[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 60 (Tuesday, May 16, 2000)]
[House]
[Pages H3093-H3145]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                          PERSONAL EXPLANATION

  Mr. LoBIONDO. Mr. Speaker, I regret I was attending a family funeral 
today and unable to be present for the following rollcall votes, 183, 
184 and 185. Had I been here I would have voted ``yea'' on all three 
votes.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Barrett of Nebraska). The question is on 
the resolution.
  The resolution was agreed to.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 499 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 853.

                              {time}  1424


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 853) to amend the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 to provide for 
joint resolutions on the budget, reserve funds for emergency spending, 
strengthened enforcement of budgetary decisions, increased 
accountability for Federal spending, accrual budgeting for Federal 
insurance programs, mitigation of the bias in the budget process toward 
higher spending, modifications in paygo requirements when there is an 
on-budget surplus, and for other purposes, with Mr. LaTourette in the 
chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having 
been read the first time.
  Under the rule, the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Nussle) and the 
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) each will control 20 
minutes; the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young) and the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Obey) each will control 10 minutes; and the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Dreier) and the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. 
Moakley) each will control 15 minutes.
  The Chair understands that each committee will consume or yield back 
its entire time as just mentioned before the next committee is 
recognized.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Nussle).
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend a number of Members on both 
sides of the aisle for their work on budget process reform. There are 
maybe a few Members of Congress and a few people watching who may think 
that this all of a sudden just came up in the last couple of weeks, but 
it did not.
  In fact, I remember talking to Members of Congress when I first 
arrived as a freshman Member who were concerned about that year's 
budget process, 1990, when, as we may recall, as the body may recall, 
Members of Congress and administration officials were being shuttled 
back and forth from Andrews Air Force Base in a very ``democratic 
process'' in order to try and arrive at the end year result of what the 
budget would look like.
  There were probably only a handful of people in this entire country 
divvying up the final $1.3 trillion worth of spending tax increases, at 
that point. There were just a few Members in a little barracks, I 
guess, right off of Andrews Air Force Base, and they were making the 
final decisions of what was then the budget process.
  At that point, as a freshman Member, and just about every year since, 
I made the commitment that this is something that I wanted to do. Well, 
there were many people that I worked with. I certainly could not and 
did not do this alone.
  I first would like to commend my partner in this, and that is the 
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Cardin). The two of us were given the task 
of sitting down and trying to take all of the good ideas from Members 
since the 1974 Act was passed and to try and put them together in a 
comprehensive bill that addressed many of the problems that we were 
facing at that time.

                              {time}  1430

  So I want to commend the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Cardin), the 
gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Minge), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Stenholm), the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. Sununu), the gentleman 
from Minnesota (Mr. Gutknecht), the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kasich), 
so many people, the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox), and the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Barton), that we stand on their shoulders as 
we work together.
  Why is this process broken, or how do we know it is broken? Well, one 
does not have to go back to my very first year as a freshman to 1990. 
Just go back to 1995, the government shutdown. Everybody certainly 
remembers that. In fact, that is the poster child for budget process 
reform. The same is true with 1998 when we did not even get a budget, 
did not even pass a budget that particular year.
  So we have a number of different dynamics that proved to us as 
Members that the process is broken. So one can pick any year one wants 
and see a number of opportunities for the budget process to break down.
  We also considered just about every alternative that was put before 
the Congress, both past and present. We considered every kind of 
lockbox one can imagine. We considered joint resolutions. We considered 
concurrent resolutions. We considered all sorts of things which people 
outside might glaze over in their eyes. They may not even be following.
  But as I explained to a group of young people that I spoke to back in 
my district when they were asking me what I was going to be working on 
this week, I told them budget process reform. Of course, they do not 
quite understand what that would mean.
  I said, well, it is the rules in which we govern our behavior in 
coming up with a budget. Those rules are not much different than when 
one dusts off that old Monopoly box that one pulls out from under one's 
bed, and one dusts it off because one has not played it in a while. So 
one is trying to remember the rules. One opens the box, and one looks 
on the back of the box, and there it says very clearly the non-outcome, 
in other words, it does not determine the outcome, but it says how one 
plays the games in a fair way so that the process can work its will, 
and that the players can achieve their end result on their own, based 
on those rules.
  That is what we tried to do here. We did not game it. We did not say 
there is a special rule for this or a special rule for that. We did not 
take advantage for the Committee on Ways and Means or the Committee on 
Appropriations or any of the authorizing committees. We said, what is 
the best way for us to get a common sense result?
  So what did we do? We looked back and we said, since 1994, when has 
the process worked? Do my colleagues know what? Mr. Chairman, we could 
only find one year where the budget process truly worked. Do my 
colleagues know what year that was? That was the year that we did not 
follow the budget process. It was 1997.
  Let me remind my colleagues what happened. Early in that year, 
Democrats and Republicans met with both the House, the Senate, the 
administration together, and they said, how can we make sure that the 
budget process works? They came up with what was called a memorandum of 
agreement. That memorandum of agreement set

[[Page H3094]]

out the aggregate numbers by which the entire year worked. It said what 
taxes were going to be. It said what spending was going to be. It said 
debt reduction, how we were going to reduce the deficit.
  Together in a memorandum of understanding, the White House, together 
working with the Congress, they came up with what was the framework for 
probably one of the most successful years of budgeting since 1974. So 
it was that process that we used as a boilerplate for this particular 
bill.
  Now, since we wrote the bill and in the last few days when this bill 
has been coming to the floor, I have been having three typical 
conversations. One is, of course, Members who support the reform. They 
are very happy that we can prevent government shutdowns, that we can 
stop with the game playing and the political documents as part of a 
budget bill because it has to be real.
  If we make it a joint resolution, it means the president of either 
party cannot come to the Congress in February and submit a budget that 
is dead on arrival, leave for 9 months, and come back when there are 
negotiations at Andrews Air Force Base. It means that the Congress and 
the Committee on the Budget cannot put a political document out on to 
the table and leave and check out until October when the budget should 
have been done and we are already on the government shutdown, and they 
come back in to try to fix everything. It means that the process has to 
be real. It should not be political. It should not be a game. We are 
talking about $1.8 trillion of one's hard-earned money that is being 
spent, that is being taxed, that is being used for the betterment of 
our country. We should have a process that works.
  The second kind of conversation is from Members who I have to 
honestly suggest to my colleagues find a certain amount of advantage 
from our current chaos. I would suggest to my colleagues those are 
probably Members who find themselves in that last room on that last day 
putting the finishing touches on a 15,000-page bill. That is not me. 
That is not the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt). That is 
probably very few of us in this room right here today.
  So are my constituents from Iowa being represented in that process? I 
would suggest to my colleagues no. Are my friends who are here today 
listening to the debate? Are their constituents being served by that 
process where one has no input, where the House is not working its 
will? I would suggest to my colleagues that it is not. It does work for 
those Members who observe a certain advantage of being in that room and 
taking advantage of that chaos.
  The final group of people are those who are concerned about bringing 
the White House into the process. Mr. Chairman, should not the White 
House be in our budget process? I mean, I realize that my colleagues 
are all walking around here today suggesting that maybe we can do it 
all by ourselves, but did that not, in some respect, contribute to the 
government shutdown? Did that not, in some respect, contribute to the 
chaos and the confusion of years past when, all of a sudden, at the end 
of the year, be they a Republican majority or a Democratic majority, 
because the process was not real, at the last minute, in order to avert 
a government shutdown, had to rush into a room and try and finally put 
a finishing touch on that bill?

  By excluding the President from this particular provision, what we 
end up doing is not make it real, not make it realistic. More so, we 
send a false sense of security to our constituents suggesting that, as 
long as we continue to have votes on all these bills, things must be 
proceeding successfully, when we all know with a wink and a nod that 
they are, in fact, not.
  Now, there are some committees that have some specific concerns that 
have been coming up to me as well. One are the authorizing committees. 
For those of my colleagues listening, those are the committees, such as 
the Committee on Agriculture, the Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure, the Committee on Commerce, committees such as that. 
They are in charge of authorizing the many departments, laws, and 
agencies of our government.
  They are concerned that if, in fact, we create a budget law at the 
beginning of the year, that, in fact, the Committee on Budget could 
decide to do all of the work for those other committees. I would 
suggest to my colleagues, not only is that protected in this 
legislation, but it is protected by the Speaker, and it is protected by 
the rules of our House. We do not have the ability to circumvent any 
jurisdiction at all in this bill. Do not buy the arguments that suggest 
otherwise.
  The Committee on Appropriations. The Committee on Appropriations have 
some concerns with this bill. Why? Well, number one, I say very 
respectfully, and if I was a Cardinal, as they call them, one of the 
chairmen of the subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations, I 
might kind of like this, too. But I am, of course, invited as one of 
the Cardinals into that final room to write the bill, and, of course, I 
kind of like that opportunity. So they oppose the bill because the 
current amount of chaos and confusion that gets us to that end result 
advantages that committee.
  There are other committees, such as the Committee on Transportation 
and Infrastructure that has suggested that mischief might be created by 
that as well. But, again, I would suggest to my colleagues that all 
they are trying to do is to determine the outcome before the House gets 
to work its will.
  I would just like to suggest to my colleagues, in closing, my part of 
this that we have an opportunity today to fix a process that is broken. 
Oftentimes, we come to the floor, and we do not have a broken process. 
But even the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt), the ranking 
member on the Committee on the Budget, has worked on this, his staff. 
While they have not been in agreement, I respected his opinion on this 
and his input on this.
  Even though we may want to agree on this, I would suggest to him that 
we have an opportunity today to fix the process that he knows is 
broken. In fact, the gentleman from South Carolina admitted that during 
the debate on the rule. This may not be exactly the best way in 
everybody's estimation, but it is a start, and we should not kill this 
bill on the floor today.
  There is a reason why we have not reformed the process since 1974. 
The reason is, quite honestly, because people see some advantage in 
there to them, personal, jurisdictional advantage. What we have come up 
with is a non-outcome determining solution to this process. It has been 
an arduous task, to say the least, but we feel we have brokered a 
compromise that works well and allows the House today, as we debate 
this bill to work its will and to make a determination that does, in 
fact, fix this final process.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. McDermott).
  (Mr. McDERMOTT asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Chairman, this is sort of an interesting bill 
because it is kind of inside baseball. Nobody outside this building or 
outside this Hill really cares about it. But, therefore, it ought to be 
possible to have an honest discussion about what this is really all 
about.
  This, in my view, is a repeal of the Committee on the Budget. It 
really is saying we are done with it, but we are not going to do it 
directly because we do it by three mechanisms.
  One is, we say that the budget document has to be signed by the 
President. Now, let us just suppose, in the worst case, we have George 
Bush as President and a Democratic House of Representatives and a 
Republican Senate, and they fight, and they fight, and they fight, and 
we never get a budget resolution done? Now, what happens? Is the 
government paralyzed? Do we close down? No, we just go on, and they 
make it easier by repealing the May 15 deadline.
  The Committee on Appropriations just goes about their business as 
though there was no budget resolution. We do not need a budget 
resolution essentially is what this says. Because if it gets snarled up 
in a fight between the White House and the Houses here, we will just go 
right ahead.
  But the real hooker, the real fast ball in under one's fingers in 
this bill is the automatic CR. This establishes an automatic CR that 
goes in perpetuity

[[Page H3095]]

at the year 2000 levels. If nothing else happens, that is what we have 
got. Now, God bless the Committee on Appropriations. Their problem is 
going to have to be to reduce the funding in some things before they 
vote for things that increase the funding in other things.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Yes, I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Chairman, only to let the gentleman from Washington 
know that we did take that automatic CR out of the bill. There will be 
an amendment later, and my colleagues can decide whether they want that 
as part of this bill.
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Chairman, I want to make the Members aware of that 
issue because I know it is coming. Everybody who fears that the 
shutdown of 1995 is going to say we have to put that in there.
  So those three elements will kill the Committee on Budget.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from New Hampshire (Mr. Sununu), a member of the Budget Reform Task 
Force.
  Mr. SUNUNU. Mr. Chairman, I think it is always a good sign when one 
brings a piece of legislation to the floor like this one that is rooted 
in common sense, and the only opposition that can be put up is to argue 
against elements that are not even in the legislation. I think that is 
an indication of the strength of the bill, and I rise in strong support 
of it.
  This is budgeting process. It is not necessarily exciting, but it is 
important. This legislation does a few basic things to put us back on a 
ground of common sense and fiscal responsibility. We give the budget 
resolution the teeth of law, allowing the President the opportunity to 
sign it into law, and thereby enable us to know where we are headed at 
the beginning of the process and make the outcome that much better.
  We set aside for emergencies. Everyone in America would think that 
that makes sense to budget for emergencies or contingent funds at the 
beginning of the year. But we do not do it in Congress. As a result, we 
are caught in an endless cycle of supplemental and emergency 
appropriations where we have to exceed whatever our every budget caps 
might have been put into place.
  We will take up the opportunity to look at 2-year budget cycles, 
which would give us an opportunity to improve the budget cycle by 
improving our capacity for oversight, to make sure that taxpayer funds 
are spent effectively.
  The bottom line is that this legislation gives a better planning 
process to all of Congress. It improves the accountability that is in 
the system and puts us on a road to greater fiscal discipline and 
restores public confidence in the way we fund government. It is not a 
cure-all. The opponents of this legislation will raise some legitimate 
concerns. But the objective is to incrementally improve the budget 
process and restore public confidence in the way we do business here in 
Congress.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from North Carolina (Mr. Price).
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to 
this bill. I do want to commend those who have worked on it in good 
faith. I know that their intention is good. But this is a flawed 
remedy. It is not a convincing remedy. It might well do more harm than 
good.
  I think we will all agree that the budget process is not working 
well. But it is a mistake to believe that endless procedural tinkering 
is the answer.

                              {time}  1445

  The problem is not mainly a flawed process. The challenge to us as 
Members is to use the existing process responsibly, and yet in recent 
years that has just not been done. In 1998, for the first time, 
Congress failed to even adopt a budget resolution. And for the past 2 
years, the leadership has allowed Congress to approve budget 
resolutions that could not possibly be implemented, and then has 
facilitated waiving as many rules as necessary in order to break or 
circumvent or ignore those budget resolutions.
  So if the budget process is broken, it is not so much that we need to 
tinker with the machinery as to use that machinery responsibly. We need 
to adopt realistic budget plans and then comply with the existing 
rules. The bill before us purports to address our problems by more 
tinkering with the machinery. But I think it looks for a fix in the 
wrong direction.
  One of the best examples of this is the misguided proposal for 
biennial budgeting, and I will be able to address that, as will other 
Members, when the amendment process begins. Let me focus for now on the 
base bill and the proposal to make the budget resolution a joint 
resolution. That would bring the President into the process and would 
require his signature on the budget resolution.
  I understand very well the attraction of this. I can remember times 
in the Reagan and Bush administrations when as Democrats we wished for 
a way to bring the President to the table earlier, to share 
responsibility for putting our fiscal house in order. But I believe the 
advantages of doing this are outweighed by the likely disadvantages.
  First of all, I think this would invite further delays in the budget 
and appropriations process, beyond those we already experience. It 
would halt the process in years when the President or the Congress 
could not agree. I know there is supposed to be a fail-safe mechanism 
whereby we would then revert to a concurrent resolution. But when that 
kicked in, the process would already be way behind.
  And then, finally, once the President and the budget committees found 
themselves negotiating over a real statute and not a planning document, 
they might very well succumb to the temptation to directly legislate, 
to load all kinds of controversies that properly belong in the 
reconciliation process or in authorization bills onto the budget 
resolution.
  So this bill would take power away from the committees of this body 
and move it toward the Committee on the Budget, and away from the 
Congress as a whole and move it toward the President. I urge my 
colleagues to vote ``no.''
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Cardin).
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, let me thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time.
  Mr. Chairman, let me just make a couple points, if I might. First, I 
want to compliment my friend, the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Nussle), for 
the manner in which we developed this proposal. It was done in a 
bipartisan way, an honest effort to try to improve the process around 
here.
  Let me make three points, if I might, first in regards to the joint 
resolution. In response to my friend from North Carolina, there is no 
opportunity to add, other than the budget requirements in the budget 
resolution. And if we do not enact the budget resolution, we report 
back to the current process. So there is really no danger there.
  But the key here is to try to get the White House and the Congress 
engaged on the same page on the budget document of this country. Why is 
that important? In the last 10 years, we have only passed a budget on 
time twice, once under Democrats, once under Republicans. In the last 
10 years, we have only passed the appropriation bills on time once. We 
have had summit after summit, we have had violations of the rules after 
violations of the rules, and what this all means is that the Congress 
is not as strong as it needs to be. None of us like a summit. We are 
all neutered in that process except for a few of us. This empowers each 
one of the Members in this body as well as the institution itself to be 
stronger.
  Number two, emergency spending. Look what we have done with emergency 
spending in this body. Through the 1990s, we had 18 supplemental 
appropriation bills and 21 regular appropriation bills that included 
emergency spending. Much of this was not even emergency spending. It is 
time to reform this process and this legislation does it.
  And number three, it is time for us to start moving towards accrual 
accounting. Members should try explaining to their business leaders why 
we are still on a cash basis accounting system. That allows us to play 
gimmicks with the budget, which is wrong. This is a good first step.
  I urge the Members to please read what is in this document, because

[[Page H3096]]

there are statements being made that are just not true. We do not 
sunset any of the entitlement programs under this bill, but it sets up 
a way in which we can start reviewing government spending in a more 
responsible way.
  I urge my colleagues to support the underlying reform bill. It will 
make us stronger as an institution.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Barton).
  (Mr. BARTON of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in very strong support of 
this bill. It is not a perfect budget process reform bill, but it is 
the most perfect budget process reform bill we can get to the floor, 
and I am for it.
  A lot of the talk we will hear against it is really inside baseball 
against the prerogatives of certain committees or, in some cases, 
perhaps certain specific Members. I think the fact that we have to have 
a joint resolution signed by the President early in the process is a 
very positive step.
  We have sat around here, those of us that have been in the body a 
number of years, and watched President Clinton demand more spending to 
sign the appropriation bills, or watched President Reagan or Bush 
demand less spending. Why not bring the President and the Congress 
together at the beginning?
  In terms of the emergency day fund, how many emergency supplemental 
bills have really been just about emergencies? Not very many. This bill 
has a real definition and actually does try to budget for emergencies. 
I think that is a very positive step.
  It does not have the 2-year budget biennium that we hope will be 
passed on the amendment, but if we pass that, that will be a good step, 
and I will speak later on other amendments as they come forward.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express my support for H.R. 853, the 
Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act, introduced by Congressman 
Nussle. As a cosponsor of this legislation, I am very glad to see this 
important measure considered here today.
  The American people are sick and tired, like I am, of the same old 
budget story coming out of Washington at the end of every year. The 
process in which we now fund our government has become one big staring 
contest--waiting to see who will blink first. Each year, hot political 
issues and scare tactics are used to hold up and stall the federal 
budget process so that at the end of the year some can attempt to cater 
the final budget numbers to be most appealing to their constituencies, 
regardless of whether or not the spending direction and levels are good 
for the country as a whole. This political game must be ended and 
sanity must be brought back to the federal budgeting process.
  Since joining Congress, I have been a strong supporter of budget 
process reform. I believe that budget process reform is an essential 
key to reaching and maintaining a balanced budget. Passage of 
meaningful process reform would leave its mark on this Nation for 
generations to come. In fact, I have introduced budget process reform 
legislation in this Congress, H.R. 2293, the ``Budget Enforcement 
Simplification Trust'' Act, or the ``BEST'' bill. This legislation, 
along with H.R. 853, recognizes the need for discipline and order in 
making spending and revenue decisions at the federal level.
  There are many issues that H.R. 853 addresses that should be central 
to any budget debate. For example, I support the idea of a joint 
resolution. A joint, rather than the current concurrent, resolution 
would bring the President into Congressional budget deliberations and 
make him accountable for its success or failure. And, because the 
President would have the authority to veto an unacceptable resolution, 
a joint resolution would require Congress to pay attention to 
Presidential concerns. Unlike the current budget process, this new 
framework would make both the Executive and the Legislative branches 
stakeholders in the resolution's outcome and require them to agree on 
overall spending and revenue levels, annual deficits, total debt 
levels, and on the allocation of resources among budget functions and 
committees.
  I understand that an amendment will be offered today to strike the 
provision in H.R. 853 that changes the budget resolution from a 
concurrent resolution to a joint resolution. I would hope that my 
colleagues would oppose this amendment and keep this important 
provision in the bill.
  I am also grad to see included in H.R. 853 the creation of a Reserve 
Fund which would replace the ``emergency'' supplemental appropriations 
bills which have become a catch-all for non-emergency spending schemes. 
Disbursements will be only for certified natural disasters with tough 
procedures to ensure spending on only its designed purposes. An 
``emergency'' should not be defined as a requirement lacking budgeted 
funds. Congress has become too reliable on labeling increases in 
spending as an ``emergency'' designation, when in fact, the emergency 
at hand does not coincide with the spending levels considered.
  H.R. 853 also budgets for insurance programs on an accrual basis, 
which is the budget records net cost or receipts on a present value 
basis at the time the government commits to provide insurance. While I 
did not offer a similar provision in my BEST bill, I also see merit in 
this responsible treatment of insurance program transactions.
  While Congressman Nussle's bill, H.R. 853, contains many similar 
provisions to my BEST bill, there are a few differences in the two. One 
main difference is the fact that my budget process reform bill calls 
for a biennial budgeting process, while H.R. 853 retains the annual 
budget and appropriation process.
  I do want to elaborate some on this distinction between the use of 
biennial budgeting as compared to an annual budget and appropriation 
process. Today, an amendment will be offered by Rules Committee 
Chairman Drier that will establish a two-year budgeting and 
appropriations cycle and budget timetable. I appreciate the efforts of 
Chairman Drier in working to offer this important amendment and feel 
that this will go a long way to make an already good bill even better. 
I urge my colleagues to support his amendment.
  There are many sound arguments as to why and how biennial budgeting 
would help make the federal budgeting process more reliable and 
sensible. First of all, budgeting for a two year cycle would force 
Congress to be more careful in their spending habits and encourage 
members to be more responsible in the amounts and directions in which 
they allocate taxpayer dollars. Far too often, pet projects are added 
on to annual appropriations bills at the last minute, usually without 
the proper scrutiny of Congress. With one budget process every two 
years, the opportunities for that kind of spending would be cut in 
half.
  Federal agencies would also be more efficient and cautious in how 
they use their funds because of the length and stability of their 
funding over a two year cycle. In addition, Congress would be able to 
exercise better oversight over these government agencies and programs 
to ensure that the financial commitment involved is sound fiscal policy 
for the country to undertake.
  However, the most important aspect of biennial budgeting in my 
opinion is not what enacting it would do for Congress, but rather what 
it would allow Congress to accomplish. Each year, both parties state 
the many goals and accomplishments they hope to pass in order to 
improve the life of the American people. And each year, achieving these 
goals are becoming more and more difficult because of the time that is 
required to be spent on the annual appropriations process.
  Imagine how productive Congress could be if instead of having to 
deliberate over every dollar the government will see that given year, 
we could commit more time to the different issues that most of us came 
here to work toward. I want to spend more time helping small business 
and small communities by cutting taxes and wasteful spending in our 
government and pushing for legislative proposals that give more freedom 
for the American people to work toward a better tomorrow. I think every 
Member would tell you that he or she would like to have more time and 
resources to pursue the types of issues that they were all sent to 
Congress for in the first place. Biennial budgeting can help to make 
that happen.
  Again, I applaud this House for taking up budget process reform 
legislation here today. It is time for Congress to free up this process 
and allow this body to stand for more than annual appropriations 
battles. It is time for us to start spending our time and the American 
taxpayers' dime more wisely.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Bentsen).
  (Mr. BENTSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in reluctant opposition to this 
bill. I want to commend the gentleman from Iowa and the gentleman from 
Maryland for their work on it, but I do not think this bill is fully 
done.
  I have to say, Mr. Chairman, that we can come up with any budget 
process we want, but if the Members are not going to abide by it, it 
will not make any difference in the world. We could be back here, and 
probably it will not be any of us, but someone will be back in 10 
years, if we enact this, saying, boy, the budget process is broken, we 
have to change it again. It ultimately comes down to the Members of the 
House and the Senate being willing to abide by it.

[[Page H3097]]

  If we look at the reforms that were enacted in 1990, the pay-go and 
caps, when those were put into law, Congress actually abided by those 
for a number of years, until the Congress decided it did not want to. 
It was not a single party, it was a bipartisan effort that led the way. 
So whatever change is not going to make a good deal of difference.
  Now, there are some good things in here dealing with emergency 
spending, although some of the language was changed, which I will talk 
to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Nussle) about later, I think the 
accrual funding is good, but I do think this idea of moving the 
goalpost, which is in effect what we have done, we have decided we are 
going to move the goalpost back up the field 50 yards rather than 
having it at the back, by having the fight with the President early on 
rather than later. The problem with that is, I think, that they might 
push the fight to the very end of the year and make it much more 
difficult. It may work, it may not, but I do not think it solves the 
problems that our colleagues are trying to solve.
  I think they made an honest attempt. I do not think this bill is 
fully done yet. And, again, this is a matter of human nature. Nothing 
that we change in the process will make that much difference. So I 
think we should send this bill back to committee and work on it some 
more.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
North Carolina (Mrs. Clayton).
  (Mrs. CLAYTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Mrs. CLAYTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time. I oppose this bill as written, though I think it is indeed 
well intended.
  For more than half a century biennial budgeting has been considered 
and rejected by many States. In 1940, some 44 States used biennial 
budgeting. Today, less than half do.
  The bill will cause harmful delays, reduce accuracy in forecasting 
and planning, and obstruct legislative control in the budget process. 
Under this bill, harmful delays will result because a joint resolution, 
as is proposed, takes longer than a concurrent resolution, as is in 
current law.
  Worse, Mr. Chairman, under this bill, from the time items within a 
budget are formulated to the time such items are implemented would be 
extended in a way that no one could be assured of accuracy.
  Budget cycles for Federal agencies could extend over 2- or 3-year 
periods, and forecasting and planning would be affected by economic 
swings, inflation, and unanticipated need. Fiscal control would become 
elusive and fanciful. And, also, many of our colleagues believe we use 
emergency spending measures far too often now. Imagine how often we 
would be tempted to use emergency spending measures if we were unable 
to get help to citizens in need due to the inherent sluggish budget 
process. I welcome the amendment that addresses this issue.
  Moreover, the President and small groups of legislators would 
exercise inordinate power in a process where a determined minority 
could frustrate the will of the majority.
  Mr. Chairman, the goals of the Comprehensive Budget Process Reform 
Act are laudable and we should commend the purpose of it. However, this 
bill gives us little more than we already have and threatens much of 
what we are required to do. Defeat this bill as it is currently 
written. We seek to fix things that are not broken and will result in 
breaking those things which we seek to fix.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this bill.
  For more than half a century, Biennial budgeting has been considered 
and rejected by many states.
  In 1940, some 44 states used biennial budgeting. Today, less than 
half do.
  Many states have considered and rejected biennial budgeting because 
it causes harmful delays; reduces accuracy in forecasting and planning; 
and constricts legislative control in the budget process.
  Under this Bill, harmful delay will result because a joint 
resolution, as is proposed, takes longer than a concurrent resolution, 
as in current law. Not only would Congress be forced to await action by 
the President to pass a budget, but appropriations bills could not move 
until a budget is passed.
  Current law, allowing appropriations bills to come to the House Floor 
after May 15th is repealed by this Bill.
  Mr. Chairman, many of our colleagues believe we use emergency 
spending measures too often now. Imagine how often we will be tempted 
to use emergency spending measures if we are unable to get help to 
citizens in need due to an inherently sluggish budget process.
  And, imagine the mammoth bills we would construct, with add-on 
provisions of every sort and kind, while attempting to pass a budget 
bill that must be passed before this Government can spend money.
  Worse, Mr. Chairman, under this Bill, from the time items within a 
budget are formulated to the time such items are implemented would be 
extended in a way that no one could assure accuracy.
  Budget cycles for Federal agencies could extend over two or three 
year periods, and forecasting and planning would be affected by 
economic swings, inflation and unanticipated needs. Fiscal control 
would become illusive and fanciful.
  Moreover, the President and small groups of legislators could 
exercise inordinate power in a process where a determined minority 
could frustrate the will of the majority.
  Senate Rules, different from House Rules, would empower Senators in a 
way never before seen.
  Do we really want to surrender our role as representatives to the 
President and small bands of Senators?
  Mr. Chairman, the goals of the Comprehensive Budget Process reform 
Act are laudable. But, we already have the authority to exercise 
regular oversight and to adopt multi-year budget plans.
  Why do we need a Bill to reaffirm that role? We have already stood 
for the protection of Social Security. Why do we need a Bill to make 
that stand again? We can already reauthorize or rescind spending 
programs. Why must we restate that authority? And do we really want to 
expose entitlement programs to the perils of biennial budgeting?
  Mr. Chairman, we need, and the American people demand, predictability 
in our budgeting; calculated choices in deciding how much, for what 
purposes and when to spend; reliability as we proceed; and certainty in 
how we operate as we shape the budget of the United States.
  This Bill gives us little more than we already have and threatens 
much of what we are required to do.
  Defeat this Bill. It seeks to fix what ain't broke, and will result 
in breaking what it seeks to fix.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Minnesota (Mr. Oberstar).
  (Mr. OBERSTAR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time, and I compliment him on his leadership in standing up and 
offering a rationale on this issue we can all heed.
  The Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 was crafted for the 
purpose of giving the Congress a coequal role with the President in 
setting the budget of the United States. That law created a process 
whereby the Congress, after reviewing the administration's spending and 
policy priorities, would establish priorities and investment levels 
that reflect the appropriateness of our ideas, the people's body, and 
the people we represent.
  This bill turns that initiative on its head. The joint resolution 
proposal brings the President into this Chamber and gives him three 
cracks at the budget ball; his budget, our budget, and the 
appropriation bills. That is a formula for failure. That is a formula 
for surrender of the prerogatives of the legislative body to the 
executive body.
  Some of the advocates for this bill decry the 1990 budget summit, 
but, ironically, they are creating a formula for annual budget summits. 
Budget targets and committee allocations will be negotiated by the 
Committee on the Budget, the House and Senate leadership, and the 
President, without the participation of authorizing committees and the 
rank-and-file Members of this body. Most of us will be shut out of the 
process.
  If my colleagues do not think so, think back on 1997. Three years 
ago. Three years ago this week we considered the 1997 Balanced Budget 
Act. Well, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Shuster) and I offered 
a substitute to increase highway and transit spending, adjusting the 
deal by one-third of 1 percent. What did we hear? ``A deal is a deal,'' 
intoned colleagues on both sides of the aisle. ``Do

[[Page H3098]]

not break the deal,'' said a panicked White House, ``Stick to the 
deal,'' said the Committee on the Budget.
  At 2 a.m. in the morning, when I got a chance to debate the issue, I 
said, ``Who is a part of this deal? Not me. Not the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania. Not most of those in the Chamber. We did not have 
anything to say about the deal. So why are we being asked to support 
it?'' Well, that is where we will be if we pass this goofy idea.

                              {time}  1500

  With this bill, we will be in that kind of debate every year, 
eliminate functional categories from the budget resolution. We even 
take away our ability to offer amendments to the leadership-negotiated 
deal.
  Well, the budget process is where we set our priorities, where we 
decide what the values are for America. It sets the priorities for the 
future. It is a process where every Member of this Chamber ought to 
have a voice and a say and have an equal role. This proposition cuts us 
out of that role. We ought to defeat this bill.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Minnesota (Mr. Minge).
  Mr. MINGE. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, this proposal that we are considering this afternoon 
gives us in the House of Representatives an opportunity to move ahead 
with a very ticklish task of developing a budget and trying to improve 
the rigors of the budget process in several different respects.
  It is always easy to criticize progress and to say, oh, there is a 
parade of horribles here. If we try something new and different, we may 
have problems. Well, I submit that is really not the issue. The issue 
is do we have problems with the way we are currently handling our 
budget responsibilities. And indeed we do. The problems are legion.
  One of them is that we do not find out until September or October of 
each year whether or not we have agreement with the White House. So one 
of the challenges is how can we move this dispute up to an earlier 
point in the year. This particular proposal does that.
  The same thing for emergencies. The same thing for accrual accounting 
and a variety of other things that would represent improvements in the 
budget process.
  I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of this proposal.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Royce).
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Comprehensive Budget Process 
Reform Act. While this bill will not fix everything that is wrong with 
the budget process, I believe it is a step in the right direction.
  The current economic trend we are enjoying will not last forever. Now 
is the time to increase accountability for spending taxpayers' dollars, 
strengthening enforcement of budgetary decisions, promote long-term 
budget planning, and encourage fiscal discipline.
  This bill requires a binding budget resolution to compel the 
President and compel the Congress to agree, from the start, on levels 
of spending and not at the last moment, as is currently done.
  Furthermore, this bill forces both the Congress and President to 
budget up front for long-term liabilities. It sets aside a strategic 
reserve, something we should have done years ago instead of the 
supplemental budgets that become Christmas trees. It closes existing 
loopholes in budget enforcement.
  In addition, it will limit the authorization of any new spending 
program to not more than 10 years, and requires committees to submit a 
plan for reauthorization for all programs within 10 years.
  I urge my colleagues to pass these important reforms.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha).
  Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, let me talk about my concern about this 2-
year budget process.
  I think that the worst thing we could do is allow the executive 
branch to have any more influence than they have. I mean, they send a 
budget over to us. Every year we dispose of that budget in one way or 
the other. If we dispose of it 1 year and we had 2 years, we would have 
little or no influence over the departments.
  I was talking to the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Larson) from 
Connecticut. They used to have a 2-year budget. They have to open their 
budget up every year and go through the same process they would 
ordinarily. But the problem with then having influence with the 
departments, they have no personnel in there, they would have none of 
the things that they are really interested in in their budget.
  So what they would be doing, the process things that are so important 
to the changes that happen, the supplemental appropriation, all of the 
things that they need to do to make sure that things are operating 
smoothly would have to be taken care of every year. They would have to 
open the budget up. And yet all their personnel and things they are 
really concerned about would be taken care of every year.
  Our Constitution is clear. We start the process. The Senate would 
have an inordinate influence because they have no rules over there and 
they would be able to add to any budget anything they wanted to add. 
And if my colleagues believe that we can see ahead 2 years, we get more 
changes from the Department of Defense, we get them before the 
committee, and the only real ability we have over them is to say, look, 
the budget is coming up and we will try to work things out. If we do 
not have that leverage, we are not going to have an influence over the 
Department of Defense or any other department at all.
  But the one that is really going to benefit is the White House. The 
White House is going to have that much more control. We pass about 95 
percent of what they want. The control we have would be then limited.
  I ask Members to vote against this idea, which I think sets us back 
and reduces the influence of the House.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Chairman, I yield to my friend, the gentleman from 
Minnesota (Mr. Gutknecht).
  Mr. GUTKNECHT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
the time.
  Mr. Chairman, I am reminded of a Rodney Dangerfield line where he 
comes home one night and his wife is packing and he says, ``What is the 
matter, dear?'' She says, ``I am leaving.'' And he asked her, ``Is 
there another man?'' She looked at him and said, ``There must be.''
  When I look at this system that we have today, the way we put a 
budget together, the way we are going to spend $1.83 billion this year, 
I look at that and I say, there must be a better way. Because, 
essentially, what we have now is we have no rules. I mean, the House 
has one set of rules, the Senate has a different set of rules, and the 
President of the United States has no rules.
  What is the President's target this year?
  If we do not have the same target, if we do not have the same rules, 
how will we ever get there, how will we know where we are?
  This is just simply a reform package that says we are all going to 
have the same set of rules.
  I submit that not a single Member of this body can defend the system 
that we have today, let alone explain it. There must be a better way. 
This, I think, is one better way. If my colleagues have a better idea, 
we are willing to listen.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, could the Chair advise me how much time is 
remaining on our side?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) has 3\1/
2\ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Nussle) has 4 
minutes remaining.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of the time.
  Mr. Chairman, I will stipulate that the budget process is broken, and 
I will stipulate that the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Nussle) and the 
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Cardin) have worked in earnest and in good 
faith to come forth with solutions, some of which I agree with, but not 
all of them. In fact, I think there are provisions in this bill that 
could compound our budget problems rather than solving them.
  At the core of the bill is a new idea: that we make the budget 
resolution a joint resolution rather than a concurrent resolution. 
Basically, this means

[[Page H3099]]

that the President has to sign it before it is effective. And when and 
if he does sign it, of course, it becomes law.
  Now, frankly, I think that idea is not without merit. It could be the 
device for bringing the President and the Congress together earlier in 
the process rather than later in the process. But, in reality, we are 
all politicians and we know that these budget compromises are usually 
made at the 11th hour because that is usually when our back is against 
the wall and we have to come to some kind of decision.
  The chances are that we would not have an agreement, not have closure 
with the White House, particularly in a divided government. And, in 
that event, this bill would not facilitate the process, it would not 
improve the process; it would only delay the budget process well into 
the month of June.
  Now, if a joint resolution which becomes law is the chosen vehicle 
for the budget resolution, it also becomes a moving vehicle which is an 
occasion for passing all sorts of laws, not just budget laws, but other 
things too.
  The text of the bill recognizes this problem and tries to prohibit 
these extraneous matters from being attached to the budget resolution. 
But we all know that the Committee on Rules in this House is master at 
overruling such prohibitions, waiving points of order. And in the 
Senate, the other body, there are hardly any germaneness rules, and 60 
Senators can override anything.
  So this moving vehicle becomes a vehicle for passing all kinds of 
laws. It opens the door to one-shot riders, such as some prohibition on 
abortion spending across the board, and to major legislation.
  The President and the leadership might get together and decide they 
want to ram something through in a hurry, bypass the authorizing 
committees. That is why the Committee on Transportation, among others, 
has said this has insidious potential, this could open the door to all 
kinds of diversions.
  What do we get if we do make it through this process, if this joint 
resolution does, in fact, get adopted? We get a shell of a resolution. 
The irony of this bill is they elevate the status of it to a law, and 
then they gut it if it is meaningful content.
  What we get is about six or seven numbers. This debate is not about 
programmatic choices, it is about numbers. And because this particular 
bill would take the budget functions and put them in the report; would 
take the one power that the committee has, the power of reconciliation 
directives and put that in the report and downgrade the status of the 
two, we diminish the status of the debate on the floor.
  The one opportunity when we come to the floor and have a debate on 
programmatic priorities is taken away from us, because we are not 
talking about programmatic priorities. There are no more budget 
functions in the resolution before us. They are just aggregate numbers, 
discretionary spending, defense spending, nondefense spending, 
surpluses, and things of that nature.
  So, this takes us back, it does not take us forward. I do not think 
this is an improvement on the process. That is why I think we should 
vote down the base bill and go back to work on real solutions to our 
budget problems.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Cox), my friend who wrote the original budget process 
reform bill quite a few years ago.
  Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman from Iowa 
(Chairman Nussle), the chairman of the task force that is bringing this 
legislation to the floor; as well as his colleague, the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Cardin); the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kasich), chairman 
of the Committee on the Budget; the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Stenholm), who, on the Democratic side, did so much work on this bill; 
the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. Sununu); and the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Radanovich), Members who spent a great deal of time 
making this happen.
  A dozen years ago, Mr. Chairman, President Reagan stood at the 
rostrum just before us addressing Congress with his State of the Union 
message and he demanded that Congress reform the incomprehensible 
Budget Act of 1974. President Reagan submitted legislation to do just 
that.
  I know, because, as a White House counsel, I drafted that 
legislation, brought it to Capitol Hill, and then 2 years later, as a 
Member of Congress, had the opportunity to introduce it here, with over 
100 sponsors.
  By the 105th Congress, that legislation had over 200 sponsors. And 
thanks to the leadership of the Members whose names I have just 
recalled, this bill is on the floor today 14 years later.
  The ideas are the same. Rationalize this budget process. Make it a 
law, not a nonbinding resolution. Give us discipline. Plan for 
disasters. All of these reforms are in this legislation. It is the most 
important vote, perhaps, that we will cast this year. I urge an ``aye'' 
vote.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Stenholm).
  (Mr. STENHOLM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this bill. It is not 
a perfect bill, but it is a good bill.
  I would like to focus my comments on a provision that I have 
supported since I came to the Congress, a sunset requirement that 
requires Congress to review all programs at least every 10 years.
  The bill also provides that any new program created by Congress ought 
to have its authorization limited to no more than 10 years.
  There is no provision in H.R. 853 that would terminate any current 
programs under any circumstances. I cannot understand why some of my 
colleagues are opposing such a common sense requirement.
  I am very disappointed that some have resorted to scare tactics, 
suggesting that this bill would somehow threaten veterans' programs, 
student loans, Social Security, or Medicare.
  The bill does no such thing. It simply requires that we, as Members 
of Congress, do our job in reviewing Government programs, see what is 
working, see what is not working, figure out what needs to be changed, 
what else we should be doing at least once every 10 years.
  The Committee on Agriculture already lives with this requirement. 
Every 5 years we have a farm bill. This requirement that the farm bill 
be reauthorized every 10 years does not threaten agricultural programs. 
I do not see why some suggest this bill does.
  Support it.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Nussle) has 2 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of the time.
  Mr. Chairman, I have an opportunity here to fix something that is 
broken. That is why I proposed the particular bill that I did in a 
bipartisan way with so many different Members.
  The excuses today are flying. Everyone says, well, the process is 
broken. Everybody admits it. There are very few coming to the floor 
today suggesting that it is not. The question is how do we fix it.
  Most of the excuses regarding this particular method of fixing it 
surrounds whether or not the President should be involved in the 
process. And the complaint is that the President should not be involved 
in this process.
  Well, wake up, my colleagues. The President is involved in this 
process. First, he has got to propose the budget. That is the first 
thing that has to happen.
  Is it a realistic budget? I would submit to my colleagues that there 
has not been a President probably since the 1970s that did not submit a 
political document as their draft. I see my very good friend the 
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey), the ranking member of the 
Committee on Appropriations, nodding his head.

