[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 90 (Thursday, July 13, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6591-S6593]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




    NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001--Resumed

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the time has arrived 
to proceed to the next order of business.
  The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the next votes 
in the series be limited to 10 minutes each.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. The first vote will be 15 minutes and thereafter 10 
minutes. We agree.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 2549) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 2001 for military activities of the Department of 
     Defense, for military construction, and for defense 
     activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
     personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed 
     Forces, and for other purposes.

  Pending:

       Feingold pending amendment No. 3759, to terminate 
     production under the D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile 
     program.
       Durbin Amendment No. 3732, to provide for operationally 
     realistic testing of National Missile Defense systems against 
     countermeasures; and to establish an independent panel to 
     review the testing.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, it is my understanding that under the 
order we will now proceed to two votes. I recommend to the Senate that 
we proceed to the Feingold vote first.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. Second, to the vote on the amendment of the distinguished 
Senator from Illinois.
  At this time, I believe we have 2 minutes for those in opposition. 
But in deference to the proponents, we are willing to hear from the 
proponents first.
  They are not going to use it.
  Then I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, the Feingold amendment would undermine the 
U.S. sea-based deterrent force by killing the Trident D-5 missile 
program. Such a decision would cut the Navy's requirement short by 53 
missiles resulting in the deployment of three fewer submarines that DOD 
currently believes are required.
  I move to table the amendment.
  I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The question is on agreeing to the motion. The clerk will call the 
roll.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Chair kindly tap the gavel a little 
bit to clear the well?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senators will clear the well. The Senate will 
be in order. The clerk will not proceed until Senators clear the well.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Maryland (Ms. Mikulski) is 
necessarily absent.
  The result was announced--yeas 81, nays 18, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 177 Leg.]

                                YEAS--81

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bryan
     Bunning
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee, L.
     Cleland
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     Crapo
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Edwards
     Enzi
     Feinstein
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Reed
     Robb
     Roberts
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Torricelli
     Voinovich
     Warner

                                NAYS--18

     Boxer
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Grassley
     Harkin
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kerrey
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Lincoln
     Murray
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Mikulski
       
  The motion was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 3732

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, under the previous order, we will now 
proceed to the amendment by the Senator from Illinois. At such time as 
he concludes his portion of the 2 minutes, I yield my time to the 
senior Senator from Mississippi, Mr. Cochran.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bunning). The Senator from Illinois. The 
time is 2 minutes, equally divided.
  The Senator from Illinois is recognized.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, can I have order in the Chamber?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will come to order.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, this amendment which we offer is one that 
was debated last night on the floor of the Senate. It is very 
straightforward. If we are to go forward with a national missile 
defense system, we should have honest, realistic testing, including 
testing for countermeasures so we can say to the American people: Your 
money is being well spent; so we can say to them: If this is a source 
of security and defense for America, it is one that will work and 
function.
  Some have looked at my amendment and said it must be critical of the 
system because Durbin has questioned the system in the past. I 
presented, during the course of the debate last night, a letter from 
the Director of Testing and Evaluation in the Department of Defense, 
Mr. Philip Coyle, in which he writes to me and says:


[[Page S6592]]


       This letter is to support your effort to reinforce the need 
     for realistic testing of the National Missile Defense System.

