[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 116 (Tuesday, September 26, 2000)]
[House]
[Pages H8163-H8176]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[[Page H8163]]
EXPRESSING SENSE OF HOUSE ON PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the
resolution (H. Res. 547) expressing the sense of the House of
Representatives with respect to the peace process in Northern Ireland,
as amended.
The Clerk read as follows:
H. Res. 547
Whereas the April 10, 1998, Good Friday Agreement
established a framework for the peaceful settlement of the
conflict in Northern Ireland;
Whereas the Good Friday Agreement stated that it provided
``the opportunity for a new beginning to policing in Northern
Ireland with a police service capable of attracting and
sustaining support from the community as a whole'';
Whereas the Good Friday Agreement provided for the
establishment of an Independent Commission on Policing to
make ``recommendations for future policing arrangements in
Northern Ireland including means of encouraging widespread
community support for these arrangements'';
Whereas the Independent Commission on Policing, led by Sir
Christopher Patten, concluded its work on September 9, 1999,
and proposed 175 recommendations in its final report to
ensure a new beginning to policing, consistent with the
requirements in the Good Friday Agreement;
Whereas the Patten report explicitly ``warned in the
strongest terms against cherry-picking from this report or
trying to implement some major elements of it in isolation
from others'';
Whereas section 405 of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg
Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
2000 and 2001 (as contained in H.R. 3427, as enacted by
section 1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106-113, and as contained in
appendix G to such Public Law) requires President Clinton to
certify, among other things, that the Governments of the
United Kingdom and Ireland are committed to assisting in the
full implementation of the recommendations contained in the
Patten Commission report issued on September 9, 1999 before
the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other Federal law
enforcement agency can provide training for the Royal Ulster
Constabulary;
Whereas a May 5, 2000, joint letter by the British Prime
Minister and the Irish Prime Minister stated that
``legislation to implement the Patten report will, subject to
Parliament, be enacted by November 2000'';
Whereas on May 16, 2000, the British Government published
the proposed Police (Northern Ireland) bill, which purports
to implement in law the Patten report;
Whereas many of the signatories to the Good Friday
Agreement have stated that the proposed Police (Northern
Ireland) bill does not live up to the letter or spirit of the
Patten report and dilutes or fails to implement many of the
Patten Commission's key recommendations regarding
accountability, such as, by limiting the Policing Board and
Police Ombudsman's powers of inquiry, by failing to appoint a
commissioner to oversee implementation of the Patten
Commission's 175 recommendations and instead limiting the
commissioner to overseeing those changes in policing which
are decided upon by the British Government, and by rejecting
the Patten Commission's recommendation that all police
officers in Northern Ireland take an oath expressing an
explicit commitment to uphold human rights;
Whereas Northern Ireland's main nationalist parties have
indicated that they will not participate or encourage
participation in the new policing structures unless the
Patten report is fully implemented; and
Whereas on June 15, 2000, British Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland Peter Mandelson said, ``I remain absolutely
determined to implement the Patten recommendations and to
achieve the effective and representative policing service,
accepted in every part of Northern Ireland, that his report
aimed to secure'': Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the House of Representatives--
(1) commends the parties for progress to date in
implementing all aspects of the Good Friday Agreement and
urges them to move expeditiously to complete the
implementation;
(2) believes that the full and speedy implementation of the
recommendations of the Independent Commission on Policing for
Northern Ireland holds the promise of ensuring that the
police service in Northern Ireland will gain the support of
both nationalists and unionists and that ``policing
structures and arrangements are such that the police service
is fair and impartial, free from partisan political control,
accountable . . . to the community it serves, representative
of the society that it polices . . . [and] complies with
human rights norms'', as mandated by the Good Friday
Agreement; and
(3) calls upon the British Government to fully and
faithfully implement the recommendations contained in the
September 9, 1999, Patten Commission report on policing.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Pitts). Pursuant to the rule, the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) and the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Crowley) each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).
General Leave
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks
on this measure.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from New York?
There was no objection.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to support H. Res. 547. I
joined as an original cosponsor of this bill, along with many on our
committee and others from both sides of the aisle familiar with the
problems in Northern Ireland.
In Northern Ireland last spring, the IRA's efforts at putting arms
beyond use and having that verified by outside observers demonstrated
their good faith. It made it possible for the power-sharing executive
to run again and for real, peaceful democratic change.
As part of that arrangement to restore the executive, in May 2000 the
British and Irish governments made a firm commitment to the nationalist
community to fully implement the Patten Commission policing reforms
that form a core portion of the Good Friday Accord for a new beginning
in policing.
The British Government and the unionists have, so far, failed to show
similar good faith. They firmly need to live up to their agreements in
the Good Friday Accord, especially concerning real police reform as
envisioned by the Patten Report of September 1999, a report consistent
with the terms of the Good Friday Accord.
A 93 percent Protestant police force will not do in a nearly equally
divided society. The British Government cannot put aside promised
change and the Good Friday Accord for temporary tactical or political
gain, for whatever reason. The Irish National Caucus and other Irish
American groups here fully support this bill, as well as the SDLP, the
largest nationalist Catholic party in the north of Ireland whose
leader, John Hume, won the Nobel Peace Prize.
Seamus Mallon, the SDLP's deputy minister in charge of the executive,
stated to our committee and said that failure to implement Patten
policing proposals will have a damaging effect on the whole psyche of
the fledgling political process.
{time} 2030
We do not want this, nor can we afford this. The Washington Post
noted in July that the onus remains on the British Government to
respond to Catholic objections on its failure to fully implement all of
Patten's police reforms, since these reforms were part of the agreement
in the Good Friday Accord. To date, regrettably, they have not
responded.
At hearings held last week by the gentleman from New Jersey (Chairman
Smith) of the Helsinki Commission, a Member of the Patten Commission,
Dr. Gerald Lynch, the president of the John J. College of Criminal
Justice in New York, told us that any significant modification of its
recommendations ``will deprive the people of Northern Ireland of this
long-awaited police service capable of sustaining support from the
community as a whole.''
We also learned that the current Police Authority in the North has
said it is ``vital'' that the police bill now before the British
parliament to carry out Patten be amended.
Finally, a former adviser to the Northern Ireland secretary of state
has also told us that the first draft of the bill ``eviscerated Patten.
The latest version presents a mostly bloodless ghost.''
There must be policing reform as the Roman Catholic Church and as
Nationalist Party leaders want, and are entitled to, as well as was
agreed upon in the Good Friday Accord. The old Unionist ``veto
politics'' must end.
I was proud to join as an original cosponsor of this resolution that
was passed out of our Committee on International Relations without one
objection. All Members of Congress want to see lasting peace and
justice to take permanent hold in Northern Ireland, and we should act
favorably on this proposal.
[[Page H8164]]
The resolution before us, Mr. Speaker, merely calls on the British
Government to fully and faithfully implement the Patten Commission
report, to which they agreed, both as part of the Good Friday Accord
and the recent restoration of power sharing executive in the North.
If the British Government truly intends to do this, there is nothing
for them to fear from this bill. If they are not serious about policing
reform, then they are not in compliance with the Good Friday Accord,
and the judgment of history will be rightfully harsh.
Now is the time for us to get it right and to fully support the Good
Friday Accord.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise to voice my support for House Resolution 547. I
regret that such a resolution is necessary. However, the British
Government's failure to fully implement the Good Friday Agreement and
the Patten Commission report is an issue of great concern among many
Members of this body and must be addressed.
I want to thank the gentleman from New York (Chairman Gilman) for
moving this measure along in an expeditious manner, and I want to thank
my colleague and friend and cochair of the Ad Hoc Committee on Irish
Affairs here in the House as well, the gentleman from Massachusetts
(Mr. Neal), for introducing this measure.
Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman
from Massachusetts (Mr. Neal).
Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, let me if I can at the outset
thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) and thank the gentleman
from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) and members of the Committee on
International Relations for the expeditious manner in which they
brought this piece of legislation that I authored to the floor.
Also I think to fully acknowledge that time and again on the issue of
Ireland, there has been bipartisan support in this House of
Representatives for the work that has occurred on this side of the
ocean, as well as on that side of the ocean.
House Resolution 547, Mr. Speaker, simply urges the British
Government to fully implement the Patten recommendations on police
reform in the North of Ireland. The people on the island of Ireland
support the Patten recommendations, not the Mandelson recommendations.
Let me give you a little bit of background, if I can, on this issue.
Probably one of the most difficult problems that has confronted the
people in the North of Ireland for the better part of the previous
century was the issue of policing in a small state the size essentially
of what we would know as Connecticut. But on May 21, 1998, the vast
majority of the people of the island of Ireland voted for what we know
as the Good Friday Agreement. In unprecedented numbers, they said yes
to the future, a future that would include justice, and a future that
would include reconciliation between the two traditions that have
resided on that island.
But as part of that Good Friday Agreement, there was a very special
provision that cuts to the heart of the discussion that we are having
this evening. It established an independent commission on policing that
would make recommendations to the British Government and to the Irish
Government. The notion was to create a new policing service capable of
attracting and sustaining support from the community as a whole.
The Nationalist population currently comprises about 7 percent of the
Royal Ultra Constabulary. That means that the Unionist community,
which, by the way, represents about 54 percent of the people in the
North, nonetheless constitutes 93 percent of the police force. The
Nationalist community sees them as a force to keep them in line.
Fundamentally, the issue of policing can change the whole complexion of
the process in the North of Ireland that we know as the Good Friday
Agreement.
Now, let me delve into this a bit more. On September 24, 1999, Chris
Patten, a conservative member of the British parliament, was chosen to
review the state of policing in the North of Ireland. He came back,
and, listen to this number, Mr. Speaker, offered to not only take the
politics out of policing in the North, but, just as importantly,
offered 175 recommendations that included changing the name, changing
the flag and emblems of the RUC, a new oath for all the officers, human
rights training and a new policing board to be comprised of both
communities. This evening this Chamber should be grateful for what
Chris Patten did and the efforts that he extended on behalf of this
fundamental issue.
Now, when he came to Washington at the request of the gentleman from
New York (Chairman Gilman) and the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr.
Gejdenson), he presented to us a very cogent plan for fundamentally
restructuring the Royal Ulster Constabulary. What he said at that time
essentially was this: do not allow my report to be cherry-picked.
Precisely what is happening at this moment in the North of Ireland is
the cherry-picking of Chris Patten's recommendations.
Now, I would remind all present, as well as those viewing across the
country, that there was a democratic election which people in both
traditions on both sides of the border voted for in overwhelming
numbers.
So what we are saying essentially here is this, that we have had an
agreement, we have had an election, and now we are going to move the
goalposts back by another 10 yards, because that is what the
Nationalist community will deem this intransigence to be.
Everybody in the British Isles has concluded that there has to be a
fundamental reform of policing in the North of Ireland. Secretary
Mandelson's position, however, has been to come back and say, we know
better, we know more. We have decided that, despite what Chris Patten
said, despite the Patten recommendations, despite an election, that we
are now going to compromise the very notion of fully integrating the
police service or police force in the North of Ireland.
What is difficult for most of us to digest in this process is
essentially this: if we are to go back to the recommendations that
Patten made and essentially say we cannot sell them politically now, it
invites both sides to say, let us reopen the Good Friday Agreement.
Now, George Mitchell deserves enormous credit for his good and
patient work. Bill Clinton deserves great credit for his work.
Republicans like the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) and others
deserve credit for their work. This has always been bipartisan in
nature.
Let me, if I can for a second, read a statement that Vice President
Gore has asked me to offer on his behalf: ``I also want to make clear
my position on the Patten Commission's recommendations for police
reform in Northern Ireland. I urge the British government to fully and
expeditiously implement these recommendations. The goal of the Patten
Commission's recommendations is to take politics out of policing and to
create a police service in Northern Ireland that meets the highest
possible standards and that enjoys the support of both communities.''
Now, I would submit tonight, Mr. Speaker, that if we are to head back
to a reopening of the Good Friday Agreement, canceling the provisions
of the Good Friday Accord, we are going to invite the rejectionists to
step forward. I would ask the rejectionists of the Good Friday
Agreement a very simple question: tell us your alternative. You have
always had great moments of outlining what you are against; we would
like you to tell what your competing proposal is on behalf of what you
are for.
It becomes very obvious to all of us who have been in this process,
myself included, for more than two decades, that they really have no
alternative to the Good Friday Agreement. They are going to continue to
chip away at the edges, they are going to continue to be naysayers,
they are going to continue to criticize all of the parties that have
brought us to this moment. But the point tonight to remember is this,
they provide no viable alternative.
