[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 61 (Wednesday, May 17, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4032-S4037]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




       NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank the leader for entering the order 
giving me 30 minutes for a statement this morning. I have sought that 
time to speak on what I believe to be one of the most important issues 
which will be presented to the Congress this year; that is, the issue 
of permanent normal trade relations for the People's Republic of China.
  The Senate is scheduled to take up this issue sometime next month, 
depending upon what the House of Representatives does. The House of 
Representatives is scheduled to consider this matter next week. I 
thought it appropriate to make this statement at this time, to give my 
views on important issues of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear 
proliferation, insights which I gained, in large part, from serving on 
the Senate Intelligence Committee for some 8 years, including 2 years 
as chairman during 1995 and 1996, and other insights on related matters 
which I have seen in my capacity as chairman of the Judiciary 
subcommittee on oversight of the Department of Justice.
  My own record has been that of a strong free trader. I have supported 
NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement. I have supported free 
trade with the Caribbean nations. I supported, last week, free trade 
with the African nations. I believe the long tugs and pulls of the 
economy, both domestic and international, strongly support the notion 
of free trade.
  But I am opposed, strongly opposed to granting permanent normal trade 
relations to the People's Republic of China because of their record on 
nuclear proliferation, of weapons of mass destruction, because of their 
record on human rights, and because the executive branch, the 
administration, has not imposed sanctions as required by law to stop or 
inhibit such nuclear proliferation but, in fact, has taken affirmative 
action to grant waivers. So it is necessary for Congress to exercise 
our constitutional responsibility of checks and balances and 
congressional oversight of the executive branch, to see to it the 
national interest is preserved.
  The Congress has authority under the Constitution. There are some 
constitutional inhibitions which prohibit the Congress from delegating 
that authority to the executive branch. I am not necessarily saying 
that permanent trade with China would be such an unconstitutional 
delegation, but at the very minimum it is an unwise delegation, based 
on this state of the record, based on the necessity to impose 
restraints on conduct of the People's Republic of China, not only as to 
human rights--fundamental, important human rights--but of greater 
magnitude, the threat to international peace through their 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
  During my tenure on the Intelligence Committee I saw many instances 
of the People's Republic of China supplying rogue nations, nations 
which constitute a threat to world order, with weapons of mass 
destruction.
  For example, the People's Republic of China provided M-11 missiles to 
Pakistan back in 1992. Those missiles, now armed with nuclear warheads, 
are pointed at India, creating a nuclear threat to the subcontinent, 
the possibility of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan, and 
threatening world peace.
  The People's Republic of China has assisted North Korea's missile 
program by providing specialty steel, accelerometers, gyroscopes, and 
precision grinding machinery. The People's Republic of China is 
providing assistance to Libya's long-range missile program by assisting 
in the building of a hypersonic wind tunnel which is useful for 
designing missiles and cooperating in the development of Libya's Al 
Fatah missile which has a range of some 600 miles, threatening peace 
and stability in that area.
  The People's Republic of China has helped Pakistan, Iran, North 
Korea, and Libya in a way which is very destabilizing.
  What has been the reaction of the Clinton administration to these 
issues? The transfer of M-11 missiles to Pakistan falls under category 
1 of the Missile Technology Control Regime, which is set up to 
establish gradations in seriousness of violations. That is category 1.
  The 1991 National Defense Authorization Act mandates the President to 
deny for not less than 2 years certain licenses, and we find not only 
has the President not taken those steps on sanctions, but has, in 
addition, moved ahead and granted affirmative waivers to facilitate 
developing China's ballistic missile capability. Those waivers were 
granted in a celebrated case on the application of Loral Space and 
Technology.
  A series of events, beginning in 1992, involving both Hughes and 
Loral demonstrates a very serious problem on transmitting to the 
People's Republic of China high-level technology.
  On December 21, 1992, a Chinese Long March 2E rocket carrying a 
Hughes manufactured satellite crashed shortly after takeoff. Without 
attaining the required State Department license, the Hughes personnel 
engaged in a series of discussions with Chinese officials, giving them 
very important information.
  On January 26, 1995, a Chinese Long March 2E missile carrying another 
Hughes satellite exploded approximately 50 seconds after takeoff. A 
1998 State Department assessment showed that, ``Hughes directly 
supported the Chinese space program in the areas of [accident analysis] 
. . . .''
  The Cox committee reviewed these matters and called for a very 
detailed investigation as to what had actually occurred.
  On February 15, 1996, the People's Republic of China's Long March 3B 
missile exploded with a communications satellite on board built by 
Loral. Following these explosions, Loral and Hughes transmitted to the 
People's Republic of China their assessments of why the rockets failed. 
The assessments required a prior license from the Department of State 
which had not been obtained.
  In May 1997, a classified Department of Defense report concluded that 
Loral and Hughes significantly enhanced the guidance and control 
systems of the People's Republic of China's nuclear ballistic systems. 
As a result of the Department of Defense report, the U.S. Department of 
Justice began a criminal investigation of Loral and Hughes. Then Loral 
applied for a waiver from the Clinton administration to launch another 
satellite from a Chinese rocket.
  The Department of Justice weighed in and objected to a Presidential 
grant of a waiver on the ground that such a waiver would have ``a 
significant adverse impact on any prosecution that might take place 
based on a pending investigation of export violations by Loral.''
  Notwithstanding the very serious issue of China having sold M-11 
missiles to Pakistan creating a threat of nuclear war, notwithstanding 
the fact that Loral and Hughes gave an assessment to China which 
significantly enhanced their nuclear capability system, notwithstanding 
the fact that there was a criminal investigation pending by the 
Department of Justice, notwithstanding the fact that the Department of 
Justice objected to the grant of a waiver on the ground that it would 
have an adverse impact on their criminal investigation potential 
prosecution, the President on February 18 of 1998 granted the waiver.
  What are we to make of all of that, and why, in fact, was the waiver 
granted? A preliminary investigation has shown that in an early 
memorandum in

