[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 71 (Friday, June 9, 2000)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E952-E954]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF THE F-22
______
HON. PETER A. DeFAZIO
of oregon
in the house of representatives
Thursday, June 8, 2000
Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, during the debate on the fiscal year 2001
Department of Defense appropriations bill, there was a rather rancorous
debate about the future of the F-22. I submit for the record a
devastating critique of the F-22 written by retired Colonel Everest
Riccioni as well as a letter he wrote correcting misstatements made
during the House floor debate.
Colonel Riccioni is not just any critic of the F-22. His credentials
are impeccable. He was one of three legendary ``Fighter Mafia''
mavericks who forced the Pentagon to produce the F-16 to improve U.S.
air superiority. He served in the Air Force for 30 years, flew 55
different types of military aircraft, and worked in the defense
industry for 17 years managing aircraft programs, including the B-2
bomber.
We should heed his warning that the F-22 will not work as advertised.
June 8, 2000.
Representative Randy Cunningham,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Representative Cunningham: Your comments during
yesterday's floor debate require response. The comment about
the F-15 not keeping up with the F-22 does not establish the
existence of supercruise, and reflects your lack of insight
into supersonic cruise. Cruise means the ability to cover
distance and it is not a speed. Proof of supercruise is
established by a number, specifically the number of miles
that can be covered while at a supersonic Mach like 1.6. This
number is never forthcoming because few know the definition
of supercruise or are unwilling to reveal it.
The fact that the F-16 flown by General Ryan could not keep
up with the F-22 is again an irrelevant speed statement on
the relative speed of the two aircraft. The requirements for
the F-16 specifically stated that there was no requirement
that it fly faster than Mach 1.6, a fact probably unknown to
the general. Had the general been flying a 40 year old F104A-
19, he could have flown formation with the F-22.
Pragmatic supersonic cruise is the ability to sustain
significant supersonic speeds (like 1. 6-1.8) for combat
relevant distances. For perspective, the original design
mission for the Advanced Tactical Fighter, cum F-22 was a 100
mile subsonic cruise-out to the Russian border, 400 NM
supersonic penetration at 1.6 Mach, consumption of the combat
fuel, a 400 nautical mile supersonic return to the border at
Mach 1.6, with a 100 NM return to land with normal reserves.
A true measure of the super cruise potential of the F-22
is--the penetration supersonic distance that can be flown at
1.6 Mach out and back, with the same 100 nautical mile legs
and the same fuel reserved for combat and landing reserves.
The supersonic penetration distance is the validation of
supercruise. This number has not been established. The
supercruise potential of the F-22 remains unknown.
If that number is 50 NM it is a fruitless achievement that
the F-104 can easily fulfill using its afterburner. A 100 NM
penetration can also be accomplished by the F-104A-19. A 200
NM penetration is not a great achievement; 300 NM means the
F-22 is a pragmatic supercruiser, 400 NM will remain a dream.
The distance number validates whether the F-22 has it,
nothing else.
Retention of the wrong definition will forever retain
confusion.
Sincerely,
Col. Everest Riccioni,
Rancho Palos Verdes, CA.
The F-22 Program--Fact Versus Fiction
(By Everest E. Riccioni, Col. USAF, Ret.)
The Dream
To provide the USAF Air Superiority for the period
following 2005.
[[Page E953]]
To Conduct--Offensive Counter Air Operation deep in
Russia--Its Primary Mission (300 Nautical Mile (NM) Combat
Mission--100 NM cruise to the point of penetration--200 NM
supersonic ingress and egress plus combat and fuel reserves).
To provide a 750-800 Aircraft Fleet to replace the aging F-
15 Fleet.
To be designed to a Unit Flyaway Cost Limit in 1986
dollars--$35 Million.
To control cost by conforming to a Weight Limit--50,000 lbs
(Cost and Weight comparable to the extant F-15--clearly the
imagined F-22 would have been a bargain).
Dominant Characteristics: High Stealth; Effective
Supersonic Cruise; Ultra-High Performance and
Maneuverability; and Superior Avionics for Battle Awareness
and Effectiveness.
Additional Aims: To Rejuvenate the Fleet (Reduce the
average age); Design for Low Maintenance (3 man-hours per
sortie); and Form a High-Low Mix with the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) fleet.
the realization
SUMMARY
Unrealized Dreams
The dreams for Stealth, Supercruise, Ultra-High Climb,
Acceleration, and Maneuvering Performance have not been
realized. The Outstanding Avionics will not be properly
tested before purchase and possibly not even before combat.
High Cost, Low Numbers
The number of F-22s purchased will not provide a critical
mass of fighters.
The ``Dream'' of 800 fighters for $70 Billion fell to 648
for $64.2B (after a 1992 Selected Acquisition Report), to 442
for $64.2B (after the Bottom-Up Review of defense strategy),
and to 339 for $64.2B (after a Quadrennial Defense
Review).\2\ Study groups and the Congressional Budget Office
seeking responsible funding are considering options of 175
and even 100 F-22s. This is a total program cost of more than
$200M per aircraft--one-third the cost of the B-1! This cost
(predicted in 1976) is worse than obscene.\3\
Despite high funding levels--the future size of the Air
Combat Command will soon be greatly reduced.
