[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 58 (Thursday, May 11, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3887-S3893]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




       MILITARY CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2001--Continued

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I make a parliamentary inquiry. Are we now 
out of morning business and on the bill?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. We are on the military construction bill.
  Mr. WARNER. Fine.
  Mr. President, in the course of the deliberations before the Senate 
Appropriations Committee on this measure, the distinguished senior 
Senator from West Virginia, Mr. Byrd--former majority leader of the 
Senate; one who has served in the Senate 41 years--brought before that 
committee an amendment entitled the Byrd-Warner amendment dealing with 
the issue of the balance of power in the Constitution between the 
executive branch, the President, and the legislative branch, the 
Congress of the United States, as it relates to matters of foreign 
policy but, most particularly, as it relates to the matter--and perhaps 
the most important entrusted to both the President of the United States 
and the Congress--the most important matter of when the President, as 
Commander in Chief, sends beyond the shores of our great Nation men and 
women in uniform into harm's way in the cause of peace.
  This week, those of us on the Republican side of the aisle had our 
weekly luncheon, as did our good friends and colleagues on the other 
side of the aisle. At our luncheon, Senator Strom Thurmond stood and 
asked if we could observe a moment of silence as he recounted the 
closing day of World War II, when hostilities ceased in Europe--the 
bloodiest of all wars, in which 292,000 men and women, wearing the 
uniform of the Armed Services of the United States, lost their lives.
  You could have heard a pin drop in that caucus as that great soldier, 
as that great statesman, asked for remembrance of the veterans of those 
generations.
  In a very humble way, I have a brief memory. At age 17, I joined the 
Navy. It was January of 1945. I was simply trained, as were thousands 
of other youngsters my age, because at that point in January, in the 
winter of 1945, both the war in Europe and the war in the Pacific were 
inconclusive. I simply was at training command, waiting for the 
invasion of Japan. I thank God that last battle in the Pacific never 
occurred, not only for myself but for millions of others who would have 
been involved.
  I look back very humbly on the modest contribution I made in uniform, 
both in that war and again during the Korean war, where I served in the 
Marines for a brief period.
  The military did far more for me than I did for the military. Today, 
that 17-year-old sailor as of 1945 is privileged to be the chairman of 
the Armed Services Committee of the Senate, a dream I thought would 
never be fulfilled.

[[Page S3888]]

  I again reiterate, my service was modest. On both sides of the aisle, 
there are men who have served and show the scars of war, who understand 
the burden on the President of the United States as he sends forth 
troops into harm's way. I respect these individuals greatly for their 
knowledge, for having borne the pain in the field of battle, unlike 
myself. But I was there when others did.
  The point of this is the gravity of the decision to send forth our 
people--the sons and the daughters of people from every village and 
town across this Nation.
  I recount World War II. I then go to Korea, again, where I served as 
a young Marine officer. Over 50,000 men and women lost their lives in 
that conflict.
  During the course of the Vietnam conflict, I was privileged to serve 
in the Navy as Undersecretary of the Navy and then as Secretary of the 
Navy. I was there 5 years, 4 months, and 3 days. Over 50,000 men and 
women lost their lives, not to mention the number of those wounded.
  The point I make is, the last time this Nation declared war was World 
War II. Yet since that time we have sent men and women into harm's way, 
beyond our shores, over 100 times.
  We never declared war in the Korean conflict. As a matter of fact, it 
was called the forgotten war. We never declared war in Vietnam, a war 
that not only brought tremendous casualties on the field of battle and 
a wrenching experience to the families--as each war does--but it 
divided this Nation. Indeed, it was the people of this Nation who rose 
up and, finally, through their elected representatives in Congress, 
provided the basis for the withdrawal of our troops from that conflict.
  That is what this amendment is all about. It is a decision of power 
between the executive and the legislative branches. It is assuming the 
responsibility--the responsibility to join with the President or not 
join with the President--in sending those people beyond our shores. No 
greater responsibility rests upon a Member of Congress than that.
  I have had the privilege to know Presidents. I have had the privilege 
to learn from my elder statesmen in this Chamber--foremost among them 
John Stennis, John Tower, Barry Goldwater, and ``Scoop'' Jackson, all 
