Congressional Record, Volume 146 Issue 106 (Tuesday, September 12, 2000)

[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 106 (Tuesday, September 12, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8360-S8369]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

TO AUTHORIZE EXTENSION OF NONDISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT TO THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA--Continued

Amendment No. 4119

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. President, amendment No. 4119 deals with the human rights
question; it deals with the trade question; it deals with the issue of
Chinese exports to the United States of goods made by prison labor.
To curb such exports, this amendment is about existing agreements
that we already have with China. This amendment just says we want China
to live up to the existing agreements. The United States and China
first signed a memorandum of understanding in 1992, which I will refer
to as MOU throughout the debate. Then we signed a statement of
cooperation in 1994. This amendment would require that the President
certify that China is fully compliant with the two trade agreements
that China has already made with us before extending PNTR to China.
Let me provide some background on U.S.-China agreements on trade in
prison labor products and discuss China's deplorable record in
complying with these agreements. Actually, they haven't complied with
these agreements. The MOU was intended to end the export to the United
States of goods produced by prison labor in China. China agreed to the
United States' request back in 1992 that it would promptly investigate
any companies that were involved in using prison labor to export
products back to our country. But basically the Ministry of Justice in
China completely ignored the agreement.
In 1994, therefore, we signed another statement of cooperation with
them in which China said: We will agree and we will set some time
limits so that within 60 days of the United States' request to visit
such a facility we will make that happen. We will be expeditious in
making sure we follow through on this agreement.
For the last 3 years, they have not followed through on any of these
agreements.
Because of the good work of my colleagues, Senator Harkin from Iowa
and Senator Lautenberg from New Jersey--both of whom are going to speak
on the floor of the Senate--for the first time in 3 years we had
Customs able to visit one of these factories. But this really was the
first time that China has budged at all. Other than that, we have seen
no agreement, or no followthrough on these agreements.
When I became a member of the Foreign Relations Committee 3 years
ago, I remember the first hearing we held had to do with prison labor
conditions in China and this whole problem of trade with China.
Basically the consensus of all of the witnesses who testified,
including administration witnesses, was that the Chinese compliance
with our trade agreements was pitifully inadequate. There has been
virtually no compliance with these agreements.
The State Department issued a country-by-country report in 1999 and
also in the year 2000. I will summarize. I could quote extensively.
Both of these reports make it clear that during the last 2 years, China
has not complied with these existing agreements.
Let me simply raise a question with my colleagues. Here we have two
trade agreements with China--two understandings. We have basically said
to the Chinese Government that people in the United States of America
would be outraged if they knew that part of what they were doing was
exporting products to our country produced by prison labor. This is a
human rights issue. It is a labor issue. And it is also a trade issue.
It is interesting. I talked about a memorandum of understanding. In
1994, the administration used as evidence the fact that China had
signed the statement of cooperation. For the first time, the President
said: I am going to switch my position and I am going to delink human
rights from trade because it is a great step forward that China has
signed this statement of cooperation. That judgment turned out to be
premature. China's Ministry of Justice ignored seven U.S. Customs'
requests for investigation submitted in March of 1994, the same month
that the agreement was passed.
China, for years, has refused to allow U.S. officials access to its
reeducation through labor facilities--let me repeat that--reeducation
through labor facilities, arguing that these are not prisons.
China, in spite of these agreements, has said: We will not allow the
United States access to our reeducation through labor facilities
because these are not prisons. Beijing would have us believe that these
are merely educational institutions. And nothing, if we are at all
concerned about human rights in the Senate, could be further from the
truth.
Reeducation through labor--known as ``laojiao'' in Chinese--is a
system of administrative detention and punishment without trial. That
is what it is. The U.S. Embassy in Beijing insists that reeducation
through labor camps are covered by our trade agreements, the MOU. And
this is confirmed by the MOU record. Beijing disagrees and continues to
claim that these reeducation through labor facilities are not prisons.
For over 5 years, China has repeatedly denied or ignored all U.S.
requests to visit one of these facilities. We haven't been able to
visit even one of these facilities.
What has been this administration's reaction to China's refusal to
allow a visit? It has been the same as for all denied visits. We renew
our request every 3 months, and the Chinese totally ignore us. This
charade ought to

[[Page S8361]]

stop. It ought to stop now. That is why I hope there will be strong
bipartisan support for this amendment.
What does ``reeducation through labor'' mean? Let me read some
excerpts from Human Rights Watch reports on this subject:

The usual procedure is for the police acting on their own
to determine a re-education term. Sentences run from one to
three years' confinement in a camp or farm, often longer than
for similar criminal offenses. A term can be extended for a
fourth year if, in the prison authorities' judgment, the
recipient has not been sufficiently re-educated, fails to
admit guilt, or violates camp discipline. The recipient of a
re-education through labor sentence has no right to a
hearing, no right to counsel, and no right to any kind of
judicial determination of his case.

That is a quote from a Human Rights Watch report on this subject.
Human Rights Watch also points out that inmates may have their
reeducation sentence extended indefinitely, and concludes that
reeducation through labor violates many of the provisions of
international law, including the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which China signed in 1998. The covenant states:

Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a
court in order that the court may decide without delay on the
lawfulness of his detention.

