[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 79 (Wednesday, June 21, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5542-S5547]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




               METHAMPHETAMINE LAB CLEANUP/CHILD SOLDIERS

  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I wanted to briefly discuss two important 
provisions regarding child soldiers and methamphetamine lab cleanup 
that are included in this supplemental spending package in the Foreign 
Operations bill before us.
  Over the years, Iowa and many states in the Midwest, West and 
Southwest have been working hard to reduce the sale and abuse of 
methamphetamine. But meth has brought another problem that we must 
address: highly toxic labs that are abandoned and exposed to our 
communities.
  We know that it can cost thousands of dollars to clean up a single 
lab. Fortunately, in recent years, the Drug Enforcement Agency has 
provided critical funds to help clean up these dangerous sites.
  However, last year, the DEA funding was cut in half, despite evidence 
that more and more meth labs have been found and confiscated. Because 
of these cuts, in March, the DEA completely ran out of funding to 
provide meth lab cleanup assistance to state and local law enforcement.
  Last month, the Administration shifted $5 million in funds from other 
Department of Justice Accounts to pay for emergency meth lab cleanup. 
This action will help reimburse these states for the costs they have 
incurred since the DEA ran out of money. My state of Iowa has already 
paid some $300,000 out of its own pocket for clean up since March.
  However, we've got another five months to go before the new fiscal 
year--and the number of meth labs being found and confiscated is still 
on the rise.
  The bill before us contains $10 million I added in Committee to 
ensure that there will be enough money to pay for costly meth lab 
clean-up without forcing states to take money out of their other tight 
law enforcement budgets.
  If we can find money to fight drugs in Columbia, we should be able to 
find money to fight drugs in our own backyard. We cannot risk exposing 
these dangerous meth labs to our communities.
  Mr. President, the Appropriations Committee also adopted an amendment 
I offered to provide $5 million provision in the Colombia package to 
address one of the most alarming aspects of the drug conflict in 
Colombia--the use of child soldiers.
  Human Rights Watch estimates that as many as 19,000 youths--some as 
young as eight--are being used by the Colombian armed forces, 
paramilitary groups and guerrilla forces. Up to 50 percent of some 
paramilitary units and up to 80 percent of some guerrilla units are 
made up of children. Children are used as combatants, guides, and 
informants. They may be forced to collect intelligence, deploy land 
mines, and serve as advance shock forces in ambushes. Guerrillas often 
refer to them as ``little bees,'' because they sting before their 
targets realize they are under attack.
  These children are forced to carry arms and are enticed by false 
promises or threats to their families. They are often tortured, 
drugged, sexually abused, and permanently traumatized by the horror and 
brutality of war. Children who are turned into soldiers lose their 
childhood.
  They lose their innocence and their youth. They become instruments of 
destruction and atrocity. And the longer they remain under arms, the 
harder it is for them to heal and return to any semblance of a normal 
life.
  Some of the funds included in the supplemental for Colombia are 
intended to support judicial reform, human rights protection and peace 
negotiations. Indeed, protecting human rights and rule of law is 
central to the overall success of Plan Colombia. The use of child 
soldiers is a serious human rights abuse prohibited by numerous 
international treaties and conventions, including ILO Convention 182 on 
the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor--and by the Colombian 
government itself. The International Criminal Court makes the 
recruitment or use of children under age 15 in military activities a 
war crime. I can think of no better use for these funds than to assist 
the demobilization and rehabilitation of child soldiers.
  The current generation of children in Colombia is the fourth 
generation to grow up surrounded by conflict. The $5 million in the 
Human Rights part of the Colombia package will help some of Colombia's 
children regain their fundamental right to life and peace. The money 
will be used by NGOs working to provide humanitarian assistance to 
affected children and their families. These NGO's will support programs 
providing counseling, education and reintegration services to former 
child

