[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 110 (Monday, September 18, 2000)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1515-E1516]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                       ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. TOM BLILEY

                              of virginia

                    in the house of representatives

                       Monday, September 18, 2000

  Mr. BLILEY. Mr. Speaker, please permit me to share with my colleagues 
an Op/Ed piece from the Richmond Times Dispatch regarding the Arab-
Israeli peace process by Ralph Nurnberger.

           [From the Richmond Times-Dispatch, Aug. 13, 2000]

              For Peace, Arabs Also Must Make Concessions

                         (By Ralph Nurnberger)

       The collapse of the Camp David summit is a direct result of 
     what could be labeled the ``Taba Syndrome.'' This is the 
     tendency of Arab leaders to insist that Israel turn over 
     every inch of territory to which the Arabs might be able to 
     make a claim, however nebulous that might be, and regardless 
     of whether these demands ultimately undermine any chance for 
     a peace agreement.
       The tactic of holding out for every possible piece of land, 
     which Egypt employed after the first Camp David summit to 
     gain control over a tiny parcel of land called Taba, places 
     ``principle above peace,'' with the result that often neither 
     is achieved.
       Yasser Arafat compounded the difficulties facing the 
     negotiators at Camp David by never wavering from his public 
     statements that he would not settle for anything less than 
     Palestinian control of the West Bank and Gaza together with 
     sovereignty over East Jerusalem. Through his public 
     statements, he established expectations among his 
     constituents that would have led them to accuse him of 
     failure if he came away with only 98 percent of all his 
     demands.
       On the other hand, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak 
     informed the Israeli populace that he would be willing to 
     make compromises for peace. The debate on the extent of these 
     compromises led to a number of his coalition partners leaving 
     the government before the Camp David talks even began. This 
     pre-summit debate enabled Barak to be far more forthcoming 
     than Arafat at Camp David. Essentially, the Israelis were 
     prepared to make compromises, however difficult, for peace, 
     while Palestinian leaders had not prepared their people to do 
     the same.
       Arab refusal to make peace unless they achieved 100 percent 
     of their demands is not new. Following the first Camp David 
     agreements in 1978, Israel agreed to withdraw from Sinai in 
     exchange for peace with Egypt.
       Israel pulled out by 1982, but refused to cede to Egypt a 
     tiny parcel of land along the Gulf of Aqaba called Taba. Taba 
     was a small strip of land along the beach that had no 
     strategic importance, no population, and no natural 
     resources. Its main attraction was a resort hotel and a 
     pretty beach.
       Israel claimed sovereignty over Taba, citing a 1906 British 
     map delineating the land to be part of Turkish-controlled 
     Palestine, not British-controlled Egypt. The Egyptians based 
     their claim to Taba on 1917 border demarcations.

[[Page E1516]]

       The Egyptians responded that Israel's failure to turn over 
     control of Taba was a violation of the Camp David accord 
     requirement that the entire Sinai be returned. At times, 
     control over these few meters of sand threatened to undermine 
     the entire Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement. With U.S. 
     encouragement, both nations agreed in 1986 to send the 
     dispute to binding arbitration. Two years later, French, 
     Swiss, and Swedish international lawyers ruled in favor of 
     Egypt
       The Taba Syndrome has not been lost on other Arab leaders.
       When the late Syrian President Hafez Assad met with 
     President Bill Clinton in Geneva earlier this year, he had 
     the opportunity to regain virtually the entire Golan Heights 
     for Syria in exchange for peace with Israel. Rather than 
     taking 99 percent of the land in dispute, he held out for a 
     return to the 1967 borders instead of the internationally 
     recognized 1923 lines. The difference between the two was 
     only a few meters, yet Assad determined that principle was 
     more important than Syrian control of the land--and peace.
       Similarly, the recent Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon was 
     deemed insufficient. Once again, the border was arbitrarily 
     drawn and did not reflect geographic characteristics. This 
     border was drawn after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 
     World War I by two lieutenant colonels--one from Britain and 
     one from France--who trudged east from the Mediterranean 
     leaving white-washed rocks to mark the new lines.
       Needless to say, the location of the rocks has shifted 
     since the lines were drawn in 1923, yet Lebanon risks future 
     hostilities if its total demands are not accepted.
       Similarly, Arafat and all top Palestinian leaders never 
     have wavered from the demand that 100 percent of the West 
     Bank and East Jerusalem be turned over to Palestinian 
     control. Since agreeing to the Oslo accord in 1993, this 
     rhetoric created unrealistic expectations among Palestinians 
     and Muslims throughout the world.
       Although Barak appeared willing to turn over substantial 
     territory and even make compromises on Jerusalem in exchange 
     for a secure peace and an end to the conflict, Arafat was 
     unable to accept these. He could have had a recognized state 
     comprising approximately 90 percent of the West Bank and 
     governing authority over Palestinians in parts of Jerusalem. 
     Most important, he could have had peace.
       Arafat failed to take into account that every nationalist 
     movement must ultimately embrace pragmatism instead of 
     pursuing the maximum--and ultimately unobtainable--goals. By 
     insisting on achieving 100 percent of his objectives, Arafat 
     got caught up in the Taba Syndrome and doomed the Camp David 
     talks to failure.
       Unfortunately, this conference only served as another 
     validation of Abba Eban's famous comment that Palestinian 
     leaders ``never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity 
     for peace.''

     

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