                              {time}  1515

  Both parties, is that not true? That is what is wrong. This is not a 
political exercise. This should be a practical exercise. Can you 
imagine a family paying its bills for the mortgage, for the lights, for 
the gas, for the water, paying for their kids to go to college and at 
the end of the year they gather all those checks together and they say, 
``Oh, we've got a budget. Just add all these up and that's our 
budget.'' That is basically what we do here. That it is okay to have 
the President involved at the end of the process but not at the 
beginning of the process I suggest to

[[Page H3100]]

my colleagues is a fallacy. We need to include to make this process 
responsible to the White House and the Congress early in this process.
  There have been some that have suggested that in fact there would be 
a summit meeting. Well, heaven forbid we would actually have a 
conversation with the White House, be they of any particular party, 
prior to the last possible moment of the year when three or four people 
get to sit in a room and write the final bill.
  Folks, wake up. The process is broken, it needs to be fixed. This is 
an opportunity to do so. Vote for the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time allocated to the Committee on the Budget has 
expired. It is now in order to conduct the portion of the debate 
allocated to the Committee on Appropriations.
  The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young) and the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Obey) each will control 10 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young).
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may 
consume to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Callahan).
  Mr. CALLAHAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time, Mr. 
Chairman. I am reminded, since one of my predecessors at this dais 
today talked about Rodney Dangerfield, I read a comic strip once in Dog 
Patch, Little Abner. It seems they had a problem going in the Dog 
Patch. There was a gigantic curve, an S curve on the steep embankment 
and people were always running off the embankment. They were breaking 
their arms and their necks and their legs. So they formed a committee 
such as has been done here today and they came up with a resolve. The 
resolve the committee came up with was to build a larger hospital. That 
does not solve the problem. Neither does this underlying bill here 
today resolve a problem.
  How could anyone in the United States House of Representatives not 
understand the Constitution sufficiently to be against this measure? 
Why delegate what authority you have as Members of the Congressional 
body to the President of the United States regardless of who he is? 
Some of us hope we have a Republican President in the next 4 years and 
therefore we would be advantaged, you might think. But the fact that we 
are delegating all of our constitutional authority is absolutely wrong 
and a big mistake.
  What we are seeing here today are the same things that the Committee 
on the Budget has been leaning toward for a great number of years. They 
want to authorize and they want to appropriate. Now they want to lock 
in their suggestions, their power by getting the President of the 
United States involved in the process. This issue that we are debating 
today is not something for next year, it is not something for a 
biennial budget, it is a law that will be here until it is repealed by 
the Congress of the United States and some future President signs it, 
which you would never get a President to do. He would veto a repeal of 
this mistake if indeed we were to pass it.
  I urge my colleagues today to take a close look at what they are 
doing. There are many things in this bill I support. I support biennial 
budgeting, for example. Some of my colleagues are against biennial 
budgeting. But we can bring up biennial budgeting and we can debate 
that issue without involving this complicated, new idea that a great 
many members of the Committee on the Budget have come up with as a way 
to resolve a problem.
  This is not the resolve. This is causing a greater problem for this 
Congress and leading us into dangerous territory when we delegate our 
constitutional authority to the administrative branch of government. I 
urge my colleagues to vote against the underlying bill.
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 5 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, absolutely the budget process is broken. The problem is 
that what is being proposed today will make it even worse.
  The major argument that is being used for adopting this proposal is 
that too much time is spent in the budget and appropriations process 
and we have to find a way to shorten it. By making the budget a joint 
resolution which requires a signature by the President rather than a 
concurrent resolution which does not, you double the length of time 
that it will take for us to finish our job, because it requires 
Congress to reach agreement with the President not once but twice 
during each budget cycle, once on the budget resolution and the second 
time on each and every appropriation bill that will work their way 
through here. That is a prescription for having us never finish our 
budget business.
  Secondly, we also have the problem of 2-year budgeting, which 
apparently is going to be attached to this proposal. The problem that I 
see when you move to 2-year budgeting is that we wind up living in a 
permanent racetrack of supplementals. We have too many supplemental 
appropriations now when we set the budget for a year in advance. If you 
set the budget for 2 years in advance, the world is not static, wars 
happen, disasters happen, economic disruption happens, and that means 
we will be required to push through more and more supplementals. When 
that happens, there is a huge shift of power that takes place if we are 
in a 2-year budget versus a 1-year budget.
  First of all, we will transfer an unparalleled amount of power to the 
Senate, because Senators do not have to work under a rule of 
germaneness. If we pass an education supplemental through here, the 
Senate can go through and add anything they want to it because they do 
not have a rule of germaneness. We have a Committee on Rules that 
requires a rule of germaneness. That fundamentally transfers power to 
the Senate.
  Secondly, we have a total abdication of power to the agencies. It is 
hard enough right now to get unelected agencies to follow the 
instructions of the elected officials of the Congress. And if they do 
not have to pay any attention to us until the last 18 months of a 
budget cycle, you know that they will be even more obstreperous than 
they are right now in dealing with Congressional intent in any 
legislation. To me, that creates an even more unresponsive government 
than we have right now.
  I would make just this one point. We are the last independent 
legislative body on the face of the Earth. The reason we are is because 
we hold tightly and fiercely to the power of the purse. It is only when 
you have the power of the purse firmly in the hands of this House that 
this House can meet its constitutional responsibilities to protect 
liberty, to protect justice and to protect the country against the 
abuse of power that comes from anyone who does not have to seek anyone 
else's approval for their conduct.
  It is no accident that every President for as long as I have served 
here, including the one who serves now, wants to see 2-year budgeting 
and wants to see a joint resolution approach to the budget. It is 
because Presidents by nature want all the power--95 cents out of every 
dollar in every budget we have passed except 2 over the last 20 years 
has gone where Presidents have wanted that money to go. The other 5 
percent is the difference between having a President and having a king. 
And when you move from 1-year budget to a 2-year budget and when you 
move from a resolution which is a congressional product to a resolution 
that requires the blessing of the President, then he controls the 
process at every juncture. And when we allow that to happen, we violate 
the very constitutional oath that we took to uphold the Constitution 
and within it Article I, which speaks to the duty of the Congress to 
stand independent, not on our behalf but on behalf of the people we 
represent.
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. Walsh).
  Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time on this critical issue of importance to this House and to the 
balance of power in this country. I could not agree more with my 
colleague from Wisconsin who just spoke. There are many, many times 
when he and I disagree, many, many times. But on this he has never been 
righter. At the heart of this is the constitutional power of the House 
of Representatives.
  Just a couple of thoughts, Mr. Chairman. The Budget Act of 1974, it 
was a reform. This also is posed as a reform. Since that reform in 
1974, we have created $5 trillion in deficit spending. So that budget 
reform has been a disaster.

[[Page H3101]]

  The second item is by allowing for 2-year budgets, we are now going 
to have to make assumptions on revenue and spending over 2 years. We 
cannot get it right over 1 year now. How in God's name are we going to 
plan for 2 years? So we go to a 2-year budget, we do not get our budget 
completed, we run on these automatic continuing resolutions. It is a 
mindless, Band-Aid approach to budgeting. We lose all incentive to 
resolve the budget issues each year because we go on automatic pilot.
  What happens when we are on automatic pilot? One supplemental 
Christmas tree after another. Without the thought process that goes 
into the authorizing bills and the appropriations bills, we are on 
automatic pilot, we conjure up these supplementals, we cover them up 
with Christmas tree ornaments at the taxpayers' expense to get them 
through the process, and we completely blow the budget process even 
further wide open. If we want to continue to produce trillions and 
trillions of dollars in deficit spending, this is the right reform, Mr. 
Speaker, but if we want to exhibit and exert fiscal control, allow us 
to continue annually, one year at a time, to create a budget and to do 
it with the proper balance by using the authorizing committees to 
authorize the appropriations and the appropriations process to continue 
as it has the past several years in a proper way.
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Connecticut (Ms. DeLauro).
  Ms. DeLAURO. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Dreier amendment and I rise 
in opposition to the underlying bill and in support of responsible 
budgeting that meets America's priorities and reflects their values. I 
understand the concerns of this amendment's sponsors and I support 
their goals. Vigorous Congressional oversight is vital if we are to 
safeguard public funds and ensure that Federal agencies follow 
Congressional directives. But biennial budgeting will not improve 
oversight or guard against increased spending. In fact, it will have 
the opposite effect. Biennial budgeting will reduce the oversight that 
the Congress has over government spending.
  Agency heads, Cabinet secretaries, administrators, they all have to 
come to the Congress every year to justify their requests, to explain 
their actions, and to face tough questions. Why would Congress want to 
relinquish the power of the purse strings? With the biennial budgeting, 
these agencies have to only come every 2 years. We would have then less 
assurance that the agencies will spend money in the right way.
  I also challenge the principle in the underlying bill of sunsetting 
entitlement programs after 10 years. Does this include Social Security 
and Medicare? Why do we want to sunset Social Security and Medicare and 
deal with it every 10 years? Yesterday we had indication that there are 
those who would privatize the Social Security system. Is this another 
way in fact to threaten those bedrocks of our commitment generationally 
to seniors in this country? It makes no sense at all for us to be 
talking about sunsetting Social Security or Medicare or other 
entitlement programs every 10 years.

                              {time}  1530

  This is a blueprint for bad budgeting. It fails to meet the needs of 
Americans. Support responsible budgeting that is responsive to the 
needs of working families. I call on my colleagues to reject the 
underlying amendment and to reject the Dreier amendment.
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, last year a similar bill was introduced. The Committee 
on Appropriations asked that it be referred to the committee, and, 
after thorough consideration, we reported the bill with a negative 
recommendation.
  Some of the things that we were concerned about have now been taken 
out of this basic bill, which makes us a little more happy. However, 
there are amendments made in order that would restore some of those 
items that we really do not want to see in this bill. So we will deal 
with those as they come.
  I was going to use this chart later in the debate on the two year 
budget amendment, but I want to use it now since the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Obey) made such a compelling case as to how this bill 
would drag out the the budget process by involving the executive branch 
of government at this early stage.
  What I want all of our colleagues to know is if you look at this 
chart, every one of these months that are colored red are days that the 
Committee on Appropriations lost in dealing with its 13 appropriations 
bills. We lost all of that time, 6\1/2\ months, before we could even 
begin our work because we did not have a budget resolution. Until we 
have a budget resolution which allows us to make our 302(b) 
assignments, we cannot begin the actual markup of our legislation.
  Now, if you look at the green color, that is how many days have gone 
by since we got the 302(a) allocation. Since that time, the committee 
went to work very rapidly. We have already marked up six of our 13 
bills in subcommittee, and we have already marked up four of our major 
bills in committee. We already passed earlier today one of our primary 
bills, and we have others prepared to go to the floor. So we have done 
that much appropriations work in the couple of weeks that are colored 
green.
  If we extend the time it takes before we can actually begin our work 
for another 2, 3 or 4 weeks, we are not going to be able to get to the 
end of the fiscal year and have our work completed. We promised the 
leadership on both sides of the aisle that we would complete our work 
expeditiously, and we are well on target to do that. Any further delay 
in the budget process takes time away from the appropriations process, 
and, Mr. Chairman, time is not on our side, as you can see from this 
calendar.
  So rather than finding ways to extend the length of the budget 
process, we should be trying to find ways to reduce the time of the 
budget process, to give more time for the Committee on Appropriations 
to deal with the 13 appropriations bills in subcommittee, in full 
committee, on the House floor and in conference committee with the 
other body.
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, I often quote my friend Archie the cockroach, and 
Archie said once, ``Did you ever notice when a politician does get an 
idea, he gets it all wrong?'' I think that can be said of the remedy 
that is being proposed for the budget process problems.
  But Archie also said something else that I think is useful in this 
context. He said, ``Man always fails because he is not honest enough to 
succeed. There are not enough men continuously on the square with 
themselves and with other men. The system of government does not matter 
so much. The thing that matters so much is what men do with any kind of 
system they happen to have.''
  That would be my message with respect to the budget resolution. 
Whether we get our work done on time depends on how serious we are, it 
depends on how political both sides of the aisle are, and it depends on 
what determination we have to compromise.
  The problem with this proposition which is being set up today is that 
if a President does not want to compromise with the Congress on a 
budget, he can delay his approval of the initial budget resolution 
forever before he signs it. And then after he signs it, he can delay 
action on every appropriation bill again, and it strings you out 
forever. I would say to my conservative friends here, I do not think 
that is the result that you want, but that is the result you are going 
to get if this proposition passes.
  I would also say that every authorizing committee needs to understand 
that they will be out of business if this proposition passes, because 
Senate authorizing chairs who have not been able to have their way with 
House authorizers, when the budget resolution goes to the Senate they 
will say (because they operate in a body that has to run on unanimous 
consent so that any one Member can throw a monkey wrench into the 
gears) so every authorizing Chair will be able to say, ``Mr. Leader, if 
you don't put my authorizing bill in here, if you don't put my banking 
bill in, if you don't put my farm bill in, if you don't put my interior 
bill in, I `ain't' going to vote for your budget resolution.''
  That means that every House authorizing committee will be dealing 
with a Senate authorizing committee in a

[[Page H3102]]

 budget summit situation where they get buried in larger issues, and 
that is not the way this Congress is supposed to run.
  The reason this Congress survives as a vibrant institution is because 
of each of our individual expertise which we apply to the areas that we 
work with in our committees. I urge you not to destroy that by putting 
the President in the middle of it all.
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the 
distinguished gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Smith).
  Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding me time.
  Mr. Chairman, just following up a bit on what the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Obey) suggested, what is eventually going to make us 
successful in the way we budget, in the way we appropriate, in the way 
that we oversee administration, is the willingness of the Members of 
Congress, of the House and the Senate, to be more diligent, to have 
some guts, to have some intestinal fortitude, to make sure we are doing 
the right thing to best of our ability. Whether you have a 1-year 
budget or a 2-year budget, whether you have the President sign on to 
something early on or later on, if Congress wants to be, excuse the 
expression, lazy and shift more power to the administration, we are 
going to lose what made this republic great in the first place. Our 
forefathers, when they wrote this Constitution, gave us a powerful 
legislative branch and a less powerful executive branch. Biennial 
budgeting puts this at risk and may diminish us in terms of our 
effectiveness as a democracy and a republic.
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
  Mr. Chairman, I would just urge the Members to pay very close 
attention to the debate today. We are not talking about just a run-of-
the-mill piece of legislation. We are talking about a decision that 
this House would have to live with for a long, long time in policy and 
procedure on some of the most important things that we do.
  Mr. Chairman, of all the legislation we consider, the bills that 
really have to pass are appropriations bills. So let us be careful that 
we do not create some procedure or way to conduct a budget process, an 
appropriations process, that cannot work, that results in longer delays 
than under the current budget process.
  I just ask Members to be very careful in how they listen to the 
debate and how they choose to vote on some of the amendments and on the 
final package, whatever condition that final package is when we go to a 
final vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time allocated to the Committee on Appropriations 
having expired, it is now in order to conduct the debate on the time 
assigned to the Committee on Rules.
  The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Moakley) each will control 15 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to focus my time on a couple of the rules 
changes in H.R. 853 that are designed to increase accountability. We 
think that is a reform. Accountability in Federal spending we think is 
something that most taxpayers feel we can do better about.
  Not surprisingly, some the reforms have been demagogued by opponents 
of accountability, in my view fostering unwarranted anxiety among some 
of our Nation's students, perhaps, and some of our veterans and some of 
our senior citizens, if they have not gotten the full understanding of 
what is actually in front of us. There is no need to worry. We are 
advocating good oversight and advocating more accountability, and I 
think all of those groups, in fact, all Americans, favor those types of 
accomplishments here.
  Currently our rules state you cannot appropriate money unless a 
program has been authorized first. That is the normal order. Despite 
this rule, however, in FY 2000 we appropriated $120 billion in taxpayer 
money to 137 programs that lack authorization. Now, that is just by our 
count. Probably somebody else could find more unauthorized programs, 
unauthorized programs that were funded in the appropriations process.
  To encourage committees to do a better job, we think that H.R. 853 
adds a requirement that they provide specific timetables for 
authorization of those programs under their jurisdiction, and we have 
picked a 10-year time period, thinking that is a very fair chunk of 
time. While we still will be able to waive the rule and no program will 
be punished, as is the situation now, we think that providing some 
added sunshine in a 10-year period with oversight is going to give us 
greater accountability, and it certainly is going to create an 
incentive for more accountability and for the authorizers to do their 
jobs.
  Another rule changed would simply require that any new programs have 
a fixed year authorization. In our view, it makes sense that Congress 
should take a look at new programs it creates. We do not get it right 
every time the first time it turns out, and so maybe making a 
requirement that if we have a new program every 10 years or so, we 
ought to take a look at it and see if it is working and doing what we 
actually thought it was supposed to do.
  But, be clear, no matter what, the school lunches are still going to 
be served; we are still going to have senior prescriptions; we are 
still going to have our veterans services, and everybody getting their 
benefits. It is all going to happen. This process is not going to 
change that. There may be votes about policy change or appropriations 
amounts, but the process is not going to take away anything from 
anybody, and, hopefully, will give benefits to people that they lack 
now in terms of greater accountability and oversight.
  I think to argue otherwise indicates either a lack of understanding 
about how things really work here, or, worse, a desire perhaps to 
exploit anxieties for partisan reasons to some of our most vulnerable 
Americans. In either way, that is wrong, not acceptable, and not part 
of the spirit of the good substance we are trying to accomplish in this 
legislation.
  I encourage all Members to read the details of H.R. 835 before voting 
later this evening. It is a good bipartisan bill that promises nothing 
more than a better framework within to make our budgetary decisions. We 
have the joint budget resolution, we have the emergency rainy day fund, 
baseline budgeting reform, budgeting for unfunded liabilities, the Byrd 
rule reform, increased authorization oversight requirements, a lot of 
things we talk a lot about here. Well, we have brought them to the 
floor for debate, we are going to debate them under the rule and have a 
chance to vote them up or down.
  On top of that, there are several other issues that we did not 
include in the bill because we knew they were controversial, but we 
know that they will be debated in the amendment process, or we assume 
they will. I think of the lockbox, the continuing resolution and those 
types of things, we will be able to debate those too. So we will have 
some accountability on where we really stand when we talk about reform 
of our process here. I think that is a good outcome, and I think 
certainly worth our time.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, this bill really hides an inability to govern behind 
procedural changes, and I urge my colleagues to oppose it. This bill 
changes our current budget resolution from a concurrent resolution to a 
joint resolution. The difference between the two is a concurrent 
resolution is created by Congress to guide the way through a budget 
process, whereas a joint resolution, on the other hand, is signed by 
the President and becomes law.

                              {time}  1545

  Because it must be agreed upon by both the Congress and the 
President, a joint resolution necessarily takes much longer than a 
concurrent resolution.
  Mr. Chairman, our budget process is already slow enough. Under this 
bill's proposed joint resolution, the Committee on Appropriations 
cannot begin their work until a budget resolution is worked out and 
that, Mr. Chairman, as pointed out by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Young), could take an awful long time.

[[Page H3103]]

  If my Republican colleagues had a history of finishing the 
appropriation bills well before October 1, this proposal would not seem 
quite as ridiculous, but as it stands now the history leaves a bit to 
be desired.
  In the 104th Congress, my Republican colleagues, led by Speaker 
Gingrich, refused to compromise and failed to enact the 13 
appropriation bills on time, and as a result they shut down the Federal 
Government for a period of 28 days.
  In the 105th Congress, my Republican colleagues compromised on 
everything and passed a bloated omnibus bill that still has people 
shaking their heads.
  Last year, my Republican colleagues could not reach agreement amongst 
themselves and as a result they failed to pass a budget resolution for 
the first time since the Budget Act was enacted back in 1974.
  This year, my Republican colleagues have already given up on keeping 
spending below their caps and at some point, Mr. Chairman, Congress 
must summons the will to make the budget process work. It is not the 
fault of the Budget Act that we cannot fund everything we would like to 
fund and still reduce the deficit. Congress must make that tough 
decision, and there is just no way around it.
  Another way my colleagues are hoping to avoid budget decisions is by 
making them far in advance. My good friend, my chairman, will offer an 
amendment to change our system to a biennial system. The biennial 
system will cover a much longer period of time and therefore will need 
to be debated for even a longer period of time.
  It eliminates one year of Committee on Appropriations review. It 
tightens the reins on executive branch officials. Furthermore, Mr. 
Chairman, budget predictions are notoriously inaccurate. If we limit 
ourselves to making budget decisions every other year, our projections 
will be even further off the mark.
  It is a radical change from our current system and if my colleagues 
are determined to make these changes, I would urge them to proceed 
slowly.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to oppose this bill.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Linder), the distinguished chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Rules and Organization of the House of the Committee on 
Rules.
  Mr. LINDER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the 
Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act and I want to congratulate my 
colleagues on the Committee on Rules, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Goss) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier) for their 
commitment to these reforms and specifically their efforts to craft the 
amendment to establish a 2-year budgeting timetable.
  The Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act is an important 
institutional reform that will strengthen the enforcement of budgetary 
controls, enhance accountability for Federal spending, set aside funds 
in the budget for emergencies and alleviate the tendency toward higher 
spending.
  Specifically, I want to comment on the biennial budgeting amendment 
that will create a 2-year budget cycle. Before acting on these historic 
budget reforms, the Committee on Rules held two days of hearings on 
budget process reform and an additional 3 days of comprehensive 
hearings focused solely on biennial budgeting. Over and over again, we 
heard testimony that not only would biennial budgeting not diminish the 
role of Congress in the budget process, but that it would actually 
improve legislative branch management of Federal spending.
  For example, Dan Crippen, Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office, stated that ``It seems unlikely that agencies would be less 
responsive to the Congress simply because they would be requesting 
regular appropriations every other year. Also, a biennial budget cycle 
by setting aside time for Congressional action on oversight and 
authorizing legislation might relieve the appropriations process of 
time consuming debates on substantive policy issues which can actually 
improve Congressional control of spending.''
  Congress will continue to decide, down to the account level, the 
exact amount of spending in every appropriation bill just as is done 
under current law. In fact, biennial budgeting may enhance Congress' 
control over the budget since the process gives legislators an 
increased opportunity to review existing policies and expenditures.
  On the topic of increased opportunities to review programs, we have 
taken testimony in the Committee on Rules and in my subcommittee on the 
need to dramatically increase what is clearly a priority responsibility 
of ours: The issue of programmatic oversight. In addition to saving 
time and resources, I strongly believe that this bipartisan, biennial 
reform proposal will improve oversight and management of Federal 
spending.
  Specifically, the Dreier-Luther-Regula-Hall amendment will permit 
committees to concentrate on budget and appropriations in the first 
session, and authorization and oversight in the second session. The 
1993 Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, led by our former 
colleague Lee Hamilton and the gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier), 
chairman of the Committee on Rules, recognize that the current budget 
system is not working effectively and recommended biennial budgeting as 
a key reform.
  In hearings of the Committee on Rules in March, OMB Director Jack Lew 
stated that ``The primary potential benefit from biennial budgeting is 
that by concentrating budget decisions in the first year of each 2-year 
period, time would be freed up in the second year that could be 
redirected to management, long-range planning and oversight.''
  The bipartisan biennial budget amendment will also put the 
requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act on a logical 
timetable in conjunction with the development of budgets every 2 years.
  Under the new timetable, the GPRA reporting requirements would come 
at the most optimal time of the budget process to provide committees 
with the opportunity to utilize the performance information. As a 
result, we will deliver more efficient services to the American people 
in the most effective way.
  Under the biennial timetable, the President's budget will be 
submitted to Congress with biennial governmentwide performance plans 
and reports and agencies will submit separate biennial performance 
plans. The process will effectively give authorizing committees the 
opportunity to include their views of the GPRA plans and reports as 
parts of the views they submit to the Committee on the Budget.
  Utilizing GPRA in this manner will improve performance by letting us 
examine the program structures that Congress has put into place to 
achieve better results for the American people.
  It appears clear that the Federal Government is too often preoccupied 
with budget matters and has limited time to manage and oversee Federal 
programs or concentrate on long-term planning. In an effort to 
streamline the budget process and enhance Congressional oversight of 
Federal programs, I urge strong support for the biennial budgeting 
amendment and final passage of this historic institutional reform.
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Minnesota (Mr. Minge).
  Mr. MINGE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts 
(Mr. Moakley) for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, this afternoon we are debating budget reform 
legislation. I do not think there is a Member of this Chamber that has 
not been embarrassed by the performance of the House of Representatives 
and the Senate in the last 5 years in the handling of the budget. We 
have had massive agreements with the White House, late in the night, 
late in the session, thousands of pages. We are being asked to vote on 
things that we have not had an opportunity to analyze. It is an 
embarrassment to the institution.
  We recognize that we must reform the way we do business, and, yes, it 
could be that if we acted in a much more expeditious fashion earlier 
under the current budget framework we would not have these problems, 
but unfortunately it does not seem to be within our power to do that.
  I also know that it is tempting to blame the other side of the aisle, 
to say that therein lies the problem, and assume that on our side of 
the aisle it

[[Page H3104]]

would not be a difficulty if we were only in the majority.
  Well, I think that we are deluding ourselves. Certainly part of the 
problem that we face in enacting budgets on a timely basis, in handling 
the appropriations bills on a timely basis, is attributable to human 
nature and the difficulty of making decisions and the need to bring 
things to closure in the heat of the final moments of a session, but 
this piece of legislation that we are considering today is an effort to 
move us towards an improved process. It is an experiment admittedly, 
and like all other experiments there are risks in trying it, but I 
think that when we recognize the enormity of the problems that we have 
had and the potential for improvement, it is worth taking that risk.
  We talk about the powers of Congress. Now we are comprising the 
powers of Congress, the prerogatives of Congress, giving more power to 
the White House, the executive branch. I submit there is nothing that 
compromises Congress' power in the long-term than the embarrassment of 
not timely dispatching our affairs.
  We need to make progress, and whether or not this would be progress 
would remain to be seen, but I submit it is worth taking the chance, 
and therein lies the debate over whether it should be a joint 
resolution or whether we should continue with the concurrent resolution 
such as we have had.
  There are many other things in this legislation that go beyond the 
joint resolution issue and the role of the President earlier in the 
process. I urge my colleagues to recognize that the way that this 
legislation deals with emergency spending, the way it deals with 
emergency spending, the way that it deals with accrual accounting, the 
way that it deals with the baseline and the so-called Byrd rule and 
other issues, represents a very dramatic and significant improvement 
over the current budget process.
  This bill has been a bipartisan bill in that it was developed by a 
bipartisan subcommittee of the Committee on the Budget and this ought 
to have bipartisan support this evening. It ought to be approved.
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Alabama (Mr. Callahan), the chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs.
  Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts 
(Mr. Moakley) for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, let me just say that maybe we ought to all take a good 
close look at our Constitution and the makeup of the United States 
House of Representatives. We are each elected every 2 years for one 
session of the Congress. The people who wrote the Constitution and 
drafted this government that we have, which admittedly is the best 
government mankind has ever known, said that we would be elected for 
one session of the Congress. It also says we will have an 
organizational session and we will elect our leadership and that we 
will establish our rules.
  Each session of the Congress gives the Members of that Congress the 
authority to set their own rules. If they want biennial budgeting, 
there is nothing from prohibiting them from establishing a rule in the 
next session of the Congress, including those Members of the next 
session of the Congress, to have biennial budgeting for that one 
session of the Congress. They establish their own rules at each session 
of the Congress, and what we do here today with this underlying bill is 
to say that we are going to hamstring future sessions of the Congress. 
We are going to tell the Members of the next session of Congress, which 
will convene in January, that they do not have a sufficient intellect 
level to establish their own rules.
  Instead, we are going to say that this session of the Congress is the 
more brilliant than any succeeding session and, therefore, they must 
obey the rules that we think are best for them.
  This is a wrong Constitutional area that we are debating, and we 
should vote this issue down unanimously.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
distinguished gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Regula), the chairman of the 
Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee of the Interior.
  (Mr. REGULA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. REGULA. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Goss) for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, I have been a long-time advocate of 2-year budgeting as 
a management tool. We are the directors of the largest corporation in 
the world today. We collect taxes and we deliver services.

                              {time}  1600

  The challenge to all of us is to deliver these services in the most 
efficient way, because the more efficient we can be in our distribution 
of services, the less we have to collect in taxes.
  I think we need to think about how we can manage these resources in 
the most effective way. Two-year budgeting provides that kind of 
opportunity. Through the first year, we would establish the 
appropriation for a 2-year budget cycle. I might say, I served in the 
Ohio State legislature. We did it that way in Ohio and it worked very 
effectively, and many other States operate on a 2-year budget.
  The second year would be devoted to oversight. In our subcommittee, 
we have had over 25 oversight sessions over the last several years. We 
have discovered that in so doing, we have found ways in which we can 
more efficiently write our bills to ensure that the money is used 
wisely and produces the greatest benefit to the people of this Nation.
  I think also another advantage of 2-year budgeting is that we have 
time to do planning. Too often I find that we are so consumed, we no 
sooner finish one budget than we start on another one. We do not have 
time to think about how we can plan effectively.
  Just using the Subcommittee on the Interior, for example, I think we 
need to think about how we can manage the resources that will leave a 
legacy that will be valuable to the people of this Nation 50 or 100 
years from now, because what kind of a legacy they will inherit, what 
kind of parks and forests and fish and wildlife, and the Bureau of Land 
Management, the Smithsonian, the Kennedy Center, the National Gallery, 
what they will be like 50 years from now is being decided today.
  Therefore, we need time to do oversight, we need time to do planning, 
to ensure that we get the best possible management of the resources 
that come our way as a subcommittee.
  Secondly, I think so much time is devoted to establishing budgets 
that we do not get the time we need to think about the ways in which we 
can be more effective.
  The other advantage I see is that the people that manage these 
enterprises, the superintendents of parks, the directors of the various 
agencies, could plan more efficiently in the purchase of products, 
simple things like gasoline and food and so on, if they could contract 
on a 2-year basis, if they could manage the resources that they are 
provided under our appropriations process in a way that would be most 
efficient in the use of these materials. A 2-year budget would give 
managers an opportunity to use their time, their resources in a more 
effective way.
  I suspect that most industries have longer than a 2-year budget cycle 
in terms of managing the resources that they have to produce products 
for the marketplace. I think the previous speaker, the gentleman from 
Alabama (Mr. Callahan) has a point. Perhaps we ought to try it. But I 
believe, based on the experience that our States have had with 2-year 
budgeting, that it is an effective tool in terms of management of the 
resources available.
  I believe we should certainly try this, because as government and 
life gets more complicated, it becomes more important than ever that we 
have time for oversight, that we have time to visit facilities. We have 
found in our subcommittee if we can get out and look at some of our 
facilities, if we have time to do that, that it helps us a great deal 
in making the decisions that will provide a legacy for future 
generations that we can all take pride in.
  Certainly, we are elected by the people, as the previous speaker 
said, to make policy decisions. That is the role of the Members of this 
body. That is the separation of powers.

[[Page H3105]]

  We constitutionally have a responsibility for policy, and the 
executive branch has the responsibility for executing that policy. To 
do it well, I believe a 2-year budget cycle would be very constructive.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the two-year budget amendment that 
we will consider later today. I consider two-year budgeting as a 
management tool.
  As Members of Congress, we are the directors of the largest U.S. 
enterprise--namely the U.S. Government. We can no longer view the 
federal government as just a provider of services. In today's world--
with increasing populations and increasing needs--we need to approach 
the federal budget in a more businesslike manner. We need to determine 
how we can manage resources and provide services to the American public 
in the most efficient way within our budget constraints.
  I believe that two-year budgets would provide us with a mechanism to 
budget more efficiently and to provide more oversight over federal 
spending. In the first year we would appropriate funds. The second year 
would be devoted to oversight and planning for the next budget cycle.
  A two-year cycle would reduce significantly the number of repetitive 
votes that Congress takes on budget issues every year. It would allow 
more time for oversight hearings.
  Since becoming Chairman of the Interior Subcommittee, I have chaired 
more than 25 oversight hearings to closely examine the more than 30 
agencies funded in the bill.
  These hearings have allowed Members of the Subcommittee to explore 
management reforms within these agencies that encourage the agencies 
and programs to be run more efficiently. A two-year budget would allow 
for more oversight and follow-up to ensure that reforms are fully 
implemented.
  Furthermore, I believe a two-year budget process would allow agencies 
to be more effective. It would allow program managers and agency heads 
to do their planning on a two-year cycle.
  As a practical matter, they could contract for supplies for a two-
year period instead of just one. They wouldn't spend as much time 
putting together a budget every year and preparing the huge budget 
justifications that are sent to Congress every year.
  A two-year cycle would give agency managers more time to engage in 
long-term planning and in implementing management reforms.
  Historically, we have not viewed the federal government as a 
management challenge. I believe that it is time to do so. A two-year 
cycle would allow the time necessary to explore and implement positive 
management policies for the federal government. I urge you to support 
the two-year budget amendment.
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Florida (Mrs. Meek).
  Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I stand to address the Congress and ask them to vote no 
on H.R. 853 because, number one, it weakens the power of the 
authorizing committees. It weakens the power and the utilization of the 
Committee on Appropriations. It weakens the power of each Member of 
Congress.
  With that diminution, I ask each Member to think about why should we 
change this process. There is absolutely nothing wrong with the process 
that we use in budgeting now. It is not the process, it is those of us 
who administer this process, where we put in many times a lot of 
partisan wrangling and we put in a lot of intramural arguments. 
Whatever we put into it to make the process lasts too long. That is 
what is wrong.
  If we were to take this process seriously and use it for the time 
appointed, then we would notice that the budgeting process would end up 
as we wanted it to.
  I want to remind this Congress, I stood on the floor of Congress and 
spoke against it the last time we gave power to the President in 
determining line item vetos. I was not shouted down, but I was voted 
down.
  Here we go again, now, giving power to the President for something 
each of us was elected to do. That was to make solid decisions in a 
time certain for the budgetary process.
  I have lived through this biennial budgeting situation in the State 
of Florida. It did not work there and it will not work here. Sooner or 
later, we would just become a Congress of supplemental kinds of bills 
that would come up when there is something that we need to do something 
quickly on that we had not thought about.
  I want to tell the Members that there will be things that come up 
because of the economic conditions and other conditions that happen in 
this great country of ours.
  Mr. Chairman, many of the things we have heard about the biennial 
budget will not happen if we properly do our jobs and think timely and 
decisively in expediting it.
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Obey), the ranking member of the Committee on 
Appropriations.
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Alabama made a point which 
I think bears repeating. Every day we recognize the fact that Congress 
cannot bind future Congresses in terms of the action that they will 
take. But if we pass this legislation today, we are enabling future 
presidents to bind future Congresses, because if we pass this proposal 
and discover, as we most assuredly will, that it does not work the way 
we intended, we will not be able to change it without the permission of 
the President of the United States. That is not a position which any 
independent legislative body should be in.
  Secondly, on 2-year budgets, there is a vast difference between 
multiyear planning and multiyear budgeting. I favor long-term planning. 
I favor 5- and 10-year planning. But when we go to a 2-year budget, we 
put the House at a huge disadvantage vis-a-vis the Senate.
  In the House, we have germaneness rules, so if we pass an Interior 
supplemental through the place, no one can attach an education item or 
an agricultural item to it. We stick to the subject. But in a world of 
2-year budgeting, we will have constant supplementals. When 
supplementals move through this body and move to the Senate, we will 
have individual Senators free to add any item they want to any 
supplemental that moves through there. That means a giant loss of 
control of spending and it means a giant transfer of powers and 
prerogatives to the Senate.
  Most perniciously, I believe it ruins our ability to keep agencies on 
a short leash. The healthiest thing that occurs in this town is in the 
annual appropriation process, when senior program managers discover 
that they are not ordained by God to follow policies of their own 
making. They have to answer to the Congress. The problem is that if we 
put them on a 2-year leash rather than a 1-year leash, it will be very 
difficult to get them to follow congressional intent in legislation 
that we pass.
  People will say, ``oh, well, don't worry about it; as long as they 
need supplementals, they will need the support of the Congress''. But 
supplementals are different than regular appropriation bills. 
Supplementals add money only to programs. They do not deal with 
personnel levels, they do not deal with agency size. That is where we 
really have control over agencies, and we should not give that control 
up.
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Chairman, it is really difficult to believe the majority is 
serious about reaching agreement on the budget early with a Democratic 
president. Given the history and the failure to even seek consensus 
with the Democratic colleagues in the House on a budget resolution, it 
is very hard to believe, why would they give up the opportunity to 
clarify their differences with us? Given their history, my guess is 
that the majority would rather send the President a resolution he has 
to veto. That slows up the process. It does not help.
  Mr. Chairman, we agree the process has not run well lately, but what 
makes them propose what they propose does not help. I think it will 
make things worse. I now urge a no vote on the bill.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I recall very well Members feeling some frustration, to 
say the least, at the end of the budget cycle for the past few years, 
thinking, gosh, we need to do better on this. Why does not the 
Committee on Rules and the Committee on the Budget and the people 
responsible get together and give us some choices?
  We filed a bill at the end of the last session just because we 
listened. We

[[Page H3106]]

went through a couple of years of hard work, a lot of effort, to focus 
on issues that Members wanted to debate. We filed that bill. This year 
we have worked from that bill, taken the controversial issues out, 
brought them forward, and left the controversial issues available for 
amendment, and in addition, brought forward some other amendments that 
we know will have a lot of Member appeal, such as the biennial budget 
process that my good friend, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier) 
of the Committee on Rules has championed so long and ardently.
  We think we have provided some good choices out here for debate. I 
think that any effort to get away from the chaos at the end of the 
budget year is right.
  Our good friend, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Obey) has gotten 
up and said that bad things can happen. Yes, bad things can happen any 
time. I think the idea of getting together early with the President at 
the beginning of the session and working out an arrangement is a very 
good idea, but if it does not work, we have a fallback. The fallback is 
where we are now, so nobody loses power. We do not have these dire 
consequences that I keep hearing about.
  I think it is also true that if the other body decides that they wish 
to get off the subject of the budget matter, that there are provisions 
in this for a self-destruct mechanism, so that the dangers are not as 
great as they have been outlined.
  I think these are worthwhile changes. They deserve our careful 
attention during the debate, and I hope we will see strong support for 
good process reform.
  Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 853, 
the Comprehensive Budget Reform Act.


                            Joint Resolution

  H.R. 853 changes the current non-binding concurrent resolution to a 
joint budget resolution that would be signed by the President and have 
the force of law. Such a process would weaken the role of Congress 
(particularly the House of Representatives), authorizing committees, 
and rank-and-file Members.
  We know this from history--think back to the major budget agreements 
of the past decade, beginning with the 1990 Andrews Air Force Base 
budget summit during the Bush Administration. These agreements were 
negotiated by the House and Senate Leaderships and the President, 
without the participation of authorizing committees or rank-and-file 
Members. In practice, creating a budget resolution with the force of 
law means we will have these budget summits each and every year. Budget 
targets and committee allocations would be negotiated by the Budget 
Committees, the House and Senate Leaderships, and the President, 
without the participation of authorizing committees or rank-and-file 
Members. Most Members would be shut out of the process.
  In addition to the budget being negotiated by the House and Senate 
Leaderships and the President, the bill eliminates Members' ability to 
alter this Leadership-negotiated package. Members would no longer have 
the ability to offer amendments to either the reconciliation 
instructions or the functional allocations assumed by the joint budget 
resolution because these times would now only be included in the report 
accompanying the law.
  Finally, I am extremely concerned that once we head down the road of 
a statute implementing budget policy, the Budget Committees, the House 
and Senate Leaderships, and the President will use this must-pass 
legislative vehicle to legislate their agendas. Look at the tens and 
sometimes hundreds of legislative riders included in the Omnibus 
Appropriations Acts of the last several years--the last thing this Body 
needs is more Leadership-driven, must-lass legislation.
  Given the experiences of past budget summits, it is unlikely that 
this process will include authorizing committees, including those 
Members with the most specific issue expertise, or rank-and-file 
Members. We will simply be urged: ``Don't break the deal''--a deal in 
which almost all of us will have had no input. I recall that three 
years ago this week, the House considered the 1997 Balanced Budget 
Agreement negotiated by the House and Senate Leadership and the 
President. The Gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Shuster, and I offered 
an amendment to increase highway and transit infrastructure investment, 
adjusting the deal by one-third of one perecent--one-third of one 
percent. ``A deal is a deal,'' intoned our colleagues. ``Do not break 
the deal,'' said a panicked White House. ``Stick to the deal,'' said 
the Budget Committee. As I said then, ``Who are a part of this deal? 
Not me, and not many in this Chamber. We did not have much to say about 
the deal, so why are we being asked to stick with it?'' We lost that 
vote by two votes and it made TEA 21 impossible in 1997. Now, the 
proponents of this bill want us to have that debate each year. 
Moreover, by eliminating the functional categories from the budget 
resolution, they want to even take away our ability to offer amendments 
to alter their Leadership-negotiated package.


              Effect on Transportation Committee Programs

  I also rise in opposition to H.R. 853 because I am concerned about 
the impact of this bill on transportation trust funds. I believe that 
this bill will undermine the enormous progress we have made in 
infrastructure investment with the Transportation Equity Act for the 
21st Century (TEA 21) and the Aviation Investment and Reform Act for 
the 21st Century (AIR 21), and will make it more difficult to 
reauthorize these programs in the future.
  H.R. 853 does not acknowledge the important budget reforms contained 
in TEA 21 and AIR 21--including the reform that transportation revenues 
must be used for transportation purposes. Rather than updating the 
budget process to reflect a link between transportation trust fund 
spending and transportation trust fund receipts--a budget process 
change that was mandated by the overwhelming majority of the House in 
TEA 21 and AIR 21--H.R. 853 merely strengthens the old budget process, 
which assumes that transportation trust fund revenues are no different 
from general revenues.
  H.R. 853 would also shift power to entities that are institutionally 
opposed to the trust fund reforms that our Committee achieved in TEA 21 
and AIR 21, and would effectively shut most Members and committees out 
of the budget process. As a former Member of the Budget Committee 
(1987-1993) and a Member of this Body and the Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee for 25 years, I know that the Budget Committee 
and the Office of Management and Budget have always opposed the trust 
fund reforms that the Transportation Committee has advocated and an 
overwhelming majority of this House have supported.
  Not only does H.R. 853 fail to institutionalize the trust fund 
reforms enacted in TEA 21 and AIR 21, it assumes flat spending from 
transportation trust funds for purposes of calculating the budget 
surplus after TEA 21 and AIR 21 expire. This assumption is made despite 
the fact that transportation trust fund revenues will continue to 
increase each year as our economy and highway and air travel continue 
to grow. A flat-spending assumption would result in a return to the old 
days of trust fund surpluses being used for non-transportation 
purposes. If the link between trust fund revenues and trust fund 
spending is to be maintained, budget procedures and the assumptions for 
transportation spending must reflect the annual growth in trust fund 
revenues.


