[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 59 (Monday, May 15, 2000)]
[House]
[Pages H3037-H3042]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
CLINTON ADMINISTRATION PROPOSING MASSIVE REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC FORCES
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Ose). Under the Speaker's announced
policy of January 6, 1999, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon)
is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I will not take the full
hour. But I do rise to discuss a matter of vital importance, following
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), on issues relating to
national security.
There are some in both parties who are concerned that, perhaps, we
are rushing to try to create a new legacy for this President on foreign
policies relative to our policies with China and Russia.
As someone who spends a great deal of time focusing on both of those
countries as a senior member of the Committee on Armed Services and
Chairman of the Committee on Military Research and Development and co-
chairman of the inter-parliamentary dialogue between Russia and the
U.S., I am extremely concerned about not just our relationship with
China, which I will have more to say later on this week and next week
relative to the NTR vote, but specifically to our relationship with
Russia.
Mr. Speaker, we all know that the first week of June the President
will take an historic trip to Moscow, where he has been asked to
address the Duma, which is kind of an historic event, an American
President being asked to speak before the lower house of the Russian
Parliament.
I applaud the President for going to Moscow. I am concerned, however,
that the election of Putin as the new President of Russia saw him take
his first trip not to Washington, not to the West. But his first trip,
in fact, is to Beijing, where he is, in fact, engaged in a series of
high-level meetings with the leadership of China.
In fact, both China and Russia have talked about a new strategic
partnership, one that would include China and Russia against the West
and, in particular, against the U.S.
Now, it is important that we reach out to this new leader in Russia.
I did the day that he was sworn into office on January 11 in a three-
page letter that I wrote in Russian to him talking about the need for
us to sit down and work together to build, once again, a solid
relationship between our two countries.
But I am extremely concerned, Mr. Speaker, about the President's
upcoming trip in June; and I want to call my concerns to the attention
of our colleagues and to the American people.
Mr. Speaker, it is not that we do not want our President to go to
Moscow. We do. And we do want him to discuss issues that are important
between our two countries. And, obviously, reducing the threat of the
massive buildup of arms that we both engaged in during the Cold War has
got to be our top priority.
But, Mr. Speaker, many of us on both sides of the aisle are equally
concerned that this President not rush to a quick judgment in our
relations with Russia or China that would cause America to, in the end,
be more insecure and would cause more destabilizing relations between
us and those two nations.
Now, why do I raise these concerns today? Because, Mr. Speaker, last
week it was brought to my attention by quiet conversations brought to
me from both the Pentagon and the intelligence service that the
President had ordered the Pentagon to look at a massive reduction in
our strategic forces.
In fact, one individual told me that the President himself had
ordered a presidential nuclear initiative that would, in fact, cut our
strategic forces by 50 percent and that this initiative would be
announced as a part of the President's trip to Moscow.
Now, why is that critically important? Mr. Speaker, as we both know,
the strategic stability between us and Russia is based on an outdated
theory called ``mutually assured destruction,'' where neither side
dares challenge the other for fear of retaliation. We do not have a
defensive system to defeat a Russian accidental launch. Although, the
Russians do have a defense system around Moscow.
So when we negotiate with the Russians in terms of reducing arms, it
is critically important that our Pentagon, that our military leaders,
that our strategic thinkers in our Government, not Republican or
Democrat thinkers, but career thinkers who are paid to protect America,
be consulted in terms of what the final outcome of negotiations should
be.
What I heard last week, Mr. Speaker, which was reported in at least
three major newspapers in both Chicago, New York, and Washington on
Thursday, was that the administration is, in fact, proposing massive
reductions in our strategic forces in terms of our relations with
Russia.
Now, why am I concerned about that? I do want to see us reduce our
strategic forces and our reliance on them, but I want to do it in a
logical and methodical manner. This administration, Mr. Speaker,
unfortunately does not have a good track record in negotiating treaties
that can get the bipartisan support of the Congress. This
administration, in fact, has a terrible reputation in terms of our
foreign policy in general.
