[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 93 (Tuesday, July 18, 2000)]
[House]
[Pages H6450-H6451]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
FEDERAL RESERVE MONETARY POLICY: IS GREENSPAN'S FED THE WORLD'S CENTRAL
BANK?
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hunter). Under the Speaker's announced
policy of January 6, 1999, the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Metcalf)
is recognized for 30 minutes.
Mr. METCALF. Mr. Speaker, the topic of my speech tonight is Federal
Reserve monetary policy: Is Greenspan's Fed the world's Central Bank?
Some years ago, William McDonough of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York stated the most important asset a central bank possesses is public
confidence. He went on in that speech to note that, ``I am increasingly
concerned that in a democracy a central bank can maintain price
stability over the intermediate and long term only when it has public
support for the necessary policies.''
Public confidence here can only mean the confidence of the Members of
Congress in our oversight capacity. Most of the American public, to
this very day, have not the least interest in, awareness of, or
knowledge of the Federal Reserve System, our central bank. But most
Members feel that Allan Sproul, another former president of the New
York Federal Reserve Bank, was quite correct in his letter, still
quoted by Fed officials, that Fed independence does not mean
independence from the government but independence within the
government.
{time} 2015
In performing its major task, the administration of monetary policy,
the Federal Reserve System is an agency of the Congress, set up in a
special form to bear the responsibility for that particular task which
constitutionally belongs to the legislative branch of government.''
Clearly, that form of argument appeals to most Members today. The
construct is a masterpiece not just for being true, Congress did
abdicate its enumerated powers, but for letting even those of us
responsible for oversight off the hook: The Treasury does not rule the
Fed, the White House does not rule the Fed, but this Congress does not
write the script either.
The current Fed chairman, Alan Greenspan, will soon testify before
this House expressing his independence. As the journal Central Banking
recently noted regarding the Fed, ``It has acquired an air of sanctity.
Politicians hesitate to bait the Fed for fear of looking stupid.'' As a
result, still quoting, ``the Fed's accountability is less than it
appears. The Fed is always accountable in the sense that Congress could
bring it to heel if it really wanted to.''
And the Fed has not done too badly in some areas, as the economy
demonstrates, most notably where inflation and interest rates are today
resting. Whether they remain even close to where they are come a year
or two from now may indeed be an all together different story.
Mr. Greenspan has been pretty clear about what is now important in
Fed policy. Let me quote from some past testimony: ``The Federal
Reserve believes that the main contribution it can make to enhancing
the long-term health of the U.S. economy is to promote price stability
over time. Our short-run policy adjustments, while necessarily
undertaken against the background of the current condition of the U.S.
economy, must be consistent with moving toward the long-run goal of
price stability.''
The reality is that monetary policy can never put the economy exactly
where Greenspan might want it to be. He knows full well that supply
shocks that drive up prices suddenly, like the two major oil shocks of
the 1970s, are always going to be with us, and more so than ever as the
process of globalization continues to transform the world's economies.
And the United States Federal Reserve is leading this global
transformation. Some are quietly arguing, over lunch mostly, that
Greenspan is in charge of what he may already believe to be the World
Federal Reserve, the World Central Bank.
There is good reason to suggest this. As Robert Pringle noted some
time ago in Central Banking, ``Central banks, rather than governments,
are laying down the rules of the game for the new international
financial system. The Fed is in the lead.''
Pringle went on to argue, and I am quoting him at length here, ``If
the Fed's record during the debt crisis and in exchange rate management
is mixed, most observers would give it full marks for the way it dealt
with the stock market crash of October 1987. It is not clear that the
verdict of history will be as favorable. After being prodded into
action, some central banks, notably those of Japan and England, went on
madly pumping money into the system long after the danger had passed,
creating an unsustainable boom and reigniting inflationary pressures.
``Well, the Fed can hardly be blamed for that. The real problem was
that Greenspan's action risked creating the expectation among investors
that the Board of Governors would support U.S. stock markets in the
future. Clearly, the action was prompted by the need to protect the
banks from the risks to which they were exposed to firms in the
securities markets.
``Equally, this support signalled an extension of the central banks'
safety net to an area of the financial system where investors are
traditionally expected to bear the risks themselves. It is no accident
that after 1987 the bull market really took off, and it has never
looked back.''
I have quoted this section in the article by Robert Pringle that
appeared in Central Banking because we are hearing the very same fears
expressed today, though quietly, over lunch, by phone, by rumor, by
investors and money managers throughout the U.S. Not too long ago
former Fed chairman Paul Volker strongly suggested that our current
boom is driven almost exclusively by the major international firms in
the high-tech industry and the 40 industrials. Clearly, this is due to
the fact that these few giant monopolies dominate the world market.
Therefore, this boom reflects less what is happening here in America
than what is going on in the world to these few monopolies' financial
benefit.
I am not entirely complaining. Where these few giant firms are
concerned, some American workers do benefit. But more foreign workers
benefit than American. More investors and owners benefit than workers;
more very wealthy individuals than the middle class bedrock.
My problem is that Greenspan's Fed seems to believe money does not
matter; that we can create vast sums of cash and pump it into financial
markets at will, manipulate the Adjusted Monetary Base to even greater
height or plummet to the depths. All this is done toward long-term
price stability? Has Greenspan so rejected Milton Friedman's theory
that to do so one guarantees inflationary pressures in the road ahead
along with savage corrections when actions become necessary by, once
again, the same Fed?