[[Page S4033]]

January of 1998 from the National Security Adviser, there was a 
reference to a State Department concern about transfers by the People's 
Republic of China to Iran of C-802 antiship cruise missiles. That was a 
January 1998 draft memorandum from National Security Adviser Samuel R. 
Berger to the President.
  When the final memorandum was submitted to the President by Mr. 
Berger on February 12, 1998, that important warning was dropped. The 
earlier memorandum had contained language of the importance of an 
expedited waiver because Loral was in the process of losing money. 
Isn't it curious that emphasis is placed upon Loral's financial 
situation while an important factor about the PRC's furnishing key 
weaponry to Iran is excluded in the final memorandum?
  The decision by the President to grant that waiver is further suspect 
because the chief executive officer of Loral, Mr. Bernard Schwartz, had 
made a contribution to the President's campaign of some $1.5 million, 
and the chief executive officer of Hughes, Mr. C. Michael Armstrong, 
was the chairman of the President's export council actively lobbying on 
these issues, raising a very serious issue of a potential conflict of 
interest.
  In the face of activity of this sort, it is my view that it is 
indispensable that the Congress maintain close oversight on what the 
executive branch is doing. It is my view that it is indispensable for 
Congress to maintain close oversight on the effort by the 
administration now to grant permanent normal trade relations with the 
People's Republic of China.
  The preferable course, by far, in my view, is for Congress to make a 
year-by-year analysis as to what is happening so we can exert the 
maximum pressure on the People's Republic of China and not delegate to 
the President broader authority to initiate action which will grant 
permanent trade status to China so there is no opportunity for the 
Congress to impose leverage to try to secure China's compliance with 
their international commitments.
  As a result of the large campaign contribution, $1.5 million from Mr. 
Schwartz, the special counsel retained by the Department of Justice to 
evaluate the campaign finance issue, Charles LaBella, recommended to 
the Attorney General that an independent counsel be appointed.
  One of the reasons cited by Mr. LaBella for the need for independent 
counsel was the contribution made by Mr. Schwartz. That reason, among 
many other reasons, was forwarded by Mr. LaBella to the Attorney 
General, along with a strong recommendation by the Director of the FBI 
that independent counsel be appointed. Notwithstanding those strong 
recommendations, the Attorney General declined to appoint independent 
counsel on a complex subject which has been the matter of extensive 
hearings by the Judiciary subcommittee, which I chair, on Department of 
Justice oversight.
  It is an extraordinarily difficult matter to pursue the executive 
branch to find the facts so the Congress can exercise its 
constitutional responsibility and authority on oversight.
  Notwithstanding a subpoena issued by the Judiciary Committee calling 
for the production of the LaBella report, the report by FBI Director 
Freeh, and other reports, and all related documents, returnable on 
April 20, to this day the Department of Justice has not complied with 
that subpoena.
  A hearing was held where Mr. LaBella testified about his 
recommendation for the appointment of independent counsel, including 
his view--hypothetically stated during the course of the hearing--that 
there should have been an investigation of Mr. Schwartz, and that where 
a potential quid pro quo was involved--those were Mr. LaBella's words; 
and the language of a quid pro quo is the equivalent of bribe 
language--with the allegation of a bribe, that the President should be 
investigated as well. Yet no independent counsel was appointed.
  The Judiciary subcommittee on oversight is pursuing the documents, is 
pursuing the testimony of FBI Director Freeh. It has recently been 
disclosed that there are other documents which the Department of 
Justice has not provided, notwithstanding the return date is almost 1 
month old--April 20 to today, May 17--so there will be an application 
on tomorrow's Judiciary Executive Calendar for a contempt citation as 
to the Department of Justice.
  The subpoena is issued; some documents are returned; other documents 
are not returned; the full scope of the subpoena is ignored. We are 
trying to find out what happened on many matters, including the grant 
of a waiver to Loral. It is a long, hard chase to pursue the executive 
branch.
  On these stated facts, the question arises inevitably: Is the Clinton 
administration to be trusted? I am not prepared yet to respond to that 
question because our investigation is not complete. But I am prepared 
to say that it is devilishly difficult to pursue the oversight 
function, that the Senate, the Judiciary Committee, the Judiciary 
subcommittee, have been led on a merry, meandering chase trying to find 
answers, trying to find documents, trying to corral witnesses to find 
out what actually happened in these matters.
  So when Congress has the authority to decide on normal trade 
relations as to China, on a year-by-year basis, we ought not to give up 
that very important, that very powerful prerogative. We ought not to 
give up on the recommendation of the Clinton administration that China 
should have it. We ought not to give it to China in the face of their 
flagrant record of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
and in the face of the flagrant record by the Clinton administration of 
not acting with sanctions but even granting affirmative waivers to 
facilitate the development of Chinese capability for 
ballistic projection.