                               Conclusion

  Do not be lulled into thinking that this bill simply changes a 
technical House procedure. This bill significantly alters the 
congressional budget process. The budget process is where we decide 
priorities for America's future. It is the process where, to a large 
degree, we decide what our values are, and put a price tag on them. It 
is a process in which all Members and all committees should play a role 
H.R. 853 will shut Members out of that process.
  I urge all Members to vote ``no'' on H.R. 853.
  Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in reluctant opposition to H.R. 
853, the Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act of 1999. I commend the 
gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Nussle and the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. 
Cardin for their hard work, but in the end this bill is not yet ready 
for adoption.
  My colleagues argue that this bill will fix the ``broken'' budget 
process. While this bill may correct some deficiencies in the current 
law, no bill is going to fix what is the real problem--the behavior of 
the members of this body and the Senate. For years following inclusion 
of pay-as-you-go rules and discretionary spending caps amendments to 
the Budget Act in 1990, the Budget Act had an effect on law rather than 
serving as a mere target. It was not until 1998 that the process fell 
apart when members on both sides of the aisle felt compelled to violate 
the caps by abusing the Emergency spending designation. In 1999, 
Congress did the same thing. The primary problem with the budget 
process lies not with the system or the end game, but rather Congress 
and the Administration. There were legitimate concerns, greater 
defense, education and agriculture spending demands weighed against 
other domestic priorities, but rather than honestly argue the needs to 
the American people and raise the caps, we chose to engage in budget 
subterfuge. That is not a flaw in the process so much as human nature.
  While this bill includes some good reforms such as a tighter 
designation for emergency spending to stem abuse and bringing the use 
of accrual accounting to the federal budget process, it is flawed in 
converting the concurrent budget resolution to a joint resolution

[[Page H3107]]

signed into law by the President. This is intended to move the end game 
to the front of budget cycle but it is a little like moving the goal 
posts from the end of the field to the middle. The practical effect is 
to shift more power to the Executive branch at the expense of the 
Congress. As a result, the appropriations process will be delayed and 
the end game will be extended throughout most the year. Unintended by 
its proponents, this could result in greater, not less, politicization 
of the budget process.
  Moreover, as a joint resolution, the budget resolution would be 
vulnerable to having certain other pieces of legislation the 
Congressional leadership favored attached. The drafters of H.R. 853 
have inserted a weak provision aimed at preventing the budget 
resolution from becoming a major legislative vehicle but it cannot 
assure this body the budget resolution will be free from being taken 
hostage by an abortion amendment or, more likely, an amendment to raise 
discretionary spending caps or alter the pay-as-you-go rules to let 
projected budget surpluses be used to ``pay for'' large tax cuts.
  With regard to the biennial budgeting amendment which Representative 
Dreier plans to offer, I believe it is unrealistic and unworkable. The 
GAO has cautioned against biennial budgeting and cites ``difficulty in 
forecasting'' as the major force behind an increasing number of states 
abandoning biennial budgeting, in favor of annual cycles. Under H.R. 
853, agencies would have to begin to put together budgets for the 
second year of a two-year cycle at least 28 months before the year 
would start. Such long lead times will certainly result in decisions 
that become outdated. During the intervening period, there would 
inevitably be findings concerning the effectiveness of various programs 
and changes needed in those programs from GAO reports, Inspector 
Generals' reports, and research studies. Proponents of biennial 
budgeting assert that it will free up time for more oversight. They 
overlook the fact that a significant amount of oversight is conducted 
by the appropriations committees in the course of reviewing agency 
budget requests annually. But, I believe that if we adopt biennial 
budgeting, we will be creating new problems. We will be constructing a 
system that lacks flexibility to address GAO findings or developments 
in a program or substantial changes in our nation's economic 
conditions.
  Mr. Chairman, while I oppose H.R. 853, I support its commitment to 
limit use of emergency spending outside the spending caps only for true 
emergencies. There can be little question that in recent years, the 
emergency supplemental appropriations process has been abused and 
loaded with billions of dollars of spending which do not meet the true 
test of an ``emergency.'' We must, as a body, reign in emergency 
spending. H.R. 853 would create a reserve fund for emergencies and 
specifically defines ``emergency'' as ``loss of life or property, or a 
threat to national security'' and an ``unanticipated'' situation that 
is sudden, urgent, unforeseen and temporary.
  Mr. Chairman, I will also oppose the Gekas Automatic Continuing 
Resolution Amendment to avoid a government shutdown. We debated this in 
the House Budget Committee last year. I opposed a ``freeze'' of 
appropriations in event of a budgetary stalemate because I believed it 
would give Congress and the Administration an out, as opposed to 
compelling that the hard work of passing the budget and appropriations 
bills is done. Rather, I suggested that any automatic continuing 
resolution not be a disincentive to compromise. My amendment would have 
set the automatic continuing resolution at 75% of the previous year's 
appropriated level in order to fund essential functions, but low enough 
to spur the Congress and Administration into action.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, I will oppose the Ryan amendment to eliminate 
the on-budget surplus from the pay-as-you-go rules. While the intent of 
this amendment is to free up on-budget surpluses for tax cuts or new 
mandatory spending instead of being used for debt relief, its real 
impact would be to allow Congress to leverage tax cuts or new spending 
on the basis of long-term budget projections. And, if the projections 
are wrong, such tax cuts or spending would be ultimately backed by 
sequestration against Medicare, Medicaid or tax increases if the 
projections are wrong. This amendment is a redo of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings, allowing Congress to make long-term spending and tax 
commitments with uncertain offsets.
  Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 853. Rather 
than insure an expedited budget process, H.R. 853 will create new 
barriers to formulating a federal budget and interfere with effective 
oversight.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 
853, the Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act. We may all agree that 
the current budget process does not run as smoothly as we may like; 
however, this bill does not adequately address the inefficiencies in 
the budget process. The problem with the budget process is that for the 
last three years, the Leadership has engaged in conduct that has 
hindered this process.
  In 1998, we failed to adopt a budget resolution and for the last two 
years Congress approved budget resolutions that were difficult to 
implement. To work through these problems the Congress had to waive 
rules to circumvent the budget resolutions. This bill does nothing to 
address this issue.
  H.R. 853 will significantly hamper our ability to agree on a budget 
by requiring a joint budget resolution. Requiring the President to 
enter the process early in the year by transforming the joint budget 
resolution into an omnibus budget law, while simultaneously curtailing 
the ability of the appropriations committees to press forward if a 
budget has not been agreed to by May 15, will delay rather than speed 
up our budget process.
  Contemplate how much deliberation occurs between the House and the 
Senate on the budget resolution, just imagine how delayed this process 
will be with the interjection of the President. In the years where the 
President and Congress are in serious disagreement as to budget 
priorities, disagreements are likely to linger into the waning days of 
future legislative sessions.
  The budget resolution would be transformed into ``must pass'' 
legislation that may likely entice the Leadership to attach bills they 
favor. This is true of provisions in this bill to change Congressional 
budget procedures that include measures to impose discretionary caps or 
actual appropriations, as well as provisions to impose caps on 
entitlement programs from responding to changes in unemployment, 
poverty, the health status of our nation, and other such programs.
  The removal of functional levels and reconciliation instructions from 
the budget resolution to a budget committee report is unwise. Relying 
on an aggregate budget amount without debating the details of specific 
functions may result in significant budget cuts in discretionary 
spending without the opportunity for vigorous debate on the virtues of 
each budget request.
  Some may argue that debating budget functions obscure the ability to 
debate a set aggregate amount. On the other hand, we need to analyze 
budget functions to make the aggregate number more meaningful in 
addressing the needs of the nation. My amendment sought to reinstate a 
process that ensures that the American people's needs are sufficiently 
addressed by the Congress during the budget process.
  Finally, I do not support the Drier Biennial Budgeting Amendment 
because biennial budgeting and appropriating will not ease Congress's 
ability to meet deadlines, enact authorization provisions or engage in 
more meaningful oversight. Biennial budgeting will further complicate 
an already complicated process.
  Biennial budgeting will not assist Congress pass budget or 
appropriations bills on time. No matter whether the fiscal year begin 
on July 1 or October 1, Congress often finishes its appropriations work 
approximately one month after an imposed deadline. The real concern 
with biennial budgeting is that appropriations' debates will fall into 
the second year, as Members become less willing to compromise.
  In addition, budget projections change too quickly for biennial 
budgeting. The events of the nation and world change from year-to-year. 
It would be increasingly difficult for the Congressional Budget Office 
to project budgets for two years. The difficulty in forecasting for 
biennial budgets will likely create a need for supplemental 
appropriations. Thus, the impetus for biennial budgeting would 
diminish.
  As Martin Luther King, Jr. once said, ``Our nettlesome task is to 
discover how to organize our strength into compelling power.'' The 
Congress's task is to organize our best ideas on meaningful budget 
reform and not measures which will exacerbate the complexity of our 
nation's budget process. We can do better and we must do better.
  Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I strongly support H.R. 853, the 
Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act. This bill represents the most 
fundamental revision of the Congressional budget process since 1974.
  H.R. 853 contains a variety of critical reforms, including changing 
the Budget Resolution from a concurrent resolution to a joint 
resolution that would have to be presented to the president and 
therefore would have the force of law.
  This would improve the budget process in two ways. First, it would 
force the president to play a formal role in the budget process, rather 
than only engaging in the final stages of the appropriations process.
  Providing for formal executive participation through a joint 
resolution would avoid year-end scrambling to finance government 
programs. It would also encourage the president to submit a realistic 
budget because he will be compelled to defend it.
  Second, a joint resolution would force inter-branch agreement on 
aggregate spending levels prior to agreement on details. Currently,

[[Page H3108]]

since the president does not have to approve the Budget Resolution, 
gaining approval on the final spending measures presents a greater 
challenge.
  Forcing an early agreement on the principles in the Resolution will 
make coming together on the details of budget bills much easier in the 
fall. Moreover, this bill is still sensitive to the likelihood of an 
earlier budget ``train wreck'' by enabling Congress to adopt a 
concurrent budget resolution under expedited procedures if the 
president vetoes the joint budget resolution.
  In other words, H.R. 853 provides incentives for the president to 
sign an agreement on principles, but allows the process to move forward 
if he does not.
  The bill also requires the president and Congress to set aside a 
reserve within the budget for emergencies. This reserve would be 
equivalent to the five year historical average of emergency spending. 
The reserve could only be used for emergencies that meet both of the 
following criteria: (1) funding for ``loss of life or property, or a 
threat to national security'' and (2) an ``unanticipated situation.''
  This important provision will prevent supplemental appropriations 
bills that are stuffed with fraudulent ``emergency'' spending. 
Unfortunately such bills have often become vehicles for pork-barrel 
spending rather than ways to alleviate the suffering of Americans who 
have experienced genuine crises.
  I would like to thank Congressman Nussle and other members of the 
House Budget Committee's bipartisan task force on the budget process 
for bringing this bill to the floor. I urge my colleagues to support 
it.
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, certainly the budget process could benefit 
from useful progressive reform. However, the bill we are considering is 
neither useful nor progressive. It can properly be described as deform. 
As long as the majority lacks the political courage to set realistic 
spending caps, we will continue to see the abuse of the budget process 
that we have become accustomed to under Republican control of the 
Congress. Where more than $34 billion, including the cost of the 
census, is declared an ``emergency.'' These ``emergencies'' are nothing 
but an absolute circumvention of the budget process and a parliamentary 
exercise to evade hard choices.
  Let history be our guide and let us examine how the budget process 
has operated under Republican control.
  I would observe that last year Congress failed to even adopt a budget 
resolution for the first time since the Budget Act was signed into law. 
Why, because the budget process was broken? Hardly. Because the 
Republican majority in Congress could not agree with itself on a budget 
resolution. Rather than negotiate a bipartisan document, the majority 
chose not to draft a budget at all. This unprecedented failure is not 
an indictment of the budget process but rather of the majority's 
incompetence.
  In the 104th Congress, under the leadership of then-Speaker Newt 
Gingrich, the Republican majority could not agree with the President on 
the budget, failed to pass the regular 13 appropriations bills on time, 
and proceeded to shut down the government for 28 days. Why, because the 
budget process was broken? Hardly. Because the Republican majority was 
unwilling to compromise and negotiate in good faith with the President. 
Like little children, the majority took their toys and went home. This 
was not a result of a flawed budget process but of flawed leadership in 
the Congress.
  The Republican majority, having learned their harsh lesson from the 
rebuke of the public for such fiscal recklessness, reversed course in 
the 105th Congress and gave in on everything. The result was an 
unseemly, bloated omnibus bill that contained everything--including the 
kitchen sink. Why, because the budget process was broken? Hardly. It 
was another example of the irresponsible manner in which the majority 
runs the Congress and once again demonstrated their remarkable 
inability to govern.
  H.R. 853 continues in this rich tradition of flawed proposals and 
failed ideas. It should rightly and properly be relegated to the scrap 
heap, to reside next to the Contract with America, where it will, with 
good fortune and the good Lord's mercy, rust in peace. I urge my 
colleagues to defeat this bill so we can move on to the people's 
business.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
consisting of the text of H.R. 4397 shall be considered as an original 
bill for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule, and shall be 
considered read.
  The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as 
follows:

                               H.R. 4397

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act of 2000''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Purpose.
Sec. 3. Effective date.
Sec. 4. Declaration of purposes for the Budget Act.

                   TITLE I--BUDGET WITH FORCE OF LAW

Sec. 101. Purposes.
Sec. 102. The timetable.
Sec. 103. Annual joint resolutions on the budget.
Sec. 104. Budget required before spending bills may be considered; 
              fall-back procedures if President vetoes joint budget 
              resolution.
Sec. 105. Conforming amendments to effectuate joint resolutions on the 
              budget.

                 TITLE II--RESERVE FUND FOR EMERGENCIES

Sec. 201. Purpose.
Sec. 202. Repeal of adjustments for emergencies.
Sec. 203. OMB emergency criteria.
Sec. 204. Development of guidelines for application of emergency 
              definition.
Sec. 205. Reserve fund for emergencies in President's budget.
Sec. 206. Adjustments and reserve fund for emergencies in joint budget 
              resolutions.
Sec. 207. Up-to-date tabulations.
Sec. 208. Prohibition on amendments to emergency reserve fund.
Sec. 209. Effective date.

             TITLE III--ENFORCEMENT OF BUDGETARY DECISIONS

Sec. 301. Purposes.

  Subtitle A--Application of Points of Order to Unreported Legislation

Sec. 311. Application of Budget Act points of order to unreported 
              legislation.

             Subtitle B--Compliance With Budget Resolution

Sec. 321. Budget compliance statements.

            Subtitle C--Justification for Budget Act Waivers

Sec. 331. Justification for Budget Act waivers in the House of 
              Representatives.

             Subtitle D--CBO Scoring of Conference Reports

Sec. 341. CBO scoring of conference reports.

             TITLE IV--ACCOUNTABILITY FOR FEDERAL SPENDING

Sec. 401. Purposes.

               Subtitle A--Limitations on Direct Spending

Sec. 411. Fixed-year authorizations required for new programs.
Sec. 412. Amendments to subject new direct spending to annual 
              appropriations.

     Subtitle B--Enhanced Congressional Oversight Responsibilities

Sec. 421. Ten-year congressional review requirement of permanent budget 
              authority.
Sec. 422. Justifications of direct spending.
Sec. 423. Survey of activity reports of House committees.
Sec. 424. Continuing study of additional budget process reforms.
Sec. 425. GAO reports.

                Subtitle C--Strengthened Accountability

Sec. 431. Ten-year CBO estimates.
Sec. 432. Repeal of rule XXIII of the Rules of the House of 
              Representatives.

    TITLE V--BUDGETING FOR UNFUNDED LIABILITIES AND OTHER LONG-TERM 
                              OBLIGATIONS

Sec. 501. Purposes.

     Subtitle A--Budgetary Treatment of Federal Insurance Programs

Sec. 511. Federal insurance programs.

           Subtitle B--Reports on Long-Term Budgetary Trends

Sec. 521. Reports on long-term budgetary trends.

                    TITLE VI--BASELINE AND BYRD RULE

Sec. 601. Purpose.

                        Subtitle A--The Baseline

Sec. 611. The President's budget.
Sec. 612. The congressional budget.
Sec. 613. Congressional Budget Office reports to committees.
Sec. 614. Outyear assumptions for discretionary spending.

                       Subtitle B--The Byrd Rule

Sec. 621. Limitation on Byrd rule.

     SEC. 2. PURPOSE.

       The purposes of this Act are to--
       (1) give the budget the force of law;
       (2) budget for emergencies;
       (3) strengthen enforcement of budgetary decisions;
       (4) increase accountability for Federal spending;
       (5) display the unfunded liabilities of Federal insurance 
     programs; and
       (6) mitigate the bias in the budget process toward higher 
     spending.

     SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       Except as otherwise specifically provided, this Act and the 
     amendments made by this Act shall become effective on the 
     date of enactment of this Act and shall apply with respect to 
     fiscal years beginning after September 30, 2001.

[[Page H3109]]

     SEC. 4. DECLARATION OF PURPOSES FOR THE BUDGET ACT.

       Paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 2 of the Congressional 
     Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 are amended to 
     read as follows:
       ``(1) to assure effective control over the budgetary 
     process;
       ``(2) to facilitate the determination each year of the 
     appropriate level of Federal revenues and expenditures by the 
     Congress and the President;''.

                   TITLE I--BUDGET WITH FORCE OF LAW

     SEC. 101. PURPOSES.

       The purposes of this title are to--
       (1) focus initial budgetary deliberations on aggregate 
     levels of Federal spending and taxation;
       (2) encourage cooperation between Congress and the 
     President in developing overall budgetary priorities; and
       (3) reach budgetary decisions early in the legislative 
     cycle.

     SEC. 102. THE TIMETABLE.

       Section 300 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is 
     amended to read as follows:


                              ``timetable

       ``Sec. 300. The timetable with respect to the congressional 
     budget process for any fiscal year is as follows:

Action to be completed:
President submits his budget...........................................
Congressional Budget Office submits report to Budget Committees........
Committees submit views and estimates to Budget Committees.............
Senate Budget Committee reports joint resolution on the budget.........
Congress completes action on joint resolution on the budget............
House Appropriations Committee reports last annual appropriation bill..
Congress completes action on reconciliation legislation................
House completes action on annual appropriation bills...................
Fiscal year begins.''..................................................

     SEC. 103. ANNUAL JOINT RESOLUTIONS ON THE BUDGET.

       (a) Content of Annual Joint Resolutions on the Budget.--
     Section 301(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is 
     amended as follows:
       (1) Strike paragraph (4) and insert the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(4) subtotals of new budget authority and outlays for 
     nondefense discretionary spending, defense discretionary 
     spending, direct spending (excluding interest), and interest; 
     and for fiscal years to which the amendments made by title II 
     of the Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act of 2000 apply, 
     subtotals of new budget authority and outlays for 
     emergencies;''.
       (2) Strike the last sentence of such subsection.
       (b) Additional Matters in Joint Resolution.--Section 301(b) 
     of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended as 
     follows:
       (1) Strike paragraphs (2), (4), and (6) through (9).
       (2) After paragraph (1), insert the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(2) if submitted by the Committee on Ways and Means of 
     the House of Representatives or the Committee on Finance of 
     the Senate to the Committee on the Budget of that House of 
     Congress, amend section 3101 of title 31, United States Code, 
     to change the statutory limit on the public debt;''.
       (3) After paragraph (3), insert the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(4) require such other congressional procedures, relating 
     to the budget, as may be appropriate to carry out the 
     purposes of this Act;''; and
       (4) After paragraph (5), insert the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(6) set forth procedures in the Senate whereby committee 
     allocations, aggregates, and other levels can be revised for 
     legislation if that legislation would not increase the 
     deficit, or would not increase the deficit when taken with 
     other legislation enacted after the adoption of the 
     resolution, for the first fiscal year or the total period of 
     fiscal years covered by the resolution.''.
       (c) Required Contents of Report.--Section 301(e)(2) of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended as follows:
       (1) Redesignate subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), and 
     (F) as subparagraphs (B), (C), (E), (F), (H), and (I), 
     respectively.
       (2) Before subparagraph (B) (as redesignated), insert the 
     following new subparagraph:
       ``(A) new budget authority and outlays for each major 
     functional category, based on allocations of the total levels 
     set forth pursuant to subsection (a)(1);''.
       (3) In subparagraph (C) (as redesignated), strike 
     ``mandatory'' and insert ``direct spending''.
       (4) After subparagraph (C) (as redesignated), insert the 
     following new subparagraph:
       ``(D) a measure, as a percentage of gross domestic product, 
     of total outlays, total Federal revenues, the surplus or 
     deficit, and new outlays for nondefense discretionary 
     spending, defense spending, and direct spending as set forth 
     in such resolution;''.
       (5) After subparagraph (F) (as redesignated), insert the 
     following new subparagraph:
       ``(G) if the joint resolution on the budget includes any 
     allocation to a committee (other than the Committee on 
     Appropriations) of levels in excess of current law levels, a 
     justification for not subjecting any program, project, or 
     activity (for which the allocation is made) to annual 
     discretionary appropriations;''.
       (d) Additional Contents of Report.--Section 301(e)(3) of 
     the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended as follows:
       (1) Redesignate subparagraphs (A) and (B) as subparagraphs 
     (B) and (C), respectively, strike subparagraphs (C) and (D), 
     and redesignate subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (D).
       (2) Before subparagraph (B), insert the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(A) reconciliation directives described in section 
     310;''.
       (e) President's Budget Submission to the Congress.--(1) The 
     first two sentences of section 1105(a) of title 31, United 
     States Code, are amended to read as follows:

     ``On or after the first Monday in January but not later than 
     the first Monday in February of each year the President shall 
     submit a budget of the United States Government for the 
     following fiscal year which shall set forth the following 
     levels:
       ``(A) totals of new budget authority and outlays;
       ``(B) total Federal revenues and the amount, if any, by 
     which the aggregate level of Federal revenues should be 
     increased or decreased by bills and resolutions to be 
     reported by the appropriate committees;
       ``(C) the surplus or deficit in the budget;
       ``(D) subtotals of new budget authority and outlays for 
     nondefense discretionary spending, defense discretionary 
     spending, direct spending, and interest; and for fiscal years 
     to which the amendments made by title II of the Comprehensive 
     Budget Process Reform Act of 2000 apply, subtotals of new 
     budget authority and outlays for emergencies; and
       ``(E) the public debt.

     Each budget submission shall include a budget message and 
     summary and supporting information and, as a separately 
     delineated statement, the levels required in the preceding 
     sentence for at least each of the 9 ensuing fiscal years.''.
       (2) The third sentence of section 1105(a) of title 31, 
     United States Code, is amended by inserting ``submission'' 
     after ``budget''.
       (f) Limitation on Contents of Budget Resolutions.--Section 
     305 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(e) Limitation on Contents.--(1) A joint resolution on 
     the budget and the report accompanying it may not--
       ``(A) appropriate or otherwise provide, impound, or rescind 
     any new budget authority, increase any outlay, or increase or 
     decrease any revenue (other than through reconciliation 
     instructions);
       ``(B) directly (other than through reconciliation 
     instructions) establish or change any program, project, or 
     activity;
       ``(C) establish or change any limit or control over 
     spending, outlays, receipts, or the surplus or deficit except 
     those that are enforced through congressional rule making; or
       ``(D) amend any law except as provided by section 304 
     (permissible revisions of joint resolutions on the budget) or 
     enact any provision of law that contains any matter not 
     permitted in section 301(a) or (b).
       ``(2) No allocation under section 302(a) shall be construed 
     as changing such discretionary spending limit.
       ``(3) It shall not be in order in the House of 
     Representatives or in the Senate to consider any joint 
     resolution on the budget or any amendment thereto or 
     conference report thereon that contains any matter not 
     permitted in section 301(a) or (b).
       ``(4) Any joint resolution on the budget or any amendment 
     thereto or conference report thereon that contains any matter 
     not permitted in section 301(a) or (b) shall not be treated 
     in the House of Representatives or the Senate as a budget 
     resolution under subsection (a) or (b) or as a conference 
     report on a budget resolution under subsection (c) of this 
     section.''.

     SEC. 104. BUDGET REQUIRED BEFORE SPENDING BILLS MAY BE 
                   CONSIDERED; FALL-BACK PROCEDURES IF PRESIDENT 
                   VETOES JOINT BUDGET RESOLUTION.

       (a) Amendments to Section 302.--Section 302(a) of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended by striking 
     paragraph (5).
       (b) Amendments to Section 303 and Conforming Amendments.--
     (1) Section 303 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is 
     amended--
       (A) in subsection (b), by striking paragraph (2), by 
     inserting ``or'' at the end of paragraph (1), and by 
     redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (2); and
       (B) by striking its section heading and inserting the 
     following new section heading: ``consideration of budget-
     related legislation before budget becomes law''.
       (2) Section 302(g)(1) of the Congressional Budget Act of 
     1974 is amended by striking ``and, after April 15, section 
     303(a)''.
       (3)(A) Section 904(c)(1) of the Congressional Budget Act of 
     1974 is amended by inserting ``303(a),'' before 
     ``305(b)(2),''.
       (B) Section 904(d)(2) of the Congressional Budget Act of 
     1974 is amended by inserting ``303(a),'' before 
     ``305(b)(2),''.
       (c) Expedited Procedures Upon Veto of Joint Resolution on 
     the Budget.--(1) Title III of the Congressional Budget Act of 
     1974 is amended by adding after section 315 the following new 
     section:

[[Page H3110]]

   ``expedited procedures upon veto of joint resolution on the budget

       ``Sec. 316. (a) Special Rule.--If the President vetoes a 
     joint resolution on the budget for a fiscal year, the 
     majority leader of the House of Representatives or Senate (or 
     his designee) may introduce a concurrent resolution on the 
     budget or joint resolution on the budget for such fiscal 
     year. If the Committee on the Budget of either House fails to 
     report such concurrent or joint resolution referred to it 
     within five calendar days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, or 
     legal holidays except when that House of Congress is in 
     session) after the date of such referral, the committee shall 
     be automatically discharged from further consideration of 
     such resolution and such resolution shall be placed on the 
     appropriate calendar.
       ``(b) Procedure in the House of Representatives and the 
     Senate.--
       ``(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the provisions 
     of section 305 for the consideration in the House of 
     Representatives and in the Senate of joint resolutions on the 
     budget and conference reports thereon shall also apply to the 
     consideration of concurrent resolutions on the budget 
     introduced under subsection (a) and conference reports 
     thereon.
       ``(2) Debate in the Senate on any concurrent resolution on 
     the budget or joint resolution on the budget introduced under 
     subsection (a), and all amendments thereto and debatable 
     motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited 
     to not more than 10 hours and in the House such debate shall 
     be limited to not more than 3 hours.
       ``(c) Contents of Concurrent Resolutions.--Any concurrent 
     resolution on the budget introduced under subsection (a) 
     shall be in compliance with section 301.
       ``(d) Effect of Concurrent Resolution on the Budget.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, whenever a 
     concurrent resolution on the budget described in subsection 
     (a) is agreed to, then the aggregates, allocations, and 
     reconciliation directives (if any) contained in the report 
     accompanying such concurrent resolution or in such concurrent 
     resolution shall be considered to be the aggregates, 
     allocations, and reconciliation directives for all purposes 
     of sections 302, 303, and 311 for the applicable fiscal years 
     and such concurrent resolution shall be deemed to be a joint 
     resolution for all purposes of this title and the Rules of 
     the House of Representatives and any reference to the date of 
     enactment of a joint resolution on the budget shall be deemed 
     to be a reference to the date agreed to when applied to such 
     concurrent resolution.''.
       (2) The table of contents set forth in section 1(b) of the 
     Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 is 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to section 315 
     the following new item:

``Sec. 316. Expedited procedures upon veto of joint resolution on the 
              budget.''.

     SEC. 105. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS TO EFFECTUATE JOINT 
                   RESOLUTIONS ON THE BUDGET.

       (a) Conforming Amendments to the Congressional Budget and 
     Impoundment Control Act of 1974.--(1)(A) Sections 301, 302, 
     303, 305, 308, 310, 311, 312, 314, 405, and 904 of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 et seq.) are 
     amended by striking ``concurrent'' each place it appears and 
     by inserting ``joint''.
       (B)(i) Sections 302(d), 302(g), 308(a)(1)(A), and 310(d)(1) 
     of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 are amended by 
     striking ``most recently agreed to concurrent resolution on 
     the budget'' each place it occurs and inserting ``most 
     recently enacted joint resolution on the budget or agreed to 
     concurrent resolution on the budget (as applicable)''.
       (ii) The section heading of section 301 is amended by 
     striking ``adoption of concurrent resolution'' and inserting 
     ``joint resolutions'';
       (iii) Section 304 of such Act is amended to read as 
     follows:


             ``permissible revisions of budget resolutions

       ``Sec. 304. At any time after the joint resolution on the 
     budget for a fiscal year has been enacted pursuant to section 
     301, and before the end of such fiscal year, the two Houses 
     and the President may enact a joint resolution on the budget 
     which revises or reaffirms the joint resolution on the budget 
     for such fiscal year most recently enacted. If a concurrent 
     resolution on the budget has been agreed to pursuant to 
     section 316, then before the end of such fiscal year, the two 
     Houses may adopt a concurrent resolution on the budget which 
     revises or reaffirms the concurrent resolution on the budget 
     for such fiscal year most recently agreed to.''.
       (C) Sections 302, 303, 310, and 311, of such Act are 
     amended by striking ``agreed to'' each place it appears and 
     by inserting ``enacted''.
       (2)(A) Paragraph (4) of section 3 of the Congressional 
     Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 is amended by 
     striking ``concurrent'' each place it appears and by 
     inserting ``joint''.
       (B) The table of contents set forth in section 1(b) of such 
     Act is amended--
       (i) in the item relating to section 301, by striking 
     ``adoption of concurrent resolution'' and inserting ``joint 
     resolutions'';
       (ii) by striking the item relating to section 303 and 
     inserting the following:

``Sec. 303. Consideration of budget-related legislation before budget 
              becomes law.'';

       (iii) in the item relating to section 304, by striking 
     ``concurrent'' and inserting ``budget'' the first place it 
     appears and by striking ``on the budget''; and
       (iv) by striking ``concurrent'' and inserting ``joint'' in 
     the item relating to section 305.
       (b) Conforming Amendments to the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives.--(1) Clauses 1(e)(1), 4(a)(4), 4(b)(2), 
     4(f)(1)(A), and 4(f)(2) of rule X, clause 10 of rule XVIII, 
     and clause 10 of rule XX of the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives are amended by striking ``concurrent'' each 
     place it appears and inserting ``joint''.
       (2) Clause 10 of rule XVIII of the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives is amended--
       (A) in paragraph (b)(2), by striking ``(5)'' and inserting 
     ``(6)''; and
       (B) by striking paragraph (c).
       (c) Conforming Amendments to the Balanced Budget and 
     Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.--Section 258C(b)(1) of 
     the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 
     (2 U.S.C. 907d(b)(1)) is amended by striking ``concurrent'' 
     and inserting ``joint''.
       (d) Conforming Amendments to Section 310 Regarding 
     Reconciliation Directives.--(1) The side heading of section 
     310(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (as amended by 
     section 105(a)) is further amended by inserting ``Joint 
     Explanatory Statement Accompanying Conference Report on'' 
     before ``Joint''.
       (2) Section 310(a) of such Act is amended by striking ``A'' 
     and inserting ``The joint explanatory statement accompanying 
     the conference report on a''.
       (3) The first sentence of section 310(b) of such Act is 
     amended by striking ``If'' and inserting ``If the joint 
     explanatory statement accompanying the conference report 
     on''.
       (4) Section 310(c)(1) of such Act is amended by inserting 
     ``the joint explanatory statement accompanying the conference 
     report on'' after ``pursuant to''.
       (5) Subsection (g) of section 310 of such Act is repealed.
       (e) Conforming Amendments to Section 3 Regarding Direct 
     Spending.--Section 3 of the Congressional Budget and 
     Impoundment Control Act of 1974 is amended by adding at the 
     end the following new paragraph:
       ``(11) The term `direct spending' has the meaning given to 
     such term in section 250(c)(8) of the Balanced Budget and 
     Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.''.
       (f) Technical Amendment Regarding Revised Suballocations.--
     Section 314(d) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is 
     amended by--
       (1) striking ``Reporting'' in the side heading, by 
     inserting ``the chairmen of'' before ``the Committees'', and 
     by striking ``may report'' and inserting ``shall make and 
     have published in the Congressional Record''; and
       (2) adding at the end the following new sentence: ``For 
     purposes of considering amendments (other than for amounts 
     for emergencies covered by subsection (b)(1)), suballocations 
     shall be deemed to be so adjusted.''.

                 TITLE II--RESERVE FUND FOR EMERGENCIES

     SEC. 201. PURPOSE.

       The purposes of this title are to--
       (1) develop budgetary and fiscal procedures for 
     emergencies;
       (2) subject spending for emergencies to budgetary 
     procedures and controls; and
       (3) establish criteria for determining compliance with 
     emergency requirements.

     SEC. 202. REPEAL OF ADJUSTMENTS FOR EMERGENCIES.

       (a) Discretionary Spending Limits.--(1) Section 
     251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
     Control Act of 1985 is repealed.
       (2) Such section 251(b)(2) is further amended by 
     redesignating subparagraphs (B) through (G) as subparagraphs 
     (A) through (F).
       (b) Direct Spending.--Sections 252(e) and 252(d)(4)(B) of 
     the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 
     are repealed.
       (c) Emergency Designation.--Clause 2 of rule XXI of the 
     Rules of the House of Representatives is amended by repealing 
     paragraph (e) and by redesignating paragraph (f) as paragraph 
     (e).
       (d) Amount of Adjustments.--Section 314(b) of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended by striking 
     paragraph (1) and by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (6) 
     as paragraphs (1) through (5), respectively.

     SEC. 203. OMB EMERGENCY CRITERIA.

       Section 3 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
     Control Act of 1974 (as amended by section 105(e)) is further 
     amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(12)(A) The term `emergency' means a situation that--
       ``(i) requires new budget authority and outlays (or new 
     budget authority and the outlays flowing therefrom) for the 
     prevention or mitigation of, or response to, loss of life or 
     property, or a threat to national security; and
       ``(ii) is unanticipated.
       ``(B) As used in subparagraph (A), the term `unanticipated' 
     means that the situation is--
       ``(i) sudden, which means quickly coming into being or not 
     building up over time;
       ``(ii) urgent, which means a pressing and compelling need 
     requiring immediate action;
       ``(iii) unforeseen, which means not predicted or 
     anticipated as an emerging need; and
       ``(iv) temporary, which means not of a permanent 
     duration.''.

[[Page H3111]]

     SEC. 204. DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES FOR APPLICATION OF 
                   EMERGENCY DEFINITION.

       Not later than 5 months after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, the chairmen of the Committees on the Budget (in 
     consultation with the President) shall, after consulting with 
     the chairmen of the Committees on Appropriations and 
     applicable authorizing committees of their respective Houses 
     and the Directors of the Congressional Budget Office and the 
     Office of Management and Budget, jointly publish in the 
     Congressional Record guidelines for application of the 
     definition of emergency set forth in section 3(12) of the 
     Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.

     SEC. 205. RESERVE FUND FOR EMERGENCIES IN PRESIDENT'S BUDGET.

       Section 1105 of title 31, United States Code is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsections:
       ``(h) The budget transmitted pursuant to subsection (a) for 
     a fiscal year shall include a reserve fund for emergencies. 
     The amount set forth in such fund shall be calculated as 
     provided under section 317(b) of the Congressional Budget Act 
     of 1974.
       ``(i) In the case of any budget authority requested for an 
     emergency, such submission shall include a detailed 
     justification of the reasons that such emergency is an 
     emergency within the meaning of section 3(12) of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974, consistent with the 
     guidelines described in section 204 of the Comprehensive 
     Budget Process Reform Act of 2000.''.

     SEC. 206. ADJUSTMENTS AND RESERVE FUND FOR EMERGENCIES IN 
                   JOINT BUDGET RESOLUTIONS.

       (a) Emergencies.--Title III of the Congressional Budget Act 
     of 1974 (as amended by section 104(c)) is further amended by 
     adding at the end the following new section:


                             ``emergencies

       ``Sec. 317. (a) Adjustments.--
       ``(1) In general.--After the reporting of a bill or joint 
     resolution or the submission of a conference report thereon 
     that provides budget authority for any emergency as 
     identified pursuant to subsection (d)--
       ``(A) the chairman (in consultation with the ranking 
     minority member) of the Committee on the Budget of the House 
     of Representatives or the Senate shall determine and certify, 
     pursuant to the guidelines referred to in section 204 of the 
     Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act of 2000, the portion 
     (if any) of the amount so specified that is for an emergency 
     within the meaning of section 3(12); and
       ``(B) such chairman shall make the adjustment set forth in 
     paragraph (2) for the amount of new budget authority (or 
     outlays) in that measure and the outlays flowing from that 
     budget authority.
       ``(2) Matters to be adjusted.--The adjustments referred to 
     in paragraph (1) are to be made to the allocations made 
     pursuant to the appropriate joint resolution on the budget 
     pursuant to section 302(a) and shall be in an amount not to 
     exceed the amount reserved for emergencies pursuant to the 
     requirements of subsection (b).
       ``(3) Permissible committee vote on adjustments.--Any 
     adjustment made by the chairman of the Committee on the 
     Budget of the House of Representatives or the Senate under 
     paragraph (1) may be placed before the committee for its 
     consideration by a majority vote of the members of the 
     committee, a quorum being present.
       ``(b) Reserve Fund for Emergencies.--
       ``(1) Amounts.--(A) The amount set forth in the reserve 
     fund for emergencies for budget authority for a fiscal year 
     pursuant to section 301(a)(4) shall equal the average of the 
     enacted levels of budget authority for emergencies in the 5 
     fiscal years preceding the current year.
       ``(B) The amount set forth in the reserve fund for 
     emergencies for outlays pursuant to section 301(a)(4) shall 
     be the following:
       ``(i) For the budget year, the amount provided by 
     subparagraph (C)(i).
       ``(ii) For the year following the budget year, the sum of 
     the amounts provided by subparagraphs (i) and (ii).
       ``(iii) For the second year following the budget year, the 
     sum of the amounts provided by subparagraphs (i), (ii), and 
     (iii).
       ``(iv) For the third year following the budget year, the 
     sum of the amounts provided by subparagraphs (i), (ii), 
     (iii), and (iv).
       ``(v) For the fourth year following the budget year, the 
     sum of the amounts provided by subparagraphs (i), (ii), 
     (iii), (iv), and (v).
       ``(C) The amount used to calculate the levels of the 
     reserve fund for emergencies for outlays shall be the--
       ``(i) average outlays flowing from new budget authority in 
     the fiscal year that the budget authority was provided;
       ``(ii) average outlays flowing from new budget authority in 
     the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the budget 
     authority was provided;
       ``(iii) average outlays flowing from new budget authority 
     in the second fiscal year following the fiscal year in which 
     the budget authority was provided;
       ``(iv) average outlays flowing from new budget authority in 
     the third fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the 
     budget authority was provided for budget authority provided; 
     and
       ``(v) average outlays flowing from new budget authority in 
     the fourth fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the 
     budget authority was provided;
     if such budget authority was provided within the period of 
     the 5 fiscal years preceding the current year.
       ``(2) Average levels.--For purposes of paragraph (1), the 
     amount used for a fiscal year to calculate the average of the 
     enacted levels when one or more of such 5 preceding fiscal 
     years is any of fiscal years 1996 through 2000 shall be for 
     emergencies within the definition of section 3(12)(A) as 
     determined by the Committees on the Budget of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate after receipt of a report on 
     such matter transmitted to such committees by the Director of 
     the Congressional Budget Office 6 months after the date of 
     enactment of this section and thereafter in February of each 
     calendar year.
       ``(c) Emergencies in Excess of Amounts in Reserve Fund.--
     Whenever the Committee on Appropriations or any other 
     committee reports any bill or joint resolution that provides 
     budget authority for any emergency and the report 
     accompanying that bill or joint resolution, pursuant to 
     subsection (d), identifies any provision that increases 
     outlays or provides budget authority (and the outlays flowing 
     therefrom) for such emergency, the enactment of which would 
     cause--
       ``(1) in the case of the Committee on Appropriations, the 
     total amount of budget authority or outlays provided for 
     emergencies for the budget year; or
       ``(2) in the case of any other committee, the total amount 
     of budget authority or outlays provided for emergencies for 
     the budget year or the total of the fiscal years;

     in the joint resolution on the budget (pursuant to section 
     301(a)(4)) to be exceeded:
       ``(A) Such bill or joint resolution shall be referred to 
     the Committee on the Budget of the House or the Senate, as 
     the case may be, with instructions to report it without 
     amendment, other than that specified in subparagraph (B), 
     within 5 legislative days of the day in which it is reported 
     from the originating committee. If the Committee on the 
     Budget of either House fails to report a bill or joint 
     resolution referred to it under this subparagraph within such 
     5-day period, the committee shall be automatically discharged 
     from further consideration of such bill or joint resolution 
     and such bill or joint resolution shall be placed on the 
     appropriate calendar.
       ``(B) An amendment to such a bill or joint resolution 
     referred to in this subsection shall only consist of an 
     exemption from section 251 or 252 (as applicable) of the 
     Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 of 
     all or any part of the provisions that provide budget 
     authority (and the outlays flowing therefrom) for such 
     emergency if the committee determines, pursuant to the 
     guidelines referred to in section 204 of the Comprehensive 
     Budget Process Reform Act of 2000, that such budget authority 
     is for an emergency within the meaning of section 3(12).
       ``(C) If such a bill or joint resolution is reported with 
     an amendment specified in subparagraph (B) by the Committee 
     on the Budget of the House of Representatives or the Senate, 
     then the budget authority and resulting outlays that are the 
     subject of such amendment shall not be included in any 
     determinations under section 302(f) or 311(a) for any bill, 
     joint resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report.
       ``(d) Committee Notification of Emergency Legislation.--
     Whenever the Committee on Appropriations or any other 
     committee of either House (including a committee of 
     conference) reports any bill or joint resolution that 
     provides budget authority for any emergency, the report 
     accompanying that bill or joint resolution (or the joint 
     explanatory statement of managers in the case of a conference 
     report on any such bill or joint resolution) shall identify 
     all provisions that provide budget authority and the outlays 
     flowing therefrom for such emergency and include a statement 
     of the reasons why such budget authority meets the definition 
     of an emergency pursuant to the guidelines referred to in 
     section 204 of the Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act of 
     2000.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents set forth 
     in section 1(b) of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
     Control Act of 1974 is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 316 the following new item:

``Sec. 317. Emergencies.''.

     SEC. 207. UP-TO-DATE TABULATIONS.

       Section 308(b)(2) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 
     is amended by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph 
     (B), by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (C) 
     and inserting ``; and'', and by adding at the end the 
     following new subparagraph:
       ``(D) shall include an up-to-date tabulation of amounts 
     remaining in the reserve fund for emergencies.''.

     SEC. 208. PROHIBITION ON AMENDMENTS TO EMERGENCY RESERVE 
                   FUND.

       (a) Point of Order.--Section 305 of the Congressional 
     Budget Act of 1974 (as amended by section 103(c)) is further 
     amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(f) Point of Order Regarding Emergency Reserve Fund.--It 
     shall not be in order in the House of Representatives or in 
     the Senate to consider an amendment to a joint resolution on 
     the budget which changes the amount of budget authority and 
     outlays set forth in section 301(a)(4) for emergency reserve 
     fund.''.

[[Page H3112]]

       (b) Technical Amendment.--(1) Section 904(c)(1) of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended by inserting 
     ``305(e), 305(f),'' after ``305(c)(4),''.
       (2) Section 904(d)(2) of the Congressional Budget Act of 
     1974 is amended by inserting ``305(e), 305(f),'' after 
     ``305(c)(4),''.

     SEC. 209. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       The amendments made by this title shall apply to fiscal 
     year 2002 and subsequent fiscal years, but such amendments 
     shall take effect only after the enactment of legislation 
     changing or extending for any fiscal year the discretionary 
     spending limits set forth in section 251 of the Balanced 
     Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 or 
     legislation reducing the amount of any sequestration under 
     section 252 of such Act by the amount of any reserve for any 
     emergencies.

             TITLE III--ENFORCEMENT OF BUDGETARY DECISIONS

     SEC. 301. PURPOSES.

       The purposes of this title are to--
       (1) close loopholes in the enforcement of budget 
     resolutions;
       (2) require committees of the House of Representatives to 
     include budget compliance statements in reports accompanying 
     all legislation;
       (3) require committees of the House of Representatives to 
     justify the need for waivers of the Congressional Budget Act 
     of 1974; and
       (4) provide cost estimates of conference reports.

  Subtitle A--Application of Points of Order to Unreported Legislation

     SEC. 311. APPLICATION OF BUDGET ACT POINTS OF ORDER TO 
                   UNREPORTED LEGISLATION.

       (a) Section 315 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is 
     amended by striking ``reported'' the first place it appears.
       (b) Section 303(b) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 
     (as amended by section 104(b)(1)) is further amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``(A)'' and by 
     redesignating subparagraph (B) as paragraph (2) and by 
     striking the semicolon at the end of such new paragraph (2) 
     and inserting a period; and
       (2) by striking paragraph (2) (as redesignated by such 
     section 104(b)(1)).

             Subtitle B--Compliance With Budget Resolution

     SEC. 321. BUDGET COMPLIANCE STATEMENTS.

       Clause 3(d) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new subparagraph:
       ``(4) A budget compliance statement prepared by the 
     chairman of the Committee on the Budget, if timely submitted 
     prior to the filing of the report, which shall include 
     assessment by such chairman as to whether the bill or joint 
     resolution complies with the requirements of sections 302, 
     303, 306, 311, and 401 of the Congressional Budget Act of 
     1974 or any other requirements set forth in a joint 
     resolution on the budget and may include the budgetary 
     implications of that bill or joint resolution under section 
     251 or 252 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
     Control Act of 1985, as applicable.''.

            Subtitle C--Justification for Budget Act Waivers

     SEC. 331. JUSTIFICATION FOR BUDGET ACT WAIVERS IN THE HOUSE 
                   OF REPRESENTATIVES.

       Clause 6 of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new paragraph:
       ``(h) It shall not be in order to consider any resolution 
     from the Committee on Rules for the consideration of any 
     reported bill or joint resolution which waives section 302, 
     303, 311, or 401 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, 
     unless the report accompanying such resolution includes a 
     description of the provision proposed to be waived, an 
     identification of the section being waived, the reasons why 
     such waiver should be granted, and an estimated cost of the 
     provisions to which the waiver applies.''.

             Subtitle D--CBO Scoring of Conference Reports

     SEC. 341. CBO SCORING OF CONFERENCE REPORTS.

       (a) The first sentence of section 402 of the Congressional 
     Budget Act of 1974 is amended as follows:
       (1) Insert ``or conference report thereon,'' before ``and 
     submit''.
       (2) In paragraph (1), strike ``bill or resolution'' and 
     insert ``bill, joint resolution, or conference report''.
       (3) At the end of paragraph (2) strike ``and'', at the end 
     of paragraph (3) strike the period and insert ``; and'', and 
     after such paragraph (3) add the following new paragraph:
       ``(4) A determination of whether such bill, joint 
     resolution, or conference report provides direct spending.''.
       (b) The second sentence of section 402 of the Congressional 
     Budget Act of 1974 is amended by inserting before the period 
     the following: ``, or in the case of a conference report, 
     shall be included in the joint explanatory statement of 
     managers accompanying such conference report if timely 
     submitted before such report is filed''.

             TITLE IV--ACCOUNTABILITY FOR FEDERAL SPENDING

     SEC. 401. PURPOSES.

       The purposes of this title are to--
       (1) require committees to develop a schedule for 
     reauthorizing all programs within their jurisdictions;
       (2) provide an opportunity to offer amendments to subject 
     new entitlement programs to annual discretionary 
     appropriations;
       (3) require the Committee on the Budget to justify any 
     allocation to an authorizing committee for legislation that 
     would not be subject to annual discretionary appropriation;
       (4) provide estimates of the long-term impact of spending 
     and tax legislation;
       (5) provide a point of order for legislation creating a new 
     direct spending program that does not expire within 10 years; 
     and
       (6) require a vote in the House of Representatives on any 
     measure that increases the statutory limit on the public 
     debt.

               Subtitle A--Limitations on Direct Spending

     SEC. 411. FIXED-YEAR AUTHORIZATIONS REQUIRED FOR NEW 
                   PROGRAMS.

       Section 401 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking subsection (b) and inserting the following 
     new subsections:
       ``(b) Limitation on Direct Spending.--It shall not be in 
     order in the House of Representatives or in the Senate to 
     consider a bill or joint resolution, or an amendment, motion, 
     or conference report that provides direct spending for a new 
     program, unless such spending is limited to a period of 10 or 
     fewer fiscal years.
       ``(c) Limitation on Authorization of Discretionary 
     Appropriations.--It shall not be in order in the House of 
     Representatives or in the Senate to consider any bill, joint 
     resolution, amendment, or conference report that authorizes 
     the appropriation of new budget authority for a new program, 
     unless such authorization is specifically provided for a 
     period of 10 or fewer fiscal years.''; and
       (2) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d) and 
     by striking ``(a) and (b)'' both places it appears in such 
     redesignated subsection (d) and inserting ``(a), (b), and 
     (c)''.