of whom worked on the Armed Services Committee--of how Presidents of 
our great Nation face up to that decision to go or not to go.
  Stennis used to tell the story that Lyndon Johnson told him. The 
President used to say to Stennis: When that phone rings at night, and 
there is a troubled spot in the world, and I have to make the decision, 
Do I or do I not send those troops? I always thought, Where is an 
aircraft carrier, an island of America? What is the nearest force 
structure of the U.S. to this conflict?
  It is a big decision. Read the biographies of our Presidents. It is a 
tough decision. Congress has an obligation to share with the President 
in the making of that decision. That is my point. That is what this 
amendment is about.
  We have not really fully shared in that decisionmaking since World 
War II. Yes, we have the power to declare war under the Constitution. 
We also have the sole power over the purse--the power to decide whether 
that President can utilize the taxpayers' contribution each year in the 
operations of the United States.
  Just this week, the Armed Services Committee concluded its bill--
roughly $309 billion--to provide for the Armed Forces of the United 
States. It is the biggest money bill that goes through here. It will be 
brought to the floor next week, hopefully.
  That is what I am talking about--the power of the purse. Our 
committee authorizes, and the committee under the Senator from Alaska, 
Mr. Stevens, and the distinguished cosponsor of this amendment, Mr. 
Byrd, then make the decisions on the appropriations against the 
authorization. That is what this amendment is about. It is about how we 
conduct the expenditure in this bill--$2 billion-plus for Kosovo 
alone--how we go about spending the taxpayers' money for that. How does 
it directly relate to the safety and welfare of those brave men and 
women of the U.S. Armed Forces who are marching through, or patrolling 
through, or standing watch night and day in Kosovo?
  Mr. President, I first went to Kosovo in 1990 with then-leader Bob 
Dole. There was a group of four or five of us. I remember that trip 
very well. I remember that we exited rather speedily from Kosovo 
because there was a riot developing. So many people wanted to see the 
American Senators, wanted to tell the American Senators about the 
cruelty and the deprivation of human rights that was then, in 1990, 
being inflicted on the people of Kosovo--Kosovo being a part of 
Yugoslavia--being inflicted by Milosevic. Little did we know that war 
would soon spread through this region--first in Bosnia, and then it 
would erupt in Kosovo.
  Well, we saw those people. We went by the famous field where, 
hundreds of years ago, the people of that region fought off the 
barbarian insiders and lost the battle. They still consider that the 
most hallowed ground in Kosovo. That region has been subjected to 
fighting and internal strife ever since. Even Hitler put some 21 
divisions in there to try to control the Yugoslav region, and finally 
he told his generals to just contain them as best they could. He never 
could subvert that province because of the internal fighting. 
Throughout the occupation of the German armies, a continuous civil war 
raged among the various religious and ethnic factions in that region. 
The Germans just sort of turned their back on them. One German general 
said in a dispatch to Berlin about those who died in this civil war: 
``Less mouths to feed, less backs to clothe.''
  What a desperate, desperate cauldron of humanity. I expect that at 
one time or another in our deliberations in this body on Bosnia and 
Kosovo, every Member has availed themselves of the history of this 
region. As many times as I have been there--I believe I was the first 
U.S. Senator to go into Sarajevo in September of 1992, at the height of 
the fighting of the civil war in that town. I remember the French, who 
were controlling such security as was available, just in an airport 
where we were trying to bring in Red Cross supplies and food, put me in 
an armored vehicle and drove me around the town. We looked out through 
a little slit and firing was going on.
  A French colonel and a former Foreign Legionnaire said, ``I have 
fought in battles all over the world, and I cannot understand this 
one.'' The Croatians, Bosnians, Serbians were fighting each other. He 
said, ``If you saw them in a room, you could not tell the difference. 
Most are well-educated people.'' He said, ``In all my years of combat 
in far-flung places of the world, I have never seen the violence that 
these people can inflict on one another. I have never seen anything 
like it.''
  That violence raged for years, until the U.N. and then NATO forces 
finally came in and stabilized peace in that region. The war in Kosovo, 
we know well. We did everything we could at the diplomatic table. There 
were negotiations and valiant efforts by many. Not only the U.S, but, 
indeed, many nations tried to deal with Milosevic and to avoid the 
fighting. The rest is history. For 78 days, an air war was conducted in 
which the United States of America flew roughly 70 percent of the 
missions. Five or six other nations had their fighters, and they did 
the best they could. It was a consortium of nations.

