[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 96 (Friday, July 21, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7441-S7443]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  COUNTERING THE THREAT TO MONTENEGRO

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the threat to 
Montenegro, the sole remaining free part of the Yugoslav federation.
  In the decade of the 1990s, there were four mornings on which my 
colleagues and I awoke to a recurring headline: new war in the former 
Yugoslavia, started by Slobodan Milosevic.
  First, in Slovenia. Next, in Croatia. Then, in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Finally, in Kosovo.
  I do not want to ever read that headline again. I never want to read 
the headline that says: Milosevic starts new war in Montenegro.
  So let's say it loud and clear: hands off Montenegro, Mr. Milosevic!
  What is going on today in the so-called Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, specifically, in the relationship between Serbia and 
Montenegro?
  Why is it important for us to pay attention?
  And what should be our stance toward developments there?
  These are the questions I aim to answer in my remarks today.
  Most of my colleagues are aware that ``Yugoslavia'' is an invented 
term. It was not the name with which that nation was born after the 
First World War. Rather, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
officially changed its name in 1929 to the ``Kingdom of Yugoslavia,'' 
meaning the kingdom of the South Slavs.
  That was the first Yugoslavia, the one which perished in the course 
of the Second World War. Out of the ashes of World War II, the second 
Yugoslavia arose. That was Tito's Yugoslavia. Tito had been dead for a 
less than a decade when his Yugoslavia began to unravel at the start of 
the 1990s. And now, today, all that remains of Yugoslavia is an 
increasingly quarrelsome couple: Serbia and Montenegro.
  Once Yugoslavia was a state of 20 million inhabitants, with five 
constituent republics plus two semi-autonomous provinces. And today? 
Slovenia, gone. Croatia, gone. Bosnia and Herzegovina, gone. Macedonia, 
gone. Kosovo, for all intents and purposes, gone.
  The two republics of Serbia and Montenegro are what is left of 
Yugoslavia, Mr. President. And the undeniable fact is that many people 
in Montenegro want no more to do with that Yugoslav federation with 
Serbia as it is today.
  Will Montenegro someday split off to become an independent nation-
state, like Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina? 
Maybe.
  Will Montenegro someday become a partner with Serbia in a revitalized 
and restructured Yugoslavia? Maybe.
  Will Montenegro wind up as a Serbian puppet-state, ruled from 
Belgrade by the likes of Slobodan Milosevic or some other Serbian 
authoritarian jingoist? Not if I have anything to say about it, and I 
hope my colleagues and the U.S. Government agree with me.
  We simply must not take our eye off the ball, Mr. President. There is 
still a very serious risk that Milosevic will undermine and then 
overthrow the elected government of the Republic of Montenegro.
  What would be the result of such a development? At a minimum--
Montenegrins executed or thrown in jail, others forced to flee abroad 
as refugees, Milosevic in charge of new borders with Croatia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Albania, and Kosovo. At a maximum--war with a capital 
``W'', in the Balkans, once again.
  What is the seriousness of the threat today to Montenegro?
  Earlier this month Milosevic made his latest move from Belgrade. He 
got the obedient legislature to approve changes to Yugoslavia's 
constitution.
  The first major change was that henceforth the President of 
Yugoslavia will be directly elected. Guess who gets to run? Yes, 
Milosevic himself--who otherwise would have been obliged by the 
constitution to step down next year at his term's end. This means that 
Mr. Milosevic has, in effect, extended his legal ``shelf-life'' by as 
many as eight years.
  The second major constitutional change was that the upper house of 
Yugoslavia's parliament henceforth will be elected proportionally. Mr. 
President, that's easy for us to understand. It means that, by 
comparison, in this Chamber, there would be a heck of a lot more 
Senators from California than from Delaware. In the case of Yugoslavia, 
it isn't hard to figure out the significance: Montenegro has 650,000 
inhabitants; Serbia has 10 million.
  This constitutional re-jiggering has fooled absolutely no one.
  That it was immediately condemned, on July 8, both by Montenegrin 
President Milo Djukanovic and by the legislature of the Republic of 
Montenegro. The vote in the Montenegrin legislature was 36 to 18 in 
favor of a vigorous condemnation of the constitutional changes as 
``illegal and illegitimate.''
  The changes have also been condemned by the political opposition 
within Serbia.
  The changes have even been condemned by the Russians, who joined in

