[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 94 (Wednesday, July 19, 2000)]
[House]
[Pages H6530-H6540]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 4576, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 
                               ACT, 2001

  Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 
554, I call up the conference report on the bill (H.R. 4576), making 
appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending 
September 30, 2001, and for other purposes.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 554, the 
conference report is considered as having been read.
  (For conference report and statement, see proceedings of the House of 
July 17, 2000 at page H6102.)
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis) 
and the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha) each will control 30 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis).
  (Mr. LEWIS of California asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  First, let me say that this conference report is, in my judgment, a 
fabulous piece of work. It provides funding for fiscal year 2001 at 
levels that reflect very much the legislation that was passed by the 
House only a few weeks ago. Indeed, as the Members may know, I was 
somewhat disconcerted by the supplemental bill that we passed some 
weeks ago, because it was my view that that legislation, while 
significant, failed to fully address certain critical areas of 
interest, such as our readiness needs, the contingency operations 
funding challenges that exist around the world, all the outstanding 
needs, military medical system, et cetera. We made up for much of that 
in an emergency funding title in their conference report.
  Indeed, in working with the other side of the aisle, we have had 
truly a hallmark year, in terms of laying the foundation for our future 
national defense. We need to make sure that America continues to lead 
the world as the strongest among the countries of the world and 
continue to play our role on behalf of freedom.
  Mr. Speaker, let me say that I would like to express to the Members 
my deepest appreciation for the work done with my colleague, the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha); indeed, the cooperation of 
the ranking member of the full committee has been extremely helpful as 
well. I must say that the staff on both sides of the aisle, Kevin Roper 
and his gang of, it looks like 112 staff people, but it is actually 
only 13 women and men doing three dozen people's work.
  Beyond that, Mr. Speaker, let me say that the cooperation on the 
Senate side, in the other body's committee has been extremely valuable 
as well. The work of that staff, led by Steve Coatese, as well as 
Senator Stevens and the ranking member Senator Inouye, are very much 
appreciated.
  At this point I would like to insert for the Record a summary of the 
funding levels agreed to in the conference agreement.

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  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Speaker, this is basically the same bill that we 
passed in the House.
  I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Kucinich).
  (Mr. KUCINICH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I will include in the Record at this point 
materials relevant to this debate.
  I object to the passage of the conference report because it contains 
billions of dollars for the inception of a failed missile program which 
has already cost the taxpayers of the United States over $60 billion in 
its previous presentations. I ask my colleagues to review the record of 
failures and also to review the anti-democratic lengths to which the 
Department of Defense is going to try to cover-up the failures of the 
system.

                        National Missile Defense


                       How it is Supposed to Work

       The ground-based anti-missile system would track warheads 
     using ground-based radars and satellite-based infrared 
     sensors, and the kill vehicles would use infrared sensors to 
     home in on their targets.
       An intercontinental missile when it is launched starts out 
     early in its trajectory as a large missile, hot (because the 
     rocket engine is still burning) and slow. This is called the 
     boost phase. It would take approximately 30 minutes for a 
     missile to reach its farthest point of 6,000 miles. The boost 
     phase lasts 5 minutes.
       When the boost phase ends and there is about 300 miles left 
     before impact, only the warhead is left, leaving a small, 
     cold (and therefor hard for infra-red sensors to see) and 
     fast. This makes the warhead a much more difficult target. At 
     this point the war head is traveling at a few miles per 
     second.
       So, this small, fast and hard to track warhead must be hit 
     by an anti-missile traveling at a faster speed. This is how 
     the system has received the analogy of trying to hit a 
     ``bullet with a bullet''. It is practically impossible to do 
     now, under controlled conditions.


                         Technological Failure

       Before the decision is made, three exo-atmospheric 
     intercept tests have been scheduled to determine the system 
     success rate and reliability to deploy the system. The one of 
     two tests failed. And the third test has been put off twice 
     because it was not ready for testing. Three tests can not 
     define the technical readiness of the system and serve the 
     basis for deploying a national missile defense.
       With only two of 19 tests conducted, it has yet to work 
     under real-world conditions. According to a report by The 
     Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers and the Council for a 
     Livable World Education Fund other anti-missile systems have 
     been put through far more rigorous testing. The ``Safeguard'' 
     missile defense system, deployed in 1975 and canceled after 
     one day of operation, was put through 165 missile flight 
     tests. The ``Patriot'' theater missile defense system was 
     tested 114 times.
       According to testimony taken from Dr. David Wright of the 
     Union of Concerned Scientists before the US Senate Committee 
     on Foreign Relations in 1998:
       ``. . . Since 1982 the US has conducted 16 intercept tests 
     of exo-atmospheric hit-to-kill interceptors, which operate in 
     a similar manner to the planned NMD interceptor. To date, the 
     test record of such interceptors has been abysmal. Only 2 of 
     these 16 intercept tests scored hits, for a 13 percent 
     success rate. And the test record is not getting better with 
     time: the most recent successful high-altitude test occurred 
     in January 1991 and the last 11 such intercept tests have 
     been failures.''


