[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 100 (Thursday, July 27, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7859-S7862]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. HOLLINGS (for himself, Mr. Graham, Mr. Breaux, and Mr. 
        Cleland):
  S. 2965. A bill to amend the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, to establish 
a program to ensure greater security for United States seaports, and 
for other purposes; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation.


               the port and maritime security act of 2000

  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I rise today, to introduce the Port and 
Maritime Security Act of 2000. This legislation is long overdue. It is 
needed to facilitate future technological and advances and increases in 
international trade, and ensure that we have the sort of security 
control necessary to ensure that our borders are protected from drug 
smuggling, illegal aliens, trade fraud, threats of terrorism as well as 
potential threats to our ability to mobilize U.S. military force.
  The Department of Transportation recently commenced an evaluation of 
our marine transportation needs for the 21st Century. In September 
1999, Transportation Secretary Slater issued a preliminary report of 
the Marine Transportation System (MTS) Task Force--An Assessment of the 
U.S. Marine Transportation System. The report reflected a highly 
collaborative effort among public sector agencies, private sector 
organizations and other stakeholders in the MTS.
  The report indicates that the United States has more than 1,000 
harbor channels and 25,000 miles of inland, intracoastal, and coastal 
waterways in the United States which serve over 300 ports, with more 
than 3,700 terminals that handle passenger and cargo movements. These 
waterways and ports link to 152,000 miles of railways, 460,000 miles of 
underground pipelines and 45,000 miles of interstate highways. 
Annually, the U.S. marine transportation system moves more than 2 
billion tons of domestic and international freight, imports 3.3 billion 
tons of domestic oil, transports 134 million passengers by ferry, 
serves 78 million Americans engaged in recreational boating, and hosts 
more than 5 million cruise ship passengers.
  The MTS provides economic value, as waterborne cargo contributes more 
than $742 billion to U.S. gross domestic product and creates employment 
for more than 13 million citizens. While these figures reveal the 
magnitude of our waterborne commerce, they don't reveal the spectacular 
growth of waterborne commerce, or the potential problems in coping with 
this growth. It is estimated that the total volume of domestic and 
international trade is expected to double over the next twenty years. 
The doubling of trade also brings up the troubling issue of how the 
U.S. is going to protect our maritime borders from crime, threats of 
terrorism, or even our ability to mobilize U.S. armed forces.
  Security at our maritime borders is given substantially less federal 
consideration than airports or land borders. In the aviation industry, 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is intimately involved in 
ensuring that security measures are developed, implemented, and funded. 
The FAA works with various Federal officials to assess threats directed 
toward commercial aviation and to target various types of security 
measures as potential threats change. For example, during the Gulf War, 
airports were directed to ensure that no vehicles were parked within a 
set distance of the entrance to a terminal.
  Currently, each air carrier, whether a U.S. carrier or foreign air 
carrier, is required to submit a proposal on how it plans to meet its 
security needs. Air carriers also are responsible for screening 
passengers and baggage in compliance with FAA regulations. The types of 
machines used in airports are all approved, and in many instances paid 
for by the FAA. The FAA uses its laboratories to check the machinery to 
determine if the equipment can detect explosives that are capable of 
destroying commercial aircrafts. Clearly, we learned from the Pan Am 
103 disaster over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988. Congress passed 
legislation in 1990 ``the Aviation Security Improvement Act,'' which 
was carefully considered by the Commerce Committee, to develop the 
types of measures I noted above. We also made sure that airports, the 
FAA, air carriers and law enforcement worked together to protect the 
flying public.
  Following the crash of TWA flight 800 in 1996, we also leaped to 
spend money, when it was first thought to have been caused by a 
terrorist act. The FAA spent about $150 million on additional screening 
equipment, and we continue today to fund research and development for 
better, and more effective equipment. Finally, the FAA is responsible 
for ensuring that background checks (employment records/criminal 
records) of security screeners and those with access to secured 
airports are carried out in an effective and thorough manner. The FAA, 
at the direction of Congress, is responsible for certifying screening 
companies, and has developed ways to better test screeners. This is all 
done in the name of protecting the public. Seaports deserve no less 
consideration.
  At land borders, there is a similar investment in security by the 
federal government. In TEA-21, approved $140 million a year for five 
years for the National Corridor Planning and Development and 
Coordinated Border Infrastructure Program. Eligible activities under 
this program include improvements to existing transportation and 
supporting infrastructure that facilitate cross-border vehicles and 
cargo movements; construction of highways and related safety 
enforcement facilities that facilitate movements related to 
international trade; operational improvements, including improvements 
relating to electronic data interchange and use of telecommunications, 
to expedite cross border vehicle and cargo movements; and planning, 
coordination, design and location studies. By way of contrast, at U.S. 
seaports, the federal government invests nothing in infrastructure, 
other than the human presence of the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs 
Service, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and whatever 
equipment those agencies have to accomplish their mandates. Physical 
infrastructure is provided by state-controlled port authorities, or by 
private sector marine terminal operators. There are no controls, or 
requirements in place, except for certain standards promulgated by the 
Coast Guard for the protection of cruise ship passenger terminals. 
Essentially, where sea ports are concerned we have abrogated the 
federal responsibility of border control to the state and private 
sector.