[[Page S5543]]

soldiers; safe houses for escaped child soldiers; and public awareness 
and recruitment-prevention campaigns. Although $5 million represents 
less than one-third of 1 percent of the total supplemental funds for 
Colombia, this money may be the most well-spent of all.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, as a member for the Foreign Operations 
Subcommittee, I've worked to enact foreign aid bills that reflect our 
national interests and our values. While I support the FY2001 foreign 
operations appropriations bill, I do have some serious concerns that I 
hope will be addressed during conference.
  I am pleased that the foreign operations bill provides assistance to 
Israel, Cyprus and Armenia. I believe that its important that we stand 
by these friends as they make the difficult steps toward peace. I am 
also pleased that we support bilateral population assistance and 
support for micro-enterprise programs. These programs are vital in 
helping the world's poorest people to help themselves.
  I am disappointed that the bill does not provide sufficient 
assistance in other crucial areas, such as adequate flood relief 
assistance to Mozambique and the Administration's full funding request 
for debt relief.
  In addition, although I am pleased with the human rights requirements 
included in the Colombia aid package attached to this legislation, I 
have grave reservations about the large military aid package to 
Colombia.
  Colombia has been suffering through a civil war for over thirty 
years. Over 35,000 Colombians have been killed in the last decade. In 
recent years, this civil war has been exacerbated by the illegal 
production and trade of drugs coming out of Colombia--primarily cocaine 
and heroin. Most of these drugs wind up in the United States and 
contribute to America's growing drug problem. It is clear that the 
United States has to help Colombia deal with this volatile situation.
  It is also clear that we have to do more to stop the growing demand 
and dependence on drugs in our own country. In my own hometown of 
Baltimore--out of a population of 600,000--60,000 people are addicted 
to heroin or cocaine. These individuals not only wreck their own lives 
but they also have left a horrible mark on the city--drug-related 
crimes are now at $2 to $3 billion a year. Drugs destroy individuals, 
families and communities. That's why I've always fought for anti-drug 
education, increased drug treatment programs and strong law 
enforcement.
  I am not convinced that the military aid provided to Colombia 
included in this bill is the best way to fight drugs in the United 
States.
  First of all, I'm concerned that we're getting dragged into the 
middle of a civil war. I am also concerned that there is no clear exit 
strategy. The aid package is open-ended. The Administration has 
admitted that this ``two-year'' package is really expected to run 
longer--more like five or six years. An open-ended commitment could 
turn into a quagmire.
  I believe the best way to help Colombia is by supporting its peace 
process through a balanced aid package. The package before us is not at 
all balanced. Over 75% of this package is in military arms, equipment 
and training. Only a small fraction of the aid helps to fund economic 
alternatives to drug production, to assist the large number of 
civilians who will be displaced by this assistance or to address the 
deeper social problems that have led to Colombia's increasing reliance 
on drug production and cultivation in the first place.
  These funds would be better spent combating the drug problem in the 
United States. More funding and support is badly needed for drug 
treatment and prevention programs in our own country. That is why I 
supported Senator Wellstone's amendment to reduce the military aid 
provided to Colombia and re-direct that funding to domestic substance 
abuse programs--in particular to vital state and local community based 
programs--that are in desperate need of funding. I regret that this 
amendment did not pass.
  Although I regret that such a large percentage of our assistance to 
Colombia is in military aid, I am pleased that strong human rights 
requirements must be met by Colombia's Government and Armed Forces 