     SEC. 412. AMENDMENTS TO SUBJECT NEW DIRECT SPENDING TO ANNUAL 
                   APPROPRIATIONS.

       (a) House Procedures.--Clause 5 of rule XVIII of the Rules 
     of the House of Representatives is amended by adding at the 
     end the following new paragraph:
       ``(c)(1) In the Committee of the Whole, an amendment only 
     to subject a new program which provides direct spending to 
     discretionary appropriations, if offered by the chairman of 
     the Committee on the Budget (or his designee) or the chairman 
     of the Committee of Appropriations (or his designee), may be 
     precluded from consideration only by the specific terms of a 
     special order of the House. Any such amendment, if offered, 
     shall be debatable for twenty minutes equally divided and 
     controlled by the proponent of the amendment and a Member 
     opposed and shall not be subject to amendment.
       ``(2) As used in subparagraph (1), the term `direct 
     spending' has the meaning given such term in section 3(11) of 
     the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 
     except that such term does not include direct spending 
     described in section 401(d)(1) of such Act.''.
       (b) Adjustment of Discretionary Spending Limits for 
     Discretionary Appropriations Offset by Direct Spending 
     Savings.--
       (1) Purpose.--The purpose of the amendments made by this 
     subsection is to hold the discretionary spending limits and 
     the allocations made to the Committee on Appropriations under 
     section 302(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 
     harmless for legislation that offsets a new discretionary 
     program with a designated reduction in direct spending.
       (2) Designating direct spending savings in authorization 
     legislation for new discretionary programs.--Section 252 of 
     the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 
     (as amended by section 202) is further amended by adding at 
     the end the following new subsection:
       ``(e) Offsets.--If a provision of direct spending 
     legislation is enacted that--
       ``(1) decreases direct spending for any fiscal year; and
       ``(2) is designated as an offset pursuant to this 
     subsection and such designation specifically identifies an 
     authorization of discretionary appropriations (contained in 
     such legislation) for a new program,

     then the reductions in new budget authority and outlays in 
     all fiscal years resulting from that provision shall be 
     designated as an offset in the reports required under 
     subsection (d).''.
       (3) Exempting such designated direct spending savings from 
     paygo scorecard.--Section 252(d)(4) of the Balanced Budget 
     and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (as amended by 
     section 202(b)) is further amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subparagraph:
       ``(B) offset provisions as designated under subsection 
     (e).''.
       (4) Adjustment in discretionary spending limits.--Section 
     251(b)(2) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
     Control Act of 1985 (as amended by section 202(a)(2)) is 
     further amended by adding at the end the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(G) Discretionary authorization offsets.--If an Act other 
     than an appropriation Act includes any provision reducing 
     direct spending and specifically identifies any such 
     provision as an offset pursuant to section 252(e), the 
     adjustments shall be an increase in the discretionary 
     spending limits for budget authority and outlays in each 
     fiscal year equal to the amount of the budget authority and 
     outlay reductions, respectively, achieved by the specified 
     offset in that fiscal

[[Page H3113]]

     year, except that the adjustments for the budget year in 
     which the offsetting provision takes effect shall not exceed 
     the amount of discretionary new budget authority provided for 
     the new program (authorized in that Act) in an Act making 
     discretionary appropriations and the outlays flowing 
     therefrom.''.
       (5) Adjustment in appropriation committee's allocations.--
     Section 314(b) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (as 
     amended by section 202(d)) is further amended by striking ``; 
     or'' at the end of paragraph (4), by striking the period and 
     inserting ``; or'' at the end of paragraph (5), and by 
     adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(6) the amount provided in an Act making discretionary 
     appropriations for the program for which an offset was 
     designated pursuant to section 252(e) of the Balanced Budget 
     and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 and any outlays 
     flowing therefrom, but not to exceed the amount of the 
     designated decrease in direct spending for that year for that 
     program in a prior law.''.
       (6) Adjustment in authorizing committee's allocations.--
     Section 314 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(f) Adjustment in Authorizing Committee's Allocations by 
     Amount of Direct Spending Offset.--After the reporting of a 
     bill or joint resolution (by a committee other than the 
     Committee on Appropriations), or the offering of an amendment 
     thereto or the submission of a conference report thereon, 
     that contains a provision that decreases direct spending for 
     any fiscal year and that is designated as an offset pursuant 
     to section 252(e) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
     Deficit Control Act of 1985, the chairman of the Committee on 
     the Budget shall reduce the allocations of new budget 
     authority and outlays made to such committee under section 
     302(a)(1) by the amount so designated.''.

     Subtitle B--Enhanced Congressional Oversight Responsibilities

     SEC. 421. TEN-YEAR CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW REQUIREMENT OF 
                   PERMANENT BUDGET AUTHORITY.

       (a) Timetable for Review.--Clause 2(d)(1) of rule X of the 
     Rules of the House of Representatives is amended by striking 
     subdivisions (B) and (C) and inserting the following new 
     subdivision:
       ``(B) provide in its plans a specific timetable for its 
     review of those laws, programs, or agencies within its 
     jurisdiction, including those that operate under permanent 
     budget authority or permanent statutory authority and such 
     timetable shall demonstrate that each law, program, or agency 
     within the committee's jurisdiction will be reauthorized at 
     least once every 10 years.''.
       (b) Review of Permanent Budget Authority by the Committee 
     on Appropriations.--Clause 4(a) of rule X of the Rules of the 
     House of Representatives is amended--
       (1) by striking subparagraph (2); and
       (2) by redesignating subparagraphs (3) and (4) as 
     subparagraphs (2) and (3) and by striking ``from time to 
     time'' and inserting ``at least once each Congress'' in 
     subparagraph (2) (as redesignated).
       (c) Conforming Amendment.--Clause 4(e)(2) of rule X of the 
     Rules of the House of Representatives is amended by striking 
     ``from time to time'' and inserting ``at least once every ten 
     years''.

     SEC. 422. JUSTIFICATIONS OF DIRECT SPENDING.

       (a) Section 302 Allocations.--Section 302(a) of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (as amended by section 
     104(a)) is further amended by adding at the end the following 
     new paragraph:
       ``(5) Justification of certain spending allocations.--The 
     joint explanatory statement accompanying a conference report 
     on a joint resolution on the budget that includes any 
     allocation to a committee (other than the Committee on 
     Appropriations) of levels in excess of current law levels 
     shall set forth a justification (such as an activity that is 
     fully offset by increases in dedicated receipts and that such 
     increases would trigger, under existing law, an adjustment in 
     the appropriate discretionary spending limit) for not 
     subjecting any program, project, or activity (for which the 
     allocation is made) to annual discretionary appropriation.''.
       (b) Presidents' Budget Submissions.--Section 1105(a) of 
     title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new paragraph:
       ``(33) a justification for not subjecting each proposed new 
     direct spending program, project, or activity to 
     discretionary appropriations (such as an activity that is 
     fully offset by increases in dedicated receipts and that such 
     increases would trigger, under existing law, an adjustment in 
     the appropriate discretionary spending limit).''.
       (c) Committee Justification for Direct Spending.--Clause 
     4(e)(2) of rule X of the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives is amended by inserting before the period the 
     following: ``, and will provide specific information in any 
     report accompanying such bills and joint resolutions to the 
     greatest extent practicable to justify the reasons that the 
     programs, projects, and activities involved would not be 
     subject to annual appropriation (such as an activity that is 
     fully offset by increases in dedicated receipts and that such 
     increases would trigger, under existing law, an adjustment in 
     the appropriate discretionary spending limit)''.

     SEC. 423. SURVEY OF ACTIVITY REPORTS OF HOUSE COMMITTEES.

       Clause 1(d) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives is amended by redesignating paragraph (4) as 
     paragraph (5) and by inserting after paragraph (3) the 
     following new paragraph:
       ``(4) Such report shall include a summary of and 
     justifications for all bills and joint resolutions reported 
     by such committee that--
       ``(A) were considered before the adoption of the 
     appropriate budget resolution and did not fall within an 
     exception set forth in section 303(b) of the Congressional 
     Budget Act of 1974;
       ``(B) exceeded its allocation under section 302(a) of such 
     Act or breached an aggregate level in violation of section 
     311 of such Act; or
       ``(C) contained provisions in violation of section 401 of 
     such Act.

     Such report shall also specify the total amount by which 
     legislation reported by that committee exceeded its 
     allocation under section 302(a) or breached the revenue floor 
     under section 311(a) of such Act for each fiscal year during 
     that Congress.''.

     SEC. 424. CONTINUING STUDY OF ADDITIONAL BUDGET PROCESS 
                   REFORMS.

       Section 703 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is 
     amended as follows:
       (1) In subsection (a), strike ``and'' at the end of 
     paragraph (3), strike the period at the end of paragraph (4) 
     and insert ``; and'', and at the end add the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(5) evaluating whether existing programs, projects, and 
     activities should be subject to discretionary appropriations 
     and establishing guidelines for subjecting new or expanded 
     programs, projects, and activities to annual appropriation 
     and recommend any necessary changes in statutory enforcement 
     mechanisms and scoring conventions to effectuate such 
     changes. These guidelines are only for advisory purposes.''.
       (2) In subsection (b), strike ``from time to time'' and 
     insert ``during the One Hundred Seventh Congress''.

     SEC. 425. GAO REPORTS.

         The last sentence of section 404 of the Congressional 
     Budget Act of 1974 is amended to read as follows: ``Such 
     report shall be revised at least once every five years and 
     shall be transmitted to the chairman and ranking minority 
     member of each committee of the House of Representatives and 
     the Senate.''.

                Subtitle C--Strengthened Accountability

     SEC. 431. TEN-YEAR CBO ESTIMATES.

       (a) CBO Reports on Legislation.--Section 308(a)(1)(B) of 
     the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended by striking 
     ``four'' and inserting ``nine''.
       (b) Analysis by CBO.--Section 402(1) of the Congressional 
     Budget Act of 1974 is amended by striking ``4'' and inserting 
     ``nine''.
       (c) Cost Estimates.--Clause 3(d)(2)(A) of rule XIII of the 
     Rules of the House of Representatives is amended by striking 
     ``five'' each place it appears and inserting ``10''.

     SEC. 432. REPEAL OF RULE XXIII OF THE RULES OF THE HOUSE OF 
                   REPRESENTATIVES.

       Rule XXIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives 
     (relating to the establishment of the statutory limit on the 
     public debt) is repealed.

    TITLE V--BUDGETING FOR UNFUNDED LIABILITIES AND OTHER LONG-TERM 
                              OBLIGATIONS

     SEC. 501. PURPOSES.

       The purposes of this title are to--
       (1) budget for the long-term costs of Federal insurance 
     programs;
       (2) improve congressional control of those costs; and
       (3) periodically report on long-term budgetary trends.

     Subtitle A--Budgetary Treatment of Federal Insurance Programs

     SEC. 511. FEDERAL INSURANCE PROGRAMS.

       (a) In General.--The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is 
     amended by adding after title V the following new title:

     ``TITLE VI--BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF FEDERAL INSURANCE PROGRAMS

     ``SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.

       ``This title may be cited as the `Federal Insurance 
     Budgeting Act of 2000'.

     ``SEC. 602. BUDGETARY TREATMENT.

       ``(a) President's Budget.--Beginning with fiscal year 2007, 
     the budget of the Government pursuant to section 1105(a) of 
     title 31, United States Code, shall be based on the risk-
     assumed cost of Federal insurance programs.
       ``(b) Budget Accounting.--For any Federal insurance 
     program--
       ``(1) the program account shall--
       ``(A) pay the risk-assumed cost borne by the taxpayer to 
     the financing account, and
       ``(B) pay actual insurance program administrative costs;
       ``(2) the financing account shall--
       ``(A) receive premiums and other income,
       ``(B) pay all claims for insurance and receive all 
     recoveries,
       ``(C) transfer to the program account on not less than an 
     annual basis amounts necessary to pay insurance program 
     administrative costs;
       ``(3) a negative risk-assumed cost shall be transferred 
     from the financing account to the program account, and shall 
     be transferred from the program account to the general fund; 
     and
       ``(4) all payments by or receipts of the financing accounts 
     shall be treated in the budget as a means of financing.

[[Page H3114]]

       ``(c) Appropriations Required.--(1) Notwithstanding any 
     other provision of law, insurance commitments may be made for 
     fiscal year 2007 and thereafter only to the extent that new 
     budget authority to cover their risk-assumed cost is provided 
     in advance in an appropriation Act.
       ``(2) An outstanding insurance commitment shall not be 
     modified in a manner that increases its risk-assumed cost 
     unless budget authority for the additional cost has been 
     provided in advance.
       ``(3) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to Federal insurance 
     programs that constitute entitlements.
       ``(d) Reestimates.--The risk-assumed cost for a fiscal year 
     shall be reestimated in each subsequent year. Such reestimate 
     can equal zero. In the case of a positive reestimate, the 
     amount of the reestimate shall be paid from the program 
     account to the financing account. In the case of a negative 
     reestimate, the amount of the reestimate shall be paid from 
     the financing account to the program account, and shall be 
     transferred from the program account to the general fund. 
     Reestimates shall be displayed as a distinct and separately 
     identified subaccount in the program account.
       ``(e) Administrative Expenses.--All funding for an agency's 
     administration of a Federal insurance program shall be 
     displayed as a distinct and separately identified subaccount 
     in the program account.

     ``SEC. 603. TIMETABLE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ACCRUAL BUDGETING 
                   FOR FEDERAL INSURANCE PROGRAMS.

       ``(a) Agency Requirements.--Agencies with responsibility 
     for Federal insurance programs shall develop models to 
     estimate their risk-assumed cost by year through the budget 
     horizon and shall submit those models, all relevant data, a 
     justification for critical assumptions, and the annual 
     projected risk-assumed costs to OMB with their budget 
     requests each year starting with the request for fiscal year 
     2003. Agencies will likewise provide OMB with annual 
     estimates of modifications, if any, and reestimates of 
     program costs. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed 
     to require an agency, which is subject to statutory 
     requirements, to maintain a risk-based assessment system with 
     a minimum level of reserves against loss and to assess 
     insured entities for risk-based premiums, to provide models, 
     critical assumptions, or other data that would, as determined 
     by such agency, affect financial markets or the viability of 
     insured entities.
       ``(b) Disclosure.--When the President submits a budget of 
     the Government pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, 
     United States Code, for fiscal year 2003, OMB shall publish a 
     notice in the Federal Register advising interested persons of 
     the availability of information describing the models, data 
     (including sources), and critical assumptions (including 
     explicit or implicit discount rate assumptions) that it or 
     other executive branch entities would use to estimate the 
     risk-assumed cost of Federal insurance programs and giving 
     such persons an opportunity to submit comments. At the same 
     time, the chairman of the Committee on the Budget shall 
     publish a notice for CBO in the Federal Register advising 
     interested persons of the availability of information 
     describing the models, data (including sources), and critical 
     assumptions (including explicit or implicit discount rate 
     assumptions) that it would use to estimate the risk-assumed 
     cost of Federal insurance programs and giving such interested 
     persons an opportunity to submit comments.
       ``(c) Revision.--(1) After consideration of comments 
     pursuant to subsection (b), and in consultation with the 
     Committees on the Budget of the House of Representatives and 
     the Senate, OMB and CBO shall revise the models, data, and 
     major assumptions they would use to estimate the risk-assumed 
     cost of Federal insurance programs. Except as provided by the 
     next sentence, this paragraph shall not apply to an agency 
     that is subject to statutory requirements to maintain a risk-
     based assessment system with a minimum level of reserves 
     against loss and to assess insured entities for risk-based 
     premiums. However, such agency shall consult with the 
     aforementioned entities.
       ``(2) When the President submits a budget of the Government 
     pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, 
     for fiscal year 2004, OMB shall publish a notice in the 
     Federal Register advising interested persons of the 
     availability of information describing the models, data 
     (including sources), and critical assumptions (including 
     explicit or implicit discount rate assumptions) that it or 
     other executive branch entities used to estimate the risk-
     assumed cost of Federal insurance programs.
       ``(d) Display.--
       ``(1) In general.--For fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006 
     the budget submissions of the President pursuant to section 
     1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, and CBO's reports 
     on the economic and budget outlook pursuant to section 
     202(e)(1) and the President's budgets, shall for display 
     purposes only, estimate the risk-assumed cost of existing 
     or proposed Federal insurance programs.
       ``(2) OMB.--The display in the budget submissions of the 
     President for fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006 shall 
     include--
       ``(A) a presentation for each Federal insurance program in 
     budget-account level detail of estimates of risk-assumed 
     cost;
       ``(B) a summary table of the risk-assumed costs of Federal 
     insurance programs; and
       ``(C) an alternate summary table of budget functions and 
     aggregates using risk-assumed rather than cash-based cost 
     estimates for Federal insurance programs.
       ``(3) CBO.--In the 108th Congress and the first session of 
     the 109th Congress, CBO shall include in its estimates under 
     section 308, for display purposes only, the risk-assumed cost 
     of existing Federal insurance programs, or legislation that 
     CBO, in consultation with the Committees on the Budget of the 
     House of Representatives and the Senate, determines would 
     create a new Federal insurance program.
       ``(e) OMB, CBO, and GAO Evaluations.--(1) Not later than 6 
     months after the budget submission of the President pursuant 
     to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for 
     fiscal year 2006, OMB, CBO, and GAO shall each submit to the 
     Committees on the Budget of the House of Representatives and 
     the Senate a report that evaluates the advisability and 
     appropriate implementation of this title.
       ``(2) Each report made pursuant to paragraph (1) shall 
     address the following:
       ``(A) The adequacy of risk-assumed estimation models used 
     and alternative modeling methods.
       ``(B) The availability and reliability of data or 
     information necessary to carry out this title.
       ``(C) The appropriateness of the explicit or implicit 
     discount rate used in the various risk-assumed estimation 
     models.
       ``(D) The advisability of specifying a statutory discount 
     rate (such as the Treasury rate) for use in risk-assumed 
     estimation models.
       ``(E) The ability of OMB, CBO, or GAO, as applicable, to 
     secure any data or information directly from any Federal 
     agency necessary to enable it to carry out this title.
       ``(F) The relationship between risk-assumed accrual 
     budgeting for Federal insurance programs and the specific 
     requirements of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
     Control Act of 1985.
       ``(G) Whether Federal budgeting is improved by the 
     inclusion of risk-assumed cost estimates for Federal 
     insurance programs.
       ``(H) The advisability of including each of the programs 
     currently estimated on a risk-assumed cost basis in the 
     Federal budget on that basis.

     ``SEC. 604. DEFINITIONS.

       ``For purposes of this title:
       ``(1) The term `Federal insurance program' means a program 
     that makes insurance commitments and includes the list of 
     such programs included in the joint explanatory statement of 
     managers accompanying the conference report on the 
     Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act of 2000.
       ``(2) The term `insurance commitment' means an agreement in 
     advance by a Federal agency to indemnify a nonfederal entity 
     against specified losses. This term does not include loan 
     guarantees as defined in title V or benefit programs such as 
     social security, medicare, and similar existing social 
     insurance programs.
       ``(3)(A) The term `risk-assumed cost' means the net present 
     value of the estimated cash flows to and from the Government 
     resulting from an insurance commitment or modification 
     thereof.
       ``(B) The cash flows associated with an insurance 
     commitment include--
       ``(i) expected claims payments inherent in the Government's 
     commitment;
       ``(ii) net premiums (expected premium collections received 
     from or on behalf of the insured less expected administrative 
     expenses);
       ``(iii) expected recoveries; and
       ``(iv) expected changes in claims, premiums, or recoveries 
     resulting from the exercise by the insured of any option 
     included in the insurance commitment.
       ``(C) The cost of a modification is the difference between 
     the current estimate of the net present value of the 
     remaining cash flows under the terms of the insurance 
     commitment, and the current estimate of the net present value 
     of the remaining cash flows under the terms of the insurance 
     commitment as modified.
       ``(D) The cost of a reestimate is the difference between 
     the net present value of the amount currently required by the 
     financing account to pay estimated claims and other 
     expenditures and the amount currently available in the 
     financing account. The cost of a reestimate shall be 
     accounted for in the current year in the budget of the 
     Government pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United 
     States Code.
       ``(E) For purposes of this definition, expected 
     administrative expenses shall be construed as the amount 
     estimated to be necessary for the proper administration of 
     the insurance program. This amount may differ from amounts 
     actually appropriated or otherwise made available for the 
     administration of the program.
       ``(4) The term `program account' means the budget account 
     for the risk-assumed cost, and for paying all costs of 
     administering the insurance program, and is the account from 
     which the risk-assumed cost is disbursed to the financing 
     account.
       ``(5) The term `financing account' means the nonbudget 
     account that is associated with each program account which 
     receives payments from or makes payments to the program 
     account, receives premiums and other payments from the 
     public, pays insurance claims, and holds balances.
       ``(6) The term `modification' means any Government action 
     that alters the risk-assumed cost of an existing insurance 
     commitment from the current estimate of cash flows. This 
     includes any action resulting

[[Page H3115]]

     from new legislation, or from the exercise of administrative 
     discretion under existing law, that directly or indirectly 
     alters the estimated cost of existing insurance commitments.
       ``(7) The term `model' means any actuarial, financial, 
     econometric, probabilistic, or other methodology used to 
     estimate the expected frequency and magnitude of loss-
     producing events, expected premiums or collections from or on 
     behalf of the insured, expected recoveries, and 
     administrative expenses.
       ``(8) The term `current' has the same meaning as in section 
     250(c)(9) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
     Control Act of 1985.
       ``(9) The term `OMB' means the Director of the Office of 
     Management and Budget.
       ``(10) The term `CBO' means the Director of the 
     Congressional Budget Office.
       ``(11) The term `GAO' means the Comptroller General of the 
     United States.

     ``SEC. 605. AUTHORIZATIONS TO ENTER INTO CONTRACTS; ACTUARIAL 
                   COST ACCOUNT.

       ``(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated $600,000 for each of fiscal years 2001 
     through 2006 to the Director of the Office of Management and 
     Budget and each agency responsible for administering a 
     Federal program to carry out this title.
       ``(b) Treasury Transactions With the Financing Accounts.--
     The Secretary of the Treasury shall borrow from, receive 
     from, lend to, or pay the insurance financing accounts such 
     amounts as may be appropriate. The Secretary of the Treasury 
     may prescribe forms and denominations, maturities, and terms 
     and conditions for the transactions described above. The 
     authorities described above shall not be construed to 
     supersede or override the authority of the head of a Federal 
     agency to administer and operate an insurance program. All 
     the transactions provided in this subsection shall be subject 
     to the provisions of subchapter II of chapter 15 of title 31, 
     United States Code. Cash balances of the financing accounts 
     in excess of current requirements shall be maintained in a 
     form of uninvested funds, and the Secretary of the Treasury 
     shall pay interest on these funds.
       ``(c) Appropriation of Amount Necessary To Cover Risk-
     Assumed Cost of Insurance Commitments at Transition Date.--
     (1) A financing account is established on September 30, 2006, 
     for each Federal insurance program.
       ``(2) There is appropriated to each financing account the 
     amount of the risk-assumed cost of Federal insurance 
     commitments outstanding for that program as of the close of 
     September 30, 2006.
       ``(3) These financing accounts shall be used in 
     implementing the budget accounting required by this title.

     ``SEC. 606. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       ``(a) In General.--This title shall take effect immediately 
     and shall expire on September 30, 2008.
       ``(b) Special Rule.--If this title is not reauthorized by 
     September 30, 2008, then the accounting structure and 
     budgetary treatment of Federal insurance programs shall 
     revert to the accounting structure and budgetary treatment in 
     effect immediately before the date of enactment of this 
     title.''.
       (b)  Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents set forth 
     in section 1(b) of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
     Control Act of 1974 is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 507 the following new items:

     ``TITLE VI--BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF FEDERAL INSURANCE PROGRAMS

``Sec. 601. Short title.
``Sec. 602. Budgetary treatment.
``Sec. 603. Timetable for implementation of accrual budgeting for 
              Federal insurance programs.
``Sec. 604. Definitions.
``Sec. 605. Authorizations to enter into contracts; actuarial cost 
              account.
``Sec. 606. Effective date.''.

           Subtitle B--Reports on Long-Term Budgetary Trends

     SEC. 521. REPORTS ON LONG-TERM BUDGETARY TRENDS.

       (a) The President's Budget.--Section 1105(a) of title 31, 
     United States Code (as amended by section 404), is further 
     amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(34) an analysis based upon current law and an analysis 
     based upon the policy assumptions underlying the budget 
     submission for every fifth year of the period of 75 fiscal 
     years beginning with such fiscal year, of the estimated 
     levels of total new budget authority and total budget 
     outlays, estimated revenues, estimated surpluses and 
     deficits, and, for social security, medicare, medicaid, and 
     all other direct spending, estimated levels of total new 
     budget authority and total budget outlays; and a 
     specification of its underlying assumptions and a sensitivity 
     analysis of factors that have a significant effect on the 
     projections made in each analysis; and a comparison of the 
     effects of each of the two analyses on the economy, including 
     such factors as inflation, foreign investment, interest 
     rates, and economic growth.''.
       (b) CBO Reports.--Section 202(e)(1) of the Congressional 
     Budget Act of 1974 is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new sentences: ``Such report shall also include an 
     analysis based upon current law for every fifth year of the 
     period of 75 fiscal years beginning with such fiscal year, of 
     the estimated levels of total new budget authority and total 
     budget outlays, estimated revenues, estimated surpluses and 
     deficits, and, for social security, medicare, medicaid, and 
     all other direct spending, estimated levels of total new 
     budget authority and total budget outlays. The report 
     described in the preceding sentence shall also specify its 
     underlying assumptions and set forth a sensitivity analysis 
     of factors that have a significant effect on the projections 
     made in the report.''.

                   TITLE VI--BASELINES AND BYRD RULE

     SEC. 601. PURPOSE.

     The purposes of this title are to--
       (1) require budgetary comparisons to prior year levels; and
       (2) restrict the application of the Byrd rule to measures 
     other than conference reports.

                        Subtitle A--The Baseline

     SEC. 611. THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET.

       (a) Paragraph (5) of section 1105(a) of title 31, United 
     States Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(5) except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, 
     estimated expenditures and appropriations for the current 
     year and estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations 
     the President decides are necessary to support the Government 
     in the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted and the 
     4 fiscal years following that year, and, except for detailed 
     budget estimates, the percentage change from the current year 
     to the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted for 
     estimated expenditures and for appropriations.''.
       (b) Section 1105(a)(6) of title 31, United States Code, is 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(6) estimated receipts of the Government in the current 
     year and the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted 
     and the 4 fiscal years after that year under--
       ``(A) laws in effect when the budget is submitted; and
       ``(B) proposals in the budget to increase revenues, and the 
     percentage change (in the case of each category referred 
     to in subparagraphs (A) and (B)) between the current year 
     and the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted and 
     between the current year and each of the 9 fiscal years 
     after the fiscal year for which the budget is 
     submitted.''.
       (c) Section 1105(a)(12) of title 31, United States Code, is 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(12) for each proposal in the budget for legislation that 
     would establish or expand a Government activity or function, 
     a table showing--
       ``(A) the amount proposed in the budget for appropriation 
     and for expenditure because of the proposal in the fiscal 
     year for which the budget is submitted;
       ``(B) the estimated appropriation required because of the 
     proposal for each of the 4 fiscal years after that year that 
     the proposal will be in effect; and
       ``(C) the estimated amount for the same activity or 
     function, if any, in the current fiscal year,

     and, except for detailed budget estimates, the percentage 
     change (in the case of each category referred to in 
     subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C)) between the current year and 
     the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted.''.
       (d) Section 1105(a)(18) of title 31, United States Code, is 
     amended by inserting ``new budget authority and'' before 
     ``budget outlays''.
       (e) Section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, (as 
     amended by sections 412(b) and 521(a)) is further amended by 
     adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
       ``(35) a comparison of levels of estimated expenditures and 
     proposed appropriations for each function and subfunction in 
     the current fiscal year and the fiscal year for which the 
     budget is submitted, along with the proposed increase or 
     decrease of spending in percentage terms for each function 
     and subfunction.
       ``(36) a table on sources of growth in total direct 
     spending under current law and as proposed in this budget 
     submission for the budget year and the ensuing 9 fiscal 
     years, which shall include changes in outlays attributable to 
     the following: cost-of-living adjustments; changes in the 
     number of program recipients; increases in medical care 
     prices, utilization and intensity of medical care; and 
     residual factors.
       ``(37) a comparison of the estimated level of obligation 
     limitations, budget authority, and outlays for highways 
     subject to the discretionary spending limits for highways (if 
     any) set forth in section 251(c) of the Balanced Budget 
     and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 for the fiscal 
     year for which the budget is submitted and the 
     corresponding levels for such year under current law as 
     adjusted pursuant to section 251(b)(1)(D) of such Act.''.
       (f) Section 1109(a) of title 31, United States Code, is 
     amended by inserting after the first sentence the following 
     new sentence: ``For discretionary spending, these estimates 
     shall assume the levels set forth in the discretionary 
     spending limits under section 251(c) of the Balanced Budget 
     and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as adjusted, for 
     the appropriate fiscal years (and if no such limits are in 
     effect, these estimates shall assume the adjusted levels for 
     the most recent fiscal year for which such levels were in 
     effect).''.

     SEC. 612. THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET.

       Section 301(e) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (as 
     amended by section 103) is further amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by inserting at the end the 
     following: ``The basis of deliberations in developing such 
     joint resolution shall be the

[[Page H3116]]

     estimated budgetary levels for the preceding fiscal year. Any 
     budgetary levels pending before the committee and the text of 
     the joint resolution shall be accompanied by a document 
     comparing such levels or such text to the estimated levels of 
     the prior fiscal year. Any amendment offered in the committee 
     that changes a budgetary level and is based upon a specific 
     policy assumption for a program, project, or activity shall 
     be accompanied by a document indicating the estimated amount 
     for such program, project, or activity in the current 
     year.''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and'' at the end of 
     subparagraph (H) (as redesignated), by striking the period 
     and inserting a semicolon at the end of subparagraph (I) (as 
     redesignated), and by adding at the end the following new 
     subparagraphs:
       ``(J) a comparison of levels for the current fiscal year 
     with proposed spending and revenue levels for the subsequent 
     fiscal years along with the proposed increase or decrease of 
     spending in percentage terms for each function; and
       ``(K) a comparison of the proposed levels of new budget 
     authority and outlays for the highway category (if any) (as 
     defined in section 250(c)(4)(B) of the Balanced Budget and 
     Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985) for the budget year 
     with the corresponding levels under current law as adjusted 
     consistent with the anticipated revenue alignment adjustments 
     to be made pursuant to section 251(b)(1)(D) of such Act.''.

     SEC. 613. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE REPORTS TO COMMITTEES.

       (a) The first sentence of section 202(e)(1) of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended by inserting 
     ``compared to comparable levels for the current year'' before 
     the comma at the end of subparagraph (A) and before the comma 
     at the end of subparagraph (B).
       (b) Section 202(e)(1) of the Congressional Budget Act of 
     1974 is amended by inserting after the first sentence the 
     following new sentence: ``Such report shall also include a 
     table on sources of spending growth in total direct spending 
     for the budget year and the ensuing 9 fiscal years, which 
     shall include changes in outlays attributable to the 
     following: cost-of-living adjustments; changes in the number 
     of program recipients; increases in medical care prices, 
     utilization and intensity of medical care; and residual 
     factors.''.
       (c) Section 308(a)(1)(B) of the Congressional Budget Act of 
     1974 is amended by inserting ``and shall include a comparison 
     of those levels to comparable levels for the current fiscal 
     year'' before ``if timely submitted''.

     SEC. 614. OUTYEAR ASSUMPTIONS FOR DISCRETIONARY SPENDING.

       For purposes of chapter 11 of title 31 of the United States 
     Code, or the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, unless 
     otherwise expressly provided, in making budgetary projections 
     for years for which there are no discretionary spending 
     limits, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
     and the Director of the Congressional Budget Office shall 
     assume discretionary spending levels at the levels for the 
     last fiscal year for which such levels were in effect.

                       Subtitle B--The Byrd Rule

     SEC. 621. LIMITATION ON BYRD RULE.

       (a) Protection of Conference Reports.--Section 313 of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended--
       (1) in subsection (c), by striking ``and again upon the 
     submission of a conference report on such a reconciliation 
     bill or resolution,'';
       (2) by striking subsection (d);
       (3) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (d); and
       (4) in subsection (e), as redesignated--
       (A) by striking ``, motion, or conference report'' the 
     first place it appears and inserting ``, or motion''; and
       (B) by striking ``, motion, or conference report'' the 
     second and third places it appears and inserting ``or 
     motion''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--The first sentence of section 
     312(e) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended by 
     inserting ``, except for section 313,'' after ``Act''.

  The CHAIRMAN. No amendment to that amendment is in order except those 
printed in House Report 106-613. Each amendment may be offered only in 
the order printed in the report, by a Member designated in the report, 
shall be considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified 
in the report, equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an 
opponent, shall not be subject to an amendment, and shall not be 
subject to a demand for a division of the question.
  The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may postpone a request for 
a recorded vote on any amendment, and may reduce to a minimum of 5 
minutes the time for voting on any postponed question that immediately 
follows another vote, provided that the time for voting on the first 
question shall be a minimum of 15 minutes.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in House 
Report 106-613.


                 Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Dreier

  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Chairman, I offer amendment No. 1 made in order under 
the rule.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Dreier:
       At the end, add the following new title:

                     TITLE VII--BIENNIAL BUDGETING

     SEC. 701. FINDINGS.

       The Congress finds that--
       (1) the annual appropriations and budget process 
     increasingly dominates the congressional agenda and Congress 
     regularly fails to meet the deadlines of the Congressional 
     Budget Act of 1974;
       (2) the design of the budget process has led to repetitive 
     and time-consuming budget votes, decreasing the time 
     available for the systematic and programmatic oversight of 
     Federal programs and delaying the enactment of legislation 
     necessary to fund the Government;
       (3) Congress' responsibility to improve the efficiency, 
     economy, and effectiveness of governmental operations, 
     evaluate programs and performance, detect and prevent poor 
     administration, waste, or abuse in Government programs, 
     ensure that executive policies reflect the public interest, 
     ensure administrative compliance with legislative intent, and 
     prevent executive encroachment on legislative authority and 
     prerogatives is undermined by the current time-consuming and 
     repetitive budget process;
       (4) an annual budget process encourages inefficiency in the 
     management, stability, and predictability of Federal funding, 
     particularly for States and localities;
       (5) a biennial budget process will reduce the number of 
     budget-related votes during each Congress, enhance 
     congressional oversight of Government operations, encourage 
     longer time horizons in policy planning and greater stability 
     in fiscal policy;
       (6) a biennial budget process was a principal 
     recommendation of the 1993 Joint Committee on the 
     Organization of Congress and the Vice President's National 
     Performance Review;
       (7) since the enactment of the Congressional Budget Act of 
     1974, more than 50 bills addressing a two-year budget cycle 
     have been introduced, 10 biennial budget related provisions 
     were reported by congressional committees, 7 passed either 
     chamber and 4 were enacted; more than 40 congressional or 
     special committee hearings addressed the issue of biennial 
     budgeting; and the Congressional Budget Office, the Office of 
     Management and Budget, and 5 different special task forces or 
     joint committees of Congress have either recommended biennial 
     budgeting or further studies of it;
       (8) the adoption of a biennial budget process was 
     recommended by President Reagan in the fiscal year 1989 
     budget submission, by President Bush in the fiscal year 1990 
     and 1991 budget submissions, and by President Clinton in the 
     fiscal year 1995, 2000, and 2001 budget submissions; and
       (9) a bipartisan majority of Members of the House of 
     Representatives support a biennial budget process.

     SEC. 702. REVISION OF TIMETABLE.

       Section 300 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 
     U.S.C. 631) is amended to read as follows:


                              ``timetable

       ``Sec. 300. (a) In General.--Except as provided by 
     subsection (b), the timetable with respect to the 
     congressional budget process for any Congress (beginning with 
     the One Hundred Eighth Congress) is as follows:
       

                                   ``First Session
``On or before:                    Action to be completed:
 
First Monday in February.........  President submits budget
                                    recommendations.
February 15......................  Congressional Budget Office submits
                                    report to Budget Committees.
Not later than 6 weeks after       Committees submit views and estimates
 budget submission.                 to Budget Committees.
April 1..........................  Budget Committees report concurrent
                                    resolution on the biennial budget.
May 15...........................  Congress completes action on
                                    concurrent resolution on the
                                    biennial budget.
May 15...........................  Biennial appropriation bills may be
                                    considered in the House.
June 10..........................  House Appropriations Committee
                                    reports last biennial appropriation
                                    bill.
June 30..........................  House completes action on biennial
                                    appropriation bills.
October 1........................  Biennium begins.
 
                                   ``Second Session
 
``On or before:                    Action to be completed:
 
February 15......................  President submits budget review.
Not later than 6 weeks after       Congressional Budget Office submits
 President submits budget review.   report to Budget Committees.
The last day of the session......  Congress completes action on bills
                                    and resolutions authorizing new
                                    budget authority for the succeeding
                                    biennium.
 

       ``(b) Special Rule.--In the case of any first session of 
     Congress that begins in any year during which the term of a 
     President (except a President who succeeds himself) begins, 
     the following dates shall supersede those set forth in 
     subsection (a):


                                   ``First Session
``On or before:                    Action to be completed:
 
First Monday in April............  President submits budget
                                    recommendations.
April 20.........................  Committees submit views and estimates
                                    to Budget Committees.
May 15...........................  Budget Committees report concurrent
                                    resolution on the biennial budget.
June 1...........................  Congress completes action on
                                    concurrent resolution on the
                                    biennial budget.
June 1...........................  Biennial appropriation bills may be
                                    considered in the House.
July 1...........................  House Appropriations Committee
                                    reports last biennial appropriation
                                    bill.
July 20..........................  House completes action on biennial
                                    appropriation bills.
October 1........................  Biennium begins.''.
 

     SEC. 703. AMENDMENTS TO THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND 
                   IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT OF 1974.

       (a) Declaration of Purpose.--Section 2(2) of the 
     Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 
     U.S.C. 621(2)) is amended by striking ``each year'' and 
     inserting ``biennially''.

[[Page H3117]]

       (b) Definitions.--
       (1) Budget resolution.--Section 3(4) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 
     622(4)) is amended by striking ``fiscal year'' each place it 
     appears and inserting ``biennium''.
       (2) Biennium.--Section 3 of such Act (2 U.S.C. 622) (as 
     amended by section 203) is further amended by adding at the 
     end the following new paragraph:
       ``(13) The term `biennium' means the period of 2 
     consecutive fiscal years beginning on October 1 of any odd-
     numbered year.''.
       (c) Biennial Concurrent Resolution on the Budget.--
       (1) Contents of resolution.--Section 301(a) of such Act (2 
     U.S.C. 632(a)) is amended--
       (A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by--
       (i) striking ``April 15 of each year'' and inserting ``May 
     15 of each odd-numbered year'';
       (ii) striking ``the fiscal year beginning on October 1 of 
     such year'' the first place it appears and inserting ``the 
     biennium beginning on October 1 of such year''; and
       (iii) striking ``the fiscal year beginning on October 1 of 
     such year'' the second place it appears and inserting ``each 
     fiscal year in such period'';
       (B) in paragraph (6), by striking ``for the fiscal year'' 
     and inserting ``for each fiscal year in the biennium''; and
       (C) in paragraph (7), by striking ``for the fiscal year'' 
     and inserting ``for each fiscal year in the biennium''.
       (2) Additional matters.--Section 301(b) of such Act (2 
     U.S.C. 632(b)) is amended--
       (A) in paragraph (3), by striking ``for such fiscal year'' 
     and inserting ``for either fiscal year in such biennium''; 
     and
       (B) in paragraph (7), by striking ``for the first fiscal 
     year'' and inserting ``for each fiscal year in the 
     biennium''.
       (3) Views of other committees.--Section 301(d) of such Act 
     (2 U.S.C. 632(d)) is amended by inserting ``(or, if 
     applicable, as provided by section 300(b))'' after ``United 
     States Code''.
       (4) Hearings.--Section 301(e)(1) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 
     632(e)) is amended by--
       (A) striking ``fiscal year'' and inserting ``biennium''; 
     and
       (B) inserting after the second sentence the following: ``On 
     or before April 1 of each odd-numbered year (or, if 
     applicable, as provided by section 300(b)), the Committee on 
     the Budget of each House shall report to its House the 
     concurrent resolution on the budget referred to in subsection 
     (a) for the biennium beginning on October 1 of that year.''.
       (5) Goals for reducing unemployment.--Section 301(f) of 
     such Act (2 U.S.C. 632(f)) is amended by striking ``fiscal 
     year'' each place it appears and inserting ``biennium''.
       (6) Economic assumptions.--Section 301(g)(1) of such Act (2 
     U.S.C. 632(g)(1)) is amended by striking ``for a fiscal 
     year'' and inserting ``for a biennium''.
       (7) Section heading.--The section heading of section 301 of 
     such Act is amended by striking ``ANNUAL'' and inserting 
     ``BIENNIAL''.
       (8) Table of contents.--The item relating to section 301 in 
     the table of contents set forth in section 1(b) of such Act 
     is amended by striking ``Annual'' and inserting ``Biennial''.
       (d) Committee Allocations.--Section 302 of such Act (2 
     U.S.C. 633) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(1) by--
       (A) striking ``for the first fiscal year of the 
     resolution,'' and inserting ``for each fiscal year in the 
     biennium,'';
       (B) striking ``for that period of fiscal years'' and 
     inserting ``for all fiscal years covered by the resolution''; 
     and
       (C) striking ``for the fiscal year of that resolution'' and 
     inserting ``for each fiscal year in the biennium'';
       (2) in subsection (f)(1), by striking ``for a fiscal year'' 
     and inserting ``for a biennium'';
       (3) in subsection (f)(1), by striking ``first fiscal year'' 
     and inserting ``either fiscal year of the biennium'';
       (4) in subsection (f)(2)(A), by--
       (A) striking ``first fiscal year'' and inserting ``each 
     fiscal year of the biennium''; and
       (B) striking ``the total of fiscal years'' and inserting 
     ``the total of all fiscal years covered by the resolution''; 
     and
       (5) in subsection (g)(1)(A), by striking ``April'' and 
     inserting ``May''.
       (e) Section 303 Point of Order.--
       (1) In general.--Section 303(a) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 
     634(a)) is amended by striking ``for a fiscal year'' and 
     inserting ``for a biennium'' and by striking ``the first 
     fiscal year'' and inserting ``each fiscal year of the 
     biennium''.
       (2) Exceptions in the house.--Section 303(b) of such Act (2 
     U.S.C. 634(b)) is amended--
       (A) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking ``the budget year'' 
     and inserting ``the biennium'';
       (B) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking ``the fiscal year'' 
     and inserting ``the biennium''; and
       (C) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``(or June 1 whenever 
     section 300(b) is applicable)''.
       (3) Application to the senate.--Section 303(c)(1) of such 
     Act (2 U.S.C. 634(c)) is amended by--
       (A) striking ``fiscal year'' and inserting ``biennium''; 
     and
       (B) striking ``that year'' and inserting ``each fiscal year 
     of that biennium''.
       (f) Permissible Revisions of Concurrent Resolutions on the 
     Budget.--Section 304 of such Act (2 U.S.C. 635) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``fiscal year'' the first two places it 
     appears and inserting ``biennium'';
       (2) by striking ``for such fiscal year''; and
       (3) by inserting before the period ``for such biennium''.
       (g) Procedures for Consideration of Budget Resolutions.--
     Section 305(a)(3) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 636(b)(3)) is amended 
     by striking ``fiscal year'' and inserting ``biennium''.
       (h) Completion of House Committee Action on Appropriation 
     Bills.--Section 307 of such Act (2 U.S.C. 638) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``each year'' and inserting ``each odd-
     numbered year (or, if applicable, as provided by section 
     300(b), July 1)'';
       (2) by striking ``annual'' and inserting ``biennial'';
       (3) by striking ``fiscal year'' and inserting ``biennium''; 
     and
       (4) by striking ``that year'' and inserting ``each odd-
     numbered year''.
       (i) Quarterly Budget Reports.--Section 308 of such Act (2 
     U.S.C. 639) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(d) Quarterly Budget Reports.--The Director of the 
     Congressional Budget Office shall, as soon as practicable 
     after the completion of each quarter of the fiscal year, 
     prepare an analysis comparing revenues, spending, and the 
     deficit or surplus for the current fiscal year to assumptions 
     included in the congressional budget resolution. In preparing 
     this report, the Director of the Congressional Budget Office 
     shall combine actual budget figures to date with projected 
     revenue and spending for the balance of the fiscal year. The 
     Director of the Congressional Budget Office shall include any 
     other information in this report that it deems useful for a 
     full understanding of the current fiscal position of the 
     Federal Government. The reports mandated by this subsection 
     shall be transmitted by the Director to the Senate and House 
     Committees on the Budget, and the Congressional Budget Office 
     shall make such reports available to any interested party 
     upon request.''.
       (j) Completion of House Action on Regular Appropriation 
     Bills.--Section 309 of such Act (2 U.S.C. 640) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``It'' and inserting ``Except whenever 
     section 300(b) is applicable, it'';
       (2) by inserting ``of any odd-numbered calendar year'' 
     after ``July'';
       (3) by striking ``annual'' and inserting ``biennial''; and
       (4) by striking ``fiscal year'' and inserting ``biennium''.
       (k) Reconciliation Process.--Section 310 of such Act (2 
     U.S.C. 641) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), in the matter preceding paragraph 
     (1), by striking ``any fiscal year'' and inserting ``any 
     biennium'';
       (2) in subsection (a)(1), by striking ``such fiscal year'' 
     each place it appears and inserting ``any fiscal year covered 
     by such resolution''; and
       (3) by striking subsection (f) and redesignating subsection 
     (g) as subsection (f).
       (l) Section 311 Point of Order.--
       (1) In the house.--Section 311(a)(1) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 
     642(a)) is amended--
       (A) by striking ``for a fiscal year'' and inserting ``for a 
     biennium'';
       (B) by striking ``the first fiscal year'' each place it 
     appears and inserting ``either fiscal year of the biennium''; 
     and
       (C) by striking ``that first fiscal year'' and inserting 
     ``each fiscal year in the biennium''.
       (2) In the senate.--Section 311(a)(2) of such Act is 
     amended--
       (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``for the first fiscal 
     year'' and inserting ``for either fiscal year of the 
     biennium''; and
       (B) in subparagraph (B)--
       (i) by striking ``that first fiscal year'' the first place 
     it appears and inserting ``each fiscal year in the 
     biennium''; and
       (ii) by striking ``that first fiscal year and the ensuing 
     fiscal years'' and inserting ``all fiscal years''.
       (3) Social security levels.--Section 311(a)(3) of such Act 
     is amended by--
       (A) striking ``for the first fiscal year'' and inserting 
     ``each fiscal year in the biennium''; and
       (B) striking ``that fiscal year and the ensuing fiscal 
     years'' and inserting ``all fiscal years''.
       (m) Maximum Deficit Amount Point of Order.--Section 312(c) 
     of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 643) is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``for a fiscal year'' and inserting ``for a 
     biennium'';
       (2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``first fiscal year'' and 
     inserting ``either fiscal year in the biennium'';
       (3) in paragraph (2), by striking ``that fiscal year'' and 
     inserting ``either fiscal year in the biennium''; and
       (4) in the matter following paragraph (2), by striking 
     ``that fiscal year'' and inserting ``the applicable fiscal 
     year''.