  Why did the U.S. have the largest burden? Very simply, we had the 
most modern equipment. It was a high-tech war. We employed every bit of 
high-tech equipment that we knew how to employ to protect the lives of 
the aviators. That was the correct decision. We gave as much as we 
could to our allies, but their planes simply weren't equipped with the 
high-tech guidance systems, radar systems, and other detection systems 
to defend themselves. So we flew the bulk of the missions. NATO is 
still without adequate airlift. We supplied the cargo planes, the troop 
carriers, in large measure. In that remote location in the airfields 
that ring Kosovo--Italy had a dozen airfields, and how valiant that 
country was in that battle. They turned over much of their civil 
aviation, air space, and airfields to allow the U.S. and allies to 
operate their aircraft around the clock.
  Back to this amendment. The amendment is in two parts. I will refer 
to it as part 1 or 2. First, it is a contribution that I made some 2\1/
2\ months ago, following my most recent trip to Kosovo. I went into 
that region, I think for the fifth or sixth time, and I went to the 
headquarters of the KFOR commander,

[[Page S3889]]

a fine German officer, well-trained. He had a modest office. We were 
joined by Ambassador Kouchner, who was given by the U.N. the primary 
responsibility for trying to rebuild Kosovo following the termination 
of the conflict. This was January. I remember it well. There were 1 or 
2 light bulbs sort of hanging from the ceiling, and they were 
constantly flickering. Down the hall was a toilet that was inoperative 
because there wasn't enough power. You had to flush it by taking a big 
bucket of water and pouring it in.
  I bring this up because Ambassador Kouchner said to me repeatedly in 
the hour or so I was there, as the lights were flickering, ``We don't 
have enough money from our allies that fought this war and others who 
made the commitment to get adequate power.'' He said, ``Half of the 
city of Pristina''--that is where we were, Pristina--``is freezing 
tonight because of the inadequacy of the power, inadequacy of the 
housing, inadequacy of everything, food and the like.'' That was in 
January. That is not an American; that is a Frenchman.
  The general who commented on the lights said, ``This is the best 
building in town. We are doing our best; we are going to make it 
through.'' This was the headquarters of all the KFOR, all the troops. 
Up to 30 nations had contributed troops to try to bring about a measure 
of stability.
  The consequence of that trip and going out to visit our troops in a 
far region--the whole area was divided into various regions: The 
American sector, the French sector, the British sector. I visited our 
troops in the American sector. I watched these young men from places 
all across the United States, heavily dressed in their flack suits and 
protective vests, cold as the dickens, carrying weapons, but going 
around to try to maintain order in these war-ravaged communities. There 
was the Serb section in the town and the Albanian section.
  There was an indivisible line between them. You couldn't see it. But 
everybody knew you didn't step across it. There was very little, if 
any, contact between two factions.
  I visited other American soldiers--two and three stationed out to 
guard a church. Our soldiers then and today are doing all kinds of 
tasks at personal risk, for which in large measure they weren't 
trained. They do not teach us in boot camp how to solve marital 
disputes or how to solve disputes between shop owners who are arguing.
  These wonderful persons in uniform are drawing on a lifetime of 
American experience with their families and their homes and their towns 
to perform tasks that are far beyond any training the military gives. 
But they are doing it. They have done it, and they continue to do it, 
and do it very well.
  At the end of the war, there were commitments in which the various 
allies came in and said we will send so many million dollars; we will 
send so many police; we will send so many building supplies; we will do 
this and we will do that. Bernard Kouchner, the man in charge, simply 
said it is not being done.
  So I came back home and concocted an amendment in consultation with 
quite a few of my colleagues. I went about it very deliberately. I 
consulted on two occasions at the White House in constructive meetings. 
The administration wasn't at all supportive of this venture; that is, 
on the face of the draft that I had. But I had other people within the 
administration and elsewhere telling me privately: John, if you do 
this, I think you will get the attention of the allies and they will 
begin to fulfill the commitments they made. Whether they are dollar 
commitments, commitments for police, or other commitments; they will do 
it.
  I came to the floor of the Senate on Monday. I had quite a few 
cosponsors: The distinguished Senator Stevens, the distinguished 
Senator Inouye, members of the Appropriations Committee, and a great 
number of the Armed Services Committee. There was nothing to file the 
amendment against. But my intentions were that at such time as the 
Kosovo supplemental came through, I would put it on and have it printed 
in the Record.
  This thing reverberated around the world, known as the Warner 
amendment. I take no great pride of authorship. But they had to name it 
something. But, suddenly, the allies began to get the message that we 
mean business in the Congress of the United States. We mean business. 
They began to account for what they had done. They began to expedite 
their dollars. They began to expedite the building materials. They 
began to expedite in some ways sending police, although they are still 
far behind the goals. Now, some 2\1/2\ months later, I have just been 
advised as late as yesterday by a constant stream of U.N. and E.U. 
officials through my office. I thank them. They quietly thanked me and 
those who supported me for bringing this matter out in the public and 
making known the need of the allies to step up.
  The House of Representatives, Mr. Kasich, called me one day with 
great respect and said: John, I think your amendment is a good one. 
Would you agree if I brought it up on the House floor just as it is? I 
said: Fine. Give it a try.
  There was quite a debate in the House of Representatives on that 
amendment. I will put it in the Record later today. But it was only 
defeated by a very few votes with basically 200 on each side. By a very 
few votes did it go down, largely because a number of Members had not 
really had a chance to think it through.

  But this amendment, which is couched as the Byrd-Warner amendment 
today, simply says the following: That the allies made certain 
commitments that, in the judgment of this Senator and such others who 
support those commitments, have not been kept in a timely way.
  We have about 15 percent of the troops there. I want to make this 
clear. Other nations have 85 percent of them.
  As a consequence, our troops and the troops of other nations could be 
there indefinitely. There is no one--I defy anyone--who can come to 
this floor and give with any precision the dates on which the 
infrastructure of that nation, and particularly its judicial system, a 
police system, and other necessary infrastructure, can enable the 
troops of this Nation and others to go home.
  It seems to me they needed a wake-up call. That is precisely what 
this amendment does that I partly drew up. It simply says to our 
President: Respectfully, Mr. President, of this $2 billion coming 
through, you can utilize a certain percentage right away to reimburse 
the Department of Defense for expenditures it has already made for the 
Kosovo operation for this fiscal year to replenish the funds taken out 
of the Department of the Army, largely, but some out of the Navy, some 
out of the Air Force, but 25 percent we hold back--that is all, 25 
percent of $2 billion we hold back--until you can certify that you have 
examined, first, the commitments of our allies, and then, second, the 
extent to which they have completed their commitments. I have been told 
on good authority that in all probability the President can make that 
certification largely with what has occurred in the 2\1/2\ months since 
this Warner section of this thing has been made public.
  So my amendment in large measure has met its goal.
  I thank the many people who have helped me and stood by the purpose 
of this amendment. But had the President not been able to certify, I 
said the other 25 percent of the money would then be used to bring our 
troops home because this Nation has fulfilled its commitment and did 
its best certainly in the combat phase of this. Certainly in the year 
almost after the combat phase, we have done it. Now let the Europeans 
and other nations pick up.
  If there is one thing in this bill I will bring to the floor next 
week for the colleagues of the Armed Services Committee, the most 
serious thing facing us today in the military is the retention of the 
middle-grade personnel, enlisted and officer, because of the constant 
deployment of these individuals all over the world away from their 
families. We are not today able to retain sufficient numbers to keep 
this military of ours, this magnificent military of ours, strong in the 
future. It is not the shortage of dollars. It is not the shortage of 
equipment in large measure, although spare parts is a problem. It is 
the fact that these men and women in the uniform of our Nation are 
constantly being sent away on ships, flown away in airplanes, and many 
times with very short notice so that the remaining spouse has to pick 
up the responsibilities as that serviceperson goes overseas.

