[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 68 (Tuesday, June 6, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4519-S4521]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SIERRA LEONE
Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I want to speak about the issue of what is
happening in Africa, specifically in Sierra Leone. Recently, I have
become involved in this issue because, as chairman of the Commerce,
Justice, State, and the Judiciary Subcommittee, we have jurisdiction
over the funds that flow to the U.N. for peacekeeping activity. In
order to adequately do the job as chairman of that subcommittee, our
job involves oversight of those funds, to make sure they are being used
effectively. After all, they are American tax dollars; Congress has
control of the purse strings; and we have a major role in how those
dollars are spent.
I recognize fully, as all Members of Congress do, that the key
individual who sets foreign policy is our President. Even though we may
disagree with our President, he does have that priority position. But
there are, obviously, issues on which the Congress has a role in
foreign policy--very significant issues. One of them happens to be the
funding of peacekeeping activities and the role the United States
should play in that. So I have had very serious concerns about our
policies in Sierra Leone specifically--on a number of peacekeeping
activities, but specifically our policies in Sierra Leone. This is
because of a number of issues that have been raised there.
Last year, the United States, regrettably, played a key role in
imposing the Lome Accord on a brutalized Sierra Leone. The accord
granted a total amnesty to the Revolutionary United Front, RUF, which
is basically a gang of thugs that murders, rapes, and mutilates people.
Just about everybody in their path has come under their severe act of
violence. In fact, they actually
[[Page S4520]]
empower their soldiers--and they are not really soldiers; many are very
young boys--to cut off the arms of women and children in order to make
a point. This is a very common practice with this alleged military
group called RUF, this gang of thugs. They have been terrorizing the
country of Sierra Leone. There is no question about that. Their leader,
Foday Sankoh, and his lieutenants, as part of the Lome agreement, as
part of the understanding of the Lome agreement--and this is why it was
such a horrendous agreement--were given top spots in the ``transition''
government and guaranteed RUF control over the Sierra Leone diamond
mines, which is basically the core of the element of how they generate
their revenues.
It is inexcusable that we were party to the Lome agreement and that
we therefore empowered these war criminals to take office and to have
control over basically the only significant economic resource of the
country of Sierra Leone. So I was more than upset about this. I
believed it was essentially a surrender in the face of criminal
violence. As a result, I did put a hold --not technically a hold, but I
actually refused to approve a transfer of peacekeeping funds for the
Sierra Leone initiative. I began exploring alternatives to this, what I
believed was an extraordinarily unjust accord. In response to my
concerns, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Holbrooke and his staff took on
the difficult task of crafting a better approach to this issue.
Since my ``hold'' became news, I have been sharply criticized by
some, including some in the U.N. and the State Department, and even--
not even, but not surprisingly, really--the Washington Post, which
recently accused me of ``playing at foreign policy,'' implying that
serious students of world affairs would not question U.S. support for
the Lome Accord. I simply point out that I think a lot of serious
students of foreign policy question the decision to support that
accord.
Meanwhile, in Sierra Leone itself, the RUF, as a result of Lome in
large part, continued to terrorize civilians and even challenge the
U.N. peacekeepers. By last month, the RUF was marching on Freetown in
complete violation of the Lome Accord. In fact, of course, they have
humiliated the U.N. mission in Sierra Leone, which was supposed to
disarm them. It actually ended up being disarmed by them, and much of
the military equipment that is being used there by the RUF is U.N.
equipment taken from U.N. advisers. Thus, the mission of the U.N., as a
result of being an outgrowth of the Lome Accords, which were so
disgraceful, is in disarray. Today, all that stands between the RUF and
total control of Sierra Leone is the British and Nigerian troops who
have come in to try to stabilize the situation.
And what of the U.S. policy? Following our most recent meeting 2
weeks ago, Ambassador Holbrooke has sent me a letter laying out a new
strategy for a more just and lasting approach to peace in Sierra Leone
that gives me some reason for hope. I would like to read from what his
letter says because I think it is an important adjustment in American
policy in Sierra Leone. I congratulate him for it.