  I believe there is substantial evidence that the People's Republic of 
China will respond to pressure and to leverage. When we talk about the 
sanctions, we are talking about something which is really in the hands 
of the executive branch. But when we talk about granting permanent 
normal trade relations, that is a power which is in the hands of the 
Congress. It is very difficult--really impossible--for the Congress to 
legislate with sufficient specificity to compel the executive branch to 
impose sanctions.
  Some of my colleagues are talking about additional legislation. But 
at the end of every line of public policy, at the end of every line of 
sanctions, at the end of the rainbow, every time we take up these 
issues, there is an inevitable grant of authority to the President, as 
Chief Executive Officer, to grant a waiver under certain circumstances 
for national security reasons.
  It is not practical for the Congress to put into place--or at least 
we have never been able to do it--a set of circumstances which can be 
predetermined to anticipate every eventuality, to mandate it without 
giving that kind of discretion to the President. That is why, where we 
have independent authority, such as granting permanent normal trade 
relations to China, we ought not to give it up.
  When we talk about the issue of trusting the administration, trusting 
the executive branch, I am reminded of President Reagan's comment when 
dealing with the Soviet Union. There was a lot of wisdom in his comment 
about ``trust, but verify''--``trust, but verify''--deal with the 
Soviet Union, make arrangements with the Soviet Union, but verify to 
see that it is carried out.
  There may well be an inherent institutional distrust built into the 
Constitution with the requirement of oversight and with the requirement 
of checks and balances. Perhaps ``institutional distrust'' is a little 
strong. But in the context of this record, with what China has done, 
with what Loral has done, to have a waiver granted under these 
circumstances certainly requires that there be a determination, at the 
very minimum, on the part of Congress that if we are to trust, we ought 
to verify, and we ought not to give up any of our powerful weapons to 
see to it that the People's Republic of China does not proliferate 
weapons of mass destruction.
  In reviewing the efficacy of sanctions, in reviewing the desire of 
China to have normal trade relations, there was a case involving a 
librarian from Dickinson College in Carlisle, PA, last year which bears 
on this issue suggesting that China does respond to pressure, does 
respond to leverage.
  The librarian, Yongyi Song, was within 1 month of being sworn in as a

[[Page S4034]]