Many of our colleagues talk, for instance, frequently about the
President's comments before he went into Kosovo and declared that we
would see hundreds of thousands of mass graves from where Milosevic had
buried the people he had murdered. Well, after that war was, in fact,
wound down this year, we had the CIA before our committee and I asked
the CIA how many mass graves did we find. They said well below 10,000;
and some of those graves may have actually been wounds inflicted by the
allied forces in their attempts to remove Milosevic from power.
So while the President said one thing to get the support of the
American people to go into Kosovo, which he promised us would last only
a matter of
[[Page H3038]]
weeks and which we would win, here we are a year later and Milosevic is
still in power. We spent tons of money and, in fact, we have since
learned that we probably killed more innocent people with allied bombs
than what Milosevic did in his reign of terror. And Milosevic, the war
criminal, is still in power and, many would argue, stronger than he was
before America and Britain led the NATO allies in a massive deployment
in the Kosovo theatre.
Likewise, Mr. Speaker, many of our colleagues feel betrayed by this
administration because of the failure of our arms control policies. In
fact, in a floor speech 2 years ago, I documented 37 violations of arms
control agreements by China and Russia since 1991, cases where we
caught the Russians or the Chinese transferring technology illegally to
states like Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea, as well as India and
Pakistan.
Mr. Speaker, in all of those 37 cases where we had evidence or
inclinations that Russia and China had, in fact, violated arms control
agreements, this administration imposed the requirement sanctions only
two times. Once we caught the Chinese transferring ring magnets to
Pakistan for their nuclear program, and once we caught the Chinese
transferring M-11 missiles to Pakistan, both of which are violations of
arms control agreements. Seventeen times we saw the Russians
transferring technology, and 17 times we did nothing about it.
In fact, Mr. Speaker, as my colleagues know, the Congress became so
disenchanted with this administration and so concerned about the
flagrant ignorance of violations that were occurring by Russian
entities that the Congress did something that many felt we would never
do. We passed the Iran Missile Sanctions legislation.
We passed that because Israel, just several years ago, I believe it
was in 1998, told us that they had evidence that Russia was cooperating
with Iran to build a new class of medium-range missiles, the Shahab 3
and the Shahab 4. These missiles could target most of Europe and all of
Israel.
When the Congress heard that the Israelis had evidence, the question
to our White House is, well, what are we doing to stop this transfer of
technology? As we give Russia a billion dollars a year to assist them
in stabilizing their economy, what are we doing to enforce the arms
control agreements that require us to take actions against entities in
any country that is illegally selling technology to rogue states?
The fact is, Mr. Speaker, the response by the administration when we
began to get information from the CIA that Israel was correct that we
had evidence that Russia was, in fact, cooperating with Iran, the
response of this administration was to make life unbearable for Dr.
Gordon Ehlers.
Dr. Gordon Ehlers was the Director of Nonproliferation for the CIA.
Instead of being honest and candid with Members of Congress, as Dr.
Ehlers was, the administration wanted to keep the evidence that we had
of Russian cooperation with Iran quiet. So Dr. Ehlers was, basically,
made so uncomfortable that he took early retirement from his job.
The Congress then, in response, introduced bipartisan legislation,
the Iran Missile Sanctions bill, endorsed by the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Gilman), a Republican, and Jane Harman of California. This
bill would force the administration to impose the required sanctions on
Russia. Immediately it got over 200 cosponsors because Members of
Congress were livid that that administration was not enforcing arms
control agreements that we and Russia were supposed to abide by.
By November of that year, the House was getting ready to vote on the
Iran Missile Sanctions bill. Vice President Gore called 12 of us down
to the White House, Mr. Speaker. I was one of those 12 Members called
down to the old Executive Office Building. Sitting in the old Executive
Office Building with people like John McCain, Senator Bob Kerrey,
Congressman Lee Hamilton, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman),
Congresswoman Jane Harman, and Senator Carl Levin, we listened to the
Vice President tell us that if the Congress passed this legislation, it
would be devastating to our relationship with Russia.
When he finished talking to us for about an hour, the Members of
Congress that were there from both parties from both Houses said, Mr.
Vice President, we understand your concerns. But it is too late. The
Congress has lost its confidence in this administration's ability to
enforce arms control agreements that we are a party to.