The low number of F-22s will not rejuvenate an aging F-15,
F-16 fleet. (Algebraic averaging)
A mix of F-22s and JSFs cannot be a High-Low Mix. It will
be An Ultra-High--High Mix. There is no low element. The
complementary F-15 and F-16 do both the air superiority and
air-to-surface missions. The F-22 mainly does air superiority
missions. Both have deserted our US Army.
The few F-22s possessing quasi-F-15 performance will
degrade the air superiority capability of the Air Combat
Command, composed of 1600 fighters.
Our decision-makers have (again) opted for unilateral
disarmament in the face of their perceived threats.\4\
VALIDATION
Stealth
The F-22 is not a Stealthy Aircraft.
Stealth means the proper suppression of all its important
``signatures''--Visual Signature, Radar Signature, Infrared
Signature, Electromagnetic Emissions, and Sound.
Visually--The F-22, one of the world's largest, most
identifiable fighters, cannot hide in daylight. Its role is
in daylight. Stealth operations are night operations.
Unfortunately stealth against radar invariably increases the
size of a fighter making it more visible.
The radar signature is utterly inadequately reported. Only
a single data number is provided to congressional committees
and the GAO--the average radar signature in the level forward
direction within 20 degrees of the nose, presumably to enemy
fighter radars. In the B-1B reporting fiasco, the 100/1
signature advantage over the B-52 became a real 1.8/1. One
cannot design an aircraft to simultaneously hide from low and
medium frequency ground radars and from high frequency
airborne fighter radars. Properly, all the data should be
portrayed and reported--for all azimuths, for all
``latitudes,'' and for all radar frequencies. Single data
points constitute lying by omission and gross incompleteness.
The temperature increases of supersonic cruising flights
make the F-22s beacons in the sky to infrared sensors.
Fighters, with radar to search for and find the enemy
autonomously, at long ranges, cannot hide their high powered
electric emissions to modern, sophisticated, Russian
equipment. The Russians excel at this art and export their
equipment to many nations. Further, F-22 detection of enemies
by radar is an inverse fourth power phenomenon, while
detection of the F-22's radar is an inverse square
phenomenon, giving the advantage to the enemy. In other
words, the F-22's radar will be detected by an enemy plane
before the F-22 detects the enemy.
It appears that designing air superiority aircraft
primarily for radar stealth is an error.
Supersonic Cruise--``Supercruise''
The F-22 has not yet demonstrated effective supersonic
cruise.
The USAF has never appreciated that speed without
persistence is meaningless. Proof--Six USAF aircraft capable
of Mach 2.2 never exceeded 1.4 Mach in combat over North
Vietnam in 10 years of war, in hundreds of thousands of
sorties. The F-15 has never demonstrated its performance
guarantee of Mach 2.5 flight in a combat configuration on a
realistic combat mission profile.
The USAF has the wrong definition of supercruise--
(supersonic flight in turbojet thrust, i.e. without using an
afterburner.) Cruise means covering distance efficiently.
Fighters with wings properly sized for subsonic maneuver
achieve efficient supersonic flight at altitudes of 60,000
feet requiring partial afterburning thrust. This may be
unknown to the testers since the test program limits testing
to below 50,000. The proper cruise condition may remain
unknown. All supercruisers cruise at very high altitudes
using some afterburning (i.e. ramjet) thrust--MiG-31, SR-71,
as did the many designs that I have studied, generated, or
supervised. (Detailed aerodynamic-thermodynamic analysis is
available upon request.)
The GAO report that the F-22 has demonstrated supercruise
is specious and misleading. The reports have merely stated
that the F-22 has demonstrated 1.6 Mach flight speeds in pure
turbojet (dry) thrust. No report of distance traveled or
persistence at those speeds was made. Supersonic speeds in
dry thrust bode well, but this capability is not sufficient
to achieve supercruise. Proper data are global radius of
action and global persistence plots as functions of speed and
altitude, for rational missions.
These data must be then compared to those of the F-15 and
the ancient F-104-19 to establish progress. For example--the
40 year old F-104A-19 has twice the supersonic radius of the
20 year old F-15C at 1.7 Mach, and out-accelerates it at Mach
2.2. Compare! In comparison lies the proof of progress.
The Fuel Fraction of the F-22 is insufficient for pragmatic
supersonic cruise missions. Fuel Fraction, the weight of the
fuel divided by the weight of the aircraft at take-off,
impacts cruise-range, be it super- or subsonic. At today's
state of the art, fuel fractions of 29 percent and below
yield subcruisers; 33 percent provides a quasi-supercruiser;
and 35 percent and above provides useful missions. The F-22's
fuel fraction is 29 percent, equal to those of the
subcruising F-4s, F-15s and the Russian MiG29 Flanker. The
Russian medium range supersonic interceptor, the MiG-31
Foxhound, has a fuel fraction of over 45 percent. Supersonic
cruise fighters require higher fuel fractions since they must
have excessive wing for supersonic cruise. Breguet's range
equation establishes the dependence of aircraft radius on
speed, lifi-to-drag ratio, specific fuel consumption and the
part of the total fuel fraction available for cruise.
