[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 94 (Wednesday, July 19, 2000)]
[House]
[Pages H6530-H6540]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 4576, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS
ACT, 2001
Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution
554, I call up the conference report on the bill (H.R. 4576), making
appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending
September 30, 2001, and for other purposes.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 554, the
conference report is considered as having been read.
(For conference report and statement, see proceedings of the House of
July 17, 2000 at page H6102.)
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis)
and the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha) each will control 30
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis).
(Mr. LEWIS of California asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
First, let me say that this conference report is, in my judgment, a
fabulous piece of work. It provides funding for fiscal year 2001 at
levels that reflect very much the legislation that was passed by the
House only a few weeks ago. Indeed, as the Members may know, I was
somewhat disconcerted by the supplemental bill that we passed some
weeks ago, because it was my view that that legislation, while
significant, failed to fully address certain critical areas of
interest, such as our readiness needs, the contingency operations
funding challenges that exist around the world, all the outstanding
needs, military medical system, et cetera. We made up for much of that
in an emergency funding title in their conference report.
Indeed, in working with the other side of the aisle, we have had
truly a hallmark year, in terms of laying the foundation for our future
national defense. We need to make sure that America continues to lead
the world as the strongest among the countries of the world and
continue to play our role on behalf of freedom.
Mr. Speaker, let me say that I would like to express to the Members
my deepest appreciation for the work done with my colleague, the
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha); indeed, the cooperation of
the ranking member of the full committee has been extremely helpful as
well. I must say that the staff on both sides of the aisle, Kevin Roper
and his gang of, it looks like 112 staff people, but it is actually
only 13 women and men doing three dozen people's work.
Beyond that, Mr. Speaker, let me say that the cooperation on the
Senate side, in the other body's committee has been extremely valuable
as well. The work of that staff, led by Steve Coatese, as well as
Senator Stevens and the ranking member Senator Inouye, are very much
appreciated.
At this point I would like to insert for the Record a summary of the
funding levels agreed to in the conference agreement.
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Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Speaker, this is basically the same bill that we
passed in the House.
I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr.
Kucinich).
(Mr. KUCINICH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I will include in the Record at this point
materials relevant to this debate.
I object to the passage of the conference report because it contains
billions of dollars for the inception of a failed missile program which
has already cost the taxpayers of the United States over $60 billion in
its previous presentations. I ask my colleagues to review the record of
failures and also to review the anti-democratic lengths to which the
Department of Defense is going to try to cover-up the failures of the
system.
National Missile Defense
How it is Supposed to Work
The ground-based anti-missile system would track warheads
using ground-based radars and satellite-based infrared
sensors, and the kill vehicles would use infrared sensors to
home in on their targets.
An intercontinental missile when it is launched starts out
early in its trajectory as a large missile, hot (because the
rocket engine is still burning) and slow. This is called the
boost phase. It would take approximately 30 minutes for a
missile to reach its farthest point of 6,000 miles. The boost
phase lasts 5 minutes.
When the boost phase ends and there is about 300 miles left
before impact, only the warhead is left, leaving a small,
cold (and therefor hard for infra-red sensors to see) and
fast. This makes the warhead a much more difficult target. At
this point the war head is traveling at a few miles per
second.
So, this small, fast and hard to track warhead must be hit
by an anti-missile traveling at a faster speed. This is how
the system has received the analogy of trying to hit a
``bullet with a bullet''. It is practically impossible to do
now, under controlled conditions.
Technological Failure
Before the decision is made, three exo-atmospheric
intercept tests have been scheduled to determine the system
success rate and reliability to deploy the system. The one of
two tests failed. And the third test has been put off twice
because it was not ready for testing. Three tests can not
define the technical readiness of the system and serve the
basis for deploying a national missile defense.
With only two of 19 tests conducted, it has yet to work
under real-world conditions. According to a report by The
Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers and the Council for a
Livable World Education Fund other anti-missile systems have
been put through far more rigorous testing. The ``Safeguard''
missile defense system, deployed in 1975 and canceled after
one day of operation, was put through 165 missile flight
tests. The ``Patriot'' theater missile defense system was
tested 114 times.
According to testimony taken from Dr. David Wright of the
Union of Concerned Scientists before the US Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations in 1998:
``. . . Since 1982 the US has conducted 16 intercept tests
of exo-atmospheric hit-to-kill interceptors, which operate in
a similar manner to the planned NMD interceptor. To date, the
test record of such interceptors has been abysmal. Only 2 of
these 16 intercept tests scored hits, for a 13 percent
success rate. And the test record is not getting better with
time: the most recent successful high-altitude test occurred
in January 1991 and the last 11 such intercept tests have
been failures.''
Fraud Deception and Manipulated Tests--NMD is a Technological Failure
The Department of Defense recently ``classified'' a public
letter and attachments from an MIT scientist, Dr. Ted Postol,
containing devastating information about the failure of the
national missile defense system, its inherent inability ever
to protect the United States, and the fraud used to cover up
these facts. Dr. Postol is a missile expert who worked in the
Reagan Administration and has done analysis of weapons
systems for the government.
According to Dr. Postol, the system failed those tests. The
New York Times states that, ``The Pentagon hailed the first
intercept try as success but later conceded that the
interceptor had initially drifted off course and picked out
the decoy balloon rather than the warhead.''
