[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 90 (Thursday, July 13, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6591-S6593]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001--Resumed
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the time has arrived
to proceed to the next order of business.
The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the next votes
in the series be limited to 10 minutes each.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. REID. The first vote will be 15 minutes and thereafter 10
minutes. We agree.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 2549) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2001 for military activities of the Department of
Defense, for military construction, and for defense
activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe
personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed
Forces, and for other purposes.
Pending:
Feingold pending amendment No. 3759, to terminate
production under the D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile
program.
Durbin Amendment No. 3732, to provide for operationally
realistic testing of National Missile Defense systems against
countermeasures; and to establish an independent panel to
review the testing.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, it is my understanding that under the
order we will now proceed to two votes. I recommend to the Senate that
we proceed to the Feingold vote first.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. WARNER. Second, to the vote on the amendment of the distinguished
Senator from Illinois.
At this time, I believe we have 2 minutes for those in opposition.
But in deference to the proponents, we are willing to hear from the
proponents first.
They are not going to use it.
Then I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished chairman of the
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, the Feingold amendment would undermine the
U.S. sea-based deterrent force by killing the Trident D-5 missile
program. Such a decision would cut the Navy's requirement short by 53
missiles resulting in the deployment of three fewer submarines that DOD
currently believes are required.
I move to table the amendment.
I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The question is on agreeing to the motion. The clerk will call the
roll.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Chair kindly tap the gavel a little
bit to clear the well?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senators will clear the well. The Senate will
be in order. The clerk will not proceed until Senators clear the well.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Maryland (Ms. Mikulski) is
necessarily absent.
The result was announced--yeas 81, nays 18, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 177 Leg.]
YEAS--81
Abraham
Akaka
Allard
Ashcroft
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Breaux
Brownback
Bryan
Bunning
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Chafee, L.
Cleland
Cochran
Collins
Conrad
Coverdell
Craig
Crapo
Daschle
DeWine
Dodd
Domenici
Edwards
Enzi
Feinstein
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gorton
Graham
Gramm
Grams
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Hollings
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Kennedy
Kerry
Kyl
Landrieu
Levin
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Moynihan
Murkowski
Nickles
Reed
Robb
Roberts
Roth
Santorum
Sarbanes
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Torricelli
Voinovich
Warner
NAYS--18
Boxer
Dorgan
Durbin
Feingold
Grassley
Harkin
Jeffords
Johnson
Kerrey
Kohl
Lautenberg
Leahy
Lincoln
Murray
Reid
Rockefeller
Wellstone
Wyden
NOT VOTING--1
Mikulski
The motion was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendment No. 3732
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, under the previous order, we will now
proceed to the amendment by the Senator from Illinois. At such time as
he concludes his portion of the 2 minutes, I yield my time to the
senior Senator from Mississippi, Mr. Cochran.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bunning). The Senator from Illinois. The
time is 2 minutes, equally divided.
The Senator from Illinois is recognized.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, can I have order in the Chamber?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will come to order.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, this amendment which we offer is one that
was debated last night on the floor of the Senate. It is very
straightforward. If we are to go forward with a national missile
defense system, we should have honest, realistic testing, including
testing for countermeasures so we can say to the American people: Your
money is being well spent; so we can say to them: If this is a source
of security and defense for America, it is one that will work and
function.
Some have looked at my amendment and said it must be critical of the
system because Durbin has questioned the system in the past. I
presented, during the course of the debate last night, a letter from
the Director of Testing and Evaluation in the Department of Defense,
Mr. Philip Coyle, in which he writes to me and says:
[[Page S6592]]
This letter is to support your effort to reinforce the need
for realistic testing of the National Missile Defense System.
It is very clear to the Pentagon, as it is to those who listened to
the debate last night, that this is not a friendly amendment nor an
amendment that sets out to end the national missile defense system.
This is an amendment which asks for the facts and asks for the reality.