     SEC. 704. AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

       (a) Clause 4(a)(1)(A) of rule X of the Rules of the House 
     of Representatives is amended by inserting ``odd-numbered'' 
     after ``each''.
       (b) Clause 4(a)(4) of rule X of the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives is amended by striking ``fiscal year'' and 
     inserting ``biennium''.
       (c) Clause 4(b)(2) of rule X of the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives is amended by striking ``each fiscal year'' 
     and inserting ``the biennium''.
       (d) Clause 4(b) of rule X of the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives is amended by striking ``and'' at the end of 
     subparagraph (5), by striking the period and inserting ``; 
     and'' at the end of subparagraph (6), and by adding at the 
     end the following new subparagraph:

[[Page H3118]]

       ``(7) use the second session of each Congress to study 
     issues with long-term budgetary and economic implications, 
     which would include--
       ``(A) hold hearings to receive testimony from committees of 
     jurisdiction to identify problem areas and to report on the 
     results of oversight; and
       ``(B) by January 1 of each odd-number year, issuing a 
     report to the Speaker which identifies the key issues facing 
     the Congress in the next biennium.''.
       (e) Clause 11(i) of rule X of the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives is amended by striking ``the same or 
     preceding fiscal year''.
       (f) Clause 4(e) of rule X of the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives is amended by striking ``annually'' each 
     place it appears and inserting ``biennially'' and by striking 
     ``annual'' and inserting ``biennial''.
       (g) Clause 4(f) of rule X of the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``during each odd-numbered year'' after 
     ``submits his budget'';
       (2) by striking ``fiscal year'' the first place it appears 
     and inserting ``biennium''; and
       (3) by striking ``that fiscal year'' and inserting ``each 
     fiscal year in such ensuing biennium''.
       (h) Clause 3(d)(2)(A) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
     House of Representatives is amended by striking ``five'' both 
     places it appears and inserting ``six''.
       (i) Clause 5(a)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House 
     of Representatives is amended by striking ``fiscal year after 
     September 15 in the preceding fiscal year'' and inserting 
     ``biennium after September 15 of the year in which such 
     biennium begins''.

     SEC. 705. AMENDMENTS TO TITLE 31, UNITED STATES CODE.

       (a) Definition.--Section 1101 of title 31, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following 
     new paragraph:
       ``(3) `biennium' has the meaning given to such term in 
     paragraph (13) of section 3 of the Congressional Budget and 
     Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 622(13)).''.
       (b) Budget Contents and Submission to the Congress.--
       (1) Schedule.--The matter preceding paragraph (1) in 
     section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, is amended 
     to read as follows:
       ``(a) On or before the first Monday in February of each 
     odd-numbered year (or, if applicable, as provided by section 
     300(b) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974), beginning 
     with the One Hundred Seventh Congress, the President shall 
     transmit to the Congress, the budget for the biennium 
     beginning on October 1 of such calendar year. The budget 
     transmitted under this subsection shall include a budget 
     message and summary and supporting information. The President 
     shall include in each budget the following:''.
       (2) Expenditures.--Section 1105(a)(5) of title 31, United 
     States Code, is amended by striking ``the fiscal year for 
     which the budget is submitted and the 4 fiscal years after 
     that year'' and inserting ``each fiscal year in the biennium 
     for which the budget is submitted and in the succeeding 4 
     years''.
       (3) Receipts.--Section 1105(a)(6) of title 31, United 
     States Code, is amended by striking ``the fiscal year for 
     which the budget is submitted and the 4 fiscal years after 
     that year'' and inserting ``each fiscal year in the biennium 
     for which the budget is submitted and in the succeeding 4 
     years''.
       (4) Balance statements.--Section 1105(a)(9)(C) of title 31, 
     United States Code, is amended by striking ``the fiscal 
     year'' and inserting ``each fiscal year in the biennium''.
       (5) Government functions and activities.--Section 
     1105(a)(12) of title 31, United States Code, is amended in 
     subparagraph (A), by striking ``the fiscal year'' and 
     inserting ``each fiscal year in the biennium''.
       (6) Allowances.--Section 1105(a)(13) of title 31, United 
     States Code, is amended by striking ``the fiscal year'' and 
     inserting ``each fiscal year in the biennium''.
       (7) Allowances for unanticipated and uncontrollable 
     expenditures.--Section 1105(a)(14) of title 31, United States 
     Code, is amended by striking ``that year'' and inserting 
     ``each fiscal year in the biennium for which the budget is 
     submitted''.
       (8) Tax expenditures.--Section 1105(a)(16) of title 31, 
     United States Code, is amended by striking ``the fiscal 
     year'' and inserting ``each fiscal year in the biennium''.
       (9) Estimates for future years.--Section 1105(a)(17) of 
     title 31, United States Code, is amended--
       (A) by striking ``the fiscal year following the fiscal 
     year'' and inserting ``each fiscal year in the biennium 
     following the biennium'';
       (B) by striking ``that following fiscal year'' and 
     inserting ``each such fiscal year''; and
       (C) by striking ``fiscal year before the fiscal year'' and 
     inserting ``biennium before the biennium''.
       (10) Prior year outlays.--Section 1105(a)(18) of title 31, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (A) by striking ``the prior fiscal year'' and inserting 
     ``each of the 2 most recently completed fiscal years,'';
       (B) by striking ``for that year'' and inserting ``with 
     respect to those fiscal years''; and
       (C) by striking ``in that year'' and inserting ``in those 
     fiscal years''.
       (11) Prior year receipts.--Section 1105(a)(19) of title 31, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (A) by striking ``the prior fiscal year'' and inserting 
     ``each of the 2 most recently completed fiscal years'';
       (B) by striking ``for that year'' and inserting ``with 
     respect to those fiscal years''; and
       (C) by striking ``in that year'' each place it appears and 
     inserting ``in those fiscal years''.
       (c) Estimated Expenditures of Legislative and Judicial 
     Branches.--Section 1105(b) of title 31, United States Code, 
     is amended by striking ``each year'' and inserting ``each 
     even numbered year''.
       (d) Recommendations To Meet Estimated Deficiencies.--
     Section 1105(c) of title 31, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking ``the fiscal year for'' the first place it 
     appears and inserting ``each fiscal year in the biennium 
     for'';
       (2) by striking ``the fiscal year for'' the second place it 
     appears and inserting ``each fiscal year of the biennium, as 
     the case may be,''; and
       (3) by striking ``that year'' and inserting ``for each year 
     of the biennium''.
       (e) Capital Investment Analysis.--Section 1105(e)(1) of 
     title 31, United States Code, is amended by striking 
     ``ensuing fiscal year'' and inserting ``biennium to which 
     such budget relates''.
       (f) Supplemental Budget Estimates and Changes.--
       (1) In general.--Section 1106(a) of title 31, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by--
       (i) inserting ``and before February 15 of each even 
     numbered year'' after ``Before July 16 of each year''; and
       (ii) striking ``fiscal year'' and inserting ``biennium'';
       (B) in paragraph (1), by striking ``that fiscal year'' and 
     inserting ``each fiscal year in such biennium'';
       (C) in paragraph (2), by striking ``4 fiscal years 
     following the fiscal year'' and inserting ``4 fiscal years 
     following the biennium''; and
       (D) in paragraph (3), by striking ``fiscal year'' and 
     inserting ``biennium''.
       (2) Changes.--Section 1106(b) of title 31, United States 
     Code, is amended by--
       (A) striking ``the fiscal year'' and inserting ``each 
     fiscal year in the biennium''; and
       (B) inserting ``and before February 15 of each even 
     numbered year'' after ``Before July 16 of each year''.
       (g) Current Programs and Activities Estimates.--
       (1) The president.--Section 1109(a) of title 31, United 
     States Code, is amended--
       (A) by striking ``On or before the first Monday after 
     January 3 of each year (on or before February 5 in 1986)'' 
     and inserting ``At the same time the budget required by 
     section 1105 is submitted for a biennium''; and
       (B) by striking ``the following fiscal year'' and inserting 
     ``each fiscal year of such period''.
       (2) Joint economic committee.--Section 1109(b) of title 31, 
     United States Code, is amended by striking ``March 1 of each 
     year'' and inserting ``within 6 weeks of the President's 
     budget submission for each odd-numbered year (or, if 
     applicable, as provided by section 300(b) of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974)''.
       (h) Year-Ahead Requests for Authorizing Legislation.--
     Section 1110 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by--
       (1) striking ``May 16'' and inserting ``March 31''; and
       (2) striking ``year before the year in which the fiscal 
     year begins'' and inserting ``calendar year preceding the 
     calendar year in which the biennium begins''.

     SEC. 706. TWO-YEAR APPROPRIATIONS; TITLE AND STYLE OF 
                   APPROPRIATIONS ACTS.

       Section 105 of title 1, United States Code, is amended to 
     read as follows:

     ``Sec. 105. Title and style of appropriations Acts

       ``(a) The style and title of all Acts making appropriations 
     for the support of the Government shall be as follows: `An 
     Act making appropriations (here insert the object) for each 
     fiscal year in the biennium of fiscal years (here insert the 
     fiscal years of the biennium).'.
       ``(b) All Acts making regular appropriations for the 
     support of the Government shall be enacted for a biennium and 
     shall specify the amount of appropriations provided for each 
     fiscal year in such period.
       ``(c) For purposes of this section, the term `biennium' has 
     the same meaning as in section 3(11) of the Congressional 
     Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 
     622(11)).''.

     SEC. 707. MULTIYEAR AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) In General.--Title III of the Congressional Budget Act 
     of 1974 (as amended by section 206(a) is further amended by 
     adding at the end the following new section:


              ``multiyear authorizations of appropriations

       Sec. 318.(a) Point of Order.--(1)(A) It shall not be in 
     order in the House of Representatives or the Senate to 
     consider any measure that contains a specific authorization 
     of appropriations for any purpose unless the measure includes 
     such a specific authorization of appropriations for that 
     purpose for not less than each fiscal year in one or more 
     bienniums.
       ``(B) For purposes of this paragraph, a specific 
     authorization of appropriations is an authorization for the 
     enactment of an amount of appropriations or amounts not to 
     exceed an amount of appropriations (whether stated as a sum 
     certain, as a limit, or as such sums as may be necessary) for 
     any purpose for a fiscal year.
       ``(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply with respect to an 
     authorization of appropriations for a single fiscal year for 
     any program,

[[Page H3119]]

     project, or activity if the measure containing that 
     authorization includes a provision expressly stating the 
     following: `Congress finds that no authorization of 
     appropriation will be required for [Insert name of applicable 
     program, project, or activity] for any subsequent fiscal 
     year.'.
       ``(3) For purposes of this subsection, the term `measure' 
     means a bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or 
     conference report''.
       (b) Amendment to Table of Contents.--The table of contents 
     set forth in section 1(b) of the Congressional Budget and 
     Impoundment Control Act of 1974 is amended by adding after 
     the item relating to section 317 the following new item:

``Sec. 318. Multiyear authorizations of appropriations.''.

     SEC. 708. GOVERNMENT STRATEGIC AND PERFORMANCE PLANS ON A 
                   BIENNIAL BASIS.

       (a) Strategic Plans.--Section 306 of title 5, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``September 30, 1997'' 
     and inserting ``September 30, 2002'';
       (2) in subsection (b)--
       (A) by striking ``at least every three years'' and 
     inserting ``at least every 4 years''; and
       (B) by striking ``five years forward'' and inserting ``six 
     years forward''; and
       (3) in subsection (c), by inserting a comma after 
     ``section'' the second place it appears and adding 
     ``including a strategic plan submitted by September 30, 2002, 
     meeting the requirements of subsection (a)''.
       (b) Budget Contents and Submission to Congress.--Paragraph 
     (28) of section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, is 
     amended by striking ``beginning with fiscal year 1999, a'' 
     and inserting ``beginning with fiscal year 2004, a 
     biennial''.
       (c) Performance Plans.--Section 1115 of title 31, United 
     States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) in the matter before paragraph (1)--
       (i) by striking ``section 1105(a)(29)'' and inserting 
     ``section 1105(a)(28)''; and
       (ii) by striking ``an annual'' and inserting ``a 
     biennial'';
       (B) in paragraph (1) by inserting after ``program 
     activity'' the following: ``for both years 1 and 2 of the 
     biennial plan'';
       (C) in paragraph (5) by striking ``and'' after the 
     semicolon,
       (D) in paragraph (6) by striking the period and inserting a 
     semicolon; and inserting ``and'' after the inserted 
     semicolon; and
       (E) by adding after paragraph (6) the following:
       ``(7) cover each fiscal year of the biennium beginning with 
     the first fiscal year of the next biennial budget cycle.'';
       (2) in subsection (d) by striking ``annual'' and inserting 
     ``biennial''; and
       (3) in paragraph (6) of subsection (f) by striking 
     ``annual'' and inserting ``biennial''.
       (d) Managerial Accountability and Flexibility.--Section 
     9703 of title 31, United States Code, relating to managerial 
     accountability, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) in the first sentence by striking ``annual''; and
       (B) by striking ``section 1105(a)(29)'' and inserting 
     ``section 1105(a)(28)'';
       (2) in subsection (e)--
       (A) in the first sentence by striking ``one or'' before 
     ``years'';
       (B) in the second sentence by striking ``a subsequent 
     year'' and inserting ``for a subsequent 2-year period''; and
       (C) in the third sentence by striking ``three'' and 
     inserting ``four''.
       (e) Pilot Projects for Performance Budgeting.--Section 1119 
     of title 31, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1) of subsection (d), by striking 
     ``annual'' and inserting ``biennial''; and
       (2) in subsection (e), by striking ``annual'' and inserting 
     ``biennial''.
       (f) Strategic Plans.--Section 2802 of title 39, United 
     States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``September 30, 1997'' 
     and inserting ``September 30, 2002'';
       (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``at least every three 
     years'' and inserting ``at least every 4 years'';
       (3) by striking ``five years forward'' and inserting ``six 
     years forward''; and
       (4) in subsection (c), by inserting a comma after 
     ``section'' the second place it appears and inserting 
     ``including a strategic plan submitted by September 30, 2002, 
     meeting the requirements of subsection (a)''.
       (g) Performance Plans.--Section 2803(a) of title 39, United 
     States Code, is amended--
       (1) in the matter before paragraph (1), by striking ``an 
     annual'' and inserting ``a biennial'';
       (2) in paragraph (1), by inserting after ``program 
     activity'' the following: ``for both years 1 and 2 of the 
     biennial plan'';
       (3) in paragraph (5), by striking ``and'' after the 
     semicolon;
       (4) in paragraph (6), by striking the period and inserting 
     ``; and''; and
       (5) by adding after paragraph (6) the following:
       ``(7) cover each fiscal year of the biennium beginning with 
     the first fiscal year of the next biennial budget cycle.''.
       (h) Committee Views of Plans and Reports.--Section 301(d) 
     of the Congressional Budget Act (2 U.S.C. 632(d)) is amended 
     by adding at the end ``Each committee of the Senate or the 
     House of Representatives shall review the strategic plans, 
     performance plans, and performance reports, required under 
     section 306 of title 5, United States Code, and sections 1115 
     and 1116 of title 31, United States Code, of all agencies 
     under the jurisdiction of the committee. Each committee may 
     provide its views on such plans or reports to the Committee 
     on the Budget of the applicable House.''.
       (i) Effective Date.--
       (1) In general.--The amendments made by this section shall 
     take effect on March 1, 2003.
       (2) Agency actions.--Effective on and after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, each agency shall take such actions as 
     necessary to prepare and submit any plan or report in 
     accordance with the amendments made by this title.

     SEC. 709. BIENNIAL APPROPRIATION BILLS.

       (a) In the House of Representatives.--(1) Clause 2(a) of 
     rule XXI of the Rules of the House of Representatives is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(3)(A) Except as provided by subdivision (B), an 
     appropriation may not be reported in a general appropriation 
     bill (other than a supplemental appropriation bill), and may 
     not be in order as an amendment thereto, unless it provides 
     new budget authority or establishes a level of obligations 
     under contract authority for each fiscal year of a biennium.
       ``(B) Subdivision (A) does not apply with respect to an 
     appropriation for a single fiscal year for any program, 
     project, or activity if the bill or amendment thereto 
     containing that appropriation includes a provision expressly 
     stating the following: `Congress finds that no additional 
     funding beyond one fiscal year will be required and the 
     [Insert name of applicable program, project, or activity] 
     will be completed or terminated after the amount provided has 
     been expended.'.
       ``(C) For purposes of paragraph (b), the statement set 
     forth in subdivision (B) with respect to an appropriation for 
     a single fiscal year for any program, project, or activity 
     may be included in a general appropriation bill or amendment 
     thereto.''.
       (2) Clause 5(b)(1) of rule XXII of the House of 
     Representatives is amended by striking ``or (c)'' and 
     inserting ``or (3) or 2(c)''.
       (b) In the Senate.--(1) Title III of the Congressional 
     Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 631 et seq.) (as amended by 
     section 707) is further amended by adding at the end the 
     following:


            ``consideration of biennial appropriation bills

       ``Sec. 319. It shall not be in order in the Senate in any 
     odd-numbered year to consider any regular appropriation bill 
     providing new budget authority or a limitation on obligations 
     under the jurisdiction of the Committee on Appropriations for 
     only the first fiscal year of a biennium, unless the program, 
     project, or activity for which the new budget authority or 
     obligation limitation is provided will require no additional 
     authority beyond one year and will be completed or terminated 
     after the amount provided has been expended.''.
       (2) The table of contents set forth in section 1(b) of the 
     Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 is 
     amended by adding after the item relating to section 318 the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 319. Consideration of biennial appropriation bills.''.

     SEC. 710. ASSISTANCE BY FEDERAL AGENCIES TO STANDING 
                   COMMITTEES OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF 
                   REPRESENTATIVES.

       (a) Information Regarding Agency Appropriations Requests.--
     To assist each standing committee of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate in carrying out its 
     responsibilities, the head of each Federal agency which 
     administers the laws or parts of laws under the jurisdiction 
     of such committee shall provide to such committee such 
     studies, information, analyses, reports, and assistance as 
     may be requested by the chairman and ranking minority member 
     of the committee.
       (b) Information Regarding Agency Program Administration.--
     To assist each standing committee of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate in carrying out its 
     responsibilities, the head of any agency shall furnish to 
     such committee documentation, containing information 
     received, compiled, or maintained by the agency as part of 
     the operation or administration of a program, or specifically 
     compiled pursuant to a request in support of a review of a 
     program, as may be requested by the chairman and ranking 
     minority member of such committee.
       (c) Summaries by Comptroller General.--Within thirty days 
     after the receipt of a request from a chairman and ranking 
     minority member of a standing committee having jurisdiction 
     over a program being reviewed and studied by such committee 
     under this section, the Comptroller General of the United 
     States shall furnish to such committee summaries of any 
     audits or reviews of such program which the Comptroller 
     General has completed during the preceding six years.
       (d) Congressional Assistance.--Consistent with their duties 
     and functions under law, the Comptroller General of the 
     United States, the Director of the Congressional Budget 
     Office, and the Director of the Congressional Research 
     Service shall continue to furnish (consistent with 
     established protocols) to each standing committee of the 
     House of Representatives or the Senate such information, 
     studies, analyses, and reports

[[Page H3120]]

     as the chairman and ranking minority member may request to 
     assist the committee in conducting reviews and studies of 
     programs under this section.

     SEC. 711. REPORT ON TWO-YEAR FISCAL PERIOD.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
     shall--
       (1) determine the impact and feasibility of changing the 
     definition of a fiscal year and the budget process based on 
     that definition to a 2-year fiscal period with a biennial 
     budget process based on the 2-year period; and
       (2) report the findings of the study to the Committees on 
     the Budget of the House of Representatives and the Senate and 
     the Committee on Rules of the House of Representatives.

     SEC. 712. SPECIAL TRANSITION PERIOD FOR THE 107TH CONGRESS.

       (a) President's Budget Submission for Fiscal Year 2002.--
     The budget submission of the President pursuant to section 
     1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for fiscal year 2002 
     shall include the following:
       (1) An identification of the budget accounts for which an 
     appropriation should be made for each fiscal year of the 
     fiscal year 2002-2003 biennium.
       (2) Budget authority that should be provided for each such 
     fiscal year for the budget accounts identified under 
     paragraph (1).
       (b) Review and Recommendations of the Committees on 
     Appropriations.--The Committee on Appropriations of the House 
     of Representatives and the Senate shall review the items 
     included pursuant to subsection (a) in the budget submission 
     of the President for fiscal year 2002 and include its 
     recommendations thereon in its views and estimates made under 
     section 301(d) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 within 
     6 weeks of that budget submission.
       (c) Actions by the Committees on the Budget.--(1) The 
     Committee on the Budget of the House of Representatives and 
     the Senate shall review the items included pursuant to 
     subsection (a) in the budget submission of the President for 
     fiscal year 2002 and the recommendations submitted by the 
     Committee on Appropriations of its House pursuant to 
     subsection (b) included in its views and estimates made under 
     section 301(d) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
       (2) The report of the Committee on the Budget of each House 
     accompanying the concurrent resolution on the budget for 
     fiscal year 2002 and the joint explanatory statement of 
     managers accompanying such resolution shall also include 
     allocations to the Committee on Appropriations of its House 
     of total new budget authority and total outlays (which shall 
     be deemed to be made pursuant to section 302(a) of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974 for purposes of budget 
     enforcement under section 302(f)) for fiscal year 2003 from 
     which the Committee on Appropriations may report regular 
     appropriation bills for fiscal year 2002 that include funding 
     for certain accounts for each of fiscal years 2002 and 2003.
       (3) The report of the Committee on the Budget of each House 
     accompanying the concurrent resolution on the budget for 
     fiscal year 2002 and the joint explanatory statement of 
     managers accompanying such resolution shall also include the 
     assumptions upon which such allocations referred to in 
     paragraph (2) are based.
       (d) GAO Programmatic Oversight Assistance.--(1) During the 
     first session of the 107th Congress the committees of the 
     House of Representatives and the Senate are directed to work 
     with the Comptroller General of the United States to develop 
     plans to transition program authorizations to a multi-year 
     schedule.
       (2) During the 107th Congress, the Comptroller General of 
     the United States will continue to provide assistance to the 
     Congress with respect to programmatic oversight and in 
     particular will assist the committees of Congress in 
     designing and conforming programmatic oversight procedures 
     for the fiscal year 2003-2004 biennium.
       (e) CBO Authorization Report.--On or before January 15, 
     2002, the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, after 
     consultation with the appropriate committees of the House of 
     Representatives and Senate, shall submit to the Congress a 
     report listing (A) all programs and activities funded during 
     fiscal year 2002 for which authorizations for appropriations 
     have not been enacted for that fiscal year and (B) all 
     programs and activities funded during fiscal year 2002 for 
     which authorizations for appropriations will expire during 
     that fiscal year, fiscal year 2003, or fiscal year 2004.
       (f) President's Budget Submission for Fiscal Year 2003.--
     The budget submission of the President pursuant to section 
     1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for fiscal year 2003 
     shall include an evaluation of, and recommendations 
     regarding, the transitional biennial budget process for the 
     fiscal year 2002-2003 biennium that was carried out pursuant 
     to this section.
       (g) CBO Transitional Report.--On or before March 31, 2002, 
     the Director of the Congressional Budget Office shall submit 
     to Congress an evaluation of, and recommendations regarding, 
     the transitional biennial budget process for the fiscal year 
     2002-2003 biennium that was carried out pursuant to this 
     section.

     SEC. 713. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       Except as provided by sections 708, 711, and 712, this 
     title and the amendments made by this title shall take effect 
     on January 1, 2003, and shall apply to budget resolutions and 
     appropriations for the biennium beginning with fiscal year 
     2004.

       In section 1(b), at the end of the table of contents, 
     insert the following new items:

                     TITLE VII--BIENNIAL BUDGETING

Sec. 701. Findings.
Sec. 702. Revision of timetable.
Sec. 703. Amendments to the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
              Control Act of 1974.
Sec. 704. Amendments to rules of House of Representatives.
Sec. 705. Amendments to title 31, United States Code.
Sec. 706. Two-year appropriations; title and style of appropriations 
              acts.
Sec. 707. Multiyear authorizations.
Sec. 708. Government plans on a biennial basis.
Sec. 709. Biennial appropriation bills.
Sec. 710. Assistance by Federal agencies to standing committees of the 
              Senate and the House of Representatives.
Sec. 711. Report on two-year fiscal period.
Sec. 712. Special transition period for the 107th Congress.
Sec. 713. Effective date.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 499, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Dreier) and a Member opposed each will control 20 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier).

                              {time}  1615

  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today along with my colleagues, the gentleman 
from Minnesota (Mr. Luther), the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Regula), the 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Hall), the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young), 
the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, the gentleman from 
Kentucky (Mr. Whitfield), the gentlewoman from Missouri (Ms. McCarthy), 
the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. Bass), the gentleman from North 
Carolina (Mr. Jones), and others who worked long and hard on this to 
offer a bipartisan amendment, and I underscore the word ``bipartisan 
amendment,'' to establish a biennial budget and appropriations process 
and to enhance programmatic oversight, management, efficiency, and 
performance of the Federal Government.
  I would like to specifically commend the hard work of the gentleman 
from New Hampshire (Mr. Bass), my colleague as I mentioned, who is here 
on the floor. He has been a strong supporter of this. He is a member of 
the Committee on the Budget.
  This is also, I should say, a recommendation, as we pointed out 
several times, of the bipartisan Joint Committee on the Organization of 
Congress back in 1993.
  Under a biennial budget process, the President would submit a 2-year 
budget, and Congress would consider a 2-year budget resolution and 13 
2-year appropriations bills during the first session of a Congress. The 
second session of the Congress would be devoted to consideration of 
authorization bills and for the very important programmatic oversight 
of government agencies.
  Now, Mr. Chairman, I happen to believe that the enactment of a 
biennial budget process could lead to the most significant government-
wide fiscal reform that we have seen in a quarter century. I am not 
alone in that belief. President Clinton proposed it in his most recent 
budget. Vice President Gore proposed it as a key component of his 
reinventing government reform outlined in the National Performance 
Review Report.
  Governor George W. Bush has stated that biennial budgeting is a 
reform that needs to be done by the Congress. Let me say that again. We 
have got President Bill Clinton, the presumptive Democratic nominee 
Vice President Al Gore, presumptive Republican nominee Governor George 
Bush of Texas, all agreeing on the need for us to have a biennial 
budget.
  Earlier this year, the Committee on Rules held three separate days of 
hearings on biennial budgeting where we received detailed testimony 
from 32 witnesses. I should stress the Committee on Rules held three 
separate hearings, very important hearings, on the issue of biennial 
budgeting. Thirty-two witnesses, which included the former House 
Committee on the Budget chairman and Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, Leon Panetta, my former California colleague, 
the

[[Page H3121]]

current director of the Office of Management and Budget, Jack Lew, 10 
academics, the Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional 
Accounting Office, and 17 Members of Congress, which included opponents 
like the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Smith) and the Speaker of the 
House and the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, both of whom 
testified in strong support of this measure.
  Let me tell my colleagues that I recently met with our former 
colleague, Leon Panetta. He feels very strongly about this. He is a 
strong partisan Democrat. But, remember, he was chairman of the 
Committee on the Budget. He served as Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, and he served as Chief of Staff to President 
Clinton.
  He stated in his testimony ``a biennial budget built around a 2-year 
life of the Congress offers a better way for Congress to commit itself 
to continuing fiscal discipline and to better planning for the coming 
years.''
  Jack Lew stated, ``the primary potential benefit from biennial 
budgeting is that, by concentrating budget decisions in the first year 
of each 2-year period, time would be freed up in the second year that 
could be redirected to management, long-range planning, and 
oversight.''
  My cochairman of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, 
our former Democratic colleague, Lee Hamilton, now the head of the 
great Woodrow Wilson Center here in town said ``biennial budgeting 
would free up Members' time for important work that is now being 
squeezed out by competing pressures.''
  Now, this bipartisan amendment, Mr. Chairman, is the product of 
months of extensive hearings, technical consultation, and legislative 
drafting. It addresses comprehensive concerns with uncertainty in 
projections, weakened oversight, and larger supplementals.
  There are only two reasons, only two reasons to oppose this 
amendment. One either wants to maintain the status quo, which has 
created government shutdowns and a lot of contention late in a session. 
It breeds that annual conflict, and it enhances the level of cynicism 
that the people have towards this institution. Or one is one of those 
who supports the idea of a do-nothing Congress. Let us block any kind 
of reform that might be coming forward.
  I will say that I do not think that we should be doing either of 
those things. I do not think that we should be maintaining simply the 
status quo, and this Congress is dedicated to doing everything that it 
can to bring about major reforms. We have an historic opportunity here, 
again, the first time that we have had a chance to vote on biennial 
budgeting; and it is the first time in a quarter century that we could 
offer such a sweeping reform to this budget process which has created 
so many problems for us.
  So with that, I urge strong support of this bipartisan amendment 
which I am honored to author.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim the time in opposition to 
the biennial budgeting amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Moakley) is 
recognized for 20 minutes.
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, although I have the greatest respect for the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Dreier), my chairman, I believe the biennial 
system will make our budget process slower and less accurate. A 
biennial system will make it harder to reach budget agreements because 
the agreements will have to cover a longer period of time.
  Although no one wants to admit it, the pressure to get things 
finished is what ensures that we address the difficult issues. If 
Congress did not have that pressure each and every year, we would put 
off the more controversial issues for later; and that is really no way 
to govern.
  Proponents may argue that authorization bills are crowded off the 
schedule by appropriation bills. But it is actually policy disputes, 
not lack of time, that trip up the authorization bills.
  According to the Congressional Research Service, Congress spends less 
than one-fifth of its total floor time on budget bills. Furthermore, we 
are now in the 15th week of the session, and we have spent only 49 days 
in formal session.
  In addition to slowing things down, biennial budgeting will actually 
limit oversight. In 1993, the State of Connecticut converted to a 
biennial budget in order to improve oversight, in order to improve 
program review. But Connecticut State officials says there has not been 
any improvement in either of those areas.
  There are two reasons for that, Mr. Chairman. Biennial budgeting 
removes one year of the Committee on Appropriations review, and it 
shortens the leash on executive branch officials.
  It also relies heavily on budget predictions which are notoriously 
inaccurate. Mr. Chairman, if budget predictions are inaccurate on an 
annual system, they will be even worse on a biennial system. Decisions 
will become outdated, and changes will need to be made. But we would be 
hobbled by an every-other-year system, and our budget will have been 
slowed down to the point that we could hardly respond.
  Congress will be faced with only one choice, pass more supplemental 
appropriation bills and pile spending upon spending.
  Mr. Chairman, I do not need to remind anyone here that supplemental 
appropriation bills are not a model of fiscal discipline. But there 
will be no alternative. Congress will fail to predict every single 
spending need; and as a result, the need for supplemental appropriation 
bills in the off years will just skyrocket.
  The same is true on the State level. States with biennial budget tend 
to spend more per capita than States on an annual budget because they 
have to pass additional appropriation bills to keep up with their 
budget needs.
  Mr. Chairman, history shows that States have learned their lesson. In 
1940, 44 States had a 2-year budget cycle. Today, only 21 States have a 
2-year budget. Those States that have kept the biennial budgets tend to 
have a small or mid-sized budget. Mr. Chairman, if the States are the 
laboratories of democracy, we should avoid this at all costs. The 
Federal Government's budget is neither small, nor mid-sized.
  Mr. Chairman, switching to a biennial budget will have very far-
reaching implications for the entire Federal budget. It is a brand-new 
system, a system that has not worked well for larger States. I would 
urge my colleagues to proceed cautiously. I urge my colleagues to 
oppose this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Let me just say, since 1990, every State that has changed its budget 
cycle has changed from an annual to a biennial process.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Hampshire 
(Mr. Bass).
  Mr. BASS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California for 
yielding 2 minutes to me. I rise in strong support of the amendment to 
create biennial budgets and appropriations.
  I would point out that passage of such an amendment will remove the 
bulk of budgeting and appropriations from election years. It increases 
government efficiency and encourages more responsive spending. It 
increases the time and quality of oversight and authorizing 
legislation. It provides budget stability for the States, many of which 
were forced to abandon their own biennial budgets because of their 
growing dependence on annual Federal appropriations.
  Indeed, by passing biennial budgeting and appropriations, we would be 
getting back in sync with the States and we would most likely see a 
reversal in the trend that was brought up by the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Moakley).
  Indeed, this bill is supported by the President, both candidates for 
President, House and Senate leaders, the Committee on Appropriations 
chairman in the House and the Senate Committee on the Budget chairman.
  For once, we have a truly bipartisan amendment to move this Congress 
forward into the 21st century so that we can be a body that works on 
real legislative proposals rather than being totally reactive and being 
totally controlled by the appropriations process.

[[Page H3122]]

  Indeed, Mr. Chairman, if my colleagues like omnibus spending bills 
every year, if they like spending late nights until 1:00 and 2:00 in 
the morning, if they like turning the appropriations process ultimately 
over to two or three people, out of the hands of even the 
appropriators, if they like the system that we have now, which is 
clearly broken, then they will not support this amendment. But if they 
believe that we can run Congress better, that we can be a Congress that 
is bold enough to step forward and change fundamentally its process, 
then they will support the Dreier amendment.
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from North Carolina (Mr. Price).
  (Mr. PRICE of North Carolina asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, the budget conflicts and 
frustrations of the last 3 years have prompted various proposed 
procedural fixes for what is mainly a failure of political will and 
responsibility.
  In my view, the most misguided of these proposals is the amendment 
before us, instituting biennial budgeting and appropriating. This 
supposed remedy is not only unresponsive to the problem we face, but it 
actually would weaken Congress' power of the purse and its ability to 
hold the Executive Branch accountable.
  I would like to remind my colleagues that Congress already has the 
authority to adopt multiyear budget plans and multiyear authorizations. 
These have been important instruments in achieving advance planning and 
fiscal discipline. But to go beyond this to biennial budgeting and 
appropriating would greatly weaken Congress' hand in shaping national 
priorities and holding the Executive Branch accountable. In fact, 
annual appropriating is necessary as a complement to multiyear budget 
plans, to ensure flexibility, responsiveness, and coequal power with 
the executive.
  Under biennial budgeting, Congress would not be able to react as 
effectively to congressional oversight, GAO reports, Inspector 
General's reports, research studies, and other findings that bear on 
the effectiveness of Federal programs. Agencies would have to begin 
working in late spring on a 2-year budget, the second year of which 
would not commence for some 28 months. The President and OMB would make 
budget decisions 22 to 23 months before the beginning of the second 
year of a budget cycle.
  Biennial appropriations could limit the ability of the Federal 
Government to use fiscal policy to stabilize the economy during 
economic downturns. There would be pressure to frequently revise 2-year 
budgets through supplemental after supplemental appropriations bills. 
We know from experience that these supplemental appropriations are less 
deliberative and less systematic than regular appropriations bills, and 
they are certainly less subject to fiscal discipline and control.
  Now, some proponents argue that biennial budgeting would leave 
Congress more time to conduct oversight of the Executive Branch. That 
is an ironic claim, for the unique oversight provided through the 
appropriations process, when agency budgets and performance are gone 
over line by line, program by program, is one of the most important 
tools we have in holding the Executive Branch accountable.
  Off-year oversight under biennial appropriations would become less 
intense, less systematic, and most importantly, it would lose the teeth 
provided by the actual power of decision.
  Proponents have talked today about the support from the three most 
recent Presidents for biennial appropriations, Bill Clinton, George 
Bush, Ronald Reagan. Why should that surprise anyone? Of course 
Presidents support biennial budgeting. If that support indicates 
biennial budgeting is not a partisan issue, it surely makes our point 
for us that it is an institutional issue. Biennial budgeting would 
result in a major devolution of power from Congress to the Executive 
Branch.
  We would do our appropriating in the first 9 months of a Congress and 
become fiscal lame ducks thereafter, with executive agencies less 
subject to effective scrutiny and direction. That would be a loss, not 
only for individual Members and individual committees, but it would be 
a loss for this institution, for our constitutional system of checks 
and balances, and for the people we represent.
  We need to enhance Congress' power and performance in both budgeting 
and oversight. But moving to biennial budgeting and appropriating would 
take us in precisely the opposite direction.
  I urge my colleagues to defeat this amendment.

                              {time}  1630

  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Smith), and I ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to 
control that amount of time.
  The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. 
Smith) will control and yield time on 10 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding me this time, and I yield myself 2 minutes.
  In 1940, there were 44 States that had biennial budgets. Today, there 
are just 20 States that have biennial budgets, with eight of those 
having biennial legislatures. As we talked to the CRS, as we talked to 
the executives of budget directors for all of the States, they suggest 
and claim that a biennial budget transfers power from the legislative 
branch to the executive branch.
  Look, we have not had hearings on this issue. The Committee on the 
Budget that has jurisdiction on this issue had zero hearings on 
biennial budgets. The Committee on Rules had three informational 
hearings. None of the hearings were in Committee on the Budget. Also, 
we are looking at a situation where, on the 39-page amendment at issue, 
there have not been hearings anyplace. Informational hearings only in 
the Committee on Rules.
  So if we risk transferring power from the legislative branch to the 
executive branch, do we really want to charge ahead to make this 
decision?
  Look at this chart. This 20 percent goes to Social Security pretty 
much on automatic pilot. The Congress has transferred already too much 
power to the executive branch of government. Medicare, 11 percent, on 
automatic pilot; Medicaid, automatic pilot; other entitlements, 14 
percent, automatic pilot; interest on automatic pilot. Only Defense and 
the other 12 appropriation bills that represent less than 40 percent of 
the total budget is in the control of the Congress, and I think we have 
to be very careful as we move ahead.
  The result of the congressional majority, whether it is a Republican 
or a Democrat, will find it far more difficult and perhaps impossible 
to pass agenda-setting legislation, like tax cuts, tax increases, 
whatever, if we lose reconciliation in the Senate.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. 
Knollenberg).
  Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time, and I rise today in opposition to this amendment on biennial 
budgeting. I am concerned that in our haste to push forward this type 
of legislation we are overlooking unintended consequences that will 
drastically affect our budget process.
  Despite today's projections of enormous surpluses, these numbers will 
invariably rise and fall with the economic cycles, with emergencies and 
other factors that, frankly, are outside of Congress' immediate 
control.
  Last week, CBO updated their projections to show a $40 billion on-
budget surplus, which is an increase of $14 billion from their estimate 
of last month. Over the last 4 years, CBO incorrectly estimated the 
deficit or surplus for the upcoming fiscal year by $99.5 billion. Given 
these inevitable fluctuations of our economy and Federal revenues, 
Congress needs every tool at its disposal to ensure that there are 
sufficient surpluses each year to meet its target for tax cuts and for 
debt reduction.
  One of the supposed benefits of biennial budgeting is to provide 
additional time to focus on oversight. The truth of this whole matter 
is that most experts believe otherwise. They believe that biennial 
budgeting actually reduces oversight. One of the most important tools 
that we have in this House, in holding the executive branch 
accountable, is the appropriations process. Oversight is best 
accomplished

[[Page H3123]]

when the agencies are dependent on Congress for funding in the near 
term and, therefore, more responsive to Congress' intentions.
  The President, the executive branch and his agencies, will be less 
inclined to work with Congress once they receive their funding. In 
effect, it turns the Members of the House into fiscal lame ducks.
  Further, with no regular appropriations bills in the second session, 
Congress would be forced to consider massive supplemental bills or 
correction bills to take care of changing priorities, unanticipated 
events, and emergencies. I truly believe biennial budgeting is not the 
most effective way to solve our frustrations in the appropriations 
process.
  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Minnesota (Mr. Luther), a very able coauthor of this bipartisan 
amendment.
  Mr. LUTHER. Mr. Chairman, before coming to Congress 5 years ago, I 
served in the Minnesota legislature for 20 years working on 2-year 
budgets. From that experience, there is no question in my mind that a 
2-year budget is a better process. It would also, as has been pointed 
out, allow time for other important nonbudget issues. I think we all 
know the number of issues that are not going to be dealt with this year 
because we are, again, working on budget issues.
  Proponents of biennial budgets have already stated the arguments that 
I agree with in terms of fiscal management, oversight, and cost 
effectiveness. But I also believe biennial budgets will add to long-
term planning and it will allow us an easier time of making the budget 
cuts necessary to meet today's and tomorrow's needs.
  What is happening today is that we argue the same issues year after 
year but still have a very difficult time meeting the future needs of 
our Nation because we are unwilling oftentimes to cut the kinds of 
things we thought were important years ago. The biennial budget 
process, I believe, would make it easier to make those difficult 
decisions.
  Due to the initial closing costs associated with shutting down many 
programs, it is hard to see a lot of savings when we are looking at 
just 1 year. But if we look out 2 years, we can see the substantial 
savings. And that is the experience that I had when I worked on 2-year 
budgets in the Minnesota legislature.
  Successful families and businesses do a lot better than 1-year 
budgets, they plan into the future, and I think it is time we get that 
kind of thinking here in Washington.
  I respect many of the opponents of this amendment, certainly the 
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Moakley) and the others, and I 
respect those arguments. But based on the experience I have had working 
with both 1-year and 2-year budgets, there is no question in my mind 
that while biennial budgets may not be the total solution, they move us 
in the right direction.
  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Kentucky (Mr. Whitfield), the very able coauthor of this amendment.
  Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time, and I rise in support of H.R. 853, the Comprehensive Budget 
Process Reform Act and the biennial budgeting amendment thereto. Both 
the underlying budget reform bill and the biennial budgeting amendment 
are the result of extensive study and deliberation during a process 
characterized by bipartisan cooperation.
  The changes in the reform bill and the biennial budget amendment 
changes address long-standing inefficiencies which hamper the work of 
Congress and Federal agencies. Each year the Congress is so consumed by 
the budget process, by the appropriation process, we end up with 
omnibus bills. We do not know what is in there. This bill increases the 
accountability for Federal spending, promotes fiscal discipline and 
encourages long-term planning. It also preserves the progress we have 
made in reducing the public debt by requiring a vote on legislation 
that increases the debt.
  In my view, the most necessary reform which we will consider today is 
the biennial budget amendment. Biennial budgeting was a key 
recommendation of the 1993 Joint Committee on the Organization of 
Congress and the Vice President's National Performance Review, and as 
has been said earlier, President Reagan supported it, President Bush 
supports it, President Clinton supports it, Vice President Gore 
supports it, Governor George W. Bush of Texas supports it, and I 
believe that is what we should do as well.
  Critics of biennial budgeting allege that a 2-year cycle will reduce 
the leverage Congress exercises over Federal agencies through the 
appropriation process, resulting in a shift of power from Congress to 
the executive branch. I believe the opposite is true. Currently the 
budget process detracts from Congress' ability to conduct programmatic 
oversight and reauthorization.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge support for the amendment and the reform bill.
  Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  Can my colleagues imagine that 4 to 5 months after a new Congress is 
elected in November that they are going to be asked to analyze and 
evaluate and decide on a 2-year budget? What we are doing, again, by 
forcing a new Congress into that position, is transferring power to the 
executive branch.
  On oversight. I served in the administration, and it is my firm 
conviction that the administration, the agencies, the Departments, are 
much more respectful and responsive to Congress at budget time. If we 
allow the administration to have this longer leash, a longer leash 
because they are only obligated to come to Congress half as often, we 
are going to see an extra transfer of power and a further weakening of 
the legislative branch.
  The authorizing committees are not affected by a 2-year budget. They 
already have 2-, 3-, 5-year authorization bills. They are the 
committees that should be doing the greatest part of that work in terms 
of oversight; evaluating how the administration is performing and 
assuring that the taxpayers get their money's worth.
  Mr. Chairman, does anyone believe Members facing reelection will 
spend their time going over the dry details of Federal programs? With 
those States that have biennial budgets, every one of those States 
comes in for a second year modification of that budget with huge 
supplementals. Does anybody believe that Members that have 2 years to 
go or 18 months to go on a new budget are going to be able to get a 
quorum in those authorizing committees?
  Look, I plead with this Chamber. Let us evaluate this idea. Let us 
not rush into a situation that may very well weaken the legislative 
branch, which has already been weakened. We have an executive branch 
that is now passing more laws in the form of promulgated rules than 
actually the legislature passes. Let us evaluate this idea. Let us have 
long hearings to make sure that we are not losing further control. Let 
us have the kind of review that is necessary to consider this kind of 
dramatic change, after 200 years of annual budgeting. Let us not jump 
into something new in a 2-year budget that is going to weaken the 
legislative branch.
  Mr. Chairman, I submit for the Record an article in Roll Call written 
by me dated February 28.