[[Page S3890]]

  I just think to keep an indefinite commitment in this region without 
any participation by the Congress of the United States is wrong. We 
should speak to that, and that is what my portion does. It simply says 
25 percent is to be used to bring home the troops if you can't make the 
certification. But if the Congress wishes, it could meet and say: Even 
though you could not make the certification, Mr. President, we think 
you should continue the policy as you have laid it out despite the 
inability of making the certification, despite the fact that our allies 
have not made their commitments. That amendment simply says we should 
be involved. That is what the Constitution requires. We should be 
involved. We cannot come in here year after year, month after month, 
and just stamp these appropriations with an ``aye'' vote and then run 
out of the Chamber. We have to face up to this amendment. This 
amendment makes us face up to it.

  That is my principal contribution. I join my distinguished colleague 
and friend, Senator Byrd, in his portion. I see my distinguished 
colleague from South Carolina who worked on this and voted for it in 
the Appropriations Committee. I shorten my remarks so the Senator may 
address the Senate.
  The thrust of the Byrd amendment is not ``cut and run,'' not that we 
are trying to undermine NATO, that we are turning our back. It is 
simply saying to the Congress of the United States and to the next 
President, give Congress a plan and show we can pull out just the 
combat elements of our troops, leaving the intelligence, leaving the 
logistics, leaving other segments of the military to help the remaining 
troops of the many nations--not cut and run. Bring out the combat 
troops. Show Congress a plan.
  Those troops, in our judgment, should be out by July 2001. Is that 
too much to ask, 14 months hence? That is not cut and run. That is not 
undermining anybody. That is not sending a signal to Milosevic that the 
United States is turning its back. It is saying to the men and women of 
our Armed Forces, to this Nation, that we have done our share. It is 
time for us to pick up the combat share to the extent it is still 
necessary. And then, if it is in the infinite wisdom of this body that 
we should not make any changes, we should not come home with the combat 
elements. All we have to do is stand up and send a message, a sense of 
the Congress, we think we should stay. That would add far greater 
strength to the conviction of the American participation than this year 
after year after year of idly voting on an appropriations bill and not 
discussing it.
  I respect my dear colleague from West Virginia. How many times he has 
been on this floor reminding Members of our responsibilities? Many, 
many times. This is an amendment that simply says: Congress, the hour 
has arrived where you have to stand up and be counted if we will 
continue for an indefinite time the missions in Kosovo.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a Dear 
Colleague letter.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                  Committee on Appropriations,

                                     Washington, DC, May 11, 2000.
       Dear Colleague: On May 9, the Senate Committee on 
     Appropriations, by a bipartisan vote of 23 to 3, adopted a 
     major policy provision relating to the ongoing role of the 
     United States military in the Kosovo peacekeeping operation.
       The Senate is expected to quickly take up the FY 2001 
     Military Construction Appropriations Bill, which contains the 
     Kosovo language. As the authors of this provision, we take 
     this opportunity to provide you with our analysis of the 
     language and a fact sheet on the provision.
       We are particularly concerned about the possibility of 
     misconceptions or misinterpretations of the provision. The 
     Byrd-Warner language goes directly to the institutional and 
     constitutional responsibilities of Congress. It does not 
     require the withdrawal of U.S. military troops from Kosovo. 
     To the contrary, the language makes specific provisions for 
     Congress to vote, under expedited procedures, if the next 
     President seeks to continue U.S. military involvement in the 
     Kosovo peacekeeping operation beyond July 1, 2001.
       The provision has three main objectives. First, it 
     terminates funding for the continued deployment of U.S. 
     ground combat troops in Kosovo after July 1, 2001, unless the 
     President seeks and receives Congressional authorization to 
     keep troops in Kosovo.
       Second, the provision requires the President to develop a 
     plan, in consultation with our European allies, to turn the 
     ground combat troop element of the Kosovo peacekeeping 
     operation entirely over to the Europeans by July 1, 2001. 
     Assuming the President is successful in developing such a 
     plan, there should be no need for funding the continued 
     deployment of U.S. ground combat troops in Kosovo beyond July 
     1, 2001.
       Third, related to current operations in Kosovo and to 
     signal to the Europeans the need for them to fulfill their 
     commitments for implementing peace and stability in Kosovo, 
     the provision withholds 25 percent of the emergency 
     supplemental funding for military operations Kosovo attached 
     to the Military Construction bill pending certification by 
     the President that our allies are making adequate progress in 
     meeting the commitments they made to the Kosovo peacekeeping 
     process. If the President cannot make the certifications by 
     July 15 of this year, the funding held in reserve can only be 
     used to withdraw U.S. forces from Kosovo unless Congress 
     votes otherwise.
       This last provision has been compared to an earlier 
     proposal by Senator Warner, a version of which was narrowly 
     defeated in the House. That language, however, has been 
     modified to address a major concern expressed during the 
     House debate; namely, that failure by the President to 
     certify the requisite level of allied contributions would 
     automatically trigger the withdrawal of U.S. forces from 
     Kosovo with no opportunity for Congress or the President to 
     intervene.
       The Byrd-Warner language included in the Senate Military 
     Construction Bill addresses that issue by including a 
     provision for Congress to vote, under expedited procedures, 
     to lift the troop withdrawal requirement on use of the funds 
     held in reserve, thus disarming the automatic trigger. 
     Moreover, the allies appear to have gotten the message. They 
     have in the past two months increased their contributions, 
     and the President is expected to be able to make the required 
     certification by July 15.
       The larger issue addressed by the Byrd-Warner provision is 
     that of the responsibility of Congress to exercise its 
     constitutional duty. It was no accident that the founding 
     fathers vested in Congress alone the power of the purse. Yet, 
     we are seeking in Kosovo, as we have seen in so many other 
     peacekeeping operations, a bastardization of that process. 
     Instead of Congress' appropriating funds for expenditure by 
     the Executive Branch, the Executive Branch is spending funds 
     first and asking Congress after the fact to pay the bills.
       Setting aside for a moment the foreign policy implications 
     of the Kosovo peacekeeping operation, the Senate has a duty 
     to vigilantly guard the rights bestowed on Congress by the 
     Constitution. No such right is more central to the separation 
     of powers on which our system of government is built than the 
     vesting in Congress alone the power of the purse.
       Provisions to put Congressional check reins on funding 
     appropriated to implement U.S. foreign policy initiative are 
     often criticized as micromanaging the Administration. 
     Language dealing with troop drawdowns is subject to the 
     additional criticism of endangering U.S. troops and 
     emboldening foreign despots. The Byrd-Warner provision is 
     carefully and deliberately designed to avoid those pitfalls.
       First, the language offers guidance to the President; it 
     does not dictate an outcome. Because the United States bore 
     the lion's share of the air offensive against Yugoslavia, we 
     believe that the Europeans should be responsible for the 
     ground element of the Kosovo peacekeeping mission. The Byrd-
     Warner provision offers a road map to achieve that outcome by 
     July 1, 2001. If the next President disagrees with our 
     position, the language provides a mechanism, in the form of a 
     joint resolution to be voted on under expedited procedures, 
     for him to seek and receive congressional authorization to 
     continue the deployment of U.S. ground troops in Kosovo 
     beyond July 1, 2001.
       The provision specifically exempts from the restriction on 
     U.S. ground combat troops in Kosovo such U.S. military 
     missions as support for NATO headquarters in Kosovo, 
     intelligence support, air surveillance, and related 
     activities. The United States can continue to assist NATO 
     in Kosovo, with the exception of providing U.S. ground 
     combat troops for the mission.
       According to Administration estimates, the other NATO and 
     non-NATO countries participating in the Kosovo peacekeeping 
     operation are currently contributing about 85 percent of the 
     total force structure. The Byrd-Warner provision provides 
     ample time for those nations and others to augment their 
     deployments of ground combat troops to Kosovo. In no way does 
     this language undercut the NATO peacekeeping operation in 
     Kosovo or provide encouragement to Slobodan Milosevic. If 
     anything, it will give the Europeans the opportunity to 
     demonstrate to the world the strength and unity of their 
     opposition to Milosevic's brand of tyranny.
       The time frames outlined in this provision are deliberate. 
     Our intention is to shift long range decisionmaking on the 
     role of the United States in Kosovo away from the politically 
     charged atmosphere of an election year and into the next 
     Administration. This language allows the next President, 
     whoever is elected, to deal decisively with Kosovo and