I hope Senators will support it.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I come to the floor this morning to voice
my support for perhaps the most important amendment--on one of the most
important bills--the Senate will consider this year.
National missile defense is one of the most critical defense issue
facing this nation.
It is probably one of the more politically charged issues as well.
Despite political sensitivity and, frankly, political risk, Senator
Durbin has looked carefully at the facts, and at the arguments on all
sides of this issue. His amendment reflects a balanced measured
approach that I believe should be endorsed by both supporters and
opponents of a missile defense system.
The Senate should adopt the Durbin amendment for two reasons: What it
doesn't say. And what it does say.
What the amendment doesn't say is whether a missile defense system is
a good idea, or a bad idea.
Frankly, I believe we do not have enough information yet to make that
call. The Durbin amendment actually presumes a NMD system will be
deployed. But it does not address the issue of whether it should be
deployed.
What the Durbin amendment does say, it says well. Simply put, this
amendment says that before we commit $60 billion--or more--to deploy a
national missile defense system, we must be confident the system will
work. Nothing more, nothing less. Americans have a right to know that
their tax dollars aren't being wasted on a system that cannot work. And
we have a responsibility to provide them with that assurance.
The Durbin amendment says that before a national missile defense
system can be declared operational, the system must be tested against
measures our enemies can be expected to take to defeat it, and the
Secretary of Defense must prepare a report for Congress on the ability
of the NMD system to defeat these countermeasures.
The amendment also reconvenes the Welch panel, an independent review
panel chaired by General Welch, to assess countermeasure issues and
deliver a report on findings to both the Defense Department and the
Congress.
Why are such assurances needed?
Deployment of a national missile defense system would signal a
dramatic change in the deterrent strategy this Nation has followed
successfully for over 40 years. Moving to new strategy dependent on
defenses is not without risks.
Missle defense deployment requires enormous public commitment--not
unlike our effort to put a man on the Moon.
While success can never be guaranteed, American people have a right
to know that success is possible--before we commit $60 billion, or
more, to it.
The President must have confidence the system will work. Also,
critically important, our adversaries must know a national defense
system will work.
A deterrent is not effective if enemies can be confident it may not,
or will not, work. If tests demonstrate for the world that the United
States has a strong missile defense system, our adversaries are much
less likely to want to test our defenses.
Another reason assurances are needed: Increasing number of studies
that raise questions about whether current missile defense testing
program can provide future leaders with adequate level of confidence.
Philip Coyle III, the Pentagon's Director of Operational Testing and
Evaluation, issued a report to Congress earlier this year. The report
concluded the pre-deployment tests will not be conducted ``in a
realistic enough manner to support acquisition decisions.''
A recent report by MIT found that relatively simple countermeasures
could defeat the planned NMD system--and that current testing is not
capable of evaluating the operational effectiveness of the system
against likely countermeasures. This is a critical deficiency.
Technical experts warn that any emerging ``missile state'' that is
capable of deploying a long-range ballistic missile is also capable of
building countermeasures that could defeat a NMD system.
The intelligence community released a report last year on ``Foreign
Missile Development and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United
States through 2015.'' The report warned that emerging ``missile
states'' could develop countermeasures such as decoy balloons by the
time they flight test their first long-range missiles.
They could also acquire countermeasure technologies from Russia and
China--both of whom possess such technologies, and both of whom
strongly oppose a U.S. NMD system.
Reasons to oppose amendment? I can think of only one reason to oppose
this amendment: Belief that we should deploy an NMD system at any cost.
Regardless of whether the system can work. Regardless of the cost to
American taxpayers. Regardless of the effects deployment could have on
our relationships with our allies. Regardless of how it might escalate
an international nuclear arms race. Regardless of everything.
I understand that there are some who feel this way. Frankly, I cannot
understand this sort of thinking. They wouldn't buy a car before test-
driving it. Why in the world would they buy a $60 billion defense
system before knowing that it can work?
