[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 79 (Wednesday, June 21, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5536-S5542]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




      FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS 
                  APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2001--Continued


                           Amendment No. 3545

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, due to some confusion in the processing 
of cleared amendments, a mistake was made. Therefore, I ask unanimous 
consent to vitiate action on amendment No. 3545.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senators 
Coverdell, Kennedy, and I be added as cosponsors to the Dodd amendment 
regarding the Peace Corps.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                         assistance to lebanon

  Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, if the distinguished Senator from 
Kentucky will yield, I would like to clarify some issues regarding 
additional assistance to Lebanon.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I would be happy to yield to my colleague from 
Michigan.
  Mr. ABRAHAM. As the Senator knows, I have a special interest in the 
provision of the bill that provides $15 million for development 
activities in Lebanon, including support for the American educational 
institutions there. I am pleased that this year that level of funding 
is maintained in the bill as it was reported from committee, and I wish 
to thank the Senator from Kentucky for his leadership and the interest 
that he too has taken in Lebanon's future.
  As you know, earmarking $15 million in economic assistance is an 
important beginning to a comprehensive aid package to Lebanon. However, 
the recent events in the South of Lebanon call for a more detailed and 
larger aid package to Lebanon.
  A larger aid package can help the country rebuild itself due to the 
devastation of the past 30 years. Specifically, Lebanon needs the 
financial assistance to: rebuild its schools; repair and rebuild its 
sewage systems; repair its destroyed power generation plants; upgrade 
its water purification facilities; and construct general infrastructure 
projects.
  In my opinion, a package similar to the recent Jordanian package of 
$250 million would provide the type of support needed to effectively 
launch the rebuilding effort.
  Unfortunately, it appears that the Administration is not currently 
prepared to present a comprehensive aid package. Several inquiries of 
the Administration have produced no budgetary figures. This is 
disappointing in that your legislation is clearly the appropriate 
vehicles in which to include this funding. Notwithstanding their 
reluctance, I would like to offer my amendment to increase Lebanon's 
funding to $250 million.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Thank you, Senator Abraham.
  I, like you, am dismayed to learn that the Administration has not 
offered any budgetary amounts for an aid package to Lebanon. You are 
absolutely right that the current events in Lebanon demand that we 
reexamine our foreign aid package to that country.
  As such, I pledge to work with you every step of the way to see that 
a more comprehensive aid package to Lebanon is considered here in the 
Senate. I appreciate your suggested amount, and would like to work with 
you once all the elements for a successive aid package are assembled. 
This requires input by the Administration, and a plan as to what 
programs would be funded and which ones would receive priority funding. 
It is my hope that the Administration will consult with us as soon as 
possible regarding figures for an assistance package. However, until 
the Administration produces a comprehensive package, I will have to lay 
your amendment aside.
  Mr. ABRAHAM. I withdraw my amendment.
  Mr. McCONNELL. The Senator's comments are appreciated. As always, I 
will work with you and consult you as we put this package together. I 
highly value your expertise on Lebanon.
  Mr. ABRAHAM. I thank the Senator for that clarification. I also wish 
to commend him and his committee for their strong interest in a 
financial assistance package for Lebanon.


                        climate change language

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, Sec. 576 of S. 2522 contains language 
regarding implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. I would like to ask the 
distinguished Chairman and Ranking Member of the Foreign Operations 
Subcommittee two questions to clarify their understanding of this 
provision.
  The United States is currently engaged in climate change negotiations 
to ensure meaningful participation of developing countries and to 
ensure that greenhouse gas emissions reductions are achieved in the 
most cost-effective manner. Is my understanding correct that this 
provision is not intended to restrict the Administration from engaging 
in these international negotiations related to both the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), which was ratified by the Senate 
in 1992, and the Kyoto Protocol to that Convention?
  As you also know, the Senate has clearly expressed its views 
regarding the Kyoto Protocol in S. Res. 98, adopted unanimously by the 
Senate on July 25, 1997. That resolution calls on the Administration to 
support an approach to climate change that protects the economic 
interests of the United States and seeks commitments from

[[Page S5537]]

developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The 
Administration is aggressively engaging developing countries to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions through international projects and activities 
emphasizing market-based mechanisms and environmental technology. It is 
my understanding that this provision is not intended to restrict 
international programs or activities to encourage commitments by 
developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Is my 
understanding correct?
  Mr. McCONNELL. I thank the distinguished Senator from West Virginia 
for his questions. Your understanding is correct. Sec. 576 is not 
intended to restrict U.S. negotiations or activities such as you have 
described. Rather, it is intended to prevent the Administration from 
implementing the Kyoto Protocol prior to its ratification.
  Mr. LEAHY. The Senator's understanding is correct. Sec. 576 is not 
intended to prohibit the United States from engaging in international 
climate change negotiations or activities that would encourage 
participation by developing countries.