There is no option, that I am aware of, other than the Good Friday
Agreement. It has met the test of time, it enjoys support across the
island; and if we are to say tonight that the Patten Commission
recommendations are to be, as Chris Patten said, cherry-picked or taken
apart, then what is to prevent the next party from standing and saying,
we do not like this part of the Good Friday Agreement?
[[Page H8165]]
The term ``royal'' should be taken out of police service. Members of
the Nationalist community do not want to swear allegiance to the Queen
upon taking the oath for joining its police service. Chris Patten
understood that; Tony Blair understood that. That was part of this far-
reaching agreement, that they would not have to swear allegiance to the
Queen to join the police service. Instead, they would take an oath of
office similar to the one that patrolmen and patrolwomen across this
Nation take upon entering that service, simply acknowledging your
duties.
I would submit tonight, Mr. Speaker, to Members that are going to
have a chance to go at this later on, that my words do not ring hollow
on this occasion. If we allow any part of the Patten Commission
recommendations to be undone, we invite the naysayers and the
rejectionists to step to the floor to fill the vacuum. We have to push
them aside and make them in free elections tell the people what they
are for or what they are against, as opposed to sitting in the
inexpensive seats and telling all of us how wrong we have been all
along the way.
Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the Members assembled here this evening
again for their steadfastness.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Neal) for
his kind supporting words for this resolution. The gentleman has been a
long-time leader in the Irish cause in the Congress.
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 6\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman
from New Jersey (Mr. Smith), the distinguished chairman of the
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the
Committee on International Relations.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Gilman) for his leadership on this very important
issue, as well as the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Neal), the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley), and my good friend, the
gentleman from New York (Mr. King), who has been indefatigable for many
years on this important issue.
Mr. Speaker, I think the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Neal) is
right in pointing out that this is a bipartisan effort, and we are
trying to send a clear non-ambiguous message to the British Government
that we are looking at their policing bill, that we looked at it very
carefully, and it falls far, far short.
Last Friday, as chairman of the Subcommittee on International
Operations and Human Rights and as chairman of the Helsinki Commission,
I held my sixth hearing in a series of hearings which have delved into
the status of human rights in the North of Ireland and the deplorable
human rights record of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the RUC, Northern
Ireland's police force.
{time} 2045
Our panel of experts were emphatic about the gap that exists between
the recommendations of the Patten Commission on policing reform and the
bill that the British Government has now put forth in their attempt to
comply with the Good Friday Agreement's instructions to ``craft a new
beginning to policing.''
Professor Brendan O'Leary, one of our witnesses from the London
School of Economics and Political Science, testified that the pending
police bill is, quote, ``a poorly disguised facade'' that does not
implement the Patten report. He said it was, and I quote again,
``mendaciously misleading'' for Northern Ireland's Secretary of State,
Peter Mandelson, to suggest that his government's bill implements the
Patten report.
Professor O'Leary reported that the bill improved at the Commons
stage, yet he testified that the British government's bill is still
very ``insufficient.'' He called it a ``bloodless ghost'' of Patten and
referred to it as ``Patten light.''
Similarly, Martin O'Brien, the great human rights activist and the
Director of the Committee on Administration of Justice, an independent
human rights organization in Belfast, expressed his organization's,
quote, ``profound disappointment at the developments since the
publication of the Patten report.'' He said that ``only a third or less
of Patten's recommendations resulted in proposals for legislative
change.''
Mr. O'Brien reported that ``a study of the draft seems to confirm the
view that the British government is unwilling,'' his words, ``to put
Patten's agenda into practical effect.'' He called it ``a very far cry
from the Patten report'' and said ``despite much lobbying and extensive
changes in the course of the parliamentary process to date, there is
still a very long way to go.''
Elisa Massimino, from the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights,
testified that the bill ``falls far short of the Patten
recommendations'' and she pointed to many discrepancies to illustrate
this. And Dr. Gerald Lynch, the President of John Jay College of
Criminal Justice in New York and an American appointee to the Patten
Commission, restated the Commission's unanimous support for full
implementation and warned, in his words, ``that the recommendations
should not be cherry picked but must be implemented in a cohesive and
constructive manner.''
Mr. Speaker, the witnesses at last week's hearings, as well as
witnesses at previous hearings, as well as in correspondences that we
have all received and in the meetings that we have had throughout this
Capitol and in Belfast and elsewhere, policing has been the issue. In
fact last year we had Chris Patten himself and the U.N. Special
Rapporteur to Northern Ireland, Param Cumaraswamy, speak to our
subcommittee. They too pointed to police reform as the essence of real
reform in Northern Ireland.
It is critical to note, then, that despite the progress to date, the
British government is at a critical crossroads on the path to peace in
Northern Ireland. The British government has the sole opportunity and
responsibility for making police reform either the linchpin or the
Achilles heel of the Good Friday Agreement.
Accordingly, our legislation today calls upon the British government
to fully and faithfully implement the recommendations contained in the
Patten Commission report. The bill is the culmination of years of work
in terms of trying to get everyone to the point where they have a
transparent police force that is not wedded to secrecy and cover-up of
human rights abuses.
Mr. Speaker, H. Res. 547 does get specific. It points out that the
police bill in parliament limits the powers of inquiry and
investigation envisioned by the Patten report for the Policing Board
and the police ombudsman. Remarkably, the police bill gives the
Secretary of the State of Ireland a veto authority to prevent a
Policing Board inquiry if the inquiry ``would serve no useful
purpose.'' That just turns the bill into a farce, Mr. Speaker.
The British government also prohibits the Policing Board from looking
into any acts that occurred before the bill was enacted. The British
government's bill also denies the ombudsman the authority to
investigate police policies and practices and restricts her ability to
look at past complaints against police officers. And the bill restricts
the new oversight commissioner to assessing only those changes the
British government agrees to, rather than overseeing the implementation
of the full range of the Patten recommendations.
Mr. Speaker, when Mr. Patten met with our committee, I and many
others expressed our disappointment that his report contained no
procedure whatsoever for vetting RUC officers who committed human
rights abuses in the past. That said, we took some comfort that the
Commission at least recommended that existing police officers should
affirmingly state a willingness to uphold human rights. Now we learn
that the British government's bill guts even this minimalist
recommendation.
Mr. Speaker, let me just conclude, and I ask that my full statement
be made a part of the Record. Two years ago this week, human rights
defense attorney Rosemary Nelson testified before my subcommittee
expressing her deepest-held fear that the RUC, which had made numerous
death threats against her and her family through her clients, would one
day succeed and assassinate her. The U.N. Special Rapporteur testified
at the hearing that he was satisfied that there was truth to those
allegations that defense attorneys were harassed and intimidated by
members of the RUC.
As we sadly all know today, Rosemary Nelson was killed, the victim of
an assassin's car bomb just 6 months
[[Page H8166]]
after she asked us to take action to protect defense attorneys in
Northern Ireland. Her murder is now being investigated in part by the
RUC, the police force that she so feared. If the British government's
police bill continues to reject mechanisms for real accountability, we
may never know who killed Rosemary Nelson or defense attorney Patrick
Finucane. And sadly the police force may never be rid of those who may
have condoned, perhaps helped cover up, or even took part in some of
the most egregious human rights abuses in Northern Ireland.
Mr. Speaker, let us have a unanimous vote for this resolution and
send a clear message to our friends on the other side of the pond that
we want real reform and that real police reform is the linchpin to the
Good Friday Agreement.
Last Friday, as Chairman of the International Operations and Human
Rights subcommittee and as Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I held
my sixth hearing in a series of hearings which have delved into the
status of human rights in the north of Ireland and the deplorable human
rights record of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Northern Ireland's
police force.
Our panel of experts was emphatic about the gap that exists between
the recommendations of the Patten Commission on policing reform and the
bill that the British government has now put forth in their attempt to
comply with the Good Friday Agreement's instruction to craft ``a new
beginning to policing.''
Professor Brendan O'Leary from the London School of Economics and
Political Science testified that the pending Policing Bill is ``a
poorly disguised facade'' that does not implement the Patten report. He
said it was ``mendaciously misleading'' for Northern Ireland's
Secretary of State, Peter Mandelson, to suggest that this government's
bill implements the Pattern report.
Professor O'Leary reported that the bill was improved at the Commons
stage, yet he testified that the British government's bill is still
``insufficient''. He called it a ``bloodless ghost'' of Patten and
referred to it as ``Patten light.''
Similarly, Martin O'Brien, Director of the Committee on the
Administration of Justice, an independent human rights organization in
Belfast, expressed his organization's ``profound disappointment at the
developments since the publication of the Patten report.'' He said that
``only a third or less of Patten's recommendations resulted in proposal
for legislative change.''
Mr. O'Brien reported that ``a study of the draft to confirm the view
that government is unwilling to put Patten's agenda into practical
effect.'' He called the bill ``a very far cry from the Patten report''
and said ``despite much lobbying and extensive changes in the course of
the parliamentary process to date, there is still a long way to go.''
Elisa Massimino, from the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights,
testified that the bill ``falls far short'' of the Patten
recommendations. And Dr. Gerald Lynch, the President of John Jay
College of Criminal Justice in New York and an American appointee to
the Patten Commission, restated the Commissions unanimous support for
full implementation and warned that ``the recommendations not be cherry
picked but be implemented in a cohesive and constructive manner.''
Mr. Speaker, the witnesses at last week's hearing, as well as
witnesses at previous hearings--including Patten himself and U.N.
Special Rapporteur to Northern Ireland, Param Cumaraswamy--have all
pointed to police reform as the essence of real reform in Northern
Ireland. It is critical to note, then, that despite the progress to
date, the British government is at a critical crossroads on the path to
peace in Northern Ireland. The British government has the sole
opportunity--and responsibility--for making police reform either the
lynchpin--or the Achilles' heel--of the Good Friday Agreement.
Accordingly, our legislation today calls upon the British Government
to fully and faithfully implement the recommendations contained in the
Patten Commission report on policing. Our bill is the culmination of
our years of work and it is our urging of an ally to do what is right
for peace in Northern Ireland.
H. Res. 547 does get specific. It now contains language which I
offered at the Committee stage to highlight a few of the most egregious
examples where the proposed Police Bill does not live up to either the
letter or the spirit of the Patten report. For instance, the Police
Bill, as currently drafted, limits the powers of inquiry and
investigation envisioned by the Patten report for the Policing Board
and the Police Ombudsman. Remarkably, the Police Bill gives the
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland a veto authority to prevent a
Policing Board inquiry if the inquiry would ``serve no useful
purpose.'' The bill completely prohibits the Policing Board from
looking into any acts that occurred before the bill is enacted.
The British Government's Police Bill also denies the Ombudsman
authority to investigate police policies and practices and restricts
her ability to look at past complaints against police officers. And the
bill restricts the new oversight commissioner to assessing only those
changes the British Government agrees to rather than overseeing the
implementation of the full range of Patten's recommendations.
When Mr. Patten himself met without subcommittee, I and many others
expressed our disappointment that his report contained no procedure for
vetting RUC officers who committed human rights abuses in the past.
That said, we took some comfort that the Commission at least
recommended that the existing police officers should affirmatively
state a willingness to uphold human rights. Now we learn that the
British Government's bill guts even this minimalist recommendation.
Many of the reforms that the Patten Commission recommended, such as
those addressing police accountability or the incorporation of
international human rights standards into police practices and
training, are not issues that divide the nationalist and unionist
communities in Northern Ireland. One must ask then, who it is that the
Northern Ireland Secretary of State is trying to protect or pacify by
failing to implement these recommendations.
Our witnesses concluded that the British Government is hiding behind
the division between unionist and nationalists on other issues--such as
what the police service's name and symbols will be--to avoid making
changes in accountability structures and human rights standards for the
police. According to Mr. O'Brien, ``these constraints are there
apparently to satisfy the concerns of people already in the policing
establishment who don't want change and don't want the spotlight shown
on their past activities or future activities.''
In other words, the future of Northern Ireland is being held captive
to the interests of the very police service and other British
Government security services that the Good Friday Agreement sought to
reform with the creation of the Patten Commission.
Mr. Speaker, there should be no doubt about the importance of
policing reform in Northern Ireland as it relates to the broader peace
process. Mr. O'Brien testified that ``the issue of resolution of
policing and the transformation of the criminal justice system are at
the heart of establishing a lasting peace.'' Dr. Gerald Lynch restated
Chris Patten's oft-repeated statement that ``the Good Friday Agreement
would come down to the policing issue.''