A missile defense system that undermines our Nation politically,
economically, and strategically--without strengthening our defense--is
no defense at all.
The American people have a right to know that--if we deploy a
national missile defense system--it will work. The Durban amendment
will take a big step toward providing them with that assurance. We
should adopt it.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, 50 Nobel laureates signed an open letter
to President Clinton on July 6, 2000, urging him to reject a proposed
$60 billion missile defense system. I ask that the letter may be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
July 6, 2000.
President William Jefferson Clinton,
The White House, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: We urge you not to make the decision to
deploy an anti-ballistic missile system during the remaining
months of your administration. The system would offer little
protection and would do grave harm to this nation's core
security interests.
We and other independent scientists have long argued that
anti-ballistic missile systems, particularly those attempting
to intercept reentry vehicles in space, will inevitably lose
in an arms race of improvements to offensive missiles.
North Korea has taken dramatic steps toward reconciliation
with South Korea. Other dangerous states will arise. But what
would such a state gain by attacking the United States except
its own destruction?
While the benefits of the proposed anti-ballistic missile
system are dubious, the dangers created by a decision to
deploy are clear. It would be difficult to persuade Russia or
China that the United States is wasting tens of billions of
dollars on an ineffective missile system against small states
that are unlikely to launch a missile attack on the U.S. The
Russians and Chinese must therefore conclude that the
presently planned system is a stage in developing a bigger
system directed against them. They may respond by restarting
an arms race in ballistic missiles and having missiles in a
dangerous ``launch-on-warning'' mode.
Even if the next planned test of the proposed anti-
ballistic missile system works as planned, any movement
toward deployment would be premature, wasteful and dangerous.
Respectfully,
Sidney Altman, Yale University, 1989 Nobel Prize in
chemistry.
Philip W. Anderson, Princeton University, 1977 Nobel Prize
in physics.
Kenneth J. Arrow, Stanford University, 1972 Nobel Prize in
economics.
Julia Axelrod, NIH, 1970 Nobel Prize in medicine.
Baruj Benacerraf, Dana Farber Cancer Inst., 1980 Nobel
Prize in medicine.
Hans A. Bethe, Cornell University, 1967 Nobel Prize in
physics.
J. Michael Bishop, University of Calif., San Francisco,
1989 Nobel Prize in medicine.
Nicolaas Bloembergen, Harvard University, 1981 Nobel Prize
in physics.
Paul D. Boyer, UCLA, 1997 Nobel Prize in chemistry.
Steven Chu, Stanford University, 1997 Nobel Prize in
physics.
Stanley Cohen, Vanderbilt University, 1986 Nobel Prize in
medicine.
Leon N. Cooper, Brown University, 1972 Nobel Prize in
physics.
[[Page S6593]]
E. J. Corey, Harvard University, 1990 Nobel Prize in
chemistry.
James W. Cronin, University of Chicago, 1980 Nobel Prize in
physics.
Renato Dulbecco, The Salk Institute, 1975 Nobel Prize in
medicine.
Edmond H. Fischer, Univ. of Washington, 1992 Nobel Prize in
medicine.
Val L. Fitch, Princeton University, 1980 Nobel Prize in
physics.
Robert F. Furchgott, Suny Health Science Ctr., 1998 Nobel
Prize in medicine.
Murray Gell-Mann, Santa Fe Institute, 1969 Nobel Prize in
physics.
Ivar Giaever, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1973 Nobel
Prize in physics.
Walter Gilbert, Biological Laboratories, Cambridge, Mass.,
1980 Nobel Prize in chemistry.
Sheldon L. Glashow, Boston University 1999 Nobel Prize in
physics.
Roger C. L. Guillemin, The Salk Institute, 1977 Nobel Prize
in medicine.
Herbert A. Hauptman, The Medical Foundation of Buffalo,
1985 Nobel Prize in chemistry.
Dudley R. Herschbach, Harvard University, 1986 Nobel Prize
in chemistry.