Among other things, reeducation through labor bars the presumption of
innocence, involves no judicial officer, provides for no public trial
or defense against the charges.
Amnesty International has concluded that it is impossible for China
to claim a commitment to the rule of law while maintaining a system
that sentences hundreds of thousands of people without due process. I
couldn't agree more.
According to the 1999 State Department report on human rights, there
are 230,000 people in reeducation through labor camps. Conditions in
these camps are similar to those in prisons. What does the report say
about these conditions in prisons? It describes them as ``harsh, and
frequently degrading for both political criminals and common
criminals.'' The report says it is common for political prisoners to be
segregated from each other and placed with common criminals. There are
credible reports that common criminals have physically beaten up
political prisoners at the instigation of the guards.
I am sure my colleagues will agree that reeducation through labor
doesn't qualify as an institution whose sole aim is education and
rehabilitation, as China claims.
Before certifying that China is in compliance with the MOU and SOC
under this agreement, the President must affirm that China is
permitting investigation and U.S. inspection of reeducation through
labor facilities under the terms of both the memorandum of
understanding and the statement of cooperation, two agreements that we
have signed with China in 1992 and 1994.
I am offering this amendment because I think it addresses concerns
that many Members have in the Senate about PNTR, concerns about China's
appalling and worsening human rights record.
I heard my colleague from Nebraska say that the evidence is clear
that opening up trade leads to more respect for human rights. The
evidence is not clear on that. We have been doing record trade with
China. We have a record trade imbalance. They export much more to the
United States than vice versa. They export products made by forced
prison labor in China. Over the last 10 years, we haven't seen more
respect for human rights. Our own State Department reports that all of
the human rights organizations reports point to harsh--and in some
cases, worsening--conditions.
How can Senators reviewing our trade relations with China give up
this little leverage that we have and think somehow it will promote
human rights when, as a matter of fact, we have seen no evidence
whatever that the Government is moving in that direction. We will give
up what little leverage we have.
This amendment is about human rights. It is an amendment that speaks
to whether or not we can depend upon China to honor trade agreements.
It is an amendment that speaks to the concerns of working people, that
they can't possibly compete with prison labor in China.
Senators, I offer this amendment and I call for support on this
amendment for three reasons: (A) out of respect for human rights; (B)
because we already have these trade agreements with China. This is the
most directly relevant amendment to PNTR awaiting action. We already
have trade agreements with China and they have not abided by these
agreements. Tomorrow they could. In this amendment, we call upon China
to live up to these agreements before we automatically extend normal
trade relations. What is unreasonable about that?
Finally, I say to Democrats first, and Republicans second--Democrats
first, because we are supposed to be more the party of the ``people''--
in all due respect, a lot of our constituents, a lot of working people,
a lot of labor people, have every reason in the world to be a bit
skeptical about this new trade agreement and the new global economics
when we have China exporting to our country products produced by prison
labor.
I think this amendment is all about on whose side are we. Are we on
the side of a repressive government that basically pays no attention to
anything we say because the message we communicate is: We will, for the
sake of commerce, sign any agreement; we are not concerned about these
harsh conditions. But are we on the side of human rights? Are we on the
side of the idea that China ought to live up to these trade agreements?
Are we on the side of working people, laboring people in our own
country who, by the way, will say to each one of you back in your
States: Senator, we do not want to be put in a position of losing our
jobs because this repressive government can export products made by
forced prison labor in China and has not been willing to live up to any
of the agreements they have signed with our country.
I ask my colleagues to carefully consider the following questions:
(A) How can we expect China to honor trade agreements with us when it
systematically violates the two agreements we signed committing China
and the United States to cooperate in curbing trade in prison labor
products? They are in noncompliance with two agreements.
(B) How can we do nothing, year after year, to bar imports of Chinese
forced labor products when we know that China operates the world's
largest forced labor system estimated to encompass over 1,100 camps and
as many as 8 million Chinese prisoners? This is the Chinese version of
the Soviet gulag. It encompasses a massive complex of prisons, labor
camps, and labor farms for those sentenced judicially. Do we want to
turn our gaze away from this, Senators? Do we want to pretend we didn't
sign these agreements? Do we want to pretend China is complying with
these agreements? Do we want to pretend that it is not an important
human rights question? Do we want to pretend that this is not important
to working people in our country? Do we want to pretend that citizens
in our country would not have real indignation if they realized that we
weren't willing to at least insist China live up to these trade
agreements? And we are not going to if we do not pass this amendment.
(C) How can the administration allow China to ignore agreements to
halt forced labor exports, thereby abetting a dehumanizing system that
imprisons and persecutes Chinese democrats--Republicans, I use
democrats with a small ``d''--for peacefully advocating human rights,
while enabling Beijing to profit from exports of prison products?
Finally, how can the administration risk the displacement of U.S.
workers while we turn a blind eye and China does nothing to bar exports
to the United States of products made by prison labor. U.S. citizens
are losing jobs.
Colleagues, I look forward to hearing from the other side. H.R. 4444
proposes a toothless remedy. I do not want to let anyone in this debate
get away with saying we are very concerned about this question. H.R.
4444 mandates the establishment of an interagency task force on
prohibiting importation of products of forced or prison labor. This
task force is to make recommendations to the Customs Service on seeking
new agreements.

Another task force. In all due respect, this toothless remedy has a

[[Page S8362]]

made-for-Congress look to it. We do not want to bite the bullet, we do
not want to do something substantive and important, so we do something
that is symbolic--at best. Do we need another task force? We do not
need another task force. We do not need an interagency task force. We
already have two agreements with China--1992 and 1994. Another task
force is meaningless.
Let me just point out some of the more pointed Chinese proposals
which were conveyed in a message sent in May from China's Ministry of
Justice to the U.S. Customs attache in Beijing. The message admonishes
the U.S. Embassy to abide by certain principles, which include:

. . . the rule that Chinese officials conduct
investigations first, then if necessary arrange visits for
American counterparts.

I quote again:

Unnecessary visits will not be arranged if we can clarify
and answer questions through the investigations.

Really what the message from the Chinese Government is, is we conduct
the investigations first and only afterwards permit the United States
to visit suspected sites. This is in total opposition to the memorandum
of understanding and the statement of cooperation. We already have the
agreements. They are not in compliance with these agreements. And we
want to set up a task force?
Let me simply say the view of the Chinese Ministry of Justice that we
should trust China's sincerity and therefore reduce the necessity of
U.S. on-site visits is nothing short of ridiculous. This is pretty
incredible.
The other thing is, H.R. 4444 stipulates that the task force is to:

. . . work with the Customs Service to assist the People's
Republic of China in monitoring the sale of goods mined,
produced or manufactured by convict labor, forced labor, or
indentured labor under penal sanctions to ensure that such
goods are not exported to the United States.

The Chinese Government controls prison labor in China. It can curb
the export of forced prison labor products anytime it chooses. It
certainly does not need the assistance of the United States. This is,
frankly, ludicrous. It is just ludicrous.
The State Department, in 1997, affirmed both the memorandum of
understanding and the statement of cooperation, of 1992 and 1994, to be
binding international agreements. The trouble is that China does not.
It continues to get away with this because we impose no penalties for
these egregious and continuing Chinese violations. In contrast to the
provision now in H.R. 4444, which is toothless, my amendment for the
first time will provide China with a strong incentive to comply with
the MOE and SOC, for, if it fails to do so, then it will put PNTR at
risk. An added benefit is that it would help restore U.S. credibility
by holding China accountable for violating trade agreements with the
United States.
We are just insisting that China stop treating the bilateral
agreements it has signed with us concerning prison labor exports as
mere scraps of paper. What does this amendment ask for? It asks simply
that PNTR be denied until the President can certify that China is
honoring agreements it has repeatedly violated in the past. Is that too
much to ask? Is that too much to ask?
Mr. President, I have a document dated May 8, 2000, from the Deputy
Director General of the Prison Administration Bureau, PRC, to David
Benner, U.S. Customs Attache. I ask unanimous consent that it be
printed in the Record, and I reserve the remainder of my time.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record as follows:

Prison Administration Bureau,

Ministry of Justice,

PRC, May 8, 2000.
David Benner,
U.S. Customs Attache, American Embassy Beijing.
Mr. Benner: It was a pleasure to meet you on April 20, 2000
and the meeting was successful. As a follow-up, this letter
presents the concerned principles and suggestions we
mentioned at the meeting. We hope that your government can
give us a clear reply as soon as possible.

i. brief summary of our cooperation in the past

The signing of MEMO and COOPERATION AGREEMENT shows our
principles and sincerity of cooperation. In the past seven
years since the signing of MEMO, we have made great efforts
to arrange eight visits to eleven places for American
officials. We also conducted investigations into over fifty
places and provided the results to American counterpart. We
have noticed that American officials have closed most of the
cases related to the above places. Among these visits and
investigations, no evidence at all has been found to prove
the allegation of prison products exportation to the U.S.
These facts well show our serious attitude and cooperation
sincerity.