naturalized U.S. citizen, having lived in Pennsylvania for some 10 
years, prior to the time that he and his wife Helen took a trip to 
China last August to study the Cultural Revolution. He is a very 
distinguished Chinese scholar.
  In August, he was taken into custody by the People's Republic of 
China on trumped up charges. His wife similarly was taken into custody. 
She was released. But he remained in custody and on Christmas Eve was 
charged with a very serious crime.
  The family came to me, the college came to me, and with a large 
number of Senate cosponsors, I filed a resolution seeking the immediate 
release of Yongyi Song on the grounds that he was being detained 
improperly, illegally, without regard to basic standards of decency and 
criminal justice protocol.
  I had a meeting with the Chinese ambassador, and ultimately Yongyi 
Song was released. There is good reason to believe that the pressure, 
the leverage had some effect on what activity was taken by the People's 
Republic of China.
  The condition of normal trade relations with the United States is an 
item which is very highly prized by the People's Republic of China.
  And it is one which we ought to maintain in reserve to evaluate their 
conduct on a year-by-year basis. It is my view that when you deal with 
the question of weapons of mass destruction, and when China arms 
Pakistan, and when China arms Libya, and when China arms Iran, when 
China arms North Korea, those are matters of much greater consequence 
than the dollar profit to be gained by greater trade with China.
  When people say, ``If we don't sell it, somebody else will,'' I 
respond to that comment emphatically by saying we ought not to sell it. 
We ought to take a leadership role in the world to try to persuade our 
allies not to sell it either because the almighty dollar is not worth 
the risk we run by giving China a free hand to proliferate weapons of 
mass destruction. If we are to take a cost-benefit ratio relationship, 
taking a look at our $300 billion defense budget, and apportioning a 
part to what we have to do with the 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Strait when 
the People's Republic of China threatens Taiwan and a test missile 
drops there in their bullying efforts, considering what we have to do 
by way of defensive efforts, it is a bad deal in dollars and cents for 
whatever profit we may gain with our trade with the People's Republic 
of China.
  Mr. President, the question of human rights is a very important one. 
The record in China has been deplorable. We have utilized the trade 
issue to try to impose leverage on China, to try to persuade them to 
improve their human rights. It is a complex conclusion as to whether, 
on that issue alone, the people of China might be better off with 
expanded trade, which would improve the quality of life and living in 
China, which might move them along the road to democratization which, 
in the long run, might have an overall beneficial affect on human 
rights in China. And on a year-by-year basis, I have supported granting 
most-favored-nation status. In light of the developments on the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, I am not sure that even 
that ought to be done on a year-by-year basis. When we take a look at 
the violation of human rights, including religious persecution by the 
People's Republic of China, it is deplorable.
  Last September, police instructed 12 underground Catholic Church 
leaders in Wenzhou to go to a hotel where they were pressured to join 
the official Catholic Church. On October 18, last year, police 
disrupted services at two of Guangzhou's most prominent house churches. 
One of the pastors, Li Dexian, and his wife were detained, and his 
church was ransacked by the police. On August 24, 1999, 40 house church 
members were arrested, and the church leaders were sentenced to 1 to 3 
years in a reeducation-through-labor camp. Other items are cited, which 
I will have introduced into the Record at the close of my statement.
  The issue of religious persecution in China is overwhelming. In 1997, 
I introduced S. 772, the Freedom From Religious Persecution Act, and 
later joined with Senator Nickles in structuring legislation, which 
became law on October 27, 1997, the International Religious Freedom Act 
of 1998.
  I make reference to that during the course of these remarks to point 
out the problems of violation of human rights. It happens again and 
again and again--repressive action taken by the People's Republic of 
China. That is a factor which should weigh heavily in our consideration 
of granting of trade relations to the People's Republic of China.
  When I visited the Ambassador, talking about the case of the 
Dickinson librarian, I received a lecture about not meddling in 
internal Chinese affairs. I responded with a short lecture of my own 
about human rights and about the appropriate process of decency in 
dealing with criminal matters as a matter of balance, noting that we in 
the United States have great respect for the 1.2 billion people in 
China. The Ambassador quickly corrected me, pointing out that there are 
1.250 billion people in the People's Republic of China. I overlooked 50 
million, and perhaps the number had grown during the course of our 
conversation. There is no doubt that China is the upcoming colossus of 
the world, the dominant power, and that we are going to have to be 
very, very careful.