A week after the Vice President called us down, in spite of his
objections and the President's objections, the bipartisan Iran Missile
Sanctions bill passed the House with 392 votes.
Mr. Speaker, as my colleagues know, we do not get those kinds of
votes unless Members of Congress on both sides are absolutely upset and
feel that this administration is not, in fact, living up to its
requirements under our arms control treaties.
Then, Mr. Speaker, we broke for the Christmas and holiday recess and
came back in February. The Senate was about to take up the same bill,
the Iran Missile Sanctions Act.
The Vice President again called us back to the old Executive Office
Building; and there again, the Vice President, with a member of the
National Security Council, Jack Karavelli on one side, and the
President's security adviser, Leon Furth on the other side, talked to
us Democrats and Republicans, Senators and House Members, many of whom
had been there for the earlier meeting, and said to the Senators, you
cannot pass this bill. If you pass it, you will embarrass the President
and you will cause us irreparable harm with the Russian leadership.
Mr. Speaker, for a second time, in spite of the personal pleas of the
Vice President and the President, the Senate passed the Iran Missile
Sanctions bill with a vote that included 94 Senators voting in the
affirmative.
{time} 2000
Mr. Speaker, you do not get 94 Senators to vote in unison to
embarrass the President unless there are serious concerns about the
policies of this administration. And those 94 Senators did exactly
that. Mr. Speaker, the bill went to a conference. The President, as he
said he would, vetoed the bill that year and we had the votes to
override the veto because of a lack of confidence in this
administration's policies. In fact, I was in all of those meetings
where we discussed bringing the veto override up on the House floor
with Speaker Gingrich one month before the Congressional elections that
year in 1999.
Mr. Speaker, it was Speaker Newt Gingrich who stopped the veto
override from coming up for a vote in the House. It would have passed.
We would have had overwhelming numbers of Members on both sides
overturning the President's veto, but Republican Newt Gingrich did not
want to bring that bill up a month before the Congressional elections.
So in this new Congress, without Speaker Gingrich, without Members like
Jane Harman, bipartisan Members again reintroduced the Iran missile
sanctions bill, and this year, Mr. Speaker, the Iran missile sanctions
bill passed the House and the Senate unanimously. This year, Mr.
Speaker, the President could not veto the bill because he knew he would
be overridden. So what did he do? He did what Bill Clinton does so
frequently. He changed his sides, came over in support of the
legislation, and signed the bill into law, even though it was a direct
slap at this administration and was a direct contradiction to their
policies.
Mr. Speaker, that was probably the most clear evidence of the lack of
confidence of this Congress in the policies of this administration when
it comes to arms control. My most glaring evidence, Mr. Speaker, was
when I was in Moscow in 1996 in January, a month after the Washington
Post had just reported a front page story that we had evidence that
Iraq had received guidance systems from Russia illegally. While I was
visiting with our ambassador, Ambassador Pickering in his office in
Moscow, I said, ``Mr. Ambassador, what was the response from the
Russians when you told them that we caught them illegally transferring
guidance systems to Iraq?'' Now, the importance of these systems is
that they make their missiles more accurate. As we all know, we lost 31
young Americans in 1991 because of an Iraqi SCUD missile. Any
technology that would make those missiles more accurate could endanger
the lives of American troops and American allies. The Post reported
that we had evidence
[[Page H3039]]
that Russia had been helping Iraq with their guidance systems. So when
I asked Ambassador Pickering what the response was from the Russian
side, he said, ``Congressman, I haven't asked the Russians yet.'' I
said, ``Why haven't you asked them, Mr. Ambassador?'' He said,
``Because that's got to come from the White House.''
So I came back to Washington. At the end of January 1996 I wrote to
President Clinton a letter saying, Dear Mr. President, we have evidence
evidently, according to the Washington Post, that we have caught the
Russians illegally transferring guidance systems to Iraq, in violation
of the Missile Technology Control Regime, a key arms control agreement.
That is a serious violation, Mr. President, and if it is so, what are
you doing about it?''
Mr. Speaker, the President wrote me back in April of that year. He
said, ``Dear Congressman Weldon, you are right. If the Russians did
what the Post said they did, that would be a terribly serious violation
of an arms control agreement, and I assure you, if we can prove that
the Russians transferred those devices, we will take aggressive action,
and we will take the required actions mandated by that arms control
treaty.''
