[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 89 (Wednesday, July 12, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6538-S6567]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001--Continued
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the Defense
authorization bill.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 2549) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2001 for military activities of the Department of
Defense, for military construction, and for defense
activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe
personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed
Forces, and for other purposes.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have in mind, and I think other Members
do at this juncture, operating under the unanimous consent agreement
reached last night. I amend that unanimous consent to the extent that
the senior Senator from West Virginia very graciously is willing to
withhold the presentation of his amendment until such time that the
distinguished Senator from Massachusetts and the Senator from Alaska
bring up their amendments, which is sequenced, and they indicate to
this manager that it will not take more than 10 or 12 minutes.
Therefore, I ask that.
I further request, following the disposition of the Byrd amendment,
Mr. Feingold be recognized; following the completion of his amendment,
the Senator from Illinois, Mr. Durbin, be recognized.
Mr. LEVIN. I understand the Senator from Wisconsin is willing to have
30 minutes equally divided instead of 40 minutes on his amendment. I
ask that the unanimous consent agreement be so modified.
Mr. WARNER. I have no objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Alaska.
Amendment No. 3815
(Purpose: To provide that the limitation on payment of fines and
penalties for environmental compliance violations applies only to fines
and penalties imposed by Federal agencies)
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the Senator from Massachusetts had an
amendment pending concerning section 342 of this bill. We have
discussed this. That was an amendment that would change the existing
text that came from an amendment I suggested. I will offer an amendment
to strike the existing section 342 and insert language we agreed upon.
I do believe the Senator from Massachusetts wants to be heard on this.
I want a word after his comments.
Mr. KERRY. I suggest the Senator from Alaska go first, since he wants
to frame the change, and I will be happy to respond.
Mr. STEVENS. The Senator is very gracious. I have become increasingly
concerned about the fines that EPA has been assessing against military
reservations or elements of the Department of Defense, and had
requested this provision in the bill to curtail that activity. In fact,
it would have originally applied to similar fines from State and local
agencies also.
We have now agreed on a version of this section 342 that will limit
the fines that can be assessed against military entities by the EPA to
$1.5 million unless the amount in excess of that is approved by
Congress. It will be a provision, if accepted, which will be in effect
for 3 years. My feeling is that there are many things that go into the
operation of the Department of Defense that are subject to review by
EPA, and it is my opinion that they have been excessive in terms of
applying fines against the military departments. I do believe it
results in an alteration of the lands we have for particular
installations and it reduces the amount of money available
[[Page S6539]]
to operate those installations when they face these fines.
This amendment does not prohibit the fines. It only says they cannot
assess any and have them paid to the EPA in excess of $1.5 million
unless that fine is approved by an act of Congress.
I thank the Senator for working this out.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank my good friend from Alaska for his
efforts to try to reach an accommodation. I listened carefully to the
arguments of the Senator from Alaska who made it clear that he had a
very strong belief that certain facilities in the State of Alaska had
been treated in a way that he believed very deeply was inappropriate
and resulted in fines that were excessive and, in his judgment, wrought
with some bureaucratic issues that he had no recourse to resolve.
The initial section in the bill reported by the committee would
regrettably have prohibited the EPA entirely from being able to
enforce. A number of Members felt very strongly that was an
overreaction in how we cure the problem that the Senator from Alaska
was bringing to our attention without destroying the ability of the EPA
to be able to enforce across the country.
So we reached an agreement where 98 percent of all those enforcement
actions in the country which are under $1.5 million, the EPA will
continue to be able to enforce as it currently does. It is appropriate
for this 3-year period only to review what the impact may be of some
larger level over that period of time.
To have proceeded down the road we were going to proceed, in my and
other people's judgment, would have created a terrible double standard.
Under current law, a DOD facility that violates the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act or the Safe Drinking Water Act or the
Toxic Substances Control Act or the Clean Air Act is subject to the
same kinds of penalties as a private facility. By waiving sovereign
immunity and subjecting Federal facilities to fines, we created the
financial hammer to be able to force a sometimes reluctant Government
and a Government bureaucracy to comply.
Congress recognized this principle in 1992 when we passed the law.
The bill was sponsored by majority leader Mitchell. He said at the time
that a waiver of sovereign immunity would move us from the disorder of
Federal noncompliance to a forum in which all entities were subject to
the same law and to full enforcement action. I am pleased to say it
passed the Senate by a vote of 94-3, and it passed the House by a vote
of 403-3. It was signed into law by President Bush, who at the time
said it would bring all Federal facilities into compliance with
applicable Federal and State hazardous waste laws.
I think that very much is our purpose today--to protect our capacity
to be able to secure that kind of enforcement. I thank the Senator from
Alaska for his very reasonable approach to this. I think we have been
able to resolve the most egregious situations about which he has
expressed appropriate concern, but at the same time we have been able
to preserve the principle of Federal compliance and the principle of
all people being treated equally.
I thank the Chair and I thank the distinguished Senator from West
Virginia for his courtesy in allowing us to deal with this issue.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from West Virginia
for his courtesy and the Senator from Massachusetts. I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment I have at the desk be accepted in lieu of
the amendment offered by the Senator from Massachusetts, Senator Kerry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. STEVENS. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Alaska [Mr. Stevens] proposes an amendment
numbered 3815.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
Section 342 is amended by striking the provisions therein
and inserting:
SEC. 342. PAYMENT OF FINES AND PENALTIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPLIANCE VIOLATIONS.
(a) Payment of Fines and Penalties.--(1) Chapter 160 of
title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end
the following new section:
``Sec. 2710. Environmental compliance: payment of fines and
penalties for violations
``(a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense or the
Secretary of a military department may not pay a fine or
penalty for an environmental compliance violation that is
imposed by a Federal agency against the Department of Defense
or such military department, as the case may be, unless the
payment of the fine or penalty is specifically authorized by
law, if the amount of the fine or penalty (including any
supplemental environmental projects carried out as part of
such penalty) is $1,500,000 or more.
``(b) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term
`environmental compliance', in the case of on-going
operations, functions, or activities at a Department of
Defense facility, means the activities necessary to ensure
that such operations, functions, or activities meet
requirements under applicable environmental law.
``(B) The term does not include operations, functions, or
activities relating to environmental restoration under this
chapter that are conducted using funds in an environmental
restoration account under section 2703(a) of this title.
``(2) The term `violation', in the case of environmental
compliance, means an act or omission resulting in the failure
to ensure the compliance.
``(c) Expiration of Prohibition.--This section does not
apply to any part of a violation described in subsection (a)
that occurs on or after the date that is three years after
the date of the enactment of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001.''.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter
is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
``2710. Environmental compliance: payment of fines and penalties for
violations.''.
(b) Applicability.--(1) Section 2710 of title 10, United
States Code (as added by subsection (a)), shall take effect
on the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) Subsection (a)(1) of that section, as so added, shall
not apply with respect to any supplemental environmental
projects referred to in that subsection that were agreed to
before the date of the enactment of this Act.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, regarding the Fort Wainwright central
heat and powerplant, on March 5, 1999, the EPA Region 10 issued a
notice of violation against the U.S. Army Alaska claiming they had
violated the Clean Air Act with their central heat and powerplant.
After several meetings between regulators and Army officials, the EPA
sent them a settlement offer proposing that the Army pay a $16 million
penalty to resolve the alleged clean air violations.
In the offer, the EPA advised the Army that it would file a formal
complaint if the Army failed to make a good-faith counteroffer within
one month. The EPA also indicated that the size of fine sought will
likely increase if a complaint was filed.
This $16 million penalty is the largest single fine ever sought from
the Department of the Army or against any installation within the
Department of Defense. It also exceeds the combined total of all other
fines previously sought from the Army.
While U.S. Army Alaska had been aware for some time that the 50-year
old central heat and powerplant required numerous upgrades, significant
progress had been made toward bringing the plant into compliance.
The Army also had been working closely with the Alaska Department of
Environmental Conservation--which had been delegated Clean Air Act
enforcement authority from the EPA--regarding the timetable for
compliance.
That same year, in fiscal year 1999, the Army sought and received
authorization and appropriations from the Congress to build a $16
million baghouse to control emissions from the plant.
In addition, an additional $22 million had been budgeted for fiscal
year 2000 for plant upgrades.
The Army and the Department of Defense were surprised by the basis
for the proposed penalty.
In EPA's settlement letter, EPA stated that it was seeking to recover
the ``economic benefit'' the Army received by not constructing the
baghouse sooner.
Over $15.8 million of the proposed fine, roughly 98 percent, is
directly tied to the ``saved'' cost that U.S. Army Alaska purportedly
enjoyed.
[[Page S6540]]
This is also the first time the EPA proposed a fine whose economic
benefit components dwarf the assessed penalty based on the seriousness
of the alleged violations.
Regarding the EPA visit to Shemya Air Force Base, the Air Force had a
50-year problem of waste and drum accumulation at Shemya Island--
complicated by the large quantity generator status at Shemya AFB. This
status required processing of accumulated hazardous wastes from the
island within 90 days of generation. To meet the 90-day requirement,
airlift had to be used as the primary method of disposal of the
accumulated hazardous wastes. Also, the airlift crews had to have
special qualifications to handle and process hazardous wastes.
From 1989 through 1991, 13,781 gallons of hazardous waste were
shipped off Shemya Island. Following the 1991 Gulf War, airlift outside
of the Middle East was impossible to get.
Complicating matters, Elmendorf AFB in Alaska could not handle the
amounts of hazardous waste being returned from remote Alaskan defense
sites. Movement of hazardous waste from remote sites came to a
standstill due to strained airlift requirements and limited hazardous
waste storage and processing capabilities.
In January of 1993, the Air Force started airlifting and removing 100
waste drums every week vice 100 per month.
Two months later, in March, the EPA gave the Air Force a 10-day
notice of inspection. During the inspection, the Air Force had 660
barrels on the Shemya airfield processed awaiting air transportation.
During the out-briefing with senior Air Force personnel, the
inspectors commented that the Air Force was making good progress in
reducing the backlog of waste drums.
A long period of time ensued between the inspection and the publicly
announced result and proposed fine by EPA.
EPA assessed the Air Force a fine of $483,000--this was the largest
environmental noncompliance fine levied against the Air Force at that
point in time.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, tonight, Senator Stevens offered an
amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2001 to amend Section 342. The amendment reflects a compromise reached
between Senator Stevens, Baucus, Lautenberg and myself. I want to thank
Senator Stevens for working with us to address grave concerns we had
with Section 342 of the bill.
Mr. President, I would like to make a few comments about Section 342
and discuss why I had such great concerns over the impact it would have
had on environmental compliance. Section 342, as it was passed out of
the Armed Services Committee, would have weakened a fundamental
environmental principle that protects the environment and public health
in communities across the nation. It is the principle that national
environmental laws should apply to the federal government in the same
manner as they apply to state and local governments and to private
facilities, including companies, universities, hospitals, and nonprofit
entities.
Section 342 would have created a double standard by subjecting
corporations, state and local facilities to one legal standard and
Department of Defense facilities to a second, weaker standard. More
importantly, it had the great potential to undermine compliance with
national environmental and public health protections at military
facilities across the nation--putting the environment and citizens at
risk.
Specifically, the provision amended existing law to require
Congressional authorization before the DOD pays environmental and
public health penalties assessed by state and federal authorities in
excess of $1.5 million or based on ``economic benefit'' or ``size-of-
business'' criteria. As a result, it provided DOD a congressional
reprieve not provided to any other entity.
It created a double standard. Under current law, a DOD facility that
violates the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Safe Drinking
Water Act, Toxic Substances Control Act, or the Clean Air Act is
subject to the same kind of penalties as a private facility. By waiving
sovereign immunity--and subjecting federal facilities to fines--we
create the financial hammer that forces sometimes reluctant government
bureaucracies to comply. And we apply the law equally to all.
Congress recognized this principle in 1992 with the enactment of the
Federal Facilities Compliance Act, which waived sovereign immunity
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. The bill was
sponsored by Majority Leader George Mitchell, who said in floor debate
that, ``A waiver of sovereign immunity moves us from the disorder of
Federal noncompliance to a forum in which all entities are subject to
the same law and to full enforcement action.'' He added that: ``The
principle [of waving sovereign immunity] is important because, without
it, there is only voluntary compliance. History demonstrates that
voluntary compliance does not work.''
The Federal Facilities Compliance Act had 33 cosponsors in the
Senate--myself included. It was a bipartisan effort that passed the
Senate with a vote of 94-3 and the House by a vote of 403-3. It was
signed into law by President George Bush, who said that, ``The
objective of the bill is to bring all Federal facilities into
compliance with applicable Federal and State hazardous waste laws, to
waive Federal Sovereign immunity under those laws, and to allow the
imposition of fines and penalties.'' He added, ``Four years ago I
promised the American people that I would make the federal government
live up to the same environmental standards that apply to private
citizens. By signing this bill, we take another step toward fulfillment
of that promise.''
It was an important step for the states coping with federal agencies
that were immune to enforcement and that refused to comply. The
California Secretary of Environmental Protection, James M. Strock, said
that in passing the Act, Congress took ``an important step in restoring
the link between environmental responsibility and remediation of
environmental damage at federal facilities.'' He continued, ``The Act
provides an essential tool to states and localities which seek
compliance with hazardous waste laws.''
The National Association of Attorneys General applauded the passage
of the Act. Their statement read that, ``The [legislation] has been
among the Association's highest priorities on Capitol Hill for the past
five years. . . . [The] Attorneys General have repeatedly called upon
Congress to clarify the waiver of federal sovereign immunity, which has
thus far prevented the states from ensuring compliance at contaminated
facilities through assessment of fines and penalties.''
I feel that Section 342 would have rolled back the progress we've
made with the Federal Facilities Compliance Act and other laws. It
would have been a mistake. We should allow our law enforcement agencies
to do their job. Section 342 of the DOD bill was opposed by the
National Governors' Association, the National Association of Attorneys
General, and the National Conference of State Legislatures. In a joint
letter they write that, ``States report that the federal government is
the nation's largest polluter and military installations are a major
contributor to that pollution. Section 342 is a step backward from the
progress we have made in changing the attitude of military
installations toward compliance with the nation's environmental laws.
We urge you to support efforts to strike the provisions.'' This letter
is signed by Governor Kenny Guinn of Nevada, Attorney General Christine
Gregoire of Washington, and Senator Beverly Gard of Indiana.
Section 342 was also opposed by the Environmental Council of the
States. It writes that, ``The state environmental commissioners, along
with governors, state legislators, attorneys general and other
officials of state government have insisted that the federal government
live by exactly the same standards and requirements that it imposes on
all other parties, and we all oppose this provision in S. 2549.
Exempting military installations from one of the basic tools of
environmental enforcement is bad policy, and would seriously erode our
capacity to ensure our citizens the protection of federal and state
laws.'' The letter is signed by R. Lewis Shaw, Deputy Commissioner,
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control and
President of the Council.
[[Page S6541]]
Mr. President, even Governor George W. Bush of Texas recognizes the
important principle of treating federal facilities as we treat state
and local governments and private facilities. On Governor Bush's
website--georgebush.com
--the Governor has posted his environmental platform. The sixth plank
in that platform reads as follows: ``Direct active federal facilities
to comply with the environmental protection laws and hold them
accountable.'' It continues, ``Governor Bush will expect the federal
government to lead by example. He believes it is time to end the double
standard that has federal government acting as enforcer of the nation's
environmental laws, while at the same time causing pollution that
violates those laws.''
Mr. President, last year, a provision similar to Section 342 was
incorporated into the FY 2000 DOD appropriations bill. The
Congressional Budget Office evaluated that provision and concluded
that, ``Based on information from DOD and on conversations with
representatives of state governments, CBO believes that requiring DOD
to seek specific authorization from the Congress before paying each
fine . . . will likely delay the payment of some fines. To the extent
the Congress fails to authorize fines in the future, it is possible
that the section would make it more difficult for states and local
governments to negotiate for compliance with environmental laws.'' The
letter is signed by Dan. L. Crippen, Director of the CBO.
Plain and simple, if we had passed Section 342 we would have rolled
back environmental and public health protections for thousands of
Americans who live near DOD facilities and for generations who will
face the costs of cleanup. Our state attorneys--the people in the field
enforcing our laws--our governors and our state environmental
commissioners--and even the likely Republican nominee for President are
telling us it is a mistake to do so.
Mr. President, the principle is not just rhetoric--it is supported by
the record. In 1993, compliance by federal facilities with the
Resources Conservation and Restoration Act was 55.4 percent. Almost
half of all federal facilities operated out of compliance. Why? Because
the law was unclear as to whether or not environmental fines could be
assessed against federal facilities. But with the passage of the
Federal Facilities Compliance Act in 1992--when DOD and other federal
facilities faced fines and penalties for the first time--compliance
started to climb. By 1998, compliance at federal facilities had reached
88.2 percent. And the opposite has also proven true. Federal compliance
under the Clean Water Act, which does not have a clear waiver, has
dropped at federal facilities. In 1993, more than 94 percent of federal
facilities were in compliance, and by 1998 that number had dropped to
just 61.5 percent. According to enforcement officials at EPA and state
government, that decline coincided with court decisions that
interpreted the Clean Water Act as having only a limited waiver of
sovereign immunity. To reverse that trend, I understand that Senator
Coverdell has introduced legislation to waive sovereign immunity for
federal facilities. That Republican-led initiative now has now been
cosponsored by Senators Breaux, Chafee, DeWine, Grams, and Voinovich.
Some argued that last year's provision wouldn't impact enforcement
because, like Section 342, Congress can authorize the fine. But the
numbers don't bear out that prediction. Why? Because investigators and
attorneys knew full well that DOD was about to get a ``Get Out Of Jail
Free Card'' from Congress. Even the best legal work can be overturned
if Congress simply decides not to act on an authorization. As a result,
enforcement actions have dropped off. As with any law, without strong
enforcement, compliance will fall.
The principle is simple, Mr. President. If you want people,
companies, institutions, and the government to comply with the law you
must be tough on crime--including environmental crime. The way to
ensure that all facilities comply with the law is to make sure that
pollution does not pay. If the threat of a large fine is on the
horizon--if the laws have teeth--everyone will be far more inclined to
comply.
Mr. President, I want to focus some on the issue of ``economic
benefit'' and ``size-of-business'' criteria and what it means to limit
the federal and state authority to impose a fine based on those
criteria. There seems to be some confusion as to why a federal or state
authority would seek a penalty based on economic benefits at a DOD
facility. The Report language accompanying Section 342 notes that the
DOD, in the Committee's view, has no economic competitors in regard to
the Clean Air Act. Therefore, the principle of economic benefit or
size-of-business should not apply. Mr. President, I believe that is an
incorrect reading of the Clean Air Act and other relevant statutes.
Foremost, an economic benefit provision prevents a facility, whether
it's private or federal, from benefitting financially from
noncompliance. Federal and state authorities need the power to make
noncompliance economically unviable. We cannot have a system that
rewards people for breaking the law. The Report language accompanying
Section 342 argues that economic benefit is tied to ``competition''
among businesses and intended to prevent economic advantage through
noncompliance. That is a narrow, misreading of the Clean Air Act. For
example, all across the country, electric utilities--including
municipal facilities--operate without ``competitors'' as the report
defines the term. Utilities are guaranteed a market in return for
providing a set amount of power. This is changing with competition, but
many did and some still do operate as sanctioned monopolies. But they
are not exempt from fines and penalties in the Clean Air Act. Further,
EPA and the states assess ``economic benefit'' fines against hospitals,
universities, and local and state governments. For example, in a Clean
Water Act challenge, the United States versus City of San Diego in
1991, a federal court found that the ``plaintiffs' analysis of economic
benefit is valid as to municipalities. While it is difficult to
quantify precisely the savings realized by the City as a result of its
intransigence, plaintiffs have demonstrated by a preponderance of the
evidence that the city has saved in excess of $300 million over
approximately the last thirty years by failing to invest in capital
improvements.'' The case shows that economic benefits apply to
nonbusiness entities--the City of San Diego and that economic benefit
is based on ``savings'' from noncompliance.
Mr. President, ``economic benefit'' and ``size-of-business'' criteria
are as applicable to DOD as they are to private companies, non-profits,
states, and other federal agencies. We should not rollback protections
and create a situation in which a manager within the DOD could
rationalize noncompliance because it saves money--we must demand
compliance from federal facilities.
Further, Mr. President, the use of these criteria to enforce the law
has been endorsed by the states. The Attorneys Generals, the Governors
and the Conference of Legislatures specifically addressed this issue in
their letter opposing Section 342. They write that, ``The economic
benefit analysis, in particular, is important to states because it
prevents DOD from considering a fine merely as a cost of doing business
. . .'' The Environmental Council of the States, which represents our
state environmental commissioners, writes, ``Section 342 would have
severely restricted the ability of states to ensure that facilities do
not realize financial gain through noncompliance. Typically, states
include in their penalties an amount that offsets these financial
benefits. In this way, they significantly reduce economic incentives to
avoid environmental and public health requirements.'' A cursory review
of state policy conducted by the Governors, Attorneys General and the
State Commissioners at my request, found that most states use economic
benefits, including Texas, Montana, South Carolina, Minnesota,
Colorado, Indiana, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Alaska, Connecticut,
and California.
The Armed Services Committee Report with S. 2549 states that ``[i]t
is the committee's view that the application of the economic benefit or
size of business penalty assessment criteria to the DOD is inconsistent
with the statutory language and the legislative history under the
[Clean Air Act.]'' Again, I
[[Page S6542]]
disagree and suggest that is narrow and incorrect reading of the Act. I
believe a plain reading of the Clean Air Act makes it clear that all
fines and sanctions apply to DOD. Section 118(a) of the Act reads as
follows: ``Each department, agency, and instrumentality of executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government . . .
shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate,
and local requirements, administrative authority, and process and
sanctions respecting the control and abatement of air pollution in the
same manner, and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity. The
preceding sentence shall apply (A) to any requirement whether
substantive or procedural (including any record keeping or reporting
requirement, any requirement respecting permits and any other
requirement whatsoever), (B) to any requirement to pay a fee or charge
imposed by any State or local agency to defray the costs of its air
pollution regulatory program, (C) to the exercise of any Federal,
State, or local administrative authority, and (D) to any process and
sanction, whether enforced in Federal, State, or local courts, or in
any other manner.'' In addition, the managers report for the 1990
amendments regarding Section 118(a) reads that, ``the new language is
intended to refute the argument [DOD is not subject to fee
requirements] and to affirm the obligation of federal agencies to
comply with all requirements, including such fees or charges.'' I add
that Section 118(b) of the Clean Air Act is titled ``Exemptions'' and
it specifically delineates under what circumstances the DOD can be
exempted from enforcement action--and it makes no reference to the size
of a fine or the criteria set forth in the penalty section. The Clean
Air Act is very clear on this point.
