[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 67 (Thursday, May 25, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4449-S4450]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        10TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN BURMA

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, as an original co-sponsor of Senator 
Moynihan's resolution commemorating the 10th anniversary of the free 
and fair elections in Burma which were overturned by a military junta, 
I rise today to mark that event and to discuss the repressive 
conditions that have dominated the lives of the Burmese people for the 
past 37 years and that continue to define the terms of their existence 
to this very day.
  For the past 12 years, a brutal authoritarian regime has denied the 
Burmese people the most basic human freedoms, including the rights of 
free speech, press, assembly, and the right to determine their own 
political destiny through free and competitive elections.
  In 1988, the government led by General Ne Win--who overthrew the 
popularly elected government of Burma in 1962--brutally suppressed 
popular pro-democracy demonstrations. In September of that same year, 
the Government, in a futile public relations gambit to deflect 
international censure, reorganized itself into a junta of senior 
military officers and renamed itself the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC).
  The SLORC seemed to bow to international opinion in 1990, when it 
permitted a relatively free election for a national parliament, 
announcing before the election that it would peacefully transfer power 
to the elected assembly.
  Burmese voters overwhelmingly supported anti-government parties, one 
of which, the National League for Democracy (NLD)--the party of Aung-
San Suu-Kyi--won more than 60 percent of the popular vote and 80 
percent of the parliamentary seats.
  SLORC's public promises were a fiction. The military junta nullified 
the results of the elections and thwarted efforts by NLD 
representatives and others elected in 1990 to convene the rightfully 
elected parliament.
  Instead, SLORC convened a government-controlled body, the National 
Convention, with the goal of approving a constitution to ensure that 
the armed forces would have a dominant role in the nation's future 
political structure. The NLD has declined to participate in the 
National Convention since 1995, perceiving it to be nothing more than a 
tool of the ruling military elite.
  SLORC reorganized itself again in 1997, changing its name to the 
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). But an oppressive regime by 
any other name remains an oppressive regime. Burma continues to be 
ruled by a non-elected military clique, this time headed by General 
Than Shwe. And, even though Ne Win ostensibly relinquished power after 
the 1988 pro-democracy demonstrations, in reality, he continues to 
wield informal, if declining, influence.
  To this day, Burma continues to be ruled by fiat, denied both a valid 
constitution and a legislature representing the people.
  To solidify its hold on power and suppress Burma's widespread 
grassroots democracy movement, the military junta--whether it be named 
SLORC or the SPDC--has engaged in a campaign of systematic human rights 
abuses throughout the 1990s. It has been aided in this effort by the 
armed forces--whose ranks have swelled from 175,000 to 400,000 
soldiers--and the Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI), 
a military and security apparatus that pervades almost every aspect of 
a Burmese citizen's life.
  For many in Burma, the prospect for life has become nasty, brutish, 
and short. Citizens continue to live a tenuous life, subject at any 
time and without appeal to the arbitrary and too often brutal dictates 
of a military regime. There continue to be numerous credible reports, 
particularly in areas populated mostly by ethnic minority, of 
extrajudicial killings and rape. Disappearances happen with sickening 
regularity. Security forces torture, beat, and otherwise abuse 
detainees. Prison conditions are harsh and life threatening. Arbitrary 
arrest and detention for holding dissenting political views remains a 
fact of life. Since 1962, thousands of people have been arrested, 
detained, and imprisoned for political reasons, or they have 
``disappeared''. Reportedly, more than 1,300 political prisoners 
languished in Burmese prisons at the end of 1998.
  The Burmese judiciary is an SPDC tool. Security forces still 
systematically monitor citizens' movements and communications, search 
homes without warrants, relocate persons forcibly without just 
compensation or due process, use excessive force, and violate 
international humanitarian law in internal conflicts against ethnic 
insurgencies.
  The SPDC severely restricts freedom of speech and of the press, and 
restricts academic freedom: since 1996, government fear of political 
dissent has meant the closing of most Burmese institutions of higher 
learning. And even verbal criticism of the government is an offense 
carrying a 20-year sentence.

[[Page S4450]]

  And while the SPDC claims it recognizes the NLD as a legal entity, it 
refuses to recognize the legal political status of key NLD party 
leaders, particularly General-Secretary and 1991 Nobel Laureate Aung 
San Suu Kyi and her two co-chairs. The SPDC constrains their activities 
severely through security measures and threats.
  The SPDC restricts freedom of religion. It exercises 
institutionalized control over Buddhist clergy and promotes 
discrimination against non-Buddhist religions. It forbids the existence 
of domestic human rights organizations and remains hostile to outside 
scrutiny of its human rights record. Violence and societal 
discrimination against women remain problems, as does severe child 
neglect, the forced labor of children, and lack of funding and 
facilities for education.
  In sum, as the latest biannual State Department report on:

       Conditions in Burma and U.S. Policy Towards Burma notes, 
     over the last six months the SPDC has made no progress toward 
     greater democratization, nor has it made any progress toward 
     fundamental improvement in the quality of life of the people 
     of Burma. The regime continues to repress the National League 
     for Democracy . . . and attack its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, 
     in the state-controlled press.