Mr. Speaker, little did I know that at that time, agencies of the
U.S. Government had well over 100 sets of the Russian guidance systems
that we caught being transferred from Russia to Iraq not on one
occasion, not twice, but on three separate occasions. We caught the
Russians transferring guidance systems to Iraq. In fact, I have a set
of these devices that I carry around when I give speeches. Yet this
administration did nothing to impose the required sanctions. In fact,
Mr. Speaker, when asked by Members of Congress what action we had taken
with Russia, the response by the administration was, ``Well, we got
assurances from Russia that they'll never do it again.''
Mr. Speaker, because of the continued policy of ignoring Russia's
violations, the Congress lost total confidence in this administration
on arms control agreements. Mr. Speaker, as an aside, I am convinced
that the reason we did not call Russia on those violations was because
of our policy of a friendly relationship between Clinton and Yeltsin
and therefore our policy in this country was to prevent anything from
surfacing that would have embarrassed Boris Yeltsin. In fact, the year
of those Iraqi violations was in fact the year that Yeltsin was running
for reelection. In my opinion, that is why we never surfaced those
clear violations of an arms control agreement.
So, Mr. Speaker, the track record of this administration on arms
control is abysmal. Many in this city, including arms control groups,
maintain it is one of the worst in the history of this country in terms
of letting countries get away with obvious violations of arms control
treaties. That is why this administration could not get the votes for
the nuclear test ban treaty. That is why this administration could not
get the votes for any arms control treaty that it negotiates with any
country. That is a sad state of affairs, when the confidence is so low
that neither body will support arms control negotiations completed by
this administration.
Now, we had a similar occurrence occur, Mr. Speaker, 3 years ago. The
administration, after the Senate ratified the START II treaty with
Russia, a very important START II treaty, ratified by this country in
1993, the year President Clinton came into office, because the Senate
believed START II was important to reduce arms negotiated by former
President Bush and before that, former President Reagan. So the Senate
approved it. But then the administration did something that caused
further erosion in the confidence of the Congress. The administration
held negotiations with the Russians in Geneva to amend the ABM Treaty.
These negotiations went on for months. They were centered around two
specific issues: One was to make the ABM Treaty a multilateral treaty
that would not just apply to Russia but would bring in Belarus, Ukraine
and Kazakhstan. Now, I could not understand for the life of me why we
would want to amend the ABM Treaty to broaden it. The second issue was
demarcation, a complicated issue but one that would set up a
distinction between a theater missile defense system and a national
missile defense system. This distinction would be based on interceptor
speed, a very highly scientific development that would differentiate
between the two systems. I did not understand the negotiations. Unlike
our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, I went to Geneva. I think I am the only
Member of Congress from either body who went over there to sit in on
the negotiations firsthand. I got the approval of the administration
up-front. I sat down at the negotiating table with our chief negotiator
Stanley Riveles on my side and I sat across from the chief Russian
negotiator, General Koltunov. For 2\1/2\ hours I questioned the
Russians through General Koltunov about the negotiations going on at
Geneva. For instance, Mr. Speaker, I asked Koltunov, ``Why does Russia
want to multinationalize or lateralize the ABM Treaty?'' I said,
``General, you are the only country left of the former Soviet Union
that has long range missiles. Why do you want to include Ukraine and
Kazakhstan and Belarus? They don't have long range missiles. They have
all been removed.''
He looked at me and he said, ``Congressman, you're asking that
question of the wrong person. We didn't propose multilateralizing the
treaty. Your side did.'' Now, for the life of me, Mr. Speaker, I could
not understand why we would want to multilateralize the ABM treaty
unless there are those in the White House who wanted to make it more
difficult to amend the treaty after they left office. If you bring
Belarus in, with an unstable leader like Lukashenko, you could have
Russia and America agree on an ABM change and have the Russians quietly
tell Lukashenko, ``Don't support it,'' and have Belarus be the country
that stopped the treaty from being changed. That became a very
controversial item of negotiation that this administration agreed to.
