[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 92 (Monday, July 17, 2000)]
[House]
[Pages H6072-H6077]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




    SENSE OF HOUSE REGARDING NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND PROCEDURES

  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the 
resolution (H. Res. 534) expressing the sense of the House of 
Representatives that the recent nuclear weapons security failures at 
Los Alamos National Laboratory demonstrate that security policy and 
security procedures within the National Nuclear Security Administration 
remain inadequate, that the individuals responsible for such policy and 
procedures must be held accountable for their performance, and that 
immediate action must be taken to correct security deficiencies.
  The Clerk read as follows:

                              H. Res. 534

       Whereas two computer hard drives containing a large 
     quantity of sensitive classified nuclear weapons data at the 
     Department of Energy's Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los 
     Alamos, New Mexico, were recently

[[Page H6073]]

     missing for an undetermined period of time, exposing them to 
     possible compromise;
       Whereas the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory 
     Board, in its report dated June 1999 on security problems at 
     the Department of Energy, concluded that ``the Department of 
     Energy and the weapons laboratories have a deeply rooted 
     culture of low regard for and, at times, hostility to 
     security issues'';
       Whereas in response to longstanding security problems with 
     the nuclear weapons complex and to recommendations made by 
     the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in that 
     report, Congress enacted the National Nuclear Security 
     Administration Act (title XXXII of Public Law 106-65) to 
     establish a semi-autonomous National Nuclear Security 
     Administration with responsibility for the administration of 
     programs for the national security applications of nuclear 
     energy;
       Whereas the Special Oversight Panel on Department of Energy 
     Reorganization of the Committee on Armed Services of the 
     House of Representatives concluded in February 2000 that the 
     Department's plan to implement the provisions of that Act 
     ``taken as a whole appears to allow continued DOE authority, 
     direction, and control over the NNSA and retain current DOE 
     management, budget, and planning practices and organizational 
     structures'';
       Whereas the Secretary of Energy has recognized the need to 
     address nuclear weapons security problems within the 
     Department of Energy and has sought to make improvements;
       Whereas the Secretary of Energy, in fulfilling the duties 
     and functions of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, 
     and the Director of the Office of Security and Emergency 
     Operations of the Department of Energy, in serving as the 
     Chief of Defense Nuclear Security of the National Nuclear 
     Security Administration, were responsible for nuclear weapons 
     security policies and implementation of those policies while 
     the computer hard drives were missing;
       Whereas the effective protection of nuclear weapons 
     classified information is a critical responsibility of those 
     individuals entrusted with access to that information; and
       Whereas the compromise of the nuclear weapons data stored 
     on the computer hard drives, if confirmed, would constitute a 
     clear and present danger to the national security of the 
     United States and its allies: Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of 
     Representatives that--
       (1) the security failures at Los Alamos National Laboratory 
     revealed to Congress on June 9, 2000, demonstrate the 
     continued inadequacy of nuclear weapons security policy and 
     procedures within the National Nuclear Security 
     Administration and at facilities of the Administration;
       (2) individuals responsible for the implementation, 
     oversight, and management of nuclear weapons security policy 
     and procedures within the Administration and its facilities 
     must be held accountable for their performance; and
       (3) the Administrator for Nuclear Security must take 
     immediate action to improve procedures for the safeguarding 
     of classified nuclear weapons information and correct all 
     identified nuclear weapons security deficiencies within the 
     Administration.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
South Carolina (Mr. Spence) and the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. 
Skelton) each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spence).