                     the inter-american foundation

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, last year, the Senate adopted an amendment 
to the FY 2000 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act that deleted 
language restricting the availability of funds for the Inter-American 
Foundation. I offered that amendment, which was included in the 
managers' amendment to the bill and accepted without objection, because 
the basis for restricting the Foundation's funding was inaccurate and 
misleading. Chairman Stevens and Chairman McConnell, when apprised of 
the facts of the situation, agreed to remove the language from the 
bill, and I appreciate their willingness to do so.
  This year, the report contains language that is similarly inaccurate 
and misleading, and that implies that a principal reason for 
terminating funding for the Foundation is an ongoing concern about the 
activities of a staff member of the Foundation. Based on the agreement 
of Chairman Stevens and Chairman McConnell to remove similar language 
from the bill last year, as well as the subsequent resolution of this 
matter, I was surprised to again see a reference to this matter in the 
Committee's report.
  First, let me say that I am not passing judgment on whatever other 
reasons the Committee may have for terminating the funding for the 
Inter-American Foundation. However, I object to the Committee's 
continued reference to an individual staff member of the Foundation as 
a reason for shutting down the Foundation. Let me take a moment to 
clearly state the facts of the matter.
  Last year, the General Accounting Office conducted an investigation 
of allegations of contract and hiring regulatory abuses at the 
Foundation that were reported anonymously to their fraud hotline. The 
GAO completed their investigation and forwarded a report to the 
Committee on May 20, 1999, and requested permission to brief the Board 
of Directors of the Foundation on their findings, as well as certain 
additional allegations received during the course of interviews at the 
Foundation. On June 30, 1999, when Chairman Stevens and Chairman 
McConnell agreed to remove language from the bill last year that 
withheld funding for the Foundation until GAO completed a further 
investigation, the GAO was free to brief the Foundation. At that time, 
the Chairmen advised me that, by referring the matter to the 
Foundation's Board, the Appropriations Committee would view this 
investigation as complete and no further action would be taken by the 
Committee regarding the subject of the GAO investigation.
  GAO briefed the Foundation Board on July 23, 1999. The minutes of 
that Board meeting indicate that GAO investigators stated that GAO had 
issued a final report on their review of the Foundation's contracting 
and personnel actions and that no further review would be undertaken. 
In addition, GAO investigators stated to the Board that the anonymous 
allegations received against a Foundation staff member were 
administrative in nature and would not be further investigated by GAO. 
Board members expressed concern and indignity at the allegations 
against the staff member, and concluded that no further action would be 
necessary. On August 5, 1999, the Board adopted a formal resolution to 
that effect.
  Mr. President, continued references to unfounded, disproven anonymous 
allegations against this staff member contribute nothing to the 
public's understanding of any legitimate reasons the Committee may have 
for terminating the funding for the Inter-American Foundation. I would 
like to ask Chairman Stevens if he agrees that long-resolved issues 
regarding a now-former staff member at the Foundation are not related 
to the Committee's action.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I share the views of my colleague, 
Senator McCain, that the Committee's report language could be misread 
to imply that the actions of a former staff member are a principal 
reason to shut down the Foundation, and I do not believe that is or 
should be cited as a reason for doing so.
  Mr. McCAIN. Thank you, Senator Stevens. Mr. President, I would also 
like to ask Chairman Stevens if he would agree to include in the 
conference statement of managers on the FY 2001 Foreign Operations 
Appropriations bill a clear statement disavowing this report language 
regarding a now-former employee of the Foundation.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I would be happy to accept the Senator's 
suggestion that we include clarifying report language in the conference 
agreement.
  Mr. McCAIN. Thank you, Senator Stevens.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to voice my strong 
support for the long-in-coming supplemental appropriations request for 
Colombia included as part of this Foreign Operations bill. I believe 
that there are few requests more important to the security and well-
being of this nation in the coming years than this one.
  I believe that it is critical that we move quickly to pass the 
Foreign Operations bill and this emergency supplemental request for 
Colombia.
  Some have argued that the Colombia proposal is simply too expensive. 
But I believe that this proposal represents the proper balance 
regarding what should--in fact must--be one of this nation's highest 
priorities: to stop the flow of illegal narcotics into the United 
States.
  As we debate this proposal today, Colombia faces an unprecedented 
crisis.
  Almost 40 percent of the country--an area itself the size of the 
entire nation of Switzerland--is under the control of the Armed 
Revolutionary Forces of Colombia, FARC. The FARC is an alliance of some 
20,000 drug traffickers and terrorists who threaten the stability not 
only of Colombia, but of the entire Andean region. And, as we all know, 
there are right-wing paramilitary groups in Colombia who also have ties 
to the drug trade.
  Over 80 percent of the world's supply of cocaine is grown, produced 
or transported through Colombia, and large swaths of Colombia, now 
lawless or under FARC or paramilitary control, have become prime coca 
and opium producing zones.
  These FARC rebels earn as much as two or even three million dollars 
per day from drug cultivators and traffickers who rely on their 
protection or--perhaps even more likely--who fear their retribution.
  The FARC is currently holding hostage as many as 1,500 to 2,500 
people, including at least 250 military prisoners and 250 police 
officers.
  And, as the ability of the government of Colombia to govern large 
areas of their own country continues to disintegrate, the FARC narco-
terrorists and paramilitaries continue to expand their base of 
operations and attack surrounding areas.
  All this, and Colombia is facing its worst economic recession in more 
than 70 years: Real GDP fell by over 3 percent last year. Clearly, 
something needs to be done. And clearly, Colombia will need help.
  The situation in Colombia is not simply a problem in a far away land. 
The events taking place in Colombia have direct and severe 
repercussions for the United States and the rest of the world.
  Colombia is the source country for 80 percent of the cocaine consumed 
in the United States each year, and up to 70 percent of the heroin.