Then there was a second item, and that was demarcation. The
administration agreed to a number difference between theater and
national missile defense systems. I asked General Koltunov, ``Where do
these numbers come from, General, how do you determine what is a
theater versus a national missile defense system? Where is that line?
How do you arrive at it? Is it some theory of physics?''
He said, ``Congressman, these numbers were very carefully negotiated
by our military and your military.''
I said, ``Well, General, I don't understand but I think it's
ridiculous that we would amend the ABM Treaty to broaden it to include
theater missile defense systems when you, Russia, already have some of
the world's most capable theater missile defense systems and you're
selling them all over the place.''
I came back to Washington not satisfied with what I heard. The
administration concluded their negotiations in Geneva, and those two
items became known as the protocols. I found out a year later what I
think is the reason that these numbers were reached for the demarcation
between these systems, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, I simply want
to compliment him on his fine work and to say that the bill which will
be coming forward tomorrow on military construction should I think go
a long way towards addressing some of the concerns that my friend has
raised.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I thank my colleague. I thank him for his
chairmanship of the Committee on Rules and look forward to his new
rule, hopefully tomorrow, on the defense authorization bill for 2001.
Mr. DREIER. We are going to work on that right now.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I read an article in the Tel
Aviv newspaper that documented that Russia was trying to sell Israel a
brand new defense system called the Antei 2500. I had never heard of
this system. I know most of Russia's systems. So I called the CIA. They
were not quite sure of it either but they sent an expert over about a
month later who was a missile expert for the CIA. He brought in some
documents with him. I said, ``Have you ever heard of this new Russian
system called the Antei 2500? It is supposed to be fantastic.'' He
said, ``Congressman, I know the system.'' He said, ``In fact the
Russians have printed documents, marketing brochures,'' and he gave me
one. He said, ``This is what they were showing at the Abu
[[Page H3040]]
Dhabi air show this year.'' I picked it up and looked at it. There were
photographs of this new missile defense system that Russia was in fact
trying to sell. I found out they were not just trying to sell it to
Israel, they were also offering it to Greece. I read through the
brochure. The agent and I, the CIA agent and I had a discussion about
the capability. He said, ``It is a very capable system, almost as
capable as our PAC-3.'' On the back page of that document, Mr. Speaker,
was a summary sheet of all the capabilities of that system. To my
amazement, the interceptor speed of that Antei 2500 was right below the
threshold of the demarcation that our government got sucked into by the
Russians in Geneva. So in effect, Mr. Speaker, that is where the
demarcation number came from. In our haste to enter into an agreement
with the Russians, we agreed to an artificial number between theater
and national missile defense that would let the Russians a year later
market a brand new system right below that threshold but would prohibit
us from making our systems go beyond that capability.
Mr. Speaker, that is why there is no confidence in this
administration's ability to negotiate arms control agreements. It is
because this administration has a terrible track record. In fact, Mr.
Speaker, today the Iranians are developing the Shahab 4 system which
they got help from the Russians on which has a defined capability of at
least 2500 kilometers.
{time} 2015
If we were to accept the administration's demarcation protocol, we
could not improve our systems to defeat the Iranian Shahab-4 system
which Russia helped Iran build. That is why this Congress, Mr. Speaker,
has no confidence, and that is why I have no confidence in this
administration in arms control negotiations.
Now, to add further insult to injury, when the administration
finished their negotiations in Geneva and these two protocols were
signed by the White House and by the Russian leadership, by law and by
the Constitution, the President is required to submit those changes to
the treaty to the Senate, because constitutionally the Senate has the
role of advise and consent.
Mr. Speaker, that was 3 years ago. For 3 years Senate leadership has
been asking the administration to send those two protocols up so the
Senate could debate them, and for 3 years the White House has refused
to send those two items up. Why? Because they know they could not get
them passed, because no Member of the Senate would have confidence in
those two items that we negotiated based on the outline I have just
provided to our colleagues, so for 3 years the Senate held those
protocols back.
Quietly, in getting the Russians to approve START II, the
administration gave a wink and a nod to Russia and said, look, instead
of us bringing those demarcation items up and those protocols up
separately, attach those to START II. So when the Russian Duma ratified
the START II treaty three weeks ago, they did not just pass the START
II treaty that our Senate ratified in 1993, they added those two
protocols on to the START II ratification.