ii. additional explanation and emphasis on some cooperation principles

1. The objects that will be investigated are prison
products being exported to the U.S. No third country should
be involved.
2. Abide by the principle that Chinese authorities should
hold the sovereign right to conduct investigations.
3. Abide by the rule that Chinese officials conduct
investigations first, then if necessary arrange visits for
American counterparts. Unnecessary visits will not be
arranged if we can clarify and answer questions through the
investigations.
4. So-called ``PENDING'' or unresolved cases should be
agreed to both sides.
5. All American visitors have to be diplomats.
6. Any visits and investigations in China have to abide by
concerned Chinese laws and regulations.
7. The time limit of sixty days is valid to both sides.
8. The results of the visits and investigations made by
American officials have to be formally submitted to Chinese
government by American government.
9. American counterparts should provide sufficient
information and evidence to support the allegations and to
warrant the investigations and arrangement of visits.
10. The investigation of one case must be completed and
case closed before starting another or second case.

i. some suggestions

1. In the past seven years, both sides have made great
efforts to do tremendous work, no prison products exportation
to the U.S. has been found so far. Therefore, a summary is
very necessary.
2. American counterpart must trust our sincerity and
investigation results, which is the most important basis upon
which we cooperate with each other. Site visits are not
necessary if we can clarify the allegation by our
investigations. Reduction of site visits can result in higher
efficiency and avoid unnecessary troubles and unexpected
snags.
3. American officials should standardize the ways and norms
when close cases regarding the suspected units.
4. American counterpart should be cautious and prudent
towards the sources of information and its authenticity. As a
matter of fact, a lot of information obtained by American
officials was not accurate, some even groundless. This
creates unnecessary troubles for both of us. Pertaining to
the practice these years, we think it is very necessary for
both sides, especially our side to verify the information and
evidence obtained by American counterpart.
5. Abide by the regulation in COOPERATION AGREEMENT to
conduct investigation one case by one case. This is a serious
and responsible attitude and standardized and effective
method.
Wang Shu-sheng,
Deputy Director General.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
Delaware.
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I make a point of order a quorum is not
present.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask consent this not be charged
against my side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The quorum call is charged to the side that
suggests it.
Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WELLSTONE. I say to my colleagues, Senator Lautenberg will be
speaking in just a moment, but until he comes out, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? If no Senator yields time,
time will be charged equally to both sides.
The Senator from Minnesota.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, until my colleague from New Jersey is
ready, I want to again summarize this amendment for other Senators.
This is the issue of Chinese exports to the United States of goods made
by prison labor. This is an issue of the memorandum signed in 1992, I
say to my colleague from Delaware, to deal with this problem. The
Chinese Government agreed: Yes, we are going to stop this.
Then we signed another agreement, a statement of cooperation, in
1994. I have been on the floor citing State Department reports and
other evidence--no question about it--that the Chinese

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have refused to comply with these agreements. It has been blatant.
People in our country would be outraged to know this.
I say to Senators, this is a three-pronged issue. I have talked about
these reeducation labor camps. I have talked about the deplorable
conditions. It is a human rights issue. I have cited human rights
reports. I have said this is a trade issue. They have signed these
agreements and have not lived up to them. I have said this is a labor
issue. It permits ordinary people--which I mean in a positive way--in
the States to be a little suspicious that they could lose their jobs as
a result of this.
I hope my colleagues will support this. It is an eminently reasonable
amendment. It simply says the President needs to certify that China is
fully compliant with these two agreements, which they have already made
with us, before extending PNTR to China.
I yield 12 minutes to my colleague from New Jersey.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I thank my friend and colleague from
Minnesota for offering this amendment. I ask unanimous consent to be
added as an original cosponsor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the
Wellstone amendment on prison labor.
China has an extensive prison labor system, and many people are in
China's prisons for expressing their opinions, practicing their
religion, or engaging in other activities we would regard as the
exercise of their fundamental human rights.
Many of these political prisoners have been sentenced to what the
Chinese call ``re-education through labor'' without even being accused
of a crime, much less having a fair trial.
In the early 1990s, the U.S. had reason to believe China was using
prison labor to produce goods for export, including goods intended for
the U.S. market. China's government denied this until we found a
document directing the use of prison labor to produce goods for export.
China had long agreed not to use prison labor to make items destined
for the U.S. market. In August 1992, after protracted negotiations, the
United States and China signed a memorandum of understanding on
prohibiting import and export trade in prison labor products. This was
followed by a statement of cooperation in 1994.
For several years, the system put in place by these agreements
allowed U.S. Customs to investigate when we suspected that prison labor
was being used to make goods for sale in the U.S.
Under the agreements, U.S. Customs officers--working with their
Chinese counterparts--investigated suspicious sites. Cooperation under
the MOU included visits to 11 sites over several years.
In 1997--this is 4 years after the agreement was signed--China
stopped allowing U.S. Customs to conduct these inspections. Apparently,
the Chinese felt that the U.S. should give them a clean bill of health
and accept their assurances on prison labor without further
inspections. They went so far as to seek a renegotiation of the
memorandum of understanding.
For me, China's compliance with its freely accepted international
obligations on prison labor is a critical issue in considering PNTR.
China's willingness to suspend implementation of the memorandum of
understanding is very troubling.
For China's accession to the World Trade Organization and the 1999
bilateral market access agreement to be meaningful, we need to have
confidence that China will fulfill the letter and spirit of its
international obligations.
Senator Harkin and I recently traveled to China, and China's failure
to fulfill its commitments on prison labor was a major focus of our
visit. Before we left, we worked with the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and
the Chinese Embassy in Washington to arrange to accompany U.S. Customs
on a long-overdue prison labor site inspection visit.
When we arrived in Beijing, we were told that the Chinese authorities
did not understand our request, and then we were told such a visit
would not be possible. But we did not give up.
We pressed the point in our first formal meeting in Beijing, with
Vice Foreign Minister Yang. We did not make any progress on the issue,
but I think the Chinese Government got the message that we were
serious.
Later the same day, we met with Vice Premier Qian Qichen. We again
pressed the point that China must fulfill its obligations to allow U.S.
Customs to inspect suspected prison labor sites, and we asked that we
be permitted to join an inspection.
Vice Premier Qian agreed that the time had come to resume
implementation of the MOU on prison labor. He agreed that the first
inspection would take place in September.
We had a debate about the interpretation of understanding. We wanted
to go with Customs. At first, they said we could go to a prison, but
that was not our mission. I was distressed by the fact that they chose
to interpret what the understanding was after having worked on it for a
month before we left the United States for China.
We saw Premier Zhu Rongji and he reaffirmed China's readiness to
resume full implementation of the prison labor agreement. We urged that
U.S. Customs be allowed to conduct inspections sooner than they
planned.
While this trade-related agreement should have been implemented all
along, without need for our intervention, I am glad our visit produced
progress.
The first long-overdue prison labor site inspection by U.S. Customs
took place last Friday, September 8. According to a preliminary report
from our Embassy in Beijing, Chinese authorities cooperated well with
U.S. Customs and other personnel inspecting a factory in Shandong
Province.
I hope the implementation of the agreement will now resume in full,
including rapid completion of other outstanding inspection requests.
The amendment before us would make China's implementation of the
prison labor memorandum of understanding and statement of cooperation a
condition for granting PNTR. In my view, this is a reasonable condition
that Premier Zhu has already assured me China will fulfill and that
appears to be back on track.
If the Chinese follow through, the President should have no problem
reporting to Congress that China is complying with its international
obligations under the prison labor agreement by the time China enters
the WTO.
I believe this issue of prison labor is critical to our consideration
of PNTR for China.
I urge my colleagues to support the Wellstone amendment so that we
can be assured China understands that when we have an agreement, we
want it complied with.
That is one of the questions that loomed large in our visit. We had
an opportunity to meet some of the distinguished leadership of the
Chinese Government. We met with the mayor of Shanghai. We met with
people who had an influence in provincial policy. More than anything
else, I wanted to know that when we had an agreement, when we had an
understanding, it was going to be followed through and it was not
sufficient to produce excuses such as: Well, we didn't understand what
was meant and that wasn't our interpretation; or, we are sorry we can't
quite do that now.
That is not sufficient. This is an important agreement we are facing
overall--this amendment first and then the overall decision on PNTR.
We need, in my view, to have a positive relationship with the Chinese
Republic. It is such an enormous country with so much potential that it
would be a positive step for the United States and China to work
together for us to have access, not just to their marketplace. The
marketplace is important, but there is something more. One billion two
hundred million people reside in China, and we do not want to have an
area of constant instability. We want to let them know that democracy
works. What they have in place now just does not cut the mustard, as we
say. So we want to have this understanding.
But in order to move ahead with it, we have to have a clear view that
promises made--especially those that are so clear as to have been
signed on a document--we want upheld; we do not want them skirted with
purported misunderstandings.
So I congratulate my friend from Minnesota for having, as he usually