Professor O'Leary's comments were even more somber. He said:
In the absence of progress on Patten . . . we are likely to
see a stalling on possible progress in decommissioning,
minimally, and maximally, if one wanted to think of a
provocation to send hard line republicans back into full
scale conflict, one could think of no better choice of policy
than to fail to implement the Patten report . . . I think
disaster can follow . . . and may well follow from the
failure to implement Patten fully.
Both the nationalist and unionist communities supported the Good
Friday Agreement and all that it entailed--including police reform. The
people of Northern Ireland deserve no less than a police service that
they can trust, that is representative of the community it serves, and
that is accountable for its actions.
In conclusion Mr. Speaker, let me point out to my colleagues that it
was two years ago this week that human rights defense attorney Rosemary
Nelson testified before my subcommittee expressing her deepest held
fear that the RUC, which had made death threats to her and her family
through her clients, would one day succeed and kill her. The U.N.
Special Rapporteur, Para Cumaraswamy testified at the same hearing that
after his investigation in Northern Ireland, he was ``satisfied that
there was truth in the allegations that defense attorneys were harassed
and intimidated'' by members of the RUC.
As many people know, Rosemary Nelson was killed--the victim of an
assassin's car bomb just six months after she asked us to take action
to protect defense attorneys in Northern Ireland. Her murder is now
being investigated, in part, by the RUC--the police force she so
feared. If the British government's Police Bill continues to reject
mechanisms for real accountability, we may never know who killed
Rosemary Nelson, and defense attorney Patrick Finucane. And sadly the
police force may never be rid of those who may have condoned, helped
cover-up, or even took part in some of the most egregious human rights
abuses in Northern Ireland.
I strongly urge my colleagues to support this measure before us today
in order to express in the strongest terms possible to the British
government our support for implementation of the full Patten report and
its very modest recommendations for a ``new beginning in policing.''
[[Page H8167]]
Statement of Gerald W. Lynch, President, John Jay College of Criminal
Justice, The City University of New York, Before the Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (The Helsinki Commission), September
22, 2000
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe. I want to thank you for
the opportunity to present testimony regarding the work of
the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland,
commonly known as the Patten Commission. I would like to
discuss the Policing Bill which is before the British
Parliament.
When I was introduced to the then Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam, she said to me: ``How did you
get Ted Kennedy and Ronnie Flanagan to agree on you? (Sir
Ronnie Flanagan is the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster
Constabulary.) I told the Secretary that I believed they
agree on me because John Jay College has provided training
around the world emphasizing human rights and human dignity.
Moreover, John Jay has had an exchange of police and faculty
for 30 years with the British police, and for more than 20
years with the Garda--as well as an exchange with the R.U.C.
for over 20 years. Over that time there had been hundreds of
meetings and interactions among British, Irish and American
police and criminal-justice experts. The continuing dialogue
had generated an exchange of ideas and technology that was
totally professional--and totally non-partisan.
Many of John Jay's exchange scholars have risen to high
ranks in Britain, Ireland and America. The current
Commissioner of the police of New Scotland Yard, Sir John
Stevens, was the exchange scholar at John Jay for the Fall of
1984.
I am honored to have been selected to be a member of the
Patten Commission.
The Patten Report states that: ``the opportunity for a new
beginning to policing in Northern Ireland with a police
service capable of attracting and sustaining support from the
community as a whole . . . cannot be achieved unless the
reality that part of the community feels unable to identify
with the present name and symbols associated with the police
is addressed. . . . our proposals seek to achieve a situation
in which people can be British, Irish or Northern Irish, as
they wish, and all regard the police service as their own.
We therefore recommend:
The Royal Ulster Constabulary should henceforth be named
the Northern Ireland Police Service.
That the Northern Ireland Police Service adopt a new badge
and symbols which are entirely free from any association with
either the British or Irish states (We not that the Assembly
adopted a crest acceptable to all parties, namely, the symbol
of the flax)
That the union flag should not longer be flown from police
buildings
That, on those occasions on which it is appropriate to fly
a flag on police buildings, the flag should be that of
Northern Ireland Police Service, and it, too, should be free
from association with the British or Irish states''.
The Patten Commission worked for 15 months. We sought the
best professional models and practices for policing a divided
society in a democracy. We held meetings not only in Belfast,
Dublin, and London but in New York. Washington, California,
Canada, Belgium, Spain and South Africa. From the beginning,
we met with the police, clergy, politicians, civil-
libertarians and community groups. We went to police
headquarters. We visited every police sub-station in Northern
Ireland. We literally talked to thousands of police officers.
We held 40 hearings throughout Northern Ireland--the first
and only time such a commission went directly to the public.
These hearings were extremely tense. More than 10,000 people
attended. More than 1,000 spoke. Emotions ran high as they
described past cruelties and allegations of murder, torture
and brutality on both sides.
We listened. We heard the pain. We felt the suffering. We
understood the need to move on to a solution to help forge a
future in Northern Ireland that involved more than endless
re-creations of the terrible past.
We realized early in our deliberations that whatever we
recommended would need to pass muster not just in Britain and
Ireland but with police organizations worldwide.
Chris Patten said of his work on the Commission: ``It was
the most difficult, painful, and emotionally draining thing I
have ever done or would ever wish to do.'' I concur
completely.
The Patten report provides a framework on which a police
service built on a foundation of human rights can be
achieved. Again I quote, ``We recommended a comprehensive
program of action to focus policing in Northern Ireland on a
human rights-based approach.
Training will be one of the keys to instilling a human
rights-based approach into both new recruits and experienced
police personnel. We recommend that all police officers, and
police civilians, should be trained . . . in the fundamental
principles and standards of human rights and the practical
implications for policing. . . . We recommend the human
rights dimension should be integrated into every module of
police training''.
Another core issue which has not received the attention of
the media is the Patten Commission's recommendation that a
new police college be established in Northern Ireland.
Central to any organizations ability to imbue its members
with a focus on human rights is a facility at which to
conduct the necessary work and an appropriate curriculum. An
educated police officer is a better police officer.
The Patten Report stated: ``as a matter of priority, . . .
all members of the police service should be instructed in the
implications for policing of the Human Rights Act 1998, and
the wider context of the European Convention on Human Rights
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Human dignity
training, along the lines of that offered by John Jay College
in New York to the New York Police Department and police
services from some fifty countries, should also be provided.
Like community awareness training, human rights and human
dignity should not be seen as an add-on to training, but as a
consideration affecting all aspects of training.'' (Chapter
16.21)
The recommendations of the Patten Commission were
unanimous. It is crucial that the recommendations not be
cherry picked but be implemented in a cohesive and
constructive manner. The people of Northern Ireland deserve
no less than this new beginning for policing. Any significant
modifications will deprive them of this long awaited police
service capable of sustaining support from the community as a
whole.
____
Statement by Martin O'Brien, Committee on the Administration of
Justice, Belfast, Before the U.S. Congress Regarding Policing in
Northern Ireland, Friday, 22 September 2000
Thank you for your invitation to testify today. The
Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) is an
independent human rights organisation which draws its
membership from across the different communities in Northern
Ireland. CAJ works for a just and peaceful society where the
human rights of all are fully protected. In recognition of
its efforts to place human rights at the heart of the peace
process, CAJ was awarded the 1998 Human Rights Prize by the
then 40 Member States of the Council of Europe. We have a
broad remit which covers many conflict-related issues such as
prisoners, emergency law, miscarriages of justice, and also
issues such as fair employment, the rights of women and
children, people with disabilities, and the need for
effective government action to prevent racial discrimination.
Since our foundation in 1981, we have worked consistently
on issues of policing and, as early as 1995, CAJ argued for
an independent international commission to look into future
policing in Northern Ireland. Accordingly we worked hard to
ensure that the establishment of such a body would be
provided for in the Good Friday Agreement. We welcomed the
broad terms of reference given to the Commission by the
Agreement, and sought to work constructively with the
Commission as soon as it came into being, under the
chairmanship of the Chris Patten. We were fortunate in that
we had earlier secured funding from the Ford Foundation and
others to undertake a major comparative research project into
good policing around the world. The findings arising from
that study underpinned all our work with the Commission and
were, we believe--from a reading of the recommendations--
useful to the Commission in its work.
In testimony in September 1999 to Congress on the findings
of the Patten Commission, we concluded that: ``CAJ believes
that, in general terms, the Commission has made a very
genuine and constructive effort to meet the difficult task
imposed on it by the Agreement. They have put forward many
thoughtful and positive recommendations about the way
forward. Most importantly of all, they have recognized (as
did the Agreement itself) that just as human rights must be
at the heart of a just and peaceful society in Northern
Ireland, it must be at the heart of future policing
arrangements.''
CAJ went on, however, to outline for Congress, some of the
serious reservations we, and other human rights groups, had
regarding the omissions from the Patten report. Amongst other
things, we expressed concern as to the feasibility of
bringing about real changes to policing if emergency powers
are still retained, if plastic bullets are still deployed,
and if officers, known to have committed human rights abuses
in the past, remain as serving officers.
Despite these important shortcomings, however, the main
thrust of our submission at that time was to urge Congress to
use its best offices to push for speedy implementation of the
positive recommendations arising from Patten. Though Patten's
recommendations did not address everything that was needed
for genuine change, they gave a clear framework within which
change could occur, and they pointed all those interested in
fundamental reform in the right direction.
Unfortunately, as we said in our earlier testimony
``implementation is everything'', and in that context, CAJ
must report to Congress our profound disappointment at
developments since the publication of the Patten report. Our
concerns about implementation are twofold. First, many of the
changes Patten called for are long over-due, and speed is of
the essence. Second, and as important, a hesitant or
unwilling approach to major change--which is what we are
experiencing--feeds fears that change will be short-lived,
and indeed will be under-mined over the longer term.
One of the key findings of our earlier international
research was that political will is
[[Page H8168]]
always a determining factor in preventing or facilitating
successful change. Initially, it seemed to observers that the
necessary political will did in fact exist within government
for change. Yet, since the publication of the Patten report,
the signs have been ominous.
Patten called for the speedy appointment of an Oversight
Commissioner to oversee the pace and nature of change. The
Commission said ``we believe that a mechanism is needed to
oversee the changes required of all those involved in the
development of the new policing arrangements, and to
assure the community that all aspects of our report are
being implemented and being seen to be implemented''. This
recommendation was accepted by government, but Tom
Constantine was only appointed on 31 May 2000--almost nine
months after the Patten report was published. This tardy
appointment meant that the Commissioner was excluded from
scrutinising the draft legislation, played no part in the
detailed Implementation Plan prepared by the Northern
Ireland Office and the policing establishment, and has
still to appoint staff, take on a public profile, and
produce his first report.
Given this delay, any change that has taken place to date
has been dictated by those who have been responsible for
policing over the last 30 years and who have resisted change
in the past. Only a third or less of Patten's recommendations
resulted in proposals for legislative change, so that the
vast majority of the programme of change has been left to the
discretion of senior civil servants, and the Chief Constable.
Indeed, much of the change--whether in terms of police
training, police re-organisation, or in terms of crucial
decisions relating to Special Branch, detention centres, the
use of plastic bullets, or the extent of stop-and-search
activities--lies largely at the discretion of the Chief
Constable alone. Only with the appointment of a new Policing
Board (the political composition of which is as yet
uncertain), and/or an active and high profile Oversight
Commissioner, will people outside the policing establishment
be able to influence or assess the extent of real change
underway.
The slowness in appointing an external Oversight
Commissioner has left government open to the charge that the
nature and pace of change has been deliberately left in the
hands of those who have so mis-managed policing in the past.
This charge is not easily refuted. A study of the draft
legislation, for example, merely seems to confirm the view
that government is unwilling to put Patten's agenda into
practical effect. The draft legislation first presented to
the House of Commons in May was a very far cry from the
Patten report, and despite much lobbying, and extensive
changes in the course of the parliamentary process to date,
there is still a long way to go. (I would like, with the
Chair's permission, to have read into the record two
commentaries on the legislation. One is a short CAJ briefing
on the major outstanding concerns in the policing
legislation, and the other is a detailed series of amendments
which CAJ believes must be introduced if the legislation is
to faithfully reflect Patten).
Of course, to judge by official government statements, one
would have thought that government was fulfilling Patten in
its first draft legislative text in May. The same claim--to
be fulfilling Patten--was still being asserted in July (when,
by its own admission, it had already made 52 substantive
changes to bring the initial draft in line with Patten).
Further amendments have again been promised in the next few
weeks, prior to the House of Lords debate. However, on the
basis of CAJ's understanding to date, the changes that are to
be offered will still not deliver the Patten agenda.