Now, Mr. Speaker, this President knows that this Senate will never
approve START II with those two protocols included, so now we have a
case where the START II treaty is in jeopardy, and it is in jeopardy
again because of the underhanded and deceitful way in which the
protocols were not brought before to the Senate or to the House, but
rather, forced on the Russian side as a part of the START II final
passage.
The President also knows that we have a law on the books that says
the President cannot go below a certain threshold of strategic weapons
unless START II is fully ratified. START II is not fully ratified, Mr.
Speaker, and this President cannot get START II fully ratified under
the terms agreed to by the Russians. So if we cannot get START II
ratified as agreed to by the Russian side, then how are we ever going
to reach below that to a START III level? In fact, Mr. Speaker, in last
year's defense bill, we also put a provision in that said, in Section
1201, that not later than September 1, 2000, the Secretary of Defense
shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services in the Senate and the
House, in consultation with the CIA, an assessment of the strategic
balance between Russia and the U.S. based on decreasing numbers of
strategic weapons.
Mr. Speaker, we have been informed by the Pentagon they have not even
completed the assessment for this report. They have not even completed
the assessment for the further reductions that would come under START
III, and here is President Clinton telling the Pentagon, ``Tell me how
I can cut our strategic forces in one-half.''
Mr. Speaker, that is why there is no confidence. There is no
confidence because last week when I heard the administration was
proposing these changes, I went to see Majority Leader Trent Lott. I
said, ``Mr. Majority Leader, have you had any consultation with the
White House on what is going to be discussed in Moscow in June?'' He
said ``none.''
I went to the Speaker, I went to the Majority Leader, I went to the
Majority Whip. I went to the Chairman of the Committee on Armed
Services, I went to the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Defense
Appropriations. I said to all of them, ``Have you been briefed by this
administration on what they are going to offer and negotiate with
Russia at the summit in June?'' They all said no.
So here we have an administration that has lost the confidence of
this Congress on arms control agreements for all the reasons I
documented, plus many more, now proposing a major announcement of a
reduction with the Russians in Moscow in June. It is not that we do not
want to work with the Russians to reduce arms. I want that, Mr.
Speaker, and I work at that every day. But, Mr. Speaker, I want those
negotiations based on candor, I want them based on fact, I want them
based on what the Pentagon feels is within our best security
limitations.
I do not want the President going off to Moscow to reverse the legacy
of 7\1/2\ years of helping to cause Russia to become a failure, a
basket case, where in 1992 young Russians were parading in Moscow
streets waving American flags, and Boris Yeltsin's first speech was
declaring a new strategic relationship between the U.S. and Russia,
and, 7 years later, in 1999, having 5,000 Russians stand in front of
the American embassy in Moscow throwing bricks and cans of paint at our
embassy, and one of Boris Yeltsin's final speeches declaring a new
strategic relationship between Russia and China with the U.S. as the
enemy.
Now, we cannot blame all of that turnaround on Bill Clinton, but, Mr.
Speaker, I can tell you that we have not done well with Russia over the
last 8 years, and the level of confidence from both Russia and China is
at an all time low. Our concern is that this President, in his rush to
repair his tainted foreign policy image, may try to come out with some
grandiose scheme that does two things: It puts a new face on the
foreign policy legacy of Bill Clinton; and, secondary, it gives Al
Gore, who has been trailing in the polls by about 8 or 9 points to
Governor Bush, a political issue to run on through the November
election.
Mr. Speaker, arms control negotiations with the Russians cannot be
based on what is best for a presidential campaign, and they cannot be
based on trying to recreate a legacy that does not exist when it comes
to foreign policy issues.