Mr. President, Section 342 reached beyond the Clean Air Act. It also
applies to the Resources Conservation and Restoration Act, Toxic
Substances Control Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act. I believe that
a plain reading of RCRA and the Federal Facilities Compliance Act makes
clear that DOD should be treated the same as private facilities. There
is no ambiguity in the law or the legislative history. In the floor
debate Senator Mitchell said, ``A waiver of sovereign immunity moves us
from the disorder of Federal noncompliance to a forum in which all
entities are subject to the same law and to full enforcement action.''
At the bill signing Bush said, ``The objective of the bill is to bring
all Federal facilities into compliance with applicable Federal and
State hazardous waste laws, to waive Federal Sovereign immunity under
those laws, and to allow the imposition of fines and penalties.''
Section 102 of RCRA reads, ``The Federal, State, interstate, and local
substantive and procedural requirements referred to in this subsection
include, but are not limited to, all administrative orders and all
civil and administrative penalties and fines, regardless of whether
such penalties or fines are punitive or coercive in nature or are
imposed for isolated, intermittent, or continuing violations.'' In
regard to EPA actions against DOD, the Act reads that, ``The
Administrator may commence an administrative enforcement action against
any department, agency, or instrumentality of the executive,
legislative, or judicial branch of the Federal Government pursuant to
the enforcement authorities contained in this Act. The Administrator
shall initiate an administrative enforcement action against such a
department, agency, or instrumentality in the same manner and under the
same circumstances as an action would be initiated against another
person.'' Mr. President, I believe the law is clear. The Report
language with S. 2549 offers us an inaccurate reading of the Clean Air
Act and fails to address other environmental law statutes it impacts.
Some have suggested that Section 342 would have almost no impact on
enforcement because few cases exceed $1.5 million. As a result, we will
rarely--if ever--need a congressional authorization to impose a fine.
That's simply wrong. Section 342 reads that congressional authorization
is needed if the fine exceeds $1.5 million or if it is based on
``economic benefit'' or ``size of business'' criteria. In theory, Mr.
President, all fines originating with the Environmental Protection
Agency would have been caught by Section 342, regardless of their size.
It is EPA's policy and that of many states that all fines should
incorporate the economic benefit gained from noncompliance. It is
difficult to know how many fines will need to pass through the new
process created by Section 342 and how many will not be authorized or
authorized at a lower amount. But, we do know that it could be a fine
of any size, no matter how small.
Moreover, the threat of a large fine will be gone if Section 342
passed. This alone will deter compliance. The Congressional Budget
Office specifically noted in its letter from last year that, ``the
States, local governments, and federal agencies often use the threat of
theses fines as part of the negotiation with facilities to achieve
compliance with environmental laws.'' The Attorneys General--the people
in the field doing the work--write of Section 342 that, ``The threat of
a significant fine or penalty is one of the more effective ways state
officials have for encouraging violators, including military
installations, to take responsibility for the environmental
consequences of their operations.'' Any prosecutor, whether they are
involved in a criminal action, or civil environmental compliance, will
tell you that the threat of long jail term or a large fine is critical
to enforcing the law. Finally and most importantly, Mr. President, by
giving the largest violators, those fined over $1.5 million, a chance
for congressional reprieve, Section 342 created a perverse system where
only the most egregious violators get a special legal loophole
unavailable to less egregious violators. It is a bad precedent.
Mr. President, the compromise we have reached does not resolve all of
my concerns, but it addresses many of them. Under the agreement reached
tonight, offered by Senator Stevens and passed, all fines of $1.5
million or more, assessed against DOD by a federal agency for
environmental noncompliance, over the next three years, must be
approved by Congress. State enforcement actions are not impacted by
this agreement and our state Attorneys General can continue to enforce
the law as they now do. The concepts of economic benefits and size of
business remain in place in our environmental enforcement at the state
and federal level. Only fines equal to or in excess of $1.5 million
will require a congressional authorization and that result in only a
small percentage of fines needing authorization. And it expires in
three years. I do have some concerns with the agreement. By requiring a
congressional authorization on fines of $1.5 million or more, we
provide the most egregious violators a congressional reprieve and,
therefore, it will limit our ability to deter noncompliance because the
threat of a large fine will be reduced. However, I want to note and
recognize the concerns Senator Stevens has raised. Enforcement power,
whether it sits with the EPA or the states, can be abused. The
agreement expires in three years. In that time, Congress will have a
close look at EPA's actions in assessing large fines.
Again, I want to thank Senators Stevens, Baucus and Lautenberg.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of Senator
Kerry's effort to make sure the Federal government plays by the same
environmental rules that the private sector lives by. The Defense
Department, in carrying out its military mission operates a vast,
sprawling industrial complex with a potentially huge impact on the
environment.
I think I'm only stating the obvious when I say it's absolutely
crucial to make sure that the Defense Department and all federal
agencies are held to the same environmental standards that apply to the
private sector.
Under most current environmental laws, that's already the case.
Federal facilities, including military installations, are subject to
civil penalties for violating the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, certain provisions of the Toxic Substances Control Act, the Safe
Drinking Water Act, and the Clean Air Act. Congress specifically
recognized the importance of these penalties when it passed the Federal
Facility Compliance Act of 1992.
During the past several months I've received letters on this issue
from environmental and state organizations, as
[[Page S6543]]
well as the Statement of the Administration's strong opposition to this
provision. I ask unanimous consent that copies of these letters be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
June 6, 2000.
Dear Senator: On behalf of millions of our members
nationwide, we urge you to support the Kerry amendment to
strip an extremely damaging legislative provision included in
the National Defense Authorization bill for fiscal year 2001
(sec. 342 of S. 2549). This provision would make a permanent
change in the law that could delay and even block DOD from
having to pay civil penalties for environmental violations
occurring at DOD facilities. We strongly urge you to support
this effort to remove it from the authorization bill this
year.
Section 342 of the authorization bill would require
specific congressional authorization for the payment of
environmental fines and penalties that exceed $1.5 million,
or those that are based on the application of economic
benefit or size-of-business criteria. This provision also
would block the use of funds to implement supplemental
environmental projects that may be required as part of, or in
lieu of, a proposed civil penalty. Section 342 would negate
the current law that requires that the DOD pay fines and
penalties assessed by state and federal regulatory agencies
for violations of environmental laws just like every other
federal agency or private party that violates the law. This
provision has far-reaching ramifications and yet has not had
the benefit of any public hearings to allow the Congress to
examine the full impacts of the action.
This provision was added specifically in response to a
large environmental fine proposed by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency at Fort Wainwright, Alaska. At Fort
Wainwright, the Army operates the largest coal burning power
plant owned by the U.S. military. According to EPA documents,
violations at this facility appear to be more extensive than
any found to date in private coal-fired power plants. The
Fort Wainwright facility clearly should pay state and federal
penalties for at least 11 years of continual and serious
violations of clean air standards (which may have even given
rise to at least one criminal investigation by the Army). The
Kerry amendment would also require a General Accounting
Office report to Congress on the circumstances surrounding
the Fort Wainwright facility.
Section 342 would undermine years of progress at federal,
state and local levels towards improved environmental
compliance by federal agencies. Congress has repeatedly
declared that both state and federal environmental regulators
should have the clear authority to enforce most environmental
laws at federal facilities, including Defense Department
installations. For example, in 1992 Congress enacted the
Federal Facilities Compliance Act, clarifying regulatory
agencies' authority to enforce laws governing the treatment,
storage, disposal, and cleanup of hazardous wastes. In
signing that law, President Bush noted that it represented a
step towards fulfilling his promise to the American people
that ``the Federal Government live up to the same
environmental standards that apply to private citizens.''
Implementation of Section 342 could severely undermine this
trend towards better compliance and likely will result in
increased violations.
This provision could create a perverse incentive for the
military to incur large fines so that it can seek respite
from Congress. Additionally, without the threat of economic
benefit fines, DOD would have less incentive to comply with
state and federal environmental laws and be more likely to
divert resources that should be spent on environmental
compliance to other military projects. Military facilities
will be above the law--eroding public confidence in
government. Dan L. Crippen, the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), found that since 1994
the DOD has paid over $14 million in fines--most of which
have been paid to state and local governments. The CBO
also found that this program ``will likely delay payment
of some fines'' and could ``make it more difficult for
state and local governments to negotiate for compliance
with environmental laws.''
This provisions impairs a valuable tool that states have
used to improve environmental protection and derails the
current trend toward federal facility accountability.
Creating a special exemption for DOD from penalties for
environmental violations sends the message that this federal
agency can ignore and discount the laws by which everyone
else must abide. Because of the serious ramifications for
federal accountability and protection of the environment and
public health, we strongly urge you to oppose Section 342 of
the FY 2001 National Defense Authorization bill and support
the Kerry amendment to strike it.
Sincerely,
Robert Dewey, Vice President of Government Relations and
External Affairs, Defenders of Wildlife; Courtney Cuff,
Legislative Director, Friends of the Earth; Faith
Weiss, Legislative Counsel, Natural Resources Defense
Council; James K. Wyerman, Executive Director, 20/20
Vision; Aimee R. Houghton, Associate Director, Center
for Public Environmental Oversight; Joan Mulhern,
Legislative Counsel, Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund;
Betsy Loyless, Political Director, League of
Conservation Voters; Anna Aurilio, Staff Scientist,
U.S. Public Interest Research Group; Cindy Shogan,
Alaskan Wilderness League; Dan L. Astott, President,
AMAC: The AuSable Manistee Action Council; Craig
Williams, Director, Chemical Weapons Working Group,
Berea, KY; Peter Hille, Chairman, Kentucky
Environmental Foundation, Berea, KY; Theresa Freeman,
Executive Director, Military Toxics Project; Elizabeth
Crowe, Director, Non-Stockpile Chemical Weapons,
Citizens Coalition, Berea, KY; Carol Jahnkow, Executive
Director, Peace Resource Center of San Diego; Marylia
Kelly, Executive Director, Tri-Valley CAREs
(Communities Against a Radioactive Environment),
Livermore, CA; Naomi Shultz, Steering Committee, Common
Ground, Berea, KY; DelMar Callaway, Community Co-Chair,
McClellan AFB RAB; Walter R. Stochel, Jr., Edison, NJ;
Richard Hugus, Otis Conversion Project, Falmouth, MA;
Peter Strauss, President, PM Strauss & Associates, San
Francisco, CA.
____
NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES
May 18, 2000.
Hon. Ted Stevens,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Hon. Robert C. Byrd,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman and Senator Byrd: We, the undersigned,
are writing in opposition to a proposal we understand might
be offered for inclusion in the FY 2001 Defense
Appropriations bill and which would require Congressional
approval for payment of large environmental penalties issued
against the Department of Defense. This proposal would be
similar to the language in the FY 2001 defense authorization
bill. Section 342 of Subtitle E. This provision would, if
enacted, limit the waiver of sovereign immunity enacted by
Congress in the 1992 Federal Facilities Compliance Act and
the 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments, among other laws
and continues an unfortunate policy created in last year's
Appropriations law.
The language proposed would prohibit payment of large fines
or penalties for violations of environmental laws at military
installations from funds appropriated in the bill unless
authorized by Congress. Such a proposal has the unfortunate
effect of interjecting the legislature into what should be an
independent system of law enforcement operated by the states
and other environmental regulators. This approach to
environmental regulation undermines the ability of states to
use the threat of penalties as a means of forcing federal
facilities to take responsibility for the environmental
consequences of their operations.
The fact that this language applies only to large penalties
is of little comfort. The federal government is the nation's
largest polluter and military installations are a major
contributor to that pollution. The threat of significant
penalties can only be an effective deterrent to environmental
violations where the penalty may be potentially proportional
to the cost of compliance. A requirement for Congressional
approval of penalties of a certain size unduly limits the
ability of states to use this threat to effectively regulate
the Department of Defense.
Congress recognized the importance of penalties in 1992
when it enacted the Federal Facilities Compliance Act
clarifying the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act. With the aid of the Federal
Facilities Compliance Act and vigilance by states and other
environmental regulators, we are finally making progress
toward changing the attitude toward environmental compliance
at federal facilities. We urge you to oppose any proposal
that weakens the ability of states to continue to assess
fines and penalties in whatever levels are determined by the
states as necessary to ensure compliance.
Sincerely,
Christine Gregorie,
Attorney General of Washington, President, NAAG.
Ken Salazar,
Attorney General of Colorado, Co-Chair, NAAG Environmental
Committee.
Governor Kenny C. Guinn,
State of Nevada, NGA Chair, Committee on Natural Resources.
Senator Beverly Gard,
Indiana State Senate, Chair, NCSL Environment Committee.
____
Executive Office of the President, Office of Management
and Budget,
Washington, DC, June 6, 2000.
Statement of Administration Policy
S. 2549--National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001
The Administration supports prompt congressional action on
the national defense authorization bill for FY 2001 and
appreciates
[[Page S6544]]
the Armed Services Committee's support for many of the
President's national defense priorities. S. 2549, however,
raises serious budget, policy, and constitutional concerns as
outlined below in the SAP and in the attachment.
Environmental Provisions
The Administration strongly opposes section 342, which
would require DOD to obtain specific authorization to comply
with environmental fines and penalties assessed against the
Department. The Administration is opposed to any limitation
on the ability of DOD to pay fines or penalties it is liable
for under law. This provision could erode public confidence
in the commitment of DOD to comply with environmental laws.
The Administration also believes that all Federal agencies
should be held fully accountable for environmental violations
and should be held to the same standards as the private
sector.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, these letters are opposed to
authorization or appropriation language that limits the importance of
penalties in deterring environmental violations.
In fact, the letter signed by twenty-one environmental groups states
``Creating a special exemption for DoD from penalties for environmental
violations sends the message that this federal agency can ignore and
discount the laws by which everyone else must abide.''
My final point is that every time the Senate Environmental and Public
Works Committee has raised this topic in hearings, the Committee has
leaned toward expanding the role of fines and penalties in enforcing
environmental laws at federal facilities. They did that so federal,
state, and local governments would have all the tools they need to make
sure all federal facilities comply with health and environmental laws.
Finally, as the Administration pointed out, ``all federal agencies
should be held fully accountable for environmental violations and
should be held to the same standards as the private sector.''
That is precisely what the Kerry amendment would do and I urge my
colleagues to support it.
Mr. STEVENS. I urge the adoption of the amendment.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is
on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 3815) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. KERRY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from
West Virginia is recognized.
amendment no. 3794
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the China trade measure which passed the
House eliminates the annual congressional renewal of most-favored-
nation treatment of China, and gives China permanent normal trade
relations with the United States. This legislation has not yet been
scheduled for action on the Senate floor, yet there is already a
concerted effort to defeat any amendments by Senators which might
deviate from the provisions of the bill as passed by the House. The
fear is that a different Senate version would require a conference
committee, and another House vote, both of which may make it more
uncertain that the legislation will be enacted this session.
Given this situation, which is an obvious egregious deviation from
the traditional role of the Senate in foreign affairs, those of us who
believe that the House bill can be improved must find a way to pass
separate legislation which still addresses matters of importance in the
burgeoning U.S.-Chinese trade relationship. There is one particular
area, in which I believe the House bill and the amendments passed to
it, are silent, and cry out for some adequate treatment, and that is in
the area of national security. The administration argued in getting
enough votes for its China trade bill in the House, that it is in the
national security interest of the United States to pass the bill. I do
not believe that for one moment. That is quite an assertion given the
brutal Communist dictatorship in China, which systematically violates
the agreements it has signed with us, and which routinely pressures
U.S. firms to hand over key technologies as the price for doing
business in China. This is the same Chinese dictatorship which talks
about financial war with the United States, and which periodically
intimidates Taiwan with threats of invasion. This is the same Chinese
dictatorship which hunts down dissenters, hunts down free expression,
and religious organizations with a club.
Despite this assertion, there is no mechanism to thoroughly and
regularly assess the national security impacts on, and implications of,
the developing trading relationship with China. The huge trade and
dollar surpluses that are amassed by the Chinese Government and the
tensions between the United States and China on trade and national
security issues, as well as on human and labor rights, need informed
and periodic review. There are those who argue that our annual debate
over renewal of most-favored-nation treatment of China did not amount
to much because we never failed to renew MFN. However, annual MFN
review was of great importance to the Chinese Government, since it
certainly provided a regular open window to expose questionable Chinese
trading, human rights, military, and other policies to a wide audience.
Such monitoring and regular reporting to Congress from a reliable
source is particularly important in an era where massive and unbalanced
trade flows are certain to continue, and where, because of China's
membership in the WTO, U.S. bilateral leverage and congressional
authority under the commerce clause have been severely reduced. I would
contend that the U.S.-Chinese relationship is likely to be of enduring
concern to this body. Surely, the national security implications of
that relationship, the impacts of massive trade deficits which now
approach some $70 billion a year, the voracious appetite of the Chinese
Government for military technologies, and the pressures it brings on
our Asian allies are important to us. The implications of systematic
unfair trade practices by the Chinese Government, of dumping into our
markets, of not enforcing and not complying with agreements they have
signed with us, and of pressuring Western companies to hand over
important technologies as a price for doing business in China and as a
quid pro quo for being able to relocate and invest in China, should be
of concern to the elected representatives of the American people.
The chief Chinese imports from the United States are primarily
sophisticated manufactured products, like aircraft, telecommunications
equipment, and semiconductors. Many of these technologies have multiple
uses, both civilian and military. China's development effort is heavily
dependent on Western companies as sources of capital and technology.
There are some who contend that the large surpluses, as well as the
capital, and many technologies are being funneled to a concerted effort
to fuel a military buildup which the Chinese could not otherwise
muster. There are those who contend that we are unwittingly giving the
Chinese the tools to intimidate Taiwan, our democratic friend, and our
other Asian allies, such as Thailand, South Korea, Japan, and the
Philippines.
Chinese military officers have recently written about the need to
practice financial war, cyber war, and other economic and
technologically sophisticated means of affecting the security
relationship with the United States. Given the technological prowess of
the United States in prosecuting the Gulf War and the Kosovo conflict,
the Chinese have been reportedly alarmed regarding the obsolescence of
their military machine and their military practices. The standing
armies, upon which they have traditionally relied, cannot perform
effectively against the new weaponry demonstrated by the United States
in those conflicts. There are those in China who believe that their
long-term interests lie in competition and possibly confrontation with
the United States, and thus in order to compete they must rapidly
acquire a range of technologies and expertise that is only available
from Western firms. Are we unwittingly supplying those factions in
China with the means to confront us? Certainly our own self-interest
would dictate that we need to monitor these trends systematically and
periodically and that is the purpose of the Byrd-Warner amendment.
I think that it is only prudent that we provide for an annual
systematic review and a report to the Congress on the full range of
national security implications engendered by the increased
[[Page S6545]]
trade and investment relationship with China. The House has a
commission in its China trade bill, an executive-legislative commission
to monitor a staggering range of human rights and democracy-building
reforms in China. It has a full plate of responsibilities. While this
sort of monitoring is certainly important, no less important should be
the existence of a congressional commission to focus on the national
security relationship between our two nations. The President has argued
that it is in our national security interest to further open and widen
our trading relations with China. That proposition should be regularly
tested by an independent commission, which has the narrow mandate of
monitoring our growing bilateral relationship with an eye toward United
States security concerns.
The Congress last year created a 12-person commission, equally
divided between Republicans and Democrats, to examine our growing
negative trade balance. The Trade Deficit Review Commission will likely
finish its work in a few months, with a report to the Congress and the
President, on the implications of our global deficits, recommending new
practices, institutions and policies. It has already conducted hearings
and studies on the Chinese relationship. Mr. Warner and I suggest that
this same commission is an appropriate tool, extended and refocused, to
conduct an annual Chinese assessment and review. Such a refocused
commission would serve as a good companion to the one proposed by the
House bill on human rights and democratic reforms in China. Its
existence and assessments would certainly help to repair the dangerous
erosion of congressional involvement in, and leverage over, foreign
commerce envisioned as essential to our national well being by the
framers. It would help to replace congressional monitoring of China
resulting from her accession to the World Trade Organization, in an
area critical to the deeply rooted constitutional responsibilities of
this body.
That is the purpose of the amendment which Senator Warner and I and
other Senators have offered. In summary, the commission would review
the national security implications of our trade and investment
relations with China, including the following elements:
One, the portion of trade in goods and services dedicated by the
Chinese Government to military systems;
Two, an analysis of the statements and writings of Chinese officials
bearing on the intentions of the Chinese Government regarding military
competition with and leverage over the United States and its Asian
allies;
Three, the military actions taken by the Chinese Government over the
preceding years bearing on the national security of the United States
and its Asian allies;
Four, the acquisition by the Chinese Government of advanced military
technologies and systems through U.S. trade and Chinese procurement
policies;
Five, the use of financial transactions, capital flows, and currency
manipulations to affect the national security of the United States;
Six, actions taken by the Chinese Government in the context of the
WTO which are adverse to U.S. national security interests;
Seven, an overall assessment of the state of any security challenges
to the U.S. by the Chinese Government and whether the trend from
previous years is increasing or declining; and finally, the commission
would also provide recommendations for action, including any use of the
national defense waiver provision that already exists in the GATT
Treaty, and applies to the WTO. This article, article 21 of the GATT,
has never been used by any nation state, but remains available to be
triggered if the Congress finds some aspect of our growing relationship
with China on the trade account which adversely affects our national
security and needs to be stopped or somehow moderated.
In addition to these matters, there is also growing concern over the
activities of China in transferring missile technologies to other
nations, affecting the security of the United States and, also, our
Asian allies. The proliferation of such technologies to Pakistan is the
subject of ongoing discussions between the United States and the
Government of China. Unfortunately, the Chinese have given no sign that
they intend to halt their highly dangerous trade in missile
technologies and components.
Many Senators have expressed their concern over this practice,
including the distinguished Senator from Tennessee, Mr. Thompson, and
the distinguished Senator from New Jersey, Mr. Torricelli. It is my
intention, and my expectation, and it is the intention of my very close
and dear colleague, Senator Warner--it is our intention and expectation
that the U.S.-China Security Review Commission will investigate, report
and make recommendations on Chinese trade in missile components, which
affects our long-term security and that of our Asian allies. In this
amendment by Mr. Warner and myself, both paragraphs (E), dealing with
military actions taken by the Chinese Government, and (J), requiring an
overall assessment of the state of the security challenges presented by
China to the United States provide ample mandate to the commission to
conduct such investigations on a regular basis.
I will be happy to yield the floor to my colleague, Mr. Warner.