                    Entitlement Reform the Way To Go

       For 224 years, Congress has wrestled with the budget. As an 
     ex-wrestler and current Budget Committee member, I know that 
     can be both strenuous and challenging.
       This has led some Members to seek a ``quick fix'' in an 
     attempt to end the annual struggle. Biennial budgeting, 
     however, is a mirage that distracts us from the real budget 
     problems we face.
       Biennial budgeting would be an enormous change in our 
     budget processes, the biggest since at least 1974. The 
     effects on the budget struggle would be far-reaching and very 
     largely negative from the Congressional perspective. Biennial 
     budgeting will deprive Congress of much of the leverage it 
     needs to compete equally with the administration. 
     Specifically, Congress gives up:
       Reconciliation in off years. The Congressional majority 
     could lose much of its power in election years to use 
     reconciliation. This will endanger its priorities in election 
     years and would rule out the House tax cut strategy for this 
     year.
       Congress could include multiple reconciliation instructions 
     in a biennial budget resolution, but this deprives Congress 
     of flexibility needed to react to changing political and 
     economic needs. The majority would have to fashion its 
     political strategy for the next two years just three months 
     after the preceding election.
       Control over the agencies. The annual budget process allows 
     Congress to express its will to government agencies. I know 
     that we were more eager to cooperate with Congress

[[Page H3124]]

     at budget time when I was a member of the Nixon 
     administration. Biennial budgeting will reduce our leverage 
     to hold agencies accountable and encourage defiance.
       Budget accuracy and flexibility. Economic forecasting is 
     highly uncertain. The Congressional Budget Office estimate 
     for fiscal 2000 two years ago was for a $70 billion unified 
     budget deficit. That's $240 billion off the current fiscal 
     2000 estimate of a $170 billion unified budget surplus. The 
     estimate has shifted by $40 billion just since October 1999.
       This uncertainty means the President would bargain for high 
     second-year spending, and we would frequently need or be 
     tempted to reopen the budget. When we reopen the budget, we 
     would find ourselves with little leverage against a pre-
     funded administration that can resist unwanted budget 
     modifications with near impunity. When revenue is lower or 
     spending is higher than projected, the pressure to increase 
     fees, taxes and borrowing, rather than cut the 
     administration, would be considerable.
       Leverage over spending. Congress will inevitably grapple 
     with supplemental spending requests in the off years. In the 
     absence of pressure to produce a complete budget, an 
     administration will always have poll-tested and politically 
     motivated requests in off years that will be hard to fend off 
     in the absence of broader budget issues.
       As a result, we will pass supplemental appropriations bills 
     in most years that will grow as Members add their own pet 
     election-year projects. All of this threatens even the very 
     modest spending restraint that we've been able to exercise 
     over the last five years.
       I find it surprising, then, to hear of growing support for 
     moving from our current annual budget to a biennial budget 
     process. It does seem sometimes that we are on a budget 
     treadmill that never stops. There is no solution, however, 
     in ducking our responsibilities to exercise the power the 
     Constitution grants us. Power atrophies unless it is used, 
     that is what will surely continue to happen to 
     Congressional power is we adopt biennial budgeting.
       Members interested in getting a handle on the budget should 
     focus on substance rather than process. The truth is that the 
     discretionary portion of the budget--which is the substance 
     of the 13 annual appropriations bills--makes up just one-
     third of total federal spending.
       The rest of the spending--chiefly, entitlement programs--is 
     on automatic pilot and rising faster than inflation. This 
     growth in entitlement spending puts enormous pressure on the 
     other parts of the budget and will inevitably necessitate 
     higher taxes or a return to excessive government borrowing.
       Acting promptly and boldly will bring benefits as well. The 
     unremarked secret of our current budget surplus is the 
     welfare reforms enacted in 1996 and the Medicare changes 
     enacted in 1997. To be blunt, we should still be in deficit 
     without these reforms. But in both cases, one could also 
     argue that the programs have been strengthened.
       I have long believed that there are similar opportunities 
     to improve our largest entitlement, Social Security, which is 
     now 23 percent of total federal spending. As chairman of the 
     Budget Committee Task Force on Social Security, I helped 
     develop 18 unanimous and bipartisan findings that could serve 
     as the basis for reform.
       After the completion of the task force's business, I also 
     introduced the bipartisan Social Security Solvency Act (H.R. 
     3206), which is scored to keep Social Security solvent based 
     on these findings.
       The effect of this reform (or of similarly reforms such as 
     the 21st Century Retirement Act (H.R. 1793)) would be to 
     dramatically reduce the growth of government spending for 
     decades to come. The charts (not shown here) indicate how 
     significant reform can be.
       The first chart shows that federal spending will rise to 
     nearly 35 percent of the nation's gross domestic produce 
     without changes in our entitlement programs, about 75 percent 
     higher than it is today. Needless to say, giant tax increases 
     will be needed to sustain this level of spending.
       In contrast, the second chart shows what could happen if we 
     simply adopt the Social Security Solvency Act. Under this 
     scenario, we would experience a gradual reduction in federal 
     spending as we shift to a retirement system based partly on 
     worker-owned accounts starting at 2.5 percent of income and 
     partly on traditional government-paid benefits.
       This legislation would also fully restore the program's 
     shaky finances and create opportunities for workers to live 
     better in retirement by making full use of the power of 
     compound interest.
       This is not easy work. But if we do nothing, taxes will 
     have to rise to the equivalent of 40 percent of payroll by 
     2040 to pay for Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. 
     Social Security and our other entitlement programs are 
     complicated and alternation carries political risk.
       The benefits from this effort, however, will also be 
     substantial. Sound reforms will allow Congress to master the 
     federal budget where gimmicky process reforms such as 
     biennial budgeting are bound to fail.

  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire of the Chair how much time is 
remaining on all sides here?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier) has 8\1/2\ 
minutes remaining, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Moakley) has 
2\1/2\ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Smith) 
has 3 minutes remaining.
  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Young), and let me just say that it has been an honor to 
work with the chairman of the very important Committee on 
Appropriations, who has long been a great champion of this issue of 
biennial budgeting.
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I disagree with the argument that 
I just heard about weakening the appropriations process, or weakening 
the House. I believe that we actually strengthen the position of the 
United States Congress in our separation of powers, in our separate but 
equal branches of government, by providing oversight of the hundreds of 
billions of dollars spent by the agencies of the Federal Government.
  Now, if we do not have time to do oversight, we are not strengthening 
the position of the House of Representatives or the Congress in that 
whole process. I referred to this chart earlier, and I would ask the 
Members to look at it again. All of the days and weeks colored in red 
are days that have gone past, that have expired, that are gone before 
the Committee on Appropriations ever got a budget allocation.
  Now, we cannot assign 302(b) allocations to our subcommittees until 
we get a 302(a) allocation that comes from the budget resolution.

                              {time}  1645

  When we lose more than half of the year before we can even begin to 
make our allocations, we are losing valuable time in getting 
appropriations bills considered, passed in the House and the Senate, 
and approved by the President of the United States. We run out of time 
and do not have adequate time for negotiations with the Senate or the 
President, and we do not have time to do the oversight.
  And they say, well, do the oversight over here. That is fine, and we 
do some oversight during this period. But we need to see the 
President's budget and we need to see the resolution of the Committee 
on the Budget so we know what kind of oversight we are supposed to 
provide.
  We do a pretty good job as appropriators in oversight. We eliminate a 
lot of the wasteful programs. There is a lot more to be done. We 
eliminate a lot of duplicative programs. There is a lot more to be 
done. And if we had more time to apply to this job rather than having 
to rush and rush and hurry to get the appropriations bills done before 
the end of September, we could do more oversight. We could strengthen 
the hand of the United States House of Representatives and the United 
States Congress as we deal with the executive branch of Government.
  The branches of Government are supposedly, under our Constitution, 
separate but equal. It seems that in recent years, the executive branch 
has become more equal than any other branch, for a lot of reasons. One 
reason is the confusion that we created in the budget process that was 
put into effect in 1974. That cost us time and cost us the ability to 
do the real oversight that we ought to be doing.
  So I am a supporter of biennial appropriations, and I know a lot of 
my colleagues on the Committee on Appropriations are also supporters. I 
also know that a lot of my appropriating colleagues are not. But I 
think it is a good move and I think we ought to support this.
  While there is a difference of opinion on the Committee on 
Appropriations, for a number of reasons, it is my opinion, having 
served on this committee for 27 years that, prior to the time that we 
had limitations put on us by the Budget and Impoundment Control Act, we 
had more time to do better oversight. But once the budget act was put 
into effect and we were given dates that were not realistic as far as 
appropriations were concerned, we lost a lot of the time that we could 
use in oversight and in appropriating.
  So I would just ask the Members to think about this seriously and 
consider giving us the opportunity to have time to do this oversight 
and do it properly by supporting this amendment.
  Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt), the ranking member of our 
Committee on the Budget.
  (Mr. SPRATT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)

[[Page H3125]]

  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, one of the gravest responsibilities that is given to us 
in Congress is the power to declare war. We have the power to raise 
armies and navies. We have the power to regulate them. And we have the 
power to determine when they will be put in the field, when young men 
and women will be put in harm's way to protect the interests of this 
country.
  Frankly, we do not exercise that power very well. We have the War 
Powers Act, which gives the President presumptive authority to dispatch 
troops into conflict; and we have the power to recall them by passing a 
resolution of dubious legal status. We rarely exercise it. In the 18 
years I have been here, I think we have used it twice.
  One restraint we have is the knowledge on the part of the President 
and the executive branch that every year, every year, they must come 
here hat in hand and ask us to fund the defense budget of this country. 
And if they dispatch troops, under the biennial budget, they will have 
$600 billion to spend, they will have twice the amount that we will 
appropriate this year in our defense budget and a 2-year lapse of time 
before they have to come up here and account for how they have spent 
and used that money.
  Unless we have better controls on how we are going to dispatch troops 
to combat and commit our forces, I do not think we need biennial 
budgeting. It is one of the few limits we have, however we may exercise 
it, upon the use of our military in foreign theaters.
  I think we should retain that short leash, that 1-year appropriation, 
to remind the executive that he still must come to Congress for the 
authority to put our men and women in harm's way.
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Chairman, would the Chair be kind enough to inform 
all parties of the remaining time?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Smith) has 1\1/2\ 
minutes remaining. The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Moakley) has 
2\1/2\ minutes remaining. The gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier) 
has 4\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Oregon (Ms. Hooley).
  Ms. HOOLEY of Oregon. Mr. Chairman, while I understand the 
frustrations sometimes we have with the budget process, I come from a 
State that had biennial budgets. They did not work very well. Let me 
tell my colleagues why they did not work very well.
  In that off year, we talk about having review and oversight. Well, 
when we do it in the off year, what I found is that it does not work 
very well, it has no teeth.
  It was a time when that oversight is less systematic, it is less 
intense and, again, it really does not have any teeth. In fact, most of 
the time it did not happen. So it does not work very well.
  This is only chance we have to sit down every year and go over those 
budgets item by item and agency by agency. And again, by my experience, 
biennial budgets do not work very well.
  If we want to experiment, let us experiment with it. But this is a 
time that we should not change the process because there is not the 
oversight that happens in those opposite years.
  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to my very good 
friend, the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Clement).
  Mr. CLEMENT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of the Dreier amendment 
to replace our current time consuming, bloated, and inefficient budget 
process with the biennial budgeting.
  I believe in our budget leaders, Democrat and Republican alike. But 
the fact is, after being here for so many years, we have got to change 
the system. We have got to make some reforms. We are going to elect a 
new President in November, and let us start it out in a correct manner.
  When we do this, we are going to be fighting over surpluses and 
priorities rather than fighting over deficits in the past. And the 
amount of time spent on the annual appropriations bills both in 
committee and on the floor leaves us significantly less time to engage 
in needed oversight activities and enact authorization bills.
  Congress routinely funds unauthorized programs because we do not have 
time to take up the authorization legislation.
  For fiscal year 2000, appropriations were provided for 137 programs 
whose authorization had expired, providing $121 billion for programs 
that lacked authorization. This is simply wrong.
  Part of responsible governing includes funding programs that have 
gone through the authorization process. Biennial budgeting will allow 
us time to review and fund programs that merit taxpayers' dollars. That 
is what the people at home want. They want fairness. They want equity.
  Let us have a 2-year budget rather than a 1-year budget, and we will 
get a lot more done and we will save a lot more taxpayers' dollars.
  Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, we have problems with budgets projections. It should be 
obvious to everybody how far off our projections are 1 year in advance, 
let alone 2 years in advance.
  Two years ago, CBO projected a $70 billion deficit for the year 2000. 
The current estimate is that there will be a $170 billion surplus. That 
is a $240 billion difference.
  Budget inflation. Agencies will deal with uncertainty in two year 
budgets by padding their budget request. This will result in more 
spending.
  Mr. Chairman, Congress has had annual Federal budgets since 1789. Our 
present budget problems have nothing to do with annual budgets. Our 
present budget problems have to do with the willingness of Members to 
take the time to make the effort to oversee and review spending bills 
in the United States Congress.
  When it comes to giving taxpayers their money's worth, whether the 
budget is 2 years or 1 year, there will be no difference unless there 
is a willingness of Members to review programs that need to be 
reviewed. The authorizing committees that now have 2-, 3-, 5-year 
authorization bills now have the time available to do that.
  What is going to happen with an election year when Members want to go 
home if there is no budget to pass? I urge Members to vote against this 
amendment.
  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Washington (Ms. Dunn), one of the able coauthors of this amendment.
  Ms. DUNN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the amendment 
offered by my friend, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier), to 
require a biennial budget.
  When the gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier) and I served together 
on the Commission to Reform the House of Representatives in 1993 and 
1994, we came out with some pretty important recommendations that then 
were passed into law when we took over the running of the Congress, for 
example, the Open Meetings Act, the first ever private audit of the 
House of Representatives, reduction of staff and committee by a third, 
which allowed us to run this body at $200 million less than the other 
party had run it the year before.
  But the most important of all of those recommendations is the one 
that is being considered today on the floor, and that is implementing a 
biennial budget. It will bring us much more value for our tax dollar by 
allowing us to focus more on the efficiency of Government and the 
scrutiny that Federal programs should receive. Biennial budgeting will 
bring greater trust in Government.
  By allowing greater deliberation over budgeting by the legislative 
bodies, we can assure our constituents that their tax dollars are being 
spent wisely and judiciously.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier) has 2 
minutes remaining. The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Moakley) has 
1\1/2\ minutes remaining. The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. 
Moakley) has the right to close the debate.
  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. 
Moakley) has the right to close?
  The CHAIRMAN. As representing one of the committees managing the 
bill, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Moakley) has the right to 
close the debate, as the gentleman from

[[Page H3126]]

California (Mr. Dreier) is seeking to amend the committee's bill.
  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of the time.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment has a great deal of common sense to it. 
There are a number of statements that have been made that I think need 
to be refuted.
  This argument that the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Smith) is making 
about oversight, biennial budgeting dramatically enhances the ability 
to have oversight.
  The subcommittee of the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Callahan) can 
continue with its oversight and appropriations. But, also, we very much 
want to have the authorizers spend time on oversight.
  It is a constitutional responsibility which, unfortunately, we do not 
get to do enough of now because we spend so doggone much time on all of 
these budget disputes that are going on.
  This argument that has been made about this transfer of authority 
down to the executive branch, Jack Lew, a great protege of the 
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Moakley), who is now our Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget, said in his testimony, ``While I 
respect the concern of those who believe that biennial budgeting will 
shift power between the two branches, I don't share this concern. I do 
not believe that, under biennial budgeting, executive branch officials 
would become less responsive to Congress. That is because biennial 
budgeting would not alter the fundamental reality that, under the 
Constitution, Congress has the power of the purse.''
  Dan Crippen, who is the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, 
stated, ``It seems unlikely that agencies would be less responsive to 
the Congress simply because they would be requesting regular 
appropriations every other year. Also, a biennial budget cycle by 
setting aside some time for Congressional action on oversight and 
authorizing legislation might relieve the appropriation process of 
time-consuming debates on substantive policy issues, which could 
actually improve congressional control of spending.''
  That is what we are trying to get at.
  Mr. Chairman, this is the most sweeping reform in a quarter century. 
It makes so much sense. We have got everyone who is now in the White 
House and seeking the White House in support of this. We have 
bipartisan support. The chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, 
the Speaker of the House, many of the cardinals, many Democrats have 
joined in support of it.
  We should provide this very, very key to the reform of the budget 
process. I urge an aye vote.

                              {time}  1700

  Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time. I 
think the gentleman just made the argument why Presidents want this. It 
gives them an advantage. Every President wants it. Jack Lew who works 
for the President is doing a great job carrying out the President's 
orders because the President knows that it would have the legislature 
up against the wall in the off years.
  Mr. Chairman, I call to the Members' attention an editorial from 
yesterday's Washington Post urging the defeat of this amendment, 
``Fleeing Hard Choices.'' I urge a ``no'' vote on the biennial budget 
amendment.

                [From the Washington Post, May 15, 2000]

                          Fleeing Hard Choices

       The House this week may take up a proposal to shift to 
     biennial budgeting. The bad idea suggests that even the 
     members are disgusted with the duplicitous farce in which 
     they now annually engage. It is part of a 15-year effort to 
     find a procedural fix that will somehow magically save them 
     from their own indiscipline. But process can't solve the 
     problem, and as with so many of its predecessors, this is a 
     proposal that would do more harm than good.
       The problem is not that the budget takes too much time each 
     year, but that the Republicans particularly persist in 
     pretending that they can spend the same dollars twice. They 
     say as they have since 1981 that they can give a large tax 
     cut, protect Social Security and Medicare, increase defense 
     spending and still balance the budget by cutting other 
     domestic spending. But as everyone understands by now, they 
     lack the votes for such cuts even within their own caucus.
       The appropriations process once again has begun. To pay for 
     their tax cut plus all the rest, the Republicans would have 
     to cut domestic appropriations by about 10 percent in real 
     terms over the next five years and more thereafter. A cut 
     that large would do real harm to basic functions of 
     government, but the sponsors aren't required to name specific 
     cuts. They strike their pose, then use accounting gimmicks to 
     crawl back from the abyss to which the pose took them. That's 
     what the budget process has become. It's squalid and 
     demeaning, and members can be forgiven for wanting to engage 
     in it only once every two years. But it's their unwillingness 
     to make hard choices from which they flee.
       The choices occur within particular appropriations bills. 
     The Democrats want to increase education spending. The 
     Republicans want at least to match them without doing notable 
     harm in an election year to the health and other social 
     programs with which education competes for appropriations. 
     But in part to pay for their tax cut, their budget calls for 
     a freeze on appropriations for health, education, etc., next 
     fiscal year--not even an allowance for inflation. So they 
     already are resorting to gimmicks. Likewise in the so-called 
     VA-HUD bill, in which they propose to cut overall spending 
     while increasing veterans' health spending. But do they want 
     to offend the big cities by cutting the subsidized housing 
     programs for the poor with which the veterans' programs 
     compete?
       Myth and math don't match; truth becomes the victims. But 
     biennial budgeting won't solve that; if anything, it will 
     make it worse. The budget would have to be drawn up more than 
     two years in advance. It would be an exercise in guesswork. 
     There would have to be even more adjustments--``emergency'' 
     appropriations, with all the opportunities for mischief they 
     present--than now. That's especially so because they would 
     postpone until the second year the discipline from which they 
     would give themselves a bye in the first. No procedural fix 
     can take the place of political will.

  Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Chairman. I rise in support of the biennial budget 
amendment being offered by Mr. Dreier.
  I became an original cosponsor of the biennial budget resolution 
because I want to see our budget process improved. As we all know, the 
budget process often results in gridlock. In the past we have witnessed 
train wrecks, government shutdowns, and continuing resolutions.
  Although establishing spending levels in Washington will always be 
contentious, there is strong agreement on adopting a two-year, or 
biennial, budget process. President Clinton, Senate Majority Leader 
Trent Lott, and other congressional leaders have endorsed this 
streamlined system.
  Under a biennial budget the President would submit a two-year budget 
resolution during the first session of Congress.
  Congress then would consider and pass 13 two-year appropriation bills 
for the President's signature. The second session of Congress would be 
devoted to overseeing government programs, considering authorization 
bills, and working on other legislative priorities. Imagine, members of 
the House and Senate carefully considering legislative proposals and 
addressing major issues and emergencies at a deliberate and reasoned 
pace.
  The annual budget process has become a tool of political theatrics 
yielding poor policies. By adopting a biennial budget spending, 
decisions would be made in the year prior to an election year, putting 
policy ahead of politics.
  Annual budgeting also encourages using accounting gimmickry and 
wishful thinking. Lawmakers frequently adopt budgets with ambitious 
out-year spending restrictions; restrictions that rarely materialize. 
It is easy to promise to make tough decisions next year, beyond the 
reach of the current budget. Biennial budgeting doubles the period for 
specific spending levels and holds decision makers more accountable.
  Since 1950, Congress has only twice met the fiscal year deadline for 
completion of all 13 individual appropriation bills. A two-year budget 
cycle will introduce greater stability to the funding process, decrease 
political manipulation of federal spending, and enhance the efficiency 
of Congress and federal agencies. It would also increase the public's 
confidence in the ability of the federal government to manage its 
responsibilities. That is the mark of good government.
  Adoption of a biennial budget makes sense because it would be an 
important improvement to our budget process.
  Mr. HORN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of Representative Dreier's 
two-year budget amendment. This amendment would create a two-year 
budget cycle which would save both time and money. That cycle would 
enable Congress to increase its oversight of Federal programs and 
Federal spending.
  That is long overdue!
  Of the functions, we do well when we engage in law making and helping 
our constituents who have had difficulties with a complicated 
bureaucracy.
  We all know that we do not do enough to regularly examine how the 
executive branch implements our laws.
  Why don't we do a better job of oversight? For one reason is a lack 
of time in which to do it. Another reason is that our staffs want to 
develop policy. It is glamorous. The media also enjoys policy, not the 
hard work.

[[Page H3127]]

  The really difficult work is to spend weeks and months of going over 
a lot of paper and interviews with civil servants and clients. In 1994 
we put the government performance and results act in the public laws of 
our nation.
  Those of us on Government Reform have urged our colleagues to meet 
with their political counter-parts in the Executive Branch--the Cabinet 
Secretary, the Agency Administrator, the Deputy Secretary, the Deputy 
Administrator, or the various Assistant Secretaries. We need the 
dialogue between the principal agents of the President's administration 
and those of us who have been elected by the people.
  As we know, the Results Act is off to a very slow start. The General 
Accounting Office report on Federal agencies' 1999 performance plans 
found that only 14 of 35 agencies defined a relationship between their 
program activities and their performance goals. Few agencies explained 
how they would use their funding to achieve those goals.
  Sustained congressional oversight is essential. Congressional 
appropriators and authorizers are in the best position to provide that 
oversight. But they must have the time in which to do so. Congress must 
demand accurate and timely program performance data from the Federal 
departments and agencies.
  That objective will require agency leadership that is strong 
committed to implementing all phases of the Government Performance and 
Results Act.
  It will require the Office of Management and Budget to require 
agencies to justify their funding requests by linking them to the 
agency's program results.
  Finally, it will require greater congressional scrutiny to ensure 
that the job gets done.
  It is time for two year budgeting, and it is time to start linking 
Government spending with the results of that spending.
  I strongly urge my colleague to support the Drier amendment.
  Ms. McCARTHY of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, today we have a historic 
opportunity to fundamentally change the way we do business in Congress. 
Implementing biennial budgeting will insert new efficiencies and 
programmatic oversight into the budget process, provide agencies with 
more decisionmaking stability with which to plan for future needs, and 
allow the Congress more time to consider policy matters critical to the 
citizens.
  As is often the case with important policy decisions, Congress can 
benefit from the experiences of the States. My State of Missouri is 
among the 23 States that have implemented biennial budgeting. Missouri 
began using a mixed biennial budget process several years ago (1994-
1995 biennium).
  The day-to-day operations of the State continue to be authorized on a 
yearly basis, but our capital improvements budget--about $700 million--
operates on a biennium to aid in planning major capital investments and 
to increase agency oversight.
  As with the Missouri experience, a Federal biennial budget will 
improve both our fiscal and programmatic management, and enable us to 
become more efficient and more productive. This works in my State; I am 
here today to say it can also work at the Federal level.
  Improvement is vitally needed at the Federal level. Only twice in the 
past quarter-century has Congress completed action on all 13 
appropriations bills by the start of the new fiscal year on October 1.
  Since my election to the House of Representatives in 1994, Congress 
has never gotten all of its budgeting responsibilities completed on 
time.
  In 1995, our inability to act forced a government shut down at the 
end of the year. In 1996, Congress didn't pass the Budget Resolution 
until mid-summer and barely completed all of the appropriations bills 
prior to the fiscal year deadline. In 1997, we didn't bother to pass a 
Budget Resolution at all.
  For the past two years we have only been able to complete work on the 
annual funding bills by passing an omnibus appropriations bill with 
less than 24 hours to review a multi-agency appropriation bill 
containing critically important program funding.
  This is no way to allocate precious taxpayer dollars or to do our 
critically important oversight duties such as finding ways to expand 
enrollment in Head Start, working in a bipartisan fashion to provide 
safe streets and schools for our children, identifying strategies to 
extend the solvency of the Social Security Trust Fund, or debating how 
we can provide quality health care to all Americans.
  Let us take an important step today toward truly reforming how we do 
our nation's business and adopt biennial budgeting. Biennial budgeting 
does not eliminate our responsibility to make the difficult choices 
among spending priorities nor with it cure all the problems within the 
budget process, but biennial budgeting is a step in the right 
direction.
  I strongly urge the House to adopt my distinguished colleague's 
amendment to H.R. 853 to establish a biennial budget process, so we can 
begin a new millennium with a renewed emphasis on cooperation, results, 
and efficiency.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 201, 
noes 217, not voting 17, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 186]

                               AYES--201

     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bono
     Boucher
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cannon
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Clement
     Coble
     Coburn
     Combest
     Condit
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Crane
     Cubin
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart
     Doggett
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     English
     Ewing
     Foley
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Franks (NJ)
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inslee
     Isakson
     Jenkins
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kleczka
     Kolbe
     Kuykendall
     LaHood
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (OK)
     Luther
     Martinez
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     Meehan
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Minge
     Moran (KS)
     Morella
     Myrick
     Napolitano
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Ose
     Oxley
     Pease
     Peterson (PA)
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Roemer
     Rogan
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Salmon
     Sandlin
     Sanford
     Scarborough
     Schaffer
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shimkus
     Simpson
     Sisisky
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Souder
     Stearns
     Stump
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Toomey
     Upton
     Vento
     Vitter
     Walden
     Wamp
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wilson
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--217

     Abercrombie
     Aderholt
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson
     Chenoweth-Hage
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clyburn
     Collins
     Conyers
     Costello
     Cox
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Duncan
     Edwards
     Emerson
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Everett
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Fletcher
     Forbes
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green (TX)
     Gutierrez
     Hastings (FL)
     Hayes
     Hill (IN)
     Hill (MT)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Hunter
     Istook
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     John
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kingston
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Larson
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lucas (KY)
     Maloney (CT)
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     Meek (FL)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Neal
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Packard
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Phelps
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Reyes
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Rogers
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo

[[Page H3128]]


     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shows
     Shuster
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Snyder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walsh
     Waters
     Watkins
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Wicker
     Wise
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                             NOT VOTING--17

     Ackerman
     Campbell
     Engel
     Largent
     Lowey
     Maloney (NY)
     McCollum
     McIntosh
     McNulty
     Meeks (NY)
     Nadler
     Owens
     Rangel
     Serrano
     Stupak
     Thurman
     Udall (NM)

                              {time}  1721

  Ms. Sanchez, Mr. Everett and Mr. Ford changed their vote from ``aye'' 
to ``no.''
  Messrs. Pitts, Bliley and Sweeney changed their vote from ``no'' to 
``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 printed 
in House Report 106-613.


                  Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Gekas

  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 2 offered by Mr. Gekas:
       At the end of title VI, add the following new subtitle:

              Subtitle C--Automatic Continuing Resolution

     SEC. 631. AUTOMATIC CONTINUING RESOLUTION.

       (a) Amendment to Title 31.--Chapter 13 of title 31, United 
     States Code, is amended by inserting after section 1310 the 
     following new section:

     ``Sec. 1311. Continuing appropriations

       ``(a)(1) If any regular appropriation bill for a fiscal 
     year does not become law prior to the beginning of such 
     fiscal year and a joint resolution making continuing 
     appropriations (other than pursuant to this subsection) is 
     not in effect, there is appropriated, out of any moneys in 
     the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, and out of 
     applicable corporate or other revenues, receipts, and funds, 
     such sums as may be necessary to continue any program, 
     project, or activity for which funds were provided in the 
     preceding fiscal year--
       ``(A) in the corresponding regular appropriation Act for 
     such preceding fiscal year; or
       ``(B) if the corresponding regular appropriation bill for 
     such preceding fiscal year did not become law, then in a 
     joint resolution making continuing appropriations for such 
     preceding fiscal year.
       ``(2)(A) Except as provided by subparagraphs (B), (C), and 
     (D), appropriations and funds made available, and authority 
     granted, for a program, project, or activity for any fiscal 
     year pursuant to this section shall be at a rate of 
     operations not in excess of the rate of operations provided 
     for in the regular appropriation Act providing for such 
     program, project, or activity for the preceding fiscal year, 
     or in the absence of such an Act, the rate of operations 
     provided for such program, project, or activity pursuant to a 
     joint resolution making continuing appropriations for such 
     preceding fiscal year.
       ``(B) The applicable rate of operations for a program, 
     project, or activity for any fiscal year pursuant to this 
     section shall exclude amounts--
       ``(i) for which any adjustment was made under section 
     251(b)(2)(A) or section 252(e) of the Balanced Budget and 
     Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 before the date of 
     enactment of this section;
       ``(ii) provided for emergencies for which an exemption from 
     section 251 or 252 of such Act is granted under section 
     317(c) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974; or
       ``(iii) for which any adjustment is made under section 
     251(b)(2) (C) or (D) of such Act.
       ``(C) The applicable rate of operations for a program, 
     project, or activity for any fiscal year pursuant to this 
     section shall include amounts provided and rescinded for such 
     program, project, or activity in any supplemental or special 
     appropriations Act and in any rescission bill for that year 
     that is enacted into law.
       ``(D) The applicable rate of operations for a program, 
     project, or activity for any fiscal year pursuant to this 
     section shall be reduced by the amount of budgetary resources 
     cancelled in any such program, project, or activity resulting 
     from the prior year's sequestration under section 251 of the 
     Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 as 
     published in OMB's final sequestration report for the prior 
     fiscal year.
       ``(3) Appropriations and funds made available, and 
     authority granted, for any fiscal year pursuant to this 
     section for a program, project, or activity shall be 
     available for the period beginning with the first day of a 
     lapse in appropriations and ending with the earlier of--
       ``(A) the date on which the applicable regular 
     appropriation bill for such fiscal year becomes law (whether 
     or not such law provides for such program, project, or 
     activity) or a continuing resolution making appropriations 
     becomes law, as the case may be, or
       ``(B) the last day of such fiscal year.
       ``(b) An appropriation or funds made available, or 
     authority granted, for a program, project, or activity for 
     any fiscal year pursuant to this section shall be subject to 
     the terms and conditions imposed with respect to the 
     appropriation made or funds made available for the preceding 
     fiscal year, or authority granted for such program, project, 
     or activity under current law.
       ``(c) Appropriations and funds made available, and 
     authority granted, for any program, project, or activity for 
     any fiscal year pursuant to this section shall cover all 
     obligations or expenditures incurred for such program, 
     project, or activity during the portion of such fiscal year 
     for which this section applies to such program, project, or 
     activity.
       ``(d) Expenditures made for a program, project, or activity 
     for any fiscal year pursuant to this section shall be charged 
     to the applicable appropriation, fund, or authorization 
     whenever a regular appropriation bill or a joint resolution 
     making continuing appropriations until the end of a fiscal 
     year providing for such program, project, or activity for 
     such period becomes law.
       ``(e) This section shall not apply to a program, project, 
     or activity during a fiscal year if any other provision of 
     law (other than an authorization of appropriations)--
       ``(1) makes an appropriation, makes funds available, or 
     grants authority for such program, project, or activity to 
     continue for such period, or
       ``(2) specifically provides that no appropriation shall be 
     made, no funds shall be made available, or no authority shall 
     be granted for such program, project, or activity to continue 
     for such period; or
       ``(f) For purposes of this section, the term `regular 
     appropriation bill' means any annual appropriation bill 
     making appropriations, otherwise making funds available, or 
     granting authority, for any of the following categories of 
     programs, projects, and activities:
       ``(1) Agriculture, rural development, and related agencies 
     programs.
       ``(2) The Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the 
     judiciary, and related agencies.
       ``(3) The Department of Defense.
       ``(4) The government of the District of Columbia and other 
     activities chargeable in whole or in part against the 
     revenues of the District.
       ``(5) The Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, 
     and Education, and related agencies.
       ``(6) The Department of Housing and Urban Development, and 
     sundry independent agencies, boards, commissions, 
     corporations, and offices.
       ``(7) Energy and water development.
       ``(8) Foreign assistance and related programs.
       ``(9) The Department of the Interior and related agencies.
       ``(10) Military construction.
       ``(11) The Department of Transportation and related 
     agencies.
       ``(12) The Treasury Department, the U.S. Postal Service, 
     the Executive Office of the President, and certain 
     independent agencies.
       ``(13) The legislative branch.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 202(e)(3) of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended by inserting 
     ``and on or before September 30'' before ``of each year''.
       (c) Chapter Analysis.--The analysis of chapter 13 of title 
     31, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the 
     item relating to section 1310 the following new item:

``1311. Continuing appropriations.''.

       (d) Effect of Amendments.--Nothing in the amendments made 
     by this section shall be construed to affect Government 
     obligations mandated by other law, including obligations with 
     respect to social security, medicare, and medicaid.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 499, the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Gekas) and a Member opposed each will control 20 
minute.
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim the time in 
opposition to the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young) will be 
recognized for 20 minutes in opposition to the amendment.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gekas).
  (Mr. GEKAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, the amendment which we are about to consider is one 
that we have proposed several times over the last decade, and each year 
it becomes more important and more salient to the process which we are 
debating here today, namely, how can we prepare and devise a suitable 
budget for the people of the United States without the fear of or 
actual causing of a shutdown of government?
  Let me take you back to December of 1990, because it is important to 
recognize and for the American people to realize what the nature of 
this debate is.

[[Page H3129]]

 In that month, you will recall, half a million of our fellow 
Americans, young people serving in the Armed Forces, were in the 
deserts of Saudi Arabia, musket in hand, ready to do battle to rescue 
Kuwait from the Iraqi conquest.
  While they were poised, ready to do battle, guess what? The 
government of the United States shut down. It shut down, and, for all 
intents and purposes, then the man in uniform, the woman in uniform, 
was a man without a country, a woman without a country, because the 
Congress did not have the negotiating ability or brain power to put 
together a budget to forestall this shutdown of government.
  Now, that is the worst example. Since then we have had several 
shutdowns or threats of shutdown. The most notable one, of course, was 
in 1995 when the Clinton strategy and the Gingrich strategy collided in 
such a way that we had a colossal shutdown of government.
  What I am asking here today is for us to adopt the amendment which 
would call for an instant replay on October 1, the first day of the new 
fiscal year, an instant replay of last year's budget for all those 
appropriations bills not completed by September 30.

                              {time}  1730

  That means that there will never be a shutdown and that the 
negotiators and the appropriators, like our good friend the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Young), who does a superb job, is not robbed of one 
iota of his power in the appropriation or his ability to negotiate and 
to deal with the problems of fashioning a budget, and we would be in a 
position to proceed with the level of government without interruption.
  That is the force and effect of my amendment. Ask the Federal 
employees and the people who have to run the Federal bureaucracy, the 
Social Security Administration, the Pentagon, what the people of the 
United States expect. Like the Smithsonian Institute to stay open for 
tourism in Washington, do they not have a right to expect that, as the 
bottom line, government services to be available at all times? Yet we 
would shut down not just our 500,000 men and women in Saudi Arabia but 
the Smithsonian Institute as well for the rationale that is employed in 
the bickering between the White House and the Congress.
  I am saying what we want to put in place today is not for this 
Congress, not for this President. All those who are blindly loyal to 
the President, this President, or those who are blindly hostile to the 
President, have to set all of that aside because we are talking about 
the future budget process for the next Congress and for the next 
President, not for us who went through these shutdowns and who do not 
fully understand how it occurred in the first place.
  So what we are talking about is good government, better government, 
for the future. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young) wants a staunch, 
workable system. I know he does, but he opposes this, I learned from a 
wonderful letter that he sent to me about his rationale, because in his 
way of looking at things he, as an appropriator, is robbed of the power 
to negotiate and to bring about an orderly process, as he sees it, of a 
budget for the year.
  I say the reverse is true. If we can have the instant replay on 
October 1, with no shutdown, a smooth transition into the new fiscal 
year, he has more power than ever as an appropriator to be able to put 
all the pieces together for a new budget and all the time unpressured 
by emergencies and unpressured by special interests that always have a 
hand in that mammoth last budget that all of us are forced to support 
because there is nothing else before us except the threat of a shutdown 
in government.
  I implore my colleagues to vote in favor of the Gekas amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Knollenberg), who is a member of the 
Committee on Appropriations and also a member of the Committee on the 
Budget.
  Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida 
(Mr. Young) for yielding this time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in total opposition to this amendment. No matter 
how well written an automatic CR might be, there are always special 
cases that must be addressed with legislation in order to maintain the 
continuity of operations. The census is a perfect example, as well as 
many research programs and construction projects, including those that 
are related to national defense. In practice, this prevents Congress 
from being able to pass a CR without any changes to any departments or 
programs. Because of this reality, any automatic CR will have to be 
supplemented with other legislation in order to work effectively and to 
avoid the semi-shutdown impacts across the Federal Government. 
Therefore, even with an automatic CR, we will be in a situation not 
that much different than what we currently face.
  In addition, I am also concerned about the change in context under 
which appropriations bills are negotiated with the President. Since the 
individual appropriations bills would no longer be viewed as must-pass, 
this has the possibility of prolonging negotiations between Congress 
and the President.
  This amendment will remove the backbone from appropriators because 
there will be no sense of urgency in passing appropriations bills. I 
understand the concerns of many of my colleagues about the effects of 
the threat of a government shutdown but government shutdowns can easily 
be avoided without an automatic CR. Prior shutdowns have not occurred 
over appropriations issues but over extraneous issues. Short-term CRs 
written as cleanly as possible have always been signed by the 
President.
  While I support the efforts to avoid any appropriations train wreck 
at the end of the year, I do not believe the automatic CR will 
accomplish this goal, and I urge my colleagues to oppose this 
amendment.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Rohrabacher), a staunch supporter of our concept.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the 
amendment given us today by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. 
Gekas).
  Mr. Chairman, it is time for us to give up, which is the budgetary 
equivalent of a doom's day strategy, a nuclear weapon. It is time to 
repeal for all time the threat of a government shutdown. It is not a 
threat to us as much as it is a threat to the people of the United 
States. It is time for us to say that we do not have to threaten 
ourselves and the American people to do our job. We do not have to 
threaten to do something that everyone agrees is stupid, just to give 
ourselves enough incentive to do our job and to enact appropriation 
bills.
  Mr. Chairman, whenever we propose to end government shutdowns, we 
always hear the same thing as we have heard. How can we pass 
appropriations bills without the threat of a government shutdown? One 
answer is that almost every year we somehow manage to enact one or more 
supplemental appropriations bills, even though we know for a fact that 
the government will not shut down if we pass them.
  The larger question is this: Are our appropriation bills so bad that 
the only thing worse than passing them is the totally irrational 
alternative of shutting down the government?
  I, for one, have more confidence in our appropriators and the 
appropriations process that it will work than that. Even a step towards 
sanity would be worthwhile. The main reason that I supported the 
amendment that we just debated and which failed, which provided for a 
2-year budget cycle, is that it would mean that at least every other 
year there would be no threat of a shutdown, but if we can eliminate 
the threat for just half the time, which unfortunately we did not do, 
why should we not go all the way? Why should we not just eliminate this 
threat?
  Let me suggest this: The American people are looking to us. There is 
no reason for us to threaten the American people, especially there is 
no reason for us to threaten government employees with the hardship and 
the burden of government shutdowns just to get us to do our bills. Let 
us work together. We have proven we can work together this year, but 
let us put an insurance policy in place that protects the American 
workers, the American people and government workers; protects them if 
we

[[Page H3130]]

are not doing our job, and let us instead insist that the job get done 
and not threaten the American people if we do not do it.
  Mr. Chairman, I strongly support the Gekas amendment.
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Walsh).
  Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Young) for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment, I think, would be a terrible mistake if 
we passed it. The Founding Fathers over 200 years ago put this system 
together, a system of checks and balances, and there are consequences 
to our actions and also to our inactions. The concern here is that if 
we fail to pass an appropriations bill or several appropriations bills, 
that portion of the government will not be funded. That has happened 
once in my 12 years here and I am told the last time it happened before 
that was 1986. It was not the end of the world. Did it cause some 
disruptions? It did. The fact of the matter is, there has to be some 
discipline in the system, and if we do not get our bills done on time 
and an automatic continuing resolution takes over, all impetus, all 
momentum, all consequences to not completing our budget work are lost. 
It is a Band-Aid approach to a very complicated, delicate balance of 
power that has been working for over 200 years.
  This idea of a 2-year budget, the Founding Fathers rejected that. An 
automatic continuing resolution, I am sure they did not envision that 
but they would have rejected it, too. What we do here, if we put the 
government on automatic pilot, the pilot is the President of the United 
States and we, as the legislators, our job is to be independent of the 
executive, fiercely independent.
  Now, we already had reform in a recent Congress where we passed a 
line item veto, where we gave power to the President and the Supreme 
Court said do not do that, you idiots; do not give that power to the 
President. That is your power; and they gave it back to us, thank God.
  Now we are going to yield more power to the President by putting the 
government out on automatic pilot. We lose our control of the budget 
process and the President just runs us around. That is not what we 
want. We want to maintain our independence. Please defeat this bill.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Wynn).
  Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. 
Gekas) for yielding me this time and for his leadership on this issue.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this amendment. We need a 
continuing resolution, an automatic continuing resolution, for one 
simple reason. Pause and think a moment. We were elected to run the 
government, not to stop the government, not to shut it down. The 
current structure we have in place, and this is no slap at the 
appropriators for whom I have a great deal of respect, masks two 
things. The current structure masks either our ineptitude, our failure 
to come to a reasonable agreement on budget agreements, or it masks our 
selfishness. The notion that our personal and perceived objectives are 
more important than the government of the United States, that it is 
more important that we get our way than it is that we have museums 
open, that we fund our military, that we send out Social Security 
checks, some people in this body think their decision-making is so 
important that it is worth shutting down the government. I disagree 
with that notion. I think that a continuing resolution maintains the 
status quo. If one feels that cutting the government is that important, 
continue the debate and negotiate. If they feel expanding government is 
important, continue that debate, but in the meantime do not shut down 
the government. I support the Gekas amendment.
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Callahan).
  Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Chairman, there is no one in the House that I 
respect more than the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gekas). I 
literally have spent hours across the desk from him listening to his 
philosophy, sort of straining him to tell me some of the great depth of 
knowledge he has of the great Civil War and his process knowledge of 
this body.
  I would say to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gekas),  I am 
here today to maybe engage in a colloquy with him to ask him some 
specific questions.
  As the gentleman may know, my niche in Congress is chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related 
Programs, and as a result it is up to me to draft a bill each year to 
bring to the Members to vote on how much foreign aid we are going to 
give. This is not a real popular position. For example, I would say to 
the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gekas), we are in the process of 
reducing aid to Israel, reducing Israel $120 million a year, with an 
agreement with the Israeli government that this is the right direction 
we should go, but under the Gekas amendment, as I understand it, there 
would be no room for that reduction in a continuing resolution.
  Israel gets all of their money the first 15 days of the fiscal year. 
So if indeed that is the case, under the Gekas resolution when would I 
be able to cut foreign aid, which is what I have been doing every 
single year I have been chairman?
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CALLAHAN. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. GEKAS. The answer is in two parts. First, when next the gentleman 
meets with the appropriators to sit down for the new budget he can do 
it but, secondly, I answer the question with a question. What does the 
gentleman do now if we come to the end of the fiscal year and a 
continuing resolution temporary for 2 weeks occurs?
  Mr. CALLAHAN. Rerestrict that in the resolution. In the continuing 
resolution, we deny that early disbursal, and I am saying under the 
Gekas amendment, as I understand it, and I have great respect for the 
gentleman's tremendous knowledge of this process, but I am saying in my 
particular case we do not give foreign aid like an entitlement. We give 
it to countries based upon their needs.
  Mr. GEKAS. My answer to the gentleman is what does he do now under a 
temporary CR? The same thing.