That is because, according to the Times, the system cannot
tell the difference between warheads and decoys. Experiments
with he National Missile Defense system have revealed that
the system is``inherently unable to make the distinction
[between target warhead and decoys].''
The Times characterized the MIT scientist as saying that
the signals ``from the mock warhead and decoys . . .
`fluctuated in a varied and totally unpredictable way,'
revealing no feature `that could be used to distinguish one
object from the other.' '' Indeed, the Times reported, ``the
test showed that warheads and decoys are so similar that
sensors might never be able to tell them apart.'' In other
words, national missile defense does not work and cannot work
because it's inherently unable to tell the difference between
warheads and decoys.
Not only is the national missile defense system incapable
of working, but, according to the Times, contractors and the
Pentagon have purposely altered data to create a different
appearance. The Times reported that the ``Pentagon and its
contractors had tried to hide this failure'' and that the MIT
professor ``says the Pentagon conspired to cover up this
sensor problem.''
The Times, quoting from the classified letter and analysis,
goes on to say, ``the analytical team arbitrarily rejected
and selected data to create an `elaborate hoax' that was then
hidden in reports by the use of `misleading, confusion, and
self-contradictory language.' '' According to the Times,
``the coverup, [MIT scientist] said, was `like rolling a pair
of dice and throwing away all outcomes that did not give
snake eyes.''
TRW, Inc. One of the major contractors for this system has
had allegations of fraud made against it by a former senior
engineer from TRW, Dr. Nira Schwartz. She has provided
information challenging the claims the company made about the
weapons ability to distinguishing decoys from actual
warheads.
I have written to FBI Director, Louis Freeh, to investigate
these allegations of fraud and cover-up of this program by
Dr. Postol. The American people need an independent
investigation of this matter to determine these serious
allegations.
Moreover, according to Postol, all the data used for his
analysis was unclassified when he used it. All his supporting
information that he sent to the White House was also
designated as unclassified. The DoD has classified
allegations and evidence of fraud made from information that
was unclassified by the Department. This could be in
violation of Executive Order 12958. And I have included this
in the letter to Mr. Freeh.
The Executive Order prohibits the use of the classification
system to hide fraud or other wrongdoing. Subsection 1.8(a)
states ``In no case shall information be classified in order
to: (1) conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or
administrative error; (2) prevent embarrassment to a person,
organization, or agency; (3) restrain competition; or (4)
prevent or delay the release of information that does not
require protection in the interest of national security.''
Furthermore, the Executive Order states at 1.8(c):
``Information may not be reclassified after it has been
declassified and released to the public under proper
authority.'' Needless to say, the public deserve to expect
that the laws of the nation, including Executive Order 12958,
be upheld and enforced.
countermeasures
The 1999 National Intelligence Estimate on the ballistic
missile threat to the United States--a document prepared by
the US intelligence community--stated that countermeasures
would be available to emerging missile states.
According to the Union for Concerned Scientist,
countermeasures could be deployed more rapidly and would be
available to potential attackers before the United States
could deploy even the much less capable first phase of the
system.
A report by the Union of Concerned Scientist details how
easily countermeasures could be used against this system. And
it would not have to use new technology or new materials.
For example, it states that biological or chemical weapons
can be divided into many small warheads called
``submunitions.'' Such submunitions, released shortly after
boost phase, would overwhelm the planned defense. Any long-
range missile attack with biological or chemical agents would
almost certainly be delivered by submunitions, and that the
NMD system could not defend against such an attack.
Also, you have heard about the past tests have used
balloons as decoys, to see whether the missile can
discriminate between the real war head and the missile. What
could happen is that an attacker can deploy its nuclear
weapons inside balloons along with many other empty balloons.
So, the real warhead is indistinguishable from the decoys,
therefore tricking the infra-red sensors. Nuclear warheads
could also be with cooled materials that would prevent the
kill vehicles from detecting and hitting the warhead.
cost estimates
The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the
system will cost $60 billion to build and deploy. Congress
intends to spend $12 billion in the next 6 years.
The SDI/Star Wars system has cost the taxpayer more than
$60 billion and it estimated that this system, though less
far reaching than Star Wars will cost more.
We have spent more than $122 billion dollars on various
missile defense systems. We need to reorganize our priorities
and look at how we could better use these funds for programs,
that benefit the poor, seniors and our nation's children.
alternatives
We are the ONLY superpower in the world. The deterrent that
we currently have is sufficient. We have thousands of
missiles on hand that act as a deterrent. Any attack by
another state would not be massive and would not be able to
completely destroy our country or our nuclear arsenals. So
any attack would leave the U.S. and its armed
[[Page H6536]]
forces intact. Our deterrent is impaired only if another
state had enough missiles to knock off ours before they
launched. The Star Wars system in the 80's assumed that
Russia had enough missiles to destroy our missiles before
they could launch, that is why we spent $69 billion dollars
searching for way to stop incoming missiles. but that has
changed and now we have full diplomatic relations with
Russia.
We could use much cheaper measures to secure our national
security. For example, preventative measures. Why not
increase funding for our State Department to boost our
diplomatic arms with these so-called rogue states? We know
that strengthening diplomatic relations with nations
ensures national security.
For example, France and Britain both have Submarine-
Launched Ballistic missiles (64 and 48 respectively) or sea
based missiles. But they have never attacked us or have never
indicated that they will attack the United States. Why?