                             General Leave

  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks 
on H. Res. 534, the resolution under consideration.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from South Carolina?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, 5 weeks ago the Department of Energy informed Congress 
that two computer hard drives containing a large quantity of classified 
nuclear weapons data were missing from the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory and had been missing for at least 6 weeks. This breach of 
security was just the last in a long and sorry history of lax security 
at our nuclear weapons laboratories.
  In direct response, Congress last year created a semi-autonomous 
agency, the National Nuclear Security Administration, and charged it 
with the responsibility to better manage the Nation's nuclear weapons 
complex.
  Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson opposed this new organization 
from the beginning and has sought to undermine the implementation of 
NNSA at every step. Contrary to congressional direction, he declared 
himself as the administrator for nuclear security and he dual hatted 
his own chiefs of security and counterintelligence to serve in these 
positions for both the DOE and NNSA.
  While this arrangement is directly counter to the law, it leaves no 
doubt as to who was running the new administration and who was 
responsible for security at the labs in June.
  In fact, Secretary Richardson and the senior DOE leadership told 
Congress repeatedly that the security problems at the nuclear weapons 
laboratories were being fixed. In May of 1999, Secretary Richardson 
stated that the safeguards of national secrets have been dramatically 
strengthened and improved.
  On March 2, 2000, Secretary Richardson testified to the Committee on 
Armed Services, quote, ``that we have reached a point where we have 
very strong security procedures,'' unquote; and, quote, ``there is no 
longer a culture of lax security. That has ended,'' unquote.
  Furthermore, the Secretary's independent oversight office recently 
reviewed security practices at Los Alamos National Laboratory and 
stated that they were, quote, ``first class,'' unquote.
  Of course, Mr. Speaker, this latest episode at Los Alamos has 
demonstrated that these assertions were not true. Through briefings and 
hearings, the Committee on Armed Services determined that security 
procedures at the labs continued to be unacceptably lax and 
ineffective. We learned that no log was kept of the individuals who 
entered the vault where the hard drives were stolen; that the 
Department was not even aware of how many people have access to the 
vault; and that the vault was inadequately secure.

                              {time}  1530

  I simply cannot understand how any reasonably comprehensive review of 
a laboratory's security procedures would conclude that such procedures 
were adequate, much less first class.
  Mr. Speaker, H. Res. 534 appropriately expresses concern by the House 
of Representatives over security matters within the national nuclear 
laboratories and calls for immediate corrective action. It also 
expresses the view that those responsible for these serious lapses in 
security must be held accountable.
  The senior leadership of the Department chose to accept 
responsibility for the management of NSA and eagerly and erroneously 
claimed credit for improving security. They must now accept 
responsibility for their failures as well.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H. Res. 534.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I rise today in support of this resolution, which is a resolution 
expressing the sense of the House concerning recent security lapses at 
the Energy Department, particularly at the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory.
  On June 9 of this year, the Committee on Armed Services was notified 
by the Department of Energy that two computer hard drives containing 
classified, restricted data were missing from a document storage vault 
located in the weapons design ``X Division'' at the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory. The information on these hard drives relates to the 
development, design, and manufacture and use of nuclear weapons. In a 
very real sense, the information on these computer disks represents the 
``keys to the kingdom.'' Fortunately, the missing hard drives have been 
recovered, but we still do not know whether they were simply misplaced 
or whether they were copied or otherwise used by those with hostile 
intentions toward the United States.
  The security lapses that led to the apparently temporary loss of the 
two computer disks containing highly sensitive nuclear weapons secrets 
are inexcusable. I am especially distressed that a culture continues to 
exist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory that relegates security 
concerns to secondary importance. Something must be done to change that 
culture. I applaud Secretary Richardson's efforts to improve security 
and get the Department of Energy on the right track; but obviously, the 
steps he has taken so far are somewhat inadequate to ensure that our 
nuclear secrets are adequately safeguarded.
  The protection of nuclear weapons information is a critical 
responsibility