Here is my greatest fear, Mr. Speaker; that the President, in a rush
to accept the advice of some of his political advisers to have some
newly negotiated level of reduction in arms with the Russians, may end
up reaching an agreement that the Senate will never ratify, and,
therefore, again we will let Russia down, and again the Russians will
lose confidence, and they will think that we did it deliberately, that
the President went over to Moscow to negotiate something, announced
something was potent in front of the entire Duma and the entire
country, and then America did not follow through. Why? Not because of
any disagreement necessarily with Russia, but because this Congress has
no confidence in this administration's arms control track record. In
fact, it was not until last year that the administration began to
finally impose some limited sanctions on Russian entities that we, in
fact, knew were in violation of arms control agreements.
Now, Mr. Speaker, I want Russia to succeed, and I work at it every
day. I
[[Page H3041]]
want them to be a stable friend of ours. Calling violations of arms
control agreements into question when Russian entities do things that
are wrong is no different than when we accuse a company like Loral or
Hughes or some other American firm of illegally selling technology in
violation of those same agreements or our own laws. And what we did for
8 years was ignore the violations of Russian entities. We did it
because I think we had a failed foreign policy of not wanting to
embarrass Russia's leaders. Now we are paying the price for that.
We cannot let in the matter of the last 6 months of this
administration a President who, in my opinion, is desperately trying to
reverse what will be his legacy of a failed foreign policy, to announce
some grandiose plan that is not based on substance and does not have
bipartisan support.
Mr. Speaker, one month ago, Secretary Cohen called six of us from the
House over to the Pentagon for a luncheon meeting, three Democrats,
three Republicans, and the Secretary had all of his senior staff there,
and we talked about where we should go with Russia.
I told the Secretary then our policy with Russia has got to be a
bipartisan policy. This administration has lost the confidence of the
Congress, and the only way this administration can have any hope of a
successful new relationship is to bring in leaders of both parties.
I suggested to Secretary Cohen that he lead a bipartisan delegation
to Moscow to meet with Putin's people, with Republicans and Democrats
sitting together, to discuss a new relationship. What do we have a
month later? This President, without any consultation with the Speaker,
without any consultation with the Majority Leader, without any
consultation with any Member of Congress, secretly proposing a new
deal, one that he could stand up before the cameras, before the Duma,
bite his lip and talk about a new relationship in America's and
Russia's relations, when he knows full well this Congress just does not
trust his ability to negotiate successful treaties that are in
America's best interests.
If this President does not take those steps, then it is wrong for him
to go to Moscow and lay out a scenario to the Russians that he knows
full well this Congress will not support. He may try to give Al Gore a
political campaign theme, but that is not going to work, Mr. Speaker,
because we caught onto this act in advance.
That is why last week the White House was in a skirmish, because the
cat got out of the bag. Members of Congress were aware that there were
secret discussions taking place that were leading up to a major
announcement by the President in Moscow that would shake America and
shake Russia.
Now, Mr. Speaker, thank goodness our leadership has responded. Only
Friday Majority Leader Trent Lott and Speaker Denny Hastert announced
that they are forming a bipartisan coalition that will begin to assess
our defense posture, but specifically what increased threats might come
about by unilateral discussions in our strategic forces.
I called former CIA director, Jim Woolsey, on the phone last Thursday
and said, ``Director Woolsey, would you be willing to serve on such a
panel?'' He said ``Absolutely.'' People of the caliber of Jim Woolsey
and Don Rumsfeld are the kind of people that this Congress has
confidence in. When Don Rumsfeld and Jim Woolsey and the other seven
Members of the Rumsfeld Commission came back to this Congress two years
ago with a report that said the CIA was wrong, the administration was
wrong, the threat to our security from countries like Iran and Iraq and
China were closer than what they were originally stated to be, the
Congress responded with overwhelming bipartisan support.
We now need those same bipartisan people, who are recognized experts
on defense and strategic issues, to analyze what would happen if we, in
fact, agreed in Moscow to lower the number of strategic weapons and
what the onus would be on our side in terms of security risk, because
there are many in this country who have argued that to go too low with
strategic forces coequally be destabilizing.
So, Mr. Speaker, tonight I am asking our colleagues to begin to ask
the questions before President Clinton goes to Moscow. The first
question is, Mr. President, why have you not involved the Congress? If
you want to succeed, Mr. President, do what we suggested to Secretary
Cohen 5 weeks ago; bring a bipartisan delegation together, a delegation
that you have called upon when you want support for your initiatives.