Because we are allies. Because we have close economic and
diplomatic ties. Israel has long ranged nuclear capabilities,
but will they ever attack the United States, no? Why, because
we are allies. Diplomacy is key. What makes these countries
different than say North Korea or Iran? Our historical
diplomatic relationship.
who will benefit from the national missile defense system?
The national missile defense system will simply line the
pockets of major weapons contractors, spending billions of
dollars for a system that doesn't work and doesn't protect
against real threats, we will undermine legitimate military
expenditures, and erode readiness of our forces. So who's
benefitting from having a national missile defense system?
According to the Washington Post, Boeing in 1998 already
obtained a three year contract for $1.6 billion dollars to
assemble a basic system, before the President has even
decided to deploy the system. The Post states that TRW has
contracts for ``virtually every type of missile defense
program.''
The military industry has the most to gain from a National
Missile Defense system. According to the Washington Post,
Lockheed Martin is the major contractor on theater missile
defense, ``with its upgraded version of the Patriot missile
and the Army's $14 billion Theater High Altitude Area Defense
system.
According to Common Cause the defense industry as a whole
supplied more than $2.3 million dollars in soft money to
major campaigns last year.
nmd effect on nuclear non-proliferation and international relations
Deploying a national missile defense system could
politically succeed in setting the stage for a world-wide
arms race and dismantle past arms treaties. The NMD violates
the central principle of the ABM Treaty, which is a ban on
the deployment of strategic missile defenses. It will
undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It will
frustrate SALT II and SALT III.
It will lead directly to proliferation by the nuclear
nations. It will lead to transitions toward nuclear arms by
the non-nuclear nations. It will make the world less safe. It
will lead to the impoverishment of the people of many nations
as budgets are re-fashioned for nuclear arms expenditures.
That the United States would be willing to risk a showdown
with Russia or China and the rest of the world over the
unlikely possibility that North Korea may one day have a
missile which can touch the continental United States--argues
for talks with North Korea, not the beginning of a new world-
wide arms race.
CIA officials realize that deploying a national missile
defense system would cause world wide instability and
endanger relations with our allies in Europe. The LA Times
recently reported that officials are writing a secret report
outline their thoughts on the devastating impact that this
system will have throughout the world.
Russia and the US signed agreements (1) establishing a
permanent joint early-warning center in Moscow to prevent
miscalculations about missile launches, and (2) to reduce
their stockpiles of military-grade plutonium by 34 tons each.
This is a great sign. I think that dialogue is the step in
the right direction, but nothing was resolved regarding the
proposal of the ABM Treaty. I think it is a bad idea and it
could upset our relationship with our allies to the east.
Even if Russia does agree to changing the ABM Treaty, we
will most likely see Russia and China build up their nuclear
arsenal risking opportunities to bring them and other nuclear
countries into the arms control process.
(Note: According to law, any substantive change to a
bilateral treaty must be agreed to by the Senate. Therefore,
any changes to the ABM Treaty must be ratified by the Senate.
The Clinton Administration urged Russia to include a protocol
to their ratified ABM Treaty that makes Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus and Kazakhstan the four ABM Successors. If the Senate
wants to move forward with START II it must first agree to
make these four states successors to the ABM Treaty.)
Russia has consistently made statements that deploying a
National Missile Defense system would be interpreted by them
as a threat to their national security. So, there is a great
likelihood that deploying such a system could spark another
arms race. For example, Gregory Berdennikov, the director of
the Russian Foreign Ministry's Security and Disarmament
Department warned that if the United States deploys a missile
defense system,
``Russia will be forced to raise the effectiveness of its
strategic nuclear armed forces and carry out several other
military and political steps to guarantee its national
security under new strategic conditions . . . We see no
variants which would allow the United States to set up a
national ABM system and still preserve the ABM treaty and
strategic stability in the world.''
I would like to quote Col. General Vladimir Yakovlev,
commander of Russia's strategic rocket forces. ``Problems
have cropped up now with Russian-American 1972 AMB treaty;
for this reason, we are forced to build in into our new
missiles a capability for penetrating anti-missile
defenses.'' 1999 (Isvestia)
Deploying National Missile Defense is the wrong approach.
The United States needs to be in active engagement with
Russia about disarmament and reducing nuclear proliferation.
We need to continue a dialogue based not on fear but on
cooperation.
UN Secretary--General Kofi Annan recently said that
deploying a missile defense system would create a large arms
race world wide.
THE THREAT FROM OTHER ``ROGUE'' NO . . . . ``STATES OF CONCERN''
NATIONS
First of all, any nation with ICBM technology does not have
enough missiles to seriously combat the United States. Even
if a ``rogue'' state launches one missile, they would not be
able to retaliate because the US could easily bomb them with
the thousands of nuclear bombs we have in our arsenal. So it
would not make sense.
Also, the deterrent that we currently have is sufficient.
We have thousands of missiles on hand that act as a
deterrent. Our deterrent is impaired only if another state
had enough missiles to knock off ours before they launched.
The Star Wars system in the 80's assumed that Russia had
enough missiles to destroy our missiles before they could
launch, that is why we spent $69 billion dollars searching
for a way to stop incoming missiles. But that has changed and
now we have full diplomatic relations with Russia.