[[Page H6074]]

for all of those with access to that information. The compromise of the 
data on the missing hard drives could seriously jeopardize the national 
security of our country and of our allies.
  Mr. Speaker, the resolution before the House today, which the 
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spence) and I have cosponsored, 
expresses the sense of the House that the security failures at the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory show that our existing nuclear weapons 
security policy is inadequate, that the individuals responsible for 
implementing that security policy should be held accountable, and that 
the administrator of the Nuclear Security Administration must take 
immediate action to improve our procedures concerning the safeguarding 
of nuclear weapons information.
  It is my sincere hope that Secretary Richardson and others with the 
responsibility for security matters within the Department will heed the 
words of this resolution and take prompt steps to ensure that we do not 
again suffer security breaches such as that involving the loss of hard 
drives at Los Alamos. Our Nation simply cannot afford lax security when 
it comes to our nuclear secrets.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H. Res. 534.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry), who is chairman of the Special 
Oversight Panel of the Department of Energy Reorganization.
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate my chairman yielding me 
this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I think it is perfectly appropriate for the House to 
express its concern over the recent incidents at Los Alamos. A number 
of people in the country perhaps have lost sight of the fact that 
nuclear weapons continue to constitute the central element of this 
country's security apparatus around which the rest of our defense 
efforts support, and to have an incident like this at Los Alamos I 
think is both shocking and frustrating for a number of Members. It is 
shocking because once we get into some of the details, there are 
several common sense sort of measures that are simply not employed; and 
the difficulty for us is how we legislate common sense into the day-to-
day activities of these facilities.
  But it has also been very frustrating, because this is not an 
isolated incident; this is simply the latest in a long series, a long 
string of incidents. Last year, as the chairman mentioned, Congress, to 
try to stop this long string, enacted reforms in the Department of 
Energy which have not been implemented to the letter and spirit of the 
law. So there is a great sense of frustration that we continue to have 
security lapses while we continue to do business as usual, which has 
not worked, for the past 20 years.
  Mr. Speaker, we have to break this stream. Recently, General John 
Gordon has been installed as the administrator of the Nuclear Security 
Administration and we need to support him to make sure that he can take 
the necessary action to break this string.
  Mr. Speaker, this resolution includes two important points. One is 
that we have to hold individuals accountable, and that is exactly the 
principle of the reforms we passed last year, to have a clear chain of 
command, more like a military-style chain of command, but also a system 
of accountability, so that if somebody messes up, we know who to hold 
responsible for those lapses.
  The second element here urges the administrator to take appropriate 
action quickly. It is appropriate for him to do so, and General Gordon 
is beginning to go around to all of the sites and try to get a clear 
picture of the strengths and weaknesses in our current nuclear weapons 
complex.
  However, Congress cannot legislate the details of every silly thing 
that may cause a security lapse. It is up to the administrator, General 
Gordon, supported by Congress and others within the administration, to 
change this culture which the chairman talked about, to make the 
institutional reforms. That is really the answer.
  So I support this resolution. I think it is an appropriate expression 
of the deep concern we have, but it also gets at the heart of what it 
is going to take to fix it.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Guam (Mr. Underwood).
  Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished ranking member 
for yielding me this time.
  I too today rise in support of House Resolution 534, which focuses 
attention on the recent nuclear weapons security failures at Los Alamos 
National Lab and calls for improvements of the current system, 
especially increased accountability by those in charge.
  However, while I am in strong support of the need to improve efforts 
to protect and preserve our national security, these efforts should not 
impinge on the civil rights for all Americans, especially those of 
Asian and Pacific Islander ancestry. The security procedures at the Los 
Alamos National Lab have had a significant impact on the Asian-American 
community. The case of Wen Ho Lee, a Chinese American scientist who was 
arrested last year for mishandling classified data at Los Alamos, 
clearly indicates the nature of these effects. The effects of Lee's 
case on other Asian-American scientists was immediate and of sufficient 
concern for the Department of Energy to take action to address charges 
of racial profiling and treatment of Asian-Pacific Americans in DOE 
national labs.
  In Sunday's New York Times, James Glanz reported several APA groups 
have called to boycott the labs and are urging Asian and Asian-American 
scientists not to seek employment there. I do not support this policy; 
but while I do not support it, it is important to note the impact of 
this case on the recruitment and retention of Asian-Pacific Americans 
in the labs. The number of Asian applicants decreased from an average 
of 28 in 1998 and 1999 to three in the first half of the year 2000. And 
with Sandia and Livermore laboratories included, the percentage of 
postdoctoral appointments of Asian Americans fell from 14 percent in 
1998 to half this year. These declines are disturbing, since Asian-
Americans are a huge source of talent and have contributed more in a 
disproportionate way to the security of this country, and they earn 
over a quarter of all Ph.D.s in science and technology at American 
universities each year.
  The charges of racial profiling and discriminatory investigation at 
hand illustrate just how much security procedures have had an effect on 
the Asian-Pacific American community. All employees should be held 
accountable, regardless of race or ethnicity, but no one should be held 
additionally responsible either. Let us make sure that our nuclear 
weapons security and any subsequent activities in the labs in the name 
of security remain the focus of this resolution. Let us make sure that 
political posturing or advantage does not intimidate this effort, and 
let us make sure that a commitment to justice and fairness for all 
citizens is not sacrificed in the pursuit of national security.
  Mr. Speaker, I include the following article for the Record:

