[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 120 (Monday, October 2, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9577-S9595]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate
proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 654, S. 2507.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 2507) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2001 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill
which had been reported from the Select Committee on Intelligence with
amendments to omit the parts in black brackets and insert the parts
printed in italic.
S. 2507
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Community Management Account.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Prohibition on unauthorized disclosure of classified
information.
Sec. 304. POW/MIA analytic capability within the intelligence
community.
Sec. 305. Applicability to lawful United States intelligence activities
of Federal laws implementing international treaties and
agreements.
Sec. 306. Limitation on handling, retention, and storage of certain
classified materials by the Department of State.
Sec. 307. Clarification of standing of United States citizens to
challenge certain blocking of assets.
Sec. 308. Availability of certain funds for administrative costs of
Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 401. Expansion of Inspector General actions requiring a report to
Congress.
Sec. 402. Subpoena authority of the Inspector General.
Sec. 403. Improvement and extension of central services program.
Sec. 404. Details of employees to the National Reconnaissance Office.
Sec. 405. Transfers of funds to other agencies for acquisition of land.
Sec. 406. Eligibility of additional employees for reimbursement for
professional liability insurance.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
[Sec. 501. Two-year extension of authority to engage in commercial
activities as security for intelligence collection
activities.
[Sec. 502. Nuclear test monitoring equipment.
[Sec. 503. Experimental personnel management program for technical
personnel for certain elements of the intelligence
community.]
Sec. 501. Prohibition on transfer of imagery analysts from General
Defense Intelligence Program to National Imagery and
Mapping Agency Program.
Sec. 502. Prohibition on transfer of collection management personnel
from General Defense Intelligence Program to Community
Management Account.
Sec. 503. Authorized personnel ceiling for General Defense Intelligence
Program.
Sec. 504. Measurement and signature intelligence.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2001.--
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2001 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(6) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
(7) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations for Certain Elements
for Fiscal Years 2002 Through 2005.--Funds are hereby
authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2002
through 2005 for the conduct in each such fiscal year of the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(3) The National Security Agency.
(4) The National Reconnaissance Office.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and
the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2001,
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the elements listed in such section, are those
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill ____
of the One Hundred Sixth Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and House of Representatives and to the President. The
President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within
the Executive Branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director
of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian
personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year
2001 under section 102 when the Director of Central
Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the
performance of important intelligence functions, except that
the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of
civilian personnel authorized under such section for such
element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of
Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives whenever the Director exercises the authority
granted by this section.
SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated for
the Community Management Account of the Director of Central
Intelligence for fiscal year 2001 the sum of $232,051,000.
(2) Availability for advanced research and development
committee.--Within the amount authorized to be appropriated
in paragraph (1), amounts identified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for
the Advanced Research and Development Committee shall remain
available until September 30, 2002.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Community Management Account of the Director of Central
Intelligence are authorized a total of 618 full-time
personnel as of September 30, 2001. Personnel serving in such
elements may be permanent employees of the Community
Management Account element or personnel detailed from other
elements of the United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there is also
authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management
Account for fiscal year 2001
[[Page S9578]]
such additional amounts as are specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Community Management Account as of September 30, 2001, there
is hereby authorized such additional personnel for such
elements as of that date as is specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during
fiscal year 2001, any officer or employee of the United
States or member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the
staff of an element within the Community Management Account
from another element of the United States Government shall be
detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such
officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a
nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for
the performance of temporary functions as required by the
Director of Central Intelligence.
(e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated in subsection (a), $27,000,000 shall be
available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within
such amount, funds provided for research, development, test,
and evaluation purposes shall remain available until
September 30, 2002, and funds provided for procurement
purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2003.
(2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central
Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General of the
United States funds available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General
shall utilize funds so transferred for activities of the
National Drug Intelligence Center.
(3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the
provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
(4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the
operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 2001 the sum of $216,000,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 303. PROHIBITION ON UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
(a) In General.--Chapter 37 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating section 798A as section 798B; and
(2) by inserting after section 798 the following new
section 798A:
``Sec. 798A. Unauthorized disclosure of classified
information
``(a) Prohibition.--Whoever, being an officer or employee
of the United States, a former or retired officer or employee
of the United States, any other person with authorized access
to classified information, or any other person formerly with
authorized access to classified information, knowingly and
willfully discloses, or attempts to disclose, any classified
information to a person who is not both an officer or
employee of the United States and who is not authorized
access to the classified information shall be fined not more
than $10,000, imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both.
``(b) Construction of Prohibition.--Nothing in this section
shall be construed to establish criminal liability for
disclosure of classified information in accordance with
applicable law to the following:
``(1) Any justice or judge of a court of the United States
established pursuant to article III of the Constitution of
the United States.
``(2) The Senate or House of Representatives, or any
committee or subcommittee thereof, or joint committee
thereof, or any member of Congress.
``(c) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) The term `authorized', in the case of access to
classified information, means having authority or permission
to have access to the classified information pursuant to the
provisions of a statute, Executive Order, regulation, or
directive of the head of any department or agency who is
empowered to classify information, an order of any United
States court, or a provision of any Resolution of the Senate
or Rule of the House of Representatives which governs release
of classified information by the such House of Congress.
``(2) The term `classified information' means information
or material designated and clearly marked or represented, or
that the person knows or has reason to believe has been
determined by appropriate authorities, pursuant to the
provisions of a statute or Executive Order, as requiring
protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of
national security.
``(3) The term `officer or employee of the United States'
means the following:
``(A) An officer or employee (as those terms are defined in
sections 2104 and 2105 of title 5).
``(B) An officer or enlisted member of the Armed Forces (as
those terms are defined in section 101(b) of title 10).''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of that chapter is amended by striking the item
relating to section 798A and inserting the following new
items:
``798A. Unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
``798B. Temporary extension of section 794.''.
SEC. 304. POW/MIA ANALYTIC CAPABILITY WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402
et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``pow/mia analytic capability
``Sec. 115. (a) Requirement.--(1) The Director of Central
Intelligence shall, in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense, establish and maintain in the intelligence community
an analytic capability with responsibility for intelligence
in support of the activities of the United States relating to
prisoners of war and missing persons (as that term is defined
in section 1513(1) of title 10, United States Code).
``(2) The analytic capability maintained under paragraph
(1) shall be known as the `POW/MIA analytic capability of the
intelligence community'.
``(b) Scope of Responsibility.--The responsibilities of the
analytic capability maintained under subsection (a) shall--
``(1) extend to any activities of the Federal Government
with respect to prisoners of war and missing persons after
December 31, 1990; and
``(2) include support for any department or agency of the
Federal Government engaged in such activities.''.
SEC. 305. APPLICABILITY TO LAWFUL UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES OF FEDERAL LAWS IMPLEMENTING
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS.
The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.)
is amended by adding at the end the following:
``TITLE X--MISCELLANEOUS
``applicability to united states intelligence activities of federal
laws implementing international treaties and agreements
``Sec. 1001. (a) In General.--No Federal law enacted on or
after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 that implements a
treaty or other international agreement shall be construed as
making unlawful an otherwise lawful and authorized
intelligence activity of the United States Government or its
employees, or any other person acting at their direction to
the extent such other person is carrying out such activity on
behalf of the United States, unless such Federal law
specifically addresses such intelligence activity.
``(b) Authorized Activities.--An activity shall be treated
as authorized for purposes of subsection (a) if the activity
is authorized by an appropriate official of the United States
Government, acting within the scope of the official duties of
that official and in compliance with Federal law and any
applicable Presidential directive.''.
SEC. 306. LIMITATION ON HANDLING, RETENTION, AND STORAGE OF
CERTAIN CLASSIFIED MATERIALS BY THE DEPARTMENT
OF STATE.
(a) Certification Regarding Full Compliance With
Requirements.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall
certify to the appropriate committees of Congress whether or
not each covered element of the Department of State is in
full compliance with all applicable directives of the
Director of Central Intelligence, and all applicable
Executive Orders, relating to the handling, retention, or
storage of covered classified materials.
(b) Limitation on Certification.--The Director of Central
Intelligence may not certify a covered element of the
Department of State as being in full compliance with the
directives and Executive Orders referred to in subsection (a)
if the covered element is currently subject to a waiver of
compliance with respect to any such directive or Executive
Order.
(c) Report on Noncompliance.--Whenever the Director of
Central Intelligence determines that a covered element of the
Department of State is not in full compliance with any
directive or Executive Order referred to in subsection (a),
the Director shall promptly notify the appropriate committees
of Congress of such determination.
(d) Effects of Certification of Non-Full Compliance.--
(1)(A) Effective as of January 1, 2001, no funds authorized
to be appropriated by this Act may be obligated or
expended by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the
Department of State unless the Director of Central
Intelligence has certified under subsection (a) as of such
date that each covered element of the Department of State
is in full compliance with the directives and Executive
Orders referred to in subsection (a).
[[Page S9579]]
(B) If the prohibition in subparagraph (A) takes effect in
accordance with that subparagraph, the prohibition shall
remain in effect until the date on which the Director
certifies under subsection (a) that each covered element of
the Department of State is in full compliance with the
directives and Executive Orders referred to in that
subsection.
(2)(A) Subject to subsection (e), effective as of January
1, 2001, a covered element of the Department of State may not
retain or store covered classified information unless the
Director has certified under subsection (a) as of such date
that the covered element is in full compliance with the
directives and Executive Orders referred to in subsection
(a).
(B) If the prohibition in subparagraph (A) takes effect in
accordance with that subparagraph, the prohibition shall
remain in effect until the date on which the Director
certifies under subsection (a) that the covered element
involved is in full compliance with the directives and
Executive Orders referred to in that subsection.
(e) Presidential Waiver.--(1) The President may waive the
applicability of the prohibition in subsection (d)(2) to an
element of the Department of State otherwise covered by such
prohibition if the President determines that the waiver is in
the national security interests of the United States.
(2) The President shall submit to appropriate committees of
Congress a report on each exercise of the waiver authority in
paragraph (1).
(3) Each report under paragraph (2) with respect to the
exercise of authority under paragraph (1) shall set forth the
following:
(A) The covered element of the Department of State
addressed by the waiver.
(B) The reasons for the waiver.
(C) The actions taken by the President to protect any
covered classified material to be handled, retained, or
stored by such element.
(f) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means
the following:
(A) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) The term ``covered classified material'' means any
material classified at the Sensitive Compartmented
Information (SCI) level.
(3) The term ``covered element of the Department of State''
means each element of the Department of State that handles,
retains, or stores covered classified material.
(4) The term ``material'' means any data, regardless of
physical form or characteristic, including written or printed
matter, automated information systems storage media, maps,
charts, paintings, drawings, films, photographs, engravings,
sketches, working notes, papers, reproductions of any such
things by any means or process, and sound, voice, magnetic,
or electronic recordings.
(5) The term ``Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)
level'', in the case of classified material, means a level of
classification for information in such material concerning or
derived from intelligence sources, methods, or analytical
processes that requires such information to be handled within
formal access control systems established by the Director of
Central Intelligence.
SEC. 307. CLARIFICATION OF STANDING OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS
TO CHALLENGE CERTAIN BLOCKING OF ASSETS.
The Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (title VIII
of Public Law 106-120; 113 Stat. 1626; 21 U.S.C. 1901 et
seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``SEC. 811. STANDING OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS TO CHALLENGE
BLOCKING OF ASSETS.
``No provision of this title shall be construed to prohibit
a United States citizen from raising any challenge otherwise
available to the United States citizen under subchapter II of
chapter 5 and chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code
(commonly referred to as the Administrative Procedure Act),
or any other provision of law, with respect to the blocking
of assets by the United States under this title.''.
SEC. 308. AVAILABILITY OF CERTAIN FUNDS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
COSTS OF COUNTERDRUG INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARIAT.
Notwithstanding section 1346 of title 31, United States
Code, or section 610 of the Treasury and General Government
Appropriations Act, 2000 (Public Law 106-58; 113 Stat. 467),
funds made available for fiscal year 2000 for any department
or agency of the Federal Government with authority to conduct
counterdrug intelligence activities, including counterdrug
law enforcement information-gathering activities, may be
available to finance an appropriate share of the
administrative costs incurred by the Department of Justice
for the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat
authorized by the General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan of
February 12, 2000.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. EXPANSION OF INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIONS REQUIRING A
REPORT TO CONGRESS.
Section 17(d)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(3)) is amended by striking all that
follows after subparagraph (A) and inserting the following:
``(B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried out by
the Inspector General should focus on any current or former
Agency official who--
``(i) holds or held a position in the Agency that is
subject to appointment by the President, by and with the
advise and consent of the Senate, including such a position
held on an acting basis; or
``(ii) holds or held the position in the Agency, including
such a position held on an acting basis, of--
``(I) Executive Director;
``(II) Deputy Director for Operations;
``(III) Deputy Director for Intelligence;
``(IV) Deputy Director for Administration; or
``(V) Deputy Director for Science and Technology;
``(C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General
to the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by
a current or former Agency official described or referred to
in subparagraph (B);
``(D) the Inspector General becomes aware of the possible
criminal conduct of a current or former Agency official
described or referred to in subparagraph (B) through a means
other than an investigation, inspection, or audit and such
conduct is not referred to the Department of Justice; or
``(E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible
alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary
information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or
audit,
the Inspector General shall immediately submit a report on
such matter to the intelligence committees.''.
SEC. 402. SUBPOENA AUTHORITY OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL.
(a) Clarification Regarding Reports on Exercise of
Authority.--Section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act
of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended--
(1) in subsection (d)(1), by striking subparagraph (E) and
inserting the following new subparagraph (E):
``(E) a description of the exercise of the subpoena
authority under subsection (e)(5) by the Inspector General
during the reporting period; and''; and
(2) in subsection (e)(5), by striking subparagraph (E).
(b) Scope of Authority.--Subsection (e)(5)(B) of that
section is amended by striking ``Government'' and inserting
``Federal''.
SEC. 403. IMPROVEMENT AND EXTENSION OF CENTRAL SERVICES
PROGRAM.
(a) Deposits in Central Services Working Capital Fund.--
Subsection (c)(2) of section 21 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403u) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as subparagraph (H);
and
(2) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following new
subparagraphs:
``(F) Receipts from individuals in reimbursement for
utility services and meals provided under the program.
``(G) Receipts from individuals for the rental of property
and equipment under the program.''.
(b) Clarification of Costs Recoverable Under Program.--
Subsection (e)(1) of that section is amended in the second
sentence by inserting ``other than structures owned by the
Agency'' after ``depreciation of plant and equipment''.
(c) Financial Statements of Program.--Subsection (g)(2) of
that section is amended in the first sentence by striking
``annual audits under paragraph (1)'' and inserting the
following: ``financial statements to be prepared with respect
to the program. Office of Management and Budget guidance
shall also determine the procedures for conducting annual
audits under paragraph (1).''.