 Fraud Deception and Manipulated Tests--NMD is a Technological Failure

       The Department of Defense recently ``classified'' a public 
     letter and attachments from an MIT scientist, Dr. Ted Postol, 
     containing devastating information about the failure of the 
     national missile defense system, its inherent inability ever 
     to protect the United States, and the fraud used to cover up 
     these facts. Dr. Postol is a missile expert who worked in the 
     Reagan Administration and has done analysis of weapons 
     systems for the government.
       According to Dr. Postol, the system failed those tests. The 
     New York Times states that, ``The Pentagon hailed the first 
     intercept try as success but later conceded that the 
     interceptor had initially drifted off course and picked out 
     the decoy balloon rather than the warhead.''
       That is because, according to the Times, the system cannot 
     tell the difference between warheads and decoys. Experiments 
     with he National Missile Defense system have revealed that 
     the system is``inherently unable to make the distinction 
     [between target warhead and decoys].''
       The Times characterized the MIT scientist as saying that 
     the signals ``from the mock warhead and decoys . . . 
     `fluctuated in a varied and totally unpredictable way,' 
     revealing no feature `that could be used to distinguish one 
     object from the other.' '' Indeed, the Times reported, ``the 
     test showed that warheads and decoys are so similar that 
     sensors might never be able to tell them apart.'' In other 
     words, national missile defense does not work and cannot work 
     because it's inherently unable to tell the difference between 
     warheads and decoys.
       Not only is the national missile defense system incapable 
     of working, but, according to the Times, contractors and the 
     Pentagon have purposely altered data to create a different 
     appearance. The Times reported that the ``Pentagon and its 
     contractors had tried to hide this failure'' and that the MIT 
     professor ``says the Pentagon conspired to cover up this 
     sensor problem.''
       The Times, quoting from the classified letter and analysis, 
     goes on to say, ``the analytical team arbitrarily rejected 
     and selected data to create an `elaborate hoax' that was then 
     hidden in reports by the use of `misleading, confusion, and 
     self-contradictory language.' '' According to the Times, 
     ``the coverup, [MIT scientist] said, was `like rolling a pair 
     of dice and throwing away all outcomes that did not give 
     snake eyes.''
       TRW, Inc. One of the major contractors for this system has 
     had allegations of fraud made against it by a former senior 
     engineer from TRW, Dr. Nira Schwartz. She has provided 
     information challenging the claims the company made about the 
     weapons ability to distinguishing decoys from actual 
     warheads.
       I have written to FBI Director, Louis Freeh, to investigate 
     these allegations of fraud and cover-up of this program by 
     Dr. Postol. The American people need an independent 
     investigation of this matter to determine these serious 
     allegations.
       Moreover, according to Postol, all the data used for his 
     analysis was unclassified when he used it. All his supporting 
     information that he sent to the White House was also 
     designated as unclassified. The DoD has classified 
     allegations and evidence of fraud made from information that 
     was unclassified by the Department. This could be in 
     violation of Executive Order 12958. And I have included this 
     in the letter to Mr. Freeh.
       The Executive Order prohibits the use of the classification 
     system to hide fraud or other wrongdoing. Subsection 1.8(a) 
     states ``In no case shall information be classified in order 
     to: (1) conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or 
     administrative error; (2) prevent embarrassment to a person, 
     organization, or agency; (3) restrain competition; or (4) 
     prevent or delay the release of information that does not 
     require protection in the interest of national security.'' 
     Furthermore, the Executive Order states at 1.8(c): 
     ``Information may not be reclassified after it has been 
     declassified and released to the public under proper 
     authority.'' Needless to say, the public deserve to expect 
     that the laws of the nation, including Executive Order 12958, 
     be upheld and enforced.


                            countermeasures

       The 1999 National Intelligence Estimate on the ballistic 
     missile threat to the United States--a document prepared by 
     the US intelligence community--stated that countermeasures 
     would be available to emerging missile states.
       According to the Union for Concerned Scientist, 
     countermeasures could be deployed more rapidly and would be 
     available to potential attackers before the United States 
     could deploy even the much less capable first phase of the 
     system.
       A report by the Union of Concerned Scientist details how 
     easily countermeasures could be used against this system. And 
     it would not have to use new technology or new materials.
       For example, it states that biological or chemical weapons 
     can be divided into many small warheads called 
     ``submunitions.'' Such submunitions, released shortly after 
     boost phase, would overwhelm the planned defense. Any long-
     range missile attack with biological or chemical agents would 
     almost certainly be delivered by submunitions, and that the 
     NMD system could not defend against such an attack.
       Also, you have heard about the past tests have used 
     balloons as decoys, to see whether the missile can 
     discriminate between the real war head and the missile. What 
     could happen is that an attacker can deploy its nuclear 
     weapons inside balloons along with many other empty balloons. 
     So, the real warhead is indistinguishable from the decoys, 
     therefore tricking the infra-red sensors. Nuclear warheads 
     could also be with cooled materials that would prevent the 
     kill vehicles from detecting and hitting the warhead.


                             cost estimates

       The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the 
     system will cost $60 billion to build and deploy. Congress 
     intends to spend $12 billion in the next 6 years.
       The SDI/Star Wars system has cost the taxpayer more than 
     $60 billion and it estimated that this system, though less 
     far reaching than Star Wars will cost more.
       We have spent more than $122 billion dollars on various 
     missile defense systems. We need to reorganize our priorities 
     and look at how we could better use these funds for programs, 
     that benefit the poor, seniors and our nation's children.