  I think that the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs Agency are doing an 
outstanding job, but they are outgunned. There is simply too much money 
in the illegal activities they are seeking to curtail or eradicate, and 
there is too much traffic coming into, and out of the United States. 
For instance, in the latest data available, 1999, we had more than 10 
million TEU's imported into the United States. For the uninitiated, a 
TEU refers to a twenty-foot equivalent unit shipping container. By way 
of comparison, a regular truck measures 48-feet in length. So in 
translation, we imported close to 5 million truckloads of cargo. 
According to the Customs Service, seaports are able to inspect between 
1 percent and 2 percent of the containers, so in other words, a drug 
smuggler has a 98 percent chance of gaining illegal entry.
  It is amazing to think, that when you or I walk through an 
international airport we will walk through a metal detector, and our 
bags will be x-rayed, and Customs will interview us, and may check our 
bags. However, at a U.S. seaport you could import a 48 foot truck load 
of cargo, and have at least a 98 percent chance of not even being 
inspected. It just doesn't seem right.
  For instance, in my own state, the Port of Charleston which is the 
fourth largest container port in the United States, Customs officials 
have no equipment even capable of x-raying intermodal shipping 
containers. Customs, which is understaffed to start with, must 
physically open containers, and request the use of a canine unit from 
local law enforcement to help with drug or illegal contraband 
detection. This is simply not sufficient.
  The need for the evaluation of higher scrutiny of our system of 
seaport security came at the request of Senator

[[Page S7860]]

