[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 95 (Thursday, July 20, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7382-S7383]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: LESSONS LEARNED
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the role of unilateral economic sanctions
in the conduct of American foreign policy has been part of our debate
in the Congress and in the executive branch for the past three years.
Attempts to modify or reform the way the United States utilizes
unilateral economic sanctions in the conduct of our foreign policy have
consumed the attention of several committees, spawned numerous
sanctions reform bills--including my own efforts--resolutions and
amendments, generated a number of floor debates, stimulated countless
discussions within this body and with the administration and prompted
many press conferences and news releases. It even moved the
distinguished Majority Leader to appoint an ad hoc bipartisan Senate
task force to sort through the issue in the hopes of finding a policy
path or sanctions that best promotes our national interest.
Outside the United States Government, virtually every think tank,
university, trade association, and foreign policy association has
invested time and resources to studying, analyzing and making
recommendations on the subject of unilateral economic sanctions. This
is as it should be. The subject is integral to our approach on foreign
policy, national security and international trade.
I have been pleased that our debate and the large volume of
literature have led to considerable re-thinking about the efficacy of
unilateral economic sanctions. I have noted that the frequent resort to
use of unilateral sanctions to achieve foreign policy goals has
declined and that our sophistication about the inter-relationship
between unilateral economic sanctions and policy has grown
dramatically. One of the most important players in our debate over the
past few years has been the unique coalition of some 675 export-
oriented companies in the United States called USA*ENGAGE. They have
been critical in helping to shape the debate on unilateral economic
sanctions, a debate which continues virtually as I speak.
[[Page S7383]]
I recently read a short speech by Mr. William Lane who serves as the
Chairman of the USA*ENGAGE trade association and the Washington
Director of Caterpillar corporation titled ``USA*ENGAGE: Lessons
Learned: The Cost of Conducting Foreign Policy on the Cheap.'' The
remarks were offered at the French Institute on International Relations
last month.
I believe my colleagues will find Mr. Lane's remarks insightful and
informed so I ask unanimous consent that the full speech be printed in
the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Remarks of William Lane: USA*ENGAGE: Lessons Learned
the cost of conducting foreign policy on the cheap
I very much appreciate the opportunity to discuss the issue
of economic sanctions before such an influential audience.
For the past four years I've been closely associated with the
public policy effort known as USA*ENGAGE. Today, I'd like to
talk about that effort--with specific focus on the lessons
we've learned during what has turned into a rather remarkable
campaign.
USA*ENGAGE was organized in reaction to a disturbing
development: for much of this decade the United States has
embraced an outdated policy tool--unilateral sanctions--to
influence foreign governments. In fact, the U.S. has imposed
sanctions with such vigor that by 1997 over half the world's
population was the target of some form of economic punishment
at the hands of the United States.
Recognizing that such sanction policies rarely work, are
often counterproductive and almost always costly to other
national objectives, U.S. business and agriculture felt
compelled to challenge the wisdom of a sanctions-based
foreign policy. Organized as USA*ENGAGE, the four-year-old
effort has had a definite impact on how America's
policymakers now view sanctions.
To appreciate the lessons learned, it is best to recall the
scope of the problem. Put bluntly, with the end of the Cold
War, many U.S. policymakers embraced the simplistic view that
sanctions were the perfect compromise between doing nothing
and taking military action.
So the United States sanctioned. It sanctioned South Korea
and Saudi Arabia over labor rights; India and Pakistan for
nuclear testing; Colombia for narcotics; and China for human
rights abuses and environmental concerns. Citizens of Canada
and Israel were sanctioned for doing business in Cuba. Egypt
and Germany were threatened with sanctions because of
concerns about religious persecution, as were companies in
Russia, Malaysia and France for investing in Iran's petroleum
sector.
How many sanctions were imposed? In 1997, the President's
Export Council found that the U.S. was targeting unilateral
sanctions against 73 countries, while the Congressional
Research Service cited 125 measures authorizing unilateral
sanctions.
Did the sanctions work? The Institute for International
Economic concluded that less than one in five unilateral
sanctions resulted in anything close to the desired result.
However, the one thing unilateral sanctions have clearly done
is to hurt U.S. interest--annually costing as many as 250,000
high-paying American jobs and reducing U.S. exports by about
$19 billion.
From our perspective, sanctions also ran counter to the
reality that in many developing countries American business
represents one of the most progressive elements of society.
By encouraging trade and investment abroad, America not only
helps create jobs and higher living standards; if also
promotes values that encourage political freedom, the rule of
law, and respect for human rights. From better schools and
health care to improved infrastructure and housing,
commercial engagement can make a positive difference in the
lives of millions.
At the same time, the positive contribution made by the
many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) cannot be
underestimated. While we recognize there are no guarantees in
foreign policy, we've learned that for engagement to work, it
needs to be pursued at many levels--political, diplomatic,
economic, charitable, religious, educational, and cultural.