If government does want to implement Patten, as it says it
does, why is it still resistant to a whole range of important
safeguards which Patten called for? Why is it impossible to
get government agreement to include explicit reference in the
legislation to a broad range of international human rights
norms and standards? What reason can there be for the
government denying any role to the NI Human Rights Commission
in advising on the police use of plastic bullets? Why are
effective inquiry powers for the Policing Board consistently
opposed? Why is the Secretary of State so adamant that the
Police Ombudsperson cannot have the powers to investigate
police policies and practices that Patten called for? Why was
the appointment of the Oversight Commissioner so long
delayed, and why is his term of office so curtailed in the
legislation?
There will be some that claim that government cannot move
fast on certain issues, precisely because Northern Ireland is
divided, and policing is a very divisive issue. While there
are, of course, many contentious issues (the name and
symbols, for example), none of the important issues listed
above divide nationalist and unionist. They do, however,
clearly divide those who want to defend the status quo, from
those who want a police service that is impartial,
representative, and accountable--able and willing to ensure
that the rule of law is upheld.
Some of the obstacles to real change can be detected by a
study of the parliamentary record. A government minister, in
the course of the Commons debate, resisted any amendments
that sought to make policing subject to international
human rights and standards. He said: ``Some appalling
human rights abuses . . . take place around the world.
Those low standards should not be compared with the past
activities of the RUC . . . The RUC carried out a
difficult job, often in impossible circumstances. Such
comparisons as might be made in the light of the amendment
could cause unnecessary offense. We might reasonably say
that, against the norms in question, the RUC has a good
record on human rights''. Government appears to reject
out-of-hand the many past reports of the United Nations,
and respected international non-governmental
organizations, which criticised the RUC. This stance
presumably explains the legislation's failure to address
the legacy of the past. Yet, if government is unwilling to
admit past problems, can the necessary change occur?
CAJ's fears about the pace and nature of policing change
are further heightened by the government's approach to the
separate but complementary Chemical Justice Review (also
established as part of the Good Friday Agreement). The
interrelationship between policing and the criminal justice
system is self-evident. Accordingly, it is extremely
disturbing to have to report to Congress that CAJ has serious
concerns about the nature and pace of change proposed in the
criminal justice sphere also. A new appointment system for
judges, changes to the prosecution service, and a re-vamping
of the criminal justice system generally, are long-overdue
changes. The government timetable clearly does not recognise
any urgency; CAJ, however, feels that Northern Ireland cannot
afford any further delay.
Of course, change is inevitably difficult; and change of
the scale and nature required in Northern Ireland is
particularly difficult. We urge the US Congress to use its
best endeavours to lend its support to the UK and Irish
governments as they work, with local politicians, to develop
a more just and peaceful society in Northern Ireland. In
particular, we hope that Congress would work, both directly,
and--as appropriate--in conjunction with the US
Administration, to:
1. Urge the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to amend the draft
legislation to ensure that it reflects both the letter and
spirit of Patten. Urge that the legislation conform in
particular, to Patten's exhortation that ``the fundamental
purpose of policing should be, in the words of the Agreement,
the protection and vindication of the human rights of all''.
Congress should make it clear that future US-UK policing
cooperation is dependent to a large extent on Patten's
recommendations being fully implemented.
2. Congress should urge the UK and Irish governments to
recognise the importance of greater external oversight of the
transition process, and ask that the Oversight Commissioner
be accorded the resources and remit necessary to this vital
work.
3. Congress should commit itself to monitoring developments
closely in the coming months, and urge the US Administration
to do the same. Congress may, for example, want to consider
holding further Hearings in due course to receive a progress
report on developments.
To conclude, I hardly need to remind the Chairperson that,
defence lawyer and CAJ executive member, Rosemary Nelson,
testified before him and other members of Congress on issues
of policing almost two years ago--on the 29 September 1998.
The concerns she raised in her testimony, her terrible
murder a short while later, and the subsequent police
investigation, remind us--if we need reminding--that policing
change in Northern Ireland is not an abstract or intellectual
debate. It is about the lives of real people. We must bring
about policing change in Northern Ireland; and we must ensure
that that change is right.
Everything that the US Congress can do to help those of us
on the ground secure such change will, as always, be greatly
appreciated.
Thank you.
____
Testimony of Elisa Massimino, Director, Washington Office, Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, on Protecting Human Rights and Securing
Peace in Northern Ireland: the Vital Role of Police Reform, September
22, 2000
I. introduction
Chairman Smith and members of the Commission, thankyou for
inviting me to testify today. You have been a true champion
of human rights in the Congress, and you and your dedicated
staff have done so much to shine a spotlight on human rights
problems in Northern Ireland and around the world. Your
leadership on these issues has made a real difference. We
want to take this opportunity to commend you for this
important work, and to thank you.
The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights has been working to
advance human rights in Northern Ireland since 1990. We have
published a number of reports about the intimidation and
murder of defense lawyers in Northern Ireland, with
particular focus on the cases of solicitors Patrick Finucane
and Rosemary Nelson. As you know well, the precarious
situation of defense lawyers in Northern Ireland is closely
linked to the emergency law system and to the conduct of the
police. For the last year and a half, we have paid special
attention to the peace process in Northern Ireland and, in
particular, the central issue of police reform. We appreciate
the opportunity to be here today to share with you our views
on the status of efforts by the British Government to
implement the recommendations made by the Patten Commission.
ii. the patten commission recommendations and the pending Police Bill
The Patten Commission's mandate was as ambitious as it was
critically important to
[[Page H8169]]
Northern's Ireland's future. The Good Friday Agreement called
on the Commission to propose a new structure for policing in
Northern Ireland that would make the police service
accountable, representative of the society in policies and
reflective of principles of human rights. (The Agreement,
Policing and Justice, para. 2)
Although we were disappointed that the Patten Commission
did not directly address some key issues, such as the
continued use of emergency powers, which provides the
breeding ground for many of the human rights abuses that
persist in Northern Ireland, we believe that, on the whole,
the Patten Commission successfully integrated human rights
principles into its program for reform. The Patten Commission
Report provides a clear roadmap for building an effective and
publicly-supported police force. If the British Government
were to fully implement the Patten Commission's
recommendations, it could make Northern Ireland a model for
other civil societies transitioning from conflict to peace.
But unfortunately, the British Government has taken a
different path. Despite more than 50 substantive amendments,
the bill now pending in Parliament that is meant to implement
the Patten Commission recommendations falls far short of
doing so. There are serious deficiencies in the legislation
now under consideration, many of which have been discussed in
detail by my colleagues on this panel. But I would like to
highlight three issues regarding the Police Bill that are of
particular concern to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights
because they directly undermine the central principles of
accountability and human rights around which the Patten
Commission recommendations revolve. Last month in a letter
to Peter Mandelson, the Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland, we raised these and other concerns in detail. I
would like to submit a copy of that letter, dated August
16th, for your review and for the record.
A. Limitations on the policing board and police ombudsman
The Policing Board and the Police Ombudsman are entities
intended to be responsible for monitoring police conduct. The
current Police Bill, however, places crippling limitations on
these bodies that would significantly reduce their
effectiveness. For example, the Bill would undermine the
Policing Board's ability to conduct reviews of ongoing police
operations. Likewise, the Bill fails to clearly provide the
authority for the Police Ombudsman to investigate police
practices and policies, in addition to allegations of past
abuse. A credible system of investigation and inquiry into
alleged abuses and abusive practices is one of the best
guardians against such practices. But if the Police Bill is
approved in its current form, with significant limitations on
the powers of the Policing Board and Ombudsman, the capacity
for creating such a system will be severely limited.
B. The oversight commissioner
Implementation of the Patten Commission reforms was thought
by no one to be a simple task, which is why the position of
Oversight Commissioner was viewed as so important. But the
long delay in appointing an individual to serve in that post,
and the limitations that have been placed on his mandate,
create formidable barriers to his effectiveness. In part due
to the delay in his appointment, the Oversight Commissioner
has played no role in the process of drafting the Police
Bill. The British Government published its Implementation
Plan before the Oversight Commissioner was even appointed;
the RUC likewise came up with its own ``Programme for
Change'' with no input from the Oversight Commissioner. These
two documents, which purport to guide the implementation of
the Patten Commission recommendations, appear now to be the
measuring stick by which the Oversight Commissioner intends
to judge implementation. And yet these plans--the
Government's and the RUC's--do not themselves fully implement
the Patten Commission recommendations. This seems to us to
relegate the role of the Oversight Commissioner to that of
making sure that the police follow through on the changes
they decide they want to undertake--a far cry from ensuring
that the Patten Commission reforms are truly implemented.
C. Reference to international human rights standards
Although the British Government has repeatedly asserted
that it ``recognizes the importance of human rights,'' its
ongoing resistance to inserting reference to international
human rights standards into the language of the Police Bill
raises serious questions. The conduct of police in Northern
Ireland has been the subject of numerous reports by non-
governmental human rights organizations and UN bodies,
including by Dato' Param Cumaraswamy, the UN Special
Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers. Many of
these reports have concluded that police conduct in Northern
Ireland violates internationally recognized human rights
standards. Chairman Patten, in his statement accompanying the
release of the Commission's report, highlighted the central
importance of human rights standards to the Commission's
approach to police reform: ``We recommend a comprehensive
programme of action to focus on policing in Northern Ireland
on a human rights-based approach. We see the upholding of
fundamental human rights as the very purpose of policing, and
we propose that it should be instilled in all officers from
the start--in the oath they take, in their training, and in
their codes of practice and in their performance appraisal
system.'' In light of this clear statement of the human
rights foundations of the Patten Commission's
recommendations, the failure to incorporate reference to
international human rights standards into the Police Bill is
striking.
The failure of the British Government to adequately address
these concerns with the Police Bill, combined with the slow
pace of other reform measures, has already led to an erosion
of confidence in the ongoing process and doubts about the
Government's intentions. Many who support reform have begun
to wonder whether the Government is abandoning its stated
intention to fully implement the Patten Commission
recommendations. This perception will have serious
consequences for the long-term prospects for peace. For
example, under the Patten Commission proposals, 600 police
officers were supported to volunteer to retire by the end of
next month. This proposal was based on the assumption that
adequate compensation would be offered as an incentive to
retire. But so far, only 91 officers have come forward to
volunteer. According to a Police Federation spokesman quoted
in a recent article in the Daily Telegraph, the Government
has stated that no officer should benefit beyond the sum they
would earn if they remained on the force. When the Police
Federation asked the Government what incentive this would
give officers to retire, they were not given a credible
answer. I would ask that a copy of this September 10th
article be included in the record of this hearing.
iii. breaking the cycle of impunity
As so many societies transitioning from conflict to peace
have learned, building a culture of human rights and
accountability will require having a process for addressing
past violations. Because we believe that future progress in
developing a rights-sensitive police force in Northern
Ireland depends on breaking the existing cycle of impunity,
we urged the Patten Commission to make recommendations to the
British Government in two specific cases: the 1989 murder of
Patrick Finucane and the murder of Rosemary Nelson last year.
We regret that the Commission's report was silent with
respect to these cases. While we understand Mr. Patten's
conclusion that the Commission's work was ``forward-
looking,'' our own experience in situations such as these has
been that societies cannot reconcile until the legacy of past
abuses is squarely confronted. Although it is clear that not
all of these abuses can be addressed or rectified, there are
certain cases that embody the most profoundly entrenched
practices and problems that the peace process seeks to
overcome. If a solid foundation for the future is to be laid,
these cases must be resolved.
For this reason, we urge the Helsinki Commission to
continue its vigilant attention to the Finucane and Nelson
case, at the same time as it examines broader reforms
proposed by the Patten Commission. Because I know you
share our keen interest in these two cases, Chairman
Smith, I will devote the remainder of my testimony to
summarizing the current status of those cases.
A. Patrick Finucane
Now is a critical moment in the struggle for justice in the
Finucane case. As you know, the Lawyers Committee has done
extensive research into the circumstances surrounding the
murder and has concluded that there is compelling evidence to
suggest that British Army intelligence and the RUC were
complicit in the murder. Three weeks ago, Prime Minister Tony
Blair met with the family of Mr. Finucane. The meeting was
brokered by Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, who himself endorsed an
independent inquiry after meeting with the Finucane family in
February. During that meeting, Mr. Ahern was provided with a
new report by British Irish Rights Watch (BIRW) that details
further credible evidence of collusion. Although the same
report was provided to the British Government, there has yet
to be a reply to the substance of the allegations in the
report.
Nonetheless, during the meeting this month with Prime
Minister Blair, members of the Finucane family, along with
Paul Mageean from CAJ and Jane Winter from BIRW, presented
the BIRW report and other information supporting the
allegation of official collusion in the murder of Mr.