[[Page S3891]]

     prevents the U.S. from drifting, through inaction, into an 
     indefinite and likely prolonged commitment of U.S. personnel 
     and resources in yet another foreign peacekeeping operation.
       To promote continuity between Administrations, and to 
     ensure that the next Administration does not put off dealing 
     with Kosovo until it is too late to plan effectively, our 
     provision requires the current President to submit, by 
     September 30, 2000, an interim plan for the U.S. to 
     transition its ground combat troops out of Kosovo, and the 
     next President to submit a final plan by May 1, 2001.
       Should the Byrd-Warner language result in a drawdown of 
     U.S. ground troops from Kosovo, the language provides for a 
     ``safe, orderly, and phased'' withdrawal of troops, and 
     leaves the planning of that withdrawal up to the President. 
     Any troop drawdown would be managed by the generals, not the 
     Congress.
       We urge you to carefully consider the language of the Byrd-
     Warner provision, and we welcome your support. Should you 
     have any questions or require additional information, please 
     contact Christina Evans of Senator Byrd's staff at 224-3088 
     or Judy Ansley of Senator Warner's staff at 224-4928.
           Sincerely,
     Robert C. Byrd.
     John Warner.
                                  ____


                Fact Sheet: Byrd-Warner Kosovo Amendment

       More than 5,500 U.S. troops are participating in the NATO 
     peacekeeping operation in Kosovo despite the fact that 
     Congress has never authorized, nor even formally debated, 
     U.S. involvement in Kosovo since the Senate, on March 23, 
     1999, authorized air strikes against Yugoslavia.
       Congress has a constitutional responsibility to address 
     policy issues involving the deployment of U.S. troops 
     overseas in instances, such as Kosovo, in which American men 
     and women are being sent into potentially dangerous 
     situations.
       By tacitly endorsing, through emergency supplemental 
     funding measures, Executive Branch decisions to deploy U.S. 
     troops overseas without congressional authorization, Congress 
     is effectively abrogating its responsibility under the 
     Constitution.
       This amendment terminates funding for the continued 
     deployment of U.S. ground combat troops in Kosovo after July 
     1, 2001, unless the President seeks and receives 
     congressional authorization to continue such deployment.
       In recognition of the fact that the United States military 
     bore the brunt of the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia, 
     the amendment also requires the president to develop a plan 
     to turn the ground combat troop element of the Kosovo 
     peacekeeping operation entirely over to the Europeans by July 
     1, 2001.
       The timing is a key element of the amendment. First, it 
     shifts the responsibility of determining future U.S. 
     involvement in Kosovo from the current Administration, which 
     will be out of office within months, to the next 
     Administration, which will inherit the Kosovo peacekeeping 
     mission. Second, the amendment provides ample time for the 
     next Administration to either develop a plan to hand off the 
     Kosovo ground combat troop mission to the Europeans or make 
     its case to Congress to keep U.S. ground combat troops in 
     Kosovo.
       If the next President sees a compelling need to keep U.S. 
     ground troops in Kosovo beyond July 1, 2001, the amendment 
     requires him to seek congressional authorization. If 
     Congress, acting under expedited procedures, does not 
     authorize the continued deployment of U.S. troops in Kosovo, 
     funding would be terminated after July 1, 2001.
       As an intermediate goal, the amendment withholds 25 percent 
     of the FY 2000 supplemental appropriations for military 
     operations in Kosovo pending certification by the President 
     that the Europeans are living up to their commitments, 
     including provision of at least 33% of the commitment for 
     monetary reconstruction assistance, 75% of the commitment for 
     humanitarian assistance, 75% of the commitment for Kosovo 
     government administration monetary assistance, and 75% of the 
     commitment for civilian police.
       If the President cannot make such a certification by July 
     15, 2000, the money being held in reserve could only be used 
     to withdraw troops from Kosovo unless Congress, acting under 
     expedited procedures, votes otherwise.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. L. Chafee). The Senator from South 
Carolina.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, let me first commend the chairman of our 
Armed Services Committee. He has been to war twice. He served as our 
Secretary of the Navy. He has a conscience with respect to the GIs now 
deployed in Kosovo. That is the reason I rise this afternoon.
  My chairman, ranking member, and former majority leader, the 
distinguished Senator from West Virginia, Mr. Byrd, has a little bit of 