                [From the New York Times, July 16, 2000]

         Amid Race Profiling Claims, Asian-Americans Avoid Labs

                            (By James Glanz)

       Asian and Asian-American scientists are staying away from 
     jobs at national weapons laboratories, particularly Los 
     Alamos, saying that researchers of Asian descent are 
     systematically harassed and denied advancement because of 
     their race.
       The issue has long simmered at the laboratories, but it 
     came to a boil last year with the arrest of Dr. Wen Ho Lee, 
     who is accused of mishandling nuclear secrets at Los Alamos. 
     Though officials vehemently deny it, many Asian-Americans 
     said Dr. Lee, a naturalized citizen born in Taiwan, was 
     singled out because of his ethnicity.
       In any event, Asians and Asian-Americans said, security 
     procedures implemented after Dr. Lee's arrest fall hardest on 
     them. Since the arrest, some scholarly groups have even 
     called for a boycott of the laboratories, urging Asian and 
     Asian-American scientists not to apply for jobs with them.
       Whether because of the calls for a boycott, the underlying 
     claims of discrimination, or both, all three national weapons 
     laboratories--Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore and Sandia--have 
     seen declines in Asian and Asian-American applicants for 
     postdoctoral positions, according to their own statistics. 
     Other Asian and Asian-American scientists have left 
     voluntarily.
       Los Alamos, for example, has seen the number of Asian 
     applicants (those granted formal reviews by committees) 
     dwindle to 3 in the first half of 2000 from an average of 28 
     in 1998 and 1999. The number accepting jobs at Los Alamos 
     fell from 18 in 1998 to 9 in 1999 to 3 in the first half of 
     2000.

[[Page H6075]]