I cannot yield the floor to another Senator. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am, indeed, very honored to be a
principal cosponsor with my friend and fellow member of the Armed
Services Committee on this piece of legislation. This is a very
important step. China should not perceive this as a threat. China
should not perceive this in any other way than a positive step by the
Congress to establish or keep in place this ongoing commission for the
purpose of advising the Congress from time to time.
We do not have as individual Members--of course, our committees
perform oversight, but we do not have an opportunity, on a daily or
weekly basis, to monitor the various criteria as set forth in the Byrd-
Warner legislation. This commission will, again, be established by the
Congress with six Members appointed by the Senate and six Members
appointed by the House in a bipartisan manner, and it will be the
watchdog to inform us from time to time.
China in this millennium will compete with the United States, the
world's only superpower, on a broad range of fronts--not just foreign
affairs, not just national security, not just trade and economics, but
in areas which we cannot even envision tonight, as this new millennium
unfolds and this cyberspace in which we are all involved engulfs us day
after day. The distinguished Senator from West Virginia pointed out
some representations by certain individuals in China about their desire
to get more involved in cyberspace for national security reasons. That
is one of the important functions of this commission.
I am very pleased to join with him because China will be the
competitor. The Senate and the House--the Congress collectively--needs
its own resource, and I underline that. I commend my distinguished
colleague and friend from West Virginia.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. WARNER. Yes.
Mr. BYRD. Otherwise, the Congress is at the mercy of an
administration--the administration--for information.
Mr. WARNER. That is correct.
Mr. BYRD. In this case, this commission will report to the Congress,
so we do not have to depend upon information from the Executive; we
have our own.
Mr. WARNER. Of course, Mr. President, from time to time, committees
of this body--indeed, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee
on Armed Services, the Governmental Affairs Committee--take active
roles, but they do not do it every single day as this commission will
monitor, together with the chairman and members and the staff.
Mr. BYRD. Yes.
Mr. WARNER. I yield the floor.
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I rise today in opposition to the amendment
offered by my distinguished colleague from West Virginia, Mr. Byrd. I
do so because the commission created by this legislation is, in my
view, flawed. That is why I tried to work with my good friend from West
Virginia to address the concerns that I am raising. Unfortunately, we
were unable to come to an
[[Page S6546]]
agreement. For the following reasons, I must oppose this amendment and
I urge my colleagues to do the same.
First, let me say that if my colleague's intent is to establish a
commission to provide sound advice to Congress regarding our broader
relationship with China and its effect on our national security, then
there are ways to create a meaningful mechanism for doing just that.
One, for example, would have been to build the Senator's concerns into
the quadrennial defense review required under previous versions of the
National Defense Authorization Act. By giving the responsibility to a
standing body like the National Defense Panel that already conducts the
quadrennial defense review, we would have saved the taxpayers' money,
while getting the benefit of the unchallenged expertise of many of the
foremost authorities on our national security and on military matters.
And, we would have put the report in Congress' hands by next spring.
Instead, my colleague has adopted an approach I have not seen in my
years in the Senate. He wants to take the commissioners, staff and
clerical personnel of a commission constructed for very different
purposes and employ it to look at our security relationship with China.
That commission--the Trade Deficit Review Commission--is staffed with
commissioners and staff appointed due to their expertise in economic
policy. Frankly, this is simply the wrong group to undertake a serious
review of the impact on our national security of our relationship with
China. And, there is absolutely no benefit in terms of accelerating the
progress toward a final report when compared to giving the
responsibility to the National Defense Panel.
I must say that I do not understand my friend's interest in
perpetuating the life of the Trade Deficit Review Commission for this
task. The Trade Deficit Review Commission is already overdue in
providing us its report on the trade deficit. My expectation when we
created that commission was that we would have had its work product by
now. Instead, my colleague recently supported a three-month extension
so the Trade Deficit Review Commission could complete its now amply-
delayed report. In my view, we should let the Trade Deficit Commission
complete its existing work, rather than burdening it with new
responsibilities, even if only administrative in nature, before it has
completed its primary task.
Second, I am concerned that the way the issues as stated in my
friend's bill could be read to imply that the United States already
considers China an enemy and a threat to our national security. China
clearly is an emerging force in the international arena. In many ways,
China's emergence could be beneficial to the United States. There are,
nonetheless, concerns, which I share, regarding the PRC's behavior on
security-related matters. Those issues bear careful scrutiny.
Having said that, it should also be clear that the shape and
direction of the relationship between our countries is evolving and
remains to be shaped. What that suggests is the need for a thoughtful,
comprehensive and, most importantly, balanced review of the security
implications of our bilateral relationship with China. That is, in
fact, what I suggested to my colleague we should do.
Third, I offered my friend my thoughts on the technical changes
needed to make the commission's job clear. I worry, however, that, as
it stands now, the commission's duties will be extremely difficult for
any commissioner to decipher. For example, the proposed commission is
supposed to examine the ``portion of trade in goods and services that
the People's Republic of China dedicates to military systems or systems
of a dual nature that could be used for military purposes.'' The
problem is no country dedicates its trade to military systems. That is
simply not a meaningful concept. I am not even sure what a ``system of
a dual nature'' is? It is, furthermore, literally impossible for a
country to dedicate a portion of a trade surplus to its military budget
because a trade surplus is not cash in hand, as the proposal implies.
Similarly, the proposal simply misunderstands the nature of the World
Trade Organization and particularly Article XXI if it asks for
recommendations as to how China's participation there would harm us or
whether Article XXI should be more frequently invoked. What the WTO
provides is a forum in which to negotiate the reduction of tariffs and
other trade barriers. What do we have to fear from China lowering its
trade barriers in national security terms? As to Article XXI, that
provision is invoked when we do something to China in trade terms, not
when China does something to us.
That leads me to my final point. What the statement of the proposed
commission's duties makes clear, and what I object to most strongly to,
is its premise. There are many issues that I could conceive of
addressing in a serious, comprehensive and balanced review of our
security relationship with China. Issues related to regional stability
and weapons proliferation to name just two. But, what this amendment
suggests is that our commercial engagement with China somehow threatens
our national security interests--that in some way, the fact that we buy
toys and appliances from the Chinese, and the fact that they buy
agricultural products and heavy equipment from us endangers the
American people. That is simply not the case.
Nor is there anything about China's upcoming accession to the World
Trade Organization that makes such a review any more relevant. After
all, China has committed to open its market to our goods and services
to gain entry to the WTO. China's accession to the WTO does nothing to
reduce our security. If anything, it reduces a point of friction in our
relationship with China in a way that is only positive.
Under the circumstances, I cannot support the creation of a permanent
commission with an uncertain mission that would not reach many of the
fundamental issues that should be addressed in our relationship with
China. I urge my colleagues to oppose the amendment as well.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the clerk read the other cosponsors of
the amendment, in addition to Mr. Warner and myself.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the names.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
Mr. Byrd, for himself, Mr. Warner, Mr. Levin, Mr. Hollings,
Mr. Helms, Mr. Breaux, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Campbell, Mrs. Lincoln,
and Mr. Wellstone.
Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair, and I thank the clerk.
Mr. President, I ask for a vote on the amendment.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, with the concurrence of my distinguished
senior colleagues, I urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No.
3794.
The amendment (No. 3794) was agreed to.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No.
3767, as amended.
The amendment (No. 3767), as amended, was agreed to.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.
Mr. BYRD. Do we not wish to proceed on the vote on the amendment in
the first degree, as amended?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. We have agreed to the first and the second-
degree amendments.
Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair. I thank all Senators. And I thank my
colleague, Mr. Warner.
Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague, the senior Senator from West
Virginia.
Now, from the unanimous consent agreement, the distinguished Senator
from Wisconsin is to be recognized.
Amendment No. 3759
(Purpose: To terminate production under the D5 submarine-launched
ballistic missile program)
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from
Wisconsin is recognized.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3759 and ask for
its immediate consideration.
[[Page S6547]]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Feingold], for himself, Mr.
Harkin, Mr. Wellstone, and Mr. Wyden, proposes an amendment
numbered 3759.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 31, between lines 18 and 19, insert the following:
SEC. 126. D5 SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM.
(a) Reduction of Amount for Program.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of this Act, the total amount authorized to
be appropriated by this Act is reduced by $462,733,000.
(b) Prohibition.--None of the remaining funds authorized to
be appropriated by this Act after the reduction made by
subsection (a) may be used for the procurement of D5
submarine-launched ballistic missiles or components for D5
missiles.
(c) Termination of Program.--The Secretary of Defense shall
terminate production of D5 submarine ballistic missiles under
the D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile program after
fiscal year 2001.
(d) Payment of Termination Costs.--Funds available on or
after the date of the enactment of this Act for obligation
for the D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile program may
be obligated for production under that program only for
payment of the costs associated with the termination of
production under this Act.
(e) Inapplicability to Missiles in Production.--Subsections
(c) and (d) do not apply to missiles in production on the
date of the enactment of this Act.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, quite simply, this amendment will
terminate the future production of the Navy's Trident II missile. I am
pleased to be joined in this effort by the Senator from Iowa, Mr.
Harkin, the Senator from Minnesota, Mr. Wellstone, and the Senator from
Oregon, Mr. Wyden.
I have made it a priority to seek to eliminate unnecessary Government
spending. To the occasional consternation of some in this Chamber and
elsewhere, I have come to the floor time and time again to try to scale
back or terminate costly Federal programs, many of which have outlived
their usefulness.
In my view, the Trident II program is just the kind of cold war relic
that we can and should eliminate.
The Trident II, also called the D-5, is the Navy's submarine-launched
ballistic missile. It was designed specifically to be a first-strike
strategic missile that would attack targets inside the Soviet Union
from waters off the continental United States.
By halting further production of the Trident II missile, we would
save American taxpayers more than $460 million in fiscal year 2001
alone, and according to the CBO, we would save $2.6 billion over the
next 10 years, from 2001 to 2010.
The Navy now has in its arsenal 372 Trident II missiles, and has
requested funding this year for an additional 12. The legislation
currently before this body includes more than $430 million for those
additional 12 missiles.
It also authorizes an additional $28.8 million for advanced
procurement for still more Trident II missiles that the Navy hopes to
purchase in future years.
Let me be clear. My amendment would halt production of additional
Trident II missiles. It does not in any way prevent the Navy from
operating or maintaining its current arsenal of 372 Trident II
missiles.
I would like to take a moment to talk about the Trident II, its
predecessor, the Trident I, and the reasons why I believe this Trident
II program should be terminated.
The Trident II is deployed aboard the Navy's fleet of 18 Ohio-class
submarines. Ten of these subs are equipped with Trident II missiles.
The oldest eight subs in the fleet are equipped with the older Trident
I, or C-4, missile.
The Navy is already moving toward downsizing its Trident fleet from
18 to 14 in order to comply with the provisions of the START II treaty.
Some observers suggest simply retiring the four oldest Ohio-class
submarines in order to achieve that goal. Others support converting
those subs, which carry the older Trident I missle, to carry
conventional missiles. The CBO estimates that this conversion alone
would cost about $3.3 billion over 10 years.
That leaves four other submarines that are equipped with the older
Trident I missiles. The Navy wants to backfit those four subs to carry
newer Trident II missiles.
The Navy's current goal is to have 14 submarines with 24 Trident II
missiles each, for a total of 336 missiles, with a number of additional
missiles for testing purposes. The CBO estimates that a total of 425
missiles would be required to fully arm 14 submarines and have
sufficient missiles also for testing. That would mean the purchase of
at least 53 more missiles.
We already have 372 Trident II missiles--more than enough to fully
arm the 10 existing Trident II submarines and to maintain an inventory
for testing. So why do we need 12 more?
Why do we need to spend the taxpayers' money on advanced procurement
to buy even more missiles in future years?
And why do we need to backfit the aging remains of the Trident I
fleet at all? Ten fully-equipped Trident II submarines are more than
capable of being an effective deterrent against the moth-balled Russian
submarine fleet and against the ballistic missile aspirations of rogue
states, including China and North Korea.
And the aging Trident I subs won't outlast the Trident I missiles
they currently carry, let alone the additional Trident II missiles the
Navy wants to build for them to the tune of about $40 million per
missile.
The CBO has recommended terminating the further production of the
Trident II missile, which would save $2.6 billion over the next 10
years, and retiring all eight of the Trident I submarines, which would
save an additional $2.3 billion over the next 10 years, for a total
savings of $4.9 billion.
I do recognize that there is still a potential threat from rogue
states and from independent operators who seek to acquire ballistic
missiles and other weapons of mass destruction. I also recognize that
our submarine fleet and our arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons still
have an important role to pay in warding off these threats. Their role,
however, has diminished dramatically from what it was at the time of
the cold war. Our missile procurement decisions should really reflect
that change and it should reflect the realities of the post-cold-war
world.
Our existing inventory of 372 Trident II missiles is far superior to
any other country on the globe. And each of these missiles contains
eight independently targetable nuclear warheads, for a total of 192
warheads per submarine. The 372 missiles currently in the Navy's
inventory contain 2,976 warheads. Each warhead packs between 300 to 450
kilotons of explosive power.
For a comparison--which is really quite striking--the first atomic
bomb that the United States dropped on Hiroshima generated 15 kilotons
of force. Let's do the math for just one fully-equipped Trident II
submarine.
Each warhead can generate up to 450 kilotons of force. Each missile
has eight warheads, and each submarine has 24 missiles. That equals
86.4 megatons of force per submarine. That is the equivalent of 5,760
Hiroshimas. Let me say that again: the power of 5,760 Hiroshimas on
just one submarine.
The Navy currently has 10 such submarines, and they want to backfit
another four with these devastating weapons. It is hard to imagine why
we need to procure more of these weapons when those we already have
could destroy the Earth many times over.
And it is especially hard to comprehend why we need more Trident II
missiles when we take into account the fact that the Trident II is only
one of the several types of ballistic missiles the Department of
Defense has in its arsenal.
The world is changing. Earlier this year, the Russian Duma ratified
the START II treaty, a move that seemed highly unlikely just 1 year
ago. And Russia has also ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty, something that this body regrettably failed to do last fall.
I cannot understand the need for more Trident II missiles at a time
when the Governments of the United States and Russia are in
negotiations to implement START II and are also discussing a framework
for START III. These agreements call for reductions in our nuclear
arsenal, not increases. To spend scarce resources on building
[[Page S6548]]
more missiles now is short sighted and could seriously undermine our
efforts to negotiate further arms reductions with Russia.
The debate on the underlying legislation is one about priorities. We
should stop spending taxpayer dollars on defense programs that have
unfortunately survived the cold war and should instead concentrate on
military readiness and better pay and benefits for our men and women in
uniform.
So I urge my colleagues to support this sensible amendment, which has
been endorsed by Taxpayers for Common Sense, the Center for Defense
Information, the Peace Action Education Fund, the Union of Concerned
Scientists, the Council for a Liveable World, Physicians for Social
Responsibility, and the 20/20 Vision Education Fund.
Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. FEINGOLD. I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Feingold
amendment. I happen to believe we need a strong national defense. I
think an important ingredient in having a strong national defense is
that we have a defense system that is technologically advanced over any
opposition we may face in the world; that we have a versatile defense
system; and that we have some mobility so we can avoid duplication.
A key ingredient of a strong national defense is our submarine
program, which includes the submarine-launched ballistic missile. An
important part of a submarine-launched ballistic missile is the D-5.
The Feingold amendment would cut $462.7 million in funds to procure
the Trident D-5 missiles and, in effect, would terminate the D-5
production program. For that reason, I strongly oppose this amendment.
The Department of Defense also happens to oppose this amendment. That
was not an easy decision. There was a lot of consideration on what
should be the proper level of defense and how submarine defenses should
be a part of that. The Navy, after a considerable amount of thought,
decided they needed to outfit a total of 14 Trident submarines with the
D-5 missile. This will require a total inventory of 425 Trident
missiles. With the fiscal year 2000 budget, the Navy will have 53
missiles left to procure to meet this inventory objective. We have gone
through most of the program. We are not going to have much left, as far
as funding missiles, after this fiscal year.
In 1994, there was a nuclear posture review. This review was done by
the Department of Defense and it has been persistently evaluated. The
conclusion is that the U.S. needs 14 Trident submarines at a minimum to
be able to maintain a two-ocean SLBM force that is stabilizing,
operationally effective, and which enhances deterrence.
The Department of Defense is planning on maintaining 14 Trident
submarines for the foreseeable future regardless of arms control
developments. Current plans are to maintain 14 boats under START II as
well as under START III. Terminating the D-5 program, after fiscal year
2000, would mean the Navy would only have enough missiles to outfit 11
boats. Over time, as operational flight testing uses up an already
inadequate missile inventory, you begin to reduce the number of
submarines you would be able to maintain on operational status even
further. We would decidedly have a lack of missiles to meet the goal
for a two-ocean SLBM force.
The Feingold amendment cuts the entire fiscal year 2001 budget
request for D-5 production. However, even if the Congress wanted to
terminate the D-5 program following the fiscal year 2001 procurement,
the Navy would still need to spend over $330 million in procurement
funds to terminate the production program. Hence, the Feingold
amendment would not only prematurely stop production, but it would also
preclude orderly termination of the program.
Way back in January of this year, in a report to Congress, the
Secretary of Defense stated that the impact of procuring less than 425
of the D-5 missiles would be very severe. Specifically, the Secretary
of Defense indicated that such a decision would have adverse impacts on
the effectiveness of the U.S. strategic deterrent, severely weaken
reliability, accuracy, and safety assessments associated with the D-5
operational flight test program, and would undermine the strategic
missile industrial and production base of the United States at a time
when the D-5 missile is the only strategic missile still in production.
The Secretary's report also indicated that termination of the D-5
missile before the planned completion of 425 missiles would result in a
unilateral reduction of deployed U.S. strategic warheads in both the
START I and the START II regimes and is not consistent with U.S. START
III plans.
The Navy also looked at retaining older C-4 missiles to fill in the
lack of the D-5 missiles. It concluded that this would be even more
costly and inefficient than simply completing the D-5 production run.
With only 53 missiles to procure, termination at this point will
produce only marginal savings and will have a severe operational impact
on our ability to maintain a stable deterrent force.
It is based on these factors that I strongly urge my colleagues to
oppose the amendment by the Senator from Wisconsin.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I appreciate the opportunity to debate
this with the Senator from Colorado. I will clear up a couple of
factual points before I make a few general statements.
First, as I understand it, the question of termination costs will not
be a problem that will be absorbed because of this amendment, because
any unexpended funds can be used for purposes of the termination costs.
I don't think that is a major objection.
Secondly, I believe the Senator suggested this would have some impact
on missiles already in production. That is not the case. That is not
the way our amendment is drafted. That is not what it will do.
The most important point is that the Senator from Colorado indicates
that these missiles are a key ingredient in our national defense. Let's
assume that is the case. The fact is, we already have 372 of these
missiles. I believe the burden is on those asking for this additional
funding to show that that is not enough.
Assuming it is a key ingredient, do we really need more than 372? Do
we really need these additional 53 missiles? As I indicated earlier, we
have 2,976 warheads based on our current 372 missiles, and that is the
equivalent of 25,760 Hiroshimas per submarine. I think the burden is on
those wanting to spend this additional money to show that we need a
stronger deterrent than that.
The Senator from Colorado suggested adverse impacts on deterrence if
we don't do these additional 12. After 25,760 Hiroshimas per submarine,
we need additional deterrence? I didn't hear a single statement from
the Senator from Colorado suggesting exactly what the real adverse
impacts are of just not doing these additional missiles.
I suggest the money is desperately needed not only in general but,
even within the defense budget, for the people who serve our country,
their pay, their conditions, their housing, readiness, including that
of the National Guard, for example. In my State, the people in the
National Guard desperately need these resources, for example, for
inventory, for training. They are very strapped. They are now taking a
great deal of responsibility for our standing Army. To me, the
priorities are wrong. We have more than adequate deterrence with these
372 missiles.
I suggest the case has not been made, as it must be, by those who
want to make the expenditure for these additional missiles.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I will respond, if I may.
The amendment cuts funds which would require termination of the
program, plain and simple. DOD has repeatedly reviewed that very
question.
[[Page S6549]]
Each time they have concluded we need 53 additional missiles.
Keep in mind, the goal originally was set up that we needed to
maintain a submarine force in the Pacific Ocean as well as the Atlantic
Ocean. It was determined that, at a minimum, we had to have 14
submarines, and we needed to have them adequately armed in order to
provide the defenses we need.
The Trident submarine is the core of the U.S. strategic deterrent
force, and the Trident force is the most survivable leg of our
strategic triad.
I think it is important we go ahead and complete this program,
recognizing that we are towards the end of manufacturing of the
missiles.
I think it only makes sense that we complete it and maintain a strong
defense. I believe a strong defense does serve as a deterrent, and it
helps assure world peace. For that reason, I strongly oppose the
amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin has 3 minutes 25
seconds.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I don't know how much more I will debate
this. I want to respond to the point about the study and analysis that
the Senator from Colorado appears to rely on most exclusively. That
analysis was done prior to the time the Russian Duma approved START II.
This is an example. It is not looking at the present relationship we
have and our goals with regard to Russia and the future negotiations,
not only with regard to what is going on now, but with START III.
The whole point is that we have to look at current realities, look at
what we have--372 missiles--and their capacity, and our goals as to
what message we want to send to Russia as we negotiate what is hoped to
be a reduction in the nuclear arsenals. I think it is simply not only
an unwise expenditure, but also an attitude that does not reflect what
we are trying to accomplish with regard to our negotiations with
Russia.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I believe I need to respond again. We have
had a report as late as January of this year, and it is that we should
maintain 14 Trident submarines not only through START I and II, but
also START III. So I think this is forward looking. I think it helps us
assure our goals of a strong defense. It maintains a versatile force
and keeps us technologically advanced, with the mobility we need. I
think it is an essential aspect of our defense, and I think it would be
foolhardy for us to cut the funds necessary to fully develop the 425 D-
5 missiles for the Trident submarine.
I yield back the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of our time on
this side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, might I inquire? I was off the floor. Have
the yeas and nays been ordered for tomorrow?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. WARNER. It is ready to be sequenced tomorrow for the purpose of
voting?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senators. We are now ready to hear from our
distinguished colleague from Illinois, if he is ready.
I will ask our colleague from Illinois two questions. One, on the
assumption that Mr. Levin will soon return to the floor, I ask if we
could interrupt for the purpose of clearing some en bloc amendments,
which will enable the staff who otherwise would be here to return to
their offices and use their time productively. We will ask for that at
the appropriate time. Has the Senator indicated the amount of time he
might seek for purposes of debate?
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, there are three Members on the floor who
will be seeking recognition, and we anticipate a maximum of 60 minutes
on this side. I don't know how much is needed on the other side.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator. In looking this over, I am inclined
to think that we can, in the course of the conference, gain some
support. I hope it remains in a factual manner and that the legislative
history you are about to make in terms of your remarks, together with
your colleagues, support what is in this amendment.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I thank the chairman for his forbearance
in scheduling this debate. I don't think any of us had hoped it would
occur at 8:30 at night, but that is the situation we are in. This is a
very important debate.
