[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 94 (Wednesday, July 19, 2000)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E1277]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[[Page E1277]]


  THE ATTACK ON THE U.S.S. ``STARK'' AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ELECTRONIC 
                          WARFARE IN THE NAVY

                                 ______
                                 

                        HON. THOMAS M. REYNOLDS

                              of new york

                    in the house of representatives

                        Wednesday, July 19, 2000

  Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, on May 17, 1987, the guided missile 
frigate U.S.S. Stark was on routine patrol in the Persian Gulf to 
protect neutral shipping during the Iran-Iraq war. At about 8:00 a.m., 
a long-range U.S. electronic warning and control aircraft picked up an 
F-1 Mirage, positively identified it as an Iraqi aircraft, and passed 
the notification on to U.S. Naval units operating in the Gulf. A little 
after 9:00 that morning, the aircraft was picked up as an unknown on 
the Stark's radar, at a range of about 70 miles.
  Once the Mirage had closed to within less than 70 miles of the Stark, 
the ship's Tactical Operations Officer was tracking it continuously. 
When the aircraft closed to 13 miles, the Stark identified itself by 
radio, and requested identification from the aircraft, but received 
none. A second inquiry at a range of 11 miles also brought no response. 
At about 9:11, the operator of electronic intercept equipment aboard 
the Stark reported that it had been locked onto by the aircraft's fire 
control radar.
  When the TAO discovered the lock-on by the Mirage's radar, he 
immediately started to bring the ship's Phalanx close-in weapons system 
up. He also requested a lock by the ship's air defense radar. However, 
the attack was coming in over the port bow, and the primary radar was 
blocked by the superstructure. At 9:12, the TAO ordered a secondary 
radar brought up, but before it could be activated an Exocet missile 
launched by the Mirage hit the ship. A second missile impacted shortly 
thereafter. The ship had neither taken evasive maneuvers nor brought 
its defensive weapons systems to bear.
  The missile attacks and a large fire they ignited in the aluminum 
superstructure claimed the lives of 37 U.S. sailors. Only the heroic 
action of the crew saved the ship.
  Mr. Speaker, today the only remaining sign of this tragic event is 
the memorial engraving mounted in the midships' passageway, which lists 
the names of those who perished. However, we in Congress must always 
remember the 37 shipmates who gave their lives that day and their 
sacrifice must not have been in vain.
  Subsequent to the U.S. Navy's own inquiry, the Staff Report of the 
Committee on Armed Services concluded that although the Rules of 
Engagement allowed for a more aggressive defensive posture, the real 
world was more difficult. At the time, Iraq was considered a near-ally 
against Iran, and had never attacked a U.S. ship despite several 
opportunities.
  In all probability, the incident was caused by complementary errors 
of interpretation and the Iraqi attack was probably inadvertent. In the 
era of electronic warfare, the fear that he who hesitates is almost 
certainly lost leads to a policy of attacking immediately almost 
anything the radar engages. In contrast, the Stark regarded the closing 
of the Mirage as a puzzle rather than a threat, and did not take action 
to unmask its defensive systems in time for them to engage.
  Whether intentional or not, the end results of this attack were the 
same. Thirty-seven brave sailors lost their lives. This tragedy 
demonstrates the vital importance in Congress exercising its oversight 
powers to prevent any reoccurrence of this incident.
  It is for precisely this reason that I requested the House 
Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense include report language 
directing the Navy to assess the tactical viability of its primary 
shipboard electronic warfare system, the AN/SLQ-32(V). I am happy to 
report that the conference report to the defense appropriations bill, 
which passed the House today, included this important language.
  This language will benefit electronic warfare in the Navy. More 
importantly, however, it is an important first step toward assuring 
that we in Congress fulfill our responsibility to guarantee the best 
protection possible to our sailors and aircrews who go into harms way 
in the defense of freedom every day of their lives.

                          ____________________