       The combined acceptances of Asians and Asian-Americans at 
     Sandia and Livermore, which compile statistics by fiscal 
     years ending in late September, are similar to Los Alamos, 
     falling to 3 so far in 2000 from 21 in 1998. At Los Alamos, 
     the number of Asians applying for jobs declined in percentage 
     as well, to 4 percent of total applications from 12 percent 
     in 1998. Over all, postdoctoral appointments of Asian and 
     Asian-American fell to 7 percent from 14 percent when the 
     three laboratories, with their slightly different 
     recordkeeping, are combined.
       ``To me, this is an indicator that some of the best have 
     decided either not to apply, or even when they do apply, not 
     to come when they're offered a position,'' said Dr. John C. 
     Browne, director of Los Alamos.
       The decline is troubling for two reasons. First, Asians and 
     Asian-Americans represent a huge pool of talent--more than a 
     quarter of all Ph.D.'s awarded in science and technology at 
     American universities each year. Second, postdoctoral 
     appointments, which are generally filled by researchers who 
     have recently earned Ph.D.'s are an essential source of 
     candidates for permanent positions. The appointments 
     constitute ``the primary means of recruiting future 
     scientists and engineers for Los Alamos,'' said Jim 
     Danneskliold, a spokesman for the laboratory.
       In May, the National Science Foundation, a major source of 
     research money, reported that ``heightened security 
     concerns'' at the laboratories were hindering efforts to 
     recruit and retain Asian and Asian-American scientists.
       And last week, speaking before a panel of the House Armed 
     Services Committee on reorganizing the Energy Department, 
     Representative Ellen O. Tauscher, Democrat of California, 
     referred to suspicions of racial profiling at Livermore and 
     Sandia.
       Mrs. Tauscher said there was ``the sense that Asian-
     Americans are targeted or scapegoated as potentially coming 
     to work at the labs because they can spy,'' adding that the 
     problem ``has a deleterious effect on our ability to recruit 
     and retain.''
       Observers say they are not surprised by the comments.
       ``There's no question in my mind that the Asian-Americans 
     are conscientiously avoiding working in Los Alamos and the 
     other labs like the plague,'' said Prof. L. Ling-chi Wang, 
     chairman of the department of ethnic studies and director of 
     the Asian American studies program at the University of 
     California at Berkeley.
       Two organizations, the Asian Pacific Americans in Higher 
     Education and the Association for Asian American Studies, 
     have called for a boycott, urging Asian-Americans not to work 
     at the laboratories.
       Professor Wang, who helped organize the boycott calls, is 
     not alone in thinking that they have contributed to the 
     flight from the laboratories.
       Dr. Browne said that an ``overall black cloud'' caused by 
     the boycott was driving Asian and Asian-American scientists 
     away, but said that the did not believe racial profiling had 
     occurred at Los Alamos.
       Still, it is difficult to say whether anger over security 
     measures is the sole reason for the sharp drop in Asian and 
     Asian-American applicants, particularly with laboratory 
     budget cuts and a booming economy creating lucrative jobs in 
     private industry. But the impact is apparent.
       ``The labs are falling apart,'' said Dr. Jonathan Medalia, 
     a specialist in national defense at the Congressional 
     Research Service and the author of a study on the 
     laboratories, which he presented at a conference but has not 
     yet delivered to Congress.
       The loss of talent is most severe in computer science, Dr. 
     Medalia said, and if it continues, could threaten the 
     nation's ability to ensure the safety and reliability of its 
     nuclear weapons.
       He said that tightened security measures increased the 
     losses among all ethnic groups, but that the economy and 
     other effects contributed.
       Accusations of racism have also led to formal complaints.
       In December, nine Asian-American scientists and engineers 
     at Livermore filed a discrimination complaint with the State 
     of California that the California Department of Fair 
     Employment and Housing is investigating.
       The federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has 
     also begun an investigation, said officials at the laboratory 
     and a lawyer for the scientists.
       Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson, whose agency oversees 
     the laboratories, conceded that political pressures from 
     Congress had created ``an atmosphere of fear'' among foreign-
     born scientists.
       A year ago, Mr. Richardson named a committee to investigate 
     complaints of racial profiling, and he appointed Dr. Jeremy 
     Wu, a former official in the Agriculture Department's office 
     of civil rights, as the department's ombudsman to review 
     diversity issues and hear employee complaints. But the 
     problems are so ingrained, scientists said, that those 
     measures are not enough.
       ``For years, a lot of these things have festered, and it 
     was typical of the Asian way to say nothing,'' said Kalina 
     Wong, an American-born scientist of Chinese and Hawaiian 
     descent who tracks inventories of nuclear materials at 
     Livermore, and one of the employees who filed the complaint. 
     Now, Ms. Wong said, ``Pandora's Box is open.''
       Laboratory officials deny any systematic discrimination. If 
     anything, they said, administrators are eager to promote 
     members of ethnic groups.