before this aid is dispensed. President Pastrana has taken important 
steps to improve the human rights situation in Colombia by disciplining 
army officials who have committed human rights violations. Nonetheless, 
it is a well-known and well-documented fact that members of Colombia's 
Armed Forces continue to be linked to paramilitary groups that commit 
these violent acts.
  The human rights requirements in this legislation helps to address 
this continuing problem. For example, under this legislation, the head 
of Colombia's Armed Forces must suspend personnel alleged to have 
committed gross human rights violations or to have aided or abetted 
paramilitary groups. It also requires the Colombian Government to 
prosecute leaders and members of paramilitary groups as well as 
military personnel who aid or abet paramilitary groups. Before U.S. 
military aid can be dispensed to Colombia, the U.S. Secretary of State 
must certify that these human rights conditions have been met. By 
enforcing these conditions, I believe that the Colombian Government--
with U.S. support--might achieve real progress on Colombia's path to 
peace.
  I urge that Congress maintain the strong human rights requirements in 
this legislation. Without such checks in providing assistance to 
Colombia, we run the risk of further exacerbating Colombia's civil war. 
We must also monitor the impact this assistance will have on reducing 
drug production in Colombia and drug supply in the United States. By 
keeping this goal in mind, we can evaluate and devise the best method 
for combating the war against drugs in the United States which, after 
all, is the ultimate aim of this aid.
  As the strongest nation on earth, and the world's strongest 
democracy, our foreign aid must be used to promote peace, stability and 
human rights. As a member of the Foreign Operations Conference 
Committee, I will work to ensure that the final legislation supports 
these goals and represents our national interests and our values.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I think that a brief chronology of 
events regarding U.S. efforts to provide assistance to Colombia would 
be instructive. For years, the Administration has neglected the growing 
narcotics crisis in the Andean Region. Funding for international 
interdiction declined rapidly under the Clinton Administration. For 
example, international counter-narcotic funding dropped 56% from 1992 
to 1996. Also Department of Defense air assets for counter-narcotics 
were slashed 68% from 1992-1999. As a result, drug production abroad 
and drug usage at home increased dramatically. The statistics are 
devastating. From 1992 to 1999, for example, cocaine use among 10th 
graders increased 133%
  Republicans have long argued for a restoration of balance in the U.S. 
counter-drug strategy: the 1980s showed that eradicating and 
interdicting illegal drugs outside our borders is a necessary part of a 
successful drug strategy that also includes strong investments in 
demand reduction and domestic law enforcement.
  The Colombia crisis emerged as an international crisis last spring, 
1999. I had the opportunity to travel to Colombia in August of 1999 to 
see the drug-fueled crisis first-hand. Upon my return, Senator DeWine, 
Senator Grassley and I introduced an assistance package, the Alianza 
Act, in October of 1999. The Alianza Act authorized $1.6 billion over 3 
years to support anti-drug efforts, the rule of law, human rights, and 
the peace process in Colombia and neighboring countries. This was, in 
my view, a balanced and comprehensive approach to the crisis in 
Colombia.
  Unfortunately, the Administration was nowhere to be seen. Except for 
several Administration envoys who arrived to Bogota empty-handed, the 
White House did little. Finally, after months of delay, in January 2000 
the White House announced a response to Plan Colombia, though failed to 
provide details until early February. The Administration plan largely 
mirrored the Alianza Act, though fell short in two critical areas; it 
failed to take a truly regional approach by providing sufficient funds 
for other countries in the Andean region and it also failed to 
adequately provide for our front-line law enforcement agencies such as 
the Customs Service and the Coast Guard.