                              {time}  1745

  Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Maryland (Mrs. 
Morella).
  Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time 
to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Gekas amendment to 
provide for an automatic continuing resolution for those appropriations 
bills which have not been enacted by the start of the fiscal year.
  To respond to our previous distinguished speaker, our response is, 
get the bills done by the end of that fiscal year.
  This amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gekas) 
responds to the American people, who are tired of watching the 
spectacle of a possible Federal Government shutdown because of an 
impasse in budget negotiations between Congress and the President.
  This amendment simply prevents what all of us want to see prevented.
  Mr. Chairman, there have been 17 government shutdowns since 1977. 
When this happens, those who bear the real burden of these national 
embarrassments are not Members of Congress, nor are they those in the 
upper echelons of the executive branch. Instead, those who pay the 
price are our senior citizens and our veterans, who rely on receiving 
their social security and benefit checks on time, and our Federal work 
force, who find themselves jerked around from one day to the next, 
sometimes even 1 hour to the next, not knowing or having any control 
over their only livelihoods.
  Let us stop that and support this amendment.
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Bentsen).
  (Mr. BENTSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.

[[Page H3131]]

  Mr. Chairman, I have the greatest respect for the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Gekas). We are co-chairs on the Biomedical Research 
Caucus. However, this is just a bad amendment. It is well-intentioned, 
but I consider this amendment to be the dumbing down of American 
government.
  It means well that we do not want government shutdowns, but what this 
amendment does is it puts the government on automatic pilot. We might 
as well pass this and leave town and not come back, because if we have 
any discrepancy between the executive branch and the legislative 
branch, nothing will ever get done. All we will do is have automatic 
CRs that will go one after the other, and we will never take care of 
policy issues we should be addressing.
  Yes, there are times when the government is shut down. We had it 
during the Clinton administration, we had it during the Reagan 
administration. Usually the power inures to the executive in that 
process. Nonetheless, that is how the system works. In the end, we are 
better off because there is that separation of powers between the 
branches.
  I would encourage my colleagues to oppose this. When we debated this 
in the Committee on the Budget, I was against it. At the very least, 
what we should consider is something to do with the essential 
functions, but not 100 percent, or not a freeze at 95 percent, because 
we will never do anything around here. We will never make the hard 
decisions. That is the unintended consequences of what is otherwise a 
very well-meaning amendment.
  I would hope that my colleagues would defeat this, because, as I 
said, if we pass this, we might as well shut the place down, go home, 
put the government on automatic pilot, and let the bureaucrats run the 
operation. I do not think that is what the gentleman from Pennsylvania 
intends.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Stearns).
  (Mr. STEARNS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Chairman, let us go to October 17 of this year. We are here on 
the weekends, and it is 3 o'clock in the morning. The President has 
vetoed three or four of our appropriations bills. The Republicans meet, 
the Democrats meet. We do not know what to do. We are trying to get 
together.
  Sound familiar? That is what happened in 1999, what happened in 1998, 
what happened in 1997. What do we do? We put everything together in an 
omnibus appropriations bill for $500 billion. There is not one person 
in this body that knew what was in that appropriations bill. We brought 
it all on the House floor and everybody, exhausted, votes for it.
  Is that the way to run a government? That is not the way we should do 
it. There is so much in-fighting and partisanship near the end, 
particularly in an election year, that we need some failsafe method. 
This is what the Gekas amendment does, it fully funds 100 percent of 
the previous years's budget at the funding levels so we can go home and 
not have these omnibus appropriations bills that are so awful that all 
of us are embarrassed to go home after voting for them.
  I urge my colleagues to think in terms of protecting their 
constituents, protecting the integrity of this office. If Members do 
not pass the Gekas amendment for this continuing level, they are 
corrupting the process. We need to pass this today.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the amendment being offered 
by Mr. Gekes--the Automatic Continuing Resolution, or CR.
  I do so because an automatic Continuing Resolution is a fail safe 
provisions that would automatically and fully fund the thirteen 
appropriations measures should any or all fail to be passed into law. 
In other words, we would be adding a common sense provision to this 
budget reform measure.
  the CR is a simply and reasonable effort to protect America from the 
kind of partisan political battle that resulted in shutting down the 
government and suspending essential government services back in 1995. 
None of us want this to happen ever again. Passage of this amendment 
would ensure the uninterrupted continuation of vital services like 
Social Security and Veterans benefits--the CR remove politics from the 
appropriations process.
  The CR provision is actually quite simple and generous: should any of 
the bills fail to become law by the end of the fiscal year, they would 
be funded at fully 100 percent of the previous year's funding levels. 
In other words, there are no cuts and no elimination of programs as a 
result of passage.
  Today, America is not in desperate need of a dire course of action, 
but one never knows what the future holds. For the good of our country 
and the peace of mind of her citizens, we should pass into law this 
common sense insurance mechanism.
  As an original cosponsor of this legislation and a long-time 
supporter of the sentiments behind the CR, I urge my colleagues to vote 
in favor of this worthy amendment. I also call upon the president to 
reconsider his position on this issue for the long-term good of the 
entire country.
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis), the distinguished chairman of 
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations.
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate the 
gentleman yielding time to me, and rise in strong opposition to the 
amendment offered by my colleague, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. 
Gekas).
  It is with some hesitancy that I do so, but he and I had talked more 
than once about the fact that the Founding Fathers designed this system 
almost to stimulate confrontation. The body is made up of two parties, 
and the debate that takes place between the two parties oftentimes is 
the healthiest part of the work that we do around here. Sometimes we 
have a Democratic Congress and a Republican president, and vice versa. 
Indeed, that dialogue and exchange is very healthy for the process.
  The automatic continuing resolution presumes that we cannot get our 
work done without some way of avoiding that confrontation. Nothing 
could be worse for our government than that. If we had an automatic 
continuing resolution in place, there are some pretty dramatic things 
that could happen in the months ahead. Let me illustrate that point.
  The presumption here is that in the 00 year, everything was fine with 
certain kinds of programming, so we do not need increases for the 01 
year. Let me suggest that if the proposal of the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania were in place, this is what would occur in the defense 
arena, the area that I have responsibility for appropriating about.
  The 01 bill provides for $19.6 billion for national security above 
last year's bill. In specific categories, the military would be 
dramatically impacted by this proposal if it were in place. For 
example, for military personnel, those people we wanted so desperately 
to help last year, we would lose $2 billion; for operations and 
maintenance, there would be a reduction of $5.2 billion; for 
procurement, very important assets for the military, $8.6 billion. The 
problem goes on and on.
  I would suggest very, very strongly that the Gekas amendment, while 
carefully thought out by the author, is not what we need in this 
legislation. Indeed, with this amendment, I would urge all of my 
colleagues to vote no on the entire bill.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. LEWIS of California. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, if we came to the end of a cycle, thinking 
about those expenditures that the gentleman is talking about for the 
Pentagon, and we did not have a budget for the military, would the 
gentleman vote for a temporary CR for 30 days or 45 days? The answer is 
yes, the gentleman would, and he would be under the same constraints 
then in not being able to spend.
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Taking back my time, the fact is that short-
term clean CRs have worked from time to time. It is when we get in 
confrontations between the administration or between parties that often 
the process falls apart.
  Therefore, I strongly urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment, 
and if it should pass, to oppose the bill.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Iowa 
(Mr. Nussle), the author of the overall budget reform system that we 
are debating generally.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.

[[Page H3132]]

  Mr. Chairman, I am amazed to hear the debate today, so much 
discussion about personal and individual power, committee jurisdiction, 
prerogative, the need to put discipline into a system.
  Mr. Chairman, this is not about us, this is about America; We, the 
people. People come from around the world to see how 260 million people 
govern a Nation. They do not come here to see how much power the 
chairman of the Committee on Resources has, they come here to see how 
it works.
  What they cannot believe and what I cannot believe, and what my 
constituents in Iowa cannot believe, is that if in fact we do come to 
impasse, that they should be so affected by a government shutdown that 
everything has to stop because a couple of chairmen, a couple of 
powerful chairmen, rightfully have an argument, rightfully have a 
disagreement, and cannot come to an agreement. Therefore, everything 
has to suffer, everything has to shut down.
  The beauty of America is that we have been able to for more than 200 
years talk about the power of the people of this country, not 
individual power of Members of Congress. Let us pass this amendment.
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt), the distinguished ranking 
member of the Committee on the Budget.
  (Mr. SPRATT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is not necessary. It is not 
necessary as long as we keep our institutional memory and remember what 
happened among the public the last time we shut the government down. 
That ought to be impetus enough to get the job done, get the bills 
passed, and use temporary CRs to breach the gap until we do.
  It is not necessary and it is not useful, either. For one thing, it 
is not good for the institutions, in my opinion. It takes away all 
incentive for us to enact 13 appropriation bills on time, on schedule, 
by regular order. It is hard enough for us to do that now. If we pass 
the CR, it is no sweat, we do not have to get the job done. The 
automatic CR provision would be there to put $600 billion of spending 
on automatic pilot. We could not do our job with impunity.
  It is not good budget policy. What this effectively does is turn all 
existing discretionary appropriations into capped entitlements at this 
year's rate, because unless they are cut by a majority vote, they 
remain in effect. This backstops existing spending. It takes away all 
pressure for us to compromise.
  Having said that, I do not think we can begin to imagine all of the 
possibilities of games playing with the budget if this is adopted, not 
necessarily in this body, although I am sure we are up to it, but in 
the other body, where they have the power of filibuster. A minority of 
the Senate, by filibuster, can prevent the enactment of regular 
appropriation bills and leave the program funding levels at the capped 
entitlement level in the automatic CR.
  The President with his veto has all the more power now, if we pass 
this bill, because he can veto with impunity. He does not have to worry 
about the government keeping going because the automatic CR will fill 
the gap.
  We do not need any of these factors overhanging the budget process. 
This amendment solves very little and it raises all sorts of problems. 
It should be defeated.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, it now gives me personal pleasure to yield 1 
minute to my colleague, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Toomey).
  Mr. TOOMEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this amendment. Every year, 
at the end of the appropriation process, we end up facing the shutdown 
showdown. Congress and the President disagree on the spending level, 
and when a stalemate occurs, the threat of a disruptive, costly, 
irresponsible government shutdown looms ominously over the 
negotiations.
  Who wins those negotiations? The winner is whichever side can blame 
the other for the shutdown. The politics of who will win and who will 
get to blame the other side for the shutdown determines the winner. 
That is no way to run the government.
  The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gekas) has a good commonsense 
solution that says, keep the government running, keep spending bills in 
dispute constant at the previous year's level. One of the best things 
about this approach is, as we have heard today, nobody likes freezing 
things at last year's level. No one likes it. I do not like a freeze, I 
would like to see lower spending. Others do not like a freeze, they 
want to see higher spending. The appropriators do not like the freeze, 
they want to play the role allocated to them of allocating the 
spending.
  The good result of that is that if the Gekas amendment becomes law, 
there is plenty of pressure from all sides to reach a reasonable 
compromise, much more likely to be based on policy matters and less 
likely to be driven by the politics of a shutdown.
  I urge a yes vote on this amendment.
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the 
distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, 
and Judiciary, the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Rogers).
  Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me, Mr. 
Chairman.
  Mr. Chairman, the passage of this amendment would be an admission by 
the Members of this body that we cannot do the job our people elected 
us to do.
  We were elected by our constituents, all of us, to come here and pass 
on spending and funding the Federal government. Passing this amendment 
would say, no, we are going to put things on automatic pilot. We do not 
have the capacity or the ability to pass on individual spending bills. 
I think that would be a dereliction of our duties.
  We would take away the automatic period at the end of the sentence, 
the October 1 deadline, and therefore these appropriations bills are 
not must-pass pieces of legislation. We would extend the appropriating 
process, rather than bring it to a successful conclusion.
  Number two, passage of this amendment would put a premium on people 
opposing and stonewalling and causing inaction. Those who would want to 
increase spending or those who want to avoid a funding cut for a 
program or a bill would be automatically strengthened by the existence 
of the automatic continuing resolution, saying, if we do nothing, the 
status quo prevails.

                              {time}  1800

  Most Members of this body want some change in the status quo, either 
up or down. Automatic continuing resolution would take away the 
incentive to make something happen by a deadline. If we remove the 
deadline of October 1, then I predict nothing will take place. The 
government will be on automatic pilot. We would have, as the gentleman 
from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) says, capped entitlements. Every 
program would stay just exactly like it is year in and year out because 
there would not be the ability in this body to muster a majority of 
votes to overcome that incentive to do nothing and to cause some 
change.
  So I would hope that the body would reject this amendment by a very 
large margin because I think the people that elected us sent us here to 
decide how we spend their Federal tax dollars, not to sit by on 
automatic pilot and say I am helpless, I cannot do anything.
  I think my colleagues are elected to do something. I think they were 
elected to represent their constituents in deciding how their taxes 
were spent. If my colleagues adopt this amendment, they are saying to 
their folks back home, I cannot affect the process. I am putting it on 
automatic pilot.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge a rejection of the amendment.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Arizona (Mr. Shadegg).
  (Mr. SHADEGG asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Gekas 
amendment. Each year, this Congress is faced with a government 
shutdown. Indeed, as an earlier speaker noted, there have been 17 
government shutdowns since 1977. The last speaker made a point that it 
would be an admission that somehow this would reflect badly on this 
body.
  I want to echo what was said earlier by one of my colleagues from 
Iowa.

[[Page H3133]]

 This is not about us. I have great respect for the Committee on 
Appropriations. They work very hard at doing their job. They sort out 
the priorities and do it very, very well.
  But this is not about us. This is about the American people. Quite 
simply, the American people deserve better. They deserve to know that, 
if this Congress, working with the President, cannot come to an 
agreement, the government will not shut down. They deserve to know that 
they will not become the innocent victims of our inability to reach an 
agreement.
  Let me ask a simple question. I would make the point that if my wife 
and I could not come to an agreement on our family budget, would we 
stop feeding our children? Would we stop paying our light bill? Would 
we stop paying our mortgage? The answer is no, obviously we would not.
  Indeed, this is a reasonable proposal, and the notion that the budget 
would go on auto pilot and nothing would happen is ridiculous. What 
would happen is that we would debate the spending bills as we should 
debate them, on the merits in them, without a gun at our head and being 
forced to say we must reach agreement by a certain deadline or we will 
hurt innocent people. The notion of hurting innocent people should not 
be a part of this debate. What should be a part of it is responsible 
government.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge support for the Gekas amendment.
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha).
  Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, I worry that the Members believe that there 
is some easy way to solve these problems. The reason we do not come to 
a conclusion is because there are legitimate differences between 
Members, between parties when we are trying to solve them.
  Certainly a continuing resolution that is automatic does not solve 
it. It just puts it off and puts it off again and puts it off again. It 
is a way for us to find a deadline to solve the problem.
  I am talking about the practical results of how we legislate. If we 
face a deadline, we solve the problem. If we do not, it goes on and on. 
I have seen it happen for years. I have seen us come up to a deadline 
and finally pass the legislation.
  If my colleagues pass something like this, they may never get the 
legislation that they want. So they are making a tactical mistake when 
they try to pass something and think they are going to solve the 
problem.
  I understand the concern of the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. 
Gekas), but that does not answer the concern. It does not solve the 
problem. Every time we run into a conflict and there is no deadline, we 
just put it off. That is the nature of the legislative business.
  So I say to the Members, we make a serious mistake if we think there 
is some easy way to solve this kind of a problem. Our continuing 
resolutions allow us to solve the problem.
  I remember President Reagan getting up and saying, I will never sign 
another continuing resolution the rest of my career. Well, I do not 
remember whether he did or did not, but the point was that was a way of 
solving the problem. He put the continuing resolution on the desk, and 
he said, this is 2 feet high, and we should not pass something like 
this. Well, that got us to the culmination of the session and got us 
through to the next year.
  There are all kinds of ways to avoid it. I am sure if we pass 
something like this, all we will do is eliminate the deadline, 
eliminate the possibility of solving the problem.
  So I would urge the Members to vote against this amendment that is 
very damaging to our process.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, how much time is remaining, may I ask?
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). The gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Gekas) has 5\1/2\ minutes remaining. The gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Young) has 3 minutes remaining.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Cox).
  Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania 
(Chairman Gekas) for yielding me this time.
  I am pleased to rise in support of the Gekas amendment, which will 
provide a sustaining mechanism so that whatever conflicts and debates 
might arise between the branches, between the executive branch and the 
legislative branch, during our annual exercise of allocating our 
national resources, we will not suffer needless brinksmanship 
exercises, we will not have budgetary games of chicken, and we will not 
have wasteful government shutdowns.
  In 1986, the Federal Government shutdown, I was working in the White 
House for President Reagan at the time. That prompted President Reagan 
to observe that the 1974 Budget Act, which establishes our current 
budget process was badly flawed. He proposed budget reform legislation 
which is essentially the Nussle-Cardin bill that we are getting to vote 
on today.
  The only difference between what President Reagan then proposed and 
the base text that we have on the floor today is that we lack a 
sustaining mechanism in the base text. That is what the Gekas amendment 
provides.
  I urge my colleagues to vote aye.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I wanted to say to all of those who opposed the 
amendment on the floor, particularly the ones on our side of the aisle, 
on the Republican side, that I was elated a few years back when this 
same proposition came up in the midst of the debate on disaster relief. 
I was overjoyed when I saw that the gentleman from Florida (Chairman 
Young) and the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Rogers), others who oppose 
this legislation, voted in favor of the Gekas amendment of that era. 
The rationale was exactly the same, and the prospects were exactly the 
same, and the result would have been exactly the same.
  It would have been in operation today had the President not vetoed 
it. It is the fault of the President that we do not have a continuing 
resolution, an instant replay concept like the one we are proposing 
here today. He vetoed the disaster relief program that contained the 
Gekas amendment of that era.
  Now, what I am imploring the Members to consider is to replicate that 
which was said by the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Wynn) and the 
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Nussle) that this is not about this Congress 
and the makeup of the personalities and egos of this Congress. The 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young) and I are going to be friends way 
beyond our service in the Congress. But both of us can look back, I 
would presume, to say that we put some mechanism into play as incumbent 
legislators for the good of the future of our government, the future of 
our system, the bolstering of our Constitution.
  How anyone can say that it would be automatic pilot has to forget the 
fact that, when we vote for this amendment, we are saying that is what 
we want for the American people.
  We want a continuing automatic transition until the appropriators can 
work out a budget. I want this bill to pass, not for me or for the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young), but I want it to pass for the 
future Congresses of the United States, long after we are gone, to put 
something stable and something of which we can be proud to know that, 
forever and ever, never again will the government of the United States 
shut down, and particularly will that never occur again when we are 
poised for some emergency action and then become toothless in the face 
of the inability of the Members of Congress to come to an agreement.
  Let us support the Gekas amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, today is a great day for the American people. Soon the 
House will be voting to approve a measure of which all Americans can 
embrace and be proud--the ``Government Shutdown Prevention Act.''
  Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, the image of government shutdowns from 
the 104th Congress remains etched in the mind of the American citizen 
as shameful--and unnecessary--incidents in our nation's history. As 
taxpayers, they were incensed that the government would choose not to 
perform its essential duties. As statesmen, we were all embarrassed to 
have forsaken our obligations to the American people. While the 
Republican Congress was blamed for the shutdowns, I believe we were all 
responsible for this disgraceful exhibition of failed governance: the 
House, the Senate, Republicans, Democrats, and the President.
  Before us today is a message to the American people. An affirmation, 
if you will, in the

[[Page H3134]]

form of an amendment which states that we, the Congress, will not 
forsake the American people's trust to deliver essential government 
services and allow for another shameful government shutdown in this 
fiscal cycle. We will achieve this by voting for my amendment to 
provide 100 percent of a Fiscal Year's spending levels to continue 
through the end of the next Fiscal Year, in the absence of a regularly 
passed appropriations bill or a continuing resolution.
  Since my election to the House of Representatives in 1982, I have 
witnessed eight government shutdowns. The worst of which occurred when 
our soldiers were poised for battle in the Persian Gulf. It was at this 
time that I introduced my first government shutdown prevention bill, 
what I referred to as an ``instant replay'' mechanism. At the time, I 
knew I was facing an uphill battle in a long war. After all, the threat 
of a shutdown is one of the most effective weapons in the arsenal of 
legislative politics.
  However, I remained vigilant with the image in my mind of our 
fighting men and women ready to sacrifice their lives as they stood 
poised for Operation Desert Storm without an operating government for 
which to fight. I pledged never to let that happen again. Today, I and 
others proudly stand ready to fulfill that pledge as the House prepares 
to vote on the Government Shutdown Prevention Act Amendment now before 
us, so that we can send a clear message to the American people that we 
will no longer allow them to be pawns in budget disputes between 
Congress and the White House.
  Mr. Chairman, without question, we should have enacted the Shutdown 
Prevention Act years ago. But we did not. So let us restore the 
public's faith in its leaders by showing that we have learned from our 
mistakes by enacting this budget reform. I ask for its adoption and 
urge all members, Republican and Democrat, to vote for its passage, and 
especially urge the President to support this ``good government'' 
reform measure.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of the 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to agree with the gentleman from Pennsylvania 
(Mr. Gekas). We are friends. I would say to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Gekas), we live and learn. He referred to how I might 
have voted on an earlier Gekas amendment, but the situation was 
considerably different then than it is now.
  But I have a great difference with the gentleman from Pennsylvania 
(Mr. Gekas), as he said this is what the American people want. They 
want the status quo. Well, I do not believe that. The reason I do not 
believe that is that every Member in this House was elected by about 
the same number of people to represent that district and to do what is 
right for the country. That is where the people speak.
  Now, let me tell my colleagues how the people have spoken in just 
this year alone. What I am holding here is a stack of legal-sized 
papers. On each of these pages is a specific request made to the 
Committee on Appropriations, including requests for changes in the 
budget and changes in appropriations over last year.
  Now, here they are. The Members of Congress have spoken. I hope that 
they are all listening to this. There are 21,547 requests from Members 
of this House, mostly to change from the status quo of last year. Now, 
are the Members that asked for these requests to be considered by the 
Committee on Appropriations going to be satisfied with the status quo? 
I do not think so, Mr. Chairman.
  To be honest, will the Committee on Appropriations grant every one of 
these requests? Of course not, because they run close to $90 billion 
over last year's budget, so we cannot do all of that.
  So one thing that appropriators do is go through these lists, and 
they try to prioritize based which requests have the most merit. Well, 
the people of America, through their elected representatives in the 
House of Representatives, have spoken. They do not want the status quo. 
They want all these changes over last year. Here is the fact and here 
are the pages. These are the pages and the requests of all members.
  But if we have an automatic continuing resolution in place where we 
enjoy this status quo that makes life easy for all of us, the people's 
voice will have been muted because these 21,457 requests will not even 
be considered, let alone adopted.
  Mr. Chairman, I oppose this amendment.
  Mr. DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I am in strong support of the 
amendment offered by the Gentleman from Pennsylvania, and urge all my 
colleagues to do the same. During 17 of the last twenty budget cycles, 
there has been some level of budgetary impasse between the Congress and 
the President. More often than not, these temporary delays go 
relatively unnoticed because they are tempered by the passage of a 
Continuing Resolution (CR) that maintains the current fiscal year's 
spending levels.
  Unfortunately, in 1995, the rancor of the budget battles here in 
Washington were raised to such a pitch, that their consequences 
ultimately resonated across the nation. As many of you remember, we 
reached an impasse so insurmountable that no CR could be passed, and 
the federal government was effectively shut-down. Overnight, the people 
we were sent here to represent could no longer count on the federal 
government to provide the services they paid for. Additionally, roughly 
1 million federal employees found themselves without a job or a 
paycheck during one of the busiest commercial spending times of the 
year.
  Mr. Chairman, more than 56,000 federal employees reside in my 
district just across the Potomac River. They constitute one of my 
largest constituencies, and are by far one of the most politically 
astute groups in the Nation. But more important than that, they are the 
people who process the millions of social security checks, they are the 
DEA Agents that intercept drugs before they reach our streets, they are 
the surveyors at the Department of Agriculture that distribute aid to 
struggling farmers, and they are the HUD employees who make sure a poor 
family has its rent covered for the next month.
  No one can argue that the differences we have about the federal 
budget are not of paramount importance. But when the entire federal 
government is forced to close its door to the American people because 
of a political dispute in Washington, then we have failed the people we 
were sent here to represent. I want every member in this August Chamber 
to keep in mind that when my 56,000 federal employees can't do their 
jobs, it will be your constituents that will ultimately suffer.
  I want to thank Mr. Gekas for offering an amendment that will provide 
an automatic CR whenever the political rhetoric reaches such a pitch as 
to potentially shutdown the Government. I strongly support the 
amendment and urge all my colleagues to do the same.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Gekas).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 499, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania 
(Mr. Gekas) will be postponed.
  It is the Chair's understanding that amendment No. 3 will not be 
offered.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 printed in House 
Report 106-613.


          Amendment No. 4 Offered by Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas

  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 4 offered by Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas:
       Section 103(a) is amended by striking paragraph (1) and by 
     striking ``(2)''.
       Section 103(c) is amended--
       (1) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following 
     new paragraph:
       (1) Redesignate subparagraphs (C), (D), (E), and (F) as 
     subparagraphs (D), (E), (G), and (H), respectively.
       (2) by striking paragraph (2);
       (3) in paragraph (3), by striking ``subparagraph (C) (as 
     redesignated)'' and inserting ``subparagraph (B)'';
       (4) in paragraph (4), by striking ``subparagraph (C) (as 
     redesignated)'' and inserting ``subparagraph (B)'' and by 
     striking ``(D)'' and inserting ``(C)''; and
       (5) in paragraph (5), by striking ``subparagraph (F) (as 
     redesignated)'' and inserting ``subparagraph (E) (as 
     redesignated)'' and by striking ``(G)'' and inserting 
     ``(F)''.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 499, the 
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) and a Member opposed each will 
control 5 minutes.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim the time in opposition to 
the amendment.

[[Page H3135]]

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Nussle) will 
control 5 minutes in opposition.
  The Chair recognize the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) for 
5 minutes.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2\1/2\ 
minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, I hope that my discussion of this amendment would draw 
appropriators and budgeters together, because I believe the process of 
budgeting and appropriating are two very crucial aspects of this House 
business.

                              {time}  1815

  Call me today the conciliatory lady, the lady who is trying to bring 
us all together on the process that I think is extremely important.
  We all agree that the current budget process does not run as smoothly 
as we may like; however, this bill does not answer all of our concerns. 
The problem with the budget process is that for the last 3 years, the 
leadership has engaged sometimes in processes that do not forward the 
opportunity for resolution.
  In 1998, we failed to adopt a budget resolution, and for the last 2 
years Congress approved budget resolutions that were difficult to 
implement. To work through these problems, the Congress has to waive 
rules to circumvent the budget resolutions. This bill does nothing to 
address this issue.
  Mr. Chairman, H.R. 853 will significantly hamper our ability to agree 
on a budget by requiring a joint budget resolution, requiring the 
President to enter the process early in the year, by transforming the 
joint budget resolution to omnibus budget law, while simultaneously 
curtailing the ability of the appropriation committees to press forward 
if a budget has not been agreed to by May 15. This will delay the 
process rather than speed it up. So it is important that we look for 
options.
  To interject the President in this is not a good option. The budget 
resolution will be transformed into a must-pass legislation. It is 
important, then, to offer an amendment that puts back into the process 
the actual ability to discuss the budget items as they are noted in the 
budget process. It gives us the opportunity to be able to discuss 
thoroughly the needs of education, the needs of Medicare, the needs of 
Social Security.
  In my district, in particular, we are suffering in our public 
hospital system because of the formula of disproportionate share. It is 
important, Mr. Chairman, that we have the opportunity to ensure that we 
discuss these items in a manner that is respectful of the needs of the 
American people. That vigorous debate in the Committee on the Budget, 
that vigorous debate that is heard by the Committee on Appropriations 
is important.
  So I would hope that this amendment that strikes language, that would 
take analysis of the budget functions out of the House budget 
resolution and place them in the committee report would be accepted and 
would be viewed as an important feature, an important aspect of the 
budgeting process for all Americans.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of my amendment to eliminate 
H.R. 853's provision taking the analysis of the budget functions out of 
the House budget resolution and placing them in a Committee report. 
This Committee report would not permit the debate of each individual 
budget function; instead, the budget debate would shift to the 
comprehensive total amount.
  The prohibition of debate on individual budget functions would 
significantly curtail the ability to increase discretionary spending. 
This amendment reinstates the inclusion of budget functions in the 
budget resolution. Under my amendment, the budget resolution would 
continue to set spending targets for the current 20 budget functions.
  It is a mistake to remove budget functions and reconciliation 
directives from the budget resolution, because floor amendments that 
seek to address where money is spent, not just how much is spent, will 
no longer be possible. Priorities are often as important as aggregates, 
perhaps even more so in an era of surpluses. And if we pay inadequate 
attention to the detailed priorities, the aggregates are more likely to 
be unrealistic.
  With functional levels included in the report and not subject to 
amendment, the issue of relative priorities cannot be addressed as well 
as they are now. And with the text of the budget resolution itself 
including fewer details, those details may take on less importance over 
time. Such a result will focus the debate on total spending and tax 
levels, and generally strengthen the position of those who talk about 
lower taxes and less spending.
  Those who favor a series of programs such as Medicare, veterans 
benefits, education, highways, WIC, child care grants, defense, or 
environmental protection will be at a disadvantage in the budget 
resolution debate. This would be a tragic result for our nation.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, to me, the reason that the budget functions were 
removed from the budget process as part of the base bill probably makes 
the most sense, to me, of just about any of the provisions. And the 
reason is because, as a new Member of the Committee on the Budget, one 
of the things that I did and one of the things that my staff did as an 
exercise is we actually tried to make sense of the budget functions and 
how there was a correlation between those 20 budget functions and the 
13 appropriation bills.
  So my colleagues understand what I am saying, let me show this chart. 
This is what the budget currently looks like, and what the gentlewoman 
is suggesting is that these budget functions need to remain in the 
budget that we pass. The problem is, there is not one number within 
these 20 budget functions that correlates to anything in reality later 
on in the year.
  In other words, let me just take an example. Income security is the 
budget function called budget function 600. As an example, for this 
last budget there was $252 billion, with a B, billion dollars, set 
aside for income security. Now, my colleagues might guess what that is, 
but let me suggest to my colleagues that, first of all, it crossed the 
jurisdiction of four committees, it crossed the authorizing 
jurisdiction of seven different committees, and let me just give my 
colleagues an idea of some of the things that were part of that budget 
function: The drug elimination grants for low-income housing was in 
this, Section 8 housing vouchers, homeless assistance grants, child 
care and development block grant. That was part of the discretionary 
portion of that budget function.
  But see if it makes sense to have, for instance, military retirement 
as part of that budget function. Should that not be in defense? Should 
that not be someplace else? Why do we have budget functions that are 
never used after the budget is passed? That is the question that we as 
a budget reform panel asked ourselves.
  So, instead of having budget functions that would make it even more 
difficult for the President and the Congress to come together and make 
an agreement on the budget overall, what we said was, if we really do 
want to illustrate these 20 different budget functions, let us include 
them, but let us not include them on the face sheet of the report. Let 
us put them in the report language.
  It does not mean there is not going to be income security; it does 
not mean there will not be agriculture; it does not mean there will not 
be education; it does not mean there will not be all of the other 
important programs. Nothing is changed. Nothing is eliminated. In fact, 
all of those programs can increase.
  What the gentlewoman is trying to include in here is included already 
in our bill. What we try and do, however, is take out the confusion of 
numbers that do not make sense to anybody after the budget is passed. 
So I would recommend that we vote down this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt), the ranking member of the 
Committee on the Budget.
  (Mr. SPRATT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me 
this time.
  The irony of this bill is that it elevates the budget resolution to a 
joint resolution so that it has the force and effect of law, and then 
it takes the contents of this newly elevated resolution and literally 
guts it. It reduces us from what we have now, a debate on programmatic 
priorities, the different functions in this budget, which are

[[Page H3136]]

more aligned to programmatic spending than any of the 13 appropriation 
bills that we have. It takes those and relegates them to the committee 
report so they lose a lot of their cause and effect.
  Secondly, it takes the one power that we have as a committee to sort 
of move the budget process and require committees to do what the House 
would have them do, a process called reconciliation, and also relegates 
it to the report. So having raised the status of the resolution to a 
law, it then downgrades the contents of them to relative 
insignificance.
  It means that, when we have the budget debate on the floor, we will 
be talking about big aggregated numbers that do not mean a lot of 
anything. We will not be coming here to say that we are talking about 
more for defense or more for health care or more for veterans' health 
care or more for housing. We will not be able to make that argument 
nearly as convincingly as we do now because all of this will be tucked 
away in the report, and all we will have in the resolution itself will 
be big aggregate numbers which will not necessarily mean anything about 
individual programs.
  This is a good amendment. It should be adopted.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  The gentleman from South Carolina proposed an amendment in the 
committee, which I thought was an interesting one when we were debating 
my base bill. And that is that instead of the budget functions, what we 
do is have the 302(b) allocations, which for everybody's edification 
are the amounts that are given to the different 13 appropriation 
subcommittees. I happened to think that was a fairly ingenious idea, 
because then the numbers would connect.
  Now, having said that, I can see the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. 
Obey) and the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Callahan) about ready to come 
out of their chairs, and I do not think we are probably going to have 
much success in passing that. The gentleman from Wisconsin does not 
need to come out of his chair, I would say, because we did not put that 
in there.
  See, I should not have even brought that up.
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. NUSSLE. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I would inform the gentleman that I was 
merely making an innocent inquiry about the fate of the Chicago Cubs, 
that is all.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Well, reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, let me advise the 
gentleman that they are losing.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. NUSSLE. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, my colleague may have noticed that I winced 
when I heard him speak up in the background. I was not quite sure what 
was happening back there because that was a bold proposal. It was 
almost heresy because it breaks with the compromise that was reached in 
1974.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I would agree with the 
gentleman from South Carolina. That is right.
  To conclude, Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that if there was some 
reality between the numbers, then I think there would be more of a 
reason to have them in the base bill.
  The frustrating thing, I think for both sides, is that these budget 
functions are confusing. What we tried to do is we pushed them into the 
report and we put the reconciliation restrictions into the base bill. 
That way we, as a Congress, could decide exactly what committees made 
those decisions, if there were changes that needed to be made. It does 
not change the budget function numbers. It just, to some extent we 
believe, makes them more realistic and makes them easier to understand.
  The current budget functions, as the gentleman from South Carolina 
knows, if we tried to add them up at the end of the year and make them 
fit into the budget, rarely do. They rarely have any kind of basis in 
reality when everything is said and done. So we felt it was important 
to make this more of a real document and not have the confusion that we 
feel was part of the original budget law, and that is the reason for 
that change.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  If we are concerned about priorities for the American people, then we 
will vote for this coming-together amendment. If we are concerned about 
veterans' payments, Medicare, WIC, child care grants, education and 
highways, issues that bring people together, if we care about how the 
appropriators do their jobs well, and they do it well; how the 
Committee on the Budget does its job well, and it does it well, then we 
will give ourselves the opportunity to establish priorities on the 
floor dealing with the American people.
  This is a good amendment, Mr. Chairman, and it brings people 
together. It allows both committees respectively to do their jobs. I 
respect the jobs they do, and I would ask my colleagues to vote for the 
Jackson-Lee amendment that provides for aggregate assessment, and also 
the ability to discuss these particular programs in a way that will 
address the issues and concerns of the American people. I ask for the 
vote of my colleagues on my amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I object to the vote on the 
ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a 
quorum is not present.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 499, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-
Lee) will be postponed.
  The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed 
in House Report 106-613.


                Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Tancredo

  Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment made in order under 
the rule.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Tancredo:
       Subtitle B of title IV is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 426. COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS REPORTS.

       Clause 3(f)(1)(B) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
     Representatives is amended to read as follows:
       ``(B) a list of all appropriations contained in the bill 
     for expenditures not currently authorized by law along with 
     the last year for which the expenditures were authorized, the 
     level of expenditures authorized that year, the actual level 
     of expenditures that year, and the level of expenditures 
     contained in the bill (except classified intelligence or 
     national security programs, projects, or activities).''.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution No. 499, the gentleman 
from Colorado (Mr. Tancredo) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Tancredo) is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, the Tancredo amendment to H.R. 853, the Comprehensive 
Budget Process Reform Act, would simply expand the reporting 
requirements for unauthorized programs which appear in the back of the 
House appropriations reports.
  I want to take this opportunity to bring to the attention of the 
committee and, to help put this thing in perspective, some historical 
tidbits that I think are interesting.
  In 1979, for instance, the Conservative Party leader, Margaret 
Thatcher, was elected Britain's first female Prime Minister, the Facts 
of Life began as a four-episode spin-off from an already successful 
sitcom Different Strokes, and the Legal Services Corporation was last 
authorized.
  In 1980, Mount Saint Helens erupted in May, Ronald Reagan was elected 
President in November, and the Department of Justice was last 
reauthorized.
  In 1983, the invasion of Grenada, the last episode of MASH was 
broadcast,

[[Page H3137]]

and the EPA toxic substance program was last reauthorized.
  In 1984, the Olympics came to Los Angeles, the movie Ghost Busters 
premiered, and the Power Marketing Administration was last 
reauthorized.
  Well, I could go on, there are quite a bit of what I would call 
interesting tidbits that puts this issue in perspective. We have a lot 
of programs out there that are continuing to be appropriated for that 
have not been reauthorized for years. This is a dereliction of our 
duty, I think, and something we have to draw attention to.
  As my colleagues know, the current House rules require a list of all 
unauthorized programs to appear in the back of the appropriations 
report. While this current rule is very helpful in ensuring that 
Congress is aware of the programs that are unauthorized, I believe that 
much more needs to be done to increase the awareness.
  The amendment I propose would simply expand on current rules to 
include, one, the last year for which the expenditures were authorized; 
two, the level of expenditures authorized that year; three, the actual 
level of expenditures for that year; and, four, the level of 
expenditures contained in that current bill.
  I believe this is, although not a gigantic step in the direction I 
would like to take in terms of reauthorization, it is an important one.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. Does any Member seek the time in opposition to the 
Tancredo amendment?
  Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Iowa (Mr. Nussle).
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Chairman, we have had an opportunity to look at this 
amendment. We think it improves and enhances this particular bill and 
we would like to accept this amendment. We feel that it helps us 
particularly with the section on oversight, and we thank the gentleman 
for his work on this cause.

                              {time}  1830

  Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to my colleague, the 
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. DeMint).
  Mr. DeMINT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the amendment 
offered by my friend, the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Tancredo).
  This is a very simple amendment with a very important purpose, to 
increase access to Government spending information for Members of the 
House and the Senate and, especially, to the voting public.
  This is a step in the right direction because it brings reform to our 
Government. It increases accountability, not by creating a new 
Government program, but by empowering the people with information.
  The information required by this amendment answers the questions many 
of us and many citizens ask when we see un-budgeted spending, questions 
such as: When did Congress approve this program? How much money was 
originally approved? How does this compare with current spending 
levels?
  This amendment is important because an informed electorate is crucial 
to the future of our democracy and informed Members of Congress will 
also make better decisions.
  I urge my colleagues to support this common sense amendment.
  Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, since coming to Congress a little over a year ago, I 
have spent a considerable amount of time trying to highlight the 
problems that I have come across in unauthorized spending. As I say, I 
know this is not the ultimate answer. It is our attempt to focus a 
little attention, a little light on the problem.
  The chart I have here does not come anywhere near indicating all the 
programs that are being presently appropriated for without 
authorization, but it just looks at a couple of things that I think are 
again interesting.
  Department of Justice, the last year it was authorized was 1980. The 
amount of authorization at that time was $1,954,000,000. The level 
appropriated in this bill $18,213,926,000. That growth has occurred 
without any authorization activity.
  For fiscal year 2000, according to the annual budget report released 
by the CBO, there were 247 programs funded in 137 laws, totaling over 
$120 billion wherein authorizations have expired. Last year there were 
198 programs funded in 118 laws, totaling over $101 billion.
  I believe that this continuing practice has led to the deterioration 
of power of the authorizing committees and, thus, the loss of 
aggressive congressional oversight and fiscal responsibility. It has 
also led to the shift of power away from the legislative branch toward 
the administration and Federal bureaucracy.
  I recognize that H.R. 853 includes a provision requiring authorizing 
committees to detail how they will authorize programs within a 10-year 
period, but I believe it is time that the House adds additional 
provisions to shine the light on this egregious problem.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time for debate has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
Colorado (Mr. Tancredo).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider Amendment No. 6 printed 
in House Report 106-613.


            Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Ryan of Wisconsin

  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 6 offered by Mr. Ryan of Wisconsin:
       At the end, add the following new title:

              TITLE VII--BUDGETING IN AN ERA OF SURPLUSES

     SEC. 701. PAYGO REQUIREMENTS AND THE ON-BUDGET SURPLUS.