Graham, and I would like to at this time commend him for his persistent 
efforts to address this issue. Senator Graham has had problems with 
security at some of the Florida seaports, and although the state has 
taken some steps to address the issue, there is a great need for 
considerable improvement. Senator Graham laudably convinced the 
President to appoint a Commission, designed similarly to the Aviation 
Security Commission, to review security at U.S. seaports.
  The Commission visited twelve major U.S. seaports, as well as two 
foreign ports. It compiled a record of countless hours of testimony and 
heard from, and reviewed the security practices of the shipping 
industry. It also met with local law enforcement officials to discuss 
the issues and their experiences as a result of seaport related crime. 
Unfortunately, the report will not be publicly available until sometime 
in the fall; however, Senator Graham's staff and my staff have worked 
closely with the Commission, to develop legislation--the bill that we 
are introducing--to address the Commission's concerns.
  For instance, the Commission found that twelve U.S. seaports 
accounted for 56 percent of the number of cocaine seizures, 32 percent 
of the marijuana seizures, and 65 percent of heroin seizures in 
commercial cargo shipments and vessels at all ports of entry 
nationwide. Yet, we have done relatively little, other than send in an 
undermanned contingency of Coast Guards and Customs officials to do 
whatever they can.
  Drugs are not the only criminal problem confronting U.S. seaports. 
For example, alien smuggling has become increasingly lucrative 
enterprise. To illustrate, in August of 1999, I.N.S. officials found 
132 Chinese men hiding aboard a container ship docked in Savannah, 
Georgia. The INS district director was quoted as saying; ``This was a 
very sophisticated ring, and never in my 23 years with the INS have I 
seen anything as large or sophisticated''. According to a recent GAO 
report on INS efforts on alien smuggling (RPT-Number: B-283952), 
smugglers collectively may earn as much as several billion dollars per 
year bringing in illegal aliens.
  Another problem facing seaports is cargo theft. Cargo theft does not 
always occur at seaports, but in many instances the theft has occurred 
because of knowledge of cargo contents. International shipping provides 
access to a lot of information and a lot of cargo to many different 
people along the course of its journey. We need to take steps to ensure 
that we do not facilitate theft. Losses as a result of cargo theft have 
been estimated as high as $12 billion annually, and it has been 
reported to have increased by as much as 20 percent recently. The FBI 
has become so concerned that it recently established a multi-district 
task force, Operation Sudden Stop, to crack down on cargo crime.
  The other issues facing seaport security may be less evident, but 
potentially of greater threat. As a nation in general, we have been 
relatively lucky to have been free of some of the terrorist threats 
that have plagued other nations. However, we must not become 
complacent. U.S. seaports are extremely exposed. On a daily basis many 
seaports have cargo that could cause serious illness and death to 
potentially large populations of civilians living near seaports if 
targeted by terrorism.

  The sheer magnitude of most seaports, their historical proximity to 
established population bases, the open nature of the facility, and the 
massive quantities of hazardous cargoes being shipped through a port 
could be extremely threatening to the large populations that live in 
areas surrounding our seaports. The same conditions in U.S. seaports, 
that could expose us to threats from terrorism, could also be used to 
disrupt our abilities to mobilize militarily. During the Persian Gulf 
War, 95 percent of our military cargo was carried by sea. Disruption of 
sea service, could have resulted in a vastly different course of 
history. We need to ensure that it does not happen to any future 
military contingencies.
  As I mentioned before, our seaports are international borders, and 
consequently we should treat them as such. However, I am realistic 
about the possibilities for increasing seaport security, the realities 
of international trade, and the many functional differences inherent in 
the different seaport localities. Seaports by their very nature, are 
open and exposed to surrounding areas, and as such it will be 
impossible to control all aspects of security, however, sensitive or 
critical safety areas should be protected. I also understand that U.S. 
seaports have different security needs in form and scope. For instance, 
a seaport in Alaska, that has very little international cargo does not 
need the same degree of attention that a seaport in a major 
metropolitan center, which imports and exports thousands of 
international shipments. However, the legislation we are introducing 
today will allow for public input and will consider local issues in the 
implementation of new guidelines on port security, so as to address 
such details.
  Substantively, the Port and Maritime Security Act establishes a 
multi-pronged effort to address security needs at U.S. Seaports, and in 
some cases formalizes existing practices that have proven effective. 
The bill authorizes the Coast Guard to establish a task force on port 
security in consultation with U.S. Customs and the Maritime 
Administration.
  The purpose of the task force is to implement the provisions of the 
act; to coordinate programs to enhance the security and safety of U.S. 
seaports; to provide long-term solutions for seaport safety issues; to 
coordinate with local port security committees established by the Coast 
Guard to implement the provisions of the bill; and to ensure that the 
public and local port security committees are kept informed about 
seaport security enhancement developments.
  The bill requires the U.S. Coast Guard to establish local port 
security committees at each U.S. seaport. The membership of these 
committees is to include representatives of the port authority, labor 
organizations, the private sector, and federal, state, and local 
government officials. These committees will be chaired by the U.S. 
Coast Guard's Captain-of-the-Port, and will implement the provisions 
and requirements of the bill locally, to ensure that local 
considerations are considered in the establishment of security 
guidelines.
  The bill requires the task force, in consultation with the U.S. 
Customs Service and MarAd, to develop a system of providing port 
security threat assessments for U.S. seaports, and to revise this 
assessment at least triennially. The threat assessment shall be 
performed with the assistance of local officials, through local port 
security committees, and ensure the port is made aware of and 
participates in the analysis of security concerns.
  The bill also requires the task force to develop voluntary minimum 
security guidelines that are linked to the U.S. Coast Guard Captain-of-
the-Port controls, to include a model port concept, and to include 
recommended ``best practices'' guidelines for use of maritime terminal 
operators. Local port security committees are to participate in the 
formulation of security guidelines, and the Coast Guard is required to 
pursue the international adoption of similar security guidelines. 
Additionally, the Maritime Administration (MarAd) is required to pursue 
the adoption of proper private sector accreditation of ports that 
adhere to guidelines (similar to a underwriters lab approval, or ISO 
9000 accreditations).
  The bill authorizes MarAd to provide Title XI loan guarantees to 
cover the costs of port security infrastructure improvements, such as 
cameras and other monitoring equipment, fencing systems and other types 
of physical enhancements. The bill authorizes $10 million, annually for 
four years, to cover costs, as defined by the Credit Reform Act, which 
could guarantee up to $400 million in loans for security enhancements. 
The bill also establishes a matching grant program to develop and 
transfer technology to enhance security at U.S. seaports. The U.S. 
Customs Service may award up to $12 million annually for four years for 
this technology program, which is required to be awarded on a 
competitive basis. Long-term technology development is needed to ensure 
that we can develop non-intrusive technology that will allow trade to 
expand, but also allow us greater ability to detect criminal threat.