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  In March, the House passed a $13 billion Supplemental Package, which 
included $1.7 for Colombia. The Colombia portion is a good bill that 
rectifies many of the shortcomings in the Administrations proposal. 
Then in May, the Senate Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee 
marked up its bill, which included almost $1 billion for Colombia (the 
Milcon Appropriations Subcommittee also marked up more than $300 
million for Colombia as well).
  I strongly urge passage of this assistance. There is no doubt that 
the crisis in Colombia is an emergency that directly affects our 
national security and threatens to destabilize the entire Andean 
region. While we may not all agree on every detail of this package, 
immediate passage of counter-narcotics assistance is crucial to reduce 
the flow of drugs onto our streets and to bring stability to the Andean 
Region. It's time to realize that the emergency in Colombia threatens 
an important source of U.S. oil, continues to fuel the flood of illegal 
drugs entering America's streets, and endangers our hemisphere's common 
march toward democracy and free enterprise.
  Mr. BYRD. Will the Senator yield for a unanimous consent request?
  Mr. REED. I am happy to yield.
  Mr. BYRD. I have an amendment on the list. I would like to call this 
amendment up tomorrow. I ask unanimous consent that I may be authorized 
to call up one of my amendments on the list tomorrow.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator for yielding.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise in support of the underlying 
legislation that would provide support for the country of Colombia to 
fight the drug problem which not only involves Colombia but involves 
the United States very decisively and directly.
  I commend Senators McConnell and colleagues who drafted this 
legislative vehicle to assist Colombia.
  Part of my discussion tonight is based upon a trip last weekend that 
I took with Senator Durbin to Colombia. We had the opportunity to 
travel to Cartegena to meet with President Pastrana and his key 
national security advisers. We also traveled to Bogota to meet with the 
Defense Minister and the chairman of their joint chiefs of staff.
  But I think much more importantly, we traveled out to where the 
military forces are being deployed to counteract this drug problem, to 
the town of Larandia. It is not really a town, it is a base camp. It is 
a forward post for the Colombians to conduct these counterdrug 
operations.
  One of the first impressions you get when you go to Colombia and leaf 
through the materials provided by the Embassy is that this country has 
a long history of violence--or, as the Colombians say, La Violencia.
  In fact, according to the Embassy, there is one kidnapping every 5 
hours in Colombia. And 75 percent of the world's reported kidnappings 
occur in Colombia. The Embassy points out that Bogota is the murder 
capital of the world. In a city of 7 million people, there are 16 
murders a day and 6,000 murders a year.
  This is a country that has been wracked by political and criminal 
violence for many decades. The political violence began with some 
presence back in 1940s when elements of what later became the Liberal 
Party and the Conservative Party literally battled for control of the 
country. This lasted until 1957, when both parties agreed to form a 
national front.
  Then there was a period from 1958 until 1974 in which both parties 
literally transferred power each 4 years from one president to another, 
and there was a semblance of stability in the country. But certainly by 
the 1960s, there was renewed agitation by guerrilla forces, principally 
Marxist and Leninist forces--the whole spectrum--the two principals 
being Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC, and 
Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional, or ELN.
  These forces, spurred on by the success of Castro in Cuba, made 
significant inroads in terms of establishing independent zones along 
with agitators who also fought for agrarian rights in the countryside.
  In the 1960s, the Colombian military conducted a serious 
counterinsurgence operation. They were able to eliminate these zones. 