laryngitis. He is feeling well. He is at the committee markup right now 
with respect to the Labor, Health and Human Resources bill in 
appropriations over in the Hart Building. He wanted someone to be able 
to respond. I understood the opposition to this particular amendment 
were on their way to the floor. That is why I came. Maybe the better 
part of wisdom would be to say thank you and there is no debate, and 
when we get in one, then Senator Byrd can speak for himself.
  However, I share that concern for our troops, their morale and the 
deployment of a so-called peacekeeping mission. There isn't any peace. 
There isn't any policy. All we have to do is look at the record. The 
record shows best that we debated airstrikes and we were split down the 
middle, 58-41, March 23, under the Biden amendment. We had the McCain 
amendment deploying armed forces in Kosovo, saying let's go to war. 
That was May 4, 1999. It was tabled by a motion of 78-22.
  The record shows, at best, we have a lukewarm endorsement, maybe 
favoring some airstrikes, but against taking the life of a GI. That is 
the military policy right now. With respect to diplomacy, the policy is 
one of a so-called multiethnic society, as I remember Secretary 
Albright saying.
  I visited Kosovo shortly after the distinguished chairman of the 
Armed Services Committee did this year. I was never briefed on the 
importance of a multiethnic society . . . maybe the region should be 
partitioned. But that isn't the policy of the United States. I tried to 
verify the multiethnic policy with all of our experts deployed there--
the Army generals, the Navy admirals, and everyone else. I could find 
no support for any kind of multiethnic society in light of what was 
going on on the ground.
  Here we have another Vietnam, not in the sense of deploying more and 
more troops, but actually having a military deployment in an impossible 
situation. Don't go forward, don't go backward, just stay there; we 
will send movies. It is sort of embarrassing to see our military 
hunkered down like chickens in a hailstorm at Camp Bonsteel and 
everybody bragging that we have wooden buildings and catwalks through 
the snow and we can get hamburgers at McDonald's. That is not for the 
GI, the one who volunteers to serve in the military. He is looking to 
be trained and go to battle for our national security.
  To address these conditions that continue and languish is a reason I 
am confident Senator Byrd introduced his amendment, which is part of 
our bill. And certainly it is my feeling, likewise, that we have a 
responsibility here.
  The other day we had the 25th anniversary of Vietnam. The Secretary 
of Defense said, almost 25 years later, it was a mistake. Are we going 
to have to wait 25 years to resolve Kosovo? Bosnia was to last 1 year. 
That policy has been going on for 5, 6 years now.
  We just cannot willy-nilly go along with mixed policies. Of course, 
the clarion call for the Kosovo initiative was ethnic cleansing. At the 
time they were briefing us, they had 100,000 Albanians living 
peacefully in Belgrade. Milosevic lived down the street. Heavens above, 
this was not the Holocaust. Everybody confuses ethnic cleansing with 
enemy cleansing. When you start bombing somebody and you make that the 
enemy, an outright open warfare, then the other side has got the right, 
title, and interest to clear the area of any on the side of the enemy. 
More ethnic cleansing occurred after the bombing than before the 
bombing. Actually, it was enemy cleansing because Milosevic is a cagey 
fellow and a scoundrel and we all know it. He says to himself, whoopee, 
now I can go in there and get rid of the real Albanians  that have been 
giving me problems down there in Kosovo. And he did it.

  That is exactly what was happening. The talk now is trying to deal 
with, ex post facto, a million refugees spilling over into Macedonia, 
down into Albania and back up into Montenegro and elsewhere. But the 
real spilling over and the cleansing was enemy cleansing. We are trying 
to talk about war and victory, trying to give dignity to a mistake.
  No. 1, it was a flawed policy from the word go. We came in where 
there weren't any guys with the white hats. It wasn't the good guys 
versus the bad guys. Anybody who knows anything about Kosovo and this 
part of the world knows that both sides are really something else. I 
would not want an American to go to battle for either side. I

[[Page S3892]]

say that advisedly because it has been proven. When we went there 
earlier this year, what did we learn? Yes, there was violence upon 
violence upon violence. It was continuing. And 95 percent of the 
violence was being inflicted by Albanian on Albanian.
  It is interesting to me to see here, recently, in The Economist, 
that:

       The war has done nothing to bring the two sides together. 
     On the contrary, it has intensified ancient animosities.

  Then going down it says:

       At present, the Albanians can look to NATO for their 
     security and to the U.N. for their administration, while many 
     of them traffic in drugs and other contraband and generally 
     profit from the legal limbo in which they live.