Amendment No. 3732
(Purpose: To provide for operationally realistic testing of National
Missile Defense systems against countermeasures, and to establish an
independent panel to review the testing)
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask
for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Illinois [Mr. Durbin], for himself, Mr.
Wellstone, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Kennedy,
Mr. Harkin, and Mr. Wyden, proposes an amendment numbered
3732.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 53, after line 23, insert the following:
SEC. 243. OPERATIONALLY-REALISTIC TESTING AGAINST
COUNTERMEASURES FOR NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE.
(a) Testing Requirements.--The Secretary of Defense shall
direct the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization--
(1) to include in the ground and flight testing of the
National Missile Defense system that is conducted before the
system becomes operational any countermeasures (including
decoys) that--
(A) are likely, or at least realistically possible, to be
used against the system; and
(B) are chosen for testing on the basis of what
countermeasure capabilities a long-range missile could have
and is likely to have, taking into consideration the
technology that the country deploying the missile would have
or could likely acquire; and
(2) to determine the extent to which the exoatmospheric
kill vehicle and the National Missile Defense system can
reliably discriminate between warheads and such
countermeasures.
(b) Future Funding Requirements.--The Secretary, in
consultation with the Director of the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization shall--
(1) determine what additional funding, if any, may be
necessary for fulfilling the testing requirements set forth
in subsection (a) in fiscal years after fiscal year 2001; and
(2) submit the determination to the congressional defense
committees at the same time that the President submits the
budget for fiscal year 2002 to Congress under section 1105(a)
of title 31, United States Code.
(c) Report by Secretary of Defense.--(1) The Secretary of
Defense shall, except as provided in paragraph (4), submit to
Congress an annual report on the Department's efforts to
establish a program for operationally realistic testing of
the National Missile Defense system against countermeasures.
The report shall be in both classified and unclassified
forms.
(2) The report shall include the Secretary's assessment of
the following:
(A) The countermeasures available to foreign countries with
ballistic missiles that the National Missile Defense system
could encounter in a launch of such missiles against the
United States.
(B) The ability of the National Missile Defense system to
defeat such countermeasures, including the ability of the
system to discriminate between countermeasures and reentry
vehicles.
(C) The plans to demonstrate the capability of the National
Missile Defense system to defeat such countermeasures and the
adequacy of the ground and flight testing to demonstrate that
capability.
(3) The report shall be submitted not later than January 15
of each year. The first report shall be submitted not later
than January 15, 2001.
(4) No annual report is required under this section after
the National Missile Defense system becomes operational.
(d) Independent Review Panel.--(1) The Secretary of Defense
shall reconvene the Panel on Reducing Risk in Ballistic
Missile Defense Flight Test Programs.
(2) The Panel shall assess the following:
(A) The countermeasures available for use against the
United States National Missile Defense system.
(B) The operational effectiveness of that system against
those countermeasures.
(C) The adequacy of the National Missile Defense flight
testing program to demonstrate the capability of the system
to defeat the countermeasures.
(3) After conducting the assessment required under
paragraph (2), the Panel shall evaluate--
[[Page S6550]]
(A) whether sufficient ground and flight testing of the
system will have been conducted before the system becomes
operational to support the making of a determination, with a
justifiably high level of confidence, regarding the
operational effectiveness of the system;
(B) whether adequate ground and flight testing of the
system will have been conducted, before the system becomes
operational, against the countermeasures that are likely, or
at least realistically possible, to be used against the
system and that other countries have or likely could acquire;
and
(C) whether the exoatmospheric kill vehicle and the rest of
the National Missile Defense system can reliably discriminate
between warheads and such countermeasures.
(4) Not later than March 15, 2001, the Panel shall submit a
report on its assessments and evaluations to the Secretary of
Defense and to Congress. The report shall include any
recommendations for improving the flight testing program for
the National Missile Defense system or the operational
capability of the system to defeat countermeasures that the
Panel determines appropriate.
(e) Countermeasure Defined.--In this section, the term
``countermeasure''--
(1) means any deliberate action taken by a country with
long-range ballistic missiles to defeat or otherwise counter
a United States National Missile Defense system; and
(2) includes, among other actions--
(A) use of a submunition released by a ballistic missile
soon after the boost phase of the missile;
(B) use of anti-simulation, together with such decoys as
Mylar balloons, to disguise the signature of the warhead; and
(C) use of a shroud cooled with liquid nitrogen to reduce
the infrared signature of the warhead.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, what we are going to discuss this evening
is one of the most expensive, and perhaps one of the most important,
elements in our Nation's national defense. We are going to discuss the
national missile defense system.
The reason for its importance, I guess, could be summarized in
several ways. First, it is an extraordinary expenditure of money. It is
anticipated that if we are going to meet our first goal by 2005, we
will spend up to $60 billion. That is an exceptional expenditure, even
by Federal standards, even by the standards of the Department of
Defense.
Second, those who support this system are telling us that our goal is
to basically protect America from attack by rogue missiles, by those
enemies of the United States who might launch a missile at us and
threaten our cities and population. So the importance of the system we
are talking about cannot be overstated.
Third, we know that if we go forward with this, we run the risk of
complicating our negotiations with other countries in the world--
particularly Russia and China--about the reduction in their nuclear
arsenals. So this is high-stakes poker. We are talking about a
decision, in terms of our national defense, which may be one of the
most important in history.
I have a very straightforward amendment that will require that the
national missile defense system test realistic countermeasures before
becoming operational, and that an independent review panel--the Welch
panel--assess the testing program in light of these countermeasure
problems. The President is slated to decide soon whether to deploy a
national missile defense system. This bill we are debating authorizes
spending almost $5 billion in the next fiscal year for this program.
The Congressional Budget Office has estimated the contemplated
national missile defense total cost at $60 billion, when all components
are considered. Whether one thinks that deciding to deploy a national
missile defense system at this moment is a good idea or not, I hope we
can all agree that once that system becomes operational, it should
work. If we are going to spend $60 billion, we ought to have a high
level of confidence that it will in fact protect us from rogue states
firing a missile. If the fate of America will truly hang in the
balance, we owe this Nation and every family and every mother, father,
and child our very best effort in building a credible, effective
deterrence.
Such a high level of confidence is not possible until this system is
tested against likely responses from emerging missile states, known as
countermeasures or decoys. If the missile system cannot discriminate
between warheads and decoys, it is, as a practical matter, useless
because enemies will simply be able to overwhelm it with cheap decoys.
At this point, I will yield time to my colleagues who have gathered
here to be part of this debate. At the end of their statements, I will
reclaim my time and conclude.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask at this time if I may clear some
amendments and ask unanimous consent that the time consumed by the two
managers not in any way be counted against the time for the Senator
from Illinois.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendments Nos. 3733, 3734, 3737, and 3762, As Modified, En Bloc
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, Senator Levin and I have several
amendments cleared by myself and the ranking member, some of which have
been modified. I call up amendments Nos. 3733, 3737, 3734, and I send
to the desk a modified version of amendment No. 3762. I ask unanimous
consent that these amendments be considered en bloc, that the Senate
agree to the amendments, and that the motions to reconsider be laid on
the table.
Finally, I ask unanimous consent that statements relating to
individual amendments be printed at the appropriate place in the
Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendments (Nos. 3733, 3734, 3737, and 3762, as modified) were
agreed to, as follows:
AMENDMENT NO. 3733
(Purpose: To authorize grants for the maintenance, repair, and
renovation of school facilities that serve dependents of members of the
Armed Forces and Department of Defense employees)
On page 123, between lines 12 and 13, insert the following:
SEC. 377. ASSISTANCE FOR MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, AND RENOVATION
OF SCHOOL FACILITIES THAT SERVE DEPENDENTS OF
MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES.
(a) Grants Authorized.--Chapter 111 of title 10, United
States Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating section 2199 as section 2199a; and
(2) by inserting after section 2198 the following new
section:
``Sec. 2199. Quality of life education facilities grants
``(a) Repair and Renovation Assistance.--(1) The Secretary
of Defense may make a grant to an eligible local educational
agency to assist the agency to repair and renovate--
``(A) an impacted school facility that is used by
significant numbers of military dependent students; or
``(B) a school facility that was a former Department of
Defense domestic dependent elementary or secondary school.
``(2) Authorized repair and renovation projects may include
repairs and improvements to an impacted school facility
(including the grounds of the facility) designed to ensure
compliance with the requirements of the Americans with
Disabilities Act or local health and safety ordinances, to
meet classroom size requirements, or to accommodate school
population increases.
``(3) The total amount of assistance provided under this
subsection to an eligible local educational agency may not
exceed $5,000,000 during any period of two fiscal years.
``(b) Maintenance Assistance.--(1) The Secretary of Defense
may make a grant to an eligible local educational agency
whose boundaries are the same as a military installation to
assist the agency to maintain an impacted school facility,
including the grounds of such a facility.
``(2) The total amount of assistance provided under this
subsection to an eligible local educational agency may not
exceed $250,000 during any fiscal year.
``(c) Determination of Eligible Local Educational
Agencies.--(1) A local educational agency is an eligible
local educational agency under this section only if the
Secretary of Defense determines that the local educational
agency has--
``(A) one or more federally impacted school facilities and
satisfies at least one of the additional eligibility
requirements specified in paragraph (2); or
``(B) a school facility that was a former Department of
Defense domestic dependent elementary or secondary school,
but assistance provided under this subparagraph may only be
used to repair and renovate that facility.
``(2) The additional eligibility requirements referred to
in paragraph (1) are the following:
``(A) The local educational agency is eligible to receive
assistance under subsection (f) of section 8003 of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
7703) and at least 10 percent of the students who were in
average daily attendance in the schools of such agency during
the preceding school year were students described under
paragraph (1)(A) or (1)(B) of section 8003(a) of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.
``(B) At least 35 percent of the students who were in
average daily attendance in the
[[Page S6551]]
schools of the local educational agency during the preceding
school year were students described under paragraph (1)(A) or
(1)(B) of section 8003(a) of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965.
``(C) The State education system and the local educational
agency are one and the same.
``(d) Notification of Eligibility.--Not later than June 30
of each fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense shall notify
each local educational agency identified under subsection (c)
that the local educational agency is eligible during that
fiscal year to apply for a grant under subsection (a),
subsection (b), or both subsections.
``(e) Relation to Impact Aid Construction Assistance.--A
local education agency that receives a grant under subsection
(a) to repair and renovate a school facility may not also
receive a payment for school construction under section 8007
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 7707) for the same fiscal year.
``(f) Grant Considerations.--In determining which eligible
local educational agencies will receive a grant under this
section for a fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense shall
take into consideration the following conditions and needs at
impacted school facilities of eligible local educational
agencies:
``(1) The repair or renovation of facilities is needed to
meet State mandated class size requirements, including
student-teacher ratios and instructional space size
requirements.
``(2) There is a increase in the number of military
dependent students in facilities of the agency due to
increases in unit strength as part of military readiness.
``(3) There are unhoused students on a military
installation due to other strength adjustments at military
installations.
``(4) The repair or renovation of facilities is needed to
address any of the following conditions:
``(A) The condition of the facility poses a threat to the
safety and well-being of students.
``(B) The requirements of the Americans with Disabilities
Act.
``(C) The cost associated with asbestos removal, energy
conservation, or technology upgrades.
``(D) Overcrowding conditions as evidenced by the use of
trailers and portable buildings and the potential for future
overcrowding because of increased enrollment.
``(5) The repair or renovation of facilities is needed to
meet any other Federal or State mandate.
``(6) The number of military dependent students as a
percentage of the total student population in the particular
school facility.
``(7) The age of facility to be repaired or renovated.
``(g) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Local educational agency.--The term `local
educational agency' has the meaning given that term in
section 8013(9) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7713(9)).
``(2) Impacted school facility.--The term `impacted school
facility' means a facility of a local educational agency--
``(A) that is used to provide elementary or secondary
education at or near a military installation; and
``(B) at which the average annual enrollment of military
dependent students is a high percentage of the total student
enrollment at the facility, as determined by the Secretary of
Defense.
``(3) Military dependent students.--The term `military
dependent students' means students who are dependents of
members of the armed forces or Department of Defense civilian
employees.
``(4) Military installation.--The term `military
installation' has the meaning given that term in section
2687(e) of this title.''.
(b) Amendments to Chapter Heading and Tables of Contents.--
(1) The heading of chapter 111 of title 10, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
``CHAPTER 111--SUPPORT OF EDUCATION''.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter
is amended by striking the item relating to section 2199 and
inserting the following new items:
``2199. Quality of life education facilities grants.
``2199a. Definitions.''.
(3) The tables of chapters at the beginning of subtitle A,
and at the beginning of part III of subtitle A, of such title
are amended by striking the item relating to chapter 111 and
inserting the following:
``111. Support of Education.................................2191''.....
(c) Funding for Fiscal Year 2001.--Amounts appropriated in
the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2001, under the
heading ``Quality of Life Enhancements, Defense'' may be used
by the Secretary of Defense to make grants under section 2199
of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a).
____
AMENDMENT NO. 3734
(Purpose: To postpone implementation of the Defense Joint Accounting
System (DJAS) pending an analysis of the system)
On page 123, between lines 12 and 13, insert the following:
SEC. 377. POSTPONEMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION OF DEFENSE JOINT
ACCOUNTING SYSTEM (DJAS) PENDING ANALYSIS OF
THE SYSTEM.
(a) Postponement.--The Secretary of Defense may not grant a
Milestone III decision for the Defense Joint Accounting
System (DJAS) until the Secretary--
(1) conducts, with the participation of the Inspector
General of the Department of Defense and the inspectors
general of the military departments, an analysis of
alternatives to the system to determine whether the system
warrants deployment; and
(2) if the Secretary determines that the system warrants
deployment, submits to the congressional defense committees a
report certifying that the system meets Milestone I and
Milestone II requirements and applicable requirements of the
Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (divisions D and E of Public Law
104-106).
(b) Deadline for Report.--The report referred to in
subsection (a)(2) shall be submitted, if at all, not later
than March 30, 2001.
____
AMENDMENT NO. 3737
(Purpose: To repeal the prohibition on use of Department of Defense
funds for the procurement of a nuclear-capable shipyard crane from a
foreign source)
On page 32, after line 24, add the following:
SEC. 142. REPEAL OF PROHIBITION ON USE OF DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE FUNDS FOR PROCUREMENT OF NUCLEAR-
CAPABLE SHIPYARD CRANE FROM A FOREIGN SOURCE.
Section 8093 of the Department of Defense Appropriations
Act, 2000 (Public Law 106-79; 113 Stat. 1253) is amended by
striking subsection (d), relating to a prohibition on the use
of Department of Defense funds to procure a nuclear-capable
shipyard crane from a foreign source.
____
amendment no. 3762, as modified
(Purpose: To provide for the humane administration of Department of
Defense secrecy oaths and policies, consistent with national security
needs, where workers and communities at nuclear weapons facilities may
have had their health compromised by exposure to radioactive and other
hazardous substances)
On page 415; between lines 2 and 3, insert the following:
SEC. 1061. SECRECY POLICIES AND WORKER HEALTH.
(a) Review of Secrecy Policies.--The Secretary of Defense
in consultation with the Secretary of Energy shall review
classification and security policies and; within appropriate
national security constraints, ensure that such policies do
not prevent or discourage employees at former nuclear weapons
facilities who may have been exposed to radioactive or other
hazardous substances associated with nuclear weapons from
discussing such exposures with appropriate health care
providers and with other appropriate officials. The policies
reviewed should include the policy to neither confirm nor
deny the presence of nuclear weapons as it is applied to
former U.S. nuclear weapons facilities that no longer contain
nuclear weapons or materials.
(c) Notification of Affected Employees.--(1) The Secretary
of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of Energy shall
seek to identify individuals who are or were employed at
Department of Defense sites that no longer store, assemble,
disassemble, or maintain nuclear weapons.
(2) Upon determination that such employees may have been
exposed to radioactive or hazardous substances associated
with nuclear weapons at such sites, such employees shall be
notified of any such exposures to radiation, or hazardous
substances associated with nuclear weapons.
(3) Such notification shall include an explanation of how
such employees can discuss any such exposures with health
care providers who do not possess security clearances without
violating security or classification procedures or, if
necessary, provide guidance to facilitate the ability of such
individuals to contact health care providers with appropriate
security clearances or discuss such exposures with other
officials who are determined by the Secretary of Defense to
be appropriate.
(d) The Secretary of Defense in consultation with the
Secretary of Energy shall, no later than May 1, 2001, submit
a report to the Congressional Defense Committees setting
forth:
(1) the results of the review in paragraph (a) including
any changes made or recommendations for legislation; and
(2) the status of the notification in paragraph (b) and an
anticipated date on which such notification will be
completed.
amendment no. 3733
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I am deeply concerned about the
condition of the classrooms within our military dependent schools. A
number of our classrooms contain asbestos, roofs leak, classes are
overcrowded, three or four teachers have to share the same desk,
science labs are 30 plus years old and potentially unsafe, and some
schools are not in compliance with the American with Disabilities Act.
I am ashamed that military families who live on base are forced to
send their kids to school facilities in these conditions. I was even
more disturbed when I found out the many other
[[Page S6552]]
school districts that teach large numbers of military dependents have
similar infrastructure problems.
Amazingly most kids have done well despite this environment but I
worry about the impact the deteriorating school facilities has on
declining military retention and recruitment. The condition of these
schools is clearly a quality of life issue for military families.
Mr. President, I offer an amendment today to help alleviate these
problems and ensure a safe and comfortable learning environment for
more than 80,000 children of members of our armed forces.
My amendment establishes a grant program within the Department of
Defense to assist school districts with repair and renovation costs for
facilities used to educate large numbers of military kids. The program
would enable qualified school districts to apply for grants up to $5
million every two years to help meet health and safety, class size,
ADA, asbestos removal, and technology requirements.
The program would also assist school districts faced with significant
enrollment increases due to increases in on-base housing or mission
changes. Lastly, school districts could seek assistance for repair and
renovation costs of Department of Defense owned schools being
transferred to a local school district.
For example, at Robins Air Force Base in Georgia a DOD owned
elementary school is being transferred to the local school district but
$4 million in repairs is needed to bring the school up to the local
district's safety and fire standards.
Why is Department of Defense assistance needed? Most of the school
districts serving large numbers of military children have limited
bonding ability or no tax base to raise the necessary capital funding.
For example, seven public schools districts that serve military
dependents are located solely on the military installation and in turn
have no tax base or bonding authority. The seven schools rely on impact
aid and state funding and almost all repair or renovation expenditures
come at the expense of instructional funding.
The Department of Education is authorized to provide construction
funding for impacted schools but only $10 million is provided for
hundreds of impacted schools nationwide. An additional $5 million is
available for school facilities owned by the Department of Education
but the needs of those schools far exceed the available funding.
The Department of Education has essentially abdicated its
responsibility to ensure a safe and comfortable learning environment at
federally impacted schools. We often hear of the need for more federal
dollars for school construction but who deserves this more than the
children whose parents serve in our armed forces.
Schools that teach large numbers of military dependents receive
supplemental impact aid assistance through the Department of Defense,
$30 million in FY 2000 benefitting about 130 schools. However, the
funding is not sufficient to meet major repair and renovation costs.
A comprehensive program is needed to address this serious quality of
life issue. And, without Department of Defense assistance tens of
thousands of military children will continue to learn in inadequate and
unsafe facilities.
This amendment would benefit the 30 most heavily impacted school
districts that teach military children.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support this important quality
of life issue that will benefit more than 80,000 military children.
amendment no. 3762, as modified
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I have an amendment to correct an
absurdity in our application of important secrecy policies. This issue
would be a laughable example of bureaucratic intransigence except that
it is harming workers who may have gotten sick from working on our
nuclear weapons.
I'm sure that by now all my colleagues are aware that many of our
citizens were exposed to radioactive and other hazardous materials at
nuclear weapons production plants in the United States. While working
to protect our national security, workers at places like Paducah,
Kentucky, Portsmouth, Ohio, and Oak Ridge, Tennessee were subjected to
severe hazards, sometimes without their knowledge or consent. We
recently passed an amendment to provide compensation to some of those
who became seriously ill because of their dangerous work at nuclear
weapons plants.
The dangers at these plants thrived in the darkness of government
secrecy. Public oversight was especially weak at a factory for
assembling and disassembling nuclear weapons at the Iowa Army
Ammunition Plant in Middletown, Iowa. I first found out about the
nuclear weapons work there from a constituent letter from a former
worker, Robert Anderson. He was concerned that his non-Hodgkins
lymphoma was caused by exposures at the plant. But when I asked the
Department of Energy about the plant, at first they denied that any
nuclear weapons work took place there. The constituent's story was only
confirmed when my staff saw a promotional video from the contractor at
the site that mentioned the nuclear weapons work.
The nuclear weapons production plants were run not by the Defense
Department but by the Atomic Energy Commission, which has since been
made part of the Department of Energy. The Department of Energy has
since acknowledged what happened, and is now actively trying to help
the current and former workers in Iowa and elsewhere by reviewing
records, helping them get medical testing and care, and seeking
compensation. I was pleased this past January to host Energy Secretary
Richardson at a meeting with former workers and community members near
the plant. The Department specifically acknowledges that the Iowa Army
Ammunition Plant assembled and disassembled nuclear weapons from 1947-
1975. And their work has helped uncover potential health concerns at
the plant, such as explosions around depleted uranium that created
clouds of radioactive dust, and workers' exposure to high explosives
that literally turned their skin yellow.
But at the Iowa nuclear weapons plant the Defense Department was
inseparably intertwined with the AEC. The AEC operations were located
on the site of an Army ammunition plant. The workers at both sides of
the plant actually worked for the same contractor, workers often
switched between the plant parts, and workers on both sides of the
plant were even exposed to many of the same hazardous materials,
including beryllium and depleted uranium. Thus former workers at the
plant do not always clearly distinguish the Army from the AEC.
And while the Department of Energy is investigating what happened and
seeking solutions, the Army is stuck, still mired in a nonsensical
policy. It is the policy of the Department of Defense to ``neither
confirm nor deny'' the presence of nuclear weapons at any place at any
time. They could not admit that nuclear weapons were assembled in Iowa
without admitting that there were nuclear weapons in Iowa. So they
write vaguely about ``AEC activities,'' but don't say what those
activities were.
There have been no nuclear weapons at the Iowa site since 1975, but
it's well known that weapons were there before that. The DOE says the
weapons were there. A promotional video of the Army contractor at the
site even says the weapons were there. But the Army can't say it. This
makes the Army look ridiculous.