Finucane. Mr. Blair appeared to be deeply concerned by the
allegations and pledged that he would read and consider all
the evidence. He conveyed to the Finucane family that he
``personally'' wants to know if the allegations are true and
would put anyone guilty of collusion ``out of a job.''
On September 8th, we wrote a letter to Prime Minister Blair
to urge him to authorize an independent inquiry. As we stated
in the letter, ``We firmly believe that such an independent
public inquiry will serve both to help learn the truth about
the circumstances surrounding the murder and to publicly
confirm [the British] government's commitment to establishing
official accountability for human rights abuses.'' I have
included a copy of our letter to Prime Minister Blair with my
testimony and ask that it be included in the record.
Establishment of an independent inquiry would be a
significant breakthrough, and we urge you, Chairman Smith,
and your colleagues in the Congress to do all you can to
encourage Mr. Blair to make this decision.
[[Page H8170]]
A look at the current status of the Stevens investigation
reveals how desperately necessary such an independent inquiry
is in this case. The current 18 month-long inquiry is the
third such investigation by Mr. Stevens, who began the first
of these investigations in 1990.
As we have testified previously, we believe the Steven's
investigation is inadequate and lacks the capacity to uncover
the truth about allegations of official collusion in the
murder. As you may recall, we reported to you last March that
Mr. Steven had arrested and brought murder charges against
William Stobie, a former UDA quartermaster who worked or RUC
Special Branch, in June 1999. At Mr. Stobie's bail hearing,
lawyer for the Crown told the high court that recent
statements made by journalist Neil Mulholland led to Stobie's
arrest. However, Mr. Stobie's lawyer revealed at the bail
hearing that Stobie had been interviewed in 1990 for more
than 40 hours by members of the RUC Special Branch. These
interviews, which included Stobie's confession to supplying
the weapons used in the murder, were transcribed and have
been available to the authorities since 1990. Among other
things, these notes identify the names of the members of the
RUC Special Branch who had been warned about the murder. At
that time, the authorities never charged Stobie with murder,
and the Director of Public Prosecutions dropped unrelated
firearms charges against him in 1991.
Since the last congressional hearing into these matters,
the charges against Mr. Stobie have been lessened to aiding
and abetting murder. We have also learned that a key witness
in the prosecution of Mr. Stobie may no longer be available
and the charges against Mr. Stobie may be dropped entirely.
If brought to trial, Mr. Stobie reportedly intends to reveal
the full extent of the RUC's involvement in the murder of Mr.
Finucane.
This past August, Mr. Steven's team, now directed by
Commander Hugh Orde, seized thousands of intelligence
documents from British army headquarters revealing new
evidence of Loyalist and military collusion in the murder of
Mr. Finucane that reportedly will be used to arrest new
suspects. This new development contrasts with the 1995
decision of the Director of Public Prosecutions not to
prosecute anyone from the military. This decision was reached
despite evidence of collusion arising out of information
relating to Brian Nelson, a double agent recruited by British
Army Intelligence while he served as chief intelligence
officer for the Ulster Defense Association. The recent
discovery of these intelligence documents also suggests the
involvement of Brigadier John Gordon Kerr. Mr. Kerr, now a
British military attache in Beijing, oversaw Brian Nelson at
the time of the Finucane murder and allegedly gave testimony
during the inquest of Mr. Finucane under the pseudonym
Colonel J.
Despite compelling evidence that appears to suggest the
identities of the intellectual authors of the murder, the
Stevens inquiry continues to drag on. Establishment of an
independent inquiry would finally ensure that the allegations
of official collusion in the murder are squarely addressed.
B. Rosemary Nelson
In addition to the Finucane case, the Lawyers Committee
also believes that the British Government should authorize an
independent inquiry into the murder of defense lawyer
Rosemary Nelson. We view resolution of her case as essential
to the success of new accountability mechanisms in Northern
Ireland.
As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, Loyalist paramilitaries
claimed responsibility for the murder of Rosemary Nelson, who
was killed by a car bomb on March 15, 1999. Prior to her
death, Ms. Nelson received numerous death threats,
including those made by RUC officers relayed through her
clients. Ms. Nelson never received government protection
despite many appeals made to the Northern Ireland Office
and the RUC to protect her life, including those made by
Dato' Param Cumaraswamy, United Nations Special Rapporteur
on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers. During the time
that Ms. Nelson became a target of official harassment,
she herself became an outspoken critic of the RUC, and,
thanks to you Chairman Smith, was able to bring her case
all the way to the U.S. Congress. At that time, she
expressed deep fear regarding her safety and that of her
family.
The current criminal investigation of Ms. Nelson's murder
is lead by London detective Colin Port and has been underway
for almost a year and a half. To date, the investigation team
has taken 1,700 statements, spoken to more than 7,000
potential witnesses and unearthed 7,000 lines of inquiry, but
has yet to charge anyone in connection with the murder.
Because Mr. Port's investigation is limited to the specific
circumstances of the murder, we do not believe that his team
can effectively address the larger issue of who authored the
crime and whether official collusion was involved.
Furthermore, Mr. Port does not address the threats made
against Ms. Nelson by RUC officers, and this practice
continues today.
In the past we have expressed concern regarding the British
Government's inadequate response to Ms. Nelson's situation,
not only regarding the failure to provide her protection but
also to discipline those officers alleged to have harassed
her. We believe that both of these issues must be addressed
if the new accountability structures established by the
Police Bill are to be effective.
In particular, the new Police Ombudsmen office must be able
to have full power and independence to investigate complaints
against the new police force. As we have shared with you in
previous testimonies, the RUC's investigation into Ms.
Nelson's complaints were found to be inadequate and
unsatisfactory by the Independent Commission for Police
Complaints (ICPC). The file sent to the Director of Public
Prosecution failed to provide sufficient evidence to support
prosecution or discipline and these officers still serve as
police officers. Colleagues of Ms. Nelson viewed hers as the
``test case,'' and Ms. Nelson allegedly filed her complaint
to test the adequacy of the system. To be effective, the new
Ombudsman will have the added challenge of proving to those
subject to police harassment that they can place their
confidence in the investigation mechanism.
Our deep concern regarding accountability mechanisms in
Northern Ireland has intensified since we recently learned
that another lawyer was under threat and has been the target
of harassment and threats by the RUC. Solicitor Padraigan
Drinan was Rosemary Nelson's colleague and took on some of
Ms. Nelson's cases after her death. To those who want to
focus on the future, I would like to emphasize that today
that the British government still has the opportunity to
avert another tragedy. But it must make sure that it learns
the lesson from past errors and uses them to correct a system
that has completely failed to protect its citizens against
police abuse.
iv. conclusion
Lasting peace cannot take hold in Northern Ireland until
the British Government demonstrates the willingness and
ability to secure justice for the families of Rosemary Nelson
and Patrick Finucane and a commitment to creating a
representative and accountable police force for Northern
Ireland's future. Thank you.
____
Why Failing to Implement the Patten Report Matters
(By Professor Brendan O'Leary)
The present political position in Northern Ireland
The Belfast Agreement of April 10, 1998 was a major
achievement (O'Leary 1999a). Novel institution-building was
flanked by peace and confidence-building processes involving
cease-fires by paramilitary organisations, the release of
their incarcerated prisoners, and commitments to protect
human rights, entrench equality, demilitarise the region,
assist in decommissioning by the proxies of paramilitaries,
and the reform of the administration of justice and policing.
Implementing the Agreement was always going to be
difficult. But as I deliver this testimony just four items,
all in the domain of confidence-building, await full or
effective beginnings in implementation. These are:
1. Decommissioning by republican and loyalist
paramilitaries;
2. The reform of the system of criminal justice;
3. Demilitarization; and
4. Policing reform.
These items are inter-linked. Full demilitarization and
full decommissioning are mutually interdependent.
Decommissioning--the timetable for which has been postponed
by the agreement of the parties who made the Agreement--is
seen in republican circles as conditional on the UK
government fulfilling its public promises to implement the
Patten Report. A specific promise is said to have been given
to that effect in Spring 2000--amidst negotiations that
linked police reform, decommissioning and the lifting of the
suspension of the Agreement's institutions unilaterally
imposed by the UK Secretary of State in February (a measure
that in many eyes breached international law).
The UK government states that it is implementing the Patten
Report in full. Indeed its Prime Minister, the Secretary of
State for Northern Ireland, and the Explanatory Notes issued
by the Northern Ireland Office accompanying the Police Bill
currently before the UK Parliament, flatly declare their
intention to give effect to the recommendations of the Patten
Commission. That has not been true, and is still manifestly
not true.
In contrast the UK government often implies, usually in
off-the-record briefings, that it cannot implement the Patten
Report in full because of the `security situation'. This more
honest position, albeit in dissembling contradiction with its
official one, would have credibility if the necessary
preparatory legislative and managerial steps to implement
Patten in full when the security situation is satisfactory
had been taken. They have not.
Why the Patten Report was necessary, and its recommendations
Policing has been so controversial that the parties to the
Agreement could not concur on future arrangements (McGarry
and O'Leary 1999). The former Irish prime minister, Dr.
Garret FitzGerald, has described policing in Northern Ireland
as having the status of Jerusalem in the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process (FitzGerald 2000). The parties did agree the
terms of reference of an Independent Commission on policing,
eventually chaired by Christopher Patten, a former
Conservative minister in the region and now a European
Commissioner.
To have effective police rooted in, and legitimate with,
both major communities was vital to the new settlement. It
would persuade all citizens that law enforcement
[[Page H8171]]
would be applied impartially, help extirpate that species of
paramilitarism that is becoming an exclusively criminal
enterprise, and foster a law-abiding climate in which to
conduct business.
Eight criteria for policing arrangements were mandated in
the Belfast Agreement. They were to be:
1. Impartial;
2. Representative;
3. Free from partisan political control;
4. Efficient and effective;
5. Infused with a human rights culture;
6. Decentralised;
7. Democratically accountable `at all levels'; and
8. Consistent with the letter and the spirit of the Belfast
Agreement.
The Patten Commission engaged in extensive research and
interaction with the affected parties, interest groups and
citizens, and published its report in September 1999. It did
not, and could not, meet the hopes, or match the fears, of
all; but the Commissioners, a distinguished and
representative array of domestic and international personnel,
undoubtedly met the terms of reference of the Agreement
(O'Leary 1999b).
The Patten Report was a thorough, careful and imaginative
compromise between unionists who maintained that the existing
RUC already met the terms of reference of the Agreement and
those nationalists, especially republicans, who maintained
that the RUC's record mandated its disbanding. The Report was
not, however, simply designed to address the concerns of
policing Northern Ireland. It applied state-of-the-art
managerial and democratic thinking in its recommendations
(O'Leary 1999b).
The UK Government welcomed the Patten Report and promised
to implement it. However the Police Bill presented to
Parliament in the Spring of 2000 was an evisceration of
Patten, and condemned as such by the SDLP, Sinn Fein, the
Womens' Coalition, the Catholic Church, non-governmental and
human rights organizations, such as the Committee on the
Administration of Justice. It was also criticized by the
Irish Government, the U.S. House of Representatives (H. Res.
447, 106th Congress), and a range of Irish Americans,
including apparently, President Clinton.
To demonstrate the veracity of the critics' complaints let
me briefly compare some of Patten's recommendations with the
original Bill.
Impartiality: Patten recommended a neutral name, the
Northern Ireland Police Service. The Royal Ulster
Constabulary was not a neutral title so it was recommended to
go, period. Patten also recommended that the display of the
Union flag and the portrait of the Queen at police stations
should go--symbols in his view should be `free from
association with the British or Irish states'. These
recommendations were a consequence of Patten's terms of
reference, and of the Agreement's explicit commitment to
establishing `parity of esteem' between the national
traditions, and the UK's solemn commitment to `rigorous
impartiality' in its administration.
The original Bill proposed that the Secretary of State have
the power to decide on the issues of names and emblems, and
thereby ignored Patten's explicit recommendations.
Representativeness: Patten recommended affirmative action
to change rapidly the proportion of cultural Catholics in the
police, and envisaged a programme of at least ten-years. Even
critics of affirmative action recognized the need to correct
the existing imbalance--in which over 90 per cent of the
police are local cultural Protestants.
The original Bill reduced the period in which the police
would be recruited on a 50:50 ratio of cultural Catholics and
cultural Protestants to three years, requiring the Secretary
of State to make any extension, and was silent on
`aggregation', Patten's proposed policy for shortfalls in the
recruitment of suitably qualified cultural Catholics.