                              alternatives

       We are the ONLY superpower in the world. The deterrent that 
     we currently have is sufficient. We have thousands of 
     missiles on hand that act as a deterrent. Any attack by 
     another state would not be massive and would not be able to 
     completely destroy our country or our nuclear arsenals. So 
     any attack would leave the U.S. and its armed

[[Page H6536]]

     forces intact. Our deterrent is impaired only if another 
     state had enough missiles to knock off ours before they 
     launched. The Star Wars system in the 80's assumed that 
     Russia had enough missiles to destroy our missiles before 
     they could launch, that is why we spent $69 billion dollars 
     searching for way to stop incoming missiles. but that has 
     changed and now we have full diplomatic relations with 
     Russia.
       We could use much cheaper measures to secure our national 
     security. For example, preventative measures. Why not 
     increase funding for our State Department to boost our 
     diplomatic arms with these so-called rogue states? We know 
     that strengthening diplomatic relations with nations 
     ensures national security.
       For example, France and Britain both have Submarine-
     Launched Ballistic missiles (64 and 48 respectively) or sea 
     based missiles. But they have never attacked us or have never 
     indicated that they will attack the United States. Why? 
     Because we are allies. Because we have close economic and 
     diplomatic ties. Israel has long ranged nuclear capabilities, 
     but will they ever attack the United States, no? Why, because 
     we are allies. Diplomacy is key. What makes these countries 
     different than say North Korea or Iran? Our historical 
     diplomatic relationship.


       who will benefit from the national missile defense system?

       The national missile defense system will simply line the 
     pockets of major weapons contractors, spending billions of 
     dollars for a system that doesn't work and doesn't protect 
     against real threats, we will undermine legitimate military 
     expenditures, and erode readiness of our forces. So who's 
     benefitting from having a national missile defense system? 
     According to the Washington Post, Boeing in 1998 already 
     obtained a three year contract for $1.6 billion dollars to 
     assemble a basic system, before the President has even 
     decided to deploy the system. The Post states that TRW has 
     contracts for ``virtually every type of missile defense 
     program.''
       The military industry has the most to gain from a National 
     Missile Defense system. According to the Washington Post, 
     Lockheed Martin is the major contractor on theater missile 
     defense, ``with its upgraded version of the Patriot missile 
     and the Army's $14 billion Theater High Altitude Area Defense 
     system.
       According to Common Cause the defense industry as a whole 
     supplied more than $2.3 million dollars in soft money to 
     major campaigns last year.


  nmd effect on nuclear non-proliferation and international relations

       Deploying a national missile defense system could 
     politically succeed in setting the stage for a world-wide 
     arms race and dismantle past arms treaties. The NMD violates 
     the central principle of the ABM Treaty, which is a ban on 
     the deployment of strategic missile defenses. It will 
     undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It will 
     frustrate SALT II and SALT III.
       It will lead directly to proliferation by the nuclear 
     nations. It will lead to transitions toward nuclear arms by 
     the non-nuclear nations. It will make the world less safe. It 
     will lead to the impoverishment of the people of many nations 
     as budgets are re-fashioned for nuclear arms expenditures. 
     That the United States would be willing to risk a showdown 
     with Russia or China and the rest of the world over the 
     unlikely possibility that North Korea may one day have a 
     missile which can touch the continental United States--argues 
     for talks with North Korea, not the beginning of a new world-
     wide arms race.
       CIA officials realize that deploying a national missile 
     defense system would cause world wide instability and 
     endanger relations with our allies in Europe. The LA Times 
     recently reported that officials are writing a secret report 
     outline their thoughts on the devastating impact that this 
     system will have throughout the world.
       Russia and the US signed agreements (1) establishing a 
     permanent joint early-warning center in Moscow to prevent 
     miscalculations about missile launches, and (2) to reduce 
     their stockpiles of military-grade plutonium by 34 tons each. 
     This is a great sign. I think that dialogue is the step in 
     the right direction, but nothing was resolved regarding the 
     proposal of the ABM Treaty. I think it is a bad idea and it 
     could upset our relationship with our allies to the east.
       Even if Russia does agree to changing the ABM Treaty, we 
     will most likely see Russia and China build up their nuclear 
     arsenal risking opportunities to bring them and other nuclear 
     countries into the arms control process.
       (Note: According to law, any substantive change to a 
     bilateral treaty must be agreed to by the Senate. Therefore, 
     any changes to the ABM Treaty must be ratified by the Senate. 
     The Clinton Administration urged Russia to include a protocol 
     to their ratified ABM Treaty that makes Russia, Ukraine, 
     Belarus and Kazakhstan the four ABM Successors. If the Senate 
     wants to move forward with START II it must first agree to 
     make these four states successors to the ABM Treaty.)
       Russia has consistently made statements that deploying a 
     National Missile Defense system would be interpreted by them 
     as a threat to their national security. So, there is a great 
     likelihood that deploying such a system could spark another 
     arms race. For example, Gregory Berdennikov, the director of 
     the Russian Foreign Ministry's Security and Disarmament 
     Department warned that if the United States deploys a missile 
     defense system,
       ``Russia will be forced to raise the effectiveness of its 
     strategic nuclear armed forces and carry out several other 
     military and political steps to guarantee its national 
     security under new strategic conditions . . . We see no 
     variants which would allow the United States to set up a 
     national ABM system and still preserve the ABM treaty and 
     strategic stability in the world.''
       I would like to quote Col. General Vladimir Yakovlev, 
     commander of Russia's strategic rocket forces. ``Problems 
     have cropped up now with Russian-American 1972 AMB treaty; 
     for this reason, we are forced to build in into our new 
     missiles a capability for penetrating anti-missile 
     defenses.'' 1999 (Isvestia)
       Deploying National Missile Defense is the wrong approach. 
     The United States needs to be in active engagement with 
     Russia about disarmament and reducing nuclear proliferation. 
     We need to continue a dialogue based not on fear but on 
     cooperation.
       UN Secretary--General Kofi Annan recently said that 
     deploying a missile defense system would create a large arms 
     race world wide.