(d) Extension of Program.--Subsection (h)(1) of that
section is amended by striking ``March 31, 2002'' and
inserting ``March 31, 2005''.
SEC. 404. DETAILS OF EMPLOYEES TO THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE
OFFICE.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a
et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``details of employees
``Sec. 22. The Director may--
``(1) detail any personnel of the Agency on a reimbursable
basis indefinitely to the National Reconnaissance Office
without regard to any limitation under law on the duration of
details of Federal government personnel; and
``(2) hire personnel for the purpose of details under
paragraph (1).''.
SEC. 405. TRANSFERS OF FUNDS TO OTHER AGENCIES FOR
ACQUISITION OF LAND.
(a) In General.--Section 8 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403j) is amended by adding at
the end the following new subsection:
``(c) Transfers for Acquisition of Land.--(1) Sums
appropriated or otherwise made available to the Agency for
the acquisition of land that are transferred to another
department or agency for that purpose shall remain available
for 3 years.
``(2) The Director shall submit to the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives an annual
report on the transfers of sums described in paragraph
(1).''.
(b) Conforming Stylistic Amendments.--That section is
further amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``In General.--'' after
``(a)''; and
(2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``Scope of Authority
For Expenditure.--'' after ``(b)''.
[[Page S9580]]
(c) Applicability.--Subsection (c) of section 8 of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as added by
subsection (a) of this section, shall apply with respect to
amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for
the Central Intelligence Agency for fiscal years after
fiscal year 2000.
SEC. 406. ELIGIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL EMPLOYEES FOR
REIMBURSEMENT FOR PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any provision of section
363 of the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government
Appropriations Act, 1997 (5 U.S.C. prec. 5941 note), the
Director of Central Intelligence may--
(1) designate as qualified employees within the meaning of
subsection (b) of that section appropriate categories of
employees not otherwise covered by that subsection; and
(2) use appropriated funds available to the Director to
reimburse employees within categories so designated for one-
half of the costs incurred by such employees for professional
liability insurance in accordance with subsection (a) of that
section.
(b) Reports.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall
submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
and the Permanent Select Committee of Intelligence of the
House of Representatives a report on each designation of a
category of employees under paragraph (1) of subsection (a),
including the approximate number of employees covered by such
designation and an estimate of the amount to be expended on
reimbursement of such employees under paragraph (2) of that
subsection.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
[SEC. 501. TWO-YEAR EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES AS SECURITY FOR
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES.
[Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended
in the second sentence by striking ``December 31, 2000'' and
inserting ``December 31, 2002''.
[SEC. 502. NUCLEAR TEST MONITORING EQUIPMENT.
[(a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 138 of title 10,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
[``Sec. 2350l. Nuclear test monitoring equipment
[``(a) Authority To Convey or Provide.--Subject to
subsection (b), the Secretary of Defense may, for purposes of
satisfying nuclear test explosion monitoring requirements
applicable to the United States--
[``(1) convey or otherwise provide to a foreign government
monitoring and associated equipment for nuclear test
explosion monitoring purposes; and
[``(2) install such equipment on foreign territory or in
international waters as part of such conveyance or provision.
[``(b) Agreement Required.--Nuclear test explosion
monitoring equipment may be conveyed or otherwise provided
under the authority in subsection (a) only pursuant to the
terms of an agreement in which the foreign government
receiving such equipment agrees as follows:
[``(1) To provide the Secretary of Defense timely access to
the data produced, collected, or generated by such equipment.
[``(2) To permit the Secretary of Defense to take such
measures as the Secretary considers necessary to inspect,
test, maintain, repair, or replace such equipment, including
access for purposes of such measures.
[``(c) Delegation of Responsibilities.--(1) The Secretary
of Defense may delegate any or all of the responsibilities of
that Secretary under subsection (b) to the Secretary of the
Air Force.
[``(2) The Secretary of the Air Force may delegate any or
all of the responsibilities delegated to that Secretary under
paragraph (1).''.
[(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of subchapter II of such chapter is amended by
inserting after the item relating to section 2350k the
following new item:
[``2350l. Nuclear test monitoring equipment.''.
[SEC. 503. EXPERIMENTAL PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR
TECHNICAL PERSONNEL FOR CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
[(a) Program Authorized.--During the 5-year period
beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Director of Central Intelligence may carry out a program of
experimental use of the special personnel management
authority provided in subsection (b) in order to facilitate
recruitment of eminent experts in science or engineering for
research and development projects administered by the
elements of the intelligence community specified in
subsection (c).
[(b) Special Personnel Management Authority.--Under the
program, the Director of Central Intelligence may--
[(1) within the limitations specified in subsection (c),
appoint scientists and engineers from outside the civil
service and uniformed services (as such terms are defined in
section 2101 of title 5, United States Code) to not more than
39 scientific and engineering positions in the elements of
the intelligence community specified in that subsection
without regard to any provision of title 5, United States
Code, governing the appointment of employees in the civil
service;
[(2) prescribe the rates of basic pay for positions to
which employees are appointed under paragraph (1) at rates
not in excess of the maximum rate of basic pay authorized for
senior-level positions under section 5376 of title 5, United
States Code, notwithstanding any provision of such title
governing the rates of pay or classification of employees in
the executive branch; and
[(3) pay any employee appointed under paragraph (1)
payments in addition to basic pay within the limit applicable
to the employee under subsection (e)(1).
[(c) Specified Elements and Limitations.--The elements of
the intelligence community in which individuals may be
appointed under the program, and the maximum number of
positions for which individuals may be appointed in each such
element, are as follows:
[(1) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), 15
positions.
[(2) The National Security Agency (NSA), 12 positions.
[(3) The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), 6 positions.
[(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 6 positions.
[(d) Limitation on Term of Appointment.--(1) Except as
provided in paragraph (2), the service of an employee under
an appointment under subsection (b)(1) may not exceed 4
years.
[(2) The Director of Central Intelligence may, in the case
of a particular employee, extend the period to which service
is limited under paragraph (1) by up to 2 years if the
Director determines that such action is necessary to promote
the efficiency of the element of the intelligence community
concerned.
[(e) Limitations on Additional Payments.--(1) The total
amount of the additional payments paid to an employee under
subsection (b)(3) for any 12-month period may not exceed the
least of the following amounts:
[(A) $25,000.
[(B) The amount equal to 25 percent of the employee's
annual rate of basic pay.
[(C) The amount of the limitation that is applicable for a
calendar year under section 5307(a)(1) of title 5, United
States Code.
[(2) An employee appointed under subsection (b)(1) is not
eligible for any bonus, monetary award, or other monetary
incentive for service except for payments authorized under
subsection (b)(3).
[(f) Period of Program.--(1) The program authorized under
this section shall terminate at the end of the 5-year period
referred to in subsection (a).
[(2) After the termination of the program--
[(A) no appointment may be made under paragraph (1) of
subsection (b);
[(B) a rate of basic pay prescribed under paragraph (2) of
that subsection may not take effect for a position; and
[(C) no period of service may be extended under subsection
(d)(2).
[(g) Savings Provisions.--In the case of an employee who,
on the day before the termination of the program, is serving
in a position pursuant to an appointment under subsection
(b)(1)--
[(1) the termination of the program does not terminate the
employee's employment in that position before the expiration
of the lesser of--
[(A) the period for which the employee was appointed; or
[(B) the period to which the employee's service is limited
under subsection (d), including any extension made under
paragraph (2) of that subsection before the termination of
the program; and
[(2) the rate of basic pay prescribed for the position
under subsection (b)(2) may not be reduced for so long
(within the period applicable to the employee under paragraph
(1)) as the employee continues to serve in the position
without a break in service.
[(h) Annual Report.--(1) Not later than October 15 of each
year, beginning in 2001 and ending in the year in which the
service of employees under the program concludes (including
service, if any, that concludes under subsection (g)), the
Director of Central Intelligence shall submit a report on the
program to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.
[(2) The report submitted in a year shall cover the 12-
month period ending on the day before the anniversary, in
that year, of the date of the enactment of this Act.
[(3) The annual report shall contain, for the period
covered by the report, the following:
[(A) A detailed discussion of the exercise of authority
under this section.
[(B) The sources from which individuals appointed under
subsection (b)(1) were recruited.
[(C) The methodology used for identifying and selecting
such individuals.
[(D) Any additional information that the Director considers
helpful for assessing the utility of the authority under this
section.]
SEC. 501. PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF IMAGERY ANALYSTS FROM
GENERAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM TO
NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY PROGRAM.
(a) Prohibition on Use of Funds For Transfer.--No funds
authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be transferred
from the General Defense Intelligence Program to the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency Program for purposes of
transferring imagery analysis personnel from the General
Defense Intelligence Program to the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency Program.
(b) Role of Director of NIMA as Functional Manager for
Imagery and Geospacial
[[Page S9581]]
Programs.--(1) The Secretary of Defense shall, in
consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence,
review options for strengthening the role of the Director of
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the functional
manager for United States imagery and geospacial programs.
(2) Not later than March 15, 2001, the Secretary shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on
the review required by subsection (b). The report shall
include any recommendations regarding modifications in the
role and duties of the Director of the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency that the Secretary considers appropriate in
light of the review.
(3) In this subsection, the term ``appropriate committees
of Congress'' means the following:
(A) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(B) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
SEC. 502. PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF COLLECTION MANAGEMENT
PERSONNEL FROM GENERAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
PROGRAM TO COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be
transferred from the General Defense Intelligence Program to
the Community Management Account for purposes of transferring
intelligence collection management personnel.
SEC. 503. AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL CEILING FOR GENERAL DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
The authorized personnel ceiling for the General Defense
Intelligence Program specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in section 102 is hereby increased
by 2,152 positions.
SEC. 504. MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURE INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Study of Options.--The Director of Central Intelligence
shall, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, conduct
a study of the utility and feasibility of various options for
improving the management and organization of measurement and
signature intelligence, including the option of establishing
a centralized tasking, processing, exploitation, and
dissemination facility for measurement and signature
intelligence.
(b) Report.--Not later than April 1, 2001, the Director and
the Secretary shall jointly submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a report on their findings as a result
of the study required by subsection (a). The report shall set
forth any recommendations that the Director and the Secretary
consider appropriate.
(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means the following:
(1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the committee
amendments be agreed to.
The committee amendments were agreed to.
Amendments Nos. 4280 through 4285, En Bloc
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate
proceed en bloc to the following amendments which are at the desk:
Warner amendment No. 4280, Specter amendment No. 4281, Feinstein
amendment No. 4282, Moynihan amendment No. 4283, Kerrey amendment No.
4284, and the Shelby-Bryan amendment No. 4285. I further ask unanimous
consent that the amendments be agreed to and the motions to reconsider
be laid upon the table en bloc.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendments (Nos. 4280 through 4285) were agreed to, en bloc, as
follows:
amendment no. 4280
(Purpose: To modify the provisions relating to Department of Defense
intelligence activities)
On page 27, strike line 3 and all that follows through
page 37, line 3, and insert the following:
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 501. TWO-YEAR EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES AS SECURITY FOR
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES.
Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended
in the second sentence by striking ``December 31, 2000'' and
inserting ``December 31, 2002''.
SEC. 502. ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN
EXPERIMENTAL PERSONNEL PROGRAM FOR CERTAIN
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL.
If the Director of Central Intelligence requests that the
Secretary of Defense exercise any authority available to the
Secretary under section 1101(b) of the Strom Thurmond
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999
(Public Law 105-261; 5 U.S.C. 3104 note) to carry out a
program of special personnel management authority at the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency and the National Security
Agency in order to facilitate recruitment of eminent experts
in science and engineering at such agencies, the Secretary
shall respond to such request not later than 30 days after
the date of such request.
SEC. 503. PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF IMAGERY ANALYSTS FROM
GENERAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM TO
NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY PROGRAM.
(a) Prohibition on Use of Funds For Transfer.--No funds
authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be transferred
from the General Defense Intelligence Program to the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency Program for purposes of
transferring imagery analysis personnel from the General
Defense Intelligence Program to the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency Program.
(b) Role of Director of NIMA as Functional Manager for
Imagery and Geospacial Programs.--(1) The Secretary of
Defense shall, in consultation with the Director of Central
Intelligence, review options for strengthening the role of
the Director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency as
the functional manager for United States imagery and
geospacial programs.
(2) Not later than March 15, 2001, the Secretary shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on
the review required by subsection (b). The report shall
include any recommendations regarding modifications in the
role and duties of the Director of the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency that the Secretary considers appropriate in
light of the review.
(3) In this subsection, the term ``appropriate committees
of Congress'' means the following:
(A) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(B) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
SEC. 504. PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF COLLECTION MANAGEMENT
PERSONNEL FROM GENERAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
PROGRAM TO COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be
transferred from the General Defense Intelligence Program to
the Community Management Account for purposes of transferring
intelligence collection management personnel.
SEC. 505. AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL CEILING FOR GENERAL DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
The authorized personnel ceiling for the General Defense
Intelligence Program specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in section 102 is hereby increased
by 2,152 positions.
SEC. 506. MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURE INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Study of Options.--The Director of Central Intelligence
shall, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, conduct
a study of the utility and feasibility of various options for
improving the management and organization of measurement and
signature intelligence, including--
(1) the option of establishing a centralized tasking,
processing, exploitation, and dissemination facility for
measurement and signature intelligence;
(2) options for recapitalizing and reconfiguring the
current systems for measurement and signature intelligence;
and
(3) the operation and maintenance costs of the various
options.
(b) Report.--Not later than April 1, 2001, the Director and
the Secretary shall jointly submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a report on their findings as a result
of the study required by subsection (a). The report shall set
forth any recommendations that the Director and the Secretary
consider appropriate.
(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means the following:
(1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
____
Amendment No. 4281
(Purpose: To modify procedures under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 relating to orders for surveillance and
searches for foreign intelligence purposes.)
(The text of the amendment is printed in today's Record under
``Amendments Submitted.'')
amendment no. 4282
(Purpose: To require disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act
regarding certain persons and records of the Japanese Imperial Army in
a manner that does not impair any investigation or prosecution
conducted by the Department of Justice or certain intelligence matters)
On page 37, after line 3, add the following:
TITLE VI--DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ON JAPANESE IMPERIAL ARMY
SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Japanese Imperial Army
Disclosure Act''.
SEC. 602. ESTABLISHMENT OF JAPANESE IMPERIAL ARMY RECORDS
INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' has the meaning given such
term under section 551 of title 5, United States Code.
(2) Interagency group.--The term ``Interagency Group''
means the Japanese Imperial
[[Page S9582]]
Army Records Interagency Working Group established under
subsection (b).