[[Page S7442]]

the recent G-8 communique statement condemning Milosevic's 
constitutional fiddling.
  Milosevic and his cronies are clearly trying to topple the 
democratically elected government of President Djukanovic. These 
constitutional changes are but the latest gambit.
  In contrast with Milosevic's hopelessly inept long-term strategies, 
most of his tactics are clever. If these constitutional changes were 
ultimately to be accepted by, or forced upon, the Montenegrins, they 
would facilitate his control of Montenegro through peaceful means. 
Given, however, that the Montenegrins have rejected the changes, Mr. 
Milosevic now can claim, spuriously, that the Montenegrins are acting 
``unconstitutionally'' or ``illegally'' and that, therefore, Belgrade 
has some right to ``intervene.''
  Mr. Milosevic also is trying to provoke the Montenegrin authorities 
into reacting out of anger and national pride, and going ahead with a 
referendum on independence.
  Thankfully, the Montenegrin Government, including both President 
Djukanovic and the legislature, have not fallen for Milosevic's trap. 
On July 8, the same day that it so roundly condemned Milosevic's 
constitutional shenanigans, the Montenegrin legislature specifically 
rejected a proposal calling for an immediate referendum on 
independence.
  The support for independence in Montenegro is not--at least not yet--
sufficiently strong to justify holding a referendum. Look again at that 
vote--36 to 18. There clearly are pro-Milosevic politicians in 
Montenegro. Many Montenegrins, especially from the northern part of the 
country, either consider themselves Serbs or at least profess greater 
allegiance to Serbia and/or a Yugoslavia which Serbia dominates than to 
Montenegro.
  Aside from ethnic self-identification, there are many Montenegrins 
who are not convinced that independence is a better outcome for such a 
small country than a democratically reformed federation with Serbia 
would be. For example, in recent municipal elections in Montenegro, the 
capital, Podgorica, went for Djukanovic, while another city, Herceg 
Novi, went for the pro-Serbian party.
  The risk of holding a referendum on Montenegro's independence, in 
such a context, would be that the balloting might easily be followed by 
civil unrest and skirmishes--provoked by Milosevic's henchmen or 
spontaneous--which would be all the provocation that Milosevic would 
need in order to seize power in the name of preserving law and order 
through some combination of paramilitaries and Yugoslav Army units 
already stationed in Montenegro.
  In fact, Reuters reported that the Yugoslav Army was poised to 
implement just such a plan if the Montenegrin legislature had reacted 
more radically to the changes in the Yugoslav constitution. Our State 
Department does not discount these reports as idle speculation.
  What is our policy in response to Milosevic's constant provocations 
and threats against Montenegro? What have we been doing, what are we 
doing, what more can we do?
  First of all, we are providing economic assistance to the Government 
of Montenegro.
  In Fiscal Year 2000, we have already allocated $60.56 million. 
Secretary of State Albright announced on July 13 that the 
Administration plans to notify the Congress of its intention to 
reprogram an additional $16.5 million for democratization and economic 
reform in Montenegro.
  Why does Montenegro need this money?
  Much of it is for budget-support. As a key part of Milosevic's effort 
at destabilization, he has squeezed Montenegro's economy very hard 
through a series of measures.
  He has had Yugoslavia's central bank print extra money, against the 
wishes of the Montenegrin representatives to the bank, and then spent 
it in Montenegro to cause inflation there.
  Yugoslavia has refused to grant import and export licenses to 
Montenegrin companies.
  Serbia has taken virtually all of the revenue from Yugoslavia's 
customs collections, leaving none of it for Montenegro.
  Yugoslavia has stopped payment to Montenegrin pensioners from the 
federal pension fund.
  Yugoslavia has denied overflight clearances for aircraft that would 
transport foreign tourists to Montenegro.
  And, most significant, Belgrade has cut off Montenegrin purchasers 
from food and medicine produced in Serbia, the market which previously 
had provided 75 percent of Montenegro's purchases of such commodities. 
Think about this--the Milosevic regime, which complains about sanctions 
targeted at specific individuals and enterprises in Serbia, has placed 
sanctions on its ``brother'' republic of Montenegro. These are 
sanctions that hurt all Montenegrins.
  It is in large part to combat this kind of economic sabotage that we 
are providing so much assistance to Montenegro.
  That is merely the economic kind of sabotage.
  As I just mentioned, the Milosevic regime has been preparing the 
Yugoslav Army to be able to move against the Djukanovic government. For 
several years, Milosevic has been sending special troops to join 
Yugoslav Army units in Montenegro, as well as commanders who would not 
hesitate to obey orders to attack their Montenegrin ``brethren.''
  Ready to defend the legally elected government are the relatively 
well-armed police force and Interior Ministry troops of the Republic of 
Montenegro.
  There have been stand-offs and provocations at border crossings, at 
Podgorica airport, and elsewhere.
  So far cooler heads have prevailed, but no one should doubt that 
Milosevic has a plan to depose Djukanovic, the most prominent remaining 
democrat in Yugoslavia. Milosevic will undoubtedly wait for another 
target of opportunity. I have no inside line to Belgrade, but my guess 
is that he may act when we are preoccupied with the U.S. election 
campaign this fall and when he hopes that partisan political interest 
may make reaction to foreign aggression more difficult. More about that 
later.
  In any event, it is abundantly clear that Montenegro urgently needs 
our assistance because it is threatened by the Serbia of Milosevic, 
through economic pressure and military intimidation.
  Why, however, does Montenegro deserve our assistance?
  The answer is simple. Because Montenegro, and President Djukanovic's 
government, want to do the right thing.
  President Djukanovic, though still a young man, has traveled a long 
road. He has gone from being a Yugoslav Communist committed to the 
preservation of the status quo to being a Western-oriented democrat.
  I have met with President Djukanovic on several occasions.
  He is a realist. He knows that the only option for Montenegro is the 
Western model. That means market economy. That means fair elections and 
multi-ethnic inclusive politics. That means engagement with the outside 
world rather than sullen, sulking self-pity.
  From the beginning, his government has been a coalition of 
Montenegrins, Slavic Muslims, and ethnic Albanians,
  During the air campaign in Kosovo, President Djukanovic permitted 
refugees to enter Montenegro from Kosovo, and from Serbia as well. In 
fact, some members of the Serbian opposition were safer during that war 
in Montenegro than in Serbia.
  Even while Yugoslav Army targets were being bombed in Montenegro, 
President Djukanovic kept his cool. He understood that what NATO was 
doing had to be done.
  Recently, President Djukanovic did something that I think is 
extraordinary, and ought to be better known.
  Earlier this summer, he offered an apology. Specifically, on behalf 
of Montenegro, he said to the Croatian people: I'm sorry for the role 
that some Montenegrins played in the infamous shelling of Dubrovnik 
back in 1991.
  What is going on here? A Balkan leader actually apologizing for 
ethnic-cleansing and war-crimes?
  The fact that President Djukanovic made that statement, and that it 
was accepted as an apology by President Mesic and the Government of 
Croatia, is highly significant.
  That kind of statement and reaction represent the only way out of the 
morass of ethnic hatred that caused, and