              the complaints--a history of discrimination

       The new security directives do not explicitly mention 
     Asian-Americans or any other group; moreover, Mr. Richardson 
     accompanied the directives with a warning that they should 
     not be seen as an excuse to question the ``loyalty and 
     patriotism'' of Asian-Americans as a group.
       But the directives required scientists to report ``close 
     and continuing contact'' with nationals of sensitive 
     countries--a designation that overs Russia and most countries 
     in Asia, but few countries in Europe.
       ``If you have relatives in sensitive countries, you are 
     under the microscope,'' said Dr. Aaron Lai, a climate 
     researcher at Los Alamos and a naturalized citizen born in 
     Taiwan. ``Before the Wen Ho Lee case, the chance of getting 
     promoted was very low,'' Dr. Lai said. But with the new 
     rules, he said, ``it's getting worse.''
       Joel Wong, an engineer at Livermore, who is from Hong Kong 
     and is now an American citizen, said, ``They associate 
     foreign-born with being a threat.''
       The 19-member committee appointed by Mr. Richardson, issued 
     a report earlier this year, based on interviews with workers. 
     Its recommendations included appointing an ombudsman, as Mr. 
     Richardson has done, and compiling data on minority groups 
     across the department. Existing data are sketchy at best. The 
     report also described pervasive feelings of unease and fear.
       In October, the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus 
     heard from several scientists who said Asian-Americans faced 
     discrimination at the laboratories.
       Ms. Wong, the Livermore scientist, told the group of a 
     lagging salary, racially insensitive comments from officials, 
     her removal from sensitive projects and an unexplained 
     erosion of authority.
       ``The whole Chinese spy allegation has set us back 
     further,'' said Ms. Wong, whose family has been in the United 
     States for five generations and who has worked at Livermore 
     for more than two decades. ``It seems now that there is 
     license to do as was done to me because we Asians are 
     potential spies.''
       Livermore officials said racial bias has not played a role 
     in the treatment of scientists, either before or after the 
     Lee case.
       ``There is no underlying discrimination,'' a Livermore 
     spokeswoman, Susan Houghton, said. ``If anything, it's the 
     opposite. It is still very much a goal to increase minority 
     representation in management.''
       In an interview, Ms. Houghton and Tommy Smith, a mechanical 
     engineer who is the laboratory's director of affirmative 
     action and diversity, said Livermore had established goals 
     for increasing the numbers of Asians and other minorities in 
     management and held a one-day workshop for employees in 
     April. ``Obviously, we can always do a better job,'' Ms. 
     Houghton said.
       She also noted that the investigations into discrimination 
     claims were not proof of wrongdoing.
       Los Alamos has about 7,000 employees, including 3,500 
     scientists, said Mr. Danneskiold, the laboratory spokesman.
       Over all, Asians or Pacific Islanders make up 2.4 percent 
     of the staff and about 4 percent of the scientists, he said.
       But of 99 senior managers, only 1 is of Asian descent, Mr. 
     Danneskiold said. And of 322 leaders of technical groups, a 
     lower rung in management, only 3 are Asian-American.
       Similar if somewhat less pronounced disparities exist at 
     Livermore; at Sandia, the proportion of Asians in management 
     and the laboratory are nearly the same.
       Michael Trujillo, the equal employment opportunity officer 
     at Los Alamos, also rejected the idea that Asian-Americans' 
     relatively low representation in management was a result of 
     bias. But Mr. Trujillo said he could not offer an 
     explanation. ``I don't think that there's an easy answer on 
     that,'' he said.


         the rules--response that some called racial profiling

       The Energy Department ombudsman, Dr. Wu, said in an 
     interview that he believed new security rules had infringed 
     on ``individual rights and scientific freedom'' and added 
     that he hoped he could improve the situation.
       He has been on the job since January, but he began visiting 
     the laboratories last year and has already investigated 
     several bias complaints. In two cases, involving the loss of 
     a security clearance and the termination of a grant, rulings 
     against Asian and Asian-American scientists have been 
     overturned, he said.
       Edward J. Curran, who directs the Energy Department's 
     counterintelligence office, said a review almost two years 
     ago led to increased reporting requirements for many 
     employees and to polygraph testing of some scientists. He 
     said the rules were intended to make intelligence officials 
     aware of any unusual inquiries from foreign nationals and to 
     help catch any American scientists who were spying, whatever 
     their ethnicity.
       Among the directives are two that Mr. Richardson issued 
     last July in which scientists are required to report certain 
     ``close and continuing contact'' during unclassified visits 
     with people from countries deemed sensitive.
       Dr. Al West, a security director at Sandia, said that at 
     least one Asian-American scientist, whose fiancee was from 
     Hong Kong,