(3) Japanese imperial army records.--The term ``Japanese
Imperial Army records'' means classified records or portions
of records that pertain to any person with respect to whom
the United States Government, in its sole discretion, has
grounds to believe ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise
participated in the experimentation and persecution of any
person because of race, religion, national origin, or
political option, during the period beginning September 18,
1931, and ending on December 31, 1948, under the direction
of, or in association with--
(A) the Japanese Imperial Army;
(B) any government in any area occupied by the military
forces of the Japanese Imperial Army;
(C) any government established with the assistance or
cooperation of the Japanese Imperial Army; or
(D) any government which was an ally of the Imperial Army
of Japan.
(4) Record.--The term ``record'' means a Japanese Imperial
Army record.
(b) Establishment of Interagency Group.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish the
Japanese Imperial Army Records Interagency Working Group,
which shall remain in existence for 3 years after the date
the Interagency Group is established.
(2) Membership.--The President shall appoint to the
Interagency Group individuals whom the President determines
will most completely and effectively carry out the functions
of the Interagency Group within the time limitations provided
in this section, including the Historian of the Department of
State, the Archivist of the United States, the head of any
other agency the President considers appropriate, and no more
than 3 other persons. The head of an agency appointed by the
President may designate an appropriate officer to serve on
the Interagency Group in lieu of the head of such agency.
(3) Initial meeting.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Interagency Group shall
hold an initial meeting and begin the functions required
under this section.
(c) Functions.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Interagency Group shall, to the
greatest extent possible consistent with section 603--
(1) locate, identify, inventory, recommend for
declassification, and make available to the public at the
National Archives and Records Administration, all classified
Japanese Imperial Army records of the United States;
(2) coordinate with agencies and take such actions as
necessary to expedite the release of such records to the
public; and
(3) submit a report to Congress, including the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight of the House of
Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives, and the Committee on the Judiciary
of the Senate, describing all such records, the disposition
of such records, and the activities of the Interagency Group
and agencies under this section.
(d) Funding.--There is authorized to be appropriated such
sum as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
title.
SEC. 603. REQUIREMENT OF DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS.
(a) Release of Records.--Subject to subsections (b), (c),
and (d), the Japanese Imperial Army Records Interagency
Working Group shall release in their entirety Japanese
Imperial Army records.
(b) Exception for Privacy.--An agency head may exempt from
release under subsection (a) specific information, that
would--
(1) constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy;
(2) reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or
reveal information about the application of an intelligence
source or method, or reveal the identity of a human
intelligence source when the unauthorized disclosure of that
source would clearly and demonstrably damage the national
security interests of the United States;
(3) reveal information that would assist in the development
or use of weapons of mass destruction;
(4) reveal information that would impair United States
cryptologic systems or activities;
(5) reveal information that would impair the application of
state-of-the-art technology within a United States weapon
system;
(6) reveal actual United States military war plans that
remain in effect;
(7) reveal information that would seriously and
demonstrably impair relations between the United States and a
foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably undermine
ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States;
(8) reveal information that would clearly, and demonstrably
impair the current ability of United States Government
officials to protect the President, Vice President, and other
officials for whom protection services are authorized in the
interest of national security;
(9) reveal information that would seriously and
demonstrably impair current national security emergency
preparedness plans; or
(10) violate a treaty or other international agreement.
(c) Applications of Exemptions.--
(1) In general.--In applying the exemptions provided in
paragraphs (2) through (10) of subsection (b), there shall be
a presumption that the public interest will be served by
disclosure and release of the records of the Japanese
Imperial Army. The exemption may be asserted only when the
head of the agency that maintains the records determines that
disclosure and release would be harmful to a specific
interest identified in the exemption. An agency head who
makes such a determination shall promptly report it to the
committees of Congress with appropriate jurisdiction,
including the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2) Application of title 5.--A determination by an agency
head to apply an exemption provided in paragraphs (2) through
(9) of subsection (b) shall be subject to the same standard
of review that applies in the case of records withheld under
section 552(b)(1) of title 5, United States Code.
(d) Limitation on Exemptions.--
(1) In general.--The exemptions set forth in subsection (b)
shall constitute the only grounds pursuant to which an agency
head may exempt records otherwise subject to release under
subsection (a).
(2) Records related to investigation or prosecutions.--This
section shall not apply to records--
(A) related to or supporting any active or inactive
investigation, inquiry, or prosecution by the Office of
Special Investigations of the Department of Justice; or
(B) solely in the possession, custody, or control of the
Office of Special Investigations.
SEC. 604. EXPEDITED PROCESSING OF FOIA REQUESTS FOR JAPANESE
IMPERIAL ARMY RECORDS.
For purposes of expedited processing under section
552(a)(6)(E) of title 5, United States Code, any person who
was persecuted in the manner described in section 602(a)(3)
and who requests a Japanese Imperial Army record shall be
deemed to have a compelling need for such record.
SEC. 605. EFFECTIVE DATE.
The provisions of this title shall take effect on the date
that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
____
Amendment No. 4283
(Purpose: To improve the identification, collection, and review for
declassification of records and materials that are of archival value or
extraordinary public interest to the people of the United States)
(The text of the amendment is printed in today's Record under
``Amendments Submitted.'')
amendment no. 4284
(Purpose: To honor the outstanding contributions of Senator Daniel
Patrick Moynihan toward the redevelopment of Pennsylvania Avenue,
Washington, DC)
At the end of title III, add the following:
SEC. 3__. DESIGNATION OF DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN PLACE.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
(1) during the second half of the twentieth century,
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan promoted the importance of
architecture and urban planning in the Nation's Capital,
particularly with respect to the portion of Pennsylvania
Avenue between the White House and the United States Capitol
(referred to in this subsection as the ``Avenue'');
(2) Senator Moynihan has stressed the unique significance
of the Avenue as conceived by Pierre Charles L'Enfant to be
the ``grand axis'' of the Nation's Capital as well as a
symbolic representation of the separate yet unified branches
of the United States Government;
(3) through his service to the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal
Office Space (1961-1962), as a member of the President's
Council on Pennsylvania Avenue (1962-1964), and as vice-
chairman of the President's Temporary Commission on
Pennsylvania Avenue (1965-1969), and in his various
capacities in the executive and legislative branches, Senator
Moynihan has consistently and creatively sought to fulfill
President Kennedy's recommendation of June 1, 1962, that the
Avenue not become a ``solid phalanx of public and private
office buildings which close down completely at night and on
weekends,'' but that it be ``lively, friendly, and inviting,
as well as dignified and impressive'';
(4)(A) Senator Moynihan helped draft a Federal
architectural policy, known as the ``Guiding Principles for
Federal Architecture,'' that recommends a choice of designs
that are ``efficient and economical'' and that provide
``visual testimony to the dignity, enterprise, vigor, and
stability'' of the United States Government; and
(B) the Guiding Principles for Federal Architecture further
state that the ``development of an official style must be
avoided. Design must flow from the architectural profession
to the Government, and not vice versa.'';
(5) Senator Moynihan has encouraged--
(A) the construction of new buildings along the Avenue,
such as the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade
Center; and
[[Page S9583]]
(B) the establishment of an academic institution along the
Avenue, namely the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, a living memorial to President Wilson; and
(6) as Senator Moynihan's service in the Senate concludes,
it is appropriate to commemorate his legacy of public service
and his commitment to thoughtful urban design in the Nation's
Capital.
(b) Designation.--The parcel of land located in the
northwest quadrant of Washington, District of Columbia, and
described in subsection (c) shall be known and designated as
``Daniel Patrick Moynihan Place''.
(c) Boundaries.--The parcel of land described in this
subsection is the portion of Woodrow Wilson Plaza (as
designated by Public Law 103-284 (108 Stat. 1448)) that is
bounded--
(1) on the west by the eastern facade of the Ronald Reagan
Building and International Trade Center;
(2) on the east by the western facade of the Ariel Rios
Building;
(3) on the north by the southern edge of the sidewalk
abutting Pennsylvania Avenue; and
(4) on the south by the line that, bisecting the atrium of
the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center,
continues east to bisect the western hemicycle of the Ariel
Rios Building.
(d) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation,
document, paper, or other record of the United States to the
parcel of land described in subsection (c) shall be deemed to
be a reference to Daniel Patrick Moynihan Place.
____
amendment no. 4285
On page 10, strike line 11 and all that follows through
page 12, line 2, and insert the following:
``(a) Prohibition.--Whoever, being an officer or employee
of the United States, a former or retired officer or employee
of the United States, any other person with authorized access
to classified information, or any other person formerly with
authorized access to classified information, knowingly and
willfully discloses, or attempts to disclose, any classified
information acquired as a result of such person's authorized
access to classified information to a person (other than an
officer or employee of the United States) who is not
authorized access to such classified information, knowing
that the person is not authorized access to such classified
information, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not
more than 3 years, or both.
``(b) Construction of Prohibition.--Nothing in this section
shall be construed to establish criminal liability for
disclosure of classified information in accordance with
applicable law to the following:
``(1) Any justice or judge of a court of the United States
established pursuant to article III of the Constitution of
the United States.
``(2) The Senate or House of Representatives, or any
committee or subcommittee thereof, or joint committee
thereof, or any member of Congress.
``(3) A person or persons acting on behalf of a foreign
power (including an international organization) if the
disclosure--
``(A) is made by an officer or employee of the United
States who has been authorized to make the disclosure; and
``(B) is within the scope of such officer's or employee's
duties.
``(4) Any other person authorized to receive the classified
information.
``(c) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) The term `authorized', in the case of access to
classified information, means having authority or permission
to have access to the classified information pursuant to the
provisions of a statute, Executive Order, regulation, or
directive of the head of any department or agency who is
empowered to classify information, an order of any United
States court, or a provision of any Resolution of the Senate
or Rule of the House of Representatives which governs release
of classified information by such House of Congress.
``(2) The term `classified information' means information
or material properly classified and clearly marked or
represented, or that the person knows or has reason to
believe has been properly classified by appropriate
authorities, pursuant to the provisions of a statute or
Executive Order, as requiring protection against unauthorized
disclosure for reasons of national security.
On page 12, strike line 21 and all that follows through
page 13, line 16, and insert the following:
``Sec. 115. (a) Requirement.--(1) The Director of Central
Intelligence shall, in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense, establish and maintain in the intelligence community
an analytic capability with responsibility for intelligence
in support of the activities of the United States relating to
unaccounted for United States personnel.
``(2) The analytic capability maintained under paragraph
(1) shall be known as the `POW/MIA analytic capability of the
intelligence community'.
``(b) Scope of Responsibility.--The responsibilities of the
analytic capability maintained under subsection (a) shall--
``(1) extend to any activities of the Federal Government
with respect to unaccounted for United States personnel after
December 31, 1999; and
``(2) include support for any department or agency of the
Federal Government engaged in such activities.
``(c) Unaccounted for United States Personnel Defined.--In
this section, the term `unaccounted for United States
personnel' means the following:
``(1) Any missing person (as that term is defined in
section 1513(1) of title 10, United States Code).
``(2) Any United States national who was killed while
engaged in activities on behalf of the United States
Government and whose remains have not been repatriated to the
United States.''.
On page 14, beginning on line 11, strike ``acting at their
direction''.
On page 14, line 13, insert ``, and at the direction of,''
after ``on behalf of''.
On page 14, line 16, strike ``Authorized Activities.--An
activity'' and insert ``Authorized Intelligence Activities.--
An intelligence activity''.
On page 14, line 18, insert ``intelligence'' before
``activity''.
On page 15, beginning on line 9, strike ``, and all
applicable Executive Orders,''.
On page 15, line 11, strike ``materials'' and insert
``material''.
On page 15, line 15, strike ``and Executive Orders''.
On page 15, line 18, strike ``or Executive Order''.
On page 15, line 22, strike ``or Executive Order''.
On page 15, strike line 25 and all that follows through
page 16, line 16, and insert the following:
(d) Effects of Certification of Non-Full Compliance.--(1)
Subject to subsection (e), effective as of January 1, 2001, a
covered element of the Department of State
On page 16, line 20, strike ``and Executive Orders''.
On page 16, strike lines 22 and 23 and insert the
following:
(2) If the prohibition in paragraph (1) takes effect in
accordance with that paragraph, the prohibition
On page 17, beginning on line 1, strike ``and Executive
Orders''.
On page 17, strike line 3 and insert the following:
(e) Waiver by Director of Central Intelligence.--(1) The
Director of Central Intelligence may
On page 17, beginning on line 4, strike ``subsection
(d)(2)'' and insert ``subsection (d)''.
On page 17, line 6, strike ``the President'' and insert
``the Director''.
On page 17, line 9, strike ``The President'' and insert
``The Director''.
On page 17, between lines 17 and 18, insert the following:
(C) The actions, if any, that will be taken to bring such
element into full compliance with the directives referred to
in subsection (a), including a schedule for completion of
such actions.
On page 17, line 18, strike ``(C) The actions taken by the
President'' and insert ``(D) The actions taken by the
Director''.
On page 17, line 20, insert before the period the
following: ``pending achievement of full compliance of such
element with such directives''.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be
read the third time and the Senate proceed to the consideration of H.R.
4392. Further, I ask unanimous consent that all after the enacting
clause be stricken and the text of S. 2507, as amended, be inserted in
lieu thereof, the bill be read the third time and passed, the Senate
insist on its amendment, request a conference with the House, and the
Chair be authorized to appoint conferees on the part of the Senate.
Finally, I ask unanimous consent that S. 2507 be placed back on the
calendar.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The bill (S. 2507), as amended, was read the third time.
The bill (H.R. 4392), as amended, was read the third time and passed,
as follows:
Resolved, That the bill from the House of Representatives
(H.R. 4392) entitled ``An Act to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2001 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.'',
do pass with the following amendment:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Community Management Account.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
[[Page S9584]]
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Prohibition on unauthorized disclosure of classified
information.
Sec. 304. POW/MIA analytic capability within the intelligence
community.
Sec. 305. Applicability to lawful United States intelligence activities
of Federal laws implementing international treaties and
agreements.
Sec. 306. Limitation on handling, retention, and storage of certain
classified materials by the Department of State.
Sec. 307. Clarification of standing of United States citizens to
challenge certain blocking of assets.
Sec. 308. Availability of certain funds for administrative costs of
Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat.
Sec. 309. Designation of Daniel Patrick Moynihan Place.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 401. Expansion of Inspector General actions requiring a report to
Congress.
Sec. 402. Subpoena authority of the Inspector General.
Sec. 403. Improvement and extension of central services program.
Sec. 404. Details of employees to the National Reconnaissance Office.
Sec. 405. Transfers of funds to other agencies for acquisition of land.
Sec. 406. Eligibility of additional employees for reimbursement for
professional liability insurance.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 501. Two-year extension of authority to engage in commercial
activities as security for intelligence collection
activities.
Sec. 502. Role of Director of Central Intelligence in experimental
personnel program for certain scientific and technical
personnel.