  In conclusion--perhaps the two most popular words in any speech--I 
believe that we have to give very sober consideration to the totality 
of our relationship with the People's Republic of China. In commenting 
about a nation of 1.250 billion people, with their potential, it is no 
doubt that they are becoming a superpower, if they are not already a 
superpower. They may become the dominant superpower with that kind of a 
population. When they are throwing their weight around by selling 
weapons of mass destruction to the likes of North Korea, Libya, and 
Iran, and selling missiles to Pakistan, which threatened world peace 
with the nuclear exchange between Pakistan and Iran, the United States 
ought to retain all the leverage and pressure that it can.
  The facts are that we cannot rely upon the Clinton administration to 
do that. It may be that, institutionally, we cannot rely upon any 
administration to do that and, institutionally, the Constitution gives 
oversight authority to the Congress, and the checks and balances in the 
Constitution require that we maintain leverage and see to it that the 
national interests of the United States are maintained. That is a 
constitutional responsibility of the Congress. And it is in that 
context, from what I have seen on proliferation as chairman of the 
Senate Intelligence Committee and the dereliction I have seen in my 
chairmanship of the oversight committee of the Department of Justice, 
that I urge my colleagues to vote against the granting of permanent 
trade relations to the People's Republic of China.
  My eight years on the Senate Intelligence Committee including the 
chairmanship in 1995 and 1996 and my current chairmanship of the 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Department of Justice oversight have 
convinced me that the People's Republic of China (PRC) threatens world 
peace by flagrantly proliferating weapons of mass destruction to 
countries like Pakistan, North Korea, Iran and Libya.
  The Clinton Administration has not only deliberately refused to 
impose mandated sanctions but has also granted unwarranted waivers 
facilitating technology transfers to enhance the PRC's missile 
capabilities. As noted in the New York Times article entitled ``Clinton 
Argues for `Flexibility' Over Sanctions'' on April 28, 1998, President 
Clinton admitted that U.S. sanction laws have put ``enormous pressure 
on whoever is in the Executive Branch to fudge an evaluation of the 
facts of whatever is going . . .''
  Congress should assert its constitutional oversight and checks and 
balances on Executive Branch excesses by retaining annual review of 
trade with China to influence the PRC to honor its non-proliferation 
obligations and conform to fundamental standards of civility and 
decency in the community of nations.
  With regards to the PRC and matters of proliferation, the essential 
facts are:
  According to the unclassified extract of the classified National 
Intelligence Estimate of September 1999, the PRC sold M-11 missiles to 
Pakistan in November 1992, which are now pointed at India armed with 
nuclear weapons

[[Page S4035]]

