[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 91 (Friday, July 14, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6829-S6830]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
UNMANNED COMBAT VEHICLE INITIATIVE
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, since January, I have been working on an
initiative that deals with introducing new cutting-edge technology into
the combat arms of our Armed Services. The initiative is to have one-
third of our airborne deep strike aircraft remotely operated within 10
years, and one-third of our ground combat vehicles remotely operated
within 15 years.
I asked one of our ``Captains of Industry,'' Mr. Kent Kresa, the
Chief Executive Officer of Northrop Grumman, for his assessment of the
technical feasibility for such an undertaking. He expressed his
unqualified support for the initiative, saying that it was certainly
feasible from a technical viewpoint. His thoughts have been published
in the July 2000, issue of National Defense, the magazine of the
National Defense Industrial Association. I ask unanimous consent this
article be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From National Defense, July, 2000.]
For Unmanned Systems, the Time Has Come
(By Kent Kresa)
Today's technology gives us the ability to do things in
different ways. All we really need is determination. In
preparing for future conflicts, the area of unmanned systems
is one where institutional determination has not matched
technological reach. But that may be about to change.
Sen. John Warner, R-Va, chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, recently announced that he supports efforts to
make one-third of the U.S. operational deep strike aircraft
unmanned by 2010, and one-third of ground vehicles unmanned
by 2015.
Such a significant change in how the United States conducts
military operations would have a profound impact on future
national security efforts. Having spent many years of my
career in the defense industry working on unmanned systems, I
believe Warner's goals are reasonable aspirations. In my
view, such an acceleration reflects both a technological
possibility and an operational necessity. Certainly, there
are technological challenges to be overcome, but the greatest
obstacle may be our past experiences and concepts.
A senior defense official commented last year that, by the
year 2050, there will be no manned aircraft in the military
inventory. A growing number of senior officers see this
transition as inevitable. However, most do not see it as
imminent. The 50-year period suggested in that observation
approximates the chronological distance separating Kitty Hawk
from Sputnik.
Although there are certainly issues to be resolved,
particularly regarding command and control, we know
considerably more today about building and controlling
unmanned vehicles than the Wright Brothers did about
rocketry.
Certainly, there are those who harbor reservations about
unmanned systems. But I have been surprised at the growing
acceptance of these technologies across the Defense
Department. Field commanders, in particular, increasingly are
confident and comfortable about conducting unmanned strikes.
During Operation Desert Fox--the fourth-day campaign against
Iraq in December 1998--72 percent of the strikes were
conducted by unmanned cruise missiles. By comparison, during
the first four days of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, only 6
percent of the strikes were conducted with cruise missiles.
Although the scales of these two operations were
significantly different, this dramatic shift to unmanned
strike systems reflects a fundamental operational change.
As Gen. Michael Ryan, Air Force chief of staff, has
commented on several occasions, cruise missiles and other
standoff munitions are merely unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
on a ``one-way trip.'' Transitioning to UAVs that are re-
usable and capable of making numerous trips dropping less
costly precision munitions is within our near-term
technological ability.
Calculations suggest that in fewer than 10 missions,
unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs) dropping ordnance
similar to Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) become
considerably more cost-effective than cruise missiles.
Furthermore, these calculations do not consider additional
cost savings resulting from lower manning and routine
operational costs.
In the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
mission area, UAVs already are well accepted. The recent
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee by Gens.
Wesley Clark and Anthony Zinni, commanders-in-chief of two of
our more important regional commands, reflects this trend.
Both articulated the need for a larger number of UAVs for ISR
missions that ``are 24-hour-a-day capable and are adverse-
weather capable.''
In my view, this is a near-term possibility. Assets such as
the Global Hawk system provide such a capability. When teamed
with other key ISR assets, such as the joint surveillance
target attack radar system (JSTARS) and the airborne warning
and control system (AWACS), U.S. commanders will have a
formidable capability for seeing their operational area in
real-time, in all weather. Other assets--such as the Predator
UAV, the Army's new tactical UAV, and the Navy's vertical
take-off UAV--will offer high-fidelity battlefield
surveillance to tactical commanders.
organizational issues
There are numerous tactics, techniques, and procedures, as
well as organizational and operational issues to be resolved
on how all of these systems work together, and how they are-
controlled and integrated to form a common operational
picture. But the work currently under way by the Joint Forces
Command's experimentation program will highlight the major
issues and suggest reasonable solutions.
A study on unmanned systems conducted by the Government
Electronics and Information Technology Association (GEIA)
last fall concluded that in all areas--air, land and sea--
both institutional and technological barriers to the expanded
use of unmanned systems were dropping rapidly. The report
concluded that a heavy reliance on UAVs in both the ISR and
attack roles would happen sooner, rather than later. This
suggest that others in industry, as well as the government,
share this perspective.
Unmanned systems address two pressing problems. First, not
only will they be less expensive to build, but their
ownership costs will be lower. Since the aircraft fly
themselves, their ``mission managers'' can be trained on
simulators. The aircraft can be kept in storage until needed,
thus lowering operations and maintenance costs that currently
consume a high percentage of the defense budget.
Second, unmanned systems empower our troops, while lowering
the risks that they assume. In an age where manpower is
becoming more expensive, and sensitivity to casualties more
prominent, performing ``dirty and dangerous'' missions with
unmanned systems is likely to become an imperative. Moreover,
by removing the real constraints associated with having
humans on board, unmanned systems can provide greater range,
greater mission endurance, and great agility. Such systems
expand the options available to national and operational
leaders.
The issue of greater use of UAVs is less ``can we do it?''
than ``do we want to do it?'' In my view, the first question
is already answered: We can do it. The second question is a
function of institutional commitment and funding. Warner's
bold vision is certain to stimulate discussion that will
inevitably lead others to the conclusion that several
factors--strategic, operational, and fiscal--
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indicate that we must make this transformation. When that
question is resolved, those of us in the defense industry are
confident that we are prepared to do our part in making that
vision a reality.
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