The ``dream'' design mission was continually redefined and
degraded to--a) conform to physical reality, and--b) to
reduce the uncontrolled cost and weight. (Flexible (rubber)
Requirements.)
Ultra-High Performance
The F-22 does not provide a Great Leap Forward in
performance relative to the F-15C or MiG-29. At 65,000 lbs,
with 18,500-18,750 lbs of fuel, with two nominal 35,000 lb
thrust engines--it has the thrust to weight ratio of the F-
15C, the fuel fraction of the F-15C, and a wing loading that
is only slightly inferior to that of the F-15C, so it will
accelerate, climb, and maneuver much like the F-15C for
reasons of basic physics.
There are two differences from the F-15--thrust vectoring
and supersonic speeds in dry thrust. Thrust vectoring allows
the F-22 to maneuver controllably at sub-stall speeds, which
other aircraft cannot. This, in the helicopter speed domain,
is in seeming contradiction to an aircraft designed for
supersonic engagement with slashing attacks using its beyond
visual range missiles.
The flight test program to validate maneuverability is
utterly inadequate. Using a single number--the maximum
steady-state G at 30,000 ft at 0.9 Mach--on an aircraft that
operates from 40 knots to beyond Mach 2, from sea level to
above 60,000 ft is a throwback to the Dark Ages of aircraft
evaluation. Proper presentations are global, all-altitude
all-speed plots at the two major power settings. They must be
compared to friendly and enemy aircraft. Comparison reveals
progress, the whole truth, and even allows the formulation of
battle tactics.
Superior Avionics
The expectations for the avionics are to provide great
battle awareness and effective weapons management. The F-22
is to autonomously identify (ID) the enemy from friend, from
neutral, regardless of the country that produced the
aircraft.
But, testing will not be fully completed before going into
production! The pressure is on to meet production schedules
and to do incomplete testing to save time and money.
Incomplete testing is fatal and extremely wasteful. B-1
avionics, similarly treated, still do not function in the
aircraft after two decades, despite large transfusions of
funds.
Such refined identification capability has never been
achieved though frequently promised. Given failure and
dependence on visual identification, the F-22 will be at the
level of the F-15 and F-16. The requirement for visual ID
made the AIM-7D/E, the Talos, the complex long-range Phoenix
missile and the Aegis missile cruiser relatively worthless.
The avionics are to be treated as ``guilty'' until tested and
proven to be innocent.
The software is more extensive and complex than that of the
Aegis missile cruiser. Dependence on the integrated, complex
system belies the dream of a low maintenance requirement.
Most likely result--The F-22 will be declared combat ready
much before it is.
[[Page E954]]
Relevance of Air Superiority
The relevance of air superiority in the modern world is
vastly overstated. The USAF has faced no air superiority
force since the Korean War. Nor have our ground troops faced
an enemy air-to-surface threat.
US air superiority fighters are aimed at enemy fighters--
the irrelevant half (of the problem. Our foreseeable enemies
achieve air superiority with competent, relatively
affordable, highly mobile Russian vehicles carrying surface-
to-air missiles (IR radar, and optically guided), and two
30mm cannon (the Tangkuska). These are armed with SA-6, SA-8
and SA-10 missiles. The F-22 only counters non-existent enemy
fighters. Hence air-to-surface F-16s, A-10s, and F-15s become
the de facto air superiority aircraft. Attempts to equip the
F-22 to suppress enemy defenses are easily defeated by enemy
tactics used in Vietnam and Serbia.
The USAF is already over-equipped to handle any imaginable
air superiority problem. Today, Air Combat Command is capable
of handling any coalition of air superiority threats. Air
Combat Command has the most important factor--competent
pilots, the second most important factor--large numbers
(1,600-2,400 fighters), and the least important advantage--
the best aircraft. In Germany during World War II US numbers,
not quality, reigned supreme. \5\ The USAF has always had and
has always depended upon superior numbers to win. Numbers
guarantee victory. Numbers develop intensity and allow
multiple attacks.
The US has no realistic future air superiority problem
facing it. A sane US will not war with India, China, or
Russia. Nor will we war with France, England, Japan, and
Germany. None of these nations will attack the US. Other
countries are not threats. Nor will we war with our friends
to whom we sold US aircraft. \6\ The US must minimize its
enemies, not create them artificially to sustain the arms
industry. Even Canada has been listed as a possible threat!
Yet, the US continues to seek foreign sales before our modern
aircraft see service in the USAF and US Navy. (Examples--the
US Navy's F-14, F-18E, and the F-22.)
The conjured need to cope with our weapons places our
country in a self-perpetuating arms race with itself.
CONCLUSION
Money expended on the program will weaken Air Combat
Command and the USAF in two ways--
By getting involved with an aircraft that has no function,
and no relevance to modern wars.
By denying themselves funds they really need--for training
and for new aircraft to support a US Army, completely shipped
of supporting airpower.
Approximately 90 percent of the program funding can still
be saved, and reprogrammed to relevant Air Force programs.
____________________