But worse, it sends the wrong signal to the former workers. These
workers swore oaths never to reveal what they did at the plant. And
many of them are still reluctant to talk. They are worried that their
cancers or other health problems were caused by their work at the
plant. But they feel that they can't even tell their doctors or site
cleanup crews about the materials they worked with or the tasks they
did. They don't want to violate the oaths of secrecy they took. One
worker at the Iowa plant said recently, ``There's still stuff buried
out there that we don't know where it is. And we know people who do
know, but they will not say anything yet because they are still afraid
of repercussions.'' Instead of helping those workers speak out, the
Army is forced to share their silence.
And Mr. President, to make the position even more indefensible for my
workers in Iowa, the Pentagon is not even consistently applying the
``neither confirm nor deny,'' or ``NCND,''
[[Page S6553]]
policy. A document recently released by the Pentagon stated that the
U.S. had nuclear weapons in Alaska, Cuba, Guam, Hawaii, the Johnston
Islands, Midway, Puerto Rico, the United Kingdom, and West Germany.
After the document was released, a Department spokesman said on
television that the U.S. never had nuclear weapons in Iceland. Why can
the Pentagon talk about nuclear weapons in Iceland but not in Iowa?
Mr. President, for the health of our workers, it's time for the
Pentagon to come clean. No one is more concerned with keeping real
nuclear secrets than I am. But the Pentagon must not hide behind
inconsistent policies when workers' lives may be at risk.
This amendment is narrowly targeted to require the Defense Department
and Energy Department to review their classification and secrecy
policies and change them if they prevent or discourage workers at
nuclear weapons facilities from discussing possible exposures with
their health care providers. The amendment specifically recognizes that
this must be done within national security constraints. It also directs
the Departments to contact people who may have been exposed to
radioactive or hazardous substances at former nuclear weapons
facilities, including the Iowa plant. The Department is to notify them
of any exposures and of how they can discuss the exposures with their
health care providers and other appropriate officials without violating
secrecy oaths or policies.
I hope all my colleagues will support this common-sense change for
government consistency and worker health.
Amendments Nos. 3816 and 3817
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send two amendments to the desk which
have been cleared by myself and the ranking member. Therefore, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate consider these amendments en bloc,
they be agreed to, and the motions to reconsider laid upon the table.
Finally, I ask that any statements relating to any of the individual
amendments be printed at the appropriate place in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendments (Nos. 3816 and 3817) were agreed to, as follows:
AMENDMENT NO. 3816
(Purpose: To streamline the requirements for procurement notice when
access to notice is provided electronically through the single
Governmentwide point of access designated in the Federal Acquisition
Regulation)
On page 303, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following:
SEC. 814. PROCUREMENT NOTICE THROUGH ELECTRONIC ACCESS TO
CONTRACTING OPPORTUNITIES.
(a) Publication by Electronic Accessibility.--Subsection
(a) of section 18 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy
Act (41 U.S.C. 416) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking ``furnish for
publication by the Secretary of Commerce'' and inserting
``publish'';
(2) by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following:
``(2)(A) A notice of solicitation required to be published
under paragraph (1) may be published by means of--
``(i) electronic accessibility that meets the requirements
of paragraph (7); or
``(ii) publication in the Commerce Business Daily.
``(B) The Secretary of Commerce shall promptly publish in
the Commerce Business Daily each notice or announcement
received under this subsection for publication by that
means.''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(7) A publication of a notice of solicitation by means of
electronic accessibility meets the requirements of this
paragraph for electronic accessibility if the notice is
electronically accessible in a form that allows convenient
and universal user access through the single Government-wide
point of entry designated in the Federal Acquisition
Regulation.''.
(b) Waiting Period for Issuance of Solicitation.--Paragraph
(3) of such subsection is amended--
(1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking
``furnish a notice to the Secretary of Commerce'' and
inserting ``publish a notice of solicitation''; and
(2) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``by the Secretary of
Commerce''.
(c) Conforming Amendments for Small Business Act.--
Subsection (e) of section 8 of the Small Business Act (15
U.S.C. 637) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking ``furnish for
publication by the Secretary of Commerce'' and inserting
``publish'';
(2) by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following:
``(2)(A) A notice of solicitation required to be published
under paragraph (1) may be published by means of--
``(i) electronic accessibility that meets the requirements
of section 18(a)(7) of the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 416(a)(7)); or
``(ii) publication in the Commerce Business Daily.
``(B) The Secretary of Commerce shall promptly publish in
the Commerce Business Daily each notice or announcement
received under this subsection for publication by that
means.''; and
(3) in paragraph (3)--
(A) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking
``furnish a notice to the Secretary of Commerce'' and
inserting ``publish a notice of solicitation''; and
(B) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``by the Secretary of
Commerce''.
(d) Periodic Reports on Implementation of Electronic
Commerce in Federal Procurement.--Section 30(e) of the Office
of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 426(e)) is
amended--
(1) in the first sentence, by striking ``Not later than
March 1, 1998, and every year afterward through 2003'' and
inserting ``Not later than March 1 of each even-numbered year
through 2004''; and
(2) in paragraph (4)--
(A) by striking ``Beginning with the report submitted on
March 1, 1999,''; and
(B) by striking ``calendar year'' and inserting ``two
fiscal years''.
(e) Effective Date and Applicability.--This section and the
amendments made by this section shall take effect on October
1, 2000. The amendments made by subsections (a), (b) and (c)
shall apply with respect to solicitations issued on or after
that date.
____
AMENDMENT NO. 3817
(Purpose: To authorize a land conveyance, Mukilteo Tank Farm, Everett,
Washington)
On page 543, strike line 20 and insert the following:
Part III--Air Force Conveyances
SEC. 2861. LAND CONVEYANCE, MUKILTEO TANK FARM, EVERETT,
WASHINGTON.
(a) Conveyance Authorized.--The Secretary of the Air Force
may convey, without consideration, to the Port of Everett,
Washington (in this section referred to as the ``Port''), all
right, title, and interest of the United States in and to a
parcel of real property, including any improvements thereon,
consisting of approximately 22 acres and known as the
Mukilteo Tank Farm for the purposes of permitting the Port to
use the parcel for the development and operation of a port
facility and for other public purposes.
(b) Personal Property.--The Secretary of the Air Force may
include as part of the conveyance authorized by subsection
(a) any personal property at the Mukilteo Tank Farm that is
excess to the needs of the Air Force if the Secretary of
Transportation determines that such personal property is
appropriate for the development or operation of the Mukilteo
Tank Farm as a port facility.
(c) Interim Lease.--(1) Until such time as the real
property described in subsection (a) is conveyed by deed, the
Secretary of the Air Force may lease all or part of the real
property to the Port if the Secretary determines that the
real property is suitable for lease and the lease of the
property under this subsection will not interfere with any
environmental remediation activities or schedules under
applicable law or agreements.
(2) The determination under paragraph (1) whether the lease
of the real property will interfere with environmental
remediation activities or schedules referred to in that
paragraph shall be based upon an environmental baseline
survey conducted in accordance with applicable Air Force
regulations and policy.
(3) Except as provided by paragraph (4), as consideration
for the lease under this subsection, the Port shall pay the
Secretary an amount equal to the fair market of the lease, as
determined by the Secretary.
(4) The amount of consideration paid by the Port for the
lease under this subsection may be an amount, as determined
by the Secretary, less than the fair market value of the
lease if the Secretary determines that--
(A) the public interest will be served by an amount of
consideration for the lease that is less than the fair market
value of the lease; and
(B) payment of an amount equal to the fair market value of
the lease is unobtainable.
(d) Description of Property.--The exact acreage and legal
description of the property to be conveyed under subsection
(a) shall be determined by a survey satisfactory to the
Secretary of the Air Force and the Port.
(e) Additional Terms.--The Secretary of the Air Force, in
consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, may
require such additional terms and conditions in connection
with the conveyance under subsection (a) as the Secretary of
the Air Force considers appropriate to protect the interests
of the United States.
Part IV--Defense Agencies Conveyances
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, for the time allotted in debate in support
of the amendment, I would like to yield 10 minutes to the Senator from
Minnesota, Senator Wellstone.
[[Page S6554]]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Thank you, Mr. President. I am very proud to have
worked with Senator Durbin to be a cosponsor and have Senator Kerry
here on the floor as well.
I think this important amendment requiring more realistic testing of
the national missile system is an extremely important step for us to
take. First of all, it requires more realistic testing. Second, it
calls for the reconvening of the Welch commission to independently
evaluate the testing program. Third, it requires a report to the
Congress on the adequacy of the program.
This is the fourth time since the late fifties that we have talked
about a missile defense program. Each time there is a tremendous amount
of enthusiasm. Then scientists and independent observers do a careful
analysis. After that, the enthusiasm wanes. I do not believe this time
will be any different.
I am sure every Senator read on Sunday morning that this past
Saturday's test was an utter failure. What you may not know is that an
earlier test was unsuccessful as well. But regardless of the actual
successes and failures of the tests, the fact is, the current testing
program does not test the feasibility of the system in the real world.
Current testing determines whether or not the system works against
cooperative targets on a test range. This methodology is insufficient
to determine the technological feasibility of the system against likely
threats. At present, even if the tests had been hailed as total
successes, they would have proved nothing more than the system is
unproven against real threats. At present, we know that this system
might work if the other side is not making it hard to detect its
weapons. This hardly seems a reason to move forward to deployment.
Some might argue that this amendment demands too much. Some might
argue that today's testing program is a first step in a long process
towards full deployment. But demanding an adequate testing program,
which is what this amendment calls for, certainly does not put the bar
too far. It sets it where any reasonable person or scientist would put
it. We must stick to development and work within the confines of a
realistic test before even considering moving to deployment.
The aim of the national missile defense is to defend the United
States from limited attacks by intercontinental-range ballistic
missiles armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. However,
biological or chemical weapons can be divided into many small warheads
called submunitions. These submunitions could overwhelm the planned
defense, and more importantly, because some munitions allow for more
effective dispersal of biological and chemical agents, an attacker
would have a strong incentive to use them even in the absence of
missile defenses. When it comes to biological warfare and these
biological and chemical agents, the greater likelihood is that they
will be carried by suitcase into this country. I pray that doesn't
happen.
Current testing does not take countermeasures into account. An attack
could overwhelm the system by using something as simple as ballooned
decoys, for example, by deploying nuclear weapons inside balloons and
releasing numerous empty balloons along with them. Or an attacker could
cover its nuclear warheads with cooled shrouds which would prevent the
interceptor from detecting it. We are talking about testing which takes
into account these countermeasures. That is what we would have to deal
with.
Current testing does not take these countermeasures into account. The
Pentagon assessment will consider only whether the first phase of the
system would be effective against a threat with no credible
countermeasures. It will not consider whether the full system would be
effective against a threat with realistic countermeasures. Any decision
on whether or not the United States should deploy a national missile
defense should take into account how effective that system is likely to
be in the real world, not just whether or not it works against
cooperative targets on a test range.
Unfortunately, the technological feasibility of the proposed national
defense system, which will be determined in the Pentagon's upcoming
deployment readiness review, will be assessed precisely on the basis of
such test results. Even worse, it will be based upon only a few tests.
The administration requested that the Pentagon provide an estimate of
whether a national missile defense can be deployed in 5 year's time.
General Kadish, the head of the Pentagon's ballistic missile defense
program, has described the 2005 timetable as ``high risk.'' He has made
it clear that the timetable is much faster than military planners would
like. The recommendation of the Pentagon's own Office of the
Operational and Test Evaluation Program stated clearly that the
deployment readiness review ``is a strongly `schedule driven'
approach'' rather than one based upon results.
Is it too much to ask that we be certain that this system works
before we move ahead with deployment?
That is what this amendment is about.
If the proposed national missile defense system is to have any
possibility of enhancing U.S. security, it must work, and it must work
well. At present, the evidence isn't there to prove that it does, and
the tests underway to establish that proof are simplified and
unrealistic. We must demand that any deployment decision on national
missile defense be postponed until the system has been tested
successfully against real-world realistic threats.
Last year, I voted against a resolution urging the administration to
make a decision to deploy a national missile defense system. I believed
then, as I do now, that a decision to deploy before a decision is made
there needs to be a careful evaluation of the effectiveness of the
system.
I also believe that we need to look at this in the context of overall
U.S. security needs. The goal should be to increase U.S. security--not
to undermine it. Deploying a system now, I fear, does the opposite. It
threatens to disrupt the current arms control regimen and undermine the
credibility of our commitment to nonproliferation.
Deployment of a national missile defense system would be a violation
of the ABM Treaty. Are we prepared to discard this arms control
regimen? I worry--and I think every Senator, Democrat and Republican
alike, worries--about proliferation of these weapons of mass
destruction. If this regimen of arms control breaks down with Russia--
and, perhaps even more importantly, breaks down with China, then there
is India, then there is Pakistan, then there is South Korea, then there
is Japan--I fear the direction in which we are moving.
Colleagues, for 40 years the United States of America has led
international efforts to reduce and contain the danger from nuclear
weapons. We must not now renounce the responsibilities of that
leadership with a hasty and shortsighted decision that will have
lasting consequences. We must answer a number of questions before we
proceed:
Does it make sense to unilaterally deploy a system now if the result
might be to put the American people at even greater risk?
Should we take the time to work with allies and others to find a
mutually acceptable nonthreatening way of proceeding?
Have the threats to which we are responding been exaggerated and more
driven by politics than accurate threat assessments and hard science?
Is the technology there to deploy a system that would actually work
in the real world?
This amendment speaks directly to that last question.
I urge my colleagues to demand to know more about the complexities of
a national missile defense system prior to deploying that system. I
don't think that is an unreasonable request.
The failure of Saturday's test is only a fraction of the real story.
Even a successful test would prove nothing given the current testing
conditions.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment requiring a more
realistic testing of the national missile defense system, reconvening
the Welch panel to independently evaluate a testing program, and
requiring a report to the Congress on the adequacy of the program.
We should not commit ourselves blindly to a program that can cost
billions of dollars and could very well decrease our overall security
rather than
[[Page S6555]]
to enhance it. Our future and our children's children's future could
depend on the decision we make on this amendment. Let's do the right
thing. I hope we can have a strong vote on this amendment.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask my colleague a question and the time
allocated to the Senator from Virginia be charged for the portion of
the colloquy I use.
The Senator makes a fairly strong statement indirectly at our former
colleague, Senator Cohen, now Secretary of Defense, that he would
proceed blindly on this program which is so vital to the security of
the United States, assuming, as you say, under the full criteria that
the President addressed goes forward--that he would go blindly. Is that
a purposeful choice of words directed at this distinguished former
colleague who, in my judgment, having been on the Armed Services
Committee 22 years and having served 18 or 19 of those years with him,
I cannot imagine undertaking the responsibility to oversee a program of
this importance and proceeding, as the Senator said, ``blindly.''
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I say to my colleague I can't imagine
the Secretary of Defense doing that, either. My plea was to Senators. I
said we must not proceed blindly and I urge all Members to understand
the complexity of this testing and to at least call for a thorough
evaluation to make sure that this system will really work. My comments
were not directed to Secretary Cohen.
I also say to my colleague, I don't believe the Secretary of Defense
has made a final recommendation to the President.
Mr. WARNER. I certainly agree.
Mr. WELLSTONE. In light of the failure of this past week, I don't
know what the Secretary's decision will be.
I think all Members are just making the reasonable request that
before we go forward with deployment, let's have the kind of
operational testing that will prove that this system will work in the
real world against credible threats, and let's have an independent
evaluation by the Welch commission and have at least a report to the
Congress.
That is what I am referring to, I say to my colleague from Virginia.
I am glad he asked the question. In no way would I direct these
comments toward the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. WARNER. I have to say with all due respect to our three
colleagues, opponents on this amendment, indirectly this amendment is
suggesting that the Department is not proceeding in a prudent way
towards their responsibilities on this program. I have to state that.
I do not find any specific fault with some of the requests made but
momentarily when I take the floor in my own right, I will have
documentation to show that the Welch panel is doing the very things for
which the Senator asked. I will point to the fact that the Secretary of
Defense has said in previous testimony what he is doing on this
program. In fact, I say to the Presiding Officer, being a member of the
Armed Services Committee and indeed the chairman of the strategic
subcommittee, I asked the Secretary of Defense to come up at his
earliest opportunity and report to the Committee on Armed Services. He
has agreed to do so shortly after his return from his trip currently in
Asia. I thought he addressed the test program, which did, regrettably,
end in a failure, I thought in a very courageous and forthright way he
addressed that failure to the American public and, indeed, the world.
Mr. WELLSTONE. I probably need not respond. I appreciate my
colleague's comments.
One final comment in response to his comments. One of the things I
have liked best about preparing for this amendment for me as a Senator
has been the way I imagined Senate work to be. I tried to immerse
myself on this issue and get the best security briefings from the
Pentagon, get other briefings from other people in the Pentagon, and
talked to a whole range of experts. The Welch Commission report is a
very interesting report.
This amendment certainly says we need to make absolutely sure that we
are involved in the kind of testing that will show this system will
work before we move forward. That is true. That is certainly the
premise of this amendment. I think this is a reasonable premise.
Senators ought to raise these kinds of questions. That is why we are
here. That is why I think this amendment is important.
Mr. WARNER. The Welch panel was before the Armed Services Committee
just last week and testified.
Mr. KERRY. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. WARNER. Yes.
Mr. KERRY. It is my understanding, and I ask the Senator from
Virginia, that the testing that has been laid out in the protocols that
I have seen contemplates testing almost exclusively from off the coast
of California and Kwajalein Island, which by their own admission, the
military has said are less than ideal in representing the multiple
different sources from which a legitimate attack could come.
There is nothing in any protocol that I have seen to date suggesting
that the testing that will take place meets the kind of testing that
the Senator from Illinois is looking for.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will look into that. I recognize the
military had indicated that this perhaps doesn't give them the
diversity of tests they desire.
Certainly, I am interested in the comment that this Nation is faced
with a multiple of sources, and that confirms my concern about the
overall threat posed to this Nation by the rogue or accidental firing
of a missile. That is why we need this national missile defense
program.
Mr. KERRY. If the Senator will yield further for a question, when we
talk about multiple sources, it is possible for a so-called rogue
state--and the term itself is one that is perhaps questionable today,
but the so-called rogue state could take a rusty tanker, fit it out
with the capacity to shoot, drive it out of a harbor to almost any
location in an ocean in the world, and decide to shoot from there. Is
that accurate?
Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. KERRY. If we are strictly testing between one location, one
direction, and our radar system is specifically positioned to
anticipate an attack from a certain location, if that were to be the
case, we would face a completely different situation, would we not?
Mr. WARNER. The Senator is correct. There is a diversity of scenarios
we have to protect this Nation against. This test program was designed
in large measure to prioritize those sources from whence an attack
might emanate.
Mr. KERRY. Finally, I ask the Senator, the entire program is
currently driven by a date essentially arrived at by the national
intelligence estimate, that suggested that 2005 is the first date there
might be a possibility of a missile being fired; is that correct?
Mr. WARNER. That is correct, as a result of the national intelligence
estimate.
Mr. LEVIN. If the Senator will yield.
Mr. KERRY. We are on the time of the Senator from Virginia or I
wouldn't be doing this.
Mr. WARNER. Let's make it clear. I think in my request I said the
time that I consumed would be chargeable to my side.
Mr. KERRY. I thought it was the entire colloquy.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Allard). That was the exchange with the
Senator from Minnesota. The Senator has been yielding for questions on
his time.
Mr. WARNER. Let's make it clear for purposes of future colloquies.
The time consumed by Mr. Levin and myself will be charged to our side,
and the time for response will be charged to the other side.
Mr. KERRY. With that understanding, I am afraid I have to refrain
from this colloquy.
Mr. LEVIN. I say to my good friend from Massachusetts, I happen to
agree with his thoughts on this subject. We are very close in terms of
our views. However, there is a complete misunderstanding about the year
2005. That is not the year when the intelligence estimates say North
Korea will be able to pose a threat to us.
Mr. KERRY. Correct; they can do it today.
Mr. LEVIN. They can do it today. But 2005 is the year which the
Secretary of Defense thought at the time he was making an assessment
some time ago would be the earliest time that we would be able to field
the national missile defense.
So everybody--in the media, on this floor and just about everywhere--
has
[[Page S6556]]
now taken the common wisdom that the 2005 date is when the national
intelligence estimate says the threat will arrive.
That is not what the national intelligence estimate is. The threat is
any time when a three-stage Taepo Dong II could deliver a several-
hundred-kilogram payload anywhere in the United States. And that day is
when they next test it.
With the general point my good friend from Massachusetts is making, I
happen to agree with what he is saying. I certainly support the good
Senator from Illinois on his amendment, but I think we ought to try to
change the wisdom which has evolved around that date or the assumption
or the press coverage of that date.
Everybody uses that date for the wrong reason. Whether it is possible
to reverse it, correct it, I don't know. But I think it would help the
debate a great deal if we were able to look at that date for what it
is, which is the first date that the Secretary of Defense thought, at
the time he made the assessment some months ago, that a national
missile defense could possibly be deployed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
Mr. DURBIN. I ask for a clarification now of the time that has been
allocated to each side and how much is remaining. I have requests from
several of my colleagues, and I want to give them all a chance.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has 51 minutes, 41
seconds. The Senator from Illinois has 44 minutes, 43 seconds.
Mr. DURBIN. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts, Mr.
Kerry.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from
Illinois for his leadership, and I thank also the Senator from
Minnesota for his common sense, leadership, and eloquence on it.
This is really a matter of--I guess the best word to summarize it--
common sense. My prayer is that we in the Senate are not going to
become prisoners of politics on an issue that is as critical to the
national security interests of our country--indeed, of the world. This
is the most important arms decision we will make in years. I am not
going to get into the comparisons of when the last one was, but
certainly in the last 10 or 15 years. I think what the Senator from
Illinois is asking for ought to fit into the political philosophy of
every single member of the Republican Party. I would have hoped the
Senator, the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee,
would say we should accept this amendment. How is it that we could be
talking about deploying a weapons system?
Mr. WARNER. What did the Senator say?
Mr. KERRY. I said to the distinguished chairman of the committee, I
don't understand why he would not want to accept this, because, as a
matter of common sense, every Member of the Senate ought to be
interested in knowing that if we are going to spend $10 billion, $20
billion, $40 billion, $60 billion, $100 billion to create a weapons
system, a defensive or offensive system, we ought to know that it
works. We ought to know it can accomplish its goal.
Some of the best scientists in the United States of America are not
politicians. They do not come at this as Republicans and Democrats,
conservatives and liberals. They are scientists. They win Nobel Prizes
for their science. They go to MIT, Stanford, New York University, all
over this country.