Freedom for partisan control. Patten proposed a Policing
Board consisting of 10 representatives from political
parties, in proportion to their shares of seats on the
Executive, and 9 members nominated by the First and Deputy
First Ministers. These recommendations guaranteed a
politically representative board in which neither unionists
nor nationalists would have partisan control.
The original Bill introduced a requirement that the Board
should operate according to a weighted majority when
recommending an inquiry. Given known political dispositions
this was tantamount to giving unionist and unionist-nominated
members a veto over inquiries, i.e. partisan political
control, and therefore a direct violation of Patten's terms
of reference.
Efficient and effective policing. Patten avoided false
economies when recommending a down-sizing of the service,
advocated a strong Board empowered to set performance
targets, and proposed enabling local District Policing
Partnership Boards to engage in the market-testing of police
effectiveness.
The original Bill empowered the Secretary of State, not the
Board, to set performance targets, made no statutory
provision for disbanding the police reserve, and deflated the
proposed District Policing Partnership Boards--apparently
because of assertions that they would lead to paramilitaries
being subsidized by tax-payers.
Human Rights Culture. Patten proposed that new and serving
officers should have knowledge of human rights built into
their training, and re-training, and their codes of practice.
In addition to the European Convention, due to become part of
UK domestic law, the Commission held out international norms
as benchmarks: ``compliance . . . with international human
rights standards . . . are . . . an important safeguard both
to the public and to police officers carrying out their
duties'' (Patten, 1999, para 5.17). Patten's proposals for
normalizing the police--through dissolving the special branch
into criminal investigations--and demilitarizing the police
met the Agreement's human rights objectives.
The original Bill was a parody of Patten. The new oath was
to be confined to new officers. No standards of rights higher
than those in the European Convention were to be incorporated
into police training and practice. Responsibility for a Code
of Ethics was left with the Chief Constable. It explicitly
excluded Patten's proposed requirement that the oath of
service `respect the traditions and beliefs of people'.
Normalization and demilitarization were left unclear in the
Bill and the Implementation Plan.
Decentralization: Patten envisaged enabling local
governments to influence the Policing Board through their own
District Policing Partnership Boards, and giving the latter
powers `to purchase additional services from the police or
statutory agencies, or from the private sector', and matching
police internal management units to local government
districts.
The original Bill, by contrast, maintained or strengthened
centralization in several ways. The Secretary of State
obtained powers that Patten had proposed for the First and
Deputy First Ministers and the Board, and powers to issue
instructions to District Policing Partnership Boards; and
neither the Bill nor the Implementation Plan contained clear
plans to implement the proposed experiment in community
policing.
Democratic Accountability. Patten envisaged a strong,
independent and powerful Board to hold the police to account,
and to replace the existing and discredited Police Authority
(Patten, 1999:para 6.23), and recommended an institutional
design to ensure that policing would be the responsibility of
a plurality of networked organizations rather than the
monopoly of a police force. The police would have
`operational responsibility' but be held to account by a
powerful Board, and required to interact with the Human
Rights Commission, the Ombudsman and the Equality Commission.
The Bill radically watered down Patten's proposals,
empowering the Secretary of State to oversee and veto the
Board's powers, empowering the Chief Constable to refuse to
respond to reasonable requests from the Board, preventing the
Board from making inquiries into past misconduct, and
obligating it to have a weighted majority before inquiring
into present or future misconduct. Astonishingly this led the
existing discredited Policing Authority, correctly, to
condemn the Bill, a response that no one could have predicted
when the UK Government welcomed Patten.
Matching the Agreement? Patten was consistent with the
terms of reference and spirit of the Belfast Agreement. The
original Bill was not, being incompatible with the `parity of
esteem' and `rigorous impartiality' in administration
promised by the UK Government. Manifestly it could not
encourage `widespread community support' since it fell far
short of the compromise that moderate nationalists had
accepted and that Patten had proposed to mark a `new
beginning'.
Waiting for Explanations. What explains the radical
discrepancy between Patten and the original Bill?
The short answer is that the Bill was drafted by the
Northern Ireland Office's officials under Secretary of State
Peter Mandelson's supervision. They appeared to `forget' that
the terms of reference came from the Belfast Agreement, and
that Patten's recommendations represented a careful and
rigorous compromise between unionists and nationalists.
Indeed they appear to have treated the Patten Report as a
nationalist report which they should appropriately modify as
benign mediators.
Even though Patten explicitly warned against `cherry-
picking' the Secretary of State and his officials believed
that they had the right to implement what they found
acceptable, and to leave aside what they found unacceptable,
premature, or likely to cause difficulties for pro-Agreement
unionists or the RUC.
The Bill suggested that the UK government was:
Determined to avoid the police being subject to rigorous
democratic accountability,
Deeply distrustful of the capacity of the local parties to
manage policing at any level, and
Concerned to minimise the difficulties that the partial
implementation of Patten would occasion for First Minister
David Trimble and his party, the Ulster Unionists, by
mininising radical change and emphasising the extent to which
the `new' service would be a mere reform of the RUC.
Under pressure the UK Government has retreated: whether to
a position prepared in advance only others can know, but
skilled political management is not something I shall
criticise it for.
From Evisceration to `Patten Light'. Accusing its critics
of `hype', `rhetoric' and`hyerbole' the UK Government
promised to `listen' and to modify the Bill. Mr. Mandelson
declared that he might have been too cautious in the powers
granted the Policing Board. Indeed the Government was
subsequently to accept over 60 SDLP-driven
[[Page H8172]]
amendments to bring the Bill more into line with Patten.
This, of course, demonstrated that its original `spin' had
been a lie. Since the Bill was so extensively modified--as
the Government now proudly advertises--it confirms that the
original Bill was radically defective in relation to its
declared objectives, for reasons that remain unexplained.
The Bill was improved in the Commons Committee stage, but
insufficiently. The quota for the recruitment of cultural
Catholics is now better protected. The Policing Board has
been given power over the setting of short-run objectives,
and final responsibility for the police's code of ethics.
Consultation procedures involving the Ombudsman and the
Equality Commission have been strengthened, and the First and
Deputy First Ministers will now be consulted over the
appointment of non-party members to the Board. The weighted
majority provisions for an inquiry by the Board have gone,
replaced by the lower hurdle of an absolute majority.
Yet any honest external appraisal of the modified Bill must
report that it is still not the whole Patten. If the first
draft eviscerated Patten, the latest version of presents a
mostly bloodless ghost. The modified Bill rectifies some of
the more overt deviations from Patten, but on the crucial
issues of police accountability and ensuring a `new
beginning' it remains at odds with Patten's explicit
recommendations.
As the Bill is about to recommence its progress through the
Lords, the UK Government has started to shift its public
relations. The new line is that the `full Patten' would
render the police less effective, e.g., in dealing with
criminal paramilitarism. The implication is that anyone who
disagrees must be soft on crime (and its paramilitary
causes). The new line lacks credibility: Patten combined `the
new public management' and democratic values in a rigorous
formula to ensure no trade-off between effectiveness and
accountability.
Let me identify just some of the outstanding respects in
which the modified Bill fails to implement Patten.
Oversight Commissioner. Patten recommended an Oversight
Commissioner to `supervise the implementation of our
recommendations'. The UK Government has--under pressure--put
the commissioner's office on a statutory basis, which it did
not intend to do originally, but has confined his role to
overseeing changes `decided by the Government'. If Mr.
Mandelson and his colleagues were committed to Patten they
would charge the Commissioner with recommending, now or in
the future, any legislative and management changes necessary
for the full and effective implementation of the Patten
Report. That he refuses to do so speaks volumes. In addition
the Commissioner's role currently remains poorly specified.
Since the Commissioner is a former US policeman. American
government pressure might appropriately be directed towards
explicitly giving his office the remit that Patten envisaged.
Policing Board. Patten recommended a Policing Board to hold
the police to account, and to initiate inquiries into police
conduct and practices. Mr. Mandelson has prevented the Board
from inquiring into any act or omission arising before the
eventual Act applies (clause 58 (11) of the Bill). I believe
that this is tantamount to an undeclared amnesty for past
police misconduct, not proposed by Patten. Personally I would
not object to an open amnesty, but this step is dishonest,
and makes it much less likely that `rotten apples' will be
rooted out, as promised.
The Secretary of State will now have the extraordinary
power to prevent inquiries by the Board because they `would
serve no useful purpose', a power added at the Report stage
in the Commons--needless to say not in Patten. The only
rational explanation for this power is that the Government
has chosen to compensate itself for the concessions it made
in the Commons Committee when it expanded the Board's remit
to be more in line with Patten. So what it has given with one
hand, on the grounds that it had been too cautious, it has
taken away with two clumsy feet.
The Secretary of State will additionally have the authority
to approve or veto the person appointed to conduct any
inquiry (clause 58 (9)). And he intends having power to order
the Chief Constable to take steps in the interests of
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness, whereas Patten
envisaged this role for the Board.
The UK Government suggests its critics are petty. Its line
is `Look how much we have done to implement Patten, and how
radical Patten is by comparison with elsewhere'. This `spin'
is utterly unconvincing. The proposed arrangements would
effectively seal off past, present and future avenues through
which the police might be held to account for misconduct;
they are recipes for leaving them outside the effective ambit
of the law, and of managerial scrutiny.
And be it noted: Patten is not radical, especially not by
the standards of North America. Canada and the USA have long
made their police democratically accountable and socially
representative. Patten is only radical by the past standards
of Northern Ireland.
Ombudsman. Patten recommended that the Ombudsman should
have significant powers (Patten, 1999, para 6.42) and should
`exercise the right to investigate and comment on police
policies and practices', whereas in the modified Bill the
Ombudsman may make reports, but not investigate (so it is not
a crime to obstruct her work). The Ombudsman is additionally
restricted in her retrospective powers (clause 62), once
again circumscribing the police's accountability for past
misconduct.
Name and Symbols. Patten wanted a police rooted in both
communities, not just one. That is why he recommended that
the name of the service be entirely new: The Northern Ireland
Police Service.
The Bill, as a result of a Government decision to accept an
amendment tabled by the Ulster Unionist Party, currently
styles the service `The Police Service of Northern Ireland
(incorporating the Royal Ulster Constabulary)'. The Secretary
of State promised an amendment to define `for operational
purposes'--to ensure that the full title would rarely be
used, and that the parenthetic past generally be excluded. He
broke this commitment at Report Stage.
Secretary of State Mandelson has been mendaciously
misleading in declaring that he is merely following Patten's
wishes that the new service be connected to the old and avoid
suggestions of disbanding. This line is a characteristic
half-truth: Patten proposed an entirely new and fresh name,
and proposed linkages between the old and new services
through police memorials, and not the re-naming proposed by
Ken Maginnis, MP, Security Spokesman for the Ulster Unionist
Party.
Patten unambiguously recommended that the police's new
badge and emblems be free of association with the British or
Irish states, and that the Union flag should not fly from
police buildings. The Bill postpones these matters.
Why do these symbolic issues matter? Simply because the
best way to win widespread acceptance for police reform is to
confirm Patten's promised new beginning by following his
proposed strategy of symbolic neutrality. Full re-naming and
symbolic neutrality would spell a double message: that the
new police is to be everyone's police, and the new police is
no longer to be primarily the unionists' police. This
symbolic shift would mightily assist in obtaining
representative cultural Catholic recruitment and in winning
consent for the new order amongst nationalists as well as
unionists. Not to follow Patten's recommendations in these
respects would also spell a double message: that the new
police is merely the old RUC re-touched, and remains a police
linked more to British than Irish identity, i.e. a recipe for
the status quo ante.
Consuequences of Failing to Implement Patten in Full.
Unless the UK Government makes provision for Patten to be
fully implemented, there will be grave consequences.
Disaster may come in two forms. Its weakest form is taking
shape. The SDLP, Sinn Fein and the Catholic Church are most
unlikely to recommend that their constituents consider
joining the police, and may well boycott the Policing Board
and District Policing Partnership Boards. That will leave the
police without Patten's promised `new beginning', lacking
full legitimacy with just less than half of the local
electorate, an institutional booby-trap.
We must not forget that over three hundred police were
killed in the current conflict, but we must also not forget
that the outbreak of armed conflict in 1969 was partly caused
by an unreformed, half-legitimate police service, responsible
for seven of the first eight deaths.
In its strongest form disaster would de-couple nationalists
and republicans from the Agreement, and bring down its
political institutions. Failure to deliver Patten will mean
that Sinn Fein will find it extremely difficult to get the
IRA to go further in decommissioning. The argument will be:
`The UK Government has reneged on a fundamental commitment
under the Agreement so why should republicans disarm and
leave people to be policed by an unreformed service?' In turn
that will lead to unionist calls for the exclusion of Sinn
Fein from ministerial office, and to a repeat of Mr.