Sec. 503. Prohibition on transfer of imagery analysts from General
Defense Intelligence Program to National Imagery and
Mapping Agency Program.
Sec. 504. Prohibition on transfer of collection management personnel
from General Defense Intelligence Program to Community
Management Account.
Sec. 505. Authorized personnel ceiling for General Defense Intelligence
Program.
Sec. 506. Measurement and signature intelligence.
TITLE VI--COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS
Sec. 601. Short title.
Sec. 602. Orders for electronic surveillance under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
Sec. 603. Orders for physical searches under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978.
Sec. 604. Disclosure of information acquired under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for law enforcement
purposes.
Sec. 605. Coordination of counterintelligence with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.
Sec. 606. Enhancing protection of national security at the Department
of Justice.
Sec. 607. Coordination requirements relating to the prosecution of
cases involving classified information.
Sec. 608. Severability.
TITLE VII--DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ON JAPANESE IMPERIAL ARMY
Sec. 701. Short title.
Sec. 702. Establishment of Japanese Imperial Army Records Interagency
Working Group.
Sec. 703. Requirement of disclosure of records.
Sec. 704. Expedited processing of FOIA requests for Japanese Imperial
Army records.
Sec. 705. Effective date.
TITLE VIII--DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION
Sec. 801. Short title.
Sec. 802. Findings.
Sec. 803. Public Interest Declassification Board.
Sec. 804. Identification, collection, and review for declassification
of information of archival value or extraordinary public
interest.
Sec. 805. Protection of national security information and other
information.
Sec. 806. Standards and procedures.
Sec. 807. Judicial review.
Sec. 808. Funding.
Sec. 809. Definitions.
Sec. 810. Sunset.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2001.--
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2001 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(6) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
(7) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations for Certain Elements
for Fiscal Years 2002 Through 2005.--Funds are hereby
authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2002
through 2005 for the conduct in each such fiscal year of the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(3) The National Security Agency.
(4) The National Reconnaissance Office.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and
the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2001,
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the elements listed in such section, are those
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill ____
of the One Hundred Sixth Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and House of Representatives and to the President. The
President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within
the Executive Branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director
of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian
personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year
2001 under section 102 when the Director of Central
Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the
performance of important intelligence functions, except that
the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of
civilian personnel authorized under such section for such
element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of
Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives whenever the Director exercises the authority
granted by this section.
SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated for
the Community Management Account of the Director of Central
Intelligence for fiscal year 2001 the sum of $232,051,000.
(2) Availability for advanced research and development
committee.--Within the amount authorized to be appropriated
in paragraph (1), amounts identified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for
the Advanced Research and Development Committee shall remain
available until September 30, 2002.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Community Management Account of the Director of Central
Intelligence are authorized a total of 618 full-time
personnel as of September 30, 2001. Personnel serving in such
elements may be permanent employees of the Community
Management Account element or personnel detailed from other
elements of the United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there is also
authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management
Account for fiscal year 2001 such additional amounts as are
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a).
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Community Management Account as of September 30, 2001, there
is hereby authorized such additional personnel for such
elements as of that date as is specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during
fiscal year 2001, any officer or employee of the United
States or member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the
staff of an element within the Community Management Account
from another element of the United States Government shall be
detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such
officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a
nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for
the performance of temporary functions as required by the
Director of Central Intelligence.
(e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated in subsection (a), $27,000,000 shall be
available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within
such amount, funds provided for research, development, test,
and evaluation purposes shall remain available until
September 30, 2002, and funds provided for procurement
purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2003.
(2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central
Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General of the
United States funds available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General
shall utilize funds so transferred for activities of the
National Drug Intelligence Center.
(3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center may not be
[[Page S9585]]
used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
(4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the
operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 2001 the sum of $216,000,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 303. PROHIBITION ON UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
(a) In General.--Chapter 37 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating section 798A as section 798B; and
(2) by inserting after section 798 the following new
section 798A:
``Sec. 798A. Unauthorized disclosure of classified
information
``(a) Prohibition.--Whoever, being an officer or employee
of the United States, a former or retired officer or employee
of the United States, any other person with authorized access
to classified information, or any other person formerly with
authorized access to classified information, knowingly and
willfully discloses, or attempts to disclose, any classified
information acquired as a result of such person's authorized
access to classified information to a person (other than an
officer or employee of the United States) who is not
authorized access to such classified information, knowing
that the person is not authorized access to such classified
information, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not
more than 3 years, or both.
``(b) Construction of Prohibition.--Nothing in this section
shall be construed to establish criminal liability for
disclosure of classified information in accordance with
applicable law to the following:
``(1) Any justice or judge of a court of the United States
established pursuant to article III of the Constitution of
the United States.
``(2) The Senate or House of Representatives, or any
committee or subcommittee thereof, or joint committee
thereof, or any member of Congress.
``(3) A person or persons acting on behalf of a foreign
power (including an international organization) if the
disclosure--
``(A) is made by an officer or employee of the United
States who has been authorized to make the disclosure; and
``(B) is within the scope of such officer's or employee's
duties.
``(4) Any other person authorized to receive the classified
information.
``(c) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) The term `authorized', in the case of access to
classified information, means having authority or permission
to have access to the classified information pursuant to the
provisions of a statute, Executive Order, regulation, or
directive of the head of any department or agency who is
empowered to classify information, an order of any United
States court, or a provision of any Resolution of the Senate
or Rule of the House of Representatives which governs release
of classified information by such House of Congress.
``(2) The term `classified information' means information
or material properly classified and clearly marked or
represented, or that the person knows or has reason to
believe has been properly classified by appropriate
authorities, pursuant to the provisions of a statute or
Executive Order, as requiring protection against unauthorized
disclosure for reasons of national security.
``(3) The term `officer or employee of the United States'
means the following:
``(A) An officer or employee (as those terms are defined in
sections 2104 and 2105 of title 5).
``(B) An officer or enlisted member of the Armed Forces (as
those terms are defined in section 101(b) of title 10).''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of that chapter is amended by striking the item
relating to section 798A and inserting the following new
items:
``798A. Unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
``798B. Temporary extension of section 794.''.
SEC. 304. POW/MIA ANALYTIC CAPABILITY WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402
et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``pow/mia analytic capability
``Sec. 115. (a) Requirement.--(1) The Director of Central
Intelligence shall, in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense, establish and maintain in the intelligence community
an analytic capability with responsibility for intelligence
in support of the activities of the United States relating to
unaccounted for United States personnel.
``(2) The analytic capability maintained under paragraph
(1) shall be known as the `POW/MIA analytic capability of the
intelligence community'.
``(b) Scope of Responsibility.--The responsibilities of the
analytic capability maintained under subsection (a) shall--
``(1) extend to any activities of the Federal Government
with respect to unaccounted for United States personnel after
December 31, 1999; and
``(2) include support for any department or agency of the
Federal Government engaged in such activities.
``(c) Unaccounted for United States Personnel Defined.--In
this section, the term `unaccounted for United States
personnel' means the following:
``(1) Any missing person (as that term is defined in
section 1513(1) of title 10, United States Code).
``(2) Any United States national who was killed while
engaged in activities on behalf of the United States
Government and whose remains have not been repatriated to the
United States.''.
SEC. 305. APPLICABILITY TO LAWFUL UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES OF FEDERAL LAWS IMPLEMENTING
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS.
The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.)
is amended by adding at the end the following:
``TITLE X--MISCELLANEOUS
``applicability to united states intelligence activities of federal
laws implementing international treaties and agreements
``Sec. 1001. (a) In General.--No Federal law enacted on or
after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 that implements a
treaty or other international agreement shall be construed as
making unlawful an otherwise lawful and authorized
intelligence activity of the United States Government or its
employees, or any other person to the extent such other
person is carrying out such activity on behalf of, and at the
direction of, the United States, unless such Federal law
specifically addresses such intelligence activity.
``(b) Authorized Intelligence Activities.--An intelligence
activity shall be treated as authorized for purposes of
subsection (a) if the intelligence activity is authorized by
an appropriate official of the United States Government,
acting within the scope of the official duties of that
official and in compliance with Federal law and any
applicable Presidential directive.''.
SEC. 306. LIMITATION ON HANDLING, RETENTION, AND STORAGE OF
CERTAIN CLASSIFIED MATERIALS BY THE DEPARTMENT
OF STATE.
(a) Certification Regarding Full Compliance With
Requirements.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall
certify to the appropriate committees of Congress whether or
not each covered element of the Department of State is in
full compliance with all applicable directives of the
Director of Central Intelligence relating to the handling,
retention, or storage of covered classified material.
(b) Limitation on Certification.--The Director of Central
Intelligence may not certify a covered element of the
Department of State as being in full compliance with the
directives referred to in subsection (a) if the covered
element is currently subject to a waiver of compliance with
respect to any such directive.
(c) Report on Noncompliance.--Whenever the Director of
Central Intelligence determines that a covered element of the
Department of State is not in full compliance with any
directive referred to in subsection (a), the Director shall
promptly notify the appropriate committees of Congress of
such determination.
(d) Effects of Certification of Non-Full Compliance.--(1)
Subject to subsection (e), effective as of January 1, 2001, a
covered element of the Department of State may not retain or
store covered classified information unless the Director has
certified under subsection (a) as of such date that the
covered element is in full compliance with the directives
referred to in subsection (a).
(2) If the prohibition in paragraph (1) takes effect in
accordance with that paragraph, the prohibition shall remain
in effect until the date on which the Director certifies
under subsection (a) that the covered element involved is in
full compliance with the directives referred to in that
subsection.
(e) Waiver by Director of Central Intelligence.--(1) The
Director of Central Intelligence may waive the applicability
of the prohibition in subsection (d) to an element of the
Department of State otherwise covered by such prohibition if
the Director determines that the waiver is in the national
security interests of the United States.
(2) The Director shall submit to appropriate committees of
Congress a report on each exercise of the waiver authority in
paragraph (1).
(3) Each report under paragraph (2) with respect to the
exercise of authority under paragraph (1) shall set forth the
following:
(A) The covered element of the Department of State
addressed by the waiver.
(B) The reasons for the waiver.
(C) The actions, if any, that will be taken to bring such
element into full compliance with the directives referred to
in subsection (a), including a schedule for completion of
such actions.
(D) The actions taken by the Director to protect any
covered classified material to be handled, retained, or
stored by such element pending achievement of full compliance
of such element with such directives.
(f) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means
the following:
[[Page S9586]]
(A) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) The term ``covered classified material'' means any
material classified at the Sensitive Compartmented
Information (SCI) level.
(3) The term ``covered element of the Department of State''
means each element of the Department of State that handles,
retains, or stores covered classified material.
(4) The term ``material'' means any data, regardless of
physical form or characteristic, including written or printed
matter, automated information systems storage media, maps,
charts, paintings, drawings, films, photographs, engravings,
sketches, working notes, papers, reproductions of any such
things by any means or process, and sound, voice, magnetic,
or electronic recordings.
(5) The term ``Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)
level'', in the case of classified material, means a level of
classification for information in such material concerning or
derived from intelligence sources, methods, or analytical
processes that requires such information to be handled within
formal access control systems established by the Director of
Central Intelligence.
SEC. 307. CLARIFICATION OF STANDING OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS
TO CHALLENGE CERTAIN BLOCKING OF ASSETS.
The Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (title VIII
of Public Law 106-120; 113 Stat. 1626; 21 U.S.C. 1901 et
seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``SEC. 811. STANDING OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS TO CHALLENGE
BLOCKING OF ASSETS.
``No provision of this title shall be construed to prohibit
a United States citizen from raising any challenge otherwise
available to the United States citizen under subchapter II of
chapter 5 and chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code
(commonly referred to as the Administrative Procedure Act),
or any other provision of law, with respect to the blocking
of assets by the United States under this title.''.
SEC. 308. AVAILABILITY OF CERTAIN FUNDS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
COSTS OF COUNTERDRUG INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARIAT.
Notwithstanding section 1346 of title 31, United States
Code, or section 610 of the Treasury and General Government
Appropriations Act, 2000 (Public Law 106-58; 113 Stat. 467),
funds made available for fiscal year 2000 for any department
or agency of the Federal Government with authority to conduct
counterdrug intelligence activities, including counterdrug
law enforcement information-gathering activities, may be
available to finance an appropriate share of the
administrative costs incurred by the Department of Justice
for the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat
authorized by the General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan of
February 12, 2000.
SEC. 309. DESIGNATION OF DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN PLACE.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
(1) during the second half of the twentieth century,
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan promoted the importance of
architecture and urban planning in the Nation's Capital,
particularly with respect to the portion of Pennsylvania
Avenue between the White House and the United States Capitol
(referred to in this subsection as the ``Avenue'');
(2) Senator Moynihan has stressed the unique significance
of the Avenue as conceived by Pierre Charles L'Enfant to be
the ``grand axis'' of the Nation's Capital as well as a
symbolic representation of the separate yet unified branches
of the United States Government;
(3) through his service to the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal
Office Space (1961-1962), as a member of the President's
Council on Pennsylvania Avenue (1962-1964), and as vice-
chairman of the President's Temporary Commission on
Pennsylvania Avenue (1965-1969), and in his various
capacities in the executive and legislative branches, Senator
Moynihan has consistently and creatively sought to fulfill
President Kennedy's recommendation of June 1, 1962, that the
Avenue not become a ``solid phalanx of public and private
office buildings which close down completely at night and on
weekends,'' but that it be ``lively, friendly, and inviting,
as well as dignified and impressive'';
(4)(A) Senator Moynihan helped draft a Federal
architectural policy, known as the ``Guiding Principles for
Federal Architecture,'' that recommends a choice of designs
that are ``efficient and economical'' and that provide
``visual testimony to the dignity, enterprise, vigor, and
stability'' of the United States Government; and
(B) the Guiding Principles for Federal Architecture further
state that the ``development of an official style must be
avoided. Design must flow from the architectural profession
to the Government, and not vice versa.'';
(5) Senator Moynihan has encouraged--
(A) the construction of new buildings along the Avenue,
such as the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade
Center; and
(B) the establishment of an academic institution along the
Avenue, namely the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, a living memorial to President Wilson; and
(6) as Senator Moynihan's service in the Senate concludes,
it is appropriate to commemorate his legacy of public service
and his commitment to thoughtful urban design in the Nation's
Capital.
(b) Designation.--The parcel of land located in the
northwest quadrant of Washington, District of Columbia, and
described in subsection (c) shall be known and designated as
``Daniel Patrick Moynihan Place''.
(c) Boundaries.--The parcel of land described in this
subsection is the portion of Woodrow Wilson Plaza (as
designated by Public Law 103-284 (108 Stat. 1448)) that is
bounded--
(1) on the west by the eastern facade of the Ronald Reagan
Building and International Trade Center;
(2) on the east by the western facade of the Ariel Rios
Building;
(3) on the north by the southern edge of the sidewalk
abutting Pennsylvania Avenue; and
(4) on the south by the line that, bisecting the atrium of
the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center,
continues east to bisect the western hemicycle of the Ariel
Rios Building.