First, he notes in his opening paragraph that he has taken this issue
and walked it through the administration and that he has support for
his letter from Secretary Albright, National Security Adviser Berger,
and the head of the OMB, Jack Lew. Reading paragraphs from his letter:
You asked for a letter encapsulating our discussion on
Sierra Leone and Congo. After close consultation with
Secretary Albright, let me review where we stand on each
issue:
First, Sierra Leone. Let me posit five principles that we
will use to govern our policy. First, the United States does
not believe that Foday Sankoh should play any role whatsoever
in the future political process in Sierra Leone, and we will
continue to press this point. He must be held accountable for
his actions.
This is a significant change in policy, in my opinion, and it is a
positive one.
Second, we strongly support the British military presence
in Sierra Leone, which has played a key role in restoring a
measure of stability to Freetown. We are discussing with the
British their continuing role, and on May 23 London announced
an important training program for Sierra Leone army,
something that they will undertake at their own expense
outside the U.N. system.
This, again, is positive news that the British will be a stabilizing
force there, which will be armed and know how to defend itself.
Third, the objective should be to ensure that regional and
international forces in Sierra Leone, together with the armed
forces of the government of Sierra Leone, have the capacity
to disrupt RUF control of Sierra Leone's diamond producing
areas, the main source of RUF income. Completely eliminating
them as a military force is not likely to be possible as an
acceptable cost, but sharply reducing their sources of
financial support and restricting their capability to
threaten the people or government of Sierra Leone is within
reach of sufficient numbers of properly trained, equipped,
and well-led troops and is vitally important.
That is to paraphrase a much more robust mission directive and
portfolio and is exactly what needs to be done.
The most likely nations to carry the burden would be
Nigeria and Ghana, with the backing of other ECOWAS states.
Other nations who are already rushing troops to Sierra Leone
include India, Jordan and Bangladesh. Most potential troop
contributors from the region are likely to require better
equipment and training if they are to contribute
meaningfully. Pentagon and EUCOM assessment teams are
studying the issue urgently. If our objectives are to be
accomplished, the U.S. will need to be ready, with
congressional support and funding, to provide our share of
international effort to provide equipment and training to
those who are willing to do the military job--including the
government of Sierra Leone and other countries in the
region. Any direct training of contributing country troops
by U.S. military personnel would be done outside Sierra
Leone and no U.S. combat troops would be deployed to
Sierra Leone. We will have to work out the relationships
between such an operation and the UN, recognizing that for
many countries a UN role is preferable--but we must ensure
that the mandate is robust. Fourth, since there is
virtually no real government structure left in Sierra
Leone, if the security situation can be stabilized a
longer term international effort will be needed to help
build viable institutions in Sierra Leone. It will take
time, but in the long run, the rest of the effort will be
unsuccessful if it is not accompanied by this component.
However, this cannot start until the situation is
stabilized, and there is no present funding request for
this function. Fifth (this is a point I failed to mention
in our meeting) we must develop a corresponding political
strategy for dealing appropriately with Liberia's
President, Charles Taylor, and with the illicit diamond
trade that fuels conflict and criminality in the region.
That is a reading of two of the major paragraphs in this letter.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the letter be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
The Representative of the United States of America to the
United Nations,
May 30, 2000.
Hon. Judd Gregg,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Allow me to thank you again for your
courtesy and for our exchange of views on peacekeeping
issues. I know the Secretary also appreciates your discussion
with her on May 20, and I would like to follow up on both
conversations. I have shared our discussions with Secretary
Albright, Sandy Berger, and Jack Lew, all of whom expressed
their appreciation of your decision to release the funds for
Kosovo and for your readiness to meet with the Australian
Ambassador to resolve the East Timor peacekeeping ``hold.''