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does, a look at the side of the issue that says: This is what is fair
and equitable. That is what counts. And when we look at the
marketplace, that is important. But in order to have the kind of
wholesome relationship I would like to see us have with China, I think
we have to deal with this issue of prison labor right now. I hope our
colleagues will support it.
I thank the Chair.
Mr. WELLSTONE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank my colleague from New Jersey. Before he came
to the floor, I mentioned a report that he and Senator Harkin had done.
I really appreciate their strong voices as Senators for human rights.
Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
I will wait to respond to arguments from the other side.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, this is an important amendment and one
that deserves careful consideration and debate by the Senate.
Senator Lautenberg and I just returned from China last weekend. I'll
have a great deal more to say about our trip and its impact on my
thoughts about our relationships with China later. But I do want to
speak briefly to our efforts in China as they related to prison labor
and directly to this amendment.
As my friend and colleague from Minnesota has pointed out, the U.S.
and China entered into an official agreement on prison labor in 1992.
Its intent is to prevent the importation of goods into our country made
by prison labor in China--a practice made illegal here under Section
1307 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
The agreement is officially titled the ``Memorandum of Understanding
Between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China
on Prohibiting Import and Export Trade in Prison Labor Products.'' It
was signed on August 7, 1992.
Let me read some of the key components. Under the terms of the
agreement the United States and China agree to:

Promptly investigate companies, enterprises or units
suspected of violating relevant regulations and will
immediately report results.
Upon the request of one Party, meet to exchange information
on the enforcement of relevant laws.
Will furnish the other Party available evidence and
information regarding suspected violations.
Promptly arrange and facilitate visits by responsible
officials to its respective enterprises or units.

In March of 1994 we entered into an accompanying statement of
cooperation on the implementation of the MOU. This statement fleshes
out the details of how our two governments were to carry out the
agreement.
This is an important agreement. It aims to assure that U.S. workers
aren't forced to compete with hundreds of prison labor factories in
China. Factories that are filled at least partially with prisoners
whose only crime is seeking democracy or formation of a true labor
union. Prisoners who are held in so-called ``re-education facilities''
for up to 3 years without trials.
Unfortunateley, China's compliance with this agreement has been
dismal. From 1992 to 1997 there were joint inspections, but usually
only after great effort on our part and often only after long delays--
not within 60 days of request as required under the MOU.
But since 1997 China has stopped all compliance with the agreement.
They have denied all requests by our U.S. Customs to inspect prison
labor facilities suspected of exporting products to the United States.
Let me read a portion of one of the recent letters sent by U.S.
Customs to Chinese officials.
So when Senator Lautenberg and I went to China, we asked to accompany
Chinese officials and our U.S. Customs officials on a visit to one of
these 8 sites previously requested by Customs.
We raised this at every level. We first raised it prior to our visit
with the Chinese Embassy here in Washington. Then we raised it with the
Deputy Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, then we raised it with Vice
Premier Quian QiChen.
We raised our concerns about the failure to abide by the MOU and
asked that we be allowed to go along on a visit to see for ourselves
that the Tariff Act of 1930 is not being violated.
At first we ran into a brick wall. We were simply told ``no.'' Then
we were told they misunderstood our request.
Then they said it was very complicated and would take more time.
Then we had a breakthrough.
They refused to let Senator Lautenberg and I go on a visit to one of
these facilities, but they have agreed to renew their compliance with
the MOU. We got that assurance personally from Premier Zhu Ronji.
We got word last Friday--inspections resumed at one site.
So the first renewed inspection was completed Friday. Now we all see
if the Chinese are serious about complying with this agreement. Their
track record clearly does not inspire confidence. That is why I am
supporting the Wellstone amendment. It would add to our leverage to
ensure long-term compliance with this important agreement.
So I urge a vote for this amendment and commend Senator Wellstone for
bringing it forward.
As I mentioned earlier, I will have a good deal more to say about my
trip to China and on the underling PNTR legislation as the debate
continues.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to print the memoranda of
understanding and a letter to Wang Lixian in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record as follows:

Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and
the People's Republic of China on Prohibiting Import and Export Trade
in Prison Labor Products

The Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter
referred to as the Parties),
Considering that the Chinese Government has noted and
respects United States laws and regulations that prohibit the
import of prison labor products, has consistently paid great
attention to the question of prohibition of the export of
prison labor products, has explained to the United States its
policy on this question, and on October 10, 1991, reiterated
its regulations regarding prohibition of the export of prison
labor products;
Considering that the Government of the United States has
explained to the Chinese Government U.S. laws and regulations
prohibiting the import of prison labor products and the
policy of the United States on this issue; and
Noting that both Governments express appreciation for each
other's concerns and previous efforts to resolve this issue,
Have reached the following understanding on the question of
prohibiting import and export trade between the two countries
that violates the relevant laws and regulations of either the
United States or China concerning products produced by prison
or penal labor (herein referred to as prison labor products).
The Parties agree:
1. Upon the request of one Party, and based on specific
information provided by that Party, the other Party will
promptly investigate companies, enterprises or units
suspected of violating relevant regulations and laws, and
will immediately report the results of such investigations to
the other.
2. Upon the request of one Party, responsible officials or
experts of relevant departments of both Parties will meet
under mutually convenient circumstances to exchange
information on the enforcement of relevant laws and
regulations and to examine and report on compliance with
relevant regulations and laws by their respective companies,
enterprises, or units.
3. Upon request, each Party will furnish to the other Party
available evidence and information regarding suspected
violations of relevant laws and regulations in a form
admissible in judicial or administrative proceedings of the
other Party. Moreover, at the request of one Party, the other
Party will preserve the confidentiality of the furnished
evidence, except when used in judicial or administrative
proceedings.
4. In order to resolve specific outstanding cases related
to the subject matter of this Memorandum of Understanding,
each Party will, upon request of the other Party, promptly
arrange and facilitate visits by responsible officials of the
other Party's diplomatic mission to its respective companies,
enterprises or units.
This Memorandum of Understanding will enter into force upon
signature.
Done at Washington, in duplicate, this seventh day of
August, 1992, in the English and the Chinese languages, both
texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:

Arnold Kanter,

Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs.