Can Greenspan seriously argue the Fed has not created the worst
bubble in history; the worst speculation ever witnessed, with millions
of day traders gambling their small fortunes on meek wills, wishing to
become, each of them, another Bill Gates? Clearly, Greenspan has sent a
signal once again to investors that the stock market bears no risk for
the middle class citizen.
During 1995, it was Mexico's turn again, and as Pringle pointed out,
``The American administration panicked. Again, the Federal Reserve was
there to help, even though there was less reason for central banks to
get involved than in 1982, since there was less risk to the
international banking system.''
And as Pringle goes on to state, ``Again, European bankers were
annoyed at the lack of consultation. You do not need to be a populist
politician to expect that Wall Street was calling the shots, especially
with former senior
[[Page H6451]]
partner of Goldman Sachs, Robert Rubin, as U.S. Treasury Secretary.''
We have witnessed some rather disturbing policy stratagems in just,
say the last 10 months or so. Greenspan's Fed began around August and
September of last year to expand the money supply, the Adjusted
Monetary Base, from around $500 billion to nearly $625 billion, a $70
billion runup, in anticipation of potential Y2K effects. This enormous
expansion flowed directly into financial markets and helped create the
enormous boom in stock prices prior to that year's end. The speculation
was seen primarily in high-tech stocks.
Then comes the sudden and nearly precisely the same spike downward of
the same Adjusted Monetary Base right after the year ends and year 2000
begins. There are no problems with Y2K. This spike downward lasted
until about April of the year 2000. We know the savage corrections the
stock market displayed, and there were more losers than winners. All we
ever hear about are the winners, not the thousands or millions of
losers.
And why do we hear so little about the losers in the media? Because,
so the argument goes, the market returned almost to normal. The market
bounced back, so the argument goes. Certainly, as the Fed began once
again to pump up the monetary base around April. But the losers remain
losers, and lost homes, businesses and bankruptcies continue to reach
all-time highs; personal debt, especially credit card debt and equity
finance debt, have reached unheard of levels. This is the speculation?
No, let us call it what it really is: Gambling. This is the gambling
that is today our U.S. stock market.
We will not hear the White House complain. Only praise for Clinton's
appointee shall be sounding out, ringing out the bell in praise for
White House management of the economy. We will not hear that from the
very speculative bubble created during the last 6 months of 1999. We
will not hear that from the quickest investors, who took their profits
before the inevitable downturn and before the corrections came.
Investors paid handsomely for their gains in capital gains taxes
levied. It is no surprise to Fed watchers that the taxes collected from
capital gains nearly equaled the much-hailed government surplus, which
Clinton soberly explained was due to his wise leadership of the
economy. If the surplus was really generated by the wise leadership of
the White House, why has the government's debt not been going down? And
we should not confuse the government debt with some mythical balanced
budget.
For a Federal central bank, the concentration of power at the top is
very marked. True, although the Board of Governors sets the discount
rate and reserve requirements, the execution of monetary policy on an
ongoing basis is decided by the larger 12-member Federal Open Market
Committee. But the FMOC brings only five voting Reserve Bank
presidents, to which the New York bank is always one, leaving the
Washington governors in the majority. And the influence of the chairman
alone can be sometimes near to overwhelming.
On an historical note, and I taught history and government, so
forgive me, Congress insisted on scattering 12 Federal Reserve banks
across the country when the system was devised so the east could not
restrict credit elsewhere. Interestingly, these regional Feds were
chartered as private institutions in which local banks owned all the
stock. That is still true today, with the outside directors on the
board of a Federal Reserve a mix of representatives from small and
large member banks in the district, as well as representatives from
industry, commerce and the public.
What was intended here was a sort of balancing; three bankers with
six nonbankers on each Federal Reserve Board. Supposedly, this would
put the lenders at a disadvantage to the borrowing classes, which would
outnumber the lenders six to three. The boards choose the Federal
Reserve Bank presidents, always from the lending class, but do so only
with the approval of the seven-member Federal Reserve Board in
Washington. Thus, we can readily see that bankers, lenders, clearly
dominate the Federal Reserve System itself.
Even though at the regional Feds the distinction I just made is
superficially valid, many of the nonbank directors are tied
inextricably to banking itself, or sit on separate boards of directors
where bankers rest as well. Nor is the public sector category so clear.
Many nonindustry participants on these boards have close ties to
banking and banking's network of consultants, academics and financial
management roles clearly bank related.
Just how much power any one regional president has is still debated
in inner circles. Previous efforts at restricting Reserve Bank
presidents' powers have been dismissed on the grounds that their powers
were a proper delegation of authority by Congress. Allowing that the
Federal Reserve is a quasi-government agency, it remains the only
government agency in which private individuals, along with government-
appointed individuals, together make government policy.
I will repeat that. The only government agency in which private
individuals, along with government-appointed individuals, together make
government policy.
It remains a solid fact that these regional bank presidents cast
extremely important votes on public policies that in the present as
well as the future affect the economic lives of every American.
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Yet, and this is the point to my digression, they lack the public
accountability because they lack the public legitimacy to be making
these decisions, especially these kinds of decisions, some of whose
recent effects I have just pointed out.
Nobody can deny any longer that the Federal Reserve system dominates
the U.S. economy, that its decisions, more than even so-called market
forces, a sham notion under managed competition in any case, affect
everybody's lives and well-being, that within the decision-making
process delegated to the Federal Reserve, the Board of Governors
clearly dominates the process, that within that Board of Governors, the
chairman, and this is not intended to single out Mr. Greenspan but to
apply to all past and present and future chairmen, that the chairman
dominates the board.
If all this does not concern this Congress, then history will record
the result.
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