I think that no state will challenge the United States in a
nuclear face-off. You will need to assume that the state is
willing to face the consequences of their launch which would
mean total annihilation by US nuclear forces. No state is
ready to commit suicide. As I stated earlier, there are
nuclear capable nations that would never deploy or launch a
nuclear weapon against the United States because there simply
is not match. Diplomacy is key. What makes our allies with
nuclear weapons different than these ``rogue'' states? Our
diplomatic relationship. Lets dialogue, lets establish
diplomatic ties and maintain our national security. And if
that doesn't work, we always have the deterrent of our vastly
superior, well-stocked nuclear weapons supply.
We also have satellite technology that can pinpoint the
origin of incoming missiles, thus resulting in a massive
attack by the United States. A country would be suicidal to
launch a missile against the United States.
I think the real threat is the risk from Russian missiles
being launched accidentally. Russia has about 2000 (out of a
total of 6000) nuclear warheads on high alert, all of which
is able to destroy the United States in under an hour. The
Russian economy has not allowed the government to adequately
maintain their nuclear arsenals. I think that we need to
first take our missiles off hair-trigger alert to secure
against an accidental nuclear launch from Russia.
Keeping nuclear arsenals on hair-trigger alert increases
the risk of an accidental nuclear launch caused by a
technical either failure or human error. This nearly happened
in 1995, when an American weather rocket launched from Norway
was misconstrued by the Russians as nuclear attack. The
mistake was caught at the last minute. But a human error
nearly caused nuclear war. When missiles are at hair-trigger
alert, a nuclear war is just an error away. We need to work
with Russia through various programs to ensure that this does
not happen again.
THE TESTS CONDUCTED THUS FAR ARE FRAUDULENT
IFA-1A Test--This test was the first test where it was
discovered that the system did not work. The objective was to
understand how objects looked by the sensors. And what they
discovered is that the sensor could not distinguish between
real warheads and decoys. These senors locate a target based
on its infrared radiation that the target emits. There are
three main factors that influences a sensor's ability to
locate objects. The first is the infrared rays emitted by the
earth, also known as earth shine, which illuminated the
object from below. Secondly, there are strong infrared rays
from the sun. So, the object has strong infrared rays
surrounding it. Third, the infrared rays emitted by the
object itself which varies based on temperature. The test put
various objects in space to figure out what could and could
not be seen. It turns out that the system could not tell the
difference between various objects. So, yes the test was
successful in achieving its intended objective of gathering
information about what could be seen. But the result of this
data indicates that the sensor could not distinguish between
warheads and decoys.
IFT-2--This test was exactly the same as the first test,
except a different kill (Raytheon) vehicle was used. However,
this
[[Page H6537]]
fact does change the fact that the decoys and warheads are
indistinguishable. Kill vehicle technology is almost
identical from one company to another. It's like using two
different brands of binoculars. They both do the same thing,
and the differences are minimal.
IFT-3--This test was designed to see whether the missile
could hit a warhead. The missile hit the warhead, but with a
little help from the designers. However, the test was
modified to hit the * * *
____
[Attachment 1]
David W. Affeld,
Los Angeles, CA, July 12, 2000.
Re: U.S. ex rel Schwartz. v. TRW, Inc., U.S.D.C. Case No. CV
96-3065 RAP (RMCx).
Letter from David Affeld to Theodore A. Postol regarding
Defense Security Service claims about the release of
classified information.
Prof. Theodore A. Postol,
Department of Arms Control Studies,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge, MA
Dear Prof. Postol: I represent Dr. Nira Schwartz in the
above-referenced qui tam lawsuit. In connection with that
case, Dennis Egan of the Department of Justice and Lt. Col.
Bill Groves of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
(``BMDO'') spoke to me two days ago and yesterday,
respectively, stating that the BMDO believes Dr. Schwartz
improperly disclosed classified information to unauthorized
persons over the past few months. In particular, Mr. Egan
asserted that Dr. Schwartz had disclosed classified portions
of a POET report to you.
Mr. Egan and Lt. Col. Groves also told me that agents of
BMDO, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service and the U.S.
Attorney's office want to question Dr. Schwartz regarding
these allegations.
These allegations appear to be spurious. However, I am
trying to determine whether there is any merit to them. I
would appreciate it if you could give me your reaction to the
above. For your reference, enclosed please find a copy of a
letter regarding this matter which I sent to Mr. Egan and Lt.
Col. Groves yesterday, July 11, 2000.
Very truly yours,
David W. Affeld.
____
[Attachment 2]
David W. Affeld,
Los Angeles, CA, July 11, 2000.
Re: U.S. ex rel Schwartz v. TRW, Inc., U.S.D.C. Case No. CV
96-3065 RAP (RMCx).
Letter from David Affeld to Lt. Col. Groves regarding false
allegations of criminality against Dr. Schwartz.
Lt. Col. Bill Groves,
BMDO General Counsel,
Washington DC.
Dear Lt. Col. Groves: As you know, I represent Dr. Nira
Schwartz in the above-referenced qui tam lawsuit. This letter
is to confirm pertinent portions of our telephone
conversation of today. July 11, 2000, regarding the case. It
also confirms pertinent portions of the telephone
conversation I had last night with Dennis Egan of the
Department of Justice, which you apparently had discussed
with Mr. Egan before you and I spoke.