For the Government of the People's Republic of China:
Liu Huoqiu,
Vice Foreign Minister, PRC.

[[Page S8365]]

____
Statement of Cooperation on the Implementation of the Memorandum of
Understanding Between the United States of America and the People's
Republic of China on Prohibiting Import and Export Trade in Prison
Labor Products

As the Chinese government acknowledges and respects United
States laws concerning the prohibition of the import of
prison labor products, and the United States government
recognizes and respects Chinese legal regulations concerning
the prohibition of the export of prison labor products;
As China and the United States take note and appreciate the
good intentions and efforts made by both sides in
implementing the ``Memorandum of Understanding'' signed in
August 1992;
The Chinese government and the United States government
agree that conducting investigations of suspected exports of
prison labor products destined for the United States requires
cooperation between both sides in order to assure the
enforcement of the relevant laws of both countries. Both
sides agree that they should stipulate clear guidelines and
procedures for the conduct of these investigations.
Therefore, both sides agree to the establishment of
specialized procedures and guidelines according to the
following provisions:
First, when one side provides the other side a request,
based on specific information, to conduct investigations of
suspected exports of prison labor products destined for the
United States, the receiving side will provide the requesting
side a comprehensive investigative report within 60 days of
the receipt of said written request. At the same time, the
requesting side will provide a concluding evaluation of the
receiving side's investigative report within 60 days of
receipt of the report.
Second, if the United States government, in order to
resolve specific outstanding cases, requests a visit to a
suspected facility, the Chinese government will, in
conformity with Chinese laws and regulations and in
accordance with the MOU, arrange for responsible United
States diplomatic mission officials to visit the suspected
facility within 60 days of the receipt of a written request.
Third, the United States government will submit a report
indicating the results of the visit to the Chinese government
within 60 days of a visit by diplomatic officials to a
suspected facility.
Fourth, in cases where the U.S. government presents new or
previously unknown information on suspected exports of prison
labor products destined for the U.S. regarding a suspected
facility that was already visited, the Chinese government
will organize new investigations and notify the U.S. side. If
necessary, it can also be arranged for the U.S. side to again
visit that suspected facility.
Fifth, when the Chinese government organizes the
investigation of a suspected facility and the U.S. side is
allowed to visit the suspected facility, the U.S. side will
provide related information conducive to the investigation.
In order to accomplish the purpose of the visit, the Chinese
side will, in accordance with its laws and regulations,
provide an opportunity to consult relevant records and
materials on-site and arrange visits to necessary areas of
the facility. The U.S. side agrees to protect relevant
proprietary information of customers of the facility
consistent with the relevant terms of the Prison Labor MOU.
Sixth, both sides agree that arrangements for U.S.
diplomats to visit suspected facilities, in principle, will
proceed after the visit to a previous suspected facility is
completely ended and a report indicating the results of the
visit is submitted.
Both sides further agree to continue to strengthen already
established effective contacts between the concerned
ministries of the Chinese government and the U.S. Embassy in
Beijing and to arrange meetings to discuss specific details
when necessary to further the implementation of the MOU in
accordance with the points noted above.
Done at Beijing, in duplicate, this fourteenth day of
March, 1994, in the English and the Chinese languages, both
texts being equally authentic.
____

Embassy of the

United States of America,

February 22, 2000.
Mr. Wang Lixian,
Director for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Beijing,
100020, China.
Dear Mr. Wang: In accordance with the provisions of the
Memorandum of Understanding prohibiting Import and Export of
Prison Labor Products and the Statement of Cooperation, the
U.S. Embassy renews our request for investigation of the
following factories for evidence of prison labor exports. The
request to investigate these facilities was first made
February 28, 1994 and was again made on February 24, 1998,
March 8, 1999 and July 7, 1999.
The below listed investigations were requested five years
ago and again last year. The Ministry of Justice has not
responded with information on these cases. Therefore, we
would like to renew our request that your ministry
investigate the following facilities to determine if these
sites are involved in prison labor exports:
Nanchong Laodong Factory, Sichuan.
Fuyang General Machinery Factory, Anhui.
Dingxi Crane Works, Gansu.
Jilin forging and Pressing Equipment Plant, Jilin.
Jingzhou Xinsheng Dyeing and Weaving Mill. Hubei.
Lanzhou Valve Plant.
Shaoguan Xinsheng Industrial General Plant.
In my letter of February 24, 1998 I enclosed background
information which should assist in identifying these
facilities. I have maintained copies of identifying
information if this would be of assistance to your office. I
feel that we have made significant progress in clearing up
some of these old prison labor investigations and I look
forward to continued cooperation.
I would also like to call to your attention my letters of
April 24, 1998 and October 7, 1998, which requested
investigation of the Zhengzhou Detention Center which was
alleged to be manufacturing Christmas lights for export to
the US and the Dafeng County Reform Through Labor Camp and
the Tilanqiao Prison Labor Facility which were alleged to
have manufactured ADIDAS soccer balls which were exported to
the United States and other countries. The Ministry of
Justice has not responded to these investigative requests
within the sixty day time limit as agreed upon in the
Statement of Cooperation. Please inform us of the status of
these investigations.
If you have any questions or need further clarification
please do not hesitate to contact me. Thank you.
Sincerely yours,
David J. Benner,
Attache.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. ROTH addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I am opposed to the use of forced prison
labor in the manufacture of goods for sale in international markets.
And, I firmly believe that any allegation, whether with respect to
China or any other nation, regarding the use of prison labor ought to
be vigorously investigated under section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
which bars imports of prison-made goods into the United States.
That said, I nonetheless rise in opposition to the proposed
amendment. I do so for three reasons.
First, the amendment is unnecessary. Under section 307 of the 1930
act, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Customs
already have ample authority to investigate allegations that Chinese
enterprises are using prison labor. No new authority is needed, and no
new certification is necessary.
Second, there is nothing about China's accession to the WTO or the
passage of PNTR that limits in any way the ability of the United States
to investigate allegations of the use of prison labor in the
manufacture of goods destined for the U.S. market and to bar imports of
such goods if the allegations prove true.
The WTO contains a provision that expressly permits the United
States, as well as other WTO members, to bar entry of goods made with
prison labor from their markets. Just to be entirely clear about what
the WTO allows, let me quote from the relevant title of the WTO
agreement. It states that:

nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures
. . . relating to the products of prison labor.