Mr. WARNER. Will the Senator yield for a moment?
Mr. KERRY. We have a limited time.
Mr. WARNER. You asked me a question.
Mr. KERRY. If we can do it on the Senator's time?
Mr. WARNER. Of course. You asked if I would accept it, as chairman of
the committee, one of the managers. The answer is yes. I think our
distinguished colleague from Illinois knows that. We have said to him
three times: We accept the amendment. Am I not correct? Let the Record
indicate he is nodding assent to the question. The Senator from
Michigan has urged him we would accept it.
So rally on, dear colleague. We will listen to you. I don't mean to
deflate your argument as to why we would not do it, because we have
offered to do it.
Mr. KERRY. This is the most welcome acceptance of the power of my
argument I have ever had on the floor of the Senate. I thank the
distinguished chairman. But I am confident what the Senator from
Illinois wanted to do--and I share this belief--was to have the Senate
talk about this. I think we ought to talk about this. So I do not think
taking 1 hour to discuss something which hopefully will pass
overwhelmingly, or that we then accept, is inappropriate. I think we
need to think about this.
Mr. WARNER. No one is suggesting that.
Mr. KERRY. We face a situation where we are talking about putting
together a system that the best scientists in the world tell us could
literally be rendered absolutely inoperative, if it is simply deployed;
all you have to do is put the system out there, and you have the
ability to create decoys with fairly unsophisticated technology. In
fact, General Welch himself has said in his report, and he said it
before the Armed Services Committee the other day, that they anticipate
the C-1 deployment, which is the deployment currently contemplated,
with countermeasures by year 2005, is a deployment in which they
anticipate current technology, current state-of-the-art technology, has
the ability to deploy countermeasures.
They say you could have bomblets. After the stage separates in outer
space and it is in that midstage, you could have bomblets, up to 100 of
them, released from 1 single warhead. Strictly speaking, that is not a
countermeasure because it is not directed at the entire system. But it
is a countermeasure in that it voids the effectiveness of the system or
the capacity of the system to work effectively.
I ask my colleagues to look around the wall of this Chamber. I
counted earlier, in the great amount of time we had to wait for this
debate, 88 lights up there on the outer section. That is fewer than 100
of these bomblets. I ask you to just look at those. We are supposed to
talk about a system that would be effective enough to destroy bombs
coming at us from outer space, at a spacing far greater than any of
those lights, at tens of hundreds of miles an hour, with the capacity
to distinguish and break through every single one of them to prevent a
chemical weapon or biological weapon, that could be completely lethal
to the entire city of New York, Los Angeles, to a whole State, from
hitting this country.
Does anybody here really believe we are going to be able to go down
that kind of sophisticated, discriminative capacity? Some say maybe we
might get there in 10 years, 20 years, 30 years; that we might have
that ability if everything worked correctly. Maybe we can develop that
kind of system ultimately. But at what cost? Then the question is, What
is the next tier of countermeasure that defeats whatever it is we did
to defeat their countermeasure?
People sit here and say: Don't worry about that, Senator; we are just
going to have a technological superiority.
All you have to do is go back to the cold war, 50 years of point-
counterpoint; step-counterstep. We do the atom bomb; they do the atom
bomb. We do the hydrogen bomb; they do the hydrogen bomb. We put them
on long-range aircraft; they put them on long-range aircraft. We MIRV;
they MIRV. They do Sputnik; we do Sputnik.
Out of all of the measures through the entire cold war, the United
States of America was the first to do them almost every single time. I
think the record is all but once and maybe twice. Every single time we
did it, it may have taken them 5 years, it may have taken them 7 years,
but they did it. And finally we decided that we were safer by passing
the ABM Treaty and beginning to move in the opposite direction, first
with SALT and then with START.
Now all we are asking in this amendment is let's be certain, before
we spend these billions of dollars. I happen to support this. I want to
be very clear about this. I support the notion of developing a limited,
capable, mutually deployed system for national defense that could,
indeed, strike down a potential rogue missile or accidental firing. No
leader of the United States could responsibly suggest we are going
[[Page S6557]]
to write off an entire city or State, or half our country. Of course we
have an obligation to go down that road, but we have an equal
obligation to do it in a way that does not wind up upsetting the entire
balance of the arms race, or our current process of diminishing arms,
that does not tell all our allies the United States is going to break
out, at some point, of their regime at our own will; that we have not
established a sufficient level of scrutiny, of transparency, of
mutuality, that brings people along with us so they understand where we
are going.
I say to my friend, I am all for continuing as rapidly as we can the
technological development, the research, the capacity to do this, but
don't we want to do it in a way that guarantees we have a system that
can do what it sets out to do without inviting a set of unintended
consequences that actually wind up making the world not as safe as we
were when we began the process? That is all we are asking.
I can envision a world where the Russians and the Chinese and others
decide we are all safer if we have a capacity to prevent a terrorist
from firing some kind of missile from anywhere, but we are only safer
if other countries move along with us and perceive that they are
sharing in that safety and that, somehow, it is not a new measure
directed by the United States against their current level of perceived
security or threat level.
All of this is an ongoing process of perceptions: How they perceive
us; how we perceive them. It is important to be sensitive to those
perceptions.
I believe what the amendment of the Senator from Illinois will do
will actually build on General Welch's recommendations. It will
explicitly set out what the BMDO should do. It will require ground and
flight testing that will make the system safer and better. It will
ultimately guarantee us that we will get the kind of system we want.
General Welch says he intends for the independent review team to
address these countermeasure issues. It seems to me what the Senator
from Illinois is doing is guaranteeing that the Congress is going on
record, just as we did in saying we think we ought to pursue this, just
as we did in suggesting that there are certain threshold levels that we
ought to respond to with respect to our intelligence.
My final comment is, picking up where the Senator from Michigan
closed, the 2005 deadline is exactly what the Senator from Michigan
defined it as. It is, in effect, an out-of-the-sky, artificially
arrived at deadline. Yet it has been driving this debate and driving
the Congress' actions. We have time to pursue this thoughtfully and
efficiently. That is what this amendment sets out to do. I congratulate
the Senator from Illinois.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired. The Senator
from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I may address my colleague on my time
and his reply can be charged to his time, I wish to associate myself
with the response of my distinguished colleague from Michigan with
regard to 2005. He is absolutely correct. The threat exists today. The
warhead content is a different subject for a different time, but it is
a part of this equation in calculation of time.
I am pleased the Senator from Massachusetts said on the floor tonight
that he supports going forward with the concept of what we call the
Cochran bill which was signed by the President of the United States.
That is my understanding of what he said. He did vote for it. But he
said collectively, we, and he opened his arms. The record also shows
that the other two colleagues on this amendment did not vote for the
Cochran bill and were two of the three who voted against it. The ``we''
I think we want to make a little clearer.
Here is my problem with this amendment, and I find myself in somewhat
of an awkward position. I am defending Bill Cohen, my good friend, the
Secretary of Defense of the administration with which my colleagues
pride themselves with a long-time association. Fine.
Here is what it says on page 4 of the amendment:
Independent Review Panel.-- (1) The Secretary of Defense
shall reconvene the Panel on Reducing Risk in Ballistic
Missile Defense Flight Test Program.
There it is, ``shall reconvene.''
Here is the panel to which he was speaking which reported to the
Nation on June 13 of this year, and on page 3, General Welch and his
colleagues said the following:
The IRT believes that design discrimination capabilities
are adequate to meet the defined C-1 threat. However, more
advanced decoy suites are likely to escalate the
discrimination challenge. The mid-course phase BMD concept
used in the current NMD program has important architectural
advantages. At the same time, that concept requires critical
attention to potential countermeasure challenges.
Precisely what my colleague from Massachusetts is saying. Let me
finish:
There is extensive potential in the system design to grow
discrimination capabilities. The program to more fully
understand needs and to exploit and expand this growth
potential to meet future threats needs to be well defined,
clearly assigned, and funded now.
The concluding sentence:
A panel of the IRT is continuing work in this area.
When you direct the Secretary of Defense to do something the panel is
already doing, I say to my good friends and colleagues, what is this
about? That is why we will not accept the amendment. It has some
constructive parts to it, but you are directing the Secretary of
Defense to do something he is already doing. That is my concern.
Mr. KERRY. If I can answer the distinguished Senator, and I know the
Senator from Illinois will talk about it more, the truth is, if you
read the Senator's amendment in full, the Senator is very precise about
those kinds of tests that he thinks the Congress ought to guarantee
take place.
The Secretary of Defense is a friend of mine, too. I went to meet
with him 3 weeks ago on this very subject to spend some time talking it
through with him, but I find nothing inappropriate, nor do I think he
would as a former Member of this Chamber, in this Chamber expressing
its will in requiring a certain set of tests with respect to a system.
This is not the first time we will have required the Secretary of
Defense to do something. In point of fact, when we pass the DOD
authorization bill, we have literally hundreds of directives for the
Secretary of Defense with respect to housing, treatment of deployments,
recruitments--there are countless numbers of ways we direct him to do
things. It is entirely appropriate we direct him----
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I agree, but the amendment says clearly
you shall do something he is already doing.
Mr. KERRY. I say to my friend from Virginia, I read that report very
carefully. There is nothing in it that guarantees to me--there is
terminology about further investigation, further evaluation, but that
could be on paper; that could be a computer model; that could be in any
number of ways that they decide satisfy a fairly strong compulsion,
shall we say, within the institution to build.
What we want to guarantee is that compulsion is appropriately
measured against a clear empirical standard that we are establishing. I
find absolutely nothing inconsistent in that.
Moreover, with respect to the date that is compelling us--I know the
chairman of the committee will agree with me on this --the fact is that
significant changes have been made in the intelligence estimating
process which has also made many people nervous about how people want
to push this process a little bit.
The Senator from Michigan talked about the possibility of a missile
being fired by North Korea. Until, I think, a year ago or 2 years ago--
I will finish very quickly. I am not going to go on long. I want to
make this point because it is important.
We used to measure in an intelligence estimate more than mere
possibility. We measure intention, and it was only in response to the
1995 Rumsfeld process that suddenly we changed the way we evaluate
this. We now no longer contemplate intention; we merely look at
possibility. I say to my friend, it may be a possibility that North
Korea has one missile that they could fire, but they would have to be
beyond insane to do it because they would not last on the face of this
planet more than 30 minutes because of our response.
So do they have an intention to do it, particularly when you measure
it against the Perry mission, when you
[[Page S6558]]
measure it against Kim Dae-jung's recent visit and the entire
rapprochement that is currently taking place? Are we to believe this is
a legitimate threat we should be responding to with such speed that
will not guarantee the kind of testing the Senator from Illinois is
asking for?
That is our point. I think this is one where there are suspicions
sufficient to raise questions about the guarantees that the testing
will be there that we need.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague.
It is important we do have colloquies on this issue. You have hit on
a very important point, and that is ``contentious.'' Throughout our
long history, through the cold war with the former Soviet Union--
indeed, today with Russia--there was always the underlying predicate
that the Soviet Union--and now Russia--would handle decisionmaking as
it relates to strategic intercontinental ballistic missiles in a
responsible way.
Up until recently, we knew very little about North Korea, we knew
very little about the intentions of the deceased leader, and now the
new leader. Some ground has been broken. I happen to be on the cautious
side.
So let us watch, not just for a month, not just for 2 months, but for
over a period of time. It may well be that we can get a different
perspective and understanding about the new leadership. But as yet, we
cannot, and we have to rely on much in the past.
Mr. KERRY. I thank the Senator from Illinois for his indulgence
because he has allowed us to go ahead longer than he gave me. I thank
him.
Mr. WARNER. Yes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, what is the status of the time allocation
for both sides?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois has 32 minutes 42
seconds; and the Senator from Virginia has 42 minutes 48 seconds.
Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, I yield myself no more than 3 minutes to make one
point.
Let me say, first to the chairman of the committee, who has been kind
enough to stay here this evening for this important debate, that I
think the level of exchange and dialog here this evening is an
indication of the knowledge on the subject of the Members who have
stayed and the level of their interest. I hope it adds to the national
debate.
I also say to the chairman of the committee, I believe all of us in
this Chamber share mutual respect for our current Secretary of Defense.
I think he is doing an excellent job. Nothing that any of us have said
or will say should bring into question our admiration and respect for
his ability and his service to our country.
I also tell my colleagues, I had the good fortune, in preparing for
the debate, to go through a classified briefing and also to meet with
Director Philip Coyle, who is in charge of Operational Test and
Evaluation at the Department of Defense under the leadership of
Secretary Cohen.
I asked him to put in common terms, that I can take back to a town
meeting in Illinois, what we are talking about when we use the words
``technologically feasible.''
He said: Well, consider it this way. Is it technologically feasible
to hit a hole in one in golf? Yes. Is it technologically feasible to
hit a hole in one if the hole you are shooting at is moving? Yes, but
it is getting a little more difficult. Is it technologically feasible
to hit a hole in one if the hole you are shooting at is moving, as is
the flag in that hole, and five or six other flags are moving as well,
and you are not sure which one is actually the hole you are shooting
at? Yes, I suppose that is technologically feasible, but now it is
getting to be very difficult.
But it raises the very question of this debate about countermeasures.
I would like to quote and make part of this Record a letter that was
sent to me on July 11 by Philip Coyle, director of the Office of
Operational Test and Evaluation, in which he said:
This letter is to support your effort to reinforce the need
for realistic testing of the National Missile Defense (NMD)
system. It is still very early in the developmental testing
of NMD. As we move forward, test realism will need to grow
with system capability, and it will become more and more
important to achieve realistic operational conditions in NMD
system tests. This will include realistic countermeasures and
engagement conditions.
The very nature of missile defense means that it will not
be possible to demonstrate all possible engagements in open
air flight intercept tests. Accordingly, it will be necessary
to develop realistic ground test simulations including
realistic hardware-in-the-loop and scene generation
facilities. I especially appreciate your commitment to both
ground based and open air flight tests.
If I can provide additional information, please don't
hesitate to call me.
I say to the chairman of the committee, it is true that we are giving
a directive to the Department of Defense and it is also true that the
gentleman in charge of the testing under this program has said to us he
believes it is an honest effort to make certain the system works.
Mr. WARNER. Could the distinguished Senator provide us with a copy of
that letter?
Mr. DURBIN. I would be happy to.
Mr. WARNER. Perhaps it would be important to put it in the Record.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC, July 11, 2000.
Hon. Richard J. Durbin,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Durbin: This letter is to support your effort
to reinforce the need for realistic testing of the National
Missile Defense (NMD) system. It is still very early in the
developmental testing of NMD. As we move forward, test
realism will need to grow with system capability, and it will
become more and more important to achieve realistic
operational conditions in NMD system tests. This will include
realistic countermeasures and engagement conditions.
The very nature of missile defense means that it will not
be possible to demonstrate all possible engagements in open
air flight intercept tests. Accordingly, it will be necessary
to develop realistic ground test simulations, including
realistic hardware-in-the-loop and scene generation
facilities. I especially appreciate your commitment to both
ground based and open air flight tests.
If I can provide additional information, please don't
hesitate to call me.
Sincerely,
Philip E. Coyle,
Director.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I yield 6 minutes to the Democratic leader
on our Armed Services Committee, Senator Levin of Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first, I commend the Senator from Illinois
for this amendment. It is a very important amendment. It really shows
congressional interest in an area which is going to require a great
deal of attention. That is the statement of General Welch himself,
which my good friend from Virginia just read.
I want to reread one of the lines in the Welch report, which is that:
``more advanced decoy suites are likely to escalate the discrimination
challenge. The mid-course phase BMD concept used in the current
national missile defense program has important architectural
advantages. At the same time, that concept requires critical attention
to potential countermeasure challenges.''
The countermeasures issue requires critical attention.
What the Senator from Illinois is saying is that the Congress should
pay some attention to this, not just the executive branch. I have no
doubt, and my good friend from Virginia has no doubt, Secretary Cohen
will pay attention to this. We do not know if the next Secretary of
Defense will be as interested in this issue--we hope he will be--as
this Secretary.
But the fact that the executive branch is doing something has never
prevented the Congress from putting something into law. We have had
Presidents who have had Executive orders that we agree with, that we
repeat in law. Why would we hesitate to simply express our own view,
show congressional interest, and reinforce something which hopefully
the Defense Department will continue to do? So it is not unusual for us
to direct something. I think we ought to adopt this amendment
overwhelmingly.
This is a very complicated system. The Senator from Virginia pointed
out that a few of our colleagues voted against the Cochran bill. Almost
all of us voted in favor of it. One part of the
[[Page S6559]]
Cochran bill said it should be our national policy--it is our national
policy--to deploy a system when ``technologically feasible'' or words
to that effect.
But there is another provision in the Cochran bill which was added by
amendment, by the Senator from Louisiana, Ms. Landrieu, which I
cosponsored, which said that it is also the policy of the United States
to seek to continue to reduce, by negotiations, the number of nuclear
weapons in this world. That is also the policy of the United States.
We have two policies--a policy to deploy a limited missile defense
and a policy to reduce the number of nuclear weapons. What happens when
those two policies clash is unresolved in the Cochran bill.
We must continue on both those courses. If there is a conflict
between deploying a limited defense, after it is technologically
proven--assuming it is--and reducing the number of nuclear weapons
through continuing negotiations, if there is a conflict--as there
apparently is at the moment, since Russia says she will not reduce
further nuclear weapons if we are going to unilaterally deploy a
national missile defense--if and when there is such a conflict, that
conflict will have to be resolved under the circumstances at that time.
So I think the Senator from Massachusetts was very proper in using
the term ``we'' because many of us supported the Missile Defense Act
because of the presence of a number of policies, both to deploy a
system when technologically feasible, subject to appropriation, as well
as to reduce, through negotiations, the number of nuclear weapons in
this world.
This amendment is a commonsense, fly-before-you-buy amendment. It is
consistent with the Senate's traditions. And it is something we have
almost always required.
The few times we have deviated from the fly-before-you-buy approach,
we have paid heavily for it, at least in a number of those instances.
We should test against countermeasures. We are testing against
countermeasures. This amendment simply says that it wants the Welch
panel to be reauthorized, to continue in existence, to report to the
Congress on defenses against countermeasures.
Finally, I will reread the one line which I think is so important
from the Welch panel: The national missile defense program requires
critical attention to potential countermeasures challenges.
That says it all to me. The current system does not address future
countermeasure threats. It only addresses the so-called C-1 threat, as
the Senator from Massachusetts pointed out. There are going to be in
the future much more sophisticated countermeasures which this system
has to be able to address or else it won't make sense to deploy. That
is what we would be going on record as saying we believe is important.
We would be doing what the Welch panel says is important: paying
critical attention to potential countermeasures challenges, saying that
the Congress cares about this issue, that it makes sense to us that as
part of any decision of operational effectiveness, that there be
testing against reasonably likely countermeasures that could be faced
by a national missile defense.
I am glad my good friend from Virginia believes this is kind of a
commonsense amendment, that it reinforces what the Secretary is already
doing. I think it is very appropriate for Congress to do exactly that,
to show our support when we do support something that is done by the
executive branch and to state our opinion on the subject, and to put it
in law so the next Secretary of Defense realizes it is in law and that
there is congressional interest in the subject.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 6 minutes have expired.
The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have no better friend than my
distinguished colleague from Michigan. What troubles me is he used the
term ``reauthorize.'' Congress never authorized the Welch panel. It was
convened by the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. LEVIN. I said the Secretary, not Congress.
Mr. WARNER. My friend used the term this amendment ``reauthorizes.''
I say to my good friend, Congress had nothing to do with it. This is a
panel of the Secretary of Defense. The amendment language says ``to
reconvene.'' It is not necessary to reconvene something which is
ongoing. I want accuracy in this debate.
Mr. LEVIN. If my friend will yield, if I said Congress reauthorized
instead of urging the Secretary to reconvene and to keep reconvened, I
stand corrected and am happy to stand corrected.
I think the intent was clear, however, of what the Senator from
Michigan said.
Mr. DURBIN. If the Senator from Virginia is not seeking time, I will
continue allocating.
Mr. WARNER. The Senator may go ahead.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from
Rhode Island, Mr. Reed.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Durbin amendment. I
commend him for raising this very important issue this evening.
This debate has already illustrated the knowledge of the participants
and also the commitment of both sides in this debate to try to reach a
very important and principled decision with respect to national missile
defense. The obvious fact is that this is the most expensive military
program we have contemplated, perhaps, in the history of this country,
and there is a great deal riding on it.
It is not only financial, it is also strategic in terms of our
increased security in the world and in terms of the reaction of our
allies, reaction of potential adversaries, all of which makes this
debate critical.
At the heart of this debate--one of the reasons the Senator from
Illinois is contributing mightily to the debate--is the issue of
countermeasures. The importance of countermeasures should be obvious to
all of us. My colleague from Massachusetts talked about this. In the
history of conflict, for every development, there is an attempt to
circumvent or to neutralize that development. So it should be no
wonder, as we contemplate deploying a national missile defense, our
adversaries are at this time thinking of ways they could, in fact,
defeat such a national missile defense.
There are two general ways to do that. One is to build more launchers
with more warheads so you essentially overwhelm whatever missile
defense we have in place. Or--this is probably the most likely
response--you develop countermeasures on your missiles to confuse our
defense and allow your missiles to penetrate despite our national
missile defense.
At the heart of what we should be doing in contemplating the
deployment and funding of this system is ensuring that in the testing
we pay particular attention to the issue of countermeasures, because
that is the most likely response of an adversary to defeat the system
we are proposing. That is common sense in many respects. Anyone with a
cursory knowledge of history would immediately arrive at that
conclusion.
This is not a merely theoretical discussion. Sophisticated
countermeasures already exist. They are the penetrating aids which are
on most of the Russian missiles. There is the possibility, of course,
that these penetrating aids will either be copied by rogue nations or,
in fact, be traded or exchanged to these rogue nations.
I found very interesting a report by the intelligence community which
was unclassified and issued last September. In their words:
We assess that countries developing ballistic missiles
would also develop various responses to U.S. theater and
national defenses. Russia and China each have developed
numerous countermeasures and probably are willing to sell the
requisite technologies.
Many countries, such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq,
probably would rely initially on readily available
technology--including separating RVs, spin-stabilized RVs, RV
reorientation, radar absorbing material, booster
fragmentation, low-power jammers, chaff, and simple balloon
decoys--to develop penetration aids and countermeasures.
These countries could develop countermeasures based on
these technologies by the time they flight test their
missiles.
Frankly, what we are testing against today is a very small fraction
of these possible countermeasures penetrating aids. We have selected a
very discrete set of the most primitive countermeasures, and we have
used that as our benchmark to determine whether or
[[Page S6560]]
not the proposed national missile defense system will work well enough
to fund development and ultimate deployment, when, in fact, our own
intelligence community is telling us today there are numerous
sophisticated penetrating aids that are readily available.