(d) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation,
document, paper, or other record of the United States to the
parcel of land described in subsection (c) shall be deemed to
be a reference to Daniel Patrick Moynihan Place.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. EXPANSION OF INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIONS REQUIRING A
REPORT TO CONGRESS.
Section 17(d)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(3)) is amended by striking all that
follows after subparagraph (A) and inserting the following:
``(B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried out by
the Inspector General should focus on any current or former
Agency official who--
``(i) holds or held a position in the Agency that is
subject to appointment by the President, by and with the
advise and consent of the Senate, including such a position
held on an acting basis; or
``(ii) holds or held the position in the Agency, including
such a position held on an acting basis, of--
``(I) Executive Director;
``(II) Deputy Director for Operations;
``(III) Deputy Director for Intelligence;
``(IV) Deputy Director for Administration; or
``(V) Deputy Director for Science and Technology;
``(C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General
to the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by
a current or former Agency official described or referred to
in subparagraph (B);
``(D) the Inspector General becomes aware of the possible
criminal conduct of a current or former Agency official
described or referred to in subparagraph (B) through a means
other than an investigation, inspection, or audit and such
conduct is not referred to the Department of Justice; or
``(E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible
alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary
information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or
audit,
the Inspector General shall immediately submit a report on
such matter to the intelligence committees.''.
SEC. 402. SUBPOENA AUTHORITY OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL.
(a) Clarification Regarding Reports on Exercise of
Authority.--Section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act
of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended--
(1) in subsection (d)(1), by striking subparagraph (E) and
inserting the following new subparagraph (E):
``(E) a description of the exercise of the subpoena
authority under subsection (e)(5) by the Inspector General
during the reporting period; and''; and
(2) in subsection (e)(5), by striking subparagraph (E).
(b) Scope of Authority.--Subsection (e)(5)(B) of that
section is amended by striking ``Government'' and inserting
``Federal''.
SEC. 403. IMPROVEMENT AND EXTENSION OF CENTRAL SERVICES
PROGRAM.
(a) Deposits in Central Services Working Capital Fund.--
Subsection (c)(2) of section 21 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403u) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as subparagraph (H);
and
(2) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following new
subparagraphs:
``(F) Receipts from individuals in reimbursement for
utility services and meals provided under the program.
``(G) Receipts from individuals for the rental of property
and equipment under the program.''.
(b) Clarification of Costs Recoverable Under Program.--
Subsection (e)(1) of that section is amended in the second
sentence by inserting ``other than structures owned by the
Agency'' after ``depreciation of plant and equipment''.
(c) Financial Statements of Program.--Subsection (g)(2) of
that section is amended in the first sentence by striking
``annual audits under paragraph (1)'' and inserting the
following: ``financial statements to be prepared with respect
to the program. Office of Management and Budget guidance
shall also determine the procedures for conducting annual
audits under paragraph (1).''.
(d) Extension of Program.--Subsection (h)(1) of that
section is amended by striking ``March 31, 2002'' and
inserting ``March 31, 2005''.
SEC. 404. DETAILS OF EMPLOYEES TO THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE
OFFICE.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a
et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``details of employees
``Sec. 22. The Director may--
``(1) detail any personnel of the Agency on a reimbursable
basis indefinitely to the National Reconnaissance Office
without regard to any limitation under law on the duration of
details of Federal government personnel; and
[[Page S9587]]
``(2) hire personnel for the purpose of details under
paragraph (1).''.
SEC. 405. TRANSFERS OF FUNDS TO OTHER AGENCIES FOR
ACQUISITION OF LAND.
(a) In General.--Section 8 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403j) is amended by adding at
the end the following new subsection:
``(c) Transfers for Acquisition of Land.--(1) Sums
appropriated or otherwise made available to the Agency for
the acquisition of land that are transferred to another
department or agency for that purpose shall remain available
for 3 years.
``(2) The Director shall submit to the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives an annual
report on the transfers of sums described in paragraph
(1).''.
(b) Conforming Stylistic Amendments.--That section is
further amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``In General.--'' after
``(a)''; and
(2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``Scope of Authority
For Expenditure.--'' after ``(b)''.
(c) Applicability.--Subsection (c) of section 8 of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as added by
subsection (a) of this section, shall apply with respect to
amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the
Central Intelligence Agency for fiscal years after fiscal
year 2000.
SEC. 406. ELIGIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL EMPLOYEES FOR
REIMBURSEMENT FOR PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any provision of section
363 of the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government
Appropriations Act, 1997 (5 U.S.C. prec. 5941 note), the
Director of Central Intelligence may--
(1) designate as qualified employees within the meaning of
subsection (b) of that section appropriate categories of
employees not otherwise covered by that subsection; and
(2) use appropriated funds available to the Director to
reimburse employees within categories so designated for one-
half of the costs incurred by such employees for professional
liability insurance in accordance with subsection (a) of that
section.
(b) Reports.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall
submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
and the Permanent Select Committee of Intelligence of the
House of Representatives a report on each designation of a
category of employees under paragraph (1) of subsection (a),
including the approximate number of employees covered by such
designation and an estimate of the amount to be expended on
reimbursement of such employees under paragraph (2) of that
subsection.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 501. TWO-YEAR EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES AS SECURITY FOR
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES.
Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended
in the second sentence by striking ``December 31, 2000'' and
inserting ``December 31, 2002''.
SEC. 502. ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN
EXPERIMENTAL PERSONNEL PROGRAM FOR CERTAIN
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL.
If the Director of Central Intelligence requests that the
Secretary of Defense exercise any authority available to the
Secretary under section 1101(b) of the Strom Thurmond
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999
(Public Law 105-261; 5 U.S.C. 3104 note) to carry out a
program of special personnel management authority at the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency and the National Security
Agency in order to facilitate recruitment of eminent experts
in science and engineering at such agencies, the Secretary
shall respond to such request not later than 30 days after
the date of such request.
SEC. 503. PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF IMAGERY ANALYSTS FROM
GENERAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM TO
NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY PROGRAM.
(a) Prohibition on Use of Funds For Transfer.--No funds
authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be transferred
from the General Defense Intelligence Program to the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency Program for purposes of
transferring imagery analysis personnel from the General
Defense Intelligence Program to the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency Program.
(b) Role of Director of NIMA as Functional Manager for
Imagery and Geospacial Programs.--(1) The Secretary of
Defense shall, in consultation with the Director of Central
Intelligence, review options for strengthening the role of
the Director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency as
the functional manager for United States imagery and
geospacial programs.
(2) Not later than March 15, 2001, the Secretary shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on
the review required by subsection (b). The report shall
include any recommendations regarding modifications in the
role and duties of the Director of the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency that the Secretary considers appropriate in
light of the review.
(3) In this subsection, the term ``appropriate committees
of Congress'' means the following:
(A) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(B) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
SEC. 504. PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF COLLECTION MANAGEMENT
PERSONNEL FROM GENERAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
PROGRAM TO COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be
transferred from the General Defense Intelligence Program to
the Community Management Account for purposes of transferring
intelligence collection management personnel.
SEC. 505. AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL CEILING FOR GENERAL DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
The authorized personnel ceiling for the General Defense
Intelligence Program specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in section 102 is hereby increased
by 2,152 positions.
SEC. 506. MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURE INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Study of Options.--The Director of Central Intelligence
shall, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, conduct
a study of the utility and feasibility of various options for
improving the management and organization of measurement and
signature intelligence, including--
(1) the option of establishing a centralized tasking,
processing, exploitation, and dissemination facility for
measurement and signature intelligence;
(2) options for recapitalizing and reconfiguring the
current systems for measurement and signature intelligence;
and
(3) the operation and maintenance costs of the various
options.
(b) Report.--Not later than April 1, 2001, the Director and
the Secretary shall jointly submit to the appropriate
committees of Congress a report on their findings as a result
of the study required by subsection (a). The report shall set
forth any recommendations that the Director and the Secretary
consider appropriate.
(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means the following:
(1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
TITLE VI--COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS
SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Counterintelligence Reform
Act of 2000''.
SEC. 602. ORDERS FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE UNDER THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.
(a) Requirements Regarding Certain Applications.--Section
104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1804) is amended by adding at the end the following
new subsection:
``(e)(1)(A) Upon written request of the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of State, or the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Attorney General shall personally review
under subsection (a) an application under that subsection for
a target described in section 101(b)(2).
``(B) Except when disabled or otherwise unavailable to make
a request referred to in subparagraph (A), an official
referred to in that subparagraph may not delegate the
authority to make a request referred to in that subparagraph.
``(C) Each official referred to in subparagraph (A) with
authority to make a request under that subparagraph shall
take appropriate actions in advance to ensure that delegation
of such authority is clearly established in the event such
official is disabled or otherwise unavailable to make such
request.
``(2)(A) If as a result of a request under paragraph (1)
the Attorney General determines not to approve an application
under the second sentence of subsection (a) for purposes of
making the application under this section, the Attorney
General shall provide written notice of the determination to
the official making the request for the review of the
application under that paragraph. Except when disabled or
otherwise unavailable to make a determination under the
preceding sentence, the Attorney General may not delegate the
responsibility to make a determination under that sentence.
The Attorney General shall take appropriate actions in
advance to ensure that delegation of such responsibility is
clearly established in the event the Attorney General is
disabled or otherwise unavailable to make such determination.
``(B) Notice with respect to an application under
subparagraph (A) shall set forth the modifications, if any,
of the application that are necessary in order for the
Attorney General to approve the application under the second
sentence of subsection (a) for purposes of making the
application under this section.
``(C) Upon review of any modifications of an application
set forth under subparagraph (B), the official notified of
the modifications under this paragraph shall modify the
application if such official determines that such
modification is warranted. Such official shall supervise the
making of any modification under this subparagraph. Except
when disabled or otherwise unavailable to supervise the
making of any modification under the preceding sentence, such
official may not delegate the responsibility to supervise the
making of any modification under that preceding sentence.
Each such official shall take appropriate actions in advance
to ensure that delegation of such responsibility is clearly
established in the event such official is disabled or
otherwise unavailable to supervise the making of such
modification.''.
(b) Probable Cause.--Section 105 of that Act (50 U.S.C.
1805) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), (d), (e), (f),
and (g) as subsections (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h),
respectively;
[[Page S9588]]
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new
subsection (b):
``(b) In determining whether or not probable cause exists
for purposes of an order under subsection (a)(3), a judge may
consider past activities of the target, as well as facts and
circumstances relating to current or future activities of the
target.''; and
(3) in subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (1), by
striking ``subsection (b)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection
(c)(1)''.
SEC. 603. ORDERS FOR PHYSICAL SEARCHES UNDER THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.
(a) Requirements Regarding Certain Applications.--Section
303 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1823) is amended by adding at the end the following
new subsection:
``(d)(1)(A) Upon written request of the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of State, or the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Attorney General shall personally review
under subsection (a) an application under that subsection for
a target described in section 101(b)(2).
``(B) Except when disabled or otherwise unavailable to make
a request referred to in subparagraph (A), an official
referred to in that subparagraph may not delegate the
authority to make a request referred to in that subparagraph.
``(C) Each official referred to in subparagraph (A) with
authority to make a request under that subparagraph shall
take appropriate actions in advance to ensure that delegation
of such authority is clearly established in the event such
official is disabled or otherwise unavailable to make such
request.
``(2)(A) If as a result of a request under paragraph (1)
the Attorney General determines not to approve an application
under the second sentence of subsection (a) for purposes of
making the application under this section, the Attorney
General shall provide written notice of the determination to
the official making the request for the review of the
application under that paragraph. Except when disabled or
otherwise unavailable to make a determination under the
preceding sentence, the Attorney General may not delegate the
responsibility to make a determination under that sentence.
The Attorney General shall take appropriate actions in
advance to ensure that delegation of such responsibility is
clearly established in the event the Attorney General is
disabled or otherwise unavailable to make such determination.
``(B) Notice with respect to an application under
subparagraph (A) shall set forth the modifications, if any,
of the application that are necessary in order for the
Attorney General to approve the application under the second
sentence of subsection (a) for purposes of making the
application under this section.
``(C) Upon review of any modifications of an application
set forth under subparagraph (B), the official notified of
the modifications under this paragraph shall modify the
application if such official determines that such
modification is warranted. Such official shall supervise the
making of any modification under this subparagraph. Except
when disabled or otherwise unavailable to supervise the
making of any modification under the preceding sentence, such
official may not delegate the responsibility to supervise the
making of any modification under that preceding sentence.
Each such official shall take appropriate actions in advance
to ensure that delegation of such responsibility is clearly
established in the event such official is disabled or
otherwise unavailable to supervise the making of such
modification.''.
(b) Probable Cause.--Section 304 of that Act (50 U.S.C.
1824) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) as
subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new
subsection (b):
``(b) In determining whether or not probable cause exists
for purposes of an order under subsection (a)(3), a judge may
consider past activities of the target, as well as facts and
circumstances relating to current or future activities of the
target.''.
SEC. 604. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED UNDER THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES.
(a) Inclusion of Information on Disclosure in Semiannual
Oversight Report.--Section 108(a) of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1808(a)) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) Each report under the first sentence of paragraph (1)
shall include a description of--
``(A) each criminal case in which information acquired
under this Act has been passed for law enforcement purposes
during the period covered by such report; and
``(B) each criminal case in which information acquired
under this Act has been authorized for use at trial during
such reporting period.''.
(b) Report on Mechanisms for Determinations of Disclosure
of Information for Law Enforcement Purposes.--(1) The
Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress a report on the authorities and procedures
utilized by the Department of Justice for determining whether
or not to disclose information acquired under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et
seq.) for law enforcement purposes.
(2) In this subsection, the term ``appropriate committees
of Congress'' means the following:
(A) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee
on the Judiciary of the Senate.
(B) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 605. COORDINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WITH THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
(a) Treatment of Certain Subjects of Investigation.--
Subsection (c) of section 811 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. 402a) is
amended--
(1) in paragraphs (1) and (2), by striking ``paragraph
(3)'' and inserting ``paragraph (5)'';
(2) by redesignating paragraphs (3), (4), (5), and (6) as
paragraphs (5), (6), (7), and (8), respectively;
(3) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new
paragraph (3):
``(3)(A) The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall submit to the head of the department or
agency concerned a written assessment of the potential impact
of the actions of the department or agency on a
counterintelligence investigation.
``(B) The head of the department or agency concerned
shall--
``(i) use an assessment under subparagraph (A) as an aid in
determining whether, and under what circumstances, the
subject of an investigation under paragraph (1) should be
left in place for investigative purposes; and
``(ii) notify in writing the Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation of such determination.