In other words, we will retain the leverage we need following China's
accession to the WTO to encourage China's compliance with its
international commitments in respect of prison labor, particularly the
1994 bilateral agreement it signed with the United States.
Third, the House bill before us, H.R. 4444, already addresses the
issue of prison labor and does so more constructively. The bill creates
an executive branch task force to assist the U.S. Customs Service in
the effective enforcement of our laws barring imports of goods made
with prison labor.
As I said at the outset of my remarks, I join those who have been
very critical of the Chinese Government for its failure to be more
cooperative--on a more consistent basis--in rooting out and ending
these practices. But, the proposed amendment would not advance our
argument with the Chinese; it would, instead, prove counterproductive,
by killing the chances of the passage of PNTR.
In light of that fact, I ask my colleagues to join me in opposing
this amendment.
Again, let me reiterate, it is my deep concern that any amendment
would kill this legislation, would kill PNTR. For that reason, I oppose
the amendment, and urge my colleagues to do the same.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.

[[Page S8366]]

Mr. WELLSTONE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
Mr. WELLSTONE. I reserve a little bit of time for my colleague,
Senator Harkin. But let me just say to my colleague from Delaware, as
to the argument that it is not necessary to have any new agreements,
there is nothing new here. We have existing trade agreements. We signed
an agreement in 1992 and in 1994. The Chinese Government agreed not to
export products to our country made by prison labor.
They have not lived up to those agreements. This amendment just says
we call on them to live up to the existing trade agreements before we
go forward with PNTR. It is really that simple.
The bitter irony is they are in violation of one law; they are not
supposed to be exporting products made by prison labor. And we are in
violation of another law: We are not supposed to be importing those
products.
My second point is, my colleague cites H.R. 4444. It is just a
toothless remedy. This has a ``made-for-Congress'' look. We are going
to set up a task force, and we are going to assist the Chinese
Government in living up to these trade agreements. The Chinese
Government does not need any assistance. They control the prison labor
camps. They can live up to the agreements today. They can live up to
the agreements tomorrow. They do not need a task force set up. So I
cannot let my good friend from Delaware get away with this.
I just think it boils down to this: They have the largest forced
prison labor system in the world; these are the functional equivalent
of gulags. I could use, frankly, stronger terms, I say to my colleague
from Delaware, to describe them.
Do we really want to be implicated in this? Do we want to be
beneficiaries of these gulags? Do the citizens of our country--we are
now speaking and voting in their name--want to be beneficiaries of this
forced prison labor system, the largest in the world, these gulags,
where we get products at a lower price because it is on the backs of
people who are political prisoners, who have done nothing more than
speak out for their freedom? I think not.
If we are concerned about it, we will support this amendment. There
is no way around that, I say to my colleagues. This is a straight up-
or-down vote on whether or not this is a concern to us.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
If no one yields time, the time will be divided equally.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 9 minutes.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I informed the distinguished chair of
the Finance Committee that I would be ready to yield back time. I
wonder if I could take 2 minutes and then I will yield back.
We will have a vote on the Thompson-Torricelli amendment, and there
are going to be Senators who will come out and say: This is not about
trying to scuttle this overall trade agreement. We will go to
conference committee. We will get this worked out. And there is such
strong sentiment for this overall agreement, this is a good thing to
do.
I want to say to Senators, I hope when we vote on the amendment I
have offered with Senator Lautenberg--and I believe Senator Harkin will
want to be an original cosponsor--there will be the same sentiment. If
you think it is the right thing to do to vote for this amendment, if
you think it is the right thing to do to say to China: We already have
these trade agreements with you in regard to prison labor conditions
and we are just asking you to live up to those agreements before, in
fact, we finally go forward with PNTR--if you think this is an
important human rights issue, if you think we should not be implicated
in any way, shape, or form in the functional equivalent of these
gulags, if you think this is a labor issue, if you think this is a
trade issue--it is a very compelling issue--then please don't vote
against what you think is right.
We can't have Senators being selective on this and voting one way on
one amendment. Senators can say: We will not vote for any amendments,
period. I have heard that. But now different people are voting for some
amendments and not others.
I say to my colleagues: Vote for what you think is right. If you
think this amendment I have offered is wrong, it is not the right thing
to do based upon your sense of justice or right or anything else, then
vote against it. Otherwise, please vote for this amendment. Don't make
the argument that I am voting against all amendments when, in fact,
Senators are obviously going to be voting for some amendments.

I yield the remainder of my time.
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time, and ask
for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from
Minnesota. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Jeffords)
is necessarily absent.
Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. Akaka) and the
Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Lieberman) are necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
who desire to vote?--
The result was announced--yeas 29, nays 68, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 238 Leg.]

YEAS--29

Ashcroft
Bayh
Boxer
Bunning
Byrd
Campbell
Collins
Dorgan
Edwards
Feingold
Gregg
Harkin
Helms
Hollings
Hutchinson
Inhofe
Kennedy
Lautenberg
Leahy
Mikulski
Reed
Santorum
Sarbanes
Sessions
Smith (NH)
Snowe
Specter
Torricelli
Wellstone

NAYS--68

Abraham
Allard
Baucus
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Breaux
Brownback
Bryan
Burns
Chafee, L.
Cleland
Cochran
Conrad
Craig
Crapo
Daschle
DeWine
Dodd
Domenici
Durbin
Enzi
Feinstein
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gorton
Graham
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Hagel
Hatch
Hutchison
Inouye
Johnson
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Levin
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Miller
Moynihan
Murkowski
Murray
Nickles
Reid
Robb
Roberts
Rockefeller
Roth
Schumer
Shelby
Smith (OR)
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Voinovich
Warner
Wyden

NOT VOTING--3

Akaka
Jeffords
Lieberman
The amendment (No. 4119) was rejected.
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Amendment No. 4132

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Thompson
amendment.
I have been listening to the debate on the Thompson amendment for the
last day or so. I am very concerned that his amendment has been
portrayed as a bill killer.
I support PNTR. I want to open trade with China. This is very
important for the future of both of our countries. But I am also very
concerned about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I
cannot see any situation in which the security of the United States of
America would take second place to a trade issue, even a most important
trade issue. Nevertheless, I would never, ever I put the security of
our country in a secondary position.
To say that we cannot go back to the House and resolve our
differences because we would vote on a responsible amendment that would
require a reporting of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
is just beyond my comprehension. This is the United States Senate. To
say we cannot amend a bill that has been passed by the House would be
the height of irresponsibility.

[[Page S8367]]

I am also speaking today in favor of normal trade relations with
China because I want our countries to have a mutually good
relationship. The idea that we would have a good relationship on trade
but one that gives a wink and a nod to proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction to people intent on hurting the United States of America is
not a fair trade. I couldn't possibly exercise my responsibility as a
Senator and vote against the Thompson amendment.
In early 1969, newly elected President Richard Nixon asserted:

One-fourth of the world's people live in Communist China.
Today they are not a significant power, but 25 years from now
they could be decisive. For the United States not to do what
it can at this time, when it can, would lead to a situation
of great danger. We could have total detente with the Soviet
Union, but that would mean nothing if the Chinese are outside
the international community.