But in that time, they won for themselves the infamous designation of 
being significant abusers of human rights. That reputation--both the 
perception and, unfortunately, reality--continues in the Colombian 
military today.
  But by the end of the 1960s and the 1970s, they had effectively 
pushed the insurgency away from the populated centers of Colombia--
which are the coastline and the Andean plains--into the jungles of the 
Amazon, in an area which is desolate, unpopulated, and, frankly, beyond 
the effective control of authorities in Bogota and elsewhere in 
Colombia.
  But in the 1970s, the drug trade began to assert itself into the life 
of Colombians, first with the cultivation of marijuana. It took the 
Colombian police authority a while to recognize the threat to them as 
well as to others from this cultivation.
  Recognizing the problem, they began to organize themselves to conduct 
counterdrug operations in the police force--not the military.
  Then, as we all know, marijuana was rapidly displaced in the world 
drug market by cocaine. The cocaine trade became a curse for Colombia.
  Within Colombia infrastructure, the leadership of several major 
organizations--the Cali cartel, the Medellin cartel and others--set up 
their headquarters in Colombia and began to run worldwide operations. 
Most of the production was done outside in the surrounding Andean 
country. This map is a recent example of cultivation areas--the 
cultivation areas in Peru, Bolivia, which have been very successful 
with eradication, and here is Colombia. Cultivation was typically 
outside Colombia. Within Colombia, they located clandestine 
laboratories to convert the coca leaf into cocaine base and later 
cocaine. From the 1970s and through the 1980s, there was a fabulously 
powerful and wealthy criminal combination that was destabilizing 
Colombia.
  The United States did not stand aside when this situation developed. 
The United States supported the Colombian police and insisted that the 
Colombian police reform themselves and throw out those who had been 
corrupted by the narcotraffickers. With cooperation, and with the 
leadership of the Colombian police and with the bravery and the 
sacrifice of scores of Colombian police officers, the Cali cartel was 
disrupted and the Medellin cartel was disrupted. The leaders of the 
cartels literally died in police shootouts.
  We have a situation, where through support by the United States and 
the police forces of Colombia, we defeated a drug combination that was 
threatening the United States by importing vast amounts of cocaine into 
the United States.
  Now there is a new situation and a new crisis. The new crisis is the 
result of two things: the collision of cocaine cultivation, coca 
cultivation, and these remnants of a political insurgency that has been 
ongoing in Colombia for decades. The FARC and other revolutionary units 
are in the hinterland. What has arrived recently has been the 
cultivation of coca. As a result, the FARC--and its other guerrilla 
forces--has been enlisted in the support and protection of these coca 
fields. They are deriving great resources in doing that. They are 
deriving resources to support their political activities.
  Coca production now has been linked with armed military forces. The 
police are no longer capable with their equipment and their technology 
to deal with this. This has become a military problem. As a result, we 
are in a military problem that requires military support of the United 
States, just as it required police support in the 1980s and the early 
1990s.
  Part of the reason the cultivation has come to Colombia is the fact 
that we have been successful. As an indication of our success, 
Colombian production has surged dramatically. It has surged where in 
other places the production has been cut back. Both in Bolivia and in 
Peru, we have made significant progress--again, working with local 
authorities, working with their counternarcotics organizations--and we 
have been able to suppress the cultivation of coca. What has been 
suppressed in Peru and Bolivia has now blossomed in the southern 
provinces of Colombia. Again, this combination of coca production and 
guerrillas has produced a military crisis as well as a drug crisis.