[[Page S5538]]

  And the situation is getting worse, not better. Coca cultivation in 
Colombia has doubled in the past decade alone, and shows no sign of 
slowing.
  In addition to undermining the democratic institutions in Colombia, 
the violence that has become endemic has forced over 500,000 people to 
flee Colombia; 65,000 have sought refuge in the United States.
  According to the administration, illegal drugs account for over 
50,000 deaths each year in the United States, and cost over $100 
billion a year in health care costs, accidents, and lost productivity. 
So the problem of narcotics production in Colombia is not just a 
problem in Colombia: To the flow of drugs from Colombia has very real, 
and very damaging effects, on our country.
  Earlier this year, I joined many of my colleagues on the 
Appropriations Committee as we met with Colombia's President, Andres 
Pastrana. President Pastrana outlined a clear and comprehensive plan to 
address the drug trade, and to start solving the deeper problems within 
his country.
  It is an ambitious plan, but one which I believe can be implemented, 
and can promote the peace process, strengthen democracy, and help 
revive Colombia's economy.
  The Plan Colombia encompasses far more than the request we have 
before us. A combination of internal and external sources will be 
providing Colombia with most of the $7.5 billion over three years that 
President Pastrana has deemed necessary.
  The United States need provide but a piece of the overall plan. 
Working with President Pastrana, President Clinton has asked Congress 
to fund $1.6 billion of that total. The two-year package will assist 
Colombia in combating the drug trade; help the country promote peace 
and prosperity; and deepen its democracy. This is a large package, but 
it is in our interest to provide it.
  Without a major new effort, supported by the United States, the 
Colombian military and police simply lack the resources and ability to 
defeat the FARC and narco-trafficking forces.
  Plan Colombia is focused on efforts to boost Colombia's interdiction 
and eradication capabilities, particularly in the south, including:
  Funds for special counter-narcotics battalions to push into coca-
growing regions of Southern Colombia;
  Funds to purchase helicopters, desperately needed to provide the 
Colombian National Police access to the remote and undeveloped regions 
of the country where the narco-traffickers thrive;
  Funds to upgrade Colombia's interdiction capabilities, with aircraft 
and airfield upgrades, radar, and improved intelligence gathering;
  Funds for equipment to be used in increased eradication efforts;
  Funds to provide economic alternatives to coca growers; and,
  Funds for new programs to promote human rights, help the judicial 
system and to crack down on money laundering.
  As many of my colleague are aware, there is some concern about the 
human rights questions raised by this assistance package. This 
supplemental request, after all, provides military assistance to an 
army and a police force which, in the past, has had a less than Steller 
record on human rights issues.
  But it is my belief that the Leahy amendment, augmented by specific 
language that has been added to this legislation in committee, goes a 
long way towards meeting these concerns.
  To begin with, any U.S. assistance to Colombian military and police 
forces will be provided in strict accordance with section 563 of the 
FY2000 Foreign Operations Act--the Leahy amendment.
  In addition, this legislation contains new and specific provisions 
intended to guarantee the protection of human rights. Colombian 
military officers accused of human rights violations are to be tried in 
a civilian court, for example, not in the military courts which have, 
in the past, been far too lenient in how they treat these cases. There 
are also requirements that any Colombian military units trained by the 
United States as part of this antinarcotics effort be screened for 
human rights abuses.
  In addition, the committee has also included language at my request 
relating to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the 
regions which, I believe, has greatly contributed to the culture of 
violence and lawlessness in Colombia.
  I believe that any effective strategy to stabilize the region and 
reduce the influence of the criminals, drug traffickers, narco-
terrorists, and paramilitaries must include the implementation of 
stringent controls on existing stockpiles and the destruction of 
surplus and seized stocks of small arms and light weapons.
  The small arms and light weapons language calls for the creation of a 
serial number registry by the Department of State and by Colombia to 
track all small arms and light weapons provided to Colombia under this 
supplemental request, as well as the creation of a small arms and light 
weapons destruction initiative for the region. If any of the small arms 
and light weapons the United States supplies to Colombia as part of 
this assistance package are used in violation of human rights, this 
registry will allow us to track, to the unit, who was using these 
weapons and bring the responsible party to justice.
  On the question of human rights then, I believe that although we must 
remain watchful, the package crafted by the Appropriations Committee 
does a good job in meeting the concerns that have been raised.
  Let me take a minute here, however, to express my concern about one 
specific part of the committee recommendations that I hope is addressed 
in conference: The lack of Blackhawk helicopters.
  The President asked for $388 million to fund 30 additional Blackhawk 
helicopters.
  These helicopters fly faster, farther, higher and hold more people 
than the Huey II helicopters provided for by the committee.
  In fact, I believe that the Blackhawk is critical to the terrain and 
mission in Colombia for several reasons:
  The Blackhawk can carry three times as many men as the Huey II; at 
high altitudes the advantage of the Blackhawk is even more pronounced; 
and the Blackhawk's maximum speed is 50 percent faster than the Huey 
II.
  I believe that the drug war is a serious one, and that we should be 
devoting the best possible resources to this ongoing struggle.
  I am not a helicopter expert, but the experts in the administration 
and elsewhere are telling us that the Blackhawk is the right equipment 
for the job. I do not think we should be second-guessing that decision 
with so much at stake.
  Let me also talk for a moment today about one other aspect of this 
assistance package for Colombia that has come under some discussions: 
The issue of demand reduction versus supply reduction.
  Let me say that I strongly believe that even as we provide the 
resources necessary to implement Plan Colombia that we must also attack 
the demand side of the drug problem in this country with a multi-
pronged, concerted effort.
  I support funding for domestic prevention and demand reduction 
programs, and I believe we must continue to provide domestic law 
enforcement with the tools they need to combat the drug trade within 
our borders.
  But much of the demand-side, domestic effort can be accomplished by 
state and local governments.
  What state and local governments cannot do is to keep drugs from 
entering this country in the first place. That task can only be 
accomplished by the federal government, which has control over our 
borders and over foreign policy.
  In fact, of the $18 billion in the Federal Government's counterdrug 
funding, 32 percent goes to domestic demand reduction, 49 percent to 
domestic law enforcement; 10 percent to interdiction along our borders; 
and only 3.2 percent to international counterdrug efforts.
  Less than 4 percent for the one area that is clearly and 
unambiguously the one area in this fight that is the sole 
responsibility of the Federal Government.
  Even with passage of this package of assistance to Colombia this 
figure will still be well under 10 percent.
  So I say to my colleagues who believe more effort needs to be 
directed to domestic programs to address demand that they are right. 
More effort in this