``(C) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the head of the department or agency concerned shall
continue to consult, as appropriate, to review the status of
an investigation covered by this paragraph and to reassess,
as appropriate, a determination of the head of the department
or agency concerned to leave a subject in place for
investigative purposes.''; and
(4) in paragraph (5), as so redesignated, by striking
``paragraph (1) or (2)'' and inserting ``paragraph (1), (2),
or (3)''.
(b) Timely Provision of Information and Consultation on
Espionage Investigations.--Paragraph (2) of that subsection
is further amended--
(1) by inserting ``in a timely manner'' after ``through
appropriate channels''; and
(2) by inserting ``in a timely manner'' after ``are
consulted''.
(c) Interference With Full Field Espionage
Investigations.--That subsection is further amended by
inserting after paragraph (3), as amended by subsection (a)
of this section, the following new paragraph (4):
``(4)(A) The Federal Bureau of Investigation shall notify
appropriate officials within the executive branch, including
the head of the department or agency concerned, of the
commencement of a full field espionage investigation with
respect to an employee within the executive branch.
``(B)(i) A department or agency may not conduct a polygraph
examination, interrogate, or otherwise take any action that
is likely to alert an employee covered by a notice under
subparagraph (A) of an investigation described in that
subparagraph without prior coordination with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
``(ii) Any examination, interrogation, or other action
taken under clause (i) shall be taken in consultation with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.''.
SEC. 606. ENHANCING PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY AT THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.
(a) Authorization for Increased Resources To Fulfill
National Security Mission of the Department of Justice.--
There are authorized to be appropriated to the Department of
Justice for the activities of the Office of Intelligence
Policy and Review to help meet the increased personnel
demands to combat terrorism, process applications to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, participate
effectively in counter-espionage investigations, provide
policy analysis on national security issues, and enhance
secure computer and telecommunications facilities--
(1) $7,000,000 for fiscal year 2001;
(2) $7,500,000 for fiscal year 2002; and
(3) $8,000,000 for fiscal year 2003.
(b) Availability of Funds.--(1) No funds authorized to be
appropriated by subsection (a) for the Office of Intelligence
Policy and Review may be obligated or expended until the
later of the dates on which the Attorney General submits the
reports required by paragraphs (2) and (3).
(2)(A) The Attorney General shall submit to the committees
of Congress specified in subparagraph (B) a report on the
manner in which the funds authorized to be appropriated by
subsection (a) for the Office of Intelligence Policy and
Review will be used by that Office--
(i) to improve and strengthen its oversight of Federal
Bureau of Investigation field offices in the implementation
of orders under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.); and
(ii) to streamline and increase the efficiency of the
application process under that Act.
(B) The committees of Congress referred to in this
subparagraph are the following:
(i) The Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee
on the Judiciary of the Senate.
(ii) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
(3) In addition to the report required by paragraph (2),
the Attorney General shall also submit to the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives a report that addresses the issues identified
in the semiannual report of the Attorney General to such
committees under section 108(a) of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1808(a)) that was
submitted in April 2000, including any corrective actions
with regard to
[[Page S9589]]
such issues. The report under this paragraph shall be
submitted in classified form.
(4) Funds made available pursuant to subsection (a), in any
fiscal year, shall remain available until expended.
(c) Report on Coordinating National Security and
Intelligence Functions Within the Department of Justice.--The
Attorney General shall report to the Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives
within 120 days on actions that have been or will be taken by
the Department to--
(1) promote quick and efficient responses to national
security issues;
(2) centralize a point-of-contact within the Department on
national security matters for external entities and agencies;
and
(3) coordinate the dissemination of intelligence
information within the appropriate components of the
Department and the formulation of policy on national security
issues.
SEC. 607. COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO THE
PROSECUTION OF CASES INVOLVING CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION.
The Classified Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C. App.)
is amended by inserting after section 9 the following new
section:
``coordination requirements relating to the prosecution of cases
involving classified information
``Sec. 9A. (a) Briefings Required.--The Assistant Attorney
General for the Criminal Division and the appropriate United
States Attorney, or the designees of such officials, shall
provide briefings to the senior agency official, or the
designee of such official, with respect to any case involving
classified information that originated in the agency of such
senior agency official.
``(b) Timing of Briefings.--Briefings under subsection (a)
with respect to a case shall occur--
``(1) as soon as practicable after the Department of
Justice and the United States Attorney concerned determine
that a prosecution or potential prosecution could result; and
``(2) at such other times thereafter as are necessary to
keep the senior agency official concerned fully and currently
informed of the status of the prosecution.
``(c) Senior Agency Official Defined.--In this section, the
term `senior agency official' has the meaning given that term
in section 1.1 of Executive Order No. 12958.''.
SEC. 608. SEVERABILITY.
If any provision of this title (including an amendment made
by this title), or the application thereof, to any person or
circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this title
(including the amendments made by this title), and the
application thereof, to other persons or circumstances shall
not be affected thereby.
TITLE VII--DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ON JAPANESE IMPERIAL ARMY
SEC. 701. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Japanese Imperial Army
Disclosure Act''.
SEC. 702. ESTABLISHMENT OF JAPANESE IMPERIAL ARMY RECORDS
INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' has the meaning given such
term under section 551 of title 5, United States Code.
(2) Interagency group.--The term ``Interagency Group''
means the Japanese Imperial Army Records Interagency Working
Group established under subsection (b).
(3) Japanese imperial army records.--The term ``Japanese
Imperial Army records'' means classified records or portions
of records that pertain to any person with respect to whom
the United States Government, in its sole discretion, has
grounds to believe ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise
participated in the experimentation and persecution of any
person because of race, religion, national origin, or
political option, during the period beginning September 18,
1931, and ending on December 31, 1948, under the direction
of, or in association with--
(A) the Japanese Imperial Army;
(B) any government in any area occupied by the military
forces of the Japanese Imperial Army;
(C) any government established with the assistance or
cooperation of the Japanese Imperial Army; or
(D) any government which was an ally of the Imperial Army
of Japan.
(4) Record.--The term ``record'' means a Japanese Imperial
Army record.
(b) Establishment of Interagency Group.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish the
Japanese Imperial Army Records Interagency Working Group,
which shall remain in existence for 3 years after the date
the Interagency Group is established.
(2) Membership.--The President shall appoint to the
Interagency Group individuals whom the President determines
will most completely and effectively carry out the functions
of the Interagency Group within the time limitations provided
in this section, including the Historian of the Department of
State, the Archivist of the United States, the head of any
other agency the President considers appropriate, and no more
than 3 other persons. The head of an agency appointed by the
President may designate an appropriate officer to serve on
the Interagency Group in lieu of the head of such agency.
(3) Initial meeting.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Interagency Group shall
hold an initial meeting and begin the functions required
under this section.
(c) Functions.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Interagency Group shall, to the
greatest extent possible consistent with section 703--
(1) locate, identify, inventory, recommend for
declassification, and make available to the public at the
National Archives and Records Administration, all classified
Japanese Imperial Army records of the United States;
(2) coordinate with agencies and take such actions as
necessary to expedite the release of such records to the
public; and
(3) submit a report to Congress, including the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight of the House of
Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives, and the Committee on the Judiciary
of the Senate, describing all such records, the disposition
of such records, and the activities of the Interagency Group
and agencies under this section.
(d) Funding.--There is authorized to be appropriated such
sum as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
title.
SEC. 703. REQUIREMENT OF DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS.
(a) Release of Records.--Subject to subsections (b), (c),
and (d), the Japanese Imperial Army Records Interagency
Working Group shall release in their entirety Japanese
Imperial Army records.
(b) Exception for Privacy.--An agency head may exempt from
release under subsection (a) specific information, that
would--
(1) constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy;
(2) reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or
reveal information about the application of an intelligence
source or method, or reveal the identity of a human
intelligence source when the unauthorized disclosure of that
source would clearly and demonstrably damage the national
security interests of the United States;
(3) reveal information that would assist in the development
or use of weapons of mass destruction;
(4) reveal information that would impair United States
cryptologic systems or activities;
(5) reveal information that would impair the application of
state-of-the-art technology within a United States weapon
system;
(6) reveal actual United States military war plans that
remain in effect;
(7) reveal information that would seriously and
demonstrably impair relations between the United States and a
foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably undermine
ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States;
(8) reveal information that would clearly, and demonstrably
impair the current ability of United States Government
officials to protect the President, Vice President, and other
officials for whom protection services are authorized in the
interest of national security;
(9) reveal information that would seriously and
demonstrably impair current national security emergency
preparedness plans; or
(10) violate a treaty or other international agreement.
(c) Applications of Exemptions.--
(1) In general.--In applying the exemptions provided in
paragraphs (2) through (10) of subsection (b), there shall be
a presumption that the public interest will be served by
disclosure and release of the records of the Japanese
Imperial Army. The exemption may be asserted only when the
head of the agency that maintains the records determines that
disclosure and release would be harmful to a specific
interest identified in the exemption. An agency head who
makes such a determination shall promptly report it to the
committees of Congress with appropriate jurisdiction,
including the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2) Application of title 5.--A determination by an agency
head to apply an exemption provided in paragraphs (2) through
(9) of subsection (b) shall be subject to the same standard
of review that applies in the case of records withheld under
section 552(b)(1) of title 5, United States Code.
(d) Limitation on Exemptions.--
(1) In general.--The exemptions set forth in subsection (b)
shall constitute the only grounds pursuant to which an agency
head may exempt records otherwise subject to release under
subsection (a).
(2) Records related to investigation or prosecutions.--This
section shall not apply to records--
(A) related to or supporting any active or inactive
investigation, inquiry, or prosecution by the Office of
Special Investigations of the Department of Justice; or
(B) solely in the possession, custody, or control of the
Office of Special Investigations.
SEC. 704. EXPEDITED PROCESSING OF FOIA REQUESTS FOR JAPANESE
IMPERIAL ARMY RECORDS.
For purposes of expedited processing under section
552(a)(6)(E) of title 5, United States Code, any person who
was persecuted in the manner described in section 702(a)(3)
and who requests a Japanese Imperial Army record shall be
deemed to have a compelling need for such record.
SEC. 705. EFFECTIVE DATE.
The provisions of this title shall take effect on the date
that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
TITLE VIII--DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION
SEC. 801. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Public Interest
Declassification Act of 2000''.
SEC. 802. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
[[Page S9590]]
(1) It is in the national interest to establish an
effective, coordinated, and cost-effective means by which
records on specific subjects of extraordinary public interest
that do not undermine the national security interests of the
United States may be collected, retained, reviewed, and
disseminated to Congress, policymakers in the executive
branch, and the public.
(2) Ensuring, through such measures, public access to
information that does not require continued protection to
maintain the national security interests of the United States
is a key to striking the balance between secrecy essential to
national security and the openness that is central to the
proper functioning of the political institutions of the
United States.
SEC. 803. PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD.
(a) Establishment.--There is established within the
executive branch of the United States a board to be known as
the ``Public Interest Declassification Board'' (in this title
referred to as the ``Board'').
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of the Board are as follows:
(1) To advise the President, the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, and such other executive branch
officials as the Board considers appropriate on the
systematic, thorough, coordinated, and comprehensive
identification, collection, review for declassification, and
release to Congress, interested agencies, and the public of
declassified records and materials (including donated
historical materials) that are of archival value, including
records and materials of extraordinary public interest.
(2) To promote the fullest possible public access to a
thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record of
significant United States national security decisions and
significant United States national security activities in
order to--
(A) support the oversight and legislative functions of
Congress;
(B) support the policymaking role of the executive branch;
(C) respond to the interest of the public in national
security matters; and
(D) promote reliable historical analysis and new avenues of
historical study in national security matters.
(3) To provide recommendations to the President for the
identification, collection, and review for declassification
of information of extraordinary public interest that does not
undermine the national security of the United States, to be
undertaken in accordance with a declassification program that
has been established or may be established by the President
by Executive Order.
(4) To advise the President, the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, and such other executive branch
officials as the Board considers appropriate on policies
deriving from the issuance by the President of Executive
Orders regarding the classification and declassification of
national security information.
(c) Membership.--(1) The Board shall be composed of nine
individuals appointed from among citizens of the United
States who are preeminent in the fields of history, national
security, foreign policy, intelligence policy, social
science, law, or archives, including individuals who have
served in Congress or otherwise in the Federal Government or
have otherwise engaged in research, scholarship, or
publication in such fields on matters relating to the
national security of the United States, of whom--
(A) five shall be appointed by the President;
(B) one shall be appointed by the Majority Leader of the
Senate;
(C) one shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of the
Senate;
(D) one shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives; and
(E) one shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of the
House of Representatives.
(2)(A) Of the members initially appointed to the Board,
three shall be appointed for a term of four years, three
shall be appointed for a term of three years, and three shall
be appointed for a term of two years.
(B) Any subsequent appointment to the Board shall be for a
term of three years.
(3) A vacancy in the Board shall be filled in the same
manner as the original appointment. A member of the Board
appointed to fill a vacancy before the expiration of a term
shall serve for the remainder of the term.
(4) A member of the Board may be appointed to a new term on
the Board upon the expiration of the member's term on the
Board, except that no member may serve more than three full
terms on the Board.
(d) Chairperson; Executive Secretary.--(1)(A) The President
shall designate one of the members of the Board as the
Chairperson of the Board.
(B) The term of service as Chairperson of the Board shall
be two years.
(C) A member serving as Chairperson of the Board may be re-
designated as Chairperson of the Board upon the expiration of
the member's term as Chairperson of the Board, except that no
member shall serve as Chairperson of the Board for more than
six years.
(2) The Director of the Information Security Oversight
Office shall serve as the Executive Secretary of the Board.
(e) Meetings.--The Board shall meet as needed to accomplish
its mission, consistent with the availability of funds. A
majority of the members of the Board shall constitute a
quorum.
(f) Staff.--Any employee of the Federal Government may be
detailed to the Board, with the agreement of and without
reimbursement to the detailing agency, and such detail shall
be without interruption or loss of civil, military, or
foreign service status or privilege.
(g) Security.--(1) The members and staff of the Board
shall, as a condition of appointment to or employment with
the Board, hold appropriate security clearances for access to
the classified records and materials to be reviewed by the
Board or its staff, and shall follow the guidance and
practices on security under applicable Executive Orders and
agency directives.
(2) The head of an agency shall, as a condition of granting
access to a member of the Board, the Executive Secretary of
the Board, or a member of the staff of the Board to
classified records or materials of the agency under this
title, require the member, the Executive Secretary, or the
member of the staff, as the case may be, to--
(A) execute an agreement regarding the security of such
records or materials that is approved by the head of the
agency; and
(B) hold an appropriate security clearance granted or
recognized under the standard procedures and eligibility
criteria of the agency, including any special access approval
required for access to such records or materials.