I contacted both you and Mr. Egan yesterday in my quest to
obtain a security clearance for classified information needed
to prosecute the case. You both provided helpful suggestions
regarding how a security clearance might be obtained.
However, I am very concerned about another matter you both
raised.
Last night Mr. Egan told me that agents of the Defense
Security Service (``DSS'') and the Defense Criminal
Investigative Service (``DCIS'') will be contacting Dr.
Schwartz shortly, to question her regarding supposedly
classified information which she allegedly disclosed to
unauthorized persons over the past several months. He also
said that someone from the U.S. Attorney's office would be
involved. You confirmed to me today that such an
investigation is indeed imminent, and that the Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization (``BMDO''), to which your office
is legal counsel, requires the investigation. You also stated
that in making the alleged improper disclosures, Dr. Schwartz
supposedly violated a protective order entered in the case.
I asked each of you to identify what this supposedly
classified information was, so I could determine whether
there is any truth to the charges. Mr. Egan vaguely referred
to the POET report apparently relied upon by MIT Professor
Theodore A. Postol in some of his criticisms of the current
missile defense system. However, that document consists
solely of non-classified portions of the report publicly
available from the court docket in the above-referenced case.
You, on the other hand, told me that you were ``duty-bound''
not to tell me what the supposedly classified information is,
because I do not have a security clearance. You also did not
identify any persons to whom the information was supposedly
disclosed, the dates of any supposed disclosures, or any
disclosure events. I am thus posed with a Catch-22. It is
obviously impossible to respond to charges that you refuse to
articulate.
Just in case you were referring to the materials Dr.
Schwartz filed with the Court late last year, I have
confirmed yet again that none of it was classified. I am not
aware of any other ``disclosures'' by Dr. Schwartz. It
appears that the charges--the unarticulated charges--by BMDO
are false.
I am also concerned about what is motivating this
``investigation''. It comes at a time when the current
missile defense program is the subject of heated national
debate and intense media scrutiny. It also comes on the heels
of the spectacular failure of the system last Friday, July 7,
2000. I am concerned that the ``investigation'' of Dr.
Schwartz is motivated not to preserve national security, but
rather to intimidate an outspoken critic of the program, at a
time when the White House is deliberating over whether to
continue funding the program.
I certainly want to be cooperative, particularly since you
intimated that my security clearance might depend on it.
However, I must ask that you identify the particular
individuals at BMDO who initiated this ``investigation'', and
what specific classified information was supposedly
disclosed, to whom, and when. If such disclosures have indeed
been made, the information is now in the public domain, and
no harm can come form advising Dr. Schwartz's legal counsel
what that now-public information is. Fairness and due process
require no less. On the other hand, if you decline to provide
these specifics, I can only conclude that there is no basis
for the charges, and that the BMDO has raised the specter of
a criminal investigation purely to scare Dr. Schwartz. Dr.
Schwartz obviously will not be a party to such an agenda.
Very truly yours,
David W. Affeld.
____
[Attachment 3]
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence,
Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC, June 23, 2000.
Letter from Arthur L. Money to Theodore A. Postol making non-
credible claims about the routine nature of Defense
Security Service actions.
Dr. Theodore A. Postol,
Professor of Science, Technology and National Security
Policy, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, Cambridge, MA
Dear Dr. Postol: I regret any confusion surrounding the
recent visit of representatives of the Defense Security
Service (DSS) to you at your office. I have been asked to
write to clarify the purpose of that visit.
The DSS representatives who met with you on June 21 were
Industrial Security Specialists, who are usually called IS
Representatives, DSS IS Representatives routinely meet with
contractors and contractor employees who hold security
clearances to discuss security issues, such as a potential
unauthorized release of classified information. Their purpose
in visiting you was to obtain information you might have
about the source of possibly classified information contained
in attachments to your letter dated May 11, 2000. I
understand that you discussed the source of these attachments
with the IS Representatives and provided information they
sought; I appreciate your willingness to do so.
I want to assure you that you are not under investigation,
and I regret any misunderstanding about the purpose of this
visit. I hope DSS will have your cooperation as they continue
to review this matter.
Arthur L. Money.
____
Government Oversight,
Security Studies Program,
Washington, DC, July 13, 2000.
David W. Affeld,
Attorney at Law,
Los Angeles, CA
Dear Mr. Affeld: I am writing you in response to your
letter and our phone discussion of 12 July about threats of
criminal prosecution against your client Nira Schwartz for
the release of classified information to me. I understand
that these threats were made by Mr. Dennis Egan and Lt. Col.
William Groves--lawyers working respectively for the
Department of Justice and Defense. As I explained to you
yesterday, it is clear that when these threats were made both
Mr. Egan and Lt. Col. Groves knew, or should have known, that
Dr. Schwartz had done nothing improper. It therefore appears
that Mr. Egan and Lt. Col. Groves are involved in improper
attempts to intimidate a witness in a qui tam lawsuit
alleging fraud in the development of a weapons system that is
supposed to defend the United States from nuclear attack.
Furthermore, I was astounded to also find out that they
attempted to interfere with the privileged relationship
between an attorney and a client by falsely claiming that a
security clearance you will need to work on the qui tam case
would be contingent on your cooperating with them in their
illegal efforts at intimidation.