  It is very clear to the Pentagon, as it is to those who listened to 
the debate last night, that this is not a friendly amendment nor an 
amendment that sets out to end the national missile defense system. 
This is an amendment which asks for the facts and asks for the reality. 
I hope Senators will support it.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I come to the floor this morning to voice 
my support for perhaps the most important amendment--on one of the most 
important bills--the Senate will consider this year.
  National missile defense is one of the most critical defense issue 
facing this nation.
  It is probably one of the more politically charged issues as well.
  Despite political sensitivity and, frankly, political risk, Senator 
Durbin has looked carefully at the facts, and at the arguments on all 
sides of this issue. His amendment reflects a balanced measured 
approach that I believe should be endorsed by both supporters and 
opponents of a missile defense system.
  The Senate should adopt the Durbin amendment for two reasons: What it 
doesn't say. And what it does say.
  What the amendment doesn't say is whether a missile defense system is 
a good idea, or a bad idea.
  Frankly, I believe we do not have enough information yet to make that 
call. The Durbin amendment actually presumes a NMD system will be 
deployed. But it does not address the issue of whether it should be 
deployed.
  What the Durbin amendment does say, it says well. Simply put, this 
amendment says that before we commit $60 billion--or more--to deploy a 
national missile defense system, we must be confident the system will 
work. Nothing more, nothing less. Americans have a right to know that 
their tax dollars aren't being wasted on a system that cannot work. And 
we have a responsibility to provide them with that assurance.
  The Durbin amendment says that before a national missile defense 
system can be declared operational, the system must be tested against 
measures our enemies can be expected to take to defeat it, and the 
Secretary of Defense must prepare a report for Congress on the ability 
of the NMD system to defeat these countermeasures.
  The amendment also reconvenes the Welch panel, an independent review 
panel chaired by General Welch, to assess countermeasure issues and 
deliver a report on findings to both the Defense Department and the 
Congress.
  Why are such assurances needed?
  Deployment of a national missile defense system would signal a 
dramatic change in the deterrent strategy this Nation has followed 
successfully for over 40 years. Moving to new strategy dependent on 
defenses is not without risks.
  Missle defense deployment requires enormous public commitment--not 
unlike our effort to put a man on the Moon.
  While success can never be guaranteed, American people have a right 
to know that success is possible--before we commit $60 billion, or 
more, to it.
  The President must have confidence the system will work. Also, 
critically important, our adversaries must know a national defense 
system will work.
  A deterrent is not effective if enemies can be confident it may not, 
or will not, work. If tests demonstrate for the world that the United 
States has a strong missile defense system, our adversaries are much 
less likely to want to test our defenses.
  Another reason assurances are needed: Increasing number of studies 
that raise questions about whether current missile defense testing 
program can provide future leaders with adequate level of confidence.
  Philip Coyle III, the Pentagon's Director of Operational Testing and 
Evaluation, issued a report to Congress earlier this year. The report 
concluded the pre-deployment tests will not be conducted ``in a 
realistic enough manner to support acquisition decisions.''
  A recent report by MIT found that relatively simple countermeasures 
could defeat the planned NMD system--and that current testing is not 
capable of evaluating the operational effectiveness of the system 
against likely countermeasures. This is a critical deficiency.
  Technical experts warn that any emerging ``missile state'' that is 
capable of deploying a long-range ballistic missile is also capable of 
building countermeasures that could defeat a NMD system.
  The intelligence community released a report last year on ``Foreign 
Missile Development and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United 