(3) The members of the Board, the Executive Secretary of
the Board, and the members of the staff of the Board may not
use any information acquired in the course of their official
activities on the Board for nonofficial purposes.
(4) For purposes of any law or regulation governing access
to classified information that pertains to the national
security of the United States, and subject to any limitations
on access arising under section 806(b), and to facilitate the
advisory functions of the Board under this title, a member of
the Board seeking access to a record or material under this
title shall be deemed for purposes of this subsection to have
a need to know the contents of the record or material.
(h) Compensation.--(1) Each member of the Board shall
receive compensation at a rate not to exceed the daily
equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay payable for
positions at ES-1 of the Senior Executive Service under
section 5382 of title 5, United States Code, for each day
such member is engaged in the actual performance of duties of
the Board.
(2) Members of the Board shall be allowed travel expenses,
including per diem in lieu of subsistence at rates authorized
for employees of agencies under subchapter of chapter 57 of
title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or
regular places of business in the performance of the duties
of the Board.
(i) Guidance; Annual Budget.--(1) On behalf of the
President, the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs shall provide guidance on policy to the
Board.
(2) The Executive Secretary of the Board, under the
direction of the Chairperson of the Board and the Board, and
acting in consultation with the Archivist of the United
States, the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, and the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, shall prepare the annual budget of the Board.
(j) Support.--The Information Security Oversight Office may
support the activities of the Board under this title. Such
support shall be provided on a reimbursable basis.
(k) Public Availability of Records and Reports.--(1) The
Board shall make available for public inspection records of
its proceedings and reports prepared in the course of its
activities under this title to the extent such records and
reports are not classified and would not be exempt from
release under the provisions of section 552 of title 5,
United States Code.
(2) In making records and reports available under paragraph
(1), the Board shall coordinate the release of such records
and reports with appropriate officials from agencies with
expertise in classified information in order to ensure that
such records and reports do not inadvertently contain
classified information.
(l) Applicability of Certain Administrative Laws.--The
provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C.
App.) shall not apply to the activities of the Board under
this title. However, the records of the Board shall be
governed by the provisions of the Federal Records Act of
1950.
SEC. 804. IDENTIFICATION, COLLECTION, AND REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION OF ARCHIVAL
VALUE OR EXTRAORDINARY PUBLIC INTEREST.
(a) Briefings on Agency Declassification Programs.--(1) As
requested by the Board, or by the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate or the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, the head of
any agency with the authority under an Executive Order to
classify information shall provide to the Board, the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, or the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives, on an annual basis, a summary briefing and
report on such agency's progress and plans in the
declassification of national security information. Such
briefing shall cover the declassification goals set by
statute, regulation, or policy, the agency's progress with
respect to such goals, and the agency's planned goals and
priorities for its declassification activities over the next
two fiscal years. Agency briefings and reports shall give
particular attention to progress on the declassification of
records and materials that are of archival value or
extraordinary public interest to the people of the United
States.
(2)(A) The annual briefing and report under paragraph (1)
for agencies within the Department of Defense, including the
military departments, and the elements of the intelligence
community shall be provided on a consolidated basis.
(B) In this paragraph, the term ``elements of the
intelligence community'' means the elements of the
intelligence community specified or designated under section
3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
401a(4)).
[[Page S9591]]
(b) Recommendations on Agency Declassification Programs.--
(1) Upon reviewing and discussing declassification plans and
progress with an agency, the Board shall provide to the head
of the agency the written recommendations of the Board as to
how the agency's declassification program could be improved.
A copy of each recommendation shall also be submitted to the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.
(2) Consistent with the provisions of section 803(k), the
Board's recommendations to the head of an agency under
paragraph (1) shall become public 60 days after such
recommendations are sent to the head of the agency under that
paragraph.
(c) Recommendations on Special Searches for Records of
Extraordinary Public Interest.--(1) The Board shall also make
recommendations to the President regarding proposed
initiatives to identify, collect, and review for
declassification classified records and materials of
extraordinary public interest.
(2) In making recommendations under paragraph (1), the
Board shall consider the following:
(A) The opinions and requests of Members of Congress,
including opinions and requests expressed or embodied in
letters or legislative proposals.
(B) The opinions and requests of the National Security
Council, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the heads
of other agencies.
(C) The opinions of United States citizens.
(D) The opinions of members of the Board.
(E) The impact of special searches on systematic and all
other on-going declassification programs.
(F) The costs (including budgetary costs) and the impact
that complying with the recommendations would have on agency
budgets, programs, and operations.
(G) The benefits of the recommendations.
(H) The impact of compliance with the recommendations on
the national security of the United States.
(d) President's Declassification Priorities.--(1)
Concurrent with the submission to Congress of the budget of
the President each fiscal year under section 1105 of title
31, United States Code, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget shall publish a description of the
President's declassification program and priorities, together
with a listing of the funds requested to implement that
program.
(2) Nothing in this title shall be construed to substitute
or supersede, or establish a funding process for, any
declassification program that has been established or may be
established by the President by Executive Order.
SEC. 805. PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND
OTHER INFORMATION.
(a) In General.--Nothing in this title shall be construed
to limit the authority of the head of an agency to classify
information or to continue the classification of information
previously classified by an agency.
(b) Special Access Programs.--Nothing in this title shall
be construed to limit the authority of the head of an agency
to grant or deny access to a special access program.
(c) Authorities of Director of Central Intelligence.--
Nothing in this title shall be construed to limit the
authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence as the
head of the intelligence community, including the Director's
responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure as required by section 103(c)(6)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6)).
(d) Exemptions to Release of Information.--Nothing in this
title shall be construed to limit any exemption or exception
to the release to the public under this title of information
that is protected under section 552(b) of title 5, United
States Code (commonly referred to as the ``Freedom of
Information Act''), or section 552a of title 5, United States
Code (commonly referred to as the ``Privacy Act'').
(e) Withholding Information From Congress.--Nothing in this
title shall be construed to authorize the withholding of
information from Congress.
SEC. 806. STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES.
(a) Liaison.--(1) The head of each agency with the
authority under an Executive Order to classify information
and the head of each Federal Presidential library shall
designate an employee of such agency or library, as the case
may be, to act as liaison to the Board for purposes of this
title.
(2) The Board may establish liaison and otherwise consult
with such other historical and advisory committees as the
Board considers appropriate for purposes of this title.
(b) Limitations on Access.--(1)(A) Except as provided in
paragraph (2), if the head of an agency or the head of a
Federal Presidential library determines it necessary to deny
or restrict access of the Board, or of the agency or library
liaison to the Board, to information contained in a record or
material, in whole or in part, the head of the agency or the
head of the library, as the case may be, shall promptly
notify the Board in writing of such determination.
(B) Each notice to the Board under subparagraph (A) shall
include a description of the nature of the records or
materials, and a justification for the determination, covered
by such notice.
(2) In the case of a determination referred to in paragraph
(1) with respect to a special access program created by the
Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence,
or the head of any other agency, the notification of denial
of access under paragraph (1), including a description of the
nature of the Board's request for access, shall be submitted
to the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs rather than to the Board.
(c) Discretion to Disclose.--At the conclusion of a
declassification review, the head of an agency may, in the
discretion of the head of the agency, determine that the
public's interest in the disclosure of records or materials
of the agency covered by such review, and still properly
classified, outweighs the Government's need to protect such
records or materials, and may release such records or
materials in accordance with the provisions of Executive
Order 12958 or any successor order to such Executive Order.
(d) Discretion To Protect.--At the conclusion of a
declassification review, the head of an agency may, in the
discretion of the head of the agency, determine that the
interest of the agency in the protection of records or
materials of the agency covered by such review, and still
properly classified, outweigh's the public's need for access
to such records or materials, and may deny release of such
records or materials in accordance with the provisions of
Executive Order 12958 or any successor order to such
Executive Order.
(e) Reports.--(1)(A) Except as provided in paragraph (2),
the Board shall annually submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on the activities of the
Board under this title, including summary information
regarding any denials by the head of an agency or the head of
a Federal Presidential library of access of the Board to
records or materials under this title.
(B) In this paragraph, the term ``appropriate congressional
committees'' means the Select Committee on Intelligence and
the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee
on Government Reform and Oversight of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), notice that the Board
has been denied access to records and materials, and a
justification for the determination in support of the denial,
shall be submitted by the agency denying the access as
follows:
(A) In the case of the denial of access to a special access
program created by the Secretary of Defense, to the
Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate
and to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of
the House of Representatives.
(B) In the case of the denial of access to a special access
program created by the Director of Central Intelligence, or
by the head of any other agency (including the Department of
Defense) if the special access program pertains to
intelligence activities, or of access to any information and
materials relating to intelligence sources and methods, to
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
(C) In the case of the denial of access to a special access
program created by the Secretary of Energy or the
Administrator for Nuclear Security, to the Committees on
Armed Services and Appropriations and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and to the Committees on Armed
Services and Appropriations and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 807. JUDICIAL REVIEW.
Nothing in this title limits the protection afforded to any
information under any other provision of law. This title is
not intended and may not be construed to create any right or
benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law
against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or its
employees. This title does not modify in any way the
substantive criteria or procedures for the classification of
information, nor does this title create any right or benefit
subject to judicial review.
SEC. 808. FUNDING.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is hereby
authorized to be appropriated to carry out the provisions of
this title amounts as follows:
(1) For fiscal year 2001, $650,000.
(2) For each fiscal year after fiscal year 2001, such sums
as may be necessary for such fiscal year.
(b) Funding Requests.--The President shall include in the
budget submitted to Congress for each fiscal year under
section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, a request for
amounts for the activities of the Board under this title
during such fiscal year.
SEC. 809. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Agency.--(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
the term ``agency'' means the following:
(i) An executive agency, as that term is defined in section
105 of title 5, United States Code.
(ii) A military department, as that term is defined in
section 102 of such title.
(iii) Any other entity in the executive branch that comes
into the possession of classified information.
(B) The term does not include the Board.
(2) Classified material or record.--The terms ``classified
material'' and ``classified record'' include any
correspondence, memorandum, book, plan, map, drawing,
diagram, pictorial or graphic work, photograph, film,
microfilm, sound recording, videotape, machine readable
records, and other documentary material, regardless of
physical form or characteristics, that has been determined
pursuant to Executive Order to require protection against
unauthorized disclosure in the interests of the national
security of the United States.
(3) Declassification.--The term ``declassification'' means
the process by which records or materials that have been
classified are determined no longer to require protection
from unauthorized disclosure to protect the national security
of the United States.
[[Page S9592]]
(4) Donated historical material.--The term ``donated
historical material'' means collections of personal papers
donated or given to a Federal Presidential library or other
archival repository under a deed of gift or otherwise.
(5) Federal presidential library.--The term ``Federal
Presidential library'' means a library operated and
maintained by the United States Government through the
National Archives and Records Administration under the
applicable provisions of chapter 21 of title 44, United
States Code.
(6) National security.--The term ``national security''
means the national defense or foreign relations of the United
States.
(7) Records or materials of extraordinary public
interest.--The term ``records or materials of extraordinary
public interest'' means records or materials that--
(A) demonstrate and record the national security policies,
actions, and decisions of the United States, including--
(i) policies, events, actions, and decisions which led to
significant national security outcomes; and
(ii) the development and evolution of significant United
States national security policies, actions, and decisions;
(B) will provide a significantly different perspective in
general from records and materials publicly available in
other historical sources; and
(C) would need to be addressed through ad hoc record
searches outside any systematic declassification program
established under Executive Order.
(8) Records of archival value.--The term ``records of
archival value'' means records that have been determined by
the Archivist of the United States to have sufficient
historical or other value to warrant their continued
preservation by the Federal Government.
SEC. 810. SUNSET.
The provisions of this title shall expire four years after
the date of the enactment of this Act, unless reauthorized by
statute.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Fitzgerald) appointed Mr. Shelby, Mr.
Lugar, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Inhofe, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Allard, Mr.
Mack, Mr. Warner, Mr. Bryan, Mr. Graham, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Baucus, Mr.
Robb, Mr. Lautenberg, and Mr. Levin conferees on the part of the
Senate.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I yield to Senator Bryan.
Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I thank the leader. I specifically thank
the chairman, Senator Shelby. We have worked to put this authorization
bill together. It could not have happened but for his cooperation and
the cooperation of a number of others of our colleagues on the
Intelligence Committee. I thank them for their cooperation, the
chairman in particular. I thank the majority leader and Senator Daschle
as well. Again, I acknowledge the leadership of my chairman. He has
been most helpful in working through this bill. I thank him, the
majority leader, and our colleagues.
My remarks will echo many of the points made by the distinguished
chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Shelby. Those who are
not familiar with the workings of the Intelligence Committee may find
it odd that members from different parties have such agreement on the
substance of this legislation. Most of my colleagues, however, know
that the committee has a long tradition of bipartisanship and I am
proud to say that under Senator Shelby's leadership we have upheld that
tradition. We have confronted difficult policy issues and budget
choices, and the chairman has gone out of his way to ensure that the
committee addressed these in a fair and nonpartisan way. I appreciate
the courtesies he has shown me as vice chairman. I think we have
produced a good bill that focuses on several critical areas of
intelligence policy.
This important legislation authorizes the activities of the U.S.
intelligence community and seeks to ensure that this critical function
will continue to serve our national security interests into the 21st
century. The community faces momentous challenges from both the
proliferation of threats facing America and from the rapid pace of
technological change occurring throughout society. How we respond to
these challenges today will affect our ability to protect American
interests in the years ahead.
Some have argued that the end of the cold war should have
significantly reduced our need for a robust intelligence collection
capability. In fact, the opposite is true. The bipolar world of the
Soviet-United States confrontation provided a certain stability with a
clear threat and a single principal adversary on which to focus. We now
face a world with growing transnational threats of weapons
proliferation, terrorism, and international crime and narcotics
trafficking, and multiple regional conflicts which create instability
and threaten U.S. interests. While we, of course, must continue to
closely monitor Russia, which still possesses the singular capability
to destroy our country, these emerging threats demand increasing
attention and resources.
A decade after the collapse of Soviet communism, the intelligence
community continues its difficult transition, from an organization
which confronted one threat to one which now must focus on a variety of
threats, each unique in its potential to harm the United States. At the
same time, the community has been buffeted by the information
revolution, which provides tremendous opportunity for intelligence
collection, but threatens to overwhelm our ability to process and
disseminate information. These twin challenges--new and qualitatively
different threats, coupled with an information and technological
explosion--threaten the community's ability to serve as an early
warning system for our country and a force multiplier for our armed
services.
Unfortunately, the intelligence community has often been too slow to
confront these challenge and to adapt to these new realities. To make
this transition will require the following:
First, the intelligence community must get its budget in order.
Although I believe the community probably needs additional resources,
the Congress first must be convinced that existing resources are being
used effectively.