   THE THREAT FROM OTHER ``ROGUE'' NO . . . . ``STATES OF CONCERN'' 
                                NATIONS

       First of all, any nation with ICBM technology does not have 
     enough missiles to seriously combat the United States. Even 
     if a ``rogue'' state launches one missile, they would not be 
     able to retaliate because the US could easily bomb them with 
     the thousands of nuclear bombs we have in our arsenal. So it 
     would not make sense.
       Also, the deterrent that we currently have is sufficient. 
     We have thousands of missiles on hand that act as a 
     deterrent. Our deterrent is impaired only if another state 
     had enough missiles to knock off ours before they launched. 
     The Star Wars system in the 80's assumed that Russia had 
     enough missiles to destroy our missiles before they could 
     launch, that is why we spent $69 billion dollars searching 
     for a way to stop incoming missiles. But that has changed and 
     now we have full diplomatic relations with Russia.
       I think that no state will challenge the United States in a 
     nuclear face-off. You will need to assume that the state is 
     willing to face the consequences of their launch which would 
     mean total annihilation by US nuclear forces. No state is 
     ready to commit suicide. As I stated earlier, there are 
     nuclear capable nations that would never deploy or launch a 
     nuclear weapon against the United States because there simply 
     is not match. Diplomacy is key. What makes our allies with 
     nuclear weapons different than these ``rogue'' states? Our 
     diplomatic relationship. Lets dialogue, lets establish 
     diplomatic ties and maintain our national security. And if 
     that doesn't work, we always have the deterrent of our vastly 
     superior, well-stocked nuclear weapons supply.
       We also have satellite technology that can pinpoint the 
     origin of incoming missiles, thus resulting in a massive 
     attack by the United States. A country would be suicidal to 
     launch a missile against the United States.
       I think the real threat is the risk from Russian missiles 
     being launched accidentally. Russia has about 2000 (out of a 
     total of 6000) nuclear warheads on high alert, all of which 
     is able to destroy the United States in under an hour. The 
     Russian economy has not allowed the government to adequately 
     maintain their nuclear arsenals. I think that we need to 
     first take our missiles off hair-trigger alert to secure 
     against an accidental nuclear launch from Russia.
       Keeping nuclear arsenals on hair-trigger alert increases 
     the risk of an accidental nuclear launch caused by a 
     technical either failure or human error. This nearly happened 
     in 1995, when an American weather rocket launched from Norway 
     was misconstrued by the Russians as nuclear attack. The 
     mistake was caught at the last minute. But a human error 
     nearly caused nuclear war. When missiles are at hair-trigger 
     alert, a nuclear war is just an error away. We need to work 
     with Russia through various programs to ensure that this does 
     not happen again.


              THE TESTS CONDUCTED THUS FAR ARE FRAUDULENT

       IFA-1A Test--This test was the first test where it was 
     discovered that the system did not work. The objective was to 
     understand how objects looked by the sensors. And what they 
     discovered is that the sensor could not distinguish between 
     real warheads and decoys. These senors locate a target based 
     on its infrared radiation that the target emits. There are 
     three main factors that influences a sensor's ability to 
     locate objects. The first is the infrared rays emitted by the 
     earth, also known as earth shine, which illuminated the 
     object from below. Secondly, there are strong infrared rays 
     from the sun. So, the object has strong infrared rays 
     surrounding it. Third, the infrared rays emitted by the 
     object itself which varies based on temperature. The test put 
     various objects in space to figure out what could and could 
     not be seen. It turns out that the system could not tell the 
     difference between various objects. So, yes the test was 
     successful in achieving its intended objective of gathering 
     information about what could be seen. But the result of this 
     data indicates that the sensor could not distinguish between 
     warheads and decoys.
       IFT-2--This test was exactly the same as the first test, 
     except a different kill (Raytheon) vehicle was used. However, 
     this

[[Page H6537]]

     fact does change the fact that the decoys and warheads are 
     indistinguishable. Kill vehicle technology is almost 
     identical from one company to another. It's like using two 
     different brands of binoculars. They both do the same thing, 
     and the differences are minimal.
       IFT-3--This test was designed to see whether the missile 
     could hit a warhead. The missile hit the warhead, but with a 
     little help from the designers. However, the test was 
     modified to hit the * * *
                                  ____


                             [Attachment 1]


                                              David W. Affeld,

                                   Los Angeles, CA, July 12, 2000.
     Re: U.S. ex rel Schwartz. v. TRW, Inc., U.S.D.C. Case No. CV 
         96-3065 RAP (RMCx).
     Letter from David Affeld to Theodore A. Postol regarding 
         Defense Security Service claims about the release of 
         classified information.
     Prof. Theodore A. Postol,
     Department of Arms Control Studies,
     Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
     Cambridge, MA
       Dear Prof. Postol: I represent Dr. Nira Schwartz in the 
     above-referenced qui tam lawsuit. In connection with that 
     case, Dennis Egan of the Department of Justice and Lt. Col. 
     Bill Groves of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization 
     (``BMDO'') spoke to me two days ago and yesterday, 
     respectively, stating that the BMDO believes Dr. Schwartz 
     improperly disclosed classified information to unauthorized 
     persons over the past few months. In particular, Mr. Egan 
     asserted that Dr. Schwartz had disclosed classified portions 
     of a POET report to you.
       Mr. Egan and Lt. Col. Groves also told me that agents of 
     BMDO, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service and the U.S. 
     Attorney's office want to question Dr. Schwartz regarding 
     these allegations.
       These allegations appear to be spurious. However, I am 
     trying to determine whether there is any merit to them. I 
     would appreciate it if you could give me your reaction to the 
     above. For your reference, enclosed please find a copy of a 
     letter regarding this matter which I sent to Mr. Egan and Lt. 
     Col. Groves yesterday, July 11, 2000.
           Very truly yours,
     David W. Affeld.
                                  ____