  The bill also authorizes additional funding for the U.S. Customs 
Service to carry out the requirements of the

[[Page S7861]]

bill, and more generally, to enhance seaport security. The bill 
requires a report to be attached on security and a revision of 1997 
document entitled ``Port Security: A National Planning Guide.'' The 
report and revised guide are to be submitted to Congress and are to 
include a description of activities undertaken under the Port and 
Maritime Security Act of 2000, in addition to analysis of the effect of 
those activities on port security and preventing acts of terrorism and 
crime.
  The bill requires the Attorney General, to the extent feasible, to 
coordinate reporting of seaport related crimes and to work with state 
law enforcement officials to harmonize the reporting of data on cargo 
theft. Better data will be crucial in identifying the extent and 
location of criminal threats and will facilitate law enforcement 
efforts combating crime. The bill also requires the Secretaries of 
Agriculture, Treasury, and Transportation, as well as the Attorney 
General to work together to establish shared dockside inspection 
facilities at seaports for federal and state agencies, and authorizes 
$3 million, annually for four years, to carry out this section. The 
bill also requires the Customs Service to improve reporting of imports 
at seaports, and to eliminate user fees for domestic U.S.- flag 
carriers carrying in-bond domestic cargo.
  Finally, the bill reauthorizes an extension of tonnage duties through 
2006, and makes available $40,000,000 from the collections of these 
duties to carry out the Port and Maritime Security Act. These fees 
currently are set at certain levels, and are scheduled to be reduced in 
2002. The legislation reauthorizes and extends the current fee level 
for an additional four years, but dedicates its use to enhancing our 
efforts to fight crime at U.S. seaports and to facilitating improved 
protection of our borders, as well as to enhance our efforts to ward 
off potential threats of terrorism.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise today, joined by Senators Hollings, 
Breaux, and Cleland, to introduce the Port and Maritime Security Act of 
2000, a bill that would significantly improve the overall security and 
cargo processing operations at U.S. seaports.
  For some time, I have very been concerned that seaports--unlike our 
airports, lack the advanced security procedures and equipment that are 
necessary to prevent acts of terrorism, cargo theft and drug 
trafficking. In addition, although seaports conduct the vast majority 
of our international trade, the activities of law enforcement and trade 
processing agencies--such as the Coast Guard, Customs, the Department 
of Agriculture, the FBI, and state and local agencies--are often 
uncoordinated and fragmented. Taken together, the lack of security and 
interagency coordination at U.S. seaports present an extremely 
attractive target for criminals and a variety of criminal activities.
  Before discussing the specifics of this legislation, it is important 
to describe the circumstances that have caused the security crisis at 
our seaports. Today, U.S. seaports conduct 95 percent of the Nation's 
international trade. Over the next twenty years, the total volume of 
imported and exported goods at seaports is expected to increase three-
fold.
  In addition, the variety of trade and commerce that are carried out 
at seaports has greatly expanded. Bulk cargo, containerized cargo, 
passenger cargo and tourism, intermodal transportation systems, and 
complex domestic and international trade relationships have 
significantly changed the nature and conduct of seaport commerce. This 
continuing expansion of activity at seaports has increased the 
opportunities for a variety of illegal activities, including drug 
trafficking, cargo theft, auto theft, illegal immigration, and the 
diversion of cargo, such as food, to avoid safety inspections.
  In the face of these new challenges, it appears that the U.S. port 
management system has fallen behind the rest of the world. We lack a 
comprehensive, nationwide strategy to address the security issues that 
face our seaport system.
  Therefore, in 1998, I asked the President to establish a Federal 
commission to evaluate both the nature and extent of crime and the 