[[Page S5545]]

  I have heard colleagues come to the floor and talk about the 
situation, saying: This is Colombia's problem, not our problem.
  Mr. President, the streets of America are also the battlegrounds for 
this problem because the final impact of cocaine is felt--as too many 
Americans are subject to the ravages of cocaine addiction.
  This chart demonstrates what we are talking about. As I mentioned 
before, Peru has shown a 27-percent reduction in cultivation; Bolivia, 
a 53-percent reduction in cultivation; Colombia, production has 
increased and will increase unabated unless we do something.

  The bottom line is, from all these sources, but increasingly from 
Colombia, 512 metric tons a year of cocaine is directed to the United 
States. About 380 metric tons arrive, get through our border 
checkpoints, get around our intense efforts to stop it, and hit the 
streets of America.
  In a real sense, Colombia's problem is our problem and our problem is 
Colombia's problem. It is the huge demand of the United States which is 
causing some of this instability in Colombia. So we have a rather 
strong national security interest in assisting Colombian forces to do 
the job we insist they do, which is to stop cocaine production and 
distribution emanating from Colombia. It is important to note we have a 
situation where we want to ensure that the Colombian forces help us by 
curtailing supply, so it does not arrive on the streets of America.
  The proposal that is included in the legislation before the Senate, 
Plan Colombia, has been carefully worked out. Its focus is 
counternarcotics--not the political insurgencies that have washed back 
and forth across Colombia for decades. It represents the recognition by 
our Government and the Government of Colombia, first, that there is a 
significant problem in Colombia that directly affects the tranquility 
of peace and the security of the United States. Second, I believe it 
also recognizes the competence of the Colombian authorities to fight 
the good fight.
  Again, as I indicated, it was Colombian police officials working with 
the United States and other international narcotics control officers 
that went a long way to destroy the Cali cartel and the Medellin 
cartel. Now this is a new phase. It is no longer simply criminal 
syndicates operating in the cities of Colombia. It is a situation where 
guerrilla forces are protecting and profiting from the cultivation of 
coca in the hinterlands of Colombia.
  Mr. President, as I mentioned, Plan Colombia is a reaction to the 
recognition of a crisis. It is also proposed as a result of the 
confidence that has been demonstrated in the Government of Colombia, 
their sincere dedication to try to eradicate their own problem with 
drug cultivation, and also it represents, I think, and based upon my 
trip, a sense of a reasonable prospect for success because of their 
commitment and also because of the nature of the problem we face.
  Plan Colombia has many different aspects. First, it focuses on not 
only military operations. It focuses on the peace process, which is 
ongoing in Colombia today. President Pastrana, when he was elected, was 
elected on a plank that called for sincere and serious negotiations 
with the guerrilla forces. He has instituted such negotiations. In 
fact, what has happened in Colombia is that he had dedicated an area, 
approximately outlined by this blue, in the hinterlands of Colombia, 
which is a DMZ area, controlled by FARC, the principle guerrilla group. 
This peace process is important.
  This plan is also an attempt to provide alternate development efforts 
for the peasants and the cultivators in a region where coca was being 
cultivated. This plan calls not only for military operations but also 
calls for heightened sensitivity to peace, a commitment and a 
contribution to economic development. The United States share is just a 
fraction of what the Colombian Government has committed to this effort 
for economic development and for ways to have alternatives to the coca 
cultivation.
  Also, and quite rightly, the plan calls for reform of the justice 
system and protection of human rights, because, frankly, one of the 
most feeble institutions within Colombia, and this accounts for many of 
their problems, is the justice system and the penal system that is not 
responsive to efficient, fair, and appropriate justice. Here, too, Plan 
Colombia, will call for a reform and renewal of those institutions, 
which are so important.
  Then part of it, of course, is a military component. Without security 
in these areas, in these areas we have talked about--without security 
in these areas, there will be no way in which we can effectively 
conduct--``we,'' meaning the Government of Colombia and its 
international partners--can conduct the kind of economic development 
and alternative development that is necessary for long-term stability.
  Here is another map that focuses clearly on Colombia alone. Here are 
the regions where the production is significant, Putumayo and Caqueta, 
these provinces. Here in the pink is the zone controlled by FARC. You 
can see it really is in between major production areas.
  In order to get into these areas, in order to provide the kind of 
economic development that is necessary, there has to be, first, 
security, and, because of the nature of the armed combatants in the 
area, that calls for military assistance.
  This is a big part but not the only part of Plan Colombia. Within the 
context of Plan Colombia, there are basically two significant 
components militarily: first, the training of counternarcotics troops, 
and, second, the provision of helicopters for their mobility, because 
without helicopters you really cannot be effective in this region.
  The training has already been finished for the 1st Battalion and they 
are in Tres Esquinas. The second is up here in Larandia. They are 
awaiting our approval so American special forces troops can conduct the 
training. Without helicopters, however, none of these trained troops 
can effectively get to where the cultivation is taking place, where the 
clandestine laboratories are located, where they must go in order to 
upset and defeat the drug lords in this part of Colombia. So it is very 
critical we move today with dispatch with this legislation, and move 
forward to allow the military plan to go forward as well as to provide 
the basis for later alternative development.
  Many legitimate concerns have been raised with respect to the program 
that is being presented within this legislation. First of significance, 
one we should all be very concerned about, is human rights. There is no 
way we want to be involved in an operation that is not going to 
emphasize the appropriate treatment of human rights, not only because 
that is the right thing to do but because in the long run that is the 
most effective way to win away any type of support for drug eradication 
and to build respect for the legitimate institutions of government in 
Colombia.
  We are aided in this effort by provisions that already have been 
included under the direction of Senator Leahy. Essentially, under the 
Leahy provisions, units that receive assistance and training from the 
United States cannot receive that training unless an individual who 
faces any type of credible human rights violation has either been 
removed or appropriate justice has been rendered to that individual. In 
a practical sense, this means all the troops who are going to be 
trained are vetted for human rights abuses. And all of them must pass.
  Also, the Minister of Defense of Colombia must, every 6 months, 
report on the process of bringing to justice those individuals who have 
been accused of human rights violations. As of today, both of the 
counternarcotics battalions have been vetted--the 1st Battalion and the 
2nd Battalion. Also, other units of the Colombian Army have been 
vetted. In order to receive our training, these units must receive this 
vetting. And it has already had a positive effect. But rest assured, 
this is a constant struggle and we must insist and ensure that this 
human rights perspective is one that is not lost in our efforts to aid 
Colombia.

  There is another point that I think is important to make. There have 
been many suggestions that the greatest human rights violation that the 
Colombian Army engages in is passive and active cooperation with armed 
militias, self-defense forces, or paramilitaries as they are called--
the perception that they are really in cahoots with vigilante groups 
that are