[[Page S5539]]

area is needed. Our states should do more. Our cities should do more. 
But clearly more effort supporting our friends and allies in 
international efforts to curtail production, refinement, and 
transportation are needed too. And that is the one area where only the 
Federal government can act.
  Only with assistance from the United States will the Government of 
Colombia be able to eradicate and intercept the tons of illegal 
narcotics that leave that country each year bound for our shores.
  The ongoing narco-crisis in Colombia and the overall crisis of drugs 
in America represent an important threat to our nation's security and 
stability. The war against drugs is real, and should be treated with 
the same seriousness of purpose and resources as any other war.
  The funding provided for the Colombia supplemental request in the 
Foreign Operations bill, although expensive, is clearly within our 
national interest. We face a crisis in this nation, and that crisis 
demands action.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Colombia package in the Foreign 
Operations bill, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the foreign operations of the United States 
are all undertaken to promote the national interests of our country. 
They are all useful and important programs, and they deserve our 
support.
  The national interests that they serve, however, are of varying 
importance. As George Orwell wrote in his novel ``Animal Farm,'' ``some 
are more equal than others.'' All our foreign operations programs are 
useful, but some are downright vital to our national security.
  One element in this bill that is truly vital to our national security 
is severely underfunded. I will introduce shortly an amendment to 
address that severe problem.
  The funding line to which I refer is known as ``NADR.'' That does not 
refer to Ralph Nader. It does refer to ``Nonproliferation, 
Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs.'' The 10 programs in 
this category are all on the front line of protecting our people from 
terrorism and from weapons of mass destruction.
  Unfortunately, the funding in this bill for 7 of those 10 programs is 
37 percent below the levels requested by the President. (And that 
ignores another $30 million that was cut because the Foreign Operations 
Subcommittee concluded that a new counter-terrorism training center 
must be funded in the Commerce, Justice, State appropriation.) I submit 
that the national security requires that we provide substantially more 
of those requested funds.
  Let me describe the programs that are treated so badly in this bill:
  In the non-proliferation field, the Department of State's Export 
Control Assistance program helps foreign countries to combat the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
  Recently customs agents in Uzbekistan stopped a shipment of 
radioactive contraband from Kazakhstan that was on its way to Iran, 
with an official final destination of Pakistan. Some press stories 
suggested that the shipment was really intended for a terrorist group 
affiliated with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, who would have used it 
to build a radiological weapon for use against Americans.
  Those customs agents were trained by the United States. The equipment 
they used to detect the radioactive material was provided by the United 
States. In that case, the funding came from the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction program.
  But the Export Control Assistance program provides the same sort of 
assistance when Nunn-Lugar funds can not be used, and it helps other 
countries to enact the laws and regulations that they need in order to 
have effective export controls. The personal ties that are forged by 
this program with export control officials from other countries are 
equally crucial to improving other countries' export control 
performance.
  This year, the Export Control Assistance program will enable the 
Department of Commerce to assign a resident export control attache to 
Russia. The Export Control Assistance program also sets up internal 
compliance programs in Russia's high-tech industries and trains the 
Russian personnel who staff those offices. These programs enable Russia 
to police itself and give us increased visibility into plants that are 
of particular concern from the non-proliferation standpoint.
  Last year, Congress increased funding for this program from $10 
million to $14 million. Indeed, the report on the bill before us takes 
credit for that increase. This year, the President asked for $14 
million, to maintain this vital level of effort, but the bill before us 
includes only $10 million.
  When the appropriators increased this program last year, they were 
right. This year, they should do it again. We need more export control 
assistance to help other countries keep nuclear materials out of the 
hands of their dangerous neighbors.
  Earlier this month, the National Commission on Terrorism warned that 
it was ``particularly concerned about the persistent lack of adequate 
security and safeguards for the nuclear material in the former Soviet 
Union.'' That is a cogent concern, and Export Control Assistance is one 
of the programs that helps to keep dangerous materials from crossing 
former Soviet borders.
  By the way, the Foreign Relations Committee favors full funding of 
the President's request for this program. Indeed, at the suggestion of 
Chairman Helms, we added $5 million in our security assistance bill to 
support a new project in Malta.
  Another non-proliferation program, the International Science and 
Technology Centers, provides safe employment opportunities for former 
Soviet experts in weapons of mass destruction who might otherwise be 
tempted to sell their skills to rogue states. This program not only 
helps those scientists. It also gives hope to, and helps to preserve 
discipline at, the institutes where those experts work.
  The activities of this program are guided by a Governing Board headed 
by the Honorable Ron Lehman, a wonderful public servant who was 
Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan Administration and 
director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Bush 
Administration.
  Ron Lehman and I often disagree on policy matters, but we are in 
complete agreement on the need to help Russia to restructure its 
bloated, Soviet-era weapons complexes without leaving its 
weapons experts prey to offers from countries like Iran, Iraq or Libya. 
His program is doing some wonderful things, moreover. Since 1994, the 
Science Centers have supported over 840 projects, employing over 30,000 
weapons experts at more than 400 former Soviet institutes.