I can recall in each of the past 5 years, former administration
official Howard Smith calling me each year to deliver Republican votes
for the administration's cooperative threat reduction program, and each
year we did that. The administration has had a policy of calling us
when they want our support for their priorities, but ignoring us when
they tread on such delicate issues as arms control treaties and
relations.
Nothing could be more devastating to our relationship with Russia
than to have a President of the United States go to Moscow, make a
grand appearance before the Duma and announce some grand strategy, only
to have the Senate say, ``We don't agree, Mr. President. You went too
far.''
{time} 2030
Right now, that is the way the Senate feels about START II, Mr.
Speaker. In the words of senators like Jon Kyl and Jim Inhofe, Senators
on both sides of the aisle have questioned the two protocols that were
added to the START II treaty by the Russian side. This administration
needs to clear up those two protocols before it attempts to negotiate
further reductions in the START III process.
Mr. Speaker, in the end I want us to reach historic new levels in our
relationship with the Russians, as Ronald Reagan and George Bush did;
but Ronald Reagan and George Bush negotiated with Russia with three
basic conditions in mind: Strength, consistency and candor.
For the last 7\1/2\ years, Mr. Speaker, we have not seen any of those
three positions used in our negotiations with Russia. We have wavered.
We have ignored reality. We have pretended things are not what they are
and we have allowed Russian entities to get away with deliberate
violations of arms control treaties that have undermined the confidence
of the Congress in terms of a new treaty we would enter into, and that
is a real sorrowful situation.
So I would hope, Mr. Speaker, that this administration and the
President and his team would reach out in the last 3 weeks before the
Moscow trip to the Congress to bring in Republican and Democrat
leaders, to have a full and open debate and dialogue about where we are
going with Russia; not to do something in secret, not to have some
grand announcement, where he attempts to capture the imagination of the
American people to restore a failed foreign policy legacy and not to
boost Al Gore's campaign and give him an edge on defense issues.
If the President does not do that, Mr. Speaker, then this Congress
will not support anything that the President negotiates and,
unfortunately, we will again create more of a lack of confidence on the
Russian side as to what our intentions are in our relationship.
In fact, Mr. Speaker, I have encouraged the President to move away
from the whole theory of mutually assured deterrence where we basically
dare each other to attack and build up these large missiles to attack
each other and move toward what I call asymmetric deterrence, where we
continue to negotiate with the Russians decreases in our offensive
weapons but begin to allow in those negotiations strategic defensive
systems as well, so that we focus on defending our people as opposed to
threatening to attack the other side.
Mr. Speaker, if this President wants to change the legacy that he has
made for himself, the best thing he could do would be to go to Moscow
with a bipartisan approach. In fact, I would go even one step further,
Mr. Speaker. I would implore the President in this, an election year,
to invite Governor George Bush and Vice President Al Gore in to let
each of them share in any negotiation that takes place in Moscow,
because President Clinton is not going to get anything ratified that he
does in Moscow, number one, because of the legacy of the failed arms
control practices of the past 7\1/2\ years but, two, just because of
the time involved.
[[Page H3042]]
The President will go in June. We will be in session the rest of June
and July. We will break in August, come back in September. No arms
control agreement has ever been ratified that quickly by a Senate, and
the President knows that. So he will not have to get the support of the
Congress in the next session. It will be either Al Gore or George W.
Bush.
So my advice to the President would be, bring in Republicans and
Democrats, Mr. Speaker; have an honest discussion with us about our
approach with the Russians; clear up the START II treaty; get rid of
those two protocols that were never a part of the START II treaty that
the Senate ratified in 1993 and bring in George W. Bush along with Al
Gore and involve both of them in any discussions with the Russians,
because if the President does not, Mr. Speaker, if he does not do that
then we could only read his intent as being purely political; purely
political because the President knows that his only attempt would be
to, one, change his own legacy and, two, bolster Al Gore's campaign and
not to a sincere effort to get this country's legislative bodies to
ratify a substantive agreement with Russia, because if that were the
case the President would involve this Congress and he would involve
George W. Bush in this process before he goes to Moscow.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask my colleagues to convey their
concerns, as I will be doing.
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