  Peacekeeping? Where is the peace? Where is the peace? We are now 
saying we have a deployment for peacekeeping. It is an enforced cease-
fire.
  I was briefed by the brass in Kosovo. They said both sides ran out of 
targets. We hit all the targets we wanted to hit. We were even going up 
there knocking out the Chinese Embassy.
  Of course, Milosevic had gotten rid of everything and cleansed 
everything he possibly could. What a wonderful war. We won. Now we want 
to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. Come on, don't give us that.
  We were there in the little town of Urosevac. The President visited 
that town at Christmas time. They had a big show. They had 400-some 
troops, and they all were hunkered down in the city hall. You could 
tell the 65,000 or 70,000 residents of the town were not friendly. We 
drove around and they glowered at us. They were in charge. We were not 
in charge of the town the President was in. We were not in charge of 
anything, really, in Kosovo. We have deployments here with walls around 
them, fences and everything else. We do not wander down the street or 
outside the compound.
  Similarly, in Mitrovica, we have a GI at one end of the block, a GI 
at the other end of the block, and a GI in the middle of the block on a 
24-hour, three times eight, 24-hour routine, guarding people going to 
the grocery store.
  It's public knowledge what the reporter says in The Economist about 
this thing not working:

       The war has done nothing to bring the two sides together. 
     On the contrary, it has intensified ancient animosities.

  There are the soldiers in the peacekeeping force, having to spend 6 
months away from their families. People hate to waste time. We, in the 
Senate, we love wasting time. There is nothing to do tomorrow and 
nothing on Monday. We cannot wait for November and the Presidential 
election to be over with so we can all go back to work. But the normal 
attitude is not to waste time and, you see, that is exactly what is 
happening in Kosovo.
  I finally understood about the Albanians when I was in London and I 
met with one of the leaders of Parliament. He said the Albanians are 
bringing 14- and 15-year-old girls to Portsmouth and forcing them into 
prostitution. They have drugs all over England now. He said: It's the 
worst threat and problem that we have here in England. He said: I never 
thought I would ever say anything good about Milosevic, but I can sort 
of understand his problem.

  That is not to say Milosevic is a good guy, or the Albanians are all 
bad. But you generally get a feel for what is out there and what is 
going on when responsible people tell you: Look, all the Afghanistan 
drugs are coming up through Kosovo, and into Europe. Instead of keeping 
the peace, we are keeping the flow of drugs.
  The GI with any common sense is saying to himself: Where is this 
peace we have here? We have one fellow who murdered another one but we 
had to let him go in 48 hours because we only had 93 slots in the 
prison and the United Nations had not supplied a police force. The 
United Nations had not supplied a court system. The United Nations had 
not put up their money for a prison system.
  So we go right to the ultimatum. If this is diplomacy, let me quote 
none other than our friend, the former Secretary of State, Henry 
Kissinger:

       Rambouillet was not a negotiation--as is often claimed--but 
     an ultimatum. This marked an astounding departure for an 
     administration that had entered office proclaiming its 
     devotion to the UN Charter and multilateral procedures.

  And on and on.

       The transformation of Alliance from a defensive military 
     grouping into an institution prepared to impose its values by 
     force occurred in the same month that three former Soviet 
     satellites joined NATO.

  That is none other than Kissinger himself. In that light, I am glad 
we did not send Secretary Albright to Northern Ireland. We sent Senator 
George Mitchell instead. But under the Albright policy, you either 
agree by 12 o'clock midnight or we go bombing. Come on. This thing is 
afoul, amiss, and a mistake, and we don't have to wait for 25 years to 
know it. Those are my words, the words of the Senator from South 
Carolina, and not the words of the Senator from West Virginia. He will 
be glad at the first of the week--I am confident he will be in good 
shape again. He will explain it, no doubt, to everyone's satisfaction.
  We all agree on one thing. With GIs deployed on account of our 
mistakes, we are going to give them every dollar necessary, every 
benefit, every support we possibly can.
  We cannot possibly continue day in and day out in limbo with a flawed 
policy and act like it is a policy. It is a nonpolicy and a flawed 
policy and a mistaken policy. We have to somehow bring it to a head.
  How do we do that in a deliberate, tactful manner? What we say is: 
Look, get these countries of the U.N. to support it.
  Of course, we learned at the briefings that the Greeks were not for 
it in their sector. They did not like it. The French, are comme ci 
comme ca. The Soviets never were for it, and they do not adhere to us. 
NATO responds to Moscow. The Brits are pulling out. In one place they 
pulled out, 3 hours later a church was burned.
  I asked our British friends what their reason for pulling out was and 
they said they were too stretched. We are stretched, too. We have nine 
peacekeeping missions. We have Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the Congo, and 
East Timor. There are four more we are going to be asking for. The GIs 
are given a policeman's duty in a totally hostile place where one 
cannot take sides and one has to defend oneself and not act like an 
authority on keeping the peace but, by gosh, keep out of trouble.
  We are not in charge in Kosovo, nor is the U.N., nor is NATO. We have 
invaded a sovereign country without a full debate. We made that mistake 
in Vietnam. We have the feeling of responsibility. I understand the 
distinguished Senator from Arizona is very much in favor of Kosovo. I 
could have saved him 4 or 5 years in prison if I knew at the time I got 
to the Senate in 1966 that McNamara felt Vietnam was a mistake.
  Come on. Are we going to continue just because we do not want to send 
a message to Milosevic? Do my colleagues really think that Milosevic 
does not know what is going on? He has already removed the opposition 
authorities in Montenegro. If he went in there tonight, what would we 
do? Nothing. He is corralling his support. Read this week's Time 
magazine about what the Air Force did not hit. I wish my colleagues 
would get a copy and read it because it reports we were misled in that 
particular briefing about how we destroyed so many tanks, so many 
planes, so many targets; we just ruined the country.
  Our distinguished friend, the Secretary of State, said: Give peace a 
chance; it takes time to get the roads and the bridges and industry and 
the hospitals and the air fields all repaired.
  I remember a visit I had when I first came to the Senate. I was at 
the Connaught in London having dinner with Martin Agronsky who had been 
behind the lines in Northern Ireland for a 3-week period. He came out 
in despair. He said: That crowd is never going to get together.
  Fortunately, under the leadership of President Clinton and Senator 
Mitchell, there was a break last Friday, and, finally, the IRA says 
they are going to disarm, and it looks like it might work.
  For 30 years, they have had the infrastructure--the roads, the 
bridges, the hospitals, the universities. I have been to Northern 
Ireland. Some sections of Belfast have better housing than my hometown. 
With all that infrastructure, the British troops are still deployed 
years and years later.
  Is that the policy of the United States of America with our GIs? That