overall state of security in seaports and to develop recommendations 
for improving the response of Federal, State and local agencies to all 
types of seaport crime. In response to my request, President Clinton 
established the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. 
Seaports on April 27, 1999.
  Over the past year, the Commission has conducted on-site surveys of 
twelve (12) U.S. seaports, including the Florida ports of Miami and 
Port Everglades. At each location, interviews and focus group sessions 
were held with representatives of Government agencies and the trade 
community. The focus group meetings with Federal agencies, State and 
local government officials, and the trade community were designed to 
solicit their input regarding issues involving crime, security, 
cooperation, and the appropriate government response to these issues. 
The Commission also visited two large foreign ports--Rotterdam and 
Felixstowe--in order to assess their security procedures and use their 
standards and procedures as a ``benchmark'' for operations at U.S. 
ports.

  In February of this year, the Commission issued preliminary findings 
which outlined many of the common security problems that were 
discovered in U.S. seaports. Among other conclusions, the Commission 
found that: (1) intelligence and information sharing among law 
enforcement agencies needs to be improved at many ports; (2) many ports 
do not have any idea about the threats they face, because vulnerability 
assessments are not performed locally; (3) a lack of minimum security 
standards at ports and at terminals, warehouses, and trucking firms, 
leaves many ports and port users vulnerable to theft, pilferage, and 
unauthorized access by criminals; and (4) advanced equipment, such as 
small boats, cameras, vessel tracking devices, and large scale x-rays, 
are lacking at many high-risk ports. Although the Commission's final 
report will not be released until later this summer, I have worked 
closely with them to draft this legislation.
  The legislation Senator Hollings and I are introducing today will 
begin to address the problems of our seaports by directing the 
Commandant of the Coast Guard, in consultation with the Customs Service 
and the Maritime Administration, to establish a Task Force on Port 
Security. The new Task Force on Port Security will be responsible for 
implementing all of the provisions of our legislation. It will have a 
balanced representation, including Federal, State, local, and private 
sector representatives familiar with port operations, including port 
labor.
  To ensure full implementation of this legislation, the bill requires 
the U.S. Coast Guard to establish local port security committees at 
each U.S. seaport. Membership of these committees will include 
representatives of the local port authority, labor organizations, the 
private sector, and Federal, State, and local government officials. The 
committees will be chaired by the local U.S. Coast Guard Captain-of-
the-Port.
  In addition, our bill requires the Task Force on Port Security to 
develop a system of providing port security threat assessments for U.S. 
seaports, and to revise these assessments at least every three years. 
The local port security committees will participate in the analysis of 
threat and security concerns.
  Perhaps most important, the bill requires the Task Force to develop 
voluntary minimum security guidelines for seaports, develop a ``model 
port'' concept for all seaports, and include recommended ``best 
practices'' guidelines for use by maritime terminal operators. Again, 
local port security committees are to participate in the formulation of 
these security guidelines, and the Coast Guard is required to pursue 
the international adoption--through the International Maritime 
Organization and other organizations--of similar security guidelines.
  Some States and localities have already conducted seaport security 
reviews, and have implemented strategies to correct the security 
shortfalls that they have discovered. In 1999, Florida initiated 
comprehensive security review of seaports within the state. Led by 
James McDonough, Director of the governor's Office of Drug Control, the 
review found that 150 to 200 metric tons of cocaine--or fifty percent 
of the U.S. total-flow into Florida annually through ports throughout 
the state.