Trimble's gambit used earlier this year: `decommission now or
I'll resign now'.
The day before I flew to Washington I was in Northern
Ireland and watched Mr. Trimble in effect repeat this threat
in the Assembly under challenge from his hard-line unionist
opponents. If decommissioning does not happen because of
Secretary of State Mandelson's failure to deliver fully on
Patten, the SDLP will not be able or willing to help
prioritize decommissioning, unless it prefers electoral
suicide. The IRA will find it difficult to prevent further
departures to the Real and Continuity IRAs, except by
refusing to budge on arms. In turn that will at some stage
prompt a resignation threat from the First Minister. In
short, a second collapse of the Agreement's institutions
looms.
This vista and worse can and must be avoided.
Final thoughts and answers
It may be thought: ``Is this analysis partisan?''; and ``Is
not Mr. Mandelson's conduct designed to help Mr. Trimble who
is in a precarious position?''
My answer to the first question is `no'. I have a long
record of advocating bi-national resolutions of the conflict
that are fair to both nationalists and unionists.
The answer to the second question must be a very qualified
`yes'. `Saving David Trimble' may account for Mr. Mandelson's
tampering with Patten's proposals on symbolic matters. But it
does not account for his evisceration of the efforts to have
a more accountable and human-rights infused service--here the
Secretary of State has succumbed to lobbying by security
officials.
[[Page H8173]]
Another answer to the second question is more
straightforward: Mr. Mandelson must not unilaterally abandon
or re-negotiate the Agreement or the work of Commissions sent
up under the Agreement at the behest of any party.
A third answer I would propose is that pro-Agreement
unionists can, eventually, accept the full Patten, because
they know that a legitimate and effective police is necessary
to reconcile nationalists to the continuation of the Union--
the reason they signed the Agreement.
Lastly, I believe that the Patten Report is not only what
Mr. Mandelson should fully implement under the Agreement as
proof of rigorous impartiality in his administration, but
also what he should implement even if there were to be no
Agreement.
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr.
Smith) for his comments. I recognize the gentleman's work on human
rights throughout the world. Not just in Northern Ireland, but
throughout the world. But especially in Northern Ireland.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs.
McCarthy).
Mrs. McCARTHY of New York. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleagues here
for taking up this battle, and that is what it is. Many have been
fighting this for many, many years. But since I have been here the last
4 years, we have seen progress. For the first time in Northern Ireland,
people had hope. People thought peace was right there.
Well, peace is there, but we have some things that we have to work
out. One of the strongest things we have to work on is making sure that
we send a strong message from this great body that we have to keep with
the Patten agreement.
Mr. Speaker, we have seen even in our own country when the people
lose faith in the police departments, we see the anger that is in those
communities. So there are things that we have to make sure that are
done and the Patten agreement covers those things. The Patten agreement
can work for Northern Ireland.
One of the things that we have seen constantly, every time we bring
up the Patten agreement, we see them trying to chip away a little bit.
They do not like the agreement. So what are they trying to do? Are they
trying to break the whole fragile agreement that we have for Good
Friday? This is what we are all fighting for.
Tomorrow many of us here, actually, will have 40 women from Northern
Ireland. We are going to have Protestant and Catholic women. They are
going to be following us around so that we can show them how
legislative work goes, because they are willing to make this work. They
will spend 2 weeks here in this country to see how our government works
and they want to go home and make this work.
Well, the only way it is going to work is really making sure that we
put the pressure on to make sure the Patten agreement is lived up to.
That is our job, and it is really a small part. We are here, we are
here in Washington, D.C. We do not have to face the fear many Northern
Irish people have to fear of the police officers. We can change that.
Peace can come to that country. I am proud to be with all of my
colleagues to stand here and make a difference.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
New York (Mr. King), a cochairman of our Irish Caucus, and a member of
our Committee on International Relations.
Mr. KING. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Gilman), chairman of the Committee on International Relations, for
yielding me this time. At the very outset I want to commend him for the
outstanding job he has done for so many years, not just in the last 6
that he has been chairman of the Committee on International Relations,
but for more than two decades as a real warrior in the cause of peace
and justice in Ireland.
We also have to commend the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith),
chairman of the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human
Rights for the invaluable work that he has done in holding hearings
that go right to the depth of the allegations against the Royal Ulster
Constabulary, and right to the heart of the problems which have
inflicted law enforcement and the criminal justice system in Northern
Ireland for far too many years, for at least the last three decades.
Also, I have to commend the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Neal)
for the tremendous work he has done, not just during the 12 years he
has been in Congress, but the years before that when he was the mayor
in Springfield, Massachusetts, and just for the tremendous amount of
dedication and enthusiasm and unyielding tenacity he brings to this
entire issue of peace and justice in Ireland.
Mr. Speaker, I know that if the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr.
Meehan) were here tonight, in fact he has asked me to say this on his
behalf, there is nobody in the House of Representatives he looks up to
more in providing moral leadership and guidance than the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. Neal). And the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr.
Meehan) asked me to put that on the public record this evening.
As the gentleman from Massachusetts said earlier, this is a
bipartisan issue. I want to commend President Clinton for the job that
he has done. I know that tonight the gentleman read into the record a
statement from Vice President Gore. The gentleman from New York
(Chairman Gilman) and I and the gentleman from New Jersey (Chairman
Smith) can report last week Governor Bush also has put out a statement
calling for the full implementation of the Patten Commission report,
which shows that this clearly is a bipartisan issue. It is an issue on
which all men and woman of goodwill can stand together.
What we are faced with tonight, today, and for the next weeks and
months in the north of Ireland is a true crisis. If the Good Friday
Agreement is premised on concession and compromise. The Good Friday
Agreement itself was a compromise. The Good Friday Agreement itself was
based on very strong concessions made by all sides, particularly by the
Catholic community, the Nationalist community, the Republican community
who made very deep concessions in return for a pledge by the British
and Irish governments that all the provisions of the Good Friday
Agreement would be carried out.
Mr. Speaker, no provision was more important in the Patten Commission
than the section dealing with police reform, because in the north of
Ireland for three decades the Royal Ulster Constabulary was guilty of
the most vicious and gross human rights violations imaginable. It is
hard for us as Americans to envision in the English speaking world, in
the United Kingdom which stands for the Magna Carta and justice and
law, that there was such brutality systematically carried out. Not the
type of brutalities that occur by accident, not those that are
incidental, but brutalities that were root and branch a part of the
policing in Northern Ireland.
Torture, murder of children, intentional killings, intentionally
maimings. This was all part of the police policy in the north of
Ireland. So the police have to be reformed. That was an integral part,
the integral part of the Good Friday Agreement. And the Patten
Commission, which was chaired by Chris Patten, a conservative MP, a
former conservative MP, a minister in Margaret Thatcher's government,
he came up with a series of reforms which, again, were themselves a
compromise.
There is much that is lacking, as the gentleman from New Jersey
(Chairman Smith) has pointed out time and again. The Patten Commission
itself, the Patten Commission recommendations themselves are deficient.
Yet now the British Government is attempting to compromise the
compromise. It is attempting to water down the compromise of the Patten
Commission to come out with a series of reforms that will not be
reforms at all. It will just be a readjustment of the status quo. It
will be a continuation of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. Not even under
a new name, because the old name will still remain. It will be a
subset, but it will still be there and this is wrong.
Mr. Speaker, the entire peace process is at risk. The entire peace
process is being put at risk by the British Government, by the Ulster
Unionist Party, and probably nothing is more aggravating than to hear
someone like David Trimble, who is head of the Ulster Unionist Party,
to say that we in the Congress should not get involved, that the
American Government should not get involved. The reality is that on the
night the Good Friday Agreement was reached and the morning that it was
[[Page H8174]]
signed, David Trimble would not sign it until he was assured by
President Clinton that the U.S. would stay involved. And now that we
are involved he is saying that we should get out and back away from the
agreement and allow it to go back to the status quo. The way it was for
three decades and seven decades and even three centuries, if we want to
go all the way back, where the Catholic community was systematically
discriminated against and had their rights violated.
It is essential for us in the Congress to stand together. It is
essential for the President to speak out as clearly as he has in the
past to let the British Government know, to let Tony Blair know, let
the British Secretary of State, Peter Mandelson, know that they cannot
continue to violate the rights of Catholics. They cannot take the
Nationalist community for granted.
The fact is an agreement was signed, an international agreement, and
the British Government has the absolute obligation to enforce that
agreement. It cannot back down and cannot succumb to blackmail from
David Trimble, because if it does it puts at risk the entire peace
process and we will go back to the situation that ruined so many
innocent lives for so many years. Mr. Speaker, if that happens the
blood will be on the hands of the British government and the Ulster
Unionist Party.
{time} 2100
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from the
Bronx, New York (Mr. Engel), a stalwart leader in protecting the rights
of all of the people of Ireland, particularly from the North of
Ireland.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Crowley), my friend, for yielding time to me.
Mr. Speaker, I want to echo the words of all the eloquent colleagues
who have spoke before me on both sides of the aisle. The gentleman from
New York (Mr. King) has it exactly right, the Good Friday Agreement of
April 1998 was a compromise, and that compromise established a
framework for the peaceful settlement for the conflict in the North of
Ireland. Once you start to unravel a compromise, then everybody wants
to change it, and that is why it is important that we stick to that
compromise and not let one side try to blackmail everybody else into
getting their way.
I rise in support of H.Res. 547. This vital accord which was
negotiated by former Senator George Mitchell provided for the
establishment of an independent commission to make recommendations on
how to fix the problems and abuses that have plagued policing in the
North of Ireland.
The commission lead by Sir Christopher Patten concluded its work on
September 9, 1999, and proposed 175 recommendations in its final
report. In May of this year, the British Government published a bill
which purports to implement the Patten report. Unfortunately, the draft
bill certainly does not live up to the letter or spirit of the Patten
report and dilutes many key recommendations of the Patten Commission.
The problems of the North of Ireland will never be resolved until the
egregious human rights violations caused by the Royal Ulster
Constabulary are permanently ended and the unit replaced by a police
service truly representational of the population of the region; and as
the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Neal) pointed out, the population
right now is 5,446.
This important resolution that rightly calls for full and speedy
implementation of the Patten Commission report is a way to correct the
years of police abuses and gain the support of both nationalists and
unionists for peace in the North of Ireland.
I urge passage of H.Res. 547. I hope it is unanimous, and all of us
in this Congress that have worked so long for peace and justice in the
North of Ireland, while it is within our grasp, we cannot let those who
want to destroy the agreement to get their own ways and succeed.
Mr. Speaker, if peace is to come, then we must take the ball, we must
run with it and support H.Res. 547.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Payne).
(Mr. PAYNE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Gilman), chairman of the Committee on International Relations, and the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith) from the Helsinki Commission, the
gentleman from New York (Mr. King), and to my colleagues on the other
side of the aisle, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley) and the
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Neal), who has introduced this
resolution.
Let me say that the Good Friday Accord established an international
body chaired by Chris Patten, and it called to bring a new beginning to
policing in Northern Ireland with a police service capable of
attracting and sustaining support from the community as a whole.
In September 1999, over 170 recommendations for change were given,
such things as the power of a policing board should be looked at, the
appointment of its members should be looked at carefully, the
centrality of human rights, they talked about a name change, the future
of full time reserves, the power of the police ombudsperson, a
statutory basis to work from the International Oversight Commission.
There are a number of things that were talked about in this very
thorough report.
Mr. Speaker, we are disappointed that the watered-down version that
has come forth does not stand up to what the people of Ireland, North
and South, wanted, a new beginning; and we believe that there is much
room for improvement.
We heard just on Friday very distinguished persons, Dr. Gerald Lynch,
president of John Jay College. We listened to experts who came from
Ireland to talk about what was going on, Brendan O'Leary, and Martin
O'Brien, and our own Elisa Massimino from the Washington office of
Lawyers Committee; and they all said, person after person, that there
has to be real reform; there has to be change if this new policing is
going to serve all of the people.
Mr. Speaker, I would just urge that we support the resolution by the
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Neal), my colleague, and that we urge
a thorough look at what the Patten report really said and try to
implement those changes that have been recommended in that great
report.
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my friend, the
gentlewoman from New York City (Mrs. Maloney).
(Mrs. MALONEY of New York asked and was given permission to revise
and extend her remarks.)
Mrs. MALONEY of New York. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Crowley) for yielding the time to me.
Mr. Speaker, I commend the gentleman's leadership on this issue and
so many others. I rise in support of this resolution, which reaffirms
our Nation's commitment to the Northern Ireland peace process and
expresses our strong support for the policing recommendations of the
Patten Commission.