States through 2015.'' The report warned that emerging ``missile 
states'' could develop countermeasures such as decoy balloons by the 
time they flight test their first long-range missiles.
  They could also acquire countermeasure technologies from Russia and 
China--both of whom possess such technologies, and both of whom 
strongly oppose a U.S. NMD system.
  Reasons to oppose amendment? I can think of only one reason to oppose 
this amendment: Belief that we should deploy an NMD system at any cost. 
Regardless of whether the system can work. Regardless of the cost to 
American taxpayers. Regardless of the effects deployment could have on 
our relationships with our allies. Regardless of how it might escalate 
an international nuclear arms race. Regardless of everything.
  I understand that there are some who feel this way. Frankly, I cannot 
understand this sort of thinking. They wouldn't buy a car before test-
driving it. Why in the world would they buy a $60 billion defense 
system before knowing that it can work?
  A missile defense system that undermines our Nation politically, 
economically, and strategically--without strengthening our defense--is 
no defense at all.
  The American people have a right to know that--if we deploy a 
national missile defense system--it will work. The Durban amendment 
will take a big step toward providing them with that assurance. We 
should adopt it.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, 50 Nobel laureates signed an open letter 
to President Clinton on July 6, 2000, urging him to reject a proposed 
$60 billion missile defense system. I ask that the letter may be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                                     July 6, 2000.
     President William Jefferson Clinton,
     The White House, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: We urge you not to make the decision to 
     deploy an anti-ballistic missile system during the remaining 
     months of your administration. The system would offer little 
     protection and would do grave harm to this nation's core 
     security interests.
       We and other independent scientists have long argued that 
     anti-ballistic missile systems, particularly those attempting 
     to intercept reentry vehicles in space, will inevitably lose 
     in an arms race of improvements to offensive missiles.
       North Korea has taken dramatic steps toward reconciliation 
     with South Korea. Other dangerous states will arise. But what 
     would such a state gain by attacking the United States except 
     its own destruction?
       While the benefits of the proposed anti-ballistic missile 
     system are dubious, the dangers created by a decision to 
     deploy are clear. It would be difficult to persuade Russia or 
     China that the United States is wasting tens of billions of 
     dollars on an ineffective missile system against small states 
     that are unlikely to launch a missile attack on the U.S. The 
     Russians and Chinese must therefore conclude that the 
     presently planned system is a stage in developing a bigger 
     system directed against them. They may respond by restarting 
     an arms race in ballistic missiles and having missiles in a 
     dangerous ``launch-on-warning'' mode.
       Even if the next planned test of the proposed anti-
     ballistic missile system works as planned, any movement 
     toward deployment would be premature, wasteful and dangerous.
       Respectfully,
       Sidney Altman, Yale University, 1989 Nobel Prize in 
     chemistry.
       Philip W. Anderson, Princeton University, 1977 Nobel Prize 
     in physics.
       Kenneth J. Arrow, Stanford University, 1972 Nobel Prize in 
     economics.
       Julia Axelrod, NIH, 1970 Nobel Prize in medicine.
       Baruj Benacerraf, Dana Farber Cancer Inst., 1980 Nobel 
     Prize in medicine.
       Hans A. Bethe, Cornell University, 1967 Nobel Prize in 
     physics.
       J. Michael Bishop, University of Calif., San Francisco, 
     1989 Nobel Prize in medicine.
       Nicolaas Bloembergen, Harvard University, 1981 Nobel Prize 
     in physics.
       Paul D. Boyer, UCLA, 1997 Nobel Prize in chemistry.
       Steven Chu, Stanford University, 1997 Nobel Prize in 
     physics.
       Stanley Cohen, Vanderbilt University, 1986 Nobel Prize in 
     medicine.
       Leon N. Cooper, Brown University, 1972 Nobel Prize in 
     physics.