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out to destroy not only leftist rebels, but anyone who seeks to express 
themselves or ask for their rights in Colombia. That has been the 
history. But at least on the surface, things are changing.
  One example of that is this particular section of last week's major 
paper in Bogata, Colombia. This is an advertisement that was taken out 
by the military. Essentially it says that 785 families will not 
celebrate Father's Day. Then it lists the victims of the violence in 
Colombia. But I think it is significant to note that they clearly point 
out the violence that is the result of guerrilla, leftist activity, and 
the violence that is the result of what they determine are 
``autodefensas,'' militias, self-defense forces. This is a result, I 
believe, also based on my conversations, that the military authorities 
in Colombia are getting the message. They are getting the message that 
there is no way we will tolerate alliances with paramilitary forces who 
are trying to subvert our emphasis on human rights. I think this is 
discouraging, in the sense that it is a horrible litany of lost souls, 
but it is also important to note that at least the military is trying 
to address the issue in an evenhanded way, the violence that both sides 
are doing to the fabric of peace in Colombia.
  There is a situation here on human rights which is serious and in 
which the military is, for the first time I believe, taking this 
responsibility very seriously. There has been vetting of these military 
units. We are objecting to any type of training that would go to units 
containing individuals who have serious human rights violations.
  There is also a high level of support for the effort to improve the 
human rights position in the Colombian Army, both the Defense Minister, 
General Tapias, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and at the 
tactical level in Tres Esquinas, General Montoya. These individuals 
recognize that the continued cooperation and collaboration with the 
United States rests upon sincere and effective efforts to provide 
effective human rights training and effective human rights behavior in 
the Colombian military.
  There is another aspect of concern that has been raised by some of my 
colleagues with respect to operations in Colombia, and that is the 
perception that the elites of Colombia are not actively involved in 
this struggle. It is most significantly reflected in constitutional 
provisions that prevent graduates of high school from being sent into 
combat, where nongraduates can be drafted and sent into combat. This is 
an issue which is both symbolic and substantive, too.

  Our discussions with the Minister of Defense suggest they are also 
recognizing this issue; that they are consciously moving to 
professionalize their force by replacing draftees with professional 
soldiers; and they are also proposing, according to the Defense 
Minister, legislation within this session of the Colombian Congress 
that will attempt to prevent this discrimination in favor of high 
school graduates and against non-high school graduates. It does 
represent, once again, a perception on the part of the Colombian 
authorities that they must not only protect human rights, but they must 
be fully committed to this struggle in order to receive the support of 
the United States.
  There is another criticism that has been lodged by some of my 
colleagues, and that is that this is just another entre into an 
unwinnable military quagmire, like Vietnam. There are many lessons to 
be drawn from Vietnam. One lesson is that we cannot fight and should 
not fight someone else's battle if they do not have the will to do it 
themselves.
  In this particular situation, Colombia is unlike Vietnam because the 
Colombian forces are asking for our help in terms of training, in terms 
of equipment, but not our troops. They recognize they must do that 
themselves. Also, their history suggests they have in the past done 
precisely that. They wanted our training for their police, equipment 
for their police, intelligence reports for their police, but they went 
after the cartels themselves. It was their responsibility. They carried 
it out successfully.
  The other difference between Vietnam and the situation in Colombia is 
that our focus is on drugs. Our focus is on supporting Colombian 
military authorities to provide the security so that police authorities 
can destroy labs and destroy coca fields. That is a lot different from 
trying to win the hearts and minds, to win the political allegiance of 
a population, as we were by default forced to attempt in Vietnam.
  Winning the political allegiance of the people of Colombia is 
strictly and only the function and responsibility of the Colombian 
Government. That is why President Pastrana's peace plan represents a 
sincere effort to do just that. It is their plan, their peace plan. Our 
effort should rightfully be restricted, and is restricted, to the war 
on drugs.
  Our role is also limited operationally because, as I mentioned 
before, we are providing equipment, we are providing trainers, and we 
are providing intelligence, but intelligence related only to 
counternarcotics operations. Again, this is very similar to what we did 
with the Colombian national police in their successful effort to 
destroy the cartel.
  One cannot totally dismiss history. I believe we have to be very 
careful and cautious so that these steps--appropriate steps and limited 
steps--do not lead to something more. Part of this debate then should 
be to not only reassure the American public that what we are doing is 
appropriate, but also that we will continue to be vigilant so that any 
commitment we make to Colombia will be limited and will strictly be a 
function of their capacity and their willingness to fight their own 
fight and not unwittingly involve Americans directly in that fight.
  There are some other differences between Colombia and those who 
suggest the Vietnam analogy. First of all, this is an insurgency 
without any significant foreign support. With the demise of Castro as a 
potent revolutionary force in Latin America, with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, this is not a situation where there are indigenous forces 
supported by outside powers. In fact, the support the guerrillas on the 
left and the paramilitary on the right are deriving is from their 
participation in the drug trade. There is no great popular support 
abroad for the leftist or for the rightist forces who are guerrillas or 
paramilitaries. Public opinion polls suggest they have very limited 
appeal.