[[Page S7862]]

  Both the Florida Legislature and the Florida National Guard 
recognized the need to address this growing problem and acted 
decisively. Legislation was introduced in the Florida Senate that 
called for the development and implementation of statewide port 
security plans, including requirements for minimum security standards 
and compliance inspections. In fiscal year 2001, the Florida National 
Guard will commit $1 million to provide counter-narcotics support at 
selected ports-of-entry to both strengthen U.S. Customs Service 
interdiction efforts and enhance overall security at these ports.
  In a July 21, 2000, editorial in the Tallahassee Democrat, Mr. 
McDonough identifies the evaluation of Florida's seaports and the 
implementation of security standards as a priority initiative in 
stemming the flow of drugs into Florida.
  We realize that U.S. seaports are a joint federal, state, and local 
responsibility, and we seek to support comprehensive port security 
efforts such as the one in Florida. Therefore, our bill provides 
significant incentives for both port infrastructure improvements and 
research and development on new port security equipment.
  The bill authorizes the Maritime Administration to provide title XI 
loan guarantees to cover the costs of port security infrastructure 
improvements, such as cameras and other monitoring equipment, fencing 
systems, as well as other physical security enhancements. The 
authorization level of $10 million annually, for four years, could 
guarantee up to $400 million in loans for seaport security 
enhancements.
  In addition, the legislation will also establish a matching grant 
program to develop and transfer technology to enhance security at U.S. 
seaports. The U.S. Customs Service may award up to $12 million 
annually, for four years, for this competitive grant program.
  We also must improve the reporting on, and response to, seaport 
crimes as they take place. Therefore, the bill requires the Attorney 
General to coordinate reports of seaport related crimes and to work 
with State law enforcement officials to harmonize the reporting of data 
of cargo theft. To facilitate this coordination, the bill authorizes $2 
million annually, for four years, to modify the Justice Department's 
National Incident-Based Reporting System. It also authorizes grants to 
states to help them modify their reporting systems to capture crime 
data more accurately.
  In order to pay for all of these important initiatives, the bill 
would reauthorize an extension of tonnage duties through 2006. It would 
also make available $40,000,000 from the collection of these duties to 
carry out all of the provisions of the Port and Maritime Security Act. 
Currently, the collection of tonnage duties is not directed towards a 
specific program. Implementing the provisions of the Port and Maritime 
Security Act of 2000 will produce concrete improvements in the 
efficiency, safety, and security of our nation's seaports, and will 
result in a demonstrable benefit for those who currently pay tonnage 
duties.
  Seaports play one of the most critical roles in expanding our 
international trade and protecting our borders from international 
threats. The ``Port and Maritime Security Act'' recognizes these 
important responsibilities of our seaports, and devotes the necessary 
resources to move ports into the 21st century. I urge my colleagues to 
look towards the future by supporting this critical legislation--and by 
taking action to protect one of our most valuable tools in promoting 
economic growth.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to print the July 21, 2000 
editorial from The Tallahasee Democrat in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

             [From the Tallahassee Democrat, July 21, 2000]