Rather than view each other as adversaries, business and the
NGO communities would be well served to be supportive of
common objectives.
So, the strategy of USA*ENGAGE was to engage friend and foe
alike in the sanctions debate. Our original hope was that 100
companies would join us. Clearly, this was an issue of great
concern for the business community, as our membership quickly
swelled to 675 companies.
Moreover, we engaged the academic community and think
tanks. We engaged non-traditional business allies ranging
from religious and humanitarian organizations to human rights
groups. We engaged the Congress and Clinton Administration.
We worked with the media and aggressively used the Internet
to engage the public--building a web outreach program that
was receiving 140,000 hits per month at its peak. With our
encouragement, the sanctions issue even became the national
college-debating topic.
To be frank, our message evolved with time. Initially we
stressed what our experience told us was true:
(1) Unilateral sanctions don't work and can be costly;
(2) Engagement--when pursued at all levels--can be a strong
force for positive change;
(3) Isolating a country from positive values and means of
influence rarely gets results;
(4) Multilateral actions are almost always more effective
than unilateral ones.
As the public debate continued, our views coalesced around
one overriding theme: the United States cannot conduct an
effective foreign policy on the cheap. Unilateral sanctions
are not only the lazy man's foreign policy, but a symptom of
a larger problem: a lack of recognition of the broad array of
foreign policy tools--ranging from carrots to sticks--that
are available.
Sanctions--even unilateral ones--at times may be necessary,
but other foreign policy tools must be part of the equation.
These include the Foreign Service. USAID, military and
intelligence agencies, as well as multilateral institutions
like the UN, World Bank, IMF and WTO. But for these tools to
work, U.S. leadership, commitment, and funding is essential.
The problem with unilateral sanctions is that they often
cut off American influence and hurt the very people the U.S.
is trying to help. We don't think it is an accident that the
countries the United States has attempted to isolate the
most--Cuba and North Korea--have changed the least over the
past 40 years.
The efforts of USA*ENGAGE have prompted a reexamination of
many U.S. sanction policies. Sanctions have been lifted
against Colombia, Vietnam, and both South and North Korea.
The U.S. has rejected sanctions against Mexico, Indonesia,
Russia, Malaysia and France and waived sanctions against
India and Pakistan. Earlier this week, the U.S. Supreme
Court, in a rare unanimous vote, ruled that state and local
sanctions are unconstitutional. There has even been movement
toward engaging Cuba, with legislation now moving in the
Congress that would open the door to U.S. shipments of food
and medicine.
While a few new sanctions--Burma and Sudan--have been
imposed in recent years, it is clear that policymakers view
unilateral sanctions in a more critical light. It is
important to note that last year, and so far this year, the
United States has not imposed any unilateral sanctions of
note. This is a far cry from 1996, when USA*ENGAGE was
organized. In that year alone, according to the National
Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. imposed 23 unilateral
sanctions, including two measures--the Helms-Burton Act and
the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act--that were unusually onerous in
that extraterritorial sanctions were authorized.
For our part, business now sees value in supporting issues
that it previously ignored--such as encouraging America to
pay its UN arrears and ensuring that the IMF and Foreign
Service are adequately funded.
Under the leadership of foreign policy and trade experts
like Senators Lugar, Kerrey and Hagel and Representatives
Crane, Dooley and Manzullo, there is a serious effort in
Congress to enact legislation that would put in place a more
deliberate process to use when the U.S. considers new
unilateral sanction proposals. Known as The Sanctions Process
Reform Act, this common sense legislation is a good bill and
should be enacted.
While this legislation is important, it won't be new laws
that stop policymakers from adopting new unilateral sanctions
rather than pursuing more effective multilateral actions. Nor
will new laws ensure that our leaders recognize the full
power of engagement and the risks associated with isolation.
That is why we must continue to be vigilant and keep U.S.
foreign policymakers on a path that included multilateral
solutions to international problems.
What will ultimately change America's sanctions-base
foreign policy will be Americans who--armed with the facts--
demand a more effective foreign policy. To that end, the
ultimate success of USA*ENGAGE will depend on whether the
lessons learned are reinforced by a commitment from our
leaders to refrain from conducting foreign policy on the
cheap.
As a conclusion, I'd like you to note that perhaps the most
telling event to illustrate the evolution of U.S. sanctions
policy took place earlier this week. The decision this week
by President Clinton to drop many of the U.S. sanctions that
have been in place against North Korea for nearly a half a
century was indeed profound. What better way to mark the 50th
anniversary of the Korean War than to finally make
significant progress towards ending the Cold War on the
Korean Peninsula?
The United States should now further follow the lead of
South Korea, as we too face an opportunity to ease tensions
with a hostile neighbor. America can learn from the Koreans
by opening a dialogue with the government of Cuba. Engagement
is working throughout the world--it can work in our backyard
too. Perhaps that will be the greatest lesson we have yet to
learn.
Thank you.
____________________