                             [Attachment 2]


                                              David W. Affeld,

                                   Los Angeles, CA, July 11, 2000.
     Re: U.S. ex rel Schwartz v. TRW, Inc., U.S.D.C. Case No. CV 
         96-3065 RAP (RMCx).
     Letter from David Affeld to Lt. Col. Groves regarding false 
         allegations of criminality against Dr. Schwartz.
     Lt. Col. Bill Groves,
     BMDO General Counsel,
     Washington DC.
       Dear Lt. Col. Groves: As you know, I represent Dr. Nira 
     Schwartz in the above-referenced qui tam lawsuit. This letter 
     is to confirm pertinent portions of our telephone 
     conversation of today. July 11, 2000, regarding the case. It 
     also confirms pertinent portions of the telephone 
     conversation I had last night with Dennis Egan of the 
     Department of Justice, which you apparently had discussed 
     with Mr. Egan before you and I spoke.
       I contacted both you and Mr. Egan yesterday in my quest to 
     obtain a security clearance for classified information needed 
     to prosecute the case. You both provided helpful suggestions 
     regarding how a security clearance might be obtained. 
     However, I am very concerned about another matter you both 
     raised.
       Last night Mr. Egan told me that agents of the Defense 
     Security Service (``DSS'') and the Defense Criminal 
     Investigative Service (``DCIS'') will be contacting Dr. 
     Schwartz shortly, to question her regarding supposedly 
     classified information which she allegedly disclosed to 
     unauthorized persons over the past several months. He also 
     said that someone from the U.S. Attorney's office would be 
     involved. You confirmed to me today that such an 
     investigation is indeed imminent, and that the Ballistic 
     Missile Defense Organization (``BMDO''), to which your office 
     is legal counsel, requires the investigation. You also stated 
     that in making the alleged improper disclosures, Dr. Schwartz 
     supposedly violated a protective order entered in the case.
       I asked each of you to identify what this supposedly 
     classified information was, so I could determine whether 
     there is any truth to the charges. Mr. Egan vaguely referred 
     to the POET report apparently relied upon by MIT Professor 
     Theodore A. Postol in some of his criticisms of the current 
     missile defense system. However, that document consists 
     solely of non-classified portions of the report publicly 
     available from the court docket in the above-referenced case. 
     You, on the other hand, told me that you were ``duty-bound'' 
     not to tell me what the supposedly classified information is, 
     because I do not have a security clearance. You also did not 
     identify any persons to whom the information was supposedly 
     disclosed, the dates of any supposed disclosures, or any 
     disclosure events. I am thus posed with a Catch-22. It is 
     obviously impossible to respond to charges that you refuse to 
     articulate.
       Just in case you were referring to the materials Dr. 
     Schwartz filed with the Court late last year, I have 
     confirmed yet again that none of it was classified. I am not 
     aware of any other ``disclosures'' by Dr. Schwartz. It 
     appears that the charges--the unarticulated charges--by BMDO 
     are false.
       I am also concerned about what is motivating this 
     ``investigation''. It comes at a time when the current 
     missile defense program is the subject of heated national 
     debate and intense media scrutiny. It also comes on the heels 
     of the spectacular failure of the system last Friday, July 7, 
     2000. I am concerned that the ``investigation'' of Dr. 
     Schwartz is motivated not to preserve national security, but 
     rather to intimidate an outspoken critic of the program, at a 
     time when the White House is deliberating over whether to 
     continue funding the program.
       I certainly want to be cooperative, particularly since you 
     intimated that my security clearance might depend on it. 
     However, I must ask that you identify the particular 
     individuals at BMDO who initiated this ``investigation'', and 
     what specific classified information was supposedly 
     disclosed, to whom, and when. If such disclosures have indeed 
     been made, the information is now in the public domain, and 
     no harm can come form advising Dr. Schwartz's legal counsel 
     what that now-public information is. Fairness and due process 
     require no less. On the other hand, if you decline to provide 
     these specifics, I can only conclude that there is no basis 
     for the charges, and that the BMDO has raised the specter of 
     a criminal investigation purely to scare Dr. Schwartz. Dr. 
     Schwartz obviously will not be a party to such an agenda.
           Very truly yours,
     David W. Affeld.
                                  ____


                             [Attachment 3]

         Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, 
           Assistant Secretary of Defense,
                                    Washington, DC, June 23, 2000.
     Letter from Arthur L. Money to Theodore A. Postol making non-
         credible claims about the routine nature of Defense 
         Security Service actions.
     Dr. Theodore A. Postol,
     Professor of Science, Technology and National Security 
         Policy, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute 
         of Technology, Cambridge, MA
       Dear Dr. Postol: I regret any confusion surrounding the 
     recent visit of representatives of the Defense Security 
     Service (DSS) to you at your office. I have been asked to 
     write to clarify the purpose of that visit.
       The DSS representatives who met with you on June 21 were 
     Industrial Security Specialists, who are usually called IS 
     Representatives, DSS IS Representatives routinely meet with 
     contractors and contractor employees who hold security 
     clearances to discuss security issues, such as a potential 
     unauthorized release of classified information. Their purpose 
     in visiting you was to obtain information you might have 
     about the source of possibly classified information contained 
     in attachments to your letter dated May 11, 2000. I 
     understand that you discussed the source of these attachments 
     with the IS Representatives and provided information they 
     sought; I appreciate your willingness to do so.
       I want to assure you that you are not under investigation, 
     and I regret any misunderstanding about the purpose of this 
     visit. I hope DSS will have your cooperation as they continue 
     to review this matter.
     Arthur L. Money.
                                  ____