              Florida's Drug War: Looking Back--And Ahead

                        (By James R. McDonough)

       The recent signing of anti-drug legislation by Gov. Jeb 
     Bush should come as welcome news to Debbie Alumbaugh and 
     parents like her.
       In 1998, Michael Tiedemann, the Fort Pierce woman's 15-
     year-old son, choked to death on his vomit after getting sick 
     from ingesting GHB and another drug. GHB is one of several 
     ``club'' or ``designer'' drugs that are a growing problem in 
     Tallahassee, as pointed out recently in a letter to the 
     Democrat by Rosalind Tompkins, director of the newly created 
     Anti-Drug Anti-Violence Alliance. The new law won't bring 
     Michael back, but it lessens the chance that GHB and other 
     dangerous substances will fall into other young hands. Gov. 
     Bush, who has made reducing drug abuse one of his top 
     priorities, approved the following anti-drug measures passed 
     during the 2000 session:
       A controlled substance act, which is aimed at GHB, ecstasy 
     and other club drugs, and more established drugs such as 
     methamphetamine. The new law addresses the trafficking, sale, 
     purchase, manufacture and possession of these drugs.
       A nitrous oxide criminalization act that addresses the 
     illegal possession, sale, purchase or distribution of this 
     substance.
       A money-laundering bill designed to tighten security at 
     Florida's seaports. The measure also creates a contraband 
     interdiction team that will search vehicles for illegal 
     drugs.
       A bill that applies the penalties under Florida's ``10/20/
     Life'' law to juveniles who carry a gun while trafficking in 
     illegal drugs.
       Gov. Bush also approved a budget that includes an estimated 
     $270 million for drug abuse prevention and treatment. This is 
     a big step in the right direction, as these services, 
     especially drug prevention programs aimed at children, are 
     critical.
       Considering the above legislation--along with the 
     publication of the Florida Drug Control Strategy, a statewide 
     crackdown on rave clubs, a survey that shows significant 
     reductions in youth use of marijuana, cocaine and inhalants, 
     and a decline in heroin and cocaine overdose deaths--the past 
     year has shown some progress toward reducing drug abuse.
       Even with additional dollars for drug abuse treatment, the 
     number of treatment beds still falls far short of demand. The 
     wait time to enter a treatment program is measured in weeks. 
     This is unacceptable when you consider the damage done to the 
     individual and to society as an addict awaits treatment. We 
     must continue to narrow the treatment gap until those who 
     need this vital help can get it in a timely manner.
       Our efforts cannot be solely focused on the demand for 
     drugs. A sound drug control strategy must also address 
     supply. The Office of Drug Control has several initiatives to 
     stem the flow of drugs into Florida.
       An intelligence effort to determine the types of drugs 
     entering our state, the way in which they enter, who brings 
     them in and the amounts. This includes the expansion of a 
     drug supply database, all of which go to better inform 
     counter-drug operations.
       An evaluation of Florida's seaports and the implementation 
     of standards for security against drug smuggling and money 
     laundering.
       The addition of a third High Intensity Drug Trafficking 
     Area--a formal designation that creates a multi-agency anti-
     drug task force--covering Northeast Florida.
       A systematic counter-drug effort aimed at interdicting and 
     deterring drug trafficking on Florida's roads and highways.
       Development of intelligence-driven multi-jurisdictional 
     counter-drug operations that combine the efforts of law 
     enforcement agencies at the federal, state and local levels.
       Our efforts will continue. As history has taught us, the 
     struggle against drugs is one that never ends. The minute we 
     believe we have put the matter to rest and relax our guard, 
     drug use immediately begins to resurge. Conversely, if we 
     address the problem in a rational, balanced way, drug abuse 
     abates. The fact is that government can only do so much in 
     countering illegal drugs. Because substance abuse has such as 
     pervasive impact on the family and on society, addressing the 
     problem falls to the entire community: government, educators, 
     community and business leaders, clergy, coaches and, most 
     importantly, parents.
                                 ______