[[Page H6076]]

     left for a longstanding job offer in private industry 
     ``because they got tired of dealing with all the inquiries 
     into their personal affairs'' as a result of the new rule.
       And Dr. Shao-Ping Chen, a physicist at Los Alamos, 
     criticized a requirement to list all contacts and 
     relationships with people in sensitive countries.
       ``Where it should stop is not easy to tell,'' said Dr. 
     Chen, originally from Taiwan but now an American citizen. 
     ``If you have a big family, those people are large numbers.''
       Henry Tang, chairman of the Committee of 100, a group of 
     Chinese-Americans engaged in public policy issues, said that 
     in enforcing the new rules, security officials ``are no 
     different than a highway patrolman suspecting someone merely 
     by virtue of their physical characteristics.''
       Dr. Paul D. Moore, who was the F.B.I.'s chief of Chinese 
     counterintelligence analysis for more than 20 years and is 
     now at the Center for Counterintelligence and Security 
     Studies, a nongovernmental training center in Alexandria, 
     Va., said that belief was mistaken. But Dr. Moore said that 
     it had ultimately taken root because, in his view, the 
     Chinese government specifically courts ethnic Chinese in the 
     United States when looking for potential spies. As a result, 
     he said, counterintelligence agents focus on Chinese-
     Americans. ``It's unfair,'' he said, ``but what are you going 
     to do?''


             the boycott--a mixed reaction among scientists

       As racism accusations simmer, the moves that have sparked 
     the most discussion--and dissension--are the calls for a 
     boycott.
       Dr. Shujia Zhou, who left Los Alamos last year, said, ``The 
     Asian people feel hit hard.''
       Dr. Zhou published research in journals like Science and 
     Physical Review Letters but said he left the laboratory 
     because officials made continuing his work difficult, 
     revoking his computer access, for example, and because the 
     atmosphere had soured for Asians.
       He easily found another job, Dr. Browne, the Los Alamos 
     director, said that revoking computer privileges for some 
     Asian scientists was an ``unfortunate'' overreaction and that 
     fairer procedures had been put in place.
       The calls for a boycott have generated mixed reactions at 
     the laboratories. Dr. Manvendra K. Dubey, a Los Alamos 
     scientist and chairman of its Asian-American Working Group, 
     said he opposed a boycott ``because if we disappear from 
     within, we will have no voice.'' Some say the heightened 
     sensitivity to race may eventually help the laboratories.
       But for now, the security concerns about Asian countries, 
     the lack of data on where and how Asian-American scientists 
     work, and the near-absence of Asians in upper ranks are 
     hindering progress at the laboratories, many Asian-American 
     scientists say.
       Perhaps more pernicious, they add, is the idea, prevalent 
     among some Americans of European descent, that rational 
     scientists must be immune to ordinary racial bias. That 
     visceral difference in viewpoint may pose the most elusive 
     but enduring barrier to improvements, some Asian scientists 
     say.
       ``I think it's hard for a white person to appreciate the 
     bias,'' said Dr. Huan Lee, a Chinese-American scientist at 
     Los Alamos.