Today, President Nixon's words sound remarkably prescient. China is
undeniably a major world power, thanks in large part to leaders such as
Presidents Nixon and Bush and Reagan, Secretary Jim Baker, Secretary
Henry Kissinger, China is not outside the international community but
neither is China fully a member in good standing of the family of
responsible nations.
The major issues our two nations must confront are difficult and
complex: China's military buildup, arms sales and proliferation, the
future of Taiwan, bilateral trade, and human rights. All of the
previous Presidents in my lifetime have recognized the unfolding
importance of China, and they have all pursued policies aimed at
constructive engagement with the Chinese Government.
The question at issue with our vote on PNTR and our vote on the
amendments that condition the Senate's approval of PNTR must be, what
are the underlying goals of our relationship with China and what are
the primary issues that should guide American policymaking and actions.
My answer is, our policies should be focused on cultivating a stable
and peaceful Asia. We should look to economic competition and mutual
prosperity to bring this about, and we must at all times consider the
security interests of the United States.
As the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee,
Jesse Helms, pointed out yesterday, the Chinese proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction poses a direct threat to the national
security of the United States. I share his view that it would be
irresponsible for us not to address that threat.
The Federal Government has no greater responsibility nor higher duty
to the people of our country and to our allies than to provide for the
common defense of the United States of America.

The bipartisan amendment offered by Senators Thompson and Torricelli
is a responsible vote. It does not scuttle PNTR, as some have warned.
This is the responsible action of the Senate. It would be my fervent
wish that we could vote our conscience on this very important issue,
and not in any way respond to the scare tactics that have been put
forth that this will kill the bill, but instead do what is right for
both of our countries; that is, open, normal trade relations, and
secure the United States from weapons proliferation by China or any
other country or rogue nation that would seek to harm our people or our
allies anywhere in the world.
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thompson). The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, it has been obvious for some time now
that when permanent normal trade relations for China comes to a vote in
the Senate, it will, indeed, pass overwhelmingly. My colleagues
proceeding with this debate in recent days have detailed at length the
enormous potential economic benefits to the U.S. economy. Other
colleagues have appropriately discussed the human rights record in
China, problems with religious freedom, and the rights of workers in
China. They are all legitimate points and each belongs in a debate on
PNTR with China, but the debate is not complete.
The relationship of the United States with the People's Republic of
China is not only about economics; it must include human rights,
religious rights, and workers rights. But it is not just about those
rights; it is also ultimately about the security of the United States.
Our relationship with the People's Republic of China, a nation of 1.3
billion people, an immense land of economic, geopolitical significance,
goes beyond that, perhaps, of any other trading partner of our country.
Indeed, how we define this relationship in this vote and in this debate
has enormous ramifications in the next generation.
Indeed, just as the debate in those first few months and years after
the Second World War changed permanently the security and economic
relationship between the United States and Western Europe and the
remainder of the world, this debate will permanently alter our
relationship with the People's Republic of China, and it is not right
and it is not appropriate that it be done on a single plane. Economics
is important, but it is not everything. That is why Senator Thompson
and I have offered our amendment to address the continuing problem of
the proliferation of weapons and technology from the People's Republic
of China.
It was, of course, our hope that this vote could have been taken
independently of PNTR. It was our desire not to complicate PNTR but to
have a separate debate and separate vote. Regrettably, that proved not
to be possible. So we return today with this amendment actually on the
bill.
As I understand the arguments now for the bill, the most compelling
is that PNTR will integrate China into the international economy, that
it will encourage China to follow international trading rules. It is a
strong argument, but even with passage of PNTR, even if the proponents
are correct that China will then adhere to international trading rules,
that does not automatically make China a member in good standing of the
global community. Trading rules do not govern all international
conduct. A nation is not a nation in good standing in the world simply
because it trades according to these rules; it is by all the rules by
which it chooses to live.
Truly to participate in the global community, China will, as has been
argued on this floor, have to reform its human rights practices, the
way it treats its workers, the way it relates to Taiwan, and how it
deals with sensitive military technology that threatens all peoples
everywhere.
Despite many assurances that it will reform its behavior, China has
continued to be one of the most persistent and serious violators of
international nonproliferation agreements. Ultimately, that is the
question every Senator must ask themselves: If, indeed, PNTR is passed
and China continues to violate trade agreements, you can go to your
local townhall meeting and complain to the autoworkers and you can
explain it to the Chamber of Commerce, but if China continues to
violate proliferation agreements which leads to the spread of nuclear
technology and missiles to a variety of dangerous neighbors that one
day leads to warfare involving our Nation or others, to whom will you
apologize then? Where will the explanations lie? That is the question
before the Senate.

Last month, the Director of Central Intelligence delivered to the
Congress the intelligence community's biannual ``Unclassified Report on
the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass
Destruction.''
The DCI report clearly states that China has increased its missile-
related assistance to Pakistan, and it continues to provide missile-
related assistance to countries such as Iran, North Korea, and Libya.
What is especially troubling about China's activities is that this
sensitive assistance is going to the most dangerous nations in the most
volatile areas of the world, with the greatest potential to do harm.
Indeed, looking at this map I have here--from Algeria to Libya to
Syria to Iran--what is it that China could do more? What would be
worse? What other nation would have to receive nuclear or missile
technology before it

[[Page S8368]]

would offend Members of the Senate? In the entire list of rogue
nations, almost no one is absent.
Just a couple of months ago, Chinese sales to Iran led to the test by
Iran of a Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile. It is believed that
components of Iran's missile program are from Beijing.
The People's Republic of China companies were sanctioned in 1997 for
transfers to Iran, contributing to chemical weapons proliferation. Yet
the DCI's August 2000 report said Iran continues to seek production
technology, expertise, and chemicals for its chemical weapons program.
So it is missiles and chemicals.
Pakistan is a country located, perhaps, in the most volatile region
of the world, which in recent years exploded a nuclear device and has
come to the brink of war with India on several occasions since its new
nuclear status.
The DCI reported last month that the PRC provided ``extensive
support'' to Pakistan's weapons of mass destruction program, and in the
second half of 1999 Iran had ``ongoing contacts'' that could not be
ruled out, despite a 1996 promise by the PRC to stop assistance to
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
In unpublished press accounts, U.S. intelligence agencies have
reportedly concluded that China has stepped up its shipment of
specialty steels, guidance systems, and technical expertise to
Pakistan. Chinese experts have also been sighted around Pakistan's
newest missile factory, which appears to be partly based on Chinese
design.
Libya is a country with a history of promoting regional instability,
sponsoring state terrorism, including the destruction of our own
aircraft and our own citizens.
The August 2000 DCI report publicly confirmed the PRC's assistance to
Libya for the first time. The Defense Department reportedly discovered
in December 1999 that the PRC plans to build a hypersonic wind tunnel
in Libya for missile designs for the Al-Fatah missile program.
According to reports in the Washington Times, the director of Libya's
Al-Fatah missile program is planning to travel to China to attend
China's premier training center for missile scientists and technicians.
North Korea's missile program is now believed to be achieving the
potential to reach the United States with a ballistic missile,
potentially by the year 2005--a direct security concern of the United
States, leading this Congress to authorize and appropriate billions of
dollars for missile defense, leading all of us to a sense of new
vulnerability.

