[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 110 (Monday, September 18, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8664-S8665]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
PNTR WITH CHINA
Mr. ROBB. Madam President, the suspense regarding this particular
vote is long over, but the date on the effect and implications of PNTR
in China is really just beginning.
My rationale for supporting PNTR differs in some respects from my
colleagues, who have mostly emphasized the positive impact on our
economy and exports, and it relates to our ability to change the face
of China--not just economically, but in terms of improving human
rights, labor standards, and environmental protections, and in ensuring
the rule of law.
My genuine, and I think realistic, hope is that WTO accession becomes
a means for improving the most repressive aspects of Chinese society,
eventually permitting our two nations to embrace, in a sincere way, the
same cause of global security and peace.
It will take a concentrated effort by the next President, however, to
institute a policy that uses WTO as a cudgel to aid those who have been
repressed, incarcerated, and persecuted in China.
I would submit that we need to keep the faith with those brave
Chinese who have risked their lives in the name of freedom--at
Tiananmen and elsewhere--as China adapts its economy to the rules
required of every WTO member.
Like the President, I believe the choice between economic rights and
human rights, between economic security and national security, is a
false choice.
But I do not believe that the emphasis of American foreign policy
should be on engaging and partnering with any Chinese leaders whose
sole aim is to maintain and promote the power of a bankrupt Communist
party.
Looking back on the last 30 years, I think it would be fair to say
that the current administration has dedicated an extraordinary amount
of effort and attention toward building a lasting cooperative
relationship with China.
That is not inconsistent with the policies of Presidents Nixon, Ford,
Carter, Reagan, and Bush, who appreciated the significance of
integrating all aspects of Chinese society into the world community.
In this regard I believe that achieving WTO accession is likely to be
considered one of the President's single most important achievements
during his time in office.
The groundwork was laid during previous administrations, but this
President demonstrated the instinct and diplomatic skill and judgment
to close the deal.
He understood the urgency and necessity of bringing the world's third
largest economy into compliance with trading rules that nearly all
other nations enforce and respect.
It is a considerable achievement.
The opportunity for foreign equity ownership in China will rise
dramatically.
Many states subsidies will end.
China will have to meet international trade norms.
If they break the rules, a WTO panel can intervene with punitive
measures.
Meanwhile, the United States is not required to change a single
tariff, lower a particular subsidy, or alter any of our own invisible
barriers to trade.
This is a win-win prospect for American businesses.
China's leader, Jiang Zemin, while visiting the U.N. a few days ago,
had some interesting things to say about the future of his country, and
it relates in part to WTO accession.
His calculation, clearly, is that one party rule in China can thrive
side by side with the economic freedom required by China's membership
in the WTO.
He believes the two are mutually exclusive.
Madam President, that seems paradoxical to me.
I don't believe it is tenable to argue that, over the long term,
economic capitalism and political communism can coexist, let alone
prosper, in the same sovereign country.
And it is my fervent hope that in China the former weakens and
dissolves the latter.
WTO accession for China gets us started in that direction.
The legendary Deng Xiao Ping was fond of saying that you should
``cross the river by feeling the stones.'' I think his successors
approach WTO with some trepidation, not knowing exactly where those
stones are.
I would assert that we have a key role to play as WTO rules and
regulations penetrate Chinese society, specifically in assisting and
supporting and working with newly economically empowered Chinese
businessmen, entrepreneurs, farmers, and ordinary citizens.
With their profits and financial gain they will be in a position to
create the right circumstances for political reform and change inside
China.
We have a responsibility to do our part in pressuring the regime from
outside.
Our actions and rhetoric matter on everything from human rights to
Tibet to the rule of law.
The consequences of failing to ratify PNTR have to be considered as
well, and in this case that is why I pledged ahead of time to oppose
any and all amendments, even though some clearly had merit. As a
practical matter, at this late date in the 106th Congress if the Senate
failed to pass a clean version of PNTR it would risk, at least
procedurally, getting a measure passed into law by the end of the
congressional session.
Moreover, I have no doubt that China would misunderstand the reasons
for our inability to pass PNTR, and that would, almost inevitably,
ratchet up tensions between us even further, and it would create
serious national security problems for us and our Asian allies at a
minimum. In a larger sense, WTO is about changing the face of China.
The economic change will come first, to be sure, but it will lead
inexorably
[[Page S8665]]
to changes in these other areas--and in my judgment, it will lead to
positive changes, from our point of view, sooner than if we were to
reject PNTR.
And to re-emphasize the consequences of failure to ratify, it will
also avoid the certain deterioration in our relationship with China
that would take place if we rejected PNTR, which, again, would have
serious and long lasting consequences in our national security
relationships among all of the Pacific nations.
It has been my position that we ought to seek to maintain and
promote, on a cooperative basis, our relations with China which
represent a slight nuance of difference from administration policy
designed to engage China strategically as a partner.
We share common ground with Beijing on a broad range of subjects, and
it makes absolute sense to work together to solve problems on the
Korean Peninsula and the like.
But that should not prevent us from recognizing that our values and
principles are so starkly different.
Implying somehow that we're partners, or wishing that it were so,
does not speak truth to power.
WTO represents an opportunity for the world community to join with a
newly empowered economic class in China, and it ought to be treated as
a means for strengthening their hand.
The focal point for U.S. policymakers should be to promote, sustain,
and enforce broad economic freedoms within China.
Only then can we make a difference with our overall national security
policies, not just through implementation of the WTO that will
eventually lead to the political freedom and liberty that the Chinese
people deserve.
With that, I yield the floor.
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