  Some of these projects led to the formation of viable commercial 
companies; others resulted in contracts with western companies to 
distribute new Russian products like medical devices or high 
temperature batteries. Around a fifth of Science Center funding now 
comes from Western companies and government agencies that employ former 
Soviet experts through this program.
  Other projects have put weapons experts to work on public health, 
environmental remediation, and non-proliferation projects that provide 
real benefits to the former Soviet Union and its neighbors.
  For example, the Russian Academy of Sciences, MINATOM, and the 
prestigious Kurchatov Institute recently completed a six-year project 
to map all the nuclear contamination sites in the former Soviet Union. 
Science Center funding was the lifeblood of that project.
  The Science Centers also funded fourteen Y2K readiness projects that 
ensured the safety of nuclear power facilities and chemical and 
biological storage areas.
  The International Science and Technology Centers are multinational. 
The U.S. Government provided only 31 percent of last year's Science 
Center funding, compared to 36 percent provided by the European Union. 
Japan, Norway and South Korea also participate in the program. But 
without our leadership, this program will fail.
  The bill before us would give that program only a third of what was 
appropriated for this fiscal year. I know that the budget numbers for 
foreign operations are unrealistically tight. They always are. But if 
we cut the Science and Technology Centers program that much, we will 
endanger our national security.

[[Page S5540]]

  It only takes a few experts in nuclear, chemical or biological 
weapons to provide dangerous materials or technology to a ``rogue 
state.'' We should do everything in our power to make sure that 
economic desperation in Russia does not result in such a catastrophe.
  The committee report on this bill states that it:

     was disturbed to learn that, after at least 5 years of 
     interaction between the State Department and Russian 
     scientists, relations remain guarded.

  I, for one, am not disturbed by that. Russia still has a nuclear 
weapons program, just as we do. There are bound to be security concerns 
that keep us at arm's length.
  Unlike us, Russia may also have illegal chemical and/or biological 
weapons programs. There are military biological institutes to which we 
do not have access.
  As a result, there is always a risk that non-proliferation assistance 
will be diverted to illegal military research, or that the funds we 
provide will keep afloat people or institutes involved in an illegal 
chemical or biological weapons program. That risk pales, however, 
compared to the risk of weapons proliferation if we leave those weapons 
scientists unable to put food on their table. So we must be 
``guarded,'' and we must do more.
  The Science and Technology Centers program takes great care to 
minimize the risk of diversion. The General Accounting Office, after 
studying the Science Center's programs to employ Russia's former 
biological weapons experts, reported recently that the Center:

       . . . has directly deposited grant payments into project 
     participants' individual bank accounts, which prevents the 
     institutes from diverting funds for unauthorized purposes. . 
     . . Program managers from the Science Center review 
     programmatic and financial documents on a quarterly basis, 
     and the Science Center requires a final audit of every 
     project before it releases an overhead payment to an 
     institute.
       In addition, the U.S. Defense Contract Audit Agency has 
     conducted internal control audits for 10 Science Center 
     biotechnology projects through 1999.