causing or contributing to the threat of nuclear war between those two 
countries.
  The PRC has supplied Iran with ballistic and cruise missiles and 
technology for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, according to a 
report by the Congressional Research Service entitled ``Chinese 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues,'' 
dated April 13, 2000.
  PRC has assisted North Korea's missile program by providing specialty 
steel, accelerometers, gyroscopes, and precision grinding machinery, as 
also noted in the ``Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: Current Policy Issues'' CRS report.
  The PRC is providing assistance to Libya's long-range missile program 
by assisting in the building of a hypersonic wind tunnel which is 
useful for designing missiles, and cooperating in the development of 
Libya's Al Fatah missile, which has a range of 600 miles, according to 
the CRS report entitled ``Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: Current Policy Issues.''
  The PRC's transfer of M-11 missiles to Pakistan falls under Category 
I of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). According to the 
U.S. Department of State Bureau of Nonproliferation, Category I of the 
MTCR applies to ``complete missile systems, as well as major systems . 
. .'' as noted in the February 8, 2000 Fact Sheet entitled ``Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR).''
  Where there has been a Category I violation, the 1991 National 
Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 101-510) mandates the President 
to deny, for a period of not less than two years, licenses such as the 
licenses for the technology transferred to the PRC by Hughes Space and 
Communications, Inc. and Loral Electronics to the PRC, as specified 
herein.
  On December 21, 1992, a Chinese Long March 2E rocket carrying the 
Hughes-manufactured Optus B2 Satellite crashed shortly after takeoff. 
Without obtaining the required State Department license, Hughes 
personnel engaged in a series of discussions with Chinese officials in 
1993 and 1994 regarding improvements in the fairing (nose cone) of the 
Long March 2E rocket which resulted in changes. These events were 
clearly outlined in Volume II of the Report of the Select Committee on 
U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the 
People's Republic of China, also known as the Cox Report.
  On January 26, 1995, a Chinese Long March 2E rocket carrying the 
Hughes Apstar 2 satellite exploded approximately 50 seconds after 
takeoff. A 1998 State Department assessment concluded that, in working 
with the Chinese to address the cause of the failure, ``Hughes directly 
supported the Chinese space program in the areas of anomaly analysis/
accident investigation, telemetry analysis, coupled load analysis, 
hardware design and manufacturing, testing, and weather analysis,'' as 
noted in the Cox Report.
  The Cox Committee reviewed the Hughes launches and failure analysis 
and concluded that further inquiry should be conducted to determine: 
first, that the kind of information that may have been passed to the 
PRC beyond what has been revealed by Hughes; second, the application, 
if any, of coupled loads analysis to improving PRC ballistic missiles; 
and third, the likelihood that the PRC will in fact incorporate this 
know-how into their future missile and space programs.
  Additionally, I was informed in a letter from Wilma Lewis, United 
States Attorney for the District of Columbia on May 10, 2000, that the 
Department of Justice, including the U.S. Attorney's Office for the 
District of Columbia, has undertaken a criminal investigation of the 
1995 failed launch as part of an investigation of a 1996 launch failure 
analysis involving both Loral and Hughes, but no prosecution decisions 
have been made even though the statute of limitations has expired on 
the January 26, 1995 launch and crash.
  As outlined in the Cox Report, on February 15, 1996, the PRC's Long 
March 3B missile exploded with a communication satellite on board which 
was built by Loral. Following this explosion, Loral and Hughes 
transmitted to the PRC their assessments of why the rockets failed 
which assessment required a prior license from the State Department. As 
noted in the Cox report, in May, 1997, a classified Department of 
Defense report concluded that Loral and Hughes significantly enhanced 
the guidance and control systems of the PRC's nuclear ballistic 
missiles.
  Following the DoD Report, the Department of Justice began a criminal 
investigation of Loral and Hughes. Then, Loral applied for a waiver 
from the Clinton Administration to launch another satellite from a 
Chinese rocket.
  Bernard Schwartz, Chief Executive Officer of Loral, contributed 
approximately $1,500,000 to President Clinton's 1996 campaign. C. 
Michael Armstrong, Chairman of Hughes, who lobbied the Administration 
against sanctions and for expansion of satellite exports to China, had 
a potential conflict of interest from his contemporaneous service as 
Chairman of the President Clinton's Export Advisory Council.
  A January 1998 draft memorandum from National Security Samuel R. 
Berger to the President regarding the Loral waiver included the issue 
of the PRC transfers to Iran of C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles. The 
Internal State Department correspondence dated December 3, 1997 noted 
that: ``In light of our ongoing review of China's transfers to Iran of 
C-802 missiles, you should be aware that if a determination were made 
triggering sanctions under the Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act, the 
sanctions might prohibit the export of satellites licensed but not yet 
exported.''
  The final memorandum from Mr. Berger to the President on February 12, 
1998 did not include the concerns of the Department of State regarding 
the PRC's transfers to Iran.
  As clearly noted in Maureen Tucker's memorandum for Samuel Berger, 
entitled ``Request for Presidential National Interest Waiver for 
Chinasat-8 Communications Satellite Project,'' of January 30, 1998, the 
Department of Justice through a Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 
objected to a presidential grant of that waiver on the grounds that ``a 
national interest waiver in this case could have a significant adverse 
impact on any prosecution that might take place based on a pending 
investigation of export violations by Loral,'' according to the 
memorandum for the President from Samuel L. Berger, Larry Stein, and 
Daniel K. Tarullo entitled ``Request for Presidential National Interest 
Waiver for Chinasat 8 Communications Satellite Project,'' dated 
February 12, 1998.
  As I was informed in a letter from Wilma Lewis, United States 
Attorney for the District of Columbia on May 10, 2000, Main Justice, in 
collaboration with the U.S. Attorney's Office in the District of 
Columbia, has been investigating the Loral/Hughes matters for three 
years with only two, sometimes one, attorney(s) assigned to the case.
  On May 4, 2000, the Judiciary Subcommittee requested a briefing from 
Mr. Berger, and was later advised that he would not be available until 
June 13th. By letter dated May 11, 2000, the Judiciary Subcommittee 
requested the briefing before Mr. Berger's scheduled departure from the 
United States on May 16th so the briefing would occur before the 
Congressional votes on PNTR. The request was rejected.
  Without drawing any conclusions at this stage, questions are 
obviously raised by the long delays in the Department of Justice 
investigation of Hughes and Loral, including allowing the statute of 
limitations to run on the January 26, 1995 explosion of the Hughes 
satellite, the limited resources devoted to the Hughes/Loral 
investigation and the issue of possible undue influence by Mr. Schwartz 
or Mr. Armstrong. A further question arises as to whether the delays by 
the Clinton Administration seek to defer answers on these sensitive 
issues until after the PNTR Congressional votes.
  Perhaps the Department of Justice will satisfactorily answer these 
questions even though the Attorney General rejected the recommendation 
of Charles G. LaBella, Esquire, for the appointment of Independent 
Counsel on the President and Mr. Schwartz on Mr. Schwartz's 
contribution. If not, Congressional oversight should seek answers 
including Mr. Berger's decision to omit the Department of State 
concerns on the PRC transfers to Iran of C-802 anti-ship cruise 
missiles from the final memorandum to the President.