[[Page S6593]]

       E. J. Corey, Harvard University, 1990 Nobel Prize in 
     chemistry.
       James W. Cronin, University of Chicago, 1980 Nobel Prize in 
     physics.
       Renato Dulbecco, The Salk Institute, 1975 Nobel Prize in 
     medicine.
       Edmond H. Fischer, Univ. of Washington, 1992 Nobel Prize in 
     medicine.
       Val L. Fitch, Princeton University, 1980 Nobel Prize in 
     physics.
       Robert F. Furchgott, Suny Health Science Ctr., 1998 Nobel 
     Prize in medicine.
       Murray Gell-Mann, Santa Fe Institute, 1969 Nobel Prize in 
     physics.
       Ivar Giaever, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1973 Nobel 
     Prize in physics.
       Walter Gilbert, Biological Laboratories, Cambridge, Mass., 
     1980 Nobel Prize in chemistry.
       Sheldon L. Glashow, Boston University 1999 Nobel Prize in 
     physics.
       Roger C. L. Guillemin, The Salk Institute, 1977 Nobel Prize 
     in medicine.
       Herbert A. Hauptman, The Medical Foundation of Buffalo, 
     1985 Nobel Prize in chemistry.
       Dudley R. Herschbach, Harvard University, 1986 Nobel Prize 
     in chemistry.
       Roald Hoffman, Cornell University, 1981 Nobel Prize in 
     chemistry.
       David H. Hubel, Harvard University, 1981 Nobel Prize in 
     medicine.
       Jerome Karle, Naval Research Laboratory, 1985 Nobel Prize 
     in chemistry.
       Arthur Kornberg, Stanford University, 1959 Nobel Prize in 
     medicine.
       Edwin G. Krebs, University of Washington, 1992 Nobel Prize 
     in medicine.
       Leon M. Lederman, Illinois Institute of Technology, 1988 
     Nobel Prize in physics.
       Edward B. Lewis, Caltech, 1995 Nobel Prize in medicine.
       Rudolph A. Marcus, Caltech, 1992 Nobel Prize in chemistry.
       Franco Modigliani, MIT, Sloan School, 1985 Nobel Prize in 
     economics.
       Mario Molina, MIT, 1995 Nobel Prize in chemistry.
       Marshall Nirenberg, NIH, 1968 Nobel Prize in medicine.
       Douglas D. Osheroff, Stanford University, 1996 Nobel Prize 
     in physics.
       Arno A. Penzias, Bell Labs, 1978 Nobel Prize in physics.
       Martin L. Perl, Stanford University, 1995 Nobel Prize in 
     physics.
       Norman F. Ramsey, Harvard University, 1989 Nobel Prize in 
     physics.
       Burton Richter, Stanford University, 1976 Nobel Prize in 
     physics.
       Richard J. Roberts, New England Biolabs, 1993 Nobel Prize 
     in medicine.
       Herbert A. Simon, Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 1978 Nobel Prize 
     in economics.
       Richard R. Smalley, Rice University, 1996 Nobel Prize in 
     chemistry.
       Jack Steinberger, CERN, 1988 Nobel Prize in physics.
       James Tobin, Yale University, 1981 Nobel Prize in 
     economics.
       Daniel C. Tsui, Princeton University, 1998 Nobel Prize in 
     physics.
       Steven Weinberg, University of Texas, Austin, 1979 Nobel 
     Prize in physics.
       Robert W. Wilson, Harvard-Smithsonian, Ctr. for 
     Astrophysics, 1978 Nobel Prize in physics.
       Chen Ning Yang, Suny, Stony Brook, 1957 Nobel Prize in 
     physics.
       Owen Chamberlain*, University of California, Berkeley, 1959 
     Nobel Prize in physics.
       Johann Diesenhofer*, University of Texas Southwestern 
     Medical Center, 1988 Nobel Prize in chemistry.
       Willis E. Lamb, Jr.*, Stanford University, 1955 Nobel Prize 
     in physics.
       *These laureates signed the letter within hours after the 
     letter was delivered to the White House.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, the Durbin amendment is unnecessary. It 
purports to direct the manner and details of a missile testing program 
that the Secretary of Defense is committed to conduct already.
  This amendment is an unprecedented effort by the Senate to 
micromanage a weapons system testing program. In no other program has 
the Senate tried to legislate in this way to dictate to DOD how a 
classified national security testing program should be conducted.
  The directions to DOD in this amendment are vague. They would 
inevitably lead to confusion and unnecessary delays in the development 
of this complex, but very important, capability to defend our Nation 
against a serious threat. I urge the Senate to reject this amendment.
  I move to table the amendment and ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The question is on agreeing to the motion. The clerk will call the 
roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  The result was announced--yeas 52, nays 48, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 178 Leg.]

                                YEAS--52

     Abraham
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Campbell
     Chafee, L.
     Cochran
     Coverdell
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeWine
     Domenici
     Enzi
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Kyl
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Roberts
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Voinovich
     Warner

                                NAYS--48

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Byrd
     Cleland
     Collins
     Conrad
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Graham
     Harkin
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Mikulski
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Snowe
     Torricelli
     Wellstone
     Wyden
  The motion was agreed to.
  Mr. COCHRAN. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. S. 2549 is now considered read a third time.
  The Senate will now proceed to H.R. 4205. The text of S. 2549 is 
substituted therefore, and the bill is considered read a third time.

                          ____________________