The title of the document released to me that is being used
as a vehicle for trying to intimidate Dr. Schwartz is
``Independent Review of TRW Discrimination Techniques Final
Report, (POET Study 1998-5).'' This study is part of a
scientific fraud that was designed to conceal the fact that
the currently under development National Missile Defense
system cannot tell the difference between warheads and
decoys. The study was
[[Page H6538]]
performed by contractors for the Department of Defense and
with full knowledge of high-level Department of Defense
officials.
In particular, I have talked with Mr. Sam Reed, the Defense
Criminal Investigation Service leader of the Department of
Defense Inspector General's investigation of allegations of
fraud at TRW. he told me that he sanitized the document in
question with the knowledge of his supervisors during the
course of pursuing this earlier investigation. Furthermore,
he told me that he had explained to Mr. Egan how Dr. Schwartz
had properly obtained this declassified document. In
addition, Mr. Reed told me that the Defense Security Service
was informed of these facts. I therefore conclude that the
actions of Egan and Groves are part of an ongoing effort by
Department of Defense officials, and possibly other agencies,
to intimidate witnesses in a continuing effort to hide acts
of fraud with regard to the development of the National
Missile Defense.
It is equally clear that officials at the highest levels of
the Department of Defense are in some way involved in these
illegal activities of their agents. In particular, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for C\3\I, Arthur Money, has
been informed multiple times of these activities. I spoke
with him by phone about a failed attempt to entrap and
intimidate me by his agents on 21 June, after receiving a
letter from him on 26 June via Express Mail. In that
conversation he claimed ignorance of the details surrounding
this event. I made it clear to him that I did not find his
excuses credible and that I expected a better explanation of
his involvement in the matter. In particular, I made it clear
that if in fact he was ignorant of what was attempted by his
agents he was culpable for not knowing what the agency under
his control was doing, and if he was not ignorant, he was
culpable for lying to me.
It is also of concern that these illegal actions are
possibly being taken with the knowledge of members of the
White House staff. The White House Chief of Staff, John
Podesta, the President's Advisor on Arms Control, Hans
Binnendijk, and the Vice President's National Security
Advisor, Leon Fuerth, have all been provided with detailed
evidence of fraud in the National Missile Defense Program as
well as misconduct in the Pentagon's Defense Security Service
in letters sent to them dated 11 May, 19 May, 21 June, and 6
July. There is as yet no visible evidence that anyone in the
White House has taken a serious action to address the
numerous issues raised in these letters, and it is hard to
believe that no one in the White House is aware of the
marauding and out of control activities of the Defense
Security Service.
It is now clear that a series of questions will eventually
need to be answered in an investigation that should include
interviews with White House staff, the Defense Security
Service, the Department of Defense Inspector General's
Office, and the Department of Justice.
These questions are as follows:
1. Who at the Department of Justice, in addition to Mr.
Egan, knew and approved of his knowingly making false
allegations of criminality against Dr. Schwartz?
2. Who at the Department of Defense, in addition to Mr.
Money, knew and/or approved of Lt. Col. Groves' involvement
in this affair?
3. What is Assistant Secretary Money's repeated role in
these matters? Who else above him at the Pentagon knows of
his activities?
4. What was the nature of the SECRET classified information
that was presented to me in the unannounced meeting at my MIT
office with three agents of the Defense Security Service?
5. Who was responsible for initiating the use of SECRET
letters to deal with matters that could simply be
investigated in terms of chain of custody?
6. Is the Department of Defense Inspector General's (IG)
Office aware of these attempts at intimidation and
entrapment? If so, why has the IG not taken steps to
investigate these improper actions?
7. Given the substantial amount of information over a two-
month period provided by my letters to the White House, what
did the White House know of these activities aimed at
intimidation and entrapment? If any staff knew of these
activities, what did they know and what was their role in the
process? If staff did not know of these activities, why did
they not know?
At a minimum the responsible U.S. government agencies have
so far conducted themselves in a manner like that of a
fictitious banana republic. Of greater concern to me is that
the White House and other elements of our government, either
by intent or negligence, are allowing, or worst yet,
encouraging, Department of Defense officials to conduct
business like Soviet style thugs.
In any case, it is clear that the document ``POET Study
1998-5'' was properly sanitized before it was released to Dr.
Schwartz. If I were in Dr. Schwartz's position, I would not
talk to the Defense Security Services. I suggest instead that
if they approach her she simply ask them to write a letter to
her explaining what they want to know from her, why they want
to know this, and who, by name, is asking for the
information. If the information is the letter is credible,
she should respond in writing.
Sincerely,
Theodore A. Postol,
Professor of Science, Technology, and National Security
Policy, Security Studies Program and Program in
Science, Technology, and Society.
Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Wisconsin (Mr. Obey).
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Let me say that I recognize all the hard work that went into putting
this bill together, and I regret that I cannot vote for it, and let me
explain why.
Number one, this bill does not respond to what the Congress always
claims the problem is. Every year, when the President sends his budget
down, we are then told by the majority that somehow the President is
not responding sufficiently to the issue of readiness, and then, when
we take a look at what Congress finally does, Congress responds, but it
responds in a way which puts other items at a higher priority than a
number of the readiness-related accounts.