[[Page S4036]]

  Even without answers to those questions, the record is clear that the 
PRC has been guilty of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
the Clinton Administration has not only not acted to stop that 
proliferation, but has assisted with the grant of the Loral waiver.
  For those who look to profits from increased trade with the PRC, what 
is the cost/benefit ratio of building, maintaining and sending the 7th 
Fleet to the Taiwan Strait with the added profits from increased China 
trade? As a matter of basic morality, the U.S. should not engage in 
such a balancing test or even consider rewarding the PRC's aggressive 
tactics. But to those who look to trade profits, let them draw the 
balance sheet and apportion the appropriate part of the $300 billion 
Defense budget to the PRC's threat to Taiwan. While hard to calculate, 
it very likely costs U.S. taxpayers a great deal more than U.S. 
consumers would benefit from cheaper Chinese goods. But, more 
importantly, it is not the right thing to do.


                        HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

  For decades, the PRC has violated human rights illustrated by the 
Tiananmen Square massacre. In voting, I have supported extending the 
PRC's NTR status on a year by year basis in the past. In doing so, I 
have weighed the potential long-range benefits to the people of China 
from NTR status with a view that as China prospered and moved toward 
democracy, there would be a concomitant improvement of human rights. 
That improvement, in my opinion, depends upon continuing pressure and 
leverage on the Chinese government.

  I saw this firsthand from my experience with a constituent, Mr. 
Yongyi Song, a librarian at Dickinson College in Carlisle, 
Pennsylvania. Mr. Song had resided in Carlisle for approximately ten 
years and was due to be sworn in as a United States citizen in 
September, 1999 when he and his wife, Helen, took a trip last August to 
the Peoples Republic of China where he intended to pursue his studies 
of the cultural revolution. On August 7, 1999, Mr. and Mrs. Song were 
arrested and detained without cause. Mrs. Song was released on November 
16, 1999. On Christmas Eve, Mr. Song was charged with ``purchase and 
illegal provision of intelligence to persons outside China'' without 
any foundation.
  At the request of the Song family and Dickinson College officials, I 
filed a resolution with eight Senate co-sponsors expressing the sense 
of the Congress that, the Government of the People's Republic of China 
should immediately release from prison and drop all criminal charges 
against Yongyi Song, and should guarantee in their legal system fair 
and professional treatment of criminal defense lawyers and conduct fair 
and open trials. I then sought a meeting with Chinese Ambassador Li 
Zhaoxing which was scheduled for 11:30 am on Friday, January 28, 2000. 
Earlier that morning I heard a rumor that Dr. Song was being released.
  My meeting with Ambassador Li Zhaoxing was pleasant and cordial 
although each of us expressed our views in direct blunt terms. 
Ambassador Li Zhaoxing objected to U.S. protests on Mr. Song and other 
human rights issues on the ground that we were meddling in China's 
internal affairs. I countered that Mr. Song was entitled to the 
protection of the United States government and that human rights were a 
universal matter so that our intervention did not constitute officious 
meddling in their internal affairs. When I commented that we had great 
respect for the power of China with 1,200,000,000 people, I was 
promptly corrected by Ambassador Li Zhaoxing that the correct figure 
was 1,250,000,000 people with the Ambassador losing no time in telling 
me the rapid growth of China's increasing power.
  On the Senate floor, I argued that the People's Republic of China 
should have to observe minimal standards of decency and civility if 
China wished to gain the benefits of membership in the world community 
including permanent trade status and membership in the World Trade 
Organization. In my opinion, the leverage from the Senate resolution 
and China's interest in membership in the World Trade Organization or 
Normal Trade Relations status were instrumental in securing the release 
of Mr. Yongyi Song.
  Another area of serious human rights abuse in China that has been 
brought to my attention in recent years is the persecution of 
Christians and other religious minorities. The PRC officially permits 
only two recognized Christian denominations--one Protestant and one 
Catholic--to operate openly. As a result, unapproved religious groups, 
including all other Protestant and Catholic groups, experience 
repression and persecution by the government of the PRC.
  In the past year, religious services were forcibly broken up and 
church leaders and followers were fined, detained, and imprisoned. For 
instance, in September 1999, police instructed 12 underground Catholic 
church leaders in Wenzhou to go to a hotel, where they were pressured 
to join the official Catholic church. On October 18, 1999, police 
disrupted services at two of Guangzhou's most prominent house churches. 
One of the pastors, Li Dexian and his wife were detained, and his 
church was ransacked by the police. On August 24, 1999, 40 house church 
members were arrested, and the church leaders were sentenced to 1 to 3 
years in a reeducation-through-labor camp.
  In an effort to combat such religious persecution in China and other 
countries around the world, I introduced S. 772, the ``Freedom from 
Religious Persecution Act'' in May, 1997. The following Spring, I 
worked with Senator Nickles to produce the text of S. 1868, the 
``International Religious Freedom Act of 1998'' which became law in 
October 27, 1998 and required, among other things, that the State 
Department issue an annual report on religious freedom around the 
world. The first State Department report on religious persecution was 
issued in September, 1999, and it listed China as one of the ``most 
repressive nations.''
  Another area of great concern to me is the Chinese system of criminal 
justice. Although the Chinese legal system was significantly reformed 
in 1997, on paper, the PRC has not fully implemented these reforms. The 
judicial system in many cases denies criminal defendants basic legal 
safeguards and due process. For example, defendants continue to be 
subjected to torture, forced confessions, arbitrary arrest and 
prolonged detention. Police often use loopholes in the law to 
circumvent a defendant's right to seek counsel. Furthermore, lawyers 
who try to defend their clients aggressively often are harassed or 
detained by police and prosecutors. For example, on January 6, 2000 the 
New York Times reported on the case of Liu Jian, a criminal defense 
attorney, who was detained in July 1998. After defending a local 
official charged with taking bribes, Liu was charged with ``illegally 
obtaining evidence'' and was detained for 5 months. He eventually pled 
guilty in exchange for a light sentence, but his criminal record 
prevents him from practicing law.
  There are virtually daily media reports of additional PRC's human 
rights violations. For example, a front page New York Times story on 
May 8, 2000 reports Chinese leaders criticizing prominent academics and 
forbidding or punishing newspapers from running their articles. The 
same edition of the New York Times reports forcing changes in 
Princeton's language program because of a critical essay in the Beijing 
Social Science Journal.