They are also telling us that as we build up this national missile
defense, our potential adversaries, while they build their missiles,
are not just waiting around. They are also developing their
countermeasures. So countermeasures takes on a very important role in
our deliberations.
Senator Durbin has identified this critical issue and has focused the
attention of the Senate on how we will respond to this particular
issue. His response is not only principled but is entirely logical.
What he is saying is, let's ensure that in the testing process, we
don't test the just rudimentary countermeasures, we test for robust
countermeasures. If we can defeat those countermeasures, then we have a
system that not only we can deploy, but that system will be much more
stable, much more effective over time; in effect, increasing the
longevity of the system. When we are going to spend upwards of $60
billion--I think that was one figure quoted; frankly, I believe
whatever figure we have now, it will be much more when we finish paying
the price--if we are spending that much money, we don't want to buy
something that has a half-life of 1 year, 2 years, 3 years or 4 years.
We want something that will justify the expense and defend the country
against likely threats for many years.
Senator Durbin used the analogy of golf. The other analogy that is
very popular to try to bring into popular parlance what is going on
here is essentially what we are trying to do is hit a bullet with
another bullet, small objects flying through space at relatively large
speeds. Think about how difficult that is right now.
We have made progress in terms of supercomputers, in terms of large-
scale computer capacity. So the problem of identifying a speeding
bullet and then calculating instantaneously through billions of
calculations its trajectory and then sending that message to another
bullet is a daunting physical problem, but we have made progress.
However, the countermeasures takes that daunting task and infinitely
increases its complexity because to our system and our kinetic kill
vehicle that is hurling through space, it won't be only one target; it
could be multiple targets. To differentiate those targets, identify the
real targets, and strike it in a matter of seconds is an incredibly
complex technological task.
So I believe, once again, that the Senator has identified something
that is critical to our responsibilities--not the responsibility of the
Secretary of Defense, not the President's responsibility, but our
responsibility as the Senate of the United States to supervise, to
carefully review, and, ultimately, through appropriations and
authorization, to give the final say about this system. That is our
responsibility, and we would be rejecting that responsibility if we
didn't look hard and insist that the executive look hard at this whole
issue of countermeasures.
The other issue that has been discussed tonight is, why should we
tell the Department of Defense to do something such as this when they
are already doing it? Well, the simple answer is: We do it all the
time.
Here are a few examples recently: Last December, the F-22, a very
sophisticated fighter aircraft, was supposed to start its low-rate
initial production; but this decision was delayed because there was
dissatisfaction with its progress, with whether or not it was living up
to its capabilities. We mandated tests because we were unsatisfied with
the deployment schedule and its ability to be brought to the forces in
the field. That was done much further along the line than the place we
are in developing the national missile defense. In many respects, we
are doing the same thing with the Joint Strike Fighter this year.
So it is not unusual to tell the Department of Defense, or to look
over the Secretary's shoulder and say, even though you might be doing
it, we want to make sure you are doing it, we want to make sure that
they are looking specifically at the countermeasures. We want to know
more specifically, when he talks about the capacity of this system to
grow, will it grow up to all the countermeasures listed by the
Intelligence Committee? Will it go from C-1 to C-2? We are not sure
whether it will reach that ultimate test of countermeasures. This is a
valuable role we must play.
There is another aspect to this whole debate, which I think should be
noted. It is a very difficult thing and, in some respects, an
intellectual challenge. For years and years, decades and decades, we
have relied upon deterrence policy----
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 10 minutes of the Senator have expired.
Mr. DURBIN. I yield an additional 1 minute to the Senator.
Mr. REED. I will wrap up quickly.
We have relied upon deterrence policy. At the heart of deterrence
policy is the notion that the other side is rational, and they will
calculate the damage you can do them just as you can calculate the
damage that is done by them.
What has changed now? I would say that intellectually why we are even
having this debate is we have abandoned this concept of rationality. We
don't think North Korea is rational. Again, that is an assumption that
we have to look at closely as we look at some of these other things. In
some respects, if they are totally irrational, then maybe there is a
little hope of deterring them from doing anything, even with the
national missile defense. But that is the difference. That is why my
colleague from Massachusetts said we used to think about intentions,
and now we don't. We made an intellectual decision we weren't going to
look at that because we concluded they were irrational. I suggest that
as we pursue this debate, we should look seriously at whether or not
that assumption is valid.
I thank the Senator from Illinois. I yield back my time.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Rhode Island. How
much time is remaining on our side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Eleven and a half minutes remain.
Mr. DURBIN. Unless the Senator from Virginia wants to seek time, I
will conclude at this point, as briefly as possible.
Mr. WARNER. I welcome that. We have had a good debate. Having said
that, let's wrap it up and pay our respects to the Presiding Officer
and the staff who have all indulged us for this period of time.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, why do we test? We test so we can justify
the taxpayers of America the expenditure of their hard-earned money in
the defense of our country, to make certain that the expenditure is
made in a way that we can stand and be proud of it.
Secondly, we test to make sure that whatever we are building in the
defense of this country will work. That is all this amendment is about.
It is to make certain if the national missile defense is to go forward
and to provide assurance to American families not only now but for
years to come, it is because we have a missile defense system that will
work.
We have heard from a variety of different experts that the question
of countermeasures is a critically important question. In the language
of this amendment, we are asking the Secretary of Defense to come
forward and give us guidance as to what the state of countermeasures
might be in the world and to judge whether or not our missile defense
system can deal with those countermeasures and whether we are testing
to make certain that that happens. That is the bottom line.
The response from the Senator from Virginia, and virtually every
Senator who has spoken, is the understanding that what we are asking
for in this amendment is reasonably calculated to ensure that any
missile defense system, in fact, gives us a real sense of security and
not a false sense of security.
This amendment is not intended to derail the national missile defense
system. It is intended to make certain that the system, if America
comes to rely on it for national defense, actually works.
In years gone by, when we hurried along the testing process, we have
had some sorry results. The B-1 bomber went into production in the late
1970s and wasn't fully integrated into flying units for 24 years. There
were major problems with avionics, the engines,
[[Page S6561]]
and the defensive stealth configuration that costs literally hundreds
of millions of dollars. Adequate testing did not take place before
money was spent on a system that was not capable of meeting the need of
our national defense. Let us not allow that to happen when it comes to
something as critical as our national missile defense system.
I thank the Senator from Virginia for his patience this evening. I
hope he believes, as I do, that this valuable debate will not only help
the Senate but the country on this very important issue in a much more
complete fashion. I thank the Senator.
Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague. I daresay the final conference
report in the Armed Services bill will draw on this amendment for
certain portions of the law that we will write.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I also thank the chairman for making
this a very important substantive debate. I thank the ranking minority
member.
Mr. WARNER. I wonder if my colleagues might consider reviewing their
position on the Cochran bill, while there may be other opportunities to
express affirmation.
Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Senator from Virginia. We will.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I believe the regular order would provide
that we have concluded the matters in the unanimous consent agreement
as it relates to this bill. We can wrap up for the night on this bill.
I will yield to my colleague.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, if I might, I don't believe I asked for
the yeas and nays on the amendment. I do so now.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I believe the proposed amendment on
testing of our National Missile defense system is overly broad,
unnecessary, and counterproductive.
The amendment asks that we direct the Defense Department to conduct
testing of our National Missile Defense system against--and I quote--
``any countermeasures (including decoys) that . . . are likely, or at
least realistically possible, to be used against the system.'' And it
defines a countermeasure as ``any deliberate action taken by a country
with long-range ballistic missiles to defeat or otherwise counter a
United States National Missile Defense system.'' With language as broad
as this, there is virtually no bound to what we would be directing the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, as a matter of law, to go off
and test against. I don't believe it is useful to legislate such broad
and open-ended requirements.
Nor is it necessary. There is already a process in place to ensure
that the National Missile Defense system--like every other weapon
system we have--is properly tested against the likely threats if faces,
including potential countermeasures. Our acquisition system has a
methodical process by which requirements for any new weapon system are
studied and approved, and National Missile Defense is no different.
Moreover, there is an independent operational test and evaluation
organization in the Defense Department as a second layer of oversight
to make sure new systems are adequately tested. With those processes in
place, there is no need for a third layer of requirements, levied in an
overly broad statute, to deal with some vague technical notions that
someone somewhere has imagined.
There are possible countermeasures to every weapon and those are
considered as a matter of course in the design and testing of every
system. We don't have legislation directing realistic operational
testing against any possible countermeasures for the F-22, for example,
and I see no reason to single out this particular weapon system for
such treatment.
Most of the recent talk about countermeasures to the NMD system has
been generated by wild accusations from some college professors who
have long opposed missile defenses of any sort. They would have us
believe that countermeasures can become reality for
even technologically unsophisticated nations simply because they can be
imagined. But in the real world, in which ideas have to be translated
to design, and design to hardware, and the hardware tested, the reality
is far different.
Those who are building our missile defense system understand this and
that is why they have built in to that system the capability to deal
with countermeasures as they evolve. The pending amendment would direct
a reconvening of the Welsh Commission to examine this issue, but the
fact is that General Welsh and his team have already looked at this
issue. This is what he told the Senate just a couple weeks ago:
There is very significant potential designed into the C-1
[initial NMD] system to grow to beyond the capability to deal
with those countermeasures. The problem with estimates as to
what people can give was that--the Chinese will share it, the
Russians will share it--it's one thing to share technology,
it's something else to incorporate it into your system. And,
so unless they share an all-out system ready to launch, there
is still a very significant technical challenge to
integrating somebody else's countermeasure technology into
your offensive weapons system.
Those who believe it will be easy for rogue states to incorporate
countermeasures into their long-range ballistic missiles should
consider what happened last Friday night in the test of the National
Missile Defense system. A Minuteman target missile was launched from
Vandenberg Air force Base carrying a dummy warhead and a balloon decoy.
No nation except perhaps Russia has more experience than the United
States with technically sophisticated countermeasures, and those who
say such measures will be easy for rogue states to deploy derided this
balloon decoy as laughably simple. Well, the decoy didn't deploy
properly. As Undersecretary of Defense Jacques Gansler noted following
the test, ``Others have said how easy it is to put up decoys, by the
way. This is the proof that one decoy we were trying to put up didn't
go up.''
Mr. President, countermeasures will eventually challenge the National
Missile Defense system, just as they have challenged every other
weapons system that has ever been deployed. But they aren't anywhere
near as easy to perfect as opponents of missile defense would have us
believe, and we already have adequate measures in place to ensure the
National Missile Defense system is adequately designed and tested to
account for potential countermeasures. This legislation is vague,
overly broad, and unnecessary. I urge Senators to vote against it.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment being
offered by my colleague, Senator Durbin, calling for effective testing
of the National Missile Defense (NMD) program now under development by
the Department of Defense.
When the President signed H.R. 4, the National Missile Defense Act of
1999, into law a year ago, he made the statement that ``any NMD system
we deploy must be operationally effective, cost-effective, and enhance
our security.'' The key word in the President's statement, Mr.
President, is ``effective.'' In other words, before we decide to move
ahead with the NMD program, among other important considerations, we
must be confident that the system will be an ``effective'' one.
Last year, when we debated this matter in the Senate, I spoke with my
colleague, Senator Cochran, who agreed with me that we shouldn't buy
the system until we know that it will work. It's common sense, of
course, to hold back on a decision to purchase something until we know
that it will work as advertised. We know that as private consumers. The
same is true for the government as a consumer.
Indeed, that is the policy of the Department of Defense (DoD) with
respect to its purchase of ALL major weapon systems. DoD's policy
instruction governing acquisition of all major weapon systems, DoD
Directive 5000.1, contains a number of provisions intended to ensure
that the customer, DoD as well as the nation as a whole, will get what
we pay for.
The bottom line for the Department of Defense regarding
``effectiveness'' is whether a weapon system is tested successfully in
realistic operating situations. The DoD instruction states that
``before purchasing a weapon system from the production line, the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation must report to the
Secretary of Defense that the system is operationally effective and
suitable for use in combat.'' That should be true for missile
[[Page S6562]]
interceptors as well as for conventional guns, tanks, and airplanes.
Mr. President, the Congress has on many occasions expressed its
commitment to the taxpayer that the billions spent on weapons will
provide the nation with the real military capability we may need. The
provision of DoD Instruction 5000.1 that I have cited is one such
example. Another was legislation enacted during the 1980's requiring
warranties on all major weapon systems and their components.
We also, know, Mr. President, that when we fail to require that a
system meet operational standards, we pay a heavy price. In the early
1980's, the Congress appropriated over $20 billion dollars to purchase
100 B-1B bombers. The problem was that we had never tested them. The B-
1B looked like the B-1A, but in fact was a far different weapon. It
needed to be tested. We didn't do it and went ahead with the purchase.
Mr. President, we now know the unfortunate history of that purchase. It
wasn't until recently that the DoD used the B-1B in combat, and even
then under very special operational circumstances. In the intervening
decade and a half, the Air Force chose other ways to get the job done.
I'm convinced that, in part, it was because the Air Force knew that the
B-1B would not have been capable of getting the job done. There are
other expensive examples I could use to illustrate the price we've paid
for inadequate testing. Design flaws in the C-5 and F-18 have ended up
costing the taxpayer a bundle. I'm sure you've recently read the news
reports about flaws in the protective suits for our troops to use in a
chemical or biological warfare environment. They weren't adequately
tested either.
The amendment Senator Durbin is sponsoring today seeks simply to
affirm Congressional commitment to the taxpayer, to the men and women
in uniform who must operate our weapons, and to the nation that must
depend on it for our defense. I am pleased to cosponsor this amendment
that would require that the NMD system be tested against possible
countermeasures that are likely, or at least realistically possible, to
be used to accompany attacking warheads that potential enemies could
launch against us. The amendment calls for the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization (BMDO) to plan ground and flight tests to address
those threats, to seek funds to support what's needed to meet them, and
to report annually on the status and progress of the NMD program
regarding countermeasures. In short, Mr. President, the amendment
proposes concrete actions to ensure that we know the exact nature of
the threat, that we plan appropriate technical responses, and that we
test adequately to make sure that those responses work.
We are all aware of the recent outcome of the latest NMD flight test,
IFT-5. In that test, a developmental test, the kill vehicle failed to
separate from its booster to engage the incoming target warhead. Mr.
President, this was a test designed and conducted under very
controlled, hardly realistic, conditions. It was a test in which all
the pieces of the complex NMD system were given special capabilities to
carry out their job in a controlled, experimental environment.
I think we can all agree that it's appropriate to walk before we run.
In ``walking'' through this test, IFT-5, we have discovered once again
how difficult it is to ``hit a bullet with a bullet'' even though we
think we know how each piece of the system will function. I'd like to
emphasize, Mr. President, that this was not an operational test under
realistic conditions that DoD requires for every other major weapon
system before it decides to go ahead and buy it. This was a controlled,
laboratory test in which one of the pieces we thought we know most
about failed.
I believe that although the NMD test program to date indicates that
we are developing some amazing capabilities, we are a very long way
from being confident that the NMD system as a whole will work. Indeed,
in order for an NMD test to be truly realistic, there are a whole host
of variables that must differ significantly from the conditions that
were present during the IFT-5 test. In order to be more realistic, for
example, future tests should reorient the basic geographic direction of
the test from West to East rather than East to West. The flight test
envelope would have to be greatly enlarged. Various types of
countermeasures, the subject of the amendment, should be used. Actual
military personnel who would operate the system should be at the
controls. Information from the warning system should reflect likely
warning times. We are a very long way from realistic testing the NMD
system in those regards and a number of others. This amendment
addresses only one of those variables, albeit a very important one.
Adopting this amendment will provide us with critical information about
the feasibility of the NMD system to get the job done. Committing
ourselves to procuring and deploying the NMD system until we know the
answers to questions regarding key operational capabilities would be
premature and ill-advised.
There are other critical factors that will play important and
necessary roles in determining whether the President will commit the
nation to deploying NMD. Surely the nature of the threat must be
assessed and reassessed to make sure that this program is warranted.
Surely the possible responses of our allies and potential adversaries
will play an important part in the President's calculation. At the end
of the day, the President will have determined whether the nation is
more or less secure as a result of deciding to deploy the NMD system.
In the meantime, as responsible stewards for public expenditures, it
behooves us to take all measures necessary to ensure that the billions
we are spending for NMD are giving the taxpayer real dividends. This
amendment is an important means to make that happen. I urge all of my
colleagues to support realistic testing before committing the nation to
procurement and deployment of NMD. Thank you, Mr. President. I yield
the floor.
Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, this discussion of a national missile
defense system comes at a timely moment. As we struggle to complete
action on our thirteen appropriations bills that fund the Federal
Government, we are confronted with many unmet needs and the desire to
reduce the amount the Federal Government takes from the American
taxpayers' hard earned income. The budget agreement locks in spending
limits and requires a balanced budget, thereby preventing us from
increasing spending on missile defense without cutting other programs.
The debate over how much to spend in research on a national missile
defense (NMD) system and whether it is time to make a decision on
deployment strongly effects both the government's ability to meet the
needs of Americans and the likelihood that we will be able to return
money to the taxpayers of this country. The costs of such a system and
the choices it would force us to make must be carefully weighed against
the benefit of an NMD system, the chances that it would work, and the
effect that deployment would have on the arms control agenda of the
United States.
The decision on how much to spend on an NMD research program cannot
be made without considering these questions. We must ask how much we
can afford to spend on defense. I argue that national security also has
a social component: affordable health care for all Americans, better
job opportunities, a strong education system and economic security for
America's seniors are all facets of a strong America. Without these
things, military technology cannot protect America from the real
threats against us.
I have long supported a reasonable program of research and testing of
anti-ballistic missile technologies, while opposing efforts to throw
huge increases at the program. I hope that thoughtful research will
lead to some technological breakthroughs on ways to counter ballistic
missiles. Their proliferation, especially in the hands of irresponsible
leaders such as North Korea's Kim Jong Il, requires that we actively
investigate possible defenses. We cannot ignore the emergence of new
nuclear threats to the United States.
A premature decision to deploy an inadequately tested national
missile defense system would also be a risk to national security. We
cannot afford to spend huge amounts of money on a system we are not
certain would work, or on a system that might provoke the very reaction
from rogue states that we are ultimately trying to prevent. I
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am a strong believer in strengthening international non-proliferation
regimes such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty, which I am very disappointed the Senate has failed to
ratify. Successful non-proliferation efforts are worth every penny! The
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty has also served us well for many years,
and we must be careful to not throw out a valuable asset in our rush to
jump on the newest technology.
I am pleased to be a cosponsor of Senator Durbin's amendment to add
some important requirements to any national missile defense testing
regime. This amendment would require realistic testing of an NMD system
against the countermeasures that might be deployed against it. Senator
Durbin's amendment would help ensure that if we move to consider
deployment of an NMD system, we would have a realistic assessment of
that system's expected performance. Any evaluation of the effectiveness
of an NMD system must consider not only the capabilities of the system
itself, but its ability to survive what we expect might be thrown up to
defeat it. Without this information, it would be hard to judge the true
utility of such a system, and easy to overestimate its performance.
This past Friday's failed test of a space intercept brings into
sharper focus the issue of claims and performance of an NMD system.
Without realistic tests proving the expectations of researchers, we can
never be sure that laboratory results can be duplicated in practice. It
might be tempting to rush to deploy a system that appeared to provide
significant protection for the American people. Passage of this
amendment would help ensure that any system have a reasonable chance of
working before it is considered for deployment.
I continue to believe that our greatest vulnerability to nuclear
attack is not from a nuclear bomb delivered by an intercontinental
ballistic missile, but rather from a nuclear devise slipped into the
country in some much less visible way, like hidden in some cargo coming
into a major U.S. seaport. Committing many billions of dollars to
deploy the proposed defense systems would do nothing to protect us
against this very real threat. At this time, it would be much more
productive to invest these funds in stopping the spread of nuclear
technologies and in using other means to counter terrorist
organizations and other rogue elements.
Personally, I believe that the politics of missile defense have
gotten way out ahead of the science of missile defense. This amendment
would help restore the proper order of these concepts. I urge my
colleagues to support the Durbin amendment.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, the Durbin amendment to the fiscal year
2001 Defense authorization bill is a common sense proposal that will
ensure that a National Missile Defense system is properly tested before
it becomes operational.
President Clinton is expected to make a decision in the next few
months on whether or not to begin the deployment of a National Missile
Defense system. He has said that the decision will be based on four
criteria: the readiness of the technology, the impact on arms control
and our relations with Russia, the cost of the system, and the threat.
Based on these criteria, I do not believe that a decision to deploy
should be made at this time.
This amendment deals with just one of these criteria, the readiness
of the technology. It says that the National Missile Defense system
should be tested against realistic decoys and other counter-measures
before it becomes operational. Initial operating capability is now
scheduled for 2005.
Let me be clear, this amendment would not prevent a deployment
decision this year, nor would it delay the deployment of the system.
Mr. President, this is no different from school. if you cannot pass
the exams, you cannot graduate. In this case, if NMD cannot pass a test
against realistic counter-measures, it will not be made operational.
There will be no social promotion of missile defense. The strategic
implications of this system are too great. We do not want to make a
system operational that we are not sure will work against an incoming
warhead.
Now the opponents of this legislation might say: Senator Boxer, this
amendment is unnecessary. The U.S. would never make a missile defense
system operational that wouldn't work.
Well, in 1969 the U.S. made a decision to deploy the Safeguard
missile defense system to defend U.S. missile against incoming Soviet
missiles. This system would have used Spartan missiles armed with small
nuclear warheads to intercept incoming ICBMs.
On October 1, 1975, after spending $6 billion (over $20 billion in
today's dollars), the first ABM site became operational at Nekoma,
North Dakota. Five months later the project was terminated.
Why was the project terminated? Because it didn't work. There were at
least two major problems with the Safeguard system. First, its radars
were vulnerable to destruction by Soviet missiles. Destruction of these
radar systems would blind the defensive system. Second it was found
that when the nuclear warheads on defending Spartan missiles were
detonated, these explosions themselves would also blind the radar
systems. You do not have to be a rocket scientist to know that it is
important for the system to work before it is made operational.
So why is the Senator from Illinois concerned about countermeasures?
A September 1999 National Intelligence Estimate warned that emerging
missile states would use counter-measures.
Let me quote from the unclassified version of the report:
Many countries, such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq would
rely initially on readily available technology--including
separating warheads, spin-stabilized warheads, warhead
reorientation, radar absorbing material, booster
fragmentation, low power jammers, chaff, and simple balloon
decoys.
It goes on to say that ``Russia and China each have developed
numerous counter-measures and probably are willing to sell the
requisite technology.''