Mr. Speaker, I thank very much the author of this bill, the gentleman
from Massachusetts (Mr. Neal), a long-term leader of the Irish Caucus,
and the gentleman from New York (Chairman Gilman) of the Committee on
International Relations for his staunch and strong support.
Many of the Members of the Irish Caucus have already spoken, and it
shows the strong bipartisan support that has come together on this
issue. It has been well over 2 years since the Good Friday Agreement
was signed and Northern Ireland has come a long way toward a lasting
peace acceptable to all sides. That agreement was supported first and
foremost by the people of Northern Ireland, Britain and Ireland itself.
With such broad support, the peace process has been able to withstand
numerous attacks and remain on track. Nevertheless, there still are a
number of obstacles that stand in the way of a permanent peace, and one
of the most significant hurdles is the effective implementation of the
policing recommendations developed by the Patten Commission.
Everyone agrees that police reform needs to take place, and
accountability needs to be part of it. The gentleman
[[Page H8175]]
from New York (Mr. King), my colleague, outlined many of the abuses and
why this is such a deep-felt proposal by so many of the people. The
recommendations were supported by all sides, but with one condition,
that all of the recommendations were completely implemented. In this
way both sides could be assured that final policing arrangements were
fair to everyone.
Unfortunately, although they were issued over a year ago, these
recommendations have yet to be implemented. Legislation proposed in the
British parliament fails to include all of the recommendations and
nationalists in Northern Ireland have expressed their displeasure with
this bill.
Mr. Speaker, I end by commending the President of the United States,
George Mitchell and many others who have worked hard for this peace
accord; and I really urge complete and total adoption of this
resolution.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remaining 2\1/2\
minutes.
Mr. Speaker, the devolution of power from Westminster to Belfast and
its related components have been difficult endeavors for all parties
involved. The terms of the negotiations demand sacrifices by loyalists
and nationalists alike in order to achieve a successful implementation
of the Good Friday Agreement. It troubles me to report that the
sacrifices necessary for a viable solution in Northern Ireland have not
been made to the fullest.
A key factor in achieving a lasting peace in Northern Ireland will be
a police force that has the respect and trust of the entire population.
The importance of police reforms in Northern Ireland cannot be
overstated. It is essential for the local police force to garner the
trust of the people it serves. The average citizen, regardless of race,
religion or nationality, should be able to call on the police and have
them come to carry out their functions, not serve as an occupying army.
Mr. Speaker, people can talk until they are blue in the face about
how to accomplish true police reform. Unfortunately, dialogue has its
limitations. True reform requires action. It has been suggested that
the only way we can accurately measure police reform in Northern
Ireland will be the day when young nationalists walk into a police
station in Belfast, submit an application and subsequently display
conduct that is honorable, ethical and enthusiastic for the people of
Northern Ireland without fear of favor.
In the British parliament, the Northern Ireland Police Bill has been
introduced as the vehicle for implementing the Patten Commission.
However, there is a significant disparity between the bill and the
recommendations proposed by Mr. Patten in his report.
Mr. Speaker, failure to bridge this gap could put the peace process
in extreme peril. Just yesterday, Northern Ireland First Minister David
Trimble met Northern Ireland Secretary Peter Mandelson at the Labour
Party Conference in Brighton to warn him that the Good Friday Agreement
could collapse if the British Government did not make concessions to
his party with regard to reform of the Royal Ulster Constabulary.
There has been an effort on the part of the British agreement to
dilute the recommendations of the Patten Commission. I view this report
as the minimum that must be done to promote equity and equality in
policing in Northern Ireland. I am concerned by the government's recent
approach of the cherry-picking parts of the Patten Commission as if it
were an a-la-carte menu.
Mr. Speaker, I have had the opportunity to meet Mr. Patten, so I know
the countless hours he has put into a proposal that should be the
blueprint for a new force.
This process was fair and open to all sides. To make changes at this
point to a plan that was so carefully crafted will not serve anyone
well. This report and this commission would not have been needed if
there was not an injustice to correct.
Mr. Speaker, I urge the British Government to follow the spirit of
the Good Friday Agreement and uphold their commitment. I want to thank
my colleagues here this evening, especially the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. Neal), for offering this measure; the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Gilman); the gentleman from New York (Mr. King); the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith); and all the other colleagues.
I want to thank this administration who deserves a great deal of the
credit for bringing this process forward, particularly Mr. Mitchell. I
hope we can bring the Mitchell amendment, or measure, before us calling
upon the Noble committee to give him the Noble Peace Prize. I do not
think anyone deserves it more than he does at this point in time.
Mr. Speaker, a vote in favor of this resolution will send a message
to our friends across the Atlantic that the United States supports its
efforts and encourages the adherence of all aspects of the Good Friday
Agreement without exception; and, therefore, I urge my colleagues to
support H. Res. 547.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, let me close by noting that some in unionism say
Patten's police reforms go too far too fast. I have here in my hand a
1985 Belfast newspaper, the Irish News, where the SDLP's Seamus Mallon
was calling for RUC reform more than 15 years ago. This is dated August
19, 1985.
Mr. Speaker, I call on the British parliamentarians to let us get on
with police reform and let us live by the Good Friday Accord.
Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to cast a strong vote in support of
H. Res. 547.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to be an original cosponsor
of this resolution, and I congratulate Mr. Neal for authoring it. With
this Sense of Congress, we commend the parties to Northern Ireland's
peace process for their achievements to date. But, we also call on the
British Government to come to its senses on the issue of police reform.
All the parties deserve praise for the progress they have made so
far. The Good Friday Agreement stands as a remarkable achievement and
the best hope for lasting peace in Northern Ireland.
The seating of Northern Ireland's new executive, alongside the power
sharing Assembly, was a crucial step towards solidifying peace and
democracy in Northern Ireland.
Also critical were IRA steps towards disarmament. Weapons
decommissioning is one of the two most pressing and sensitive issues
facing Northern Ireland.
The other is police reform.
Without full implementation of the recommendations for police reform
made by the Patten Commission--a commission called for in the Good
Friday Agreement--a full peace will remain elusive.
Common sense calls for the name of the police force--the Royal Ulster
Constabulary (and I cannot imagine a more British-sounding name than
that)-- to be changed. And for the membership in the police force--now
93 percent Protestant and a scanty 7 percent Catholic--to be formed
more equitably to reflect the near even population split in the
community.
Mr. Speaker, we are once again at a perilous point. The answers lay
in moving forward to full implementation of the Good Friday accords--to
pull participatory, accountable and representative government and rule
of law in Northern Ireland--not in stagnation and trepidation.
Vote today to support this important resolution.
Ms. ESHOO. I rise today in support of this Resolution which commends
both groups for their progress towards implementing the Good Friday
Peace Accords. This momentous peace agreement is just the first of many
difficult steps that must be taken to ensure equality.
The Peace Accords created an Independent Commission to make
recommendations on the Northern Island policing forces. This Resolution
urges the swift implementation of the recommendations of the
Independent Commission. The Independent Commission calls for further
integration of Catholics into the policing force to 16% in four years
and 30% in ten years and for new badge and symbols free of the British
or Irish states. It also includes a dramatic reduction in the size of
the force from 11,400 to 7,500 full-time personnel. These
recommendations are vital to the long-term stability of the peace
agreement. It is crucial that the policing force somewhat represent the
community that it is meant to protect. The Royal Ulster Constabulary is
92% Protestant and serves a community comprised of 56% Protestant and
42% Catholic.
Mr. Speaker, Belfast is the last city in Europe to be divided by a
wall. Let's take an important step and pass this Resolution to begin
the movement for equality.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H. Res. 547,
introduced by my good friend and colleague, Congressman Neal of
Massachusetts.
All parties should be commended for progress under the Good Friday
Accord of
[[Page H8176]]
April 1998. What was once described as an intractable conflict between
Nationalists and Unionists in Northern Ireland never to be solved, has
seen unprecedented calm and cooperation under the Good Friday Framework
guided by Senator George Mitchell.
The seating of the executive of the power-sharing Assembly was a
crucial moment of solidifying peace in Northern Ireland. Nonetheless,
two sensitive areas of implementation under Good Friday lagged behind
the others: weapons decommissioning and police reform.
The impasse over weapons decommissioning became so strong that it
first halted implementation of the Executive last fall, and then forced
its suspension in February just as it had been established. A
settlement emerged when the Irish Republican Army agreed to allow its
weapons dumps to be inspected by a distinguished international group
led by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and former African
National Congress general secretary Cyril Ramaphosa. The weapons dumps
were inspected and the National Assembly resumed in April.
Subsequently, the other looming issue of police reform moved to the
fore. The Good Friday Accord called for police reform because it is
apparent that a police force composed of 93% Protestant and 7% Catholic
could not have sufficient credibility with a Northern Ireland community
that is split 58% Protestant, 42% Catholic.
To help create a police force that had credibility across all
communities, Chris Patten, a leader in Britain's Conservative Party and
former Governor of Hong Kong, was enlisted to produce a blueprint for
the future. His 1999 report recommended wholesale change including
restoring democratic and local accountability to policing, changing the
police force's symbols (name, insignia, uniform) to make them
community-neutral, as well as down-sizing and re-balancing the
composition of the force to reflect the make-up of the communities in
Northern Ireland.
It is important to note that this document represented a compromise
itself. While the current version of the implementing legislation in
the British House of Commons incorporates a number of the Patten
recommendations, it falls short in a few--particularly in the area of
the name change of police service, where it postpones a decision. While
only symbolic, the current name of the police service, the Royal Ulster
Constabulary, infuriates Nationalists because the name implies
allegiance to the Queen and uses the British term for Northern
Ireland--anathema for recruiting more Nationalists into the police
service. The Patten Commission recommended the more neutral ``Northern
Ireland Police Service.''
The current version of the bill in the British House of Commons still
fell short enough that moderate Nationalists such as Seamus Mallon
abstained when it came up for vote in June. Peace has perservered in
Northern Ireland over the past two years when leaders from both sides
have followed the tenets of the Good Friday Accord. Good Friday called
for full and thorough police reform and the Patten Commission delivered
that fair reform. It should be implemented in full.
As the Washington Post said in an editorial in July, ``. . . the onus
remains on the British government to respond to Catholic objections.
This is because the Catholics have the Good Friday Agreement on their
side. The deal called for the appointment of a special police
commission, headed by a respected British politician, Chris Patten; the
ensuing report laid down the contours of reform. The Catholic side is
only asking that this report be implemented fully. London should be
happy to do that . . .''
I urge my colleagues to support H. Res. 547.
Mr. LUCAS of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of
House Resolution 547, a bipartisan resolution calling upon the British
Government to fully implement reforms to Northern Ireland's police
force. These reforms are long overdue and are a crucial part of the
overall peace process in this troubled region.
After a quarter century of political violence that left thousands
dead, the people of Northern Ireland have taken a brave step forward.
The Irish are on the brink of a new era of peace with Catholics and
Protestants, for the first time, sharing in government responsibility.
The people have spoken and the spirit of peace is alive and strong.
As part of the historic Good Friday Agreement, an independent
commission was established to make recommendations for future policing
needs. The focus of the report was to take politics out of the police
force. The population of Northern Ireland is divided almost equally
between Protestants and Catholics, yet the police force is nearly
entirely made up of Protestants. With a record of brutality and human
rights abuses, this type of demographic cannot work to protect the
citizens fairly. In order for these communities and families to feel
safe, reforms are desperately needed.
When the Patten Commission completed its report, it included almost
200 recommendations. Among other things, the Patten Commission calls
upon the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) to change names and symbols,
to increase the number of Catholic officers and to provide human rights
training and a code of ethics. We must all remember that the Patten
report itself was a compromise between the Unionist and Nationalist
perspectives. It is not acceptable to compromise further on a
compromise already made. The Patten report must be implemented without
any significant change.
I have a deep interest in seeing the historic Good Friday Agreement
go forward and policing reform must go hand in hand with this effort.
We must work to advance this peace process and implement each and every
one of the Patten report's recommendations.
It is not an easy task that the Irish have before them, but rather an
extremely difficult and defining one. As the world's greatest
superpower and home to over 40 million Irish-Americans, the United
States must honor its commitment and stand up for peace and justice. We
must lead in promoting human rights for all the world's citizens and
lend our strong support to the people of Northern Ireland as they
continue this journey towards peace.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Pitts). The question is on the motion
offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) that the House
suspend the rules and agree to the resolution, H. Res. 547, as amended.
The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor
thereof) the rules were suspended and the resolution, as amended, was
agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________