                               CONCLUSION

  The record of the Clinton Administration's winking at the PRC's 
flagrant proliferation violations, in conjunction with Congress's 
constitutional responsibility for oversight and checks & balances of 
Executive Branch excesses calls for our retaining annual review of 
trade relations with China.
  Ignoring obvious facts which mandate sanctions calls into question 
many U.S. laws on sanctions and adherence to the rule of law generally, 
leaving critical questions of national security to presidential 
``fudging''. The frequently heard plea ``if we don't sell it to them, 
someone else will'' should be forcefully met with U.S. policy not to 
sell and U.S. leadership to persuade other nations not to sell to rogue 
countries.
  The record does show that the PRC responds to pressure to achieve 
highly-prized trade relations with the United States. Accordingly, we 
should use PNTR to influence the PRC to honor its international 
obligations not to

[[Page S4037]]

proliferate and to conform to fundamental standards of civility and 
decency of the international community of nations.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a press release I issued 
yesterday be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

  Senator Specter Opposes Permanent Normal Trade Relations With China

       In a Senate floor statement scheduled for May 17, 2000, 
     Senator Arlen Specter announced his intention to vote against 
     Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with the People's 
     Republic of China (PRC) and urged his Congressional 
     colleagues to do the same.
       Senator Specter based his opposition to PNTR on China's 
     flagrant proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the 
     Clinton Administration's (1) refusing to impose mandated 
     sanctions and (2) granting a waiver to enhance China's 
     missile capabilities, plus the PRC's deplorable record on 
     human rights.
       Senator Specter cited:
       (1) The PRC's sales of weapons of mass destruction to 
     Pakistan, North Korea, Iran and Libya.
       (2) The PRC's sale of M-11 missiles to Pakistan, which are 
     now pointed at India threatening nuclear war on the sub-
     continent, was a Category 1 infraction mandating sanctions to 
     preclude licensing of technology such as that transferred by 
     Loral and Hughes to the PRC.
       (3) Without obtaining the required license from the State 
     Department, Loral and Hughes provided information to the PRC 
     on a missile explosion which the Department of Defense 
     concluded significantly enhanced the PRC's nuclear ballistic 
     missiles.
       (4) After the Department of Justice initiated a criminal 
     investigation of Loral and Hughes for those disclosures to 
     the PRC, Loral applied for a Presidential waiver to launch 
     another satellite from a Chinese rocket.
       (5) Notwithstanding a DoJ objection that a presidential 
     waiver would have a ``significant adverse impact on any 
     prosecution'', President Clinton granted the waiver.
       Noting President Clinton's close relationship to CEOs from 
     Loral and Hughes and the President's admission that there was 
     ``enormous pressure * * * to fudge the facts * * * '' on 
     sanction laws, Senator Specter concluded that Congress should 
     assert its Constitutional oversight and checks & balances on 
     Executive Branch excesses by retaining annual review of trade 
     with China.
       Senator Specter served eight years on the Senate 
     Intelligence Committee including the chairmanship in 1995-96 
     and currently chairs the Judiciary Subcommittee on Department 
     of Justice.

                          ____________________