                                             Government Oversight,


                                     Security Studies Program,

                                    Washington, DC, July 13, 2000.
     David W. Affeld,
     Attorney at Law,
     Los Angeles, CA
       Dear Mr. Affeld: I am writing you in response to your 
     letter and our phone discussion of 12 July about threats of 
     criminal prosecution against your client Nira Schwartz for 
     the release of classified information to me. I understand 
     that these threats were made by Mr. Dennis Egan and Lt. Col. 
     William Groves--lawyers working respectively for the 
     Department of Justice and Defense. As I explained to you 
     yesterday, it is clear that when these threats were made both 
     Mr. Egan and Lt. Col. Groves knew, or should have known, that 
     Dr. Schwartz had done nothing improper. It therefore appears 
     that Mr. Egan and Lt. Col. Groves are involved in improper 
     attempts to intimidate a witness in a qui tam lawsuit 
     alleging fraud in the development of a weapons system that is 
     supposed to defend the United States from nuclear attack. 
     Furthermore, I was astounded to also find out that they 
     attempted to interfere with the privileged relationship 
     between an attorney and a client by falsely claiming that a 
     security clearance you will need to work on the qui tam case 
     would be contingent on your cooperating with them in their 
     illegal efforts at intimidation.
       The title of the document released to me that is being used 
     as a vehicle for trying to intimidate Dr. Schwartz is 
     ``Independent Review of TRW Discrimination Techniques Final 
     Report, (POET Study 1998-5).'' This study is part of a 
     scientific fraud that was designed to conceal the fact that 
     the currently under development National Missile Defense 
     system cannot tell the difference between warheads and 
     decoys. The study was

[[Page H6538]]

     performed by contractors for the Department of Defense and 
     with full knowledge of high-level Department of Defense 
     officials.
       In particular, I have talked with Mr. Sam Reed, the Defense 
     Criminal Investigation Service leader of the Department of 
     Defense Inspector General's investigation of allegations of 
     fraud at TRW. he told me that he sanitized the document in 
     question with the knowledge of his supervisors during the 
     course of pursuing this earlier investigation. Furthermore, 
     he told me that he had explained to Mr. Egan how Dr. Schwartz 
     had properly obtained this declassified document. In 
     addition, Mr. Reed told me that the Defense Security Service 
     was informed of these facts. I therefore conclude that the 
     actions of Egan and Groves are part of an ongoing effort by 
     Department of Defense officials, and possibly other agencies, 
     to intimidate witnesses in a continuing effort to hide acts 
     of fraud with regard to the development of the National 
     Missile Defense.
       It is equally clear that officials at the highest levels of 
     the Department of Defense are in some way involved in these 
     illegal activities of their agents. In particular, the 
     Assistant Secretary of Defense for C\3\I, Arthur Money, has 
     been informed multiple times of these activities. I spoke 
     with him by phone about a failed attempt to entrap and 
     intimidate me by his agents on 21 June, after receiving a 
     letter from him on 26 June via Express Mail. In that 
     conversation he claimed ignorance of the details surrounding 
     this event. I made it clear to him that I did not find his 
     excuses credible and that I expected a better explanation of 
     his involvement in the matter. In particular, I made it clear 
     that if in fact he was ignorant of what was attempted by his 
     agents he was culpable for not knowing what the agency under 
     his control was doing, and if he was not ignorant, he was 
     culpable for lying to me.
       It is also of concern that these illegal actions are 
     possibly being taken with the knowledge of members of the 
     White House staff. The White House Chief of Staff, John 
     Podesta, the President's Advisor on Arms Control, Hans 
     Binnendijk, and the Vice President's National Security 
     Advisor, Leon Fuerth, have all been provided with detailed 
     evidence of fraud in the National Missile Defense Program as 
     well as misconduct in the Pentagon's Defense Security Service 
     in letters sent to them dated 11 May, 19 May, 21 June, and 6 
     July. There is as yet no visible evidence that anyone in the 
     White House has taken a serious action to address the 
     numerous issues raised in these letters, and it is hard to 
     believe that no one in the White House is aware of the 
     marauding and out of control activities of the Defense 
     Security Service.
       It is now clear that a series of questions will eventually 
     need to be answered in an investigation that should include 
     interviews with White House staff, the Defense Security 
     Service, the Department of Defense Inspector General's 
     Office, and the Department of Justice.
       These questions are as follows:
       1. Who at the Department of Justice, in addition to Mr. 
     Egan, knew and approved of his knowingly making false 
     allegations of criminality against Dr. Schwartz?
       2. Who at the Department of Defense, in addition to Mr. 
     Money, knew and/or approved of Lt. Col. Groves' involvement 
     in this affair?
       3. What is Assistant Secretary Money's repeated role in 
     these matters? Who else above him at the Pentagon knows of 
     his activities?
       4. What was the nature of the SECRET classified information 
     that was presented to me in the unannounced meeting at my MIT 
     office with three agents of the Defense Security Service?
       5. Who was responsible for initiating the use of SECRET 
     letters to deal with matters that could simply be 
     investigated in terms of chain of custody?
       6. Is the Department of Defense Inspector General's (IG) 
     Office aware of these attempts at intimidation and 
     entrapment? If so, why has the IG not taken steps to 
     investigate these improper actions?
       7. Given the substantial amount of information over a two-
     month period provided by my letters to the White House, what 
     did the White House know of these activities aimed at 
     intimidation and entrapment? If any staff knew of these 
     activities, what did they know and what was their role in the 
     process? If staff did not know of these activities, why did 
     they not know?
       At a minimum the responsible U.S. government agencies have 
     so far conducted themselves in a manner like that of a 
     fictitious banana republic. Of greater concern to me is that 
     the White House and other elements of our government, either 
     by intent or negligence, are allowing, or worst yet, 
     encouraging, Department of Defense officials to conduct 
     business like Soviet style thugs.
       In any case, it is clear that the document ``POET Study 
     1998-5'' was properly sanitized before it was released to Dr. 
     Schwartz. If I were in Dr. Schwartz's position, I would not 
     talk to the Defense Security Services. I suggest instead that 
     if they approach her she simply ask them to write a letter to 
     her explaining what they want to know from her, why they want 
     to know this, and who, by name, is asking for the 
     information. If the information is the letter is credible, 
     she should respond in writing.
           Sincerely,
                                               Theodore A. Postol,
         Professor of Science, Technology, and National Security 
           Policy, Security Studies Program and Program in 
           Science, Technology, and Society.

  Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Obey).
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Let me say that I recognize all the hard work that went into putting 
this bill together, and I regret that I cannot vote for it, and let me 
explain why.
  Number one, this bill does not respond to what the Congress always 
claims the problem is. Every year, when the President sends his budget 
down, we are then told by the majority that somehow the President is 
not responding sufficiently to the issue of readiness, and then, when 
we take a look at what Congress finally does, Congress responds, but it 
responds in a way which puts other items at a higher priority than a 
number of the readiness-related accounts.
  For example, if we take a look at this budget or at this bill being 
presented today, the public will be told that for operation and 
maintenance, which is a key factor in readiness, that it is about $600 
million above the President. But if we take a look at the adjustments 
that are then made by the committee in overseas contingency operations, 
in foreign currency reestimates, in working capital funds, in 
headquarters administration accounts, we will see that, in fact, the 
committee cuts those readiness-related items by about $3 billion. So 
this Congress, having attacked the President for not having enough in 
the budget to deal with readiness-related accounts, in fact, will have 
produced a bill which is about $2.4 billion below the President's 
request for those accounts. That money has been moved largely into 
procurement and into research and development.

                              {time}  1415

  It is just by accident, I suppose, that a good many of the 
congressionally earmarked projects are found in those areas.
  I do not suggest that all of those projects are bad. They are not. 
Some of them are very deserving. All I do suggest is that this Congress 
should not pretend that it has strengthened the President's budget for 
readiness, because in fact it has made a number of reductions in this 
bill which produce readiness-related account funding levels lower than 
that recommended by the President.
  Secondly, I would simply say that the President's budget as he 
submitted it to us had a very large increase, but that was presented in 
the context of also providing increases for education, for health care, 
for agriculture, for land acquisition, items like that.
  This bill is presented to us in a far different context. This bill 
increases the military spending of the country by $20.9 billion, when 
we discount all the gimmicks. Just the increase in this bill is larger 
than the entire foreign aid bill. It is larger than the entire Interior 
appropriation bill.
  If we take a look at where it goes, a lot of it goes, in my judgment, 
not on the basis of where it is needed militarily but where it is 
produced economically. I think the country needs to understand that, as 
well.
  Secondly, I would say that we need to put in context what threat it 
is responding to. This chart demonstrates what our defense budget is 
versus the rest of the world, or certainly at least our adversaries and 
our allies.
  The United States spends about $266 billion, as represented by this 
bar. That is far more than the combined total of Russia, China, Iran, 
North Korea, Libya, our major opponents. That does not count the 
allies, our NATO allies, which last time I looked were on our side. 
They spent $227 billion. So again, we dwarf the amount of money which 
is spent on military accounts worldwide.
  If we are going to do that, it seems to me that we have an obligation 
both to take care of our other national priorities and to make certain 
that our budget has an accounting which is at least as forthright as 
that provided by the administration. I do not believe it is.
  Mr. Speaker, for those reasons, and for others, I will be constrained 
to vote against the bill when the time comes.
  Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I hope the military will not misconstrue that chart to 
think that I like charts.

[[Page H6539]]