The DCI first publicly confirmed in 1999 that the PRC is supplying
components to North Korea. The August 2000 report states that North
Korea acquired missile-related raw materials and components
``especially through firms in China'' in the second half of 1999.
These countries--Iran, Pakistan, Libya, and North Korea--are just the
countries China has proliferated to in recent years. In the past,
proliferation by the People's Republic of China has also included
sending weapons technology to Iraq, Syria, and Algeria.
I cannot imagine any accusation against a foreign government that
could or should raise more serious concerns in this body. How, indeed,
could any Member of this Senate ever explain to the American people
granting the greatest economic gift in the world, a normalized trade
relationship with the United States, the greatest economy in the world,
without at least, at a minimum, seeking enforcement of previous
agreements for arms control and nonproliferation?
Until China ceases to allow this type of sensitive equipment,
technology, and expertise to flow through its borders, it must
understand that it can never have normalized political and economic
relationships with the United States or, indeed, be accepted into the
family of nations on an equal status with all other nations.
Opponents of our amendment contend that the current nonproliferation
laws are effective; that Chinese proliferation is under control; that
unilateral sanctions never work. They could not be more wrong.
As the reports I have just cited demonstrate, Chinese proliferation
behavior is not improving. It is not getting better. And the DCI's
report delivered to this Congress proves it. Existing nonproliferation
laws are simply not working. This provides a real incentive, in actual
quantifiable costs, for sharing technology with dangerous nations.
Our nonproliferation laws must be strengthened. This amendment--and
only the Thompson-Torricelli amendment--offers that opportunity. Under
this amendment, the President of the United States would submit a
report to Congress by June 1st of each year identifying entities in key
proliferating nations that have contributed to the development or
acquisition of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, or ballistic
or cruise missiles by foreign countries--every year a report
identifying the entities.
The President would be required to impose measures against companies
in key supplier nations that have been identified as proliferators, and
the President would also be authorized to impose measures against any
supplier countries as he sees fit. The President is given the
discretion, but he is also given the responsibility. And this Congress
is given the information that it needs to know whether or not the
Nation is being safeguarded.
Over the past several months, we have substantially revised this
legislation to address a number of concerns by the administration and
by our colleagues. This amendment was not drafted by Senator Thompson
or by myself alone. The administration raised legitimate concerns that
it dealt only with specific technologies, only with the nations about
which we should be concerned. It has been redrafted to deal
specifically with those concerns.

The revised bill now applies to all countries identified by the
Director of Central Intelligence as key suppliers of weapons of mass
destruction. The list currently includes China, Russia, and North
Korea. Countries could be added or removed from the list over time
based on the DCI's guidelines. So there are no unintended consequences
of other states.
There were objections originally that the President did not have
enough discretion in applying the sanctions; that the sanctions in the
bill were too broad; and that they were applied with a standard of
evidence that was too low. Every one of those problems was changed to
meet the administration's objectives.
The bill is now drafted so that any sanctions against supplier
countries are totally within the discretion of the President. The list
of measures available to the President are the same as in the original
bill. But now the President is authorized--not mandated--to apply these
sanctions.
So those within the Senate who had concerns that we were taking away
Presidential discretion, forcing him to act when the facts may not
warrant it, prohibiting him from negotiating by not having this
discretion, have had their concerns addressed. The President is given
authorization. He is not mandated.
The only mandatory measures remaining in the bill would be applied
against specific entities or countries that are determined by the
President to be proliferators. Only if the President determines they
are a proliferator will any entity be sanctioned.
If a company is determined to be a proliferator, the President must
deny all pending licenses and suspend all existing licenses for the
transfer to that company that are controlled for export under the Arms
Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act of 1979, or the
Export Administration Regulations. Isn't that how the Senate would have
it? If a company has been identified, if they have been multiple
violators, if they have been cited by the President, shouldn't that
company then be denied the benefits of these various export acts?

There is also an across-the-board prohibition on any U.S. Government
purchase of goods or services from, and U.S. Government assistance or
credits to, the proliferator. Would any Member of the Senate argue with
this? To use the taxpayers' money, U.S. Government resources to buy
from a company that has been repeatedly cited as a proliferator by the
U.S. Government? Certainly they should not be entitled to the benefits
of trade with the Government itself.
Is it too much to ask that we impose the sanctions on companies that
are already identified, already established as

[[Page S8369]]

having been engaged in this conduct? But for some Members of the
Senate, this was not enough. So we gave the President one further set
of powers, waiver authority, which allows the President to waive the
imposition of measures required under this legislation if he determines
that the supplier country was taking appropriate actions to penalize
the entity for such acts of proliferation and to deter future
proliferation. The President also can waive the sanctions if he
determines that such a waiver is important to the national security of
the United States.
How little would be enough? It isn't mandatory. It is optional. It
requires multiple instances. It must be an entity already identified by
the President. It must be a technology already identified by the
Government. It isn't mandatory. The President can waive it. He can cite
larger national interests.
I believe there is a positive impact with the passage of this
amendment.
Now I ask the Senate another question: What is the impact of failing
to enact it? Who could ever believe that this Senate considers
proliferation issues to be serious, that we are concerned that there is
a price to selling these weapons of mass destruction or these
technologies to other nations, if we cannot at a minimum pass this
authorizing sanction on an optional basis, to be used if the President
wants to use it?
Imagine the message in Beijing or North Korea or Iran or Iraq. Are we
so desperate for trade, is this economy so desperate for that one more
dollar immediately, not to offend a potential investor or buyer, that
we would compromise our own good judgment?
I don't believe we would lose a dollar of trade with this amendment.
I don't believe we lose a product, a job. But even if we did, even if I
were wrong and we did, is the price too high to send a message that in
our proliferation policy there is more than words?
Words will not defend us. It is not at all clear that our missile
defense shield will ever protect us. This might. It can't hurt. It at
least can set a serious tone that we will not be dealt with with
impunity. Trade with us; get the benefits of our market. But we will
look the other way while you send dangerous technologies to nations
that kill our people or threaten the peace.
In a recent editorial, the Washington Post noted:

China's continuing assistance to Pakistan's weapons program
in the face of so many U.S. efforts to talk Beijing out of it
shows the limits of a nonconfrontational approach.

The Post went on to say:

The United States should make clear that . . . Chinese
missile-making is incompatible with business as usual.

A Wall Street Journal editorial stated:

If there is an assumption in Beijing that it can be less
observant to U.S. concerns now that its WTO membership seems
assured, the Chinese leadership is making a serious mistake.

Are they? The Wall Street Journal was too optimistic. Whether they
are making a serious mistake will be judged by the vote on this bill,
win or lose. How many Senators consider proliferation issues and
national security to be more than words but a policy with strength,
with cost, with sanction, if our security is violated?
If we pass PNTR alone and do not pass legislation addressing these
important national security concerns, I fear for the message that is
sent and the priorities of this Senate. This Senate will always be
sensitive to business investment, trading opportunities, and economic
growth. It is our responsibility to assure that America is prosperous
and strong and growing. We will meet that responsibility.
But it is the essence of leadership to understand that no one
responsibility stands alone. As we govern the national economy, we
possess responsibility for the national security. No economy can be so
big, no economy can grow so swiftly, there can be no number of jobs
with national income that can reach no level that makes for a secure
American future if missile technology spreads to Iraq and Iran, if
nuclear weapons begin to circle the globe and unstable regimes.
Where, my colleagues, will your economy take you then? Balance, my
friends. The Thompson-Torricelli amendment offers balance. We are
pleased by our prosperity, but we are not blinded by it. We are blessed
to live in a time of peace, but we understand how we earned it--by
strong policies of national security. That is what the Thompson-
Torricelli amendment offers today.
I yield the floor.

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