  Those precautions work. A few months ago, Science Center officials 
were warned by Russian scientists of a possible diversion of funds. 
That information was received and acted upon in a timely manner, and 
steps were taken to make sure that no diversion occurred.
  The Science Centers program also takes steps to guard against 
proliferation. After all, that's the point of this assistance. We can 
be proud of the job that this program is doing to reduce the risk of 
proliferation of Russian materials and expertise.
  When the GAO looked at Science Center biotechnology projects, they 
found that nearly half the recipients of project assistance were 
``former senior weapons scientists.'' On the average, the scientists 
devoted more than half of the year to Science Center projects. 
Institute directors told the GAO that these projects ``were crucial to 
their institute budgets.''
  The GAO also reports:

       Prior to the funding of any U.S. collaborative research 
     project, Russian institute officials must pledge that their 
     institute will not perform offensive weapons research or 
     engage in proliferation activities. According to a January 
     1999 State Department report, engaging in such inappropriate 
     behavior would have an immediate and negative impact on any 
     U.S. assistance.
  Institute officials with whom we met consistently told us that they 
are no longer involved in offensive biological weapons activities and 
that they clearly understand the conditions of U.S. collaborative 
research assistance.

  The GAO report continues:

       Officials at three institutes we visited reported that, in 
     the past, representatives of countries of proliferation 
     concern had approached them seeking to initiate questionable 
     dual-use research. Officials at the three institutes told us 
     they had refused these offers because of a pledge made to 
     U.S. executive branch officials as a condition of receiving 
     U.S. assistance.

       The pledge includes avoiding cooperation both with 
     countries of proliferation concern or with terrorist groups.
       State and Defense Department officials identified at least 
     15 former Soviet biological weapons institutes in which the 
     United States has evidence that these programs have 
     discouraged the institutes and scientists from cooperating 
     with countries of proliferation concern such as Iran.
       The Department of Defense informed Congress in a January 
     2000 report that the access gained through the collaborative 
     research programs has provided ``high confidence'' that 
     Biopreparat institutes such as Vector and Obolensk are not 
     presently engaged in offensive activities.

  Did everyone get that? This program is giving assistance to Russian 
biological weapons experts in order to keep them out of the clutches of 
rogue states. The GAO has found that it is succeeding in doing that. At 
the same time, we are guarding against the diversion of our funds to 
improper purposes. And the access we get to the institutes we assist--
thanks to this program--has enabled the Defense Department to say that 
those institutes are clean.
  Finally, we get useful research as an end product. If the executive 
branch gets the funding it wants, we will get help on defending against 
biological weapons. We will also help the Russians safeguard the 
dangerous pathogens that they keep for research purposes, thus guarding 
against their sale and reducing the risk of an accidental catastrophe.
  The Foreign Relations Committee supports this program as well. 
Indeed, in our security assistance bill, we added $14 million, so that 
the Science Centers could fund all of the deserving projects that have 
been proposed.
  But the bill before us cuts $25 million out of this fine program, 
leaving less than 45 percent of what the President requested, and 
barely a third of what the Foreign Relations Committee recommends.
  The price of such cuts could be far more than the $25 million in 
would-be savings. If we leave Russian weapons scientists underemployed, 
with time on their hands and not enough food on their tables, how will 
they resist an offer from Iran or Iraq?
  When we talk about keeping these Russian scientists usefully 
employed, we're guarding against the spread of nuclear weapons and 
dreaded plagues. We're not talking about budget caps, but rather about 
life or death for millions of people.
  I understand the need for efficient programs. But this program works. 
That GAO report did not need to make even one recommendation.
  And when millions of lives are potentially at stake, we should do 
more than do less.
  A third non-proliferation program is our contributions to KEDO, the 
Korean Energy Development Organization, pursuant to the Nuclear 
Framework with North Korea. Thanks to this agreement, North Korea has 
ceased reprocessing spent nuclear reactor fuel.
  Indeed, recently the last of the spent nuclear fuel was safely 
canned, under IAEA supervision. That vastly lowers any North Korean 
ability to produce nuclear weapons.
  The Nuclear Framework Agreement has also led North Korea to let U.S. 
experts visit an underground site that we feared might be a nuclear 
plant. Our two visits showed that it was not a nuclear facility.
  But there is a price for all these benefits, and part of that price 
is U.S. contributions of heavy fuel oil. Now, traditionally we have 
spent $35 million a year on that. But other countries have not helped 
out as much as we expected--although South Korea and Japan are spending 
much more than we are, to build new reactors in North Korea that will 
not be readily used for bomb-making. In addition, as we all know, fuel 
oil costs a lot more than it used to.
  Appropriators have refused to allocate more than $35 million, 
however. Instead, last year, they kept this line at $35 million and 
added a separate, unallocated line of $20 million in the NADR account, 
which actually went to meet our KEDO obligations.
  The bill before us again allots only $35 million, but this time there 
is no additional line with $20 million.
  This money keeps the Nuclear Framework Agreement on track. That 
agreement keeps North Korea from using a handy source of fissile 
material to make nuclear weapons. It also provides a bit of stability 
on the Korean peninsula, which has led to a suspension of North Korea's 
long-range missile tests, to U.S.-North Korean negotiations on an end 
to those programs and to North Korea's missile exports, and now to the 
first summit ever between the leaders of North and South Korea.
  Do we really want to put the Framework Agreement at risk, by failing 
to