Second, the various intelligence agencies must begin to function ore
corporately--as a community, rather than as separate entities, all with
different and often conflicting priorities. This has been a topic of
debate for some time. And yet, the passage of time does not seem to
have brought us much closer to this objective.
Third, the intelligence community must do a better job of setting
priorities. That means making hard decisions about what it will not do.
Resources are stretched thin, often because community leadership has
been unable to say no. The result is that agencies like the National
Security Agency are starved for recapitalization funds necessary to
keep pace with technological changes.
Fourth, the community must streamline its bureaucracy, eliminating
unnecessary layers of management, particularly those that separate the
collector of intelligence from the analyzer of that intelligence.
Finally, the community must revamp its information technology
backbone so that agencies can easily and effectively communicate with
one another.
These steps will not be easy but are essential if the intelligence
community is to stay relevant in today's world. Good intelligence is
more important than ever. As we deal with calls for military
intervention in far flung locales, intelligence becomes a force
multiplier. We rely on the intelligence community to keep us informed
of developing crises, to describe the situation prior to any U.S.
intervention, to help with force protection when U.S. personnel are on
the ground, and to analyze foreign leadership intentions. Solid
intelligence allows U.S. policymakers and military commanders to make
and implement informed decisions.
Maintaining our intelligence capability is difficult and sometimes
expensive but absolutely essential to national security. The committee
has identified a few areas that we think are priorities that need
additional attention. One area of particular concern is the need to
recapitalize the National Security Agency to assure our ability to
collect signals intelligence. Collecting and deciphering the
communications of America's adversaries provides senior policymakers
with a unique source of sensitive information. In 1998, and again this
year, the committee asked a group of highly qualified technical experts
to review NSA operations. The Technical Advisory Group's conclusions
were unsettling. They identified significant shortcomings which have
resulted from the sustained budget decline of the past decade. With
limited available resources the NSA has maintained its day-to-day
readiness but has not invested in needed modernization. Consequently,
NSA's technological infrastructure and human resources are
[[Page S9593]]
struggling to meet emerging challenges.
The NSA historically has led the way in development and use of
cutting edge technology. This innovative spirit has helped keep the
United States a step ahead of those whose interests are hostile to our
own. Unfortunately, rather than leading the way, the NSA now struggles
to keep pace with communications and computing advances.
There is, however, some reason for optimism. The current Director of
NSA, General Hayden, has developed a strategy for recovery. He has
undertaken an aggressive and ambitious modernization effort, including
dramatic organizational changes and innovative business practices.
These changes and the rebuilding of NSA's infrastructure will, however,
require significant additional resources. The committee decided that
this situation demands immediate attention, but the intelligence budget
faces the same constrained fiscal situation as other areas of the
Federal budget. We have, therefore, realigned priorities within
existing resources in order to reverse this downward trend. This was
not an easy process and we were forced to make some painful tradeoffs,
but ensuring the future of the NSA is the committee's top priority. We
cannot stand by and allow the United States to lose this capability. We
have taken prudent steps in this legislation to make sure NSA will
continue to be the premier signals intelligence organization in the
world.
The bill also attempts to address an imbalance that has concerned the
committee for some time. We have argued that our ability to collect
intelligence far exceeds our ability to analyze and disseminate
finished intelligence to the end user. We spend a tremendous amount of
the budget developing and fielding satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles
and all manner of other senors and collection platforms. These programs
are important but too often new sensors are put into place without
sufficient thought to how we will process and distribute the additional
data. No matter how good a satellite is at collecting raw intelligence,
it is useless if that intelligence never makes it into the hands of a
competent analyst and then on to an end user.
This imbalance has been particularly acute at the National Imagery
and Mapping Agency. At the request of Congress, NIMA has identified
projected processing shortfalls associated with its future sensor
acquisition plans. NIMA also outlined a three phase modernization to
address these shortfalls. Unfortunately, the future year funding
profile creates a situation that will force the intelligence community
to either cut deeply into other programs or abandon the modernization.
The committee has rejected that approach and has realigned priorities
in order to avoid this budgetary squeeze in the out years. It makes no
sense to purchase expensive collection platforms when the rest of the
system cannot handle the amount of intelligence produced.
Beyond the questions of resource allocation, this legislation also
address several policy issues, including the problem of serious
security breakdowns at the State Department. Over the course of the
last 2\1/2\ years the Department has been beset by seemingly
inexplicable security compromises, the latest being the disappearance
of a laptop computer in January of this year. This incident, still
unexplained, follows closely on the heels of the discovery of a Russian
listening device planted in a seventh floor conference room.
Subsequently we learned that there was no escort requirement for
foreign visitors, including Russians, to the State Department. Finally,
I must mention the 1998 tweed jacket incident. In this case an
unidentified man wearing a tweed jacket entered the Secretary of
State's office suite unchallenged by State Department employees and
removed classified documents. No one knows who he was.
The only conclusion that I can draw is that the State Department
culture does not place a priority on security. Despite Secretary
Albright's efforts to correct procedural deficiencies and to emphasize
the need for better security, we have not seen much progress. The
authorization bill contains a provision requiring all elements of the
State Department to be certified as in compliance with regulations for
the handling of Sensitive Compartmented Information. This is the most
highly classified information and is controlled by the Director of
Central Intelligence. If a component of the State Department is not in
compliance with the applicable regulations, then that office will no
longer be allowed to retain or store this sensitive information. It is
unfortunate that this provision is necessary, but we must make it clear
to individuals who handle classified material that we are serious about
enforcing security rules.
A broader but related area of concern is the ability of the U.S.
Intelligence community to meet the counterintelligence threats of the
21st Century with current structures and programs. We can no longer
worry only about the intelligence services of adversaries such as the
old Soviet Union, North Korea, or Cuba. We must deal with ever more
sophisticated terrorist organizations and international crime
syndicates capable of launching their own intelligence and
counterintelligence efforts. We also face challenges from friendly
states seeking access to economic data and advanced U.S. technology.
All of these changes argue for a major retooling of a U.S.
counterintelligence apparatus designed for the cold war. The Director
of Central Intelligence, the Director of the FBI, and the Deputy
Secretary of Defense have undertaken an effort, referred to as CI-21,
to design the structures and policies that we will need to cope with
cutting edge technology and with the emergence of threats from
nontraditional sources. I have been encouraged by the early progress
made on the CI-21 effort. We have chosen not to include legislative
provisions in the bill with the hope that the agencies involved will
reach agreement and finalize the CI-21 plan. The report accompanying
the bill strongly encourages them to do so and I reiterate that
encouragement.
One provision in the bill that has created a bit of controversy is
the section that closes a gap in existing law related to the
unauthorized disclosure of classified material. This provision will
make it a felony for a U.S. government official to knowingly pass
classified material to someone who is not authorized to receive it. I
say that this provision closes a gap because many categories of
classified information are covered by existing statutes. This includes
nuclear weapons data and defense information. Unfortunately much
sensitive intelligence information does not fall into one of the
existing definitions. Disclosure of this information could compromise
sensitive sources and in some cases endanger peoples lives. The
provision in the bill has been carefully crafted to avoid first
amendment concerns and the chairman and I will offer a technical
amendment incorporating suggestions made by the Attorney General. It is
my understanding that she supports the provision as amended.
Another provision which merits further explanation is the section
dealing with treaty implementing legislation. This language provides
that future criminal laws enacted to implement treaties will not apply
to intelligence activities unless those activities are specifically
named in the legislation. On its face this could be interpreted as
exempting our intelligence community from the law regardless of the
nature of the activity. In fact, this only applies to activities which
are otherwise lawful and authorized. Intelligence activities are
subject to an extensive set of statutes, regulations and presidential
directives. These rules try to balance our need for intelligence to
protect our national security with the American sense of values and
ethical behavior.
Intelligence gathering--spying--is an inherently deceitful activity.
To protect our military forces, thwart terrorist acts, or dismantle
drug trafficking organizations, we gather information through
surreptitious means. We either convince people to betray their country
or cause, or we use intrusive technical means to find out what people
are doing or saying. This may make some people uncomfortable, but it is
absolutely essential to protecting American interests. Treaties that
proscribe certain kinds of behavior should not inadvertently restrict
these intelligence activities. If the Congress intends to apply treaty
implementing legislation to intelligence activities,
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then we should say so explicitly. We want to be precise and ensure that
intelligence operatives in the field understand what we expect of them.
Ambiguity and uncertainty are more likely to create problems. This
provision will put the burden on Congress to make the determination of
which treaty restrictions we want to apply to intelligence activities.
I have served on the Intelligence Committee for almost 8 years now
and I have had the privilege of serving as vice chairman since January.
During that time I have made a few observations that I would like to
share. Since I am leaving the committee and the Senate at the end of
this year, I have no vested interest other than my continuing belief in
the importance of the committee's work conducting oversight of the
intelligence community.
My experience leads me to the conclusion that excessive turnover is
seriously hampering the effectiveness of the Intelligence Committee--a
committee the Senate relies upon and points to in reassuring the
American people that the intelligence community is being appropriately
monitored by their elected representatives. Because of the 8-year
limitation, member turn-over can be, and often is dramatic. For
example, when the 107th Congress convenes next January, 5 of the 7
currently serving Democrats will have departed the committee. At the
end of the 107th Congress, 5 of the 8 currently serving Republicans
will leave the committee.
Over time, this brain drain diminishes the committee's ability to
discharge its responsibilities. For example, in 1994 the committee
dealt with the Aldrich Ames espionage case, arguably the most
devastating counterintelligence failure of the cold war. The committee
produced a report extremely critical of the CIA in this case and of the
way the CIA and FBI dealt with counterintelligence in general. The Ames
debacle led to a major restructuring of our national
counterintelligence system with significant legislative input. Yet
today, there is only one member on the majority side who served on the
committee during that period, and at the end of this year there will be
no members on the Democratic side. This lack of corporate memory
greatly reduces the committee's effectiveness.
This committee deals with sensitive and complex issues, and much of
the committee's business involves the technical agencies such as the
National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office. To
understand these issues a Senator must invest significant time to
committee briefings and hearings. There is no outside source to go to
stay abreast of developments in the intelligence community. Just about
the time members are beginning to understand these issues they are
forced to rotate off the committee. This makes no sense.
The rationale behind the term limits was two fold. First, it was
feared that the intelligence community could over time co-opt
permanently serving members. In fact, new members who have little
experience with the workings of the intelligence community are more
dependent on information provided by the intelligence agencies. SSCI
members are no more likely to be co-opted by the intelligence community
than the members of other authorizing committees are likely to be co-
opted by the Departments and agencies they oversee. The second reason
term limits were enacted stemmed from the understandable view that the
SSCI would benefit from a flow of fresh ideas that new members would
bring. But because of naturally occurring turnover, new members have
regularly joined the committee, irrespective of term limits. Since the
SSCI was created 24 years ago, approximately sixty Senators have served
on the committee. Members have served an average of just over 5 years--
and approximately 60 percent of committee members have served on the
committee less than 8 years. This historical record confirms that
vacancies will continue to occur regularly on the SSCI, thus allowing
the new faces and fresh ideas. At the same time, however, members who
have a long-term interest in the area of intelligence should continue
to serve and develop expertise.
My second observation relates to the committee's authority but also
to a larger issue that is the question of declassifying the top line
number for the intelligence budget. It is difficult to conduct a
thorough and rationale debate concerning intelligence policy without
mentioning how much money we spend on our intelligence system.
Declassifying the top line budget would allow for a healthy debate
within the Congress about the priority we place on intelligence. I
would provide greater visibility and openness to average Americans,
whose tax dollars fund these programs. Disclosure of the overall budget
would provide these benefits without damaging U.S. national security.
DCI Tenet declassified the budget numbers for top past budgets with no
adverse effects, but has declined to continue this practice. I hope
that the Congress and the next administration will revisit this issue
and left this unnecessary veil of secrecy.
Finally, Mr. President, I want to thank the staff of the Intelligence
Committee for the work they do and for the support they have given me
as vice chairman. The committee is staffed by professionals dedicated
to ensuring that the intelligence community enhances U.S. national
security and does so in strict compliance with the intent of Congress.
The staff is unique in the Senate in that the vast majority are
nonpartisan and go about their business without regard to any political
agenda. The four members of the staff with partisan affiliations, the
staff directors and their deputies, approach their work with same
spirit of bipartisanship that always has been a hallmark of the
committee. Let me single our Bill Duhnke and Joan Grimson, the majority
staff director and deputy for their excellent cooperation and the
courtesy they have extended this year. I should note that Joan is not
here today because she is off on maternity leave. I extend my
congratulations to her and her husband on the birth of their first
child, Jacqueline Anna. I also thank Melvin Dubee, my deputy minority
staff director. Melvin brings a wealth of experience to the job, and it
has been reflected in the sound advice I have come to depend on him to
provide. Vicki Divoll, who joined the committee staff as counsel in
January, also has been invaluable to me during the preparation of this
legislation and in dealing with other legal issues.
Finally, I would have been lost as vice chairman without the guidance
and advice of Al Cumming, the minority staff director. Al kept me well
informed and helped me focus on issues that will have a lasting impact
on the functioning of the intelligence community. The staff has done
superb work on this legislation.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I thank Senator Bryan for his comments.
Obviously, as I said, this is very important legislation. The
Intelligence Committee does good work, important work for our
committee. It has been partially delayed by misunderstandings which we
have worked out. I think everybody is satisfied with this. I thank the
chairman for his persistence. I yield to the chairman of the committee.
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I want to take a minute or two and talk
about my colleague from Nevada, Senator Bryan. He is going to be
leaving the Senate soon. As the vice chairman of the committee--a long-
term and long-time member of the Senate Intelligence Committee--he has
been a delight to work with most of the time. Seriously. He puts a lot
of effort into what we do on the Senate Intelligence Committee.
I would be remiss if I did not bring that up as we pass this bill
tonight. We have a conference to go to. We will be spending a lot of
time together in the waning days of this Congress. Dick Bryan served
this country well, first as a State legislator, as the attorney general
of his State, as the Governor of his State, and in two terms in the
U.S. Senate. I have worked with him on a lot of issues, and I can say
this: He is a hard worker, he is smart, he is going to be prepared, he
is going to be tough, and he is going to put the Nation first.
Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, if I may respond to the excessively
generous comments of my chairman, my colleague, and my friend, the
reality is that working with him has been a pleasure. Without his
cooperation and, obviously, trying to work in a bipartisan way to
process this piece of legislation and other things we have done since
the two of us have been privileged
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to serve as chairman and vice chairman, we would not be here today with
this bill.
I acknowledge his leadership. The good citizens of Alabama have a
fine Member here and a person with whom I have been privileged to work
for the last 12 years I have been in the Senate, and most especially
this last year when we have served in our respective roles on the
Intelligence Committee. I thank him publicly.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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