[[Page S7443]]

could still cause, death and destruction in the former Yugoslavia.
  In terms of economic reform, the government of President Djukanovic 
has said that it would like to begin a major privatization of state 
assets sometime later this year. The United States, our allies, and the 
international financial institutions not only should support this, but 
should be involved in it. We have learned from hard experience 
throughout the former communist world, that if outside powers do not 
get involved, it is just too tempting for well-placed individuals to 
cream off the best for themselves, to the disadvantage of the populace 
as a whole.
  Montenegro deserves our support, because its government wants to 
follow good models of governance, economics, and politics, despite the 
risk that its democratic and free-market policies could bring civil 
war, military coup, sudden exile, or even worse, assassination. Let us 
not forget that it was in Montenegro that Milosevic's hit-men shot and 
wounded Vuk Draskovic, the Serbian opposition leader. Standing up to 
Milosevic, when you live inside Yugoslavia, takes courage. Standing up 
to Milosevic in the name of a majority of your 650,000 countrymen, as 
President Djukanovic is doing, takes quite a bit of courage.
  It seems clear to me that what we have on our hands in Montenegro is 
a case where we have American strategic interest combined with a moral 
imperative.
  Let us not be caught flat-footed in Montenegro. Let us be vigilant 
and on guard.
  First, I call upon our government to make clear to President 
Milosevic that the United States will not tolerate the overthrow of the 
legally elected government of Montenegro.
  Second, I urge in the strongest terms that the United States 
immediately take the lead within NATO in drawing up detailed 
contingency plans for responding affirmatively to any request by the 
Djukanovic government for assistance in repelling aggression by the 
Yugoslav Army against Montenegro.
  Third, in order that this not become a partisan issue in the fall 
election campaign, I urge the Administration to include representatives 
of both Vice President Gore and Governor Bush in all deliberations on 
the situation in Montenegro.
  I hope that all members of Congress, and indeed all Americans, will 
agree that we owe it to ourselves, to our allies, and to our friends in 
Montenegro and in the Balkans, to be prepared. As somebody once 
observed, ``summoning the will to win is one thing; the more important 
thing is summoning the will to prepare.'' Deterrence is much cheaper 
than war-fighting. Milosevic must be made to understand that he will 
not be allowed to get away with his fifth war of aggression in 10 
years.

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