[[Page S5541]]

fund it? Do we want to derail all the delicate negotiations that are 
ongoing with North Korea?
  Perhaps the authors of this bill intend to fix this in conference, 
once everybody admits that we need to bust the budget caps on foreign 
operations. If so, I will be relieved. Maintaining KEDO and the Nuclear 
Framework Agreement gets to the heart of our national security, 
however, and I think we should make clear that we want this shortfall 
remedied.
  Another important program in this funding category is our 
contributions to the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Preparatory 
Commission. These funds are used primarily to procure and install the 
International Monitoring system, which serves United States national 
security interests by enabling the world to detect, identify, and 
respond to any illegal nuclear tests by other countries.
  The International Monitoring System offers features that are of 
particular value to the United States. Its network of seismic stations 
will supplement those that the U.S. Government uses to monitor foreign 
nuclear weapons tests. Indeed, some of those stations will be in 
locations where we could not hope to get seismic coverage any other 
way.
  The controlled and affiliated seismic stations will also afford 
regional coverage, rather than just long-range seismic collection. This 
will result in improved detection, as well as better geolocation of 
suspect events.
  The International Monitoring System will include 
hydroacoustic collection in the world's oceans, ultrasound collection, 
and a large network of land-based atmospheric collectors to pick up 
telltale contamination in the air. Use of those additional monitoring 
techniques will increase the likelihood of getting multiple-source 
evidence of an illegal nuclear weapons test.

  In addition, the data from the International Monitoring System will 
be widely available, and therefore usable for enforcement purposes. 
This is important.
  Although the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty has not entered into 
force, signatories are bound--by international law and/or by custom--
not to undermine the ``object and purposes'' of the treaty. We have a 
legal interest, therefore--and surely a security interest--in making 
sure that other countries do not engage in nuclear weapons tests.
  How do you enforce a ban on nuclear weapons tests? That takes more 
than just monitoring. It requires exposure of the offending country and 
convincing other countries that a violation has occurred. Only then can 
we rally the world to threaten or impose penalties on the offender.
  U.S. Government sources of information, as good as they are, often 
can not be used to create a diplomatic or public case against an 
offender. Our contributions to the CTBT Preparatory Commission will 
help us to get the publicly usable information that is so vital to 
putting a stop to any cheating.
  The report on this bill states that in the past, the President has 
requested more than was needed for this program. That is true. The 
executive branch asks for our share of the coming year's tentative 
budget, but we also work within the Preparatory Commission to scrub 
that budget, and it usually comes in a bit lower.
  But does that mean we can safely cut 30 percent? Not on your life! 
The final U.S. obligation might be $20 million, as opposed to the 
requested $21.5 million. But $15 million is simply out of the question. 
That would presume a $25 million cut in the Preparatory Commission 
budget proposed by their Secretariat, which would mean an intolerable 
delay in fielding the monitoring system.
  There may be some confusion because this program has been able to 
absorb budget cuts in the past. In those years, the State Department 
was able to apply previous-year funds to make up for the cuts. 
Virtually all the Fiscal Year 2000 funds, however, have already been 
obligated. Thus, a cut in Fiscal Year 2001 funding will be much more 
harmful than were previous cuts.
  The report also states that the Preparatory Commission should 
reimburse the United States for services we have performed in setting 
up monitoring sites. That, too, is true, and we will be reimbursed. We 
will not be reimbursed, however, until the sites that we install have 
been certified as operational. That guards against shoddy work by other 
countries, and I don't think we want to give up that protection.
  Certification has been achieved for one U.S.-installed site, and we 
will get $500,000 in reimbursements in Fiscal Year 2001. That is 
already taken into account in the President's budget request. Several 
million dollars in reimbursement will be received in later years. 
Cutting the 2001 budget will jeopardize not only the work program for 
the monitoring system, but also any reimbursements for past or current 
work that depend upon achieving certification next year.
  The bottom line is simple: either we pay for our share of nuclear 
test monitoring costs, or we delay significantly the work on a 
monitoring system that serves our own national security. If we want to 
catch any country that cheats and to expose that cheating, so that we 
can sanction a violator, then we must pay our bills.
  Non-proliferation programs were not the only ones to be cut in this 
portion of the bill before us. The Department of State's Anti-Terrorism 
Assistance program and its Terrorist Interdiction program are vital to 
the security of United States diplomatic and military personnel 
overseas.
  The first line of defense against attacks like those on our embassies 
in Kenya and Tanzania, or on the Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia, 
is not ours. Rather, it is the security services of the host countries. 
All over the world, those countries need our assistance in border 
control and airport security. They need our training in spotting 
terrorist groups hiding behind legitimate charities, and in handling 
terrorist incidents--including future attacks that could use weapons of 
mass destruction. The Anti-Terrorism Assistance program does all of 
this.
  Right now, the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program trains up to 2,000 
people per year. There is so much demand for our training that we could 
help 3,000 a year, if only we had the funds and the facilities. An 
increase in training funds would make a real contribution to our 
security.
  The State Department also runs a Terrorist Interdiction Program--
known as TIP--that provides other countries the training and equipment 
needed for them to apprehend terrorists entering their countries. The 
TIP program enables countries to compare a person's travel documents to 
their own data-bases. It also works through INTERPOL to link these 
countries and promote information sharing. Finally, it trains 
immigration and customs workers in interview and screening techniques.
  The State Department recently began a program to provide these 
important capabilities to Pakistan. We all know about Pakistan, the 
gateway to Afghanistan for Osama bin Laden and his buddies. Can anybody 
think of a better place to beef up border security, so that terrorists 
can be apprehended as they go to and from those Afghan training camps?
  The first phase of the TIP program in Pakistan will be paid out of 
Fiscal Year 2000 funds. But the bill for the second phase will come due 
in Fiscal Year 2001. So will the first phase of a program in 
Kenya, which we know all too well has been used as a terrorist gateway 
to Africa, and site surveys in four more countries.