You asked for a letter encapsulating our discussion on
Sierra Leone and Congo. After close consultation with
Secretary Albright, let me review where we stand on each
issue:
First, Sierra Leone. Let me posit five principles that we
will use to govern our policy. First, the United States does
not believe that Foday Sankoh should play any role whatsoever
in the future political process in Sierra Leone, and we will
continue to press this point. He must be held accountable for
his actions. Second, we strongly support the British military
presence in Sierra Leone, which has played a key role in
restoring a measure of stability to Freetown. We are
discussing with the British their continuing role, and on May
23 London announced an important training program for the
Sierra Leone army, something that they will undertake at
their own expense outside the UN system. Third, the objective
should be to ensure that regional and international forces in
Sierra Leone, together with the armed forces of the
Government of Sierra Leone, have the capacity to disrupt RUF
control of Sierra Leone's diamond producing areas, the main
source of RUF income. Completely eliminating them as a
military force is not likely to be possible at an acceptable
cost, but sharply reducing their sources of financial support
and restricting their capability to threaten the people or
Government of Sierra Leone is within reach of sufficient
numbers of properly trained, equipped, and well-led troops
and is vitally important.
The most likely nations to carry the burden would be
Nigeria and Ghana, with the
[[Page S4521]]
backing of other ECOWAS states. Other nations who are already
rushing troops to Sierra Leone include India, Jordan and
Bangladesh. Most potential troop contributors from the region
are likely to require better equipment and training if they
are to contribute meaningfully. Pentagon and EUCOM assessment
teams are studying the issue urgently. If our objectives are
to be accomplished, the U.S. will need to be ready, with
congressional support and funding, to provide our share of an
international effort to provide equipment and training to
those who are willing to do the military job--including the
governments of Sierra Leone and other countries in the
region. Any direct training of contributing country troops by
U.S. military personnel would be done outside Sierra Leone
and no U.S. combat troops would be deployed to Sierra Leone.
We will have to work out the relationship between such an
operation and the UN, recognizing that for many countries a
UN role is preferable--but we must ensure that the mandate is
robust. Fourth, since there is virtually no real government
structure left in Sierra Leone, if the security situation can
be stabilized a longer term international effort will be
needed to help build viable institutions in Sierra Leone. It
will take time, but in the long run, the rest of the effort
will be unsuccessful if it is not accompanied by this
component. However, this cannot start until the situation is
stabilized, and there is no present funding request for this
function. Fifth (this is a point I failed to mention in our
meeting) we must develop a corresponding political strategy
for dealing appropriately with Liberia's President, Charles
Taylor, and with the illicit diamond trade that fuels
conflict and criminality in the region.
On the Congo, the problems are still daunting, but there
has been some real movement since I first discussed this
issue with you in late February:
(A) On May 4, in my presence, the Kabila Government signed
the Status of Forces Agreement with the UN--an essential
precondition for any UN deployment;
(B) Kabila has said he would accept South African troops;
(C) The Lusaka parties signed a new cease-fire agreement
effective April 14, calming the situation on the ground
considerably;
(D) The UN Security Council Mission negotiated on May 8 a
cease-fire between the Ugandans and Rwandans who were
fighting in Kisangani (Congo's third largest, and perhaps
most strategic, city); Regional leaders subsequently secured
agreement between Rwanda and Uganda on a detailed
disengagement plan;
(E) The Presidents of Rwanda and Uganda asked for immediate
UN assistance in support of demilitarizing Kisangani;
(F) All the parties to the war in the Congo have asked for
the UN observer mission as soon as possible to implement the
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement;
(G) The South Africans sent a high-level military mission
in New York to discuss their role in Congo, and the
Pakistanis (among others) are about to send troops. The South
Africans met with a joint State Pentagon-NSC team to discuss
close coordination.
Of course, not all the news from Congo is positive. While
progressing, the political dialogue called for by Lusaka is
off to a slow start; the UN and the OAU military observer
missions have not meshed sufficiently; some of the rebels
still violate the cease-fire on occasion; and there are many
other lesser problems. Still there is a real desire for some
resolution to these issues by most parties. What is required
next is a step-by-step test of their commitments to implement
their own ``African agreement for an African problem.'' This
is one of our highest priorities.