       (a) Section 252(a) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
     Deficit Control Act of 1985 is amended to read as follows:
       ``(a) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to trigger 
     an offsetting sequestration in the amount by which any excess 
     of decreases in receipts and increases in direct spending 
     over increases in receipts and decreases in direct spending, 
     caused by all direct spending and receipts legislation 
     enacted prior to October 1, 2002, exceeds estimates of the 
     on-budget surplus.''.
       (b) Timing and Calculation of Sequestration.--Section 
     252(b) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control 
     Act of 1985 is amended to read as follows:
       ``(b) Sequestration.--
       ``(1) Timing.--Not later than 15 calendar days after the 
     date Congress adjourns to end a session and on the same day 
     as a sequestration (if any) under section 251, there shall be 
     a sequestration to offset an amount equal to--
       ``(A) any excess of decreases in receipts and increases in 
     direct spending over increases in receipts and decreases in 
     direct spending for legislation enacted prior to October 1, 
     2002; minus
       ``(B) the estimated on-budget surplus (which shall not be 
     less than zero),

     as calculated under paragraph (2).
       ``(2) Calculation of sequestration.--OMB shall calculate 
     the amount of the sequestration by adding--
       ``(A) all OMB estimates for the budget year of direct 
     spending and receipts legislation transmitted under 
     subsection (d) for legislation enacted prior to October 1, 
     2002;
       ``(B) the estimated amount of savings in direct spending 
     programs applicable to the budget year resulting from the 
     prior year's sequestration under this section, if any, as 
     published in OMB's final sequestration report for that prior 
     year; and
       ``(C) all OMB estimates for the current year that were not 
     reflected in the final OMB sequestration report for that 
     year; and

     then by subtracting from such sum the OMB estimate for the 
     budget year of the on-budget surplus (if any) as set forth in 
     the OMB final sequestration report increased by the amount of 
     budgetary resources cancelled in any such program, project, 
     or activity resulting from a sequestration for the budget 
     year on the same day under section 251 as published in OMB's 
     final sequestration report.''.
       (c) Preview Reports.--Section 254(c)(3) of the Balanced 
     Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 is amended 
     by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D) and by 
     adding after subparagraph (B) the following new subparagraph:
       ``(C)(i) Mandatory.--In projecting the on-budget surplus 
     (if any) for the budget year, direct spending and receipts 
     shall be calculated consistent with the assumptions under 
     section 257(b) but shall exclude all estimates of direct 
     spending and receipts legislation for such year enacted after 
     the date of enactment of this subparagraph (as estimated by 
     OMB when such legislation was originally enacted).
       ``(ii) Discretionary.--Except as provided by the preceding 
     sentence, the following assumptions shall apply to the 
     calculation of such estimated surplus:
       ``(I) For programs, projects, and activities for which a 
     regular appropriation Act or a

[[Page H3138]]

     joint resolution (other than pursuant to section 1311 of 
     title 31, United States Code) continuing appropriations 
     through the end of the budget year is enacted, budgetary 
     resources other than unobligated balances shall be at the 
     level provided by that Act with the following adjustments:

       ``(aa) Include amounts of budget authority provided and 
     rescinded for such year in any supplemental or special 
     appropriation Act or rescission bill that is enacted into 
     law.
       ``(bb) Reduce the level by the amount of budgetary 
     resources canceled in any such program, project, or activity 
     by a sequestration under section 251 as published in OMB's 
     final sequestration report for such year.

     Substantive changes to or restrictions on entitlement law or 
     other mandatory spending law in an appropriation Act shall be 
     counted in determining the level of direct spending and 
     receipts for purposes of calculating the on-budget surplus 
     under this section.
       ``(II) For programs, projects, and activities for which a 
     regular appropriation Act or a joint resolution (other than 
     pursuant to section 1311 of title 31, United States Code) 
     continuing appropriations through the end of the budget year 
     is not enacted, budgetary resources other than unobligated 
     balances shall be at the level provided for the current year 
     in regular appropriation Acts or a joint resolution (other 
     than pursuant to section 1311 of title 31, United States 
     Code) continuing appropriations through the end of the 
     current year with the following adjustments:

       ``(aa) Include amounts of budget authority provided and 
     rescinded for such year in any supplemental or special 
     appropriation Act or rescission bill that is enacted into 
     law.
       ``(bb) Reduce the level by the amount of budgetary 
     resources canceled in any such program, project, or activity 
     by a sequestration under section 251 as published in OMB's 
     final sequestration report for such year.

     Substantive changes to or restrictions on entitlement law or 
     other mandatory spending law in an appropriation Act shall be 
     counted in determining the level of direct spending and 
     receipts for purposes of calculating the on-budget surplus 
     under this section. After making such adjustments, further 
     adjust such amount using the assumptions set forth in section 
     257(c) (1)-(5).''.
       (d) Definition of On-Budget Surplus.--Section 250(c) of the 
     Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(20) The term `on-budget surplus' means, with respect to 
     a fiscal year, the amount by which receipts exceed outlays 
     for all spending and receipt accounts of the United States 
     Government that are designated as on-budget. Such term does 
     not include outlays and receipts of the Federal Old-Age and 
     Survivors Insurance Trust Fund, the Federal Disability 
     Insurance Trust Fund, or any other off-budget entity.''.
       (e) Expedited Reconciliation Process.--Section 258C of the 
     Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 is 
     amended as follows:
       (1) The side heading of subsection (a) is amended by 
     inserting ``or in the House of Representatives'' after 
     ``Senate''.
       (2) In paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4) of subsection (a), 
     insert ``or House'' after ``Senate'' each place it appears.
       (3) In subsection (a)(7), strike ``For'' and insert ``In 
     the Senate, for''.
       (4) In subsection (b)(1), insert ``or House'' after 
     ``Senate''.
       (5) In the side heading of subsection (b)(4), insert 
     ``other'' after ``the''.
       (6) In subsection (b)(4), strike ``in the Senate from the 
     House'' and insert ``in the Senate or House of 
     Representatives from the other House'', strike ``Senate'' the 
     second place it appears and insert ``Senate or House of 
     Representatives, as the case may be,'', and strike ``Senate'' 
     the third place it appears and insert ``in the applicable 
     House''.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 499, the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan) and the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) 
each will control 10 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan).
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a very simple amendment. The reason why I am 
proposing this amendment is because our current budget process, our 
current budget laws, have failed to take into consideration that we are 
now in an era of surpluses. The budget laws were written in a time when 
we were knee deep in deficits and we had deficits as far as the eye 
could see.
  I believe that it is very important that, as we redo our budget 
process, we do it to take into consideration the fact that we now have 
budget surpluses.
  What my amendment would do is to carry out our commitment to allow 
that the on-budget or non-Social Security surpluses would be used for 
tax relief or entitlement reform or debt reduction, as current law 
allows.
  Under current law, the budget surplus cannot be used to offset tax 
relief provisions or increases in mandatory spending. This law, which 
is commonly referred to as pay-as-you-go, or the pay-go statute, was 
enacted in 1990. It says that the sum of all tax-and-entitlement 
legislation could not increase the deficit in any given fiscal year 
over a period 5 years.
  This means that if a tax or spending legislation increased the 
deficit, it had to be offset with increasing taxes or decreasing 
entitlement spending, a wise law, for a deficit period.
  But what happens when we run into a budget surplus? Mr. Chairman, 
that is what this amendment addresses. This law updates that. This 
legislation has been introduced by Members of both sides of the aisle 
in this Congress and last Congress.
  I introduced H.R. 1016 to do just this, which is similar to this 
amendment. My amendment would simply apply the on-budget surplus to the 
pay-go scorecard to allow that the surplus could be used for either 
offsetting tax relief or entitlement reform.
  If they want to pass a prescription drug benefit to Medicare, now, 
under my amendment, if it becomes law, they can do so. If they want to 
give deductibility for health insurance, if they want to abolish the 
marriage tax penalty, right now they cannot use that budget surplus. 
Under my amendment, they can do so.
  What we simply achieve in this amendment is catching up with the fact 
that we have surpluses. If we do not rewrite the pay-go statute to 
catch up with the current situation, we will spend this money.
  Mr. Chairman, what we have seen time and time again this year and 
last, if there is money left on the table by our constituents 
overpaying their income taxes, that money will be spent. Make no bones 
about that.
  What this amendment does is play off of the good support and the good 
policy we have achieved by dedicating all Social Security surpluses 
toward paying off our public debt.
  Mr. Chairman, let me add that, with the passage of our budget 
resolution, with legislation we have passed earlier, and with the 
discipline of Congress last year, we stopped the raid on the Social 
Security trust fund and we are well on our way to paying off our public 
debt in 12 years.
  What this amendment does is address those other surpluses, the non-
Social Security surpluses, the on-budget surpluses. And it simply says, 
after paying that public debt off, after taking Social Security off 
budget, if constituents, if the American taxpayer still overpays their 
taxes, that money ought to be used for either changing entitlements 
like Medicare reform or reducing their taxes. Because, after all, that 
is what surpluses are, tax overpayments.
  It is a very common sense bill. It is a very common sense amendment. 
It is endorsed and promoted by the National Taxpayer Union and Citizens 
Against Government Waste.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Bentsen).
  (Mr. BENTSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a little more than a simple amendment. But I do 
want say to my colleague, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan), he 
is one of the more thoughtful Members on these issues, even though we 
do not always agree, and I respect him for that.
  The problem with this amendment, in my opinion, is that this would 
repeal half of the pay-go rules only if it applies to the on-budget 
surplus and it would allow the Congress to leverage long-term 
projections for tax cuts or new spending which might turn out to be 
wrong.
  In the event they were wrong, then half of pay-go would apply and it 
would apply against things either as tax increases or Medicare or title 
XX social services block grants or veterans' education or student loans 
or farm price supports, or quite possibly, and the appropriators should 
think about this, it might indirectly affect discretionary spending, 
because if the Congress decided it did not want to have sequestration 
in the Medicare programs or the

[[Page H3139]]

farm price support programs, then they would have to revisit the 
discretionary side of the ledger and make adjustments in there.
  My colleagues would be better off, and I oppose this, but they would 
be better off, quite frankly, repealing all of pay-go rather than doing 
what they are doing here, which is sort of doubling up the straitjacket 
that pay-go does.
  I appreciate what the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan) is trying 
to do. He is trying to say, in this new era of bucket surplus, it is 
time to forget pay-go and move on.
  My feeling is, one, we do not know how long this is going to go on 
for. We do not know how good these projections are. We ought to be 
dedicating the vast majority of both the on-budget and off-budget 
surplus to paying down debt because we may well have to borrow in the 
future for some unforeseen event. But to do this would just rachet 
tighter and tighter pay-go on a smaller portion of the budget.
  And it probably would fail. It would probably go back to the days of 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. I was staff here when Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
first came in, and all I can remember was Congress missed, missed, 
missed and missed through Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.
  So it was not until the 1990 Budget Act, and I had left, I was on 
Wall Street at that time, that Congress then started to follow the 
spending caps and the pay-go rules.
  I think it would be a grave mistake to adopt this amendment. The 
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan) is well-intentioned, but he either 
is going to set us up to fail or he is going to set us up to make huge 
leverage decisions on long-term projections, which very likely could be 
wrong and make us have to make cuts in these programs or raise taxes in 
the future. I have not found too many Members in this body on either 
side of the aisle who are eager to raise taxes.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BENTSEN. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, to respond, I appreciate the 
compliments of the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Bentsen). I, too, believe 
that he is one of the more thoughtful members of the Committee on the 
Budget who understands these issues.
  I would like to address just a couple of points he makes. I think it 
is a valid point to suggest that we are locking in projections on this 
pay-go scorecard fix and that that might, indeed, become a case where 
those projections do not materialize.
  That is why, if we look at the amendment, we have rewritten this 
amendment so that it takes into account changes in budget projections. 
Every January, CBO would reanalyze the projections. So every single 
year we would redo the projections so that the scorecard would be 
adjusted on an annual basis so that we would not wind ourselves up into 
the point where we are going to pass a tax cut, say, for example, that 
uses a credit on the scorecard on old projections. It would be annual 
projections. And if we would exceed those projections, we would offset 
that spending.
  Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I understand that. But 
they are going to have projections that they are going to get for, say, 
fiscal year 2001 and then they are going to pass the capital gains tax 
cut. I do not think they want to pass the capital gains tax cut and do 
it on an annual basis. I think they want to do it on a long-term basis, 
and I think it is going to be a problem in how it works.
  The point is that they would not want to have to come back and say, 
well, we set the cap gains rate at 20 percent this year, but because we 
got new CBO forecast, in order not to have to cut Medicare, we are 
going to go back and reset it at 21 percent.
  For the investor who is holding an instrument for 6 months or a 
longer period of time, that is going to be quite disruptive. And that 
is a problem in trying to do this. They either have to try to go all 
the way or no way.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue 
to yield, right now if we cut taxes and we pass a tax bill saying it 
decreases capital gains taxes that is offset with spending cuts or 
mandatory spending cuts, what this amendment simply says is that the 
mixture of offsets would be on-budget surpluses or mandatory offsets, 
and that mixture would be determined by the annual re-estimate of the 
projection on an annual basis. So that, if they lock in place a capital 
gains tax cut, say, for 10 years, their on-budget portion which pays 
for that would adjust on the actual re-estimate every year and any 
money that comes in above and beyond the surplus projection amount that 
is required to offset taxes would be dedicated toward offsets coming 
from mandatory spending.
  Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I understand what the 
gentleman is saying. It is well-intentioned. But the point he made is 
that, if the numbers do not turn out, they have locked in the cap gains 
tax cut for 10 years and, so, they are going to have to go back and 
make it up on the mandatory spending side.
  That is my point exactly, they do not know for certain. They are 
going to have to come back and keep reevaluating it. So they may start 
this where they have a large surplus. Things change and they have to 
come back and take it out of the Medicare program. I do not think the 
Members on either side of the aisle are really going to want to do it.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to how much 
time is remaining.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan) has 6\1/2\ 
minutes remaining. The gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) has 
4\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, before I yield to my friend from Pennsylvania, I would 
like to actually quote Mr. Leon Panetta. Leon Panetta was the former 
chairman of the House Committee on the Budget when the Democrats 
controlled the House.

                              {time}  1845

  He was the former Budget Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget and the former Chief of Staff to President Clinton. Recently at 
a budget symposium, Mr. Panetta said, ``We should set aside a specific 
amount of the projected budget surplus for either use on entitlement 
programs or tax cuts, and Members can then fight on how that should be 
done. But to establish a pay-go account for that purpose and if that 
pay-go account is exceeded, you then have to pay for any additional 
spending above that limit.''
  Mr. Chairman, this is precisely what my amendment does. It is an 
amendment that has been endorsed effectively by Mr. Panetta, the former 
chairman of the House Committee on the Budget, the former chairman of 
the Office of Management and Budget.
  To respond to the gentleman from Texas, who is a thoughtful gentleman 
on these issues, I say that we are always passing tax relief packages 
here in the House. The only difference that this amendment presents is 
that if constituents, taxpayers continue to overpay their tax, that 
should be factored into it. We should not spend the money on 
discretionary spending if it shows up in town, if we have brand new 
surpluses. That money should instead go toward tax reduction or 
entitlement reform.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Toomey).
  Mr. TOOMEY. I thank the gentleman from Wisconsin for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I would point out that I think he deserves 
congratulations for delving so deeply into the land of esoteria here. 
This is not a very well understood topic and I congratulate him for his 
conscientious efforts certainly to understand it, which he thoroughly 
does, but to offer a constructive solution.
  I think what this amendment is all about really is honest budgeting, 
specifically honest budgeting in the age of surpluses. Pay-go is a 
relic of the era of deficits. It was designed at the time for the 
worthy purpose of preventing further growth in existing deficits. What 
the Ryan amendment does is it simply updates this tool so that it will 
also work when there are surpluses. If, God forbid, we go back to the 
days of deficits, this tool will continue to work as

[[Page H3140]]

it was designed, as it was intended, as it worked then. But today, 
fortunately, we are in a time of surplus and we need to update this 
tool.
  Theoretically, under the current budget rules, if we want to use part 
of the on-budget surplus, the non-Social Security surplus for a tax 
cut, the rules say you have got to cut entitlement spending in order to 
do that. Now, we certainly do not want to cut entitlement spending 
because we want to lower taxes from the on-budget surplus, and we do 
not. When we propose a tax cut, what we do is we waive this rule. We 
pretend it is not there. Well, that is not the right way to do things. 
That really makes a mockery of the rules of the House.
  What the gentleman from Wisconsin is attempting to do is to modify 
this rule, update it, bring it up to the era of surpluses and make it 
workable, whether we have deficits or surpluses. It is a good, 
thoughtful amendment. I urge my colleagues to support it.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Obey).
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, what the Ryan amendment says is that no 
matter how big the surpluses become in the future that you cannot spend 
a dime on veterans health care, you cannot spend a dime on education, 
you cannot spend a dime on cancer research. All you can do is use that 
money for tax cuts or entitlements, which are the fastest growing 
portion of the budget. With all due respect, he may define that as 
being balanced and fair. I think veterans and persons suffering from 
cancer and people who want their kids to get a decent education would 
respectfully disagree.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume to say just one thing. That is why we have a discretionary 
budget. We have a discretionary budget which increases every year for 
veterans programs, for NIH spending. This money goes toward either tax 
reform or entitlement reform. Medicare is a very, very important 
program for every single American in this country over the age of 65. 
We are simply saying, let us fix Medicare, let us fix our entitlements 
and let us fix the fact that we have the highest tax burden in the 
peacetime history of this Nation.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. 
Terry).
  Mr. TERRY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment, along 
with the others who are simply here because we passionately feel that 
to secure America's future and protect our children, that we need to 
limit the growth of government and that we are tired of being on the 
losing end of those attempts. What we want to do is just put in real, 
common sense measures that really focus the attention on limiting 
spending and trying to do the right things in this Congress. This 
amendment would do that. This amendment would allow the on-budget 
surplus to offset tax relief or mandatory spending increases.
  The Ryan pay-go amendment is endorsed by the National Taxpayers Union 
and Citizens Against Government Waste. What it does is that under 
current law, known as pay-go, only tax increases or cuts in mandatory 
spending may be used to offset other tax relief measures or mandatory 
spending increases. This amendment would allow the on-budget surplus, 
not the Social Security surplus, to offset these measures. In essence, 
this amendment would allow for the budget surplus to be used for tax 
relief, for mandatory spending reforms such as Medicare reform.
  This is bipartisan language that is similar to bills that have been 
introduced in the past. It is sensible. It is common sensical. I 
support it and urge all of my colleagues to support it.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  The gentleman began his amendment by saying that this would allow us 
to dedicate all Social Security funds to debt reduction. But in truth, 
the debt reduced, the debt held by the public, would be bought up by 
the Social Security administrators and there would be a commensurate 
increase in the debt held by the administrator, the Social Security 
Administration, for the decrease in the debt held by the public. So in 
truth there is no real debt retirement. I am in favor of doing that, 
but that is not really debt retirement. If you want to retire debt, pay 
off debt, you have got to use the on-budget surplus for debt reduction. 
If you wipe it out with tax cuts or mandatory spending increases as 
this would allow, then it will not be there for additional debt 
reduction, point number one.
  Point number two. He says this will protect Social Security. But in 
truth what he is doing is removing the cushion that does protect Social 
Security. Suppose we are wrong about future surpluses and suppose we 
have a big tax cut or a big spending increase premised on the 
expectation that these projections will actually obtain and they do not 
obtain, the economy takes a downturn. What happens is that you are into 
Social Security, because you have removed the cushion, the on-budget 
surplus that would absorb the downturn in the economy. You are back 
into Social Security, so it puts Social Security in jeopardy.

  To protect Social Security, he reaches back into the past and gets an 
instrument, a tool, we called it a club in the closet once, called 
sequestration. We go back to the old principles of sequestration and 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings I and Gramm-Rudman-Hollings II here. If you have 
a downturn in the economy, if the surplus does not obtain, if you have 
a tax cut or a spending increase premised on payment out of the surplus 
and the surplus does not show up in the future, then you have 
sequestration so that you stay out of Social Security. We had 
sequestration in Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. How many times did we use it? 
Once. March 1, 1986. Thereafter, when the law was changed, we never 
used sequestration again to any substantial extent. It is a phony 
device. It will not ever happen. In any event, if it does, you will cut 
Medicare instead of cutting Social Security and the same people are 
going to be hurt. So this is not a good idea.
  Let me tell the gentleman, I respect him. We work together on the 
Committee on the Budget. He was not here in the 1980s and the 1990s 
when we grappled with solutions. One of the solutions to the deficit 
that we came up with was the pay-go rule. The other was the 
discretionary spending ceiling. The pay-go rule was a reaction to our 
failed experience under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. In Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings, we said we are going to project the deficit for the future 
each year, and we had then $180 billion deficits. So we said over 5 
years we are going to eradicate this deficit. 180 over 5 equals 36, 
every year we are going to reduce the deficit by $36 billion until it 
is zero. It did not happen.
  One reason it did not happen is that the first year out of the box, 
the first year in our experience with Gramm-Rudman-Hollings the deficit 
went from $180 billion to $221 billion. That was not supposed to 
happen. The economy made it happen. As a consequence, we were $41 
billion deeper in debt than we really thought we were, $41 billion 
behind the mark where we thought we were going to start. That could 
happen here. We have been lucky, we have been fortunate, but one day 
this gravy train could come to an end. The increasing revenues that 
have fueled the increasing surplus could also terminate. When that 
happens, all of these spending increases and tax cuts that we are 
premising on paper are projected surpluses may turn awry. We may find 
ourselves in deep trouble because we have assumed that they were going 
to happen. The safe, conservative, responsible and proven way to go is 
to leave the pay-go rule the way it is and only cut taxes when you 
identify a revenue stream or an entitlement cut to offset the 
consequences to the surplus.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. Sununu).
  Mr. SUNUNU. Mr. Chairman, I have rarely heard so much time and effort 
made into making a pretty simple amendment sound so complicated. It is 
simple because if you ask anyone in this country what should be done 
with the on-budget surpluses, they give you a pretty straightforward 
response. They say, we should increase education funding, we should 
strengthen Social Security or Medicare, we should get rid of the 
marriage penalty, give individuals deductibility for their health 
insurance cost. But the fact of the matter is under the existing pay-go 
rule, you cannot get rid of the marriage penalty using the on-budget 
surplus. You cannot strengthen Medicare using the on-budget surplus.

[[Page H3141]]

  Then how in fact do we do those things? Last year we passed a 
Medicare update bill. We had to waive the pay-go rule, which is arcane 
and outdated in an age of on-budget surpluses. How did we eliminate the 
Social Security earnings limit, which is good bipartisan legislation 
that everyone in this body supports? We had to waive the pay-go rule. 
How do we get rid of the marriage penalty? We have to waive the pay-go 
rule. If you want to do these things, if you want to reduce taxes 
without cutting entitlements and if you want to strengthen entitlements 
without cutting other entitlements, you need to waive the existing pay-
go rules.
  That is what this gentleman's amendment does. It updates them in a 
common sense way.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  This is a very simple amendment. For those Members who are endorsing 
pay-go as it is currently structured, it is expiring next year, anyway. 
We should be supporting this amendment. This amendment not only retains 
pay-go but it improves and extends pay-go to apply to the fact that we 
now have budget surpluses.
  Mr. Chairman, those who are opposing this amendment are trying to 
make it more complicated than it is. All we are saying is in the land 
of budget surpluses, non-Social Security surpluses, when Washington 
gets flooded with all of this new money, that money should not go 
toward more frivolous spending. That money should go toward entitlement 
reform and tax reform or debt reduction. Congress will decide the 
mixture of those things. It extends and updates pay-go to take into 
account the fact that we have a surplus era. I urge the passage of this 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. McHugh). The question is on the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 499, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin 
(Mr. Ryan) will be postponed.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 printed in House 
Report 106-613.


            Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Ryan of Wisconsin

  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 7 offered by Mr. Ryan of Wisconsin:
       At the end of title VI, add the following new subtitle:

              Subtitle C--Spending Accountability Lock-box

     SEC. 631. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Spending Accountability 
     Lock-box Act of 1999''.

     SEC. 632. SPENDING ACCOUNTABILITY LOCK-BOX LEDGER.

       (a) Establishment of Ledger.--Title III of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (as amended by sections 
     104(c) and 206(a)) is further amended by adding after section 
     317 the following new section:


               ``spending accountability lock-box ledger

       ``Sec. 318. (a) Establishment of Ledger.--The chairman of 
     the Committee on the Budget of the House of Representatives 
     and the chairman on the Committee on the Budget of the Senate 
     shall each maintain a ledger to be known as the `Spending 
     Accountability Lock-box Ledger'. The Ledger shall be divided 
     into entries corresponding to the subcommittees of the 
     Committees on Appropriations. Each entry shall consist of 
     three components: the `House Lock-box Balance'; the `Senate 
     Lock-box Balance'; and the `Joint House-Senate Lock-box 
     Balance'.
       ``(b) Components of Ledger.--Each component in an entry 
     shall consist only of amounts credited to it under subsection 
     (c). No entry of a negative amount shall be made.
       ``(c) Credit of Amounts to Ledger.--(1) In the House of 
     Representatives or the Senate, whenever a Member offers an 
     amendment to an appropriation bill to reduce new budget 
     authority in any account, that Member may state the portion 
     of such reduction that shall be--
       ``(A) credited to the House or Senate Lock-box Balance, as 
     applicable; or
       ``(B) used to offset an increase in new budget authority in 
     any other account;
       ``(C) allowed to remain within the applicable section 
     302(b) suballocation.

     If no such statement is made, the amount of reduction in new 
     budget authority resulting from the amendment shall be 
     credited to the House or Senate Lock-box Balance, as 
     applicable, if the amendment is agreed to.
       ``(2)(A) Except as provided by subparagraph (B), the 
     chairmen of the Committees on the Budget shall, upon the 
     engrossment of any appropriation bill by the House of 
     Representatives and upon the engrossment of Senate amendments 
     to that bill, credit to the applicable entry balance of that 
     House amounts of new budget authority and outlays equal to 
     the net amounts of reductions in new budget authority and in 
     outlays resulting from amendments agreed to by that House to 
     that bill.
       ``(B) When computing the net amounts of reductions in new 
     budget authority and in outlays resulting from amendments 
     agreed to by the House of Representatives or the Senate to an 
     appropriation bill, the chairmen of the Committees on the 
     Budget shall only count those portions of such amendments 
     agreed to that were so designated by the Members offering 
     such amendments as amounts to be credited to the House or 
     Senate Lock-box Balance, as applicable, or that fall within 
     the last sentence of paragraph (1).
       ``(3) The chairmen of the Committees on the Budget shall, 
     upon the engrossment of Senate amendments to any 
     appropriation bill, credit to the applicable Joint House-
     Senate Lock-box Balance the amounts of new budget authority 
     and outlays equal to--
       ``(A) an amount equal to one-half of the sum of (i) the 
     amount of new budget authority in the House Lock-box Balance 
     plus (ii) the amount of new budget authority in the Senate 
     Lock-box Balance for that subcommittee; and
       ``(B) an amount equal to one-half of the sum of (i) the 
     amount of outlays in the House Lock-box Balance plus (ii) the 
     amount of outlays in the Senate Lock-box Balance for that 
     subcommittee.
       ``(4) Calculation of Lock-Box Savings in Senate.--For 
     purposes of calculating under this section the net amounts of 
     reductions in new budget authority and in outlays resulting 
     from amendments agreed to by the Senate on an appropriation 
     bill, the amendments reported to the Senate by its Committee 
     on Appropriations shall be considered to be part of the 
     original text of the bill.
       ``(d) Definition.--As used in this section, the term 
     `appropriation bill' means any general or special 
     appropriation bill, and any bill or joint resolution making 
     supplemental, deficiency, or continuing appropriations 
     through the end of a fiscal year.
       ``(e) Tally During House Consideration.--The chairman of 
     the Committee on the Budget of the House of Representatives 
     shall maintain a running tally of the amendments adopted 
     reflecting increases and decreases of budget authority in the 
     bill as reported. This tally shall be available to Members in 
     the House of Representatives during consideration of any 
     appropriations bill by the House.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents set forth 
     in section 1(b) of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
     Control Act of 1974 is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 317 the following new item:

``Sec. 318. Spending accountability lock-box ledger.''.

     SEC. 633. DOWNWARD ADJUSTMENT OF SECTION 302(A) ALLOCATIONS 
                   AND SECTION 302(B) SUBALLOCATIONS.

       (a) Allocations.--Section 302(a) of the Congressional 
     Budget Act of 1974 (as amended by section 422) is further 
     amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(6) Adjustment of allocations.--Upon the engrossment of 
     Senate amendments to any appropriation bill (as defined in 
     section 318(d)) for a fiscal year, the amounts allocated 
     under paragraph (1) to the Committee on Appropriations of 
     each House upon the adoption of the most recent joint 
     resolution on the budget for that fiscal year shall be 
     adjusted downward by the amounts credited to the applicable 
     Joint House-Senate Lock-box Balance under section 318(c)(2). 
     The revised levels of new budget authority and outlays shall 
     be submitted to each House by the chairman of the Committee 
     on the Budget of that House and shall be printed in the 
     Congressional Record.''.
       (b) Suballocations.--Section 302(b) of the Congressional 
     Budget Act of 1974 is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new sentence: ``Whenever an adjustment is made 
     under subsection (a)(6) to an allocation under that 
     subsection, the Committee on Appropriations of each House 
     shall make downward adjustments in the most recent 
     suballocations of new budget authority and outlays under this 
     subparagraph to the appropriate subcommittees of that 
     committee in the total amounts of those adjustments under 
     section 318(c)(2). The revised suballocations shall be 
     submitted to each House by the chairman of the Committee on 
     Appropriations of that House and shall be printed in the 
     Congressional Record.''.

     SEC. 634. PERIODIC REPORTING OF LEDGER STATEMENTS.

       Section 308(b)(1) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: 
     ``Such reports shall also include an up-to-date tabulation of 
     the amounts contained in the ledger and each entry 
     established by section 318(a).''.

     SEC. 635. DOWNWARD ADJUSTMENT OF DISCRETIONARY SPENDING 
                   LIMITS.

       The discretionary spending limits for new budget authority 
     and outlays for any fiscal

[[Page H3142]]

     year set forth in section 251(c) of the Balanced Budget and 
     Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, shall be reduced by 
     the amounts set forth in the final regular appropriation bill 
     for that fiscal year or joint resolution making continuing 
     appropriations through the end of that fiscal year. Those 
     amounts shall be the sums of the Joint House-Senate Lock-box 
     Balances for that fiscal year, as calculated under section 
     302(a)(6) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. That bill 
     or joint resolution shall contain the following statement of 
     law: ``As required by section 635 of the Spending 
     Accountability Lock-box Act of 1999, for fiscal year [insert 
     appropriate fiscal year] and each outyear, the adjusted 
     discretionary spending limit for new budget authority is 
     reduced by $ [insert appropriate amount of reduction] and the 
     adjusted discretionary limit for outlays is reduced by $ 
     [insert appropriate amount of reduction] for the fiscal year 
     and each outyear.''. Section 306 shall not apply to any bill 
     or joint resolution because of such statement. This 
     adjustment shall be reflected in reports under sections 
     254(f) and 254(g) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
     Deficit Control Act of 1985.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 499, the 
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan) and the gentleman from South 
Carolina (Mr. Spratt) each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan).
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume. I will be very brief in the summary of this amendment. 
This amendment has been here before. In fact, 321 Members of this body 
have at one time or another in this or past Congresses either 
cosponsored or voted for this amendment; 42 Members of the Committee on 
Appropriations today have either voted for or cosponsored this 
amendment.
  This amendment is commonly referred to as the discretionary lockbox. 
It simply says this. If you are a Member of Congress and you come to 
the floor of Congress with an amendment to reduce or cut spending, that 
money will go toward debt reduction. What it says is that money will go 
toward debt reduction unless you choose to designate that money to go 
toward other parts of spending. But today under current law, we have 
this crazy budget system under which if you go to the floor of 
Congress, pass an amendment to cut or eliminate spending, save some 
taxpayer dollars, that program may not be authorized or appropriated 
but the money you save by law will have to be respent at another part 
of the Federal Government. That is part of the crazy budget laws we 
live under today.
  Simply put, this amendment says if you want to pass an amendment to 
cut out some pork barrel spending, to cut some wasteful spending, that 
money will go toward paying down the national debt rather than being 
plowed into spending in another form of the Federal Government.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  It is true that this has been voted upon before. We were desperate 
for solutions and so this was one of the jerry-rigged solutions that we 
came up with. It has been through committee. It has been on the floor. 
Let me tell my colleagues what is wrong with it.

                              {time}  1900

  We can have a cut here on the House floor or in committee of a 
particular program that is unpopular amongst Members here in the House. 
They can have a cut in the Senate of the same amount, or roughly the 
same amount, of a totally different program. When you then go to 
conference, there is no coming together on the cut that has been made. 
The House has decided to cut one thing that is not popular here, the 
Senate has decided to cut another thing that is not popular there.
  The amount is roughly the same, so both Houses have interests in 
their so-called lockbox accounts that have to be reconciled, but there 
is no reconciliation on the item to be cut, how that number is to be 
achieved. They may be at total loggerheads over that particular issue. 
That is one of the problems with it.
  Secondly, you can cut something that is one time, nonrecurring, that 
would not have any really future prospect of spendout, but 
nevertheless, it has future consequences for the budget, because, if I 
understand the gentleman's amendment correctly, once you achieve that 
cut here on the House floor, if you specify that the cut will be 
charged to the lockbox account, then you have to reduce 302(a) and (b), 
and then, having done that, discretionary spending has been reduced 
overall, the discretionary spending ceiling is not only lowered for 
that year, but successive years so long as it remains in effect. Even 
though if this could have been a one-time nonrecurring item, something 
that did not have future consequences, it could and will have 
consequences for the budget.
  For all of these reasons, this lockbox idea is an idea whose time has 
come and passed. We do not need it now. There is no reason to 
complicate the process with it. I strongly recommend that we do not 
approve it tonight.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to respond to those two concerns by the 
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt), who voted for this lockbox 
amendment in prior Congresses. We have changed it a little bit since 
the last time the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) voted for 
it.
  Number one, the conference report must pass for the savings to be 
realized. We lower the 302(a) after the conference report with the 
House and the Senate passes.
  Number two, it is a 1 year time savings. It happens in the first 
year. It does not change the 5-year budget resolution window. So I 
think those are very good points the gentleman has raised. We have 
taken care of those concerns in this amendment. The gentleman voted for 
it once before, and I hope he will do so again.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Pennsylvania 
(Mr. Toomey).
  Mr. TOOMEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment. It is 
really very simple. What this amendment is all about, as it says, is if 
Congress passes an amendment designed, intended, and it passes, to save 
taxpayer money, then it should do just that. It should not be spent 
somewhere else.
  The Ryan amendment, frankly, is a reasonable and sensible compromise 
on how that happens. It says any money that is saved through an 
amendment to an appropriation bill is not going to be used for a tax 
cut and it cannot be used for additional spending. It simply will be 
used for debt reduction.
  Now, some may point out, well, you know, if nothing else happens, 
eventually this money automatically will go for debt reduction. But, 
keep in mind, that is only if it is not spent first on a subsequent 
bill. I think experience shows that it is very hard for this Chamber 
and it is very hard for the other Chamber to resist the temptation of 
spending money that is sitting on the table.
  What the Ryan amendment does is it says when this Chamber expresses 
its will by reducing the spending level, let us make that happen. Take 
the money off the table. This is a very modest modicum of fiscal 
discipline, and I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may 
consume to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Bentsen).
  Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Chairman, I am starting a new practice in the House, 
and also an old practice in the House.
  The question I have, and the staff has explained this to me, if an 
amendment passed, say, to the defense appropriations bill, I will give 
an example, which, say, cuts the D-5 missile program for $10 billion in 
the House, and then it passes in the Senate for $5 billion, then you 
take the average of $7.5 billion and reduce the overall discretionary 
spending by $7.5 billion, could the committee still then fully fund the 
D-5 missile and just take it out of somewhere else so Members would 
think they are voting for one thing but get something else in return?
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, 
first of all, that would be something that would be operated under a 
conference report agreement. If one side does one policy and the other 
does not, that could be changed in conference.
  As to the issue of the allocation, not the appropriation of a 
particular program, the allocation would be changed after the 
conference report is passed.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Bentsen).
  Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Chairman, the question though is this: The Members

[[Page H3143]]

on the floor of the House would be voting to cut a specific program 
that they think is going in a lockbox, and the members of the other 
body would be voting to cut a specific program. But then the members of 
the Committee on Appropriations could actually go back and fund that 
program, but we would get credited.
  I know it would come to a great shock to everybody that that might 
happen, that the members of the committee and conference might not 
follow the will of the House or the other body, but it seems like we 
are sort of giving a blanket approach to a lockbox, just stick whatever 
program on there nobody likes, and then we will do that, and then we 
will cut it and take it out of somewhere else.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BENTSEN. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, we cannot control what happens 
in a conference report. We cannot control from this Chamber or from the 
other Chamber what they do in conference reports. So this amendment 
does not try to control that, it simply tries to capture the savings 
from successful appropriations amendments to be used for debt 
reduction. You cannot control the level.
  Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, my only concern is it 
would be something people would say we are going to vote against a 
program we do not like, but we will take it out of a program we like.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my 
time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Wisconsin is recognized for 1 
minute.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, this is a very, very 
straightforward amendment. All this amendment does is it simply says 
that if you are a Member of Congress and you want to reduce spending, 
you want to go after a wasteful program, that means you can then use 
that money to pay off national debt.
  We have some weird laws in this body. I am a new Member of Congress 
and I am becoming acquainted with these. But one of the weirdest laws 
that we have here in this body is that if you eliminate or reduce 
spending in the appropriations process, that money is spent somewhere 
else in the Federal Government. It cannot go toward paying down our 
National debt.
  All this amendment does, an amendment supported by the National 
Taxpayers Union, an amendment supported by the Citizens Against 
Government Waste, all this amendment says is that if you successfully 
pass an amendment to save money, that that money will go toward paying 
down the National debt, unless you designate it to go to another 
account or another spending program within the Federal Government. It 
is good fiscal discipline, it is bipartisan. I am pleased to have as my 
cosponsors the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Minge) and the gentleman 
from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews). I am pleased that 321 Members of this 
House have already voted for or cosponsored this bill.
  I ask Members to be consistent. I ask Members to vote for this 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my 
request for a recorded voted on Ryan amendment No. 7.
  The CHAIRMAN. Does any other Member ask for a recorded vote?


                         Parliamentary Inquiry

  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Chairman, on the amendment that the gentleman from 
South Carolina was requesting unanimous consent regarding, what was the 
determination of the Chair?
  The CHAIRMAN. The result on the previous amendment was ``aye'' by a 
voice vote.
  The Chair would make an inquiry of the gentleman from South Carolina. 
The amendment just concluded was Ryan No. 7. I understand the 
gentleman's unanimous consent request to be with regard to which 
amendment?
  Mr. SPRATT. It was Ryan No. 7, according to mine. It is Ryan No. 6, 
the pay-go amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's request concerns the previous 
amendment, Ryan No. 6, on which the gentleman from South Carolina asked 
for a recorded vote. He is now seeking unanimous consent to withdraw 
his request for a recorded vote.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Are you talking about the pay-go amendment?
  The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Without objection, the request for a recorded vote 
entered by the gentleman from South Carolina is withdrawn. Does any 
other Member seek a recorded vote on Ryan No. 6?
  If not, that amendment is adopted.


          Sequential Votes Postponed in Committee of the Whole

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 499, proceedings will now 
resume on those amendments on which further proceedings were postponed 
in the following order:
  Amendment No. 2 offered by Mr. Gekas of Pennsylvania; and,
  Amendment No. 4 offered by Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas.
  The Chair will reduce to 5 minutes the time for any electronic vote 
after the first vote in this series.


                  Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Gekas

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gekas) 
on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes 
prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 173, 
noes 236, not voting 25, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 187]

                               AYES--173

     Aderholt
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Bono
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Camp
     Canady
     Cannon
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Coble
     Coburn
     Combest
     Cook
     Cox
     Crane
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart
     Doggett
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     English
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Franks (NJ)
     Gallegly
     Gekas
     Gillmor
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hansen
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jenkins
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kasich
     Kelly
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     LaHood
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (OK)
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Minge
     Moran (KS)
     Morella
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Pease
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Porter
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rogan
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Scarborough
     Schaffer
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Stearns
     Stump
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thune
     Toomey
     Vitter
     Walden
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wynn
     Young (AK)

                               NOES--236

     Abercrombie
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barcia
     Barrett (NE)
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson
     Chenoweth-Hage
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Collins
     Condit
     Conyers
     Cooksey
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cummings

[[Page H3144]]


     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     Deutsch
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Emerson
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Granger
     Green (TX)
     Gutierrez
     Hall (TX)
     Hastings (FL)
     Hayes
     Hill (IN)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Hunter
     Inslee
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     John
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     Kuykendall
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Larson
     Latham
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lucas (KY)
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Northup
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Ose
     Packard
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Phelps
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Rahall
     Regula
     Reyes
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor (NC)
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Tierney
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Waters
     Watkins
     Watt (NC)
     Watts (OK)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Wise
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--25

     Ackerman
     Baker
     Barrett (WI)
     Bliley
     Campbell
     Delahunt
     Engel
     Ganske
     Largent
     Lowey
     Maloney (NY)
     Martinez
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McIntosh
     McNulty
     Meeks (NY)
     Nadler
     Owens
     Oxley
     Rangel
     Serrano
     Slaughter
     Stupak
     Udall (NM)

                              {time}  1932

  Mr. LEWIS of Georgia and Mr. HUNTER changed their vote from ``aye'' 
to ``no.''
  Mrs. MORELLA and Messrs. SMITH of Michigan, PETERSON of Pennsylvania, 
REYNOLDS, and DOGGETT changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                      Announcement by the Chairman

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 499, the Chair announces 
that he will reduce to a minimum of 5 minutes the time within which a 
vote by electronic device will be taken on each amendment on which the 
Chair has postponed further proceedings.


          Amendment No. 4 Offered by Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote 
on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-
Lee) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes 
prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 188, 
noes 225, not voting 21, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 188]

                               AYES--188

     Abercrombie
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barcia
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bilbray
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Capps
     Capuano
     Carson
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Forbes
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green (TX)
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hastings (FL)
     Hill (IN)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Larson
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lucas (KY)
     Maloney (CT)
     Markey
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Mink
     Moakley
     Moore
     Moran (VA)
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Phelps
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Reyes
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Sherman
     Simpson
     Sisisky
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Strickland
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Towns
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                               NOES--225

     Aderholt
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cannon
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth-Hage
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Crane
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hansen
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jenkins
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kanjorski
     Kasich
     Kelly
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kuykendall
     LaHood
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (OK)
     Luther
     Manzullo
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Minge
     Mollohan
     Moran (KS)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Ose
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pease
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pickett
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Rivers
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaffer
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Toomey
     Traficant
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Vitter
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--21

     Ackerman
     Bliley
     Campbell
     Engel
     Ganske
     Kaptur
     Largent
     Lowey
     Maloney (NY)
     Martinez
     McCollum
     McIntosh
     McNulty
     Meeks (NY)
     Nadler
     Owens
     Rangel
     Riley
     Serrano
     Stupak
     Udall (NM)

                              {time}  1941

  Mr. LUTHER changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, as amended.

[[Page H3145]]

  The amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, was agreed 
to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
LaHood) having assumed the chair, Mr. LaTourette, Chairman of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 853) to 
amend the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 to provide for joint 
resolutions on the budget, reserve funds for emergency spending, 
strengthened enforcement of budgetary decisions, increased 
accountability for Federal spending, accrual budgeting for Federal 
insurance programs, mitigation of the bias in the budget process toward 
higher spending, modifications in paygo requirements when there is an 
on-budget surplus, and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 
499, he reported the bill back to the House with an amendment adopted 
by the Committee of the Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is 
ordered.
  Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the amendment in the 
nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the Whole? If not, 
the question is on the amendment.
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 166, 
noes 250, not voting 18, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 189]

                               AYES--166

     Aderholt
     Archer
     Armey
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bilbray
     Blunt
     Bono
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Camp
     Canady
     Cannon
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Crane
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart
     Doggett
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Ehrlich
     English
     Ewing
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Fossella
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hansen
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hutchinson
     Inslee
     Isakson
     Jenkins
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kasich
     Kingston
     LaHood
     Latham
     Lazio
     Leach
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Luther
     Manzullo
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     Meehan
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller, Gary
     Minge
     Moran (KS)
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oxley
     Pease
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Reynolds
     Rogan
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaffer
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shimkus
     Simpson
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Souder
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Toomey
     Upton
     Vitter
     Walden
     Wamp
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wilson

                               NOES--250

     Abercrombie
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barcia
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Bateman
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Capps
     Capuano
     Carson
     Chenoweth-Hage
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Cook
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cummings
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Duncan
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Everett
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fowler
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Granger
     Green (TX)
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hastings (FL)
     Hill (IN)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Istook
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     John
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kelly
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     Kuykendall
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Larson
     LaTourette
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Maloney (CT)
     Markey
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     Meek (FL)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, George
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Ney
     Northup
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Ose
     Packard
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Phelps
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Price (NC)
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Regula
     Reyes
     Riley
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shows
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Snyder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Strickland
     Stump
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Tierney
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Walsh
     Waters
     Watkins
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (PA)
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Wicker
     Wise
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--18

     Ackerman
     Bliley
     Campbell
     Engel
     Largent
     Lowey
     Maloney (NY)
     Martinez
     McCollum
     McIntosh
     McNulty
     Meeks (NY)
     Nadler
     Owens
     Rangel
     Serrano
     Stupak
     Udall (NM)

                              {time}  2000

  So the bill was not passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________