  Colombia is a country with strong democratic traditions. It has 
regular elections. Power transfers peacefully. It is a market economy, 
until recently a market economy that did very well. For all these 
reasons, I think again we should be watchful, but the analogy to 
Vietnam at this juncture fails.
  Let's also look ahead. There are consequences to our operations in 
Colombia. First of all, if there is success in Colombia, we should not 
be surprised that the level of violence will increase because these 
guerrillas and paramilitary forces depend upon support from somewhere. 
If they cannot sell drugs--we hope they will not be able to sell 
drugs--they will return to their old ways--kidnapping, extortion, et 
cetera. We have to recognize, ironically, if the drug war is 
successful, we must see escalating levels of violence.
  The Colombians recognize that, but they are still willing to pay the 
price, fight the fight, and destroy narcotics. We have to recognize the 
armed opponents, FARC and others, are well off. They will resist 
probably, and they will resist with sophisticated weapons and 
technology they have acquired through their contributions to their drug 
tactics.
  There is another consequence that might develop if this plan is 
approved and funds provided to Colombia. That is, if these guerrilla 
and paramilitary units are deprived of their resources from the drug 
trade to continue their operations, there will, I think, be more 
pressure for the peace settlement, more willingness on the part of 
these combatants to come to the table and try to work out an 
arrangement so that decisions in Colombia are decided peacefully and 
not through armed conflict, as it has been so long and so often in that 
country.
  There is another aspect, of course, that would be very helpful to the 
peace settlements there, and that would be whether the United States 
could suppress its voracious appetite for cocaine. That would go a long 
way to assist Colombia in being a more peaceful and tranquil society.

[[Page S5547]]

  So all of our efforts, not only to disrupt production in Colombia and 
elsewhere, but also to suppress demand here in the United States would, 
I think, be helpful.
  But this particular plan, if it works--and there is a reasonable 
probability that it will work--could materially and, I hope, 
effectively lead to sincere and renewed peace discussions within 
Colombia.
  There is also a consequence for failure if we fail to approve the 
resources or if the plan fails for other reasons. At least one result 
would be that President Pastrana, and his government, in the middle of 
the process, would likely also fail. That could lead to several 
consequences.
  First, he could be replaced by someone who is less amenable to the 
peace process. Given the tides of violence in Colombia, there could be 
a resurgence or the surfacing of an authoritarian figure who would be 
much less sensitive to the peace process.
  Another possibility would be a recurrence of what happened in a 
previous administration under President Samper, where, effectively, the 
President of Colombia was subverted by narcotraffickers, by drug money, 
and the country was close to falling under the sway of narcotics 
dealers rather than the elected representatives of the people of 
Colombia. So there are consequences with which we must wrestle.
  All in all, our most promising option is to support this bill and 
support Plan Colombia. To do nothing renders a severe psychological 
blow to the people of Colombia and to the administration of President 
Pastrana, who is committed not only to fighting the drug war, but also 
waging a peace process in negotiations with the insurgents.
  I think we ultimately have to conclude that our best course of action 
is to provide the kind of support that is outlined in this legislation, 
support that goes to the military aspects that have been created by the 
collision of the cocaine cultivation in the hinterlands, where armed 
bands roam and derive profit from coca production, together with a 
balanced approach that emphasizes economic development, particularly 
alternative development for the campesinos, the peasants, that 
strengthens the governance of Colombia, with particular emphasis on the 
judicial system and the penal system.
  This comprehensive approach, representing about $1.6 billion in 
American resources, about $4 billion of Colombian resources, and 
hopefully contributions from other countries around the world, is, I 
believe, at this point the best hope of significantly undercutting drug 
production in Colombia, reducing the flow of cocaine into the United 
States, making our streets safer, and giving Colombia a chance to move 
to a peaceful, stable, civil society, which has alluded them for many 
years.
  With that, Mr. President, I conclude my remarks.

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