  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may 
consume to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young), the chairman of the 
full committee.
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this bill. It 
is a good bill. The chairman and the ranking member and all the members 
of the subcommittee have done an outstanding job in bringing it to us 
originally, and bringing it to us from the conference committee.
  There has already been more than enough debate on this issue of our 
Nation's security on this particular bill. I urge the Members to 
support it very strongly.
  Mrs. MALONEY of New York. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the 
conference report for H.R. 4576, the Defense Appropriations Act for FY 
2001. In addition to supporting defense projects, this bill provides 
critical funding for important health research programs.
  I am pleased that the conference has included $15 million for the 
Neurotoxin Exposure Treatment Research Project in the search for 
answers to the mystery of Parkinson's disease.
  Parkinson's Disease is a chronic, progressive disorder affecting one 
million Americans. In its final stages, the disease robs individuals of 
the ability to speak or move. Of the many things we know about 
Parkinson's, we know that there appears to be a disproportionate number 
of veterans who are afflicted with Parkinson's disease.
  This breakthrough research will study the links between Parkinson's 
and environmental stress exposure factors encountered in military 
operations. The data will advance preventive measures and treatment 
interventions against the effects of military threats and operation 
hazards.
  I am also pleased that the bill contains $12 million for ovarian 
cancer research, $100 million for basic and clinical prostate cancer 
research, and $175 million for the Peer-Reviewed Breast Cancer Research 
Program (BCRP). Breast cancer is the most common cancer among women; 
and one out of every eight women will be afflicted with the disease in 
her lifetime. Our best hope today is early detection and more research.
  In just six years, the Breast Cancer Research Program has matured 
from an isolated research program to a well-respected resource in the 
cancer community. It is overseen by a group of distinguished scientists 
and activists, as recommended by the Institute of Medicine. 90% of the 
funds go directly to research grants, and consumer advocates are 
included at every level.
  I thank the conferees for recognizing the importance of this program.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I will oppose the defense appropriations 
conference report before us because, at $288 billion, it spends too 
much money and spends it inefficiently. The $1.9 billion it contains 
for national missile defense is but the most glaring example. That is 
an amount even greater than the House voted for national missile 
defense last month.
  President Clinton has said that later this year he will decide 
whether to deploy a national missile defense system. In light of the 
failure of the last two tests of this system, no decision to deploy 
should be made.
  The President has said his decision will be based on four criteria: 
the technology, the cost, the threat, and the impact on arms control. 
For each, the case for deployment is weak at best.
  On the technology, the recent test failures demonstrate just how hard 
effective missile defense is. It is impossible to know whether the 
system will work until realistic tests are done, and that will not 
happen for years, if ever. We should not risk American lives on a bet 
that missile defense will work.
  On cost, since the late '50s, the U.S. has spent over $120 billion on 
missile defense, with almost nothing to show for it. The Congressional 
Budget Office estimates that the Pentagon's current proposal will cost 
$60 billion. This is pouring more money into a hole in the ground.
  On threat, it is far better to pursue such endeavors as the ongoing 
talks with North Korea on ending its emerging missile program rather 
than attempting to build a defense against non-existent missiles.
  On arms control, a U.S. national missile defense is likely to push 
countries that already have nuclear weapons, Russia and China, to 
maintain or expand their arsenals, and risks destroying the entire 
nonproliferation regime that the U.S. has tirelessly built over the 
last 50 years.
  A missile defense that does not work while exacerbating tensions with 
potential adversaries is far worse than no defense at all. We should 
spend our money on more useful things.
  Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, today the House passed the FY 
2001 Defense Appropriation Bill. Included in this important legislation 
was the funding for the Crusader Program at the level requested by the 
President. The President's Budget requests includes $355.5 million for 
the continued development of the Crusader advanced field artillery 
system.
  Artillery is the one combat capability where the United States 
significantly lags behind its allies and potential adversaries. Without 
Crusader this unacceptable situation will worsen and endanger our 
military personnel who are sent in harm's way. Furthermore, the major 
reason the Army felt it could accept the risk of the 1996 decision to 
reduce the combat power of its heavy divisions was that Crusader would 
be fielded with its increased capabilities.
  The Army leadership staunchly supports the need for this system and 
the unified commanders have likewise voiced their support. The Army has 
restructured the program to ensure it fits within the overall 
transformation effort of the operational forces. The number of 
howitzers intended to be procured is 480. The Crusader is being 
modified to support the Army's transition initiatives and Objective 
Force across the full spectrum of missions. Crusader is the cannon 
system for the Army's one remaining counterattack corps. It will be 
providing continuous, all-weather fire support to the corps well into 
the fourth decade of the new century, a time when the corps transitions 
to the Objective Force.
  Also, Crusader is being redesigned to increase its global strategic 
deployability while retaining all of its Key Performance Parameters 
(range, rate-of-fire, mobility, and resupply). Important features of 
the redesigned Crusader are lower weight (38 to 42 tons), smaller size 
(2 howitzers or a complete system transportable on a single C-5 or C-17 
sortie), and a change in resupply vehicle philosophy.
  This $355 million in research and development funds will be used to 
help secure our nation's future.
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for 
time, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Barrett of Nebraska). Without objection, 
the previous question is ordered on the conference report.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the conference report.
  Pursuant to clause 10 of rule XX, the yeas and nays are ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 367, 
nays 58, not voting 9, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 413]

                               YEAS--367

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Allen
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Baldacci
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Bass
     Bateman
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Bono
     Borski
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (FL)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cannon
     Capps
     Cardin
     Carson
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth-Hage
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cummings
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Everett
     Ewing
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Gejdenson
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (IN)
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Holt
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inslee
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kuykendall
     LaFalce
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Largent

[[Page H6540]]


     Larson
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manzullo
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Menendez
     Mica
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Ose
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Pease
     Pelosi
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Phelps
     Pickering
     Pickett
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Regula
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rothman
     Roukema
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sabo
     Salmon
     Sanchez
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaffer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Snyder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stump
     Stupak
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Toomey
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Udall (NM)
     Visclosky
     Vitter
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                                NAYS--58

     Baldwin
     Barrett (WI)
     Blumenauer
     Brown (OH)
     Capuano
     Conyers
     Coyne
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     Doggett
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Eshoo
     Filner
     Frank (MA)
     Ganske
     Gutierrez
     Hooley
     Jackson (IL)
     Kucinich
     Lee
     Lofgren
     Luther
     Markey
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McKinney
     Meeks (NY)
     Metcalf
     Miller, George
     Minge
     Nadler
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Owens
     Paul
     Payne
     Peterson (MN)
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Rivers
     Rush
     Sanders
     Sanford
     Schakowsky
     Sensenbrenner
     Shays
     Stark
     Tierney
     Udall (CO)
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner

                             NOT VOTING--9

     Baca
     Barton
     Boswell
     Campbell
     Klink
     McIntosh
     Smith (WA)
     Souder
     Vento

                              {time}  1445

  Messrs. JACKSON of Illinois, OWENS, McDERMOTT, RANGEL and MEEKS of 
New York changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  Ms. GRANGER changed her vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
  So the conference report was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________