  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers at this time.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Frank).
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to be 
speaking right after the delegate from Guam, because I very much agree 
with the points he made.
  As I read the resolution, I do not disagree with much of what it 
says, but I am troubled by the climate that brought it forward and by 
the climate I think it will exacerbate.
  First, I believe there has been a substantial exaggeration of the 
threat to national security that has so far occurred from mistakes made 
at Los Alamos. I do not believe that we have any showing that America's 
security has been, in fact, jeopardized by the errors that have 
happened. I also think that we are likely to see our security 
jeopardized if we overreact in a way that drives first-rate scientists 
away from participating in the national security enterprise, and I fear 
we are coming close to that point.
  There is, after all, a tension between security and the kind of 
intellectual freedom and creativity that is necessary for science to 
flourish. Of course, we must not sacrifice security, but neither can we 
focus only on security and disregard the negative impact an excessively 
harsh and rigid regime can have on those scientists who especially 
today have many other choices. They do not have to come to work for the 
Federal Government. They do not have to come to work in these 
laboratories. If we make the mistake of treating them as perspective 
spies and criminals, we drive them away.
  I must say I am especially concerned about the anti-Asian-American 
impact of some of these efforts. I, like the gentleman from Guam, was 
disturbed to read in The New York Times, in effect, admissions by some 
of those concerned with security that there was, in fact, an anti-Asian 
bias. Indeed, I was interested to see when the Federal Government was 
forced to produce its potential list of countries with whom Wen Ho Lee 
may have dealt that it was clear that his own ethnicity was irrelevant 
to this. Even in the allegations, it was not a case of some idealogical 
or homeland betrayal; the allegation is that Dr. Lee was a man afraid 
of losing his job and he may have behaved improperly in pursuit of 
another job with a range of countries. I have no knowledge of these 
accusations, and I obviously should not and would not talk about them. 
But it is interesting to say that even in this most prominent case, no 
allegation that his ethnicity and his being of Chinese ancestry was at 
all relevant.
  Yes, it is important for us to preserve security. It is also 
important for us not to exaggerate and promote fear because there has 
not been any showing that our security has, in fact, been damaged; and 
it is especially important to avoid even the hint of prejudice against 
our Asian-American fellow citizens. We have had too many cases in 
American history in which Asian-Americans have been singled out and in 
every single one of them they have been shown to be unfair.
  So if this resolution goes forward, it in and of itself does no harm. 
But the climate that brought it forward and the climate it may produce 
must be resisted.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.

                              {time}  1545

  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Thornberry).
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Speaker, I just want to briefly comment on some 
of the things we have heard here on the floor.
  The first thing is, of course, there is nothing in this resolution 
which promotes or in any way encourages the sorts of concerns that both 
the gentlemen have talked about. Of course, none of us want to do that.
  In fact, Mr. Speaker, I fully agree and I think the committee and 
Congress fully agrees that we want to be very cautious about saying to 
any particular group ``We don't want you,'' because the fact is, we 
have to get and keep top quality people in our National Laboratories 
and plants. We can afford to do nothing to drive them away.
  But I think it is important to get back to the principles that are in 
this resolution, which include individual accountability. That is, if 
not a group but an individual makes a mistake or worse, then that 
individual will be held accountable for it.
  That is what our national security requires. It requires that we get 
and keep the best quality people, but once they are there and privy to 
some of the most sensitive information in the country, that we hold 
them accountable for how they treat that information. That is the 
principle I think that General Gordon will move ahead with as he tries 
to reach that difficult balance of doing the work in these facilities 
and also balancing the security, and bringing it all together to see 
that our security is not compromised.
  I think that there is a concern that all of us share. We want to get 
and keep the best quality people, but this resolution does not hinder 
that. In fact, I would argue that it helps it by moving towards and 
encouraging individual accountability.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. THORNBERRY. I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  I had not intended to participate in this discussion, but as a member 
of the Cox Select Committee, I do have to say that we developed 
extraordinary evidence in a unanimous report from that committee, a 
bipartisan committee, that indeed there were grave security losses from 
and inappropriate security procedures at the Los Alamos Lab.
  I would also like to mention that there was no specific reference to 
Mr. Lee made in that report. An investigation conducted by the Federal 
Bureau

[[Page H6077]]

of Investigation was the way that, I believe, there was the first time 
his identity was ever mentioned in the media or anyplace else. The Cox 
Committee made no recommendations.
  I do think the people who suggest in some fashion that Congress has 
been identifying particular ethnic group as responsible for espionage 
or as security risks, is inappropriate and inaccurate.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Miller of Florida). The question is on 
the motion offered by the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spence) 
that the House suspend the rules and agree to the resolution, H. Res. 
534.
  The question was taken.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the 
Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be 
postponed.

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