Many of our best scientists have said that the planned NMD system
would be defeated by counter-measures. An April 2000 report released
jointly by the Union of Concerned Scientists and MIT Security Studies
Program found that ``the current testing program is not capable of
assessing the system's effectiveness against a realistic attack.''
So Mr. President, this is an important amendment. It would ensure
that our NMD system is tested against realistic counter-measures and
require detailed reports from the Secretary of Defense and the
Independent Review Panel which is headed by retired Air Force General
Larry Welch.
I congratulate my friend, Senator Durbin, for offering this important
amendment and I urge the Senate to adopt it.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I want to extend my personal gratitude to
the Armed Services Committee Chairman and the Ranking Member, as well
as to the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Readiness
for their consideration of my recommended language at Sec. 361 of this
bill. This provision requires the Secretary of Defense to report on the
consequences of high OPTEMPO on military aviation and ground equipment.
Let me explain why I applaud this provision. My particular interest is
somewhat more focused on aviation assets.
Quite simply, we need to know the adverse effects that the worldwide
contingency operations engaged in by our military high-performance
aircraft are having on the integrity of the aircraft's frame, engines
and other components.
I raise this issue, Mr. President, because my state proudly hosts the
Ogden Air Logistics Center at Hill Air Force Base, Utah. Just recently,
a team of depot technicians at Hill discovered that the mechanical
assembly designed to brake or halt the rise and fall of the stabilizer
on the Air Force KC-135 tanker had been prematurely wearing out because
of a surge of KC-135 flight activity, much of it related to the frantic
deployment schedules that these aircrews are tied to.
The shortage of replacement parts for the stabilizer braking system
forced the Air Force to come up with a methodology to refurbish the old
part. There had never been a refurbishment of the braking assembly
before this time.
This is an important fact because the engineering design missed a
critical step in the refurbishment process designed to heat out
hydrogen that
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risked getting into microscopic fissures in the brake ratchet. This
would have eventually embrittled the system, causing the stabilizer to
fail. It would have meant with near certainty that we would have lost
aircraft in midair flight as well as some aircrew lives.
The Secretary of the Air Force, Whitten Peters, has commended the
depot technicians for their astute recommendations to the Air Force
Materiel Command to ground the KC-135 fleet; this was done, and I am
convinced that lives were saved.
But I am no less convinced that we need better visibility over the
rapidly aging aircraft airframes and other parts are suffering from the
near-frenetic flying schedules and deployments that they and their
crews are committed to. Put more directly: we cannot and must not push
these brave aircrews into harm's way in aircraft that are even remotely
vulnerable to critical component failures.
Mr. President, my concern extends to all tactical and strategic, as
well as support and service support aviation assets used in these
contingency and peacekeeping operations by the Navy, Marine Corps, and
the Air Force. The provision asks for a study of the effects of these
deployments on all such assets. Wisely, the Committee has added Army
aviation since its predominately rotary wing--or helicopter--operations
warrant inclusion in the scope of this assessment.
If one looks at the Air Force commitments, which have carried the
bulk of many of the contingency operations, the statistics are as
staggering as they are telling: 18,400 sorties over Iraq; 73 percent of
the air assets patrolling the Northern watch no-fly zone which produced
75 percent of the total number of sorties in that region. In the
Southern Watch no-fly zone, the Air Force also provided 35 percent of
the total air assets and produced 68 percent of the sorties. But I
don't want to ignore the Navy with its carrier-based aircraft that
undergo take-off and, especially, landing procedures that create
unimaginably harsh stresses on aircraft. Many members of this body have
witnessed carrier operations and know precisely what I am talking
about. Some of our colleagues, like my good friends John McCain and Tom
Harkin, are even former Navy carrier pilots.
The Secretary of Defense has tried to deal with this issue. And we
have tried to help him in the past year. Secretary Bill Cohen cited in
his report to Congress this February that aging systems, spot spare
parts shortages, and high OPTEMPO [high operating tempo] are placing
increased pressure on materiel readiness.'' The Secretary has testified
to his ``particular concern'' for ``negative readiness trends in
mission capable rates for aircraft.'' Last year, Congress provided DOD
with $1.8 billion in Kosovo emergency supplemental funding to meet the
most urgent demands.
Yet, our equipment is aging. The average age of Air Force aircraft is
now 20 years old. Our state of art air-to-ground mission aircraft, the
F-16, has a technology base older than most of its pilots, some of whom
are flying F-16 aircraft that have been in service longer than they
have been alive! The problems of corrosion, fatigue and even parts
obsolescence are rampant. I spend much time at Hill Air Force Base in
my state of Utah. There are certain critical components that are still
tied to vacuum tube technology. Imagine that! How many of us still
listen to vacuum tube radios; some of our younger staff members may not
even know what they are! Some of our top-of-the-line tactical fighter
aircraft use gyroscopes--which are absolutely critical to positional
accuracy--that are several generations old. It bothers me greatly to
hear people complain about ``gold-plated'' military aircraft. I would
invite any of them to join me in a tour of the Ogden, Utah, depot. When
they see the condition of components from our best tactical fighters
being serviced, I suspect they would better understand the real meaning
of courage.
But let me conclude with a word about the most important resource in
this equation: people. We have reduced our forces by 30 percent and
increased deployments by nearly 400 percent. The effect is exactly what
you would expect. Recently, the Marine Corps' Commandant and the Army
Chief of Staff announced that deployments of their aviation and ground
equipment are now 16 times the rate during the Cold War. Unprecedented
pilot losses, reaching a 33 percent level in the Navy, 15 percent in
the Air Force and 21 percent in the Marine Corps. But the most critical
losses are found among the highly specialized aircraft service
technicians. Specialists in electronic components, air traffic control,
armaments and munitions, and other technical specialties, at all levels
of service, short-term, mid-term and long-term, are leaving in
unprecedented numbers. Even the Air Force's valiant Expeditionary Air
Force concept, which organizes a highly mobile slice of the Air Force
into 10 task forces, called ``Air Expeditionary Forces,'' faces
technical enlisted skill shortages which still burden the fewer and
fewer technicians who remain on active duty, according to a General
Accounting Office study on military personnel released in early March
2000.
Mr. President, I want to thank my colleagues for listening to this
long presentation regarding my concerns for the state of our military
aircraft and the people who fly and service them. I know that most will
join with me and the committee in calling for a full review of the
consequences of the unprecedented peacetime demands being made on our
people and their equipment.
National Guard ChalleNGe Program
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I am seriously concerned about Section 910
of S. 2549, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2001.
Section 910 would effect the transfer of responsibility for the
National Guard Youth ChalleNGe program from the Chief of the National
Guard Bureau to the Secretary of Defense and would amend the limitation
on federal funding for the National Guard Challenge program to limit
only Department of Defense funding. This language removes the National
Guard Bureau from the ``chain of command'' and from its statutory role
as the channel of communication between the federal government and the
states (10 U.S.C. Sec. 10501).
Youth ChalleNGe exists in 25 states and is a federal/state
partnership program. While there is partial federal funding (which is
capped by law at $62.5 million per year), the ChalleNGe staff members
are state employees who meet state teacher and counselor certification
requirements. All legally binding cooperative agreements currently in
place are between the Governors and the Chief, National Guard Bureau.
ChalleNGe is a highly successful program that takes at-risk youths
and gives them the opportunity to turn their lives around and become
productive members of their communities. Since the program was
established, with my assistance in 1991, more than 4,500 young
Americans have graduated. Of this number, more than 66% have earned
their GED or high school diploma; more than 12% entered the military,
and more than 16% enrolled in college.
ChalleNGe is a program in demand by the states. If it were not for
the cap on spending, more states would have a ChalleNGe program.
Transferring authority from the National Guard to the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs could only have a
negative impact and upset a program that is operating extremely well
under the auspices of the National Guard Bureau. It would add another
layer of bureaucracy and require the State National Guard programs to
relate through an altogether new ``chain of command'' for the Youth
ChalleNGe program, while maintaining the existing ``chain of command''
for all other National Guard activities.
On June 16th of this year, I participated in the graduation ceremony
of the cadets of the Mountaineer ChalleNGe program at Camp Dawson, West
Virginia. In all my years of delivering commencement speeches and high
school diplomas, I can say without reservation that this was the most
impressive group of students that I have ever encountered. The
graduates sat at full attention throughout the event, with obvious
pride in their hard-earned achievements and serious commitment to a
future on the right path. Such transformation can not be achieved by
mere bootcamp exercises alone. It takes a tough-love approach with
caring and compassionate instructors who want to see the lives of these
troubled youth turned around forever. The National Guard offers these
young people
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the very virtues--leadership, followership, community service, job
skills, health and nutrition, and physical education--that are in
keeping with the Guard's tradition of adding value to America and it
certainly showed in West Virginia.
Let us not punish this fine organization which is doing an
exceptional job in helping youth in-need.
Mr. WARNER. It is my understanding that the committee report language
may not fully and adequately explain the intent of the Committee. The
Committee's intent is to reaffirm the role of the Secretary of Defense
to establish policy for and oversee the operation of DOD programs. I
intend to see that the conference report language adequately expresses
the view that the National Guard is to continue to administer the Youth
ChalleNGe program under the oversight and direction of the Secretary of
Defense.
Mr. LEVIN. I think the Chairman has a workable solution. It is not
the intent of the Committee that the National Guard should lose its
ability to administer this highly successful program. Rather, the
intent is that there be adequate policy direction and oversight of the
Youth ChalleNGe program by the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. BYRD. I had intended to offer an amendment to clarify this issue.
However, I believe that the comments of the distinguished Chairman and
Ranking Minority Member of the Armed Services Committee have helped
clear up this matter. I hope the conference report will further clarify
the matter.
conveyance authority for utility systems
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I am very concerned about a provision
contained in H.R. 4205, the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2001, regarding the conveyance authority for utility
systems at U.S. military installations. The House proposes to change
existing law in a manner that jeopardizes the ability of a municipal
utility in Washington, Tacoma Power, to participate in the competitive
selection process and acquire Fort Lewis' electric utility system. Fort
Lewis is Washington's major Army base. I oppose changes to DOD's
current conveyance authority, when that change impedes competition.
The Department of Defense is privatizing utility systems at military
bases throughout the county. Military bases are considered Federal
enclaves, and therefore are subject to Federal, rather than State, law.
The language contained in H.R. 4205 dramatically weakens existing
Federal law by subjecting military bases to State laws, regulations,
rulings and orders in the competitive bid process of their utility
systems. This would have a negative impact on DOD utility privatization
efforts in my state of Washington. The reason for this is that utility
service territories in Washington are established by service area
agreements--contracts--rather than by State decree. Eliminating the
Federal law that applies on military bases would create a host of legal
questions, the effect of which is to foster litigation and undercut the
DOD privatization process in Washington.
Because I am not a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and
would therefore not be privy to Conference Committee negotiations, I
respectfully request your assistance in assuring that whatever utility
language is included in the FY01 Defense Authorization bill properly
takes into account the unique circumstances of Washington.
Mr. WARNER. I share the Senator's concerns regarding the impact the
House language might have on competition, and will work with you to
ensure that Washington state's issues are addressed during the
conference. Any suggestions you may have on this matter would be most
welcome.
Mr. GORTON. I thank the Senator in advance for your commitment to
this effort. I look forward the working with you in the coming weeks to
see that this issue is resolved in a favorable manner.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, this past year, the men and women of the
Armed Forces proved, once again, the value of a strong and ready
military. Since the end of the Cold War, our Armed Forces have been
busier, and have conducted a greater variety of missions around the
world, than at any other time during our nation's history, short of
war.
Our forces ended Serb aggression in Kosovo, brought peace to East
Timor, and aided earthquake victims in Turkey. At this moment, American
service men and women are monitoring the demilitarized zone in Korea,
enforcing the no-fly zones over Iraq, patrolling the Arabian Gulf for
oil smugglers, and assisting in the battle against drugs in Central and
South America. These activities are in addition to the daily operations
they conduct at home and with our allies overseas to maintain the
readiness of our forces.
Our National Guard and Reserve members continue as equal partners in
carrying out our national security and national military strategies.
Last May, in the span of only one week, C-5 transport aircraft from the
439th Airlift Wing at Westover Air Reserve Base in Massachusetts
carried helicopters and equipment to Trinidad-Tobago to aid in the war
against drugs, flew the Navy's new mini-submarine to Hawaii, an
unprecedented accomplishment and a tribute to their ingenuity and
resourcefulness, airlifted Marines to Greece, carried supplies to
Europe, and continued their very important training at home.
Last week, over a hundred citizen-soldiers from Bravo Company of the
368th Engineer Combat Battalion left their homes in Attleboro,
Massachusetts for duty in Kosovo.
These are just a few examples of what Guard and Reserve members from
every state, do for us each day around the world.
We ask the men and women of our Armed Forces to prepare for and
respond to every contingency, from supporting humanitarian relief
efforts, peacekeeping, and enforcing United Nations sanctions, to
fighting a full-scale Major Theater War. A quarter million of our
service members are deployed around the world to deter aggression, keep
the peace, promote democracy, and foster goodwill and cooperation with
our allies, and even with our potential adversaries.
All of our men and women in uniform put our nation's interests above
their own. When called upon, they risk their lives for our freedom. As
a nation, we often take this sacrifice for granted, until we are
reminded of it again by tragic events such as the April training
accident in Arizona, where 19 Marines lost their lives in the line of
duty. These Marines paid the ultimate sacrifice for their country, and
it was fitting for the Senate to honor them with a resolution. I
commend my colleague Senator Snowe for her leadership on that
resolution.
More recently, this week, two Arizona Army Guardsmen lost their lives
when their Apache helicopter crashed in a night training exercise. Two
Navy pilots were killed in a training accident in Maryland. The cost of
training in the name of peace and security is high.
One of Congress' most important duties is to make sure that our Armed
Forces are able to meet the many challenges of an increasingly unstable
international environment. Both the Director of Central Intelligence
and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency testified before
the Senate Armed Services Committee that, more than at any other time
in the nation's history, we are at risk of ``substantial surprise'' by
adversaries. Their views are supported by the worldwide expansion of
information technology, the proliferation of dual-use technology, and
the fact that the expertise to develop weapons of mass destruction is
available and for hire on the open market.
The growing resentment by potential adversaries of our status as the
last superpower makes us susceptible to hostile acts ranging from
computer attacks to chemical or biological terrorism. Our military must
be equipped to deter this aggression and, if necessary, counter it. The
FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Bill takes a positive step
toward doing so.
The many activities which our forces have undertaken and maintained
in the past decade, in spite of reduced resources, has taken a toll on
our people, their equipment, and readiness. This bill continues the
increases in defense spending needed to reverse this trend that the
President and Congress began last year. At $310 billion, this bill
represents real growth, and a necessary investment in the future of the
nation's security. At the heart of our armed forces are the soldiers,
sailors,
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airmen and Marines who took the oath of office to support and defend
the Constitution against all of our enemies, foreign and domestic.
Clearly, without them, we could not preserve our freedom. Attracting
young men and women to serve, and retaining them in an all-volunteer
force, is more challenging than ever. Last year, Congress authorized
the largest pay raise in nearly two decades, reformed the pay table,
and restored the 50% retirement benefit. This year, we continue these
efforts to support our service members and their families, by granting
a 3.7 percent pay raise, which is one-half percent above inflation. We
also provide for the gradual reduction to zero--over five years --of
out-of-pocket housing expenses for service members living off base, and
we provide better military health care for family members. The bill
also directs the implementation of the Thrift Savings Plan that
Congress authorized last year. The welfare of the men and women of our
armed forces is rightly at the center of this year's Defense
Authorization Bill.
The bill also takes a bold and necessary step to honoring the promise
of lifetime health care for military retirees. The Armed Services
Committee heeded the needs of our military retirees, and addressed
their number one priority--the cost of prescription drugs. The Defense
Authorization Bill expands the Base Realignment and Closure pharmacy
benefit--already available to 450,000 retirees--to the entire 1.4
million Medicare-eligible military retiree community. This benefit lets
all men and women in uniform know that we care about their service, and
that a career in the military is honorable and worth pursuing. It also
lets all military retirees know that Congress is listening, cares, and
is willing to act on their behalf.
The bill also continues and expands health care demonstration
programs to evaluate how we can best address the health care needs of
these retirees. We must complete the evaluation of these programs and
move to answer their needs. I am hopeful that soon, we will be able to
do more.
The bill also enhances efforts to prepare for and respond to other
threats. It authorizes five additional Civil Support Teams to a total
of 32 by the end of FY 2001. The teams will be specially trained and
equipped to respond to the suspected use of weapons of mass destruction
on American soil. While we hope they will never be needed, we must be
prepared for any emergency.
The bill adds $74 million for programs to protect against chemical
and biological agents, and it funds the research and development for a
second generation, single-shot anthrax vaccine. The men and women of
our Armed Forces need this support now.
Each service has taken steps to protect the environment, but too
little has been done to detect and deal with the effects of unexploded
ordnance. On the Massachusetts Military Reservation, unexploded
ordnance may be contaminating the soil and groundwater in the area.
This situation is unacceptable. If it is not addressed now, it could
cause irreparable harm to the environment and the people who live
there.
Unexploded ordnance is a problem in every active and formerly-used
live-fire training facility. The bill includes $10 million to develop
and test new technologies to detect unexploded ordnance and analyze and
map the presence of their contaminants, so that they can be more easily
cleaned up. For too many years, this issue has been ignored. The time
has come for the Department of Defense to take on the task of removing
UXO. This step is essential to ensure the continued operation of
training ranges, which are vital to the continued readiness of our
forces and the safe reuse of facilities that have been closed.
Last May, the country felt the effect of a simple computer virus that
disabled e-mail systems throughout the world, and cost industry
billions of dollars. The ``Love Bug'' virus also reportedly infected
classified e-mail systems within the Department of Defense. Last year,
more than 22,000 cyber-attacks took place on DOD computer systems--a
300 percent increase over the previous year. The cyber threat to
national security will become more complex and more disruptive in the
future. Our armed forces must be better prepared to deal with this
threat and to protect these information systems. The bill adds $77
million to address this serious and growing threat.
In the Seapower Subcommittee, under the leadership of our
distinguished chair, Senator Snowe, we heard testimony and continued
concern about the Navy's force structure, the shipbuilding rate, and
the overall readiness of the fleet. I support the Secretary of the
Navy's decision to increase R&D spending for the new land-attack
destroyer, DD-21, but I am concerned about the delay in the program,
the effect of this delay on fire support requirements of the Marine
Corps, and its effect on our shipbuilding industrial base.
The bill includes $550 million for DD-21 research and development. It
also asks the Navy to report to Congress on the feasibility of starting
DD-21 construction in FY 2004, as originally scheduled, for delivery by
2009, and the effects of the current delay on the destroyer
shipbuilding industrial base.
To ease the strain on the shipbuilding industrial base, the bill
authorizes the extension of the DDG-51 multi-year procurement, approved
by Congress in 1997, to include procurements through fiscal year 2005.
This increase will bring greater near-term health to our destroyer
shipyards. It could raise the Navy's overall shipbuilding rate to an
acceptable level of 9 ships for each of those years, and it could save
almost $600 million for these ships by avoiding the additional unit
cost of building them at a smaller rate. This increase benefits the
Navy, the shipyards, and the shipyard workers, and it is fiscally
responsible.
I am particularly concerned about one section of the bill that closes
the School of the Americas and then reopens it as the Defense Institute
for Hemispheric Security Cooperation.
Despite the additional human rights curriculum, I am concerned that
well-known abuses by the School's graduates have caused irreparable
harm to its credibility. The School accounts for less than 10 percent
of the joint education and training programs conducted by the U.S.
military for Latin American forces, but it has graduated some of the
most notorious human rights abusers in our hemisphere.
A report of the UN Truth Commission on the School implicated former
trainees, including death squad organizer Robert D'Abuisson, in
atrocities committed in El Salvador. During the investigation of the
1989 murder of six Jesuit priests in El Salvador, it turned out that 19
of the 26 people implicated in this case were graduates of the School.
Other graduates include Leopoldo Galtieri, the former head of the
Argentine junta, Manuel Noriega, the former dictator of Panama, and
Augusto Pinochet, the former dictator of Chile. In September 1996,
after years of accusations that the School teaches soldiers how to
torture and commit other human rights violations, the Department of
Defense acknowledged that instructors at the School had taught such
techniques.
I welcome the Army's recognition that human rights and civil-military
relations must be a top priority in our programs with Latin America.
The provision in this bill, will close the School and immediately
reopen it with a new name at the same location, with the same students
and with much of the same curriculum. But this step will not solve the
problems that have plagued this institution.
I commend my colleague, Representative Moakley, for his leadership on
this issue and his proposal to create a Task Force to assess the type
of education and training appropriate for the Department of Defense to
provide to military personnel of Latin American nations. These issues
demand our attention, and we must address them more effectively.
In summary, I commend my colleagues on the Armed Services Committee
for their leadership in dealing with the many challenges facing our
nation on national defense. This bill keeps the faith with the 2.2
million men and women who make up our active duty, guard, and reserve
forces. It is vital to our nation's security, and I urge the Senate to
approve it.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a previous
unanimous consent agreement regarding the ``boilerplate language'' for
completing the Defense authorization be modified with the changes that
I now send to the desk.
[[Page S6567]]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The unanimous consent agreement, as modified, is as follows:
I ask unanimous consent that, with the exception of the
Byrd amendment on bilateral trade which will be disposed of
this evening, that votes occur on the other amendments listed
in that Order beginning at 9:30 A.M. on Thursday, July 13,
2000.
I further ask unanimous consent that, upon final passage of
H.R. 4205, the Senate amendment, be printed as passed.
I further ask unanimous consent that, following disposition
of H.R. 4205 and the appointment of conferees the Senate
proceed immediately to the consideration en bloc of S. 2550,
S. 2551, and S. 2552 (Calendar Order Numbers, 544, 545, and
546); that all after the enacting clause of these bills be
stricken and that the appropriate portion of S. 2549, as
amended, be inserted in lieu thereof, as follows:
S. 2550: Insert Division A of S. 2549, as amended;
S. 2551: Insert Division B of S. 2549, as amended;
S. 2552: Insert Division C of S. 2549, as amended; that
these bills be advanced to third reading and passed; that the
motion to reconsider en bloc be laid upon the table; and that
the above actions occur without intervening action or debate.
Finally, I ask unanimous consent with respect to S. 2550,
S. 2551, and S. 2552, that if the Senate receives a message
with respect to any of these bills from the House of
Representatives, the Senate disagree with the House on its
amendment or amendments to the Senate-passed bill and agree
to or request a conference, as appropriate, with the House on
the disagreeing votes of the two houses; that the Chair be
authorized to appoint conferees; and that the foregoing occur
without any intervening action or debate.
____________________