For example, if we take a look at this budget or at this bill being
presented today, the public will be told that for operation and
maintenance, which is a key factor in readiness, that it is about $600
million above the President. But if we take a look at the adjustments
that are then made by the committee in overseas contingency operations,
in foreign currency reestimates, in working capital funds, in
headquarters administration accounts, we will see that, in fact, the
committee cuts those readiness-related items by about $3 billion. So
this Congress, having attacked the President for not having enough in
the budget to deal with readiness-related accounts, in fact, will have
produced a bill which is about $2.4 billion below the President's
request for those accounts. That money has been moved largely into
procurement and into research and development.
{time} 1415
It is just by accident, I suppose, that a good many of the
congressionally earmarked projects are found in those areas.
I do not suggest that all of those projects are bad. They are not.
Some of them are very deserving. All I do suggest is that this Congress
should not pretend that it has strengthened the President's budget for
readiness, because in fact it has made a number of reductions in this
bill which produce readiness-related account funding levels lower than
that recommended by the President.
Secondly, I would simply say that the President's budget as he
submitted it to us had a very large increase, but that was presented in
the context of also providing increases for education, for health care,
for agriculture, for land acquisition, items like that.
This bill is presented to us in a far different context. This bill
increases the military spending of the country by $20.9 billion, when
we discount all the gimmicks. Just the increase in this bill is larger
than the entire foreign aid bill. It is larger than the entire Interior
appropriation bill.
If we take a look at where it goes, a lot of it goes, in my judgment,
not on the basis of where it is needed militarily but where it is
produced economically. I think the country needs to understand that, as
well.
Secondly, I would say that we need to put in context what threat it
is responding to. This chart demonstrates what our defense budget is
versus the rest of the world, or certainly at least our adversaries and
our allies.
The United States spends about $266 billion, as represented by this
bar. That is far more than the combined total of Russia, China, Iran,
North Korea, Libya, our major opponents. That does not count the
allies, our NATO allies, which last time I looked were on our side.
They spent $227 billion. So again, we dwarf the amount of money which
is spent on military accounts worldwide.
If we are going to do that, it seems to me that we have an obligation
both to take care of our other national priorities and to make certain
that our budget has an accounting which is at least as forthright as
that provided by the administration. I do not believe it is.
Mr. Speaker, for those reasons, and for others, I will be constrained
to vote against the bill when the time comes.
Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I hope the military will not misconstrue that chart to
think that I like charts.
[[Page H6539]]
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may
consume to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young), the chairman of the
full committee.
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this bill. It
is a good bill. The chairman and the ranking member and all the members
of the subcommittee have done an outstanding job in bringing it to us
originally, and bringing it to us from the conference committee.
There has already been more than enough debate on this issue of our
Nation's security on this particular bill. I urge the Members to
support it very strongly.
Mrs. MALONEY of New York. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the
conference report for H.R. 4576, the Defense Appropriations Act for FY
2001. In addition to supporting defense projects, this bill provides
critical funding for important health research programs.
I am pleased that the conference has included $15 million for the
Neurotoxin Exposure Treatment Research Project in the search for
answers to the mystery of Parkinson's disease.
Parkinson's Disease is a chronic, progressive disorder affecting one
million Americans. In its final stages, the disease robs individuals of
the ability to speak or move. Of the many things we know about
Parkinson's, we know that there appears to be a disproportionate number
of veterans who are afflicted with Parkinson's disease.
This breakthrough research will study the links between Parkinson's
and environmental stress exposure factors encountered in military
operations. The data will advance preventive measures and treatment
interventions against the effects of military threats and operation
hazards.
I am also pleased that the bill contains $12 million for ovarian
cancer research, $100 million for basic and clinical prostate cancer
research, and $175 million for the Peer-Reviewed Breast Cancer Research
Program (BCRP). Breast cancer is the most common cancer among women;
and one out of every eight women will be afflicted with the disease in
her lifetime. Our best hope today is early detection and more research.
In just six years, the Breast Cancer Research Program has matured
from an isolated research program to a well-respected resource in the
cancer community. It is overseen by a group of distinguished scientists
and activists, as recommended by the Institute of Medicine. 90% of the
funds go directly to research grants, and consumer advocates are
included at every level.
I thank the conferees for recognizing the importance of this program.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I will oppose the defense appropriations
conference report before us because, at $288 billion, it spends too
much money and spends it inefficiently. The $1.9 billion it contains
for national missile defense is but the most glaring example. That is
an amount even greater than the House voted for national missile
defense last month.
President Clinton has said that later this year he will decide
whether to deploy a national missile defense system. In light of the
failure of the last two tests of this system, no decision to deploy
should be made.
The President has said his decision will be based on four criteria:
the technology, the cost, the threat, and the impact on arms control.
For each, the case for deployment is weak at best.
On the technology, the recent test failures demonstrate just how hard
effective missile defense is. It is impossible to know whether the
system will work until realistic tests are done, and that will not
happen for years, if ever. We should not risk American lives on a bet
that missile defense will work.
On cost, since the late '50s, the U.S. has spent over $120 billion on
missile defense, with almost nothing to show for it. The Congressional
Budget Office estimates that the Pentagon's current proposal will cost
$60 billion. This is pouring more money into a hole in the ground.
On threat, it is far better to pursue such endeavors as the ongoing
talks with North Korea on ending its emerging missile program rather
than attempting to build a defense against non-existent missiles.
On arms control, a U.S. national missile defense is likely to push
countries that already have nuclear weapons, Russia and China, to
maintain or expand their arsenals, and risks destroying the entire
nonproliferation regime that the U.S. has tirelessly built over the
last 50 years.