  Burma's political repressiveness is matched only by its poverty. 
Burma's population is thought to be about 48 million--we can only rely 
on estimates because government restrictions make accurate counts 
impossible. The average per capita income was estimated to be about 
$300 in 1998, about $800 if considered on the basis of purchasing power 
parity.
  Things do not have to be this way. Burma has rich agricultural, 
fishing, and timber resources. It has abundant mineral resources--gas, 
oil, and gemstones. The world's finest jade comes from Burma. But the 
economic deck is stacked against Burma.
  Three decades of military rule and economic mismanagement have 
created widespread waste, loss, and suffering. Economic policy is 
suddenly reversed for political reasons. Development is killed by overt 
and covert state involvement in economic activity, state monopolization 
of leading exports, a bloated bureaucracy, arbitrary and opaque 
governance, institutionalized corruption, and poor human and physical 
infrastructure. Smuggling is rampant; the destruction of the 
environment goes on unabated. Decades of disproportionately large 
military budgets have meant scant spending on social development and 
economic infrastructure.
  There is no price stability. The Burmese currency, the Kyat, is 
worthless. There is a telling anecdote about this: one year, Burma 
asked the U.K., then its primary foreign aid donor, to give it paper so 
that it could print more Kyat because the Kyat was so devalued that 
Burma could not afford to buy the paper needed to print it. Imagine, 
the paper was worth more as paper than as money. I don't know if the 
story is true or not. The point is that in Burma's case, it easily 
could have been. In 1998-1999, the official exchange rate was 6 Kyat to 
one dollar; the black market rate was 341 Kyat to the dollar. This says 
it all.
  I could go on and on. But I don't need to. We all know that Burma's 
economy is a basket case. We all know that, for the Burmese people, 
mere existence, not life, is the norm. We all know that Burma cannot 
expect to begin the road to recovery, prosperity, and long term 
economic stability as long as the basic human rights and political will 
of the Burmese people are denied.
  The questions before us now are: what tools do we have for stopping 
this government's inhumanity toward its own citizens and for giving 
hope to the Burmese people? Are the tools we are now using the correct 
ones?
  The debate over unilateral sanctions represents a fundamental 
question in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy: Are U.S. interests 
advanced best by deepening relations or diminishing relations with a 
country that is not acting as we would like?
  I do not endorse sanctions as a panacea. Each case must be considered 
on its own merits.
  In Burma, I believe the United States government had a responsibility 
to respond to a situation in which the democratically-elected leaders 
had been summarily thrown out of office, assaulted, and imprisoned by 
renegade militarists.
  Consequently, in 1996, then-Senator Cohen and I coauthored the 
current sanctions legislation on Burma. The Cohen-Feinstein amendment 
required the President to ban new investment by U.S. firms in Burma if 
he determined that the Government of Burma has physically harmed, 
rearrested for political acts, or exiled Aung San Suu Kyi or committed 
large-scale repression or violence against the Democratic opposition.
  Shortly after Congress passed the Cohen-Feinstein Amendment, 
President Clinton implemented sanctions against Burma.
  Unfortunately, since Cohen-Feinstein went into effect on October 1, 
1996 there appears to be little improvement in human rights conditions 
in Burma: The SPDC continues to implement its repressive policies.
  Nevertheless, until the SPDC shows a willingness to make progress 
towards democracy and improved human rights, the Cohen-Feinstein 
sanctions must remain in place.
  The sanctions make us a leader on Burma and in forging a common 
international position. I believe, for example, that the European Union 
would have a much softer line on Burma if not for U.S. policy. The EU 
has no economic sanctions in place, but has taken some other measures, 
such as a visa ban for members of the SPDC government and support of 
the U.S. in introducing the annual United Nations Human Rights 
Committee resolution on Burma. The United States must continue trying 
to develop a multilateral approach, particularly with the ASEAN 
nations, to bring additional pressure to bear on the SLORC.
  There is some indication that the sanctions are causing some 
hardships for the SPDC. For example, last year the SPDC let the 
International Committee of the Red Cross back into Burma under 
conditions the ICRC found acceptable, including access to prisons and 
prisoners. Although there was no clear link to the impact of sanctions 
in getting the ICRC back in, some analysts contend that the SPDC is 
heeding international pressure. This may indicate that the SPDC could 
be willing to make some positive changes, even though it is still an 
open question if they will change the ``core behavior'' that triggered 
the sanctions to begin with.
  The bottom line is that the current sanctions should not be lifted 
without some major concession by the SPDC. To lift any sanctions 
without a concession would send the wrong signal and give the SPDC the 
message that they could continue to stifle democracy.
  We should make it clear that the United States stands on the side of 
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in Burma. We should make 
it clear that the United States stands on the side of Aung San Suu Kyi 
and the National League of Democracy and that we support their efforts 
to return Burma and its government to the people.
  I am pleased to co-sponsor Senator Moynihan's resolution which 
commemorates the 10th anniversary of the free and fair elections in 
Burma, and calls on the SPDC to: guarantee basic freedoms to the people 
of Burma; accept political dialogue with the National League for 
Democracy; comply with UN human rights agreements; and reaffirms U.S. 
sanctions as appropriate to secure the restoration of democracy.
  I look forward to the day when the United States has cause to lift 
the Cohen-Feinstein sanctions and welcome Burma into the community of 
free nations. In the interim, I urge my colleagues to support the 
Moynihan resolution.

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