As we both said to you, neither the Secretary nor I are
certain that Lusaka will succeed. But we are certain that
Lusaka will fail if the UN does not take the next series of
steps to support it, as called for by all parties. The recent
progress supports this view, I believe.
For the United States, this will require the unblocking of
$41 million of reprogrammed peacekeeping funds for the
current fiscal year for Congo. We believe that this request
does not put our national prestige on the line; it is a UN
operation (with no U.S. troops in the UN operation). However,
if we do not pay our share, we are concerned that the UN will
be unable to bring in adequate and properly equipped troops,
and the resulting failure of the mission will be attributed,
however unfairly, to the United States.
Our arrears on the current operation in Sierra Leone limit
our ability to promote effectively the critical policy
objectives outlined in this letter. More broadly, failure to
pay our share of these missions risks seriously undermining
our all-out effort to carry the Helms-Biden reform package,
on which we are making real progress. You will note several
recent news articles regarding our forward movement on a wide
range of issues, including the admission of Israel to a UN
regional grouping (after 40 years!), the new GAO report that
shows UN progress, and the first debate in 27 years on
revising the UN peacekeeping scale. All this forward movement
will greatly benefit from your support and I thank you for
your thoughtful involvement in this process.
I hope this letter is responsive to your request. If I can
be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to
contact me or my colleagues in the State Department.
Sincerely,
Richard C. Holbrooke.
Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, this letter obviously, in my opinion, is a
very positive step in the redirection of American policy in Sierra
Leone. I congratulate Ambassador Holbrooke for organizing the letter.
Whereas the Article V and IX of the Lome Accord granted Foday Sankoh
the Vice Presidency of Sierra Leone and an ``absolute and free
pardon,'' Ambassador Holbrooke's plan makes it clear that Foday Sankoh
can play no role in the politics or government of Sierra Leone and that
``he must be held accountable for his actions.'' This when as late as a
month ago State Department officials were still being quoted as saying
that Sankoh's ``voice was positive'' and that he ``has a chance to play
a positive role.'' Now, we will recognize him for what he is, a war
criminal, and treat him as such.
Whereas Annex 1 and Articles V and VII of the Lome Accord left Foday
Sankoh and the RUF in control of Sierra Leone's diamonds, Ambassador
Holbrooke's plan rightly strips Sankoh of his chairmanship of the
diamond control board and insists that ``allied'' forces ``have the
capacity to disrupt RUF control of Sierra Leone's diamond producing
areas, the main source of RUF income.'' Under Lome, peacekeepers did no
more than oversee the looting of Sierra Leone. Now, international
troops will fight alongside local forces to expel the RUF from the
diamond fields.
Whereas the Lome Accord was silent on root causes of violence in
Sierra Leone and the region, Ambassador Holbrooke's plan seeks a
``political strategy for dealing appropriately with Liberia's
President, Charles Taylor, and with the illicit diamond trade that
fuels conflict and criminality in the region.'' The RUF is in large
part Taylor's proxy. Under Lome, Taylor's success in seizing the riches
of Sierra Leone could invite a similar attack on Guinea.
Lome is dead. The U.S. will not turn a blind eye to the rape of a
people and a land. We will demand that brutal thugs are held
accountable for their atrocities, and regional trouble-makers.
Why the change? I do not flatter myself that my ``hold'' did all of
this, but it did give those of us who opposed the Lome Accord a chance
to right a terrible wrong. And to his credit, Ambassador Holbrooke has
crafted a forceful plan, and vetted it through the inter-agency process
in record time. It is a plan that I believe Americans can and should
support, and can be proud of.
Therefore, I am releasing my hold on the $50,000,000 owed the U.N.
for peacekeeping in Sierra Leone. I will also press ahead to ensure
that my provision blocking the illicit sale of diamonds from Sierra
Leone and other war-torn countries is included in the final version of
the fiscal year 2001 military construction appropriations bill.
Finally, I look forward to working with Ambassador Holbrooke and his
staff to ensure that the strategy laid out in his letter is supported
by Congress.
I thank the Chair. I thank the Senator from Idaho for his courtesy.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Idaho.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, thank you very much.
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