  The proposed budget cut in the bill before us would force us to 
choose between Pakistan and Kenya. It is simply contrary to our 
national interest to force such a Hobson's choice.
  These two anti-terrorist programs are utterly vital to our security. 
They make foreign security services more competent in protecting our 
own personnel, and they also foster ties that can be crucial in a 
crisis. We should be increasing these programs, and the President's 
proposed budget would do just that.
  The bill before us would cut 22 percent of the funds requested. It 
would impose a 7-percent cut from this year's funding for these two 
anti-terrorist programs. This is simply unacceptable.
  Finally, the Department of State's Small Arms program has 
underwritten successful arms buy-backs in Africa, notably in Mali. This 
is low-budget program is urgently needed in areas that are emerging 
from civil war and still awash in automatic weapons. A

[[Page S5542]]

little bit of support can go a long way to drain the supply of arms 
that otherwise end up going to drug-runners, bandit gangs, or renewed 
civil strife.
  The President proposed $2 million for this program. The bill before 
us would slice away half of that. This is, indeed, a low-budget 
program, but $2 million is really the floor for a workable program. To 
take away half of that is to throw this effort into the basement.
  The bill before us, Mr. President, leaves the Senate in a nearly 
untenable position. It is under the budget request by fully $1.7 
billion. This is no way to fulfill our obligations to world 
organizations or to maintain either international influence or our own 
national security. We must accept that there is no such thing as world 
leadership on the cheap.
  I deeply wish that I could restore the funds that this bill cuts from 
the NADR account. The truth is, however, that we must wait for 
conferees to break the ridiculous cap on this whole bill.
  With that in mind, the amendment that I am introducing simply states 
the sense of the Senate that the conferees should find the funds needed 
to make NADR whole.
  We have been through this drill before. In due course, more funds for 
foreign operations will be found. The crucial question is how the 
conferees will allocate those funds. This amendment calls on the 
conferees to give priority to these important national security 
efforts.
  I am pleased to report that this amendment is co-sponsored by 
Senators Lugar, Hagel, Bingaman, Conrad, Domenici and Levin. I urge all 
of my colleagues to support it.
  This amendment is not certain to succeed in conference--but it surely 
is the least we can do. The safety of our diplomats and military 
personnel overseas, and the safety of all of us from the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction, demand no less.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, the Senate is now considering S. 2522, 
the foreign operations and export financing appropriations bill for 
fiscal year 2001.
  The Senate bill provides $13.4 billion in budget authority and $4.5 
billion in new outlays to operate the programs of the Department of 
State, export and military assistance, bilateral and multilateral 
economic assistance, and related agencies for fiscal year 2001.
  When outlays from prior year budget authority and other completed 
actions are taken into account, the bill totals $13.4 billion in budget 
authority and $14.3 billion in outlays for fiscal year 2001.
  The subcommittee is below its section 302(b) allocation for budget 
authority and at its section 302(b) allocation for outlays.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a table displaying the 
budget committee scoring of this bill be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

S. 2522, FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS, 2001: SPENDING COMPARISONS--
                          SENATE-REPORTED BILL
                 [Fiscal year 2001, dollars in millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            General
                                            purpose  Mandatory    Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senate-reported bill:
  Budget authority.......................    13,384         44    13,428
  Outlays................................    14,273         44    14,317
Senate 302(b) allocation:
  Budget authority.......................    13,385         44    13,429
  Outlays................................    14,273         44    14,317
200 level:
  Budget authority.......................    15,306         44    15,350
  Outlays................................    13,527         44    13,571
President's request:
  Budget authority.......................    15,097         44    15,141
  Outlays................................    15,329         44    15,373
 
    SENATE-REPORTED BILL COMPARED TO:
 
Senate 302(b) allocation:
  Budget authority.......................        -1  .........        -1
  Outlays................................  ........  .........  ........
2000 level:
  Budget authority.......................    -1,922  .........    -1,922
  Outlays................................       746  .........       746
President's request:
  Budget authority.......................    -1,713  .........    -1,713
  Outlays................................    -1,056  .........    -1,056
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding. Totals adjusted for
  consistency with scorekeeping conventions. Prepared by SBC Majority
  Staff, May 18, 2000.
 

  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I urge adoption of this bill.

                          ____________________