A missile defense that does not work while exacerbating tensions with
potential adversaries is far worse than no defense at all. We should
spend our money on more useful things.
Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, today the House passed the FY
2001 Defense Appropriation Bill. Included in this important legislation
was the funding for the Crusader Program at the level requested by the
President. The President's Budget requests includes $355.5 million for
the continued development of the Crusader advanced field artillery
system.
Artillery is the one combat capability where the United States
significantly lags behind its allies and potential adversaries. Without
Crusader this unacceptable situation will worsen and endanger our
military personnel who are sent in harm's way. Furthermore, the major
reason the Army felt it could accept the risk of the 1996 decision to
reduce the combat power of its heavy divisions was that Crusader would
be fielded with its increased capabilities.
The Army leadership staunchly supports the need for this system and
the unified commanders have likewise voiced their support. The Army has
restructured the program to ensure it fits within the overall
transformation effort of the operational forces. The number of
howitzers intended to be procured is 480. The Crusader is being
modified to support the Army's transition initiatives and Objective
Force across the full spectrum of missions. Crusader is the cannon
system for the Army's one remaining counterattack corps. It will be
providing continuous, all-weather fire support to the corps well into
the fourth decade of the new century, a time when the corps transitions
to the Objective Force.
Also, Crusader is being redesigned to increase its global strategic
deployability while retaining all of its Key Performance Parameters
(range, rate-of-fire, mobility, and resupply). Important features of
the redesigned Crusader are lower weight (38 to 42 tons), smaller size
(2 howitzers or a complete system transportable on a single C-5 or C-17
sortie), and a change in resupply vehicle philosophy.
This $355 million in research and development funds will be used to
help secure our nation's future.
Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for
time, and I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Barrett of Nebraska). Without objection,
the previous question is ordered on the conference report.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the conference report.
Pursuant to clause 10 of rule XX, the yeas and nays are ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 367,
nays 58, not voting 9, as follows:
[Roll No. 413]
YEAS--367
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Aderholt
Allen
Andrews
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baird
Baker
Baldacci
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Bass
Bateman
Becerra
Bentsen
Bereuter
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Blagojevich
Bliley
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonior
Bono
Borski
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brown (FL)
Bryant
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cannon
Capps
Cardin
Carson
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth-Hage
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coble
Coburn
Collins
Combest
Condit
Cook
Cooksey
Costello
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crowley
Cubin
Cummings
Cunningham
Danner
Davis (FL)
Davis (VA)
Deal
DeLauro
DeLay
DeMint
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Dooley
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Dunn
Edwards
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
English
Etheridge
Evans
Everett
Ewing
Farr
Fattah
Fletcher
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fossella
Fowler
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frost
Gallegly
Gejdenson
Gekas
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gonzalez
Goode
Goodlatte
Goodling
Gordon
Goss
Graham
Granger
Green (TX)
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill (IN)
Hill (MT)
Hilleary
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoeffel
Hoekstra
Holden
Holt
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inslee
Isakson
Istook
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kelly
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kleczka
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kuykendall
LaFalce
LaHood
Lampson
Lantos
Largent
[[Page H6540]]
Larson
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Manzullo
Martinez
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McIntyre
McKeon
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Menendez
Mica
Millender-McDonald
Miller (FL)
Miller, Gary
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Moore
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Morella
Murtha
Myrick
Napolitano
Neal
Nethercutt
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Olver
Ortiz
Ose
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Pease
Pelosi
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Phelps
Pickering
Pickett
Pitts
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Regula
Reyes
Reynolds
Riley
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rogan
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Rothman
Roukema
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sabo
Salmon
Sanchez
Sandlin
Sawyer
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaffer
Scott
Serrano
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Sherman
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shows
Shuster
Simpson
Sisisky
Skeen
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Snyder
Spence
Spratt
Stabenow
Stearns
Stenholm
Strickland
Stump
Stupak
Sununu
Sweeney
Talent
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauscher
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Thune
Thurman
Tiahrt
Toomey
Towns
Traficant
Turner
Udall (NM)
Visclosky
Vitter
Walden
Walsh
Wamp
Watkins
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Wexler
Weygand
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson
Wise
Wolf
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NAYS--58
Baldwin
Barrett (WI)
Blumenauer
Brown (OH)
Capuano
Conyers
Coyne
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
Doggett
Duncan
Ehlers
Eshoo
Filner
Frank (MA)
Ganske
Gutierrez
Hooley
Jackson (IL)
Kucinich
Lee
Lofgren
Luther
Markey
McDermott
McGovern
McKinney
Meeks (NY)
Metcalf
Miller, George
Minge
Nadler
Oberstar
Obey
Owens
Paul
Payne
Peterson (MN)
Ramstad
Rangel
Rivers
Rush
Sanders
Sanford
Schakowsky
Sensenbrenner
Shays
Stark
Tierney
Udall (CO)
Upton
Velazquez
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Weiner
NOT VOTING--9
Baca
Barton
Boswell
Campbell
Klink
McIntosh
Smith (WA)
Souder
Vento
{time} 1445
Messrs. JACKSON of Illinois, OWENS, McDERMOTT, RANGEL and MEEKS of
New York changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
Ms. GRANGER changed her vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
So the conference report was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________