Roald Hoffman, Cornell University, 1981 Nobel Prize in
chemistry.
David H. Hubel, Harvard University, 1981 Nobel Prize in
medicine.
Jerome Karle, Naval Research Laboratory, 1985 Nobel Prize
in chemistry.
Arthur Kornberg, Stanford University, 1959 Nobel Prize in
medicine.
Edwin G. Krebs, University of Washington, 1992 Nobel Prize
in medicine.
Leon M. Lederman, Illinois Institute of Technology, 1988
Nobel Prize in physics.
Edward B. Lewis, Caltech, 1995 Nobel Prize in medicine.
Rudolph A. Marcus, Caltech, 1992 Nobel Prize in chemistry.
Franco Modigliani, MIT, Sloan School, 1985 Nobel Prize in
economics.
Mario Molina, MIT, 1995 Nobel Prize in chemistry.
Marshall Nirenberg, NIH, 1968 Nobel Prize in medicine.
Douglas D. Osheroff, Stanford University, 1996 Nobel Prize
in physics.
Arno A. Penzias, Bell Labs, 1978 Nobel Prize in physics.
Martin L. Perl, Stanford University, 1995 Nobel Prize in
physics.
Norman F. Ramsey, Harvard University, 1989 Nobel Prize in
physics.
Burton Richter, Stanford University, 1976 Nobel Prize in
physics.
Richard J. Roberts, New England Biolabs, 1993 Nobel Prize
in medicine.
Herbert A. Simon, Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 1978 Nobel Prize
in economics.
Richard R. Smalley, Rice University, 1996 Nobel Prize in
chemistry.
Jack Steinberger, CERN, 1988 Nobel Prize in physics.
James Tobin, Yale University, 1981 Nobel Prize in
economics.
Daniel C. Tsui, Princeton University, 1998 Nobel Prize in
physics.
Steven Weinberg, University of Texas, Austin, 1979 Nobel
Prize in physics.
Robert W. Wilson, Harvard-Smithsonian, Ctr. for
Astrophysics, 1978 Nobel Prize in physics.
Chen Ning Yang, Suny, Stony Brook, 1957 Nobel Prize in
physics.
Owen Chamberlain*, University of California, Berkeley, 1959
Nobel Prize in physics.
Johann Diesenhofer*, University of Texas Southwestern
Medical Center, 1988 Nobel Prize in chemistry.
Willis E. Lamb, Jr.*, Stanford University, 1955 Nobel Prize
in physics.
*These laureates signed the letter within hours after the
letter was delivered to the White House.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, the Durbin amendment is unnecessary. It
purports to direct the manner and details of a missile testing program
that the Secretary of Defense is committed to conduct already.
This amendment is an unprecedented effort by the Senate to
micromanage a weapons system testing program. In no other program has
the Senate tried to legislate in this way to dictate to DOD how a
classified national security testing program should be conducted.
The directions to DOD in this amendment are vague. They would
inevitably lead to confusion and unnecessary delays in the development
of this complex, but very important, capability to defend our Nation
against a serious threat. I urge the Senate to reject this amendment.
I move to table the amendment and ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The question is on agreeing to the motion. The clerk will call the
roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
The result was announced--yeas 52, nays 48, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 178 Leg.]
YEAS--52
Abraham
Allard
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Campbell
Chafee, L.
Cochran
Coverdell
Craig
Crapo
DeWine
Domenici
Enzi
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Kyl
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Roth
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Voinovich
Warner
NAYS--48
Akaka
Baucus
Bayh
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Byrd
Cleland
Collins
Conrad
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Feingold
Feinstein
Graham
Harkin
Hollings
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Mikulski
Moynihan
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Schumer
Snowe
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden
The motion was agreed to.
Mr. COCHRAN. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. S. 2549 is now considered read a third time.
The Senate will now proceed to H.R. 4205. The text of S. 2549 is
substituted therefore, and the bill is considered read a third time.
____________________