
Office of Pipeline Safety has not issued a single regulation imposing 
pipeline inspection requirements. For important parts of the industry 
NTSB has not even issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
  The failure of the Office of Pipeline Safety's failure to comply with 
statutory inspections mandates is just one example of OPS' lack of 
responsiveness to Congressional directives and NTSB recommendations 
when it comes to pipeline safety. The GAO has found that the Office of 
Pipeline Safety has not complied with 22 existing statutory 
requirements regarding pipeline safety, many of which had statutory 
deadlines that have long since past. We should not pass a bill, like S. 
2438, that imposes a 23rd statutory requirement telling OPS to do the 
right thing.
  It is time for the House to lead; it is time for these needless 
pipeline tragedies to stop. The House should go forward with its own 
pipeline safety legislation and we should get a truly effective 
pipeline safety bill on the President's desk before we adjourn.

         Summary of H.R. 5361, The Pipeline Safety Act of 2000

     1. Requires pipeline integrity management programs
       Statutorily requires that hazardous liquid and natural gas 
     pipeline operators adopt integrity management programs, 
     regardless of whether the Department of Transportation's 
     Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) completes pending and planned 
     rulemakings to require these programs.
       The Department of Transportation (DOT) must review each 
     operator's integrity management program, and either accept it 
     or require changes.

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     2. Requires Periodic Inspections (at least once every five 
         years)
       Statutorily requires periodic inspections of pipelines at 
     least once every five years in areas of high population or 
     environmental sensitivity; methods for monitoring cathodic 
     protection on the operator's entire system; follow-up actions 
     which will be taken if inspections reveal deficiencies; and 
     programs for installing emergency flow restricting devices.
     3. Ensures that pipeline employees are qualified, well 
         trained, and certified
       Statutorily requires that each pipeline operator develop 
     and implement a program for ensuring that all employees 
     performing safety sensitive functions are qualified.
       Qualifications of employees must be established by testing 
     and may not be established by observing on-the-job 
     performance only (as would be permitted under a recent OPS 
     regulation).
       Requires DOT to review all pipeline operator programs, and 
     either accept them or require changes.
       Establishes a pilot program in which DOT will develop a 
     test for certifying persons who operate computer-based 
     systems which control pipeline operations. OPS will use its 
     test to certify these employees at three companies.
     4. Expands the public's right to know
       Requires pipeline operators to establish programs to 
     educate the public on the use of the one call program prior 
     to excavation, and on how to identify and respond to a 
     pipeline release.
       Requires pipeline operators to make useful information 
     available to state emergency response committee and local 
     emergency planning committees, and to make maps of pipelines 
     available to municipalities.
       Requires pipeline operators to provide DOT, and DOT to 
     provide the public, with pipeline segment reports including 
     histories of incidents and inspection, enforcement actions 
     affecting the segment, and the results of periodic testing of 
     the segment.
     5. Provides environmental accountability and increases 
         enforcement
       Establishes a new penalty with strict liability (no fault 
     required) for oil spills, of $1,000 per barrel of hazardous 
     liquid (e.g., oil) discharged. This is the same penalty as is 
     currently imposed for oil spills in water.
       Raises maximum civil penalties from the current law level 
     of $25,000 per violation and $500,000 for a related series of 
     violations to $100,000 per violation and $1,000,000 for a 
     series of violations.
       Expands the Attorney General's authority to pursue civil 
     actions and get appropriate relief.
     6. Expands States' role in pipeline
       Authorizes the Department of Transportation to enter into 
     agreements with states to enable the states to participate in 
     pipeline safety inspections and oversight, and to comment on 
     pipeline operators' integrity management programs.
     7. Enables more citizen involvement
       Establishes a pilot program to establish and fund nine 
     Regional Advisory Councils to enable public and local 
     government representatives to make substantive 
     recommendations to the pipeline industry and regulators 
     regarding improving pipeline safety.
     8. Increases funding to improve pipeline safety
       Significantly increases authorizations for pipeline safety 
     programs to enable the Office of Pipeline Safety to carry out 
     an active, aggressive inspection program.