[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 100 (Thursday, July 27, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Page S7812]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT
Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I want to today announce my support for S.
353, the Class Action Fairness Act, just reported by the Judiciary
Committee, and announced my intention to complement this legislation by
introducing legislation soon that will require lawyers representing
plaintiffs in class actions to make preliminary disclosures estimating
the anticipated attorneys' fee, and an explanation of the relative
recoveries that both the attorney and class action clients can expect
to receive if the claim is settled or decided favorably. My
cosponsorship of the Class Action Fairness Act and intention to
introduce my own legislation is prompted by some high profile class
action case settlements that have generated a great deal of
controversy. Labeled ``coupon'' settlements, these agreements have
involved the class action claimants receiving coupons for discounts on
later purchases of goods or services while the attorneys representing
the class walk away with literally hundreds of thousands of dollars, or
even millions of dollars, in fees. Often these coupons are for
discounts on the same item rejected by the claimants in the class
action.
For instance, several years ago many of the nation's airlines were
sued based upon a claim that they had fixed prices. A database that the
airlines were using to communicate fares to the travel industry was
suspected of being used to compare and fix fares, and a Justice
Department antitrust investigation thus ensued. The Justice Department
subsequently filed a civil antitrust suit in 1992 and settled the case
in 1994. But firms specializing in class action cases also brought
their own civil suits against the airlines on behalf of air travelers.
In fact, 37 firms were involved on the plaintiff side of the
litigation.
A settlement was eventually reached that provided $438 million worth
of coupons to an unknown number of passengers, while the legal fees to
plaintiffs' attorneys amounted to $16 million. In other words, the
passengers got coupons, and the lawyers got cash. You may be thinking
that $438 million in coupons sounds like a pretty generous amount of
discounts for the passengers, but the details indicate otherwise. Each
coupon was good for only a 10 percent maximum discount off an air fare.
4.2 million air travelers recovered between $73 and $140 in coupons,
but, again, any one coupon was only good for 10 percent of the actual
fare.
One particularly revealing fact about this settlement was that one
airline that had not been named as a defendant actually asked to be
joined in the suit as a defendant because they saw the promotional
value of all these coupons going to air travelers. So what ostensibly
was a high stakes civil action degenerated into a promotional tool for
the airlines, a negligible recovery for the class members, and a
financial boon for the plaintiffs' attorneys.
It's not difficult to foresee the possibility of collusion between
plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys when the plaintiff attorneys can
get huge fees and defendants can eliminate the risk of a large
judgment. It obviously is an attractive option to a defendant to settle
a case and pay large fees to a small number of people--specifically the
attorneys--and avoid the risk of protracted litigation and lawyers
seeking a jackpot recovery. Attorneys have a fiduciary duty to
represent the best interests of their clients, but it's clear that in
the cases of coupon settlement usually the primary interest served is
their own.
So we now have a problem of plaintiff attorneys searching for causes
for which they can bring suit, and then representing anonymous clients
that they don't know and to which they have no accountability. In fact,
many members of a class in a class action don't even know they are
being represented. The windfall profits to attorneys has prompted a
deluge of these type of suits, and recent studies indicate that in the
last 36 months, some companies have faced a 300 to 1000% increase in
the number of class actions filed against them. And you know the
problem has gotten bad when the president of the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America comes out against coupon settlements.
The problem of coupon settlements has been manifested primarily in
state courts. Federal court judges generally, to their credit, have
been more vigilant in policing such ``sweetheart settlements.'' The
problem of the proliferation of this type of litigation in state courts
prompted Congress to seek a legislative remedy. The Judiciary recently
marked up the Class Action Fairness Act, which moves many of these
large, multi-state claims to the federal courts where they belong. Many
of the class action trial lawyers have worked the system to keep their
claims in state court, where they know there is not the expertise nor
staff to handle the issues, and which provides them advantages over the
defendant. The bill also requires the Judicial Conference of the United
States to recommend best practices the courts can use to ensure
settlements are fair to the class members, that attorneys fees are
appropriate, and that the class members are the primary beneficiaries
of the settlement.
I believe that these are important reforms, and I want to take the
reforms a step further by requiring attorneys in class action cases to
make an up-front disclosure about the prospects for success and also
give information about attorneys' fees and individual class member
recovery in the event of a successful conclusion to the suit. If
potential class members are likely to receive only a small fraction of
what their attorney would receive, or perhaps a coupon which they may
or may not end up using, then they need to be appraised of that fact
from the start. These types of disclosures will at least put the
potential class members on notice that perhaps the attorneys don't have
some noble pursuit of justice in mind as much as they do getting a
quick settlement that will net them huge profits, while the clients
they ostensibly are trying to assist receive little or nothing.
Again, I am pleased to join as a cosponsor of S. 343, and look
forward to introducing my own legislation to combat this abuse of our
legal system.
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