[[Page S3893]]

is why we rise this afternoon and are ready, willing, and able to draw 
some lines that are understandable that will develop into a firm 
policy.
  If the U.N. wants to get in there, fine, but if they are not going to 
support it, then we have a problem. I will never forget the story about 
Vaclav Havel saying he hoped Secretary Albright could come back to the 
Czech Republic, her native land, and succeed him as President. He said 
the one difficulty was that 75 percent of the people of the Czech 
Republic opposed ``Madeleine's war.''
  Take a rollcall. Go up to the U.N. See how enthused they are about 
the nonpolicy.
  Quit giving this patina of deliberation and positivity by doing 
nothing and keeping the troops out there and praying like we all do 
that no one gets assaulted or loses a life at Bonsteel. We have an 
impossible situation. It is not going to get better in the foreseeable 
future. We ought to bring it to a head and certainly let the next 
President, whomever that is, have a 6-month period to review the 
mistake we made and say: Wait a minute, it was not a mistake.

  I do not mind if they are right and I am wrong. I can tell my 
colleagues right now though, unfortunately, I think I gave the right 
vote when I opposed the Biden amendment.
  I appreciate the leadership and the conscientious approach the 
distinguished Senator from Virginia, the chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee, has given this responsibility. We are not trying to 
embarrass the President. We are not trying to take a political 
position. On the contrary, I have my GIs out there. I saw what happened 
in Vietnam, and I saw what happened in Somalia. If it had not been for 
the Byrd amendment, we could possibly still be there.
  This is a similar call to arms politically for us to set the policy 
and do so in a judicious way. We all know they want to try to subvert 
it; they do not want to talk about it. With this crowd in Washington, 
you have to be on message: Let's not talk about it because it might get 
on to the weekend shows, and if it gets on to the weekend shows, it 
might send the wrong message to Milosevic. Bah humbug to Milosevic. I 
am trying to send a message to those fellows at Bonsteel. I yield the 
floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague from 
South Carolina. I remember when I first came to the Senate 22 years 
ago, two-thirds of the Senate or more had the opportunity to serve in 
uniform. Today, there are fewer. I cast no aspersion against those who 
do not. It is just a generational thing.
  Listening to my dear friend from South Carolina, I know he draws on 
his experiences in the army in World War II as a young officer in the 
battle to free Europe when he had the responsibility of life. No one 
else but him, as an officer, had the responsibility for those young men 
under his command.
  This type of amendment we discussed--certainly I have and others--
with many veterans who have worn the uniform of this country and many 
who are on active duty today.
  The distinguished Senator said he has seen war. I saw it in the 
continental limits in World War II, and then I had a brief tour in 
Korea as a ground officer with an air wing. I saw the others who had to 
fight it, but I never put myself in the category of a combat soldier. I 
have always said my orders did not take me there, but they took the 
Senator there and he saw it.
  I know in the course of this debate, the issue will be raised: We may 
be putting the young men and women in the Armed Forces in jeopardy as a 
consequence of this amendment, even the act of filing it and debating 
it.
  I want to get into that. I am sure the Senator will rejoin in this 
debate if and when that happens.
  I see our distinguished colleague here, who is a naval veteran, who 
is about to speak. I do not know if it is on this matter or on another 
matter. It is not on this matter.
  But I am willing to join in that debate. When 23 members of the 
Appropriations Committee voted ``yea'' to put this in--and the 
distinguished Senator from South Carolina can correct me--but of that 
group who voted ``yea,'' the following have been privileged to wear the 
uniform of our country: Senator Cochran, Senator Specter, Senator 
Gorton, Senator Burns, Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Senator Daniel 
Inouye, Senator Ernest F. Hollings, Senator Herbert Kohl, and Senator 
Stevens, the chairman. They are veterans.
  Let us debate it, but let us debate it with great care.
  The letter which I put in the Record from Senator Byrd and myself 
states our point of view. This letter is just going out to Members, but 
already the following cosponsors, who likewise were veterans, have 
signed on: Senator Roberts, Senator Strom Thurmond, Senator Inhofe, 
Senator Robert Smith, and Senator Sessions. So a goodly number of those 
who have been privileged to wear the uniform of our country have joined 
behind this.
  We would not have done it, I say to the Senator, if we had had a 
moment's concern we were increasing the risk to our people. They are at 
risk today. They will be at risk tomorrow and the next day. And as we 
are drifting into this endless--endless--commitment, they are at risk 
every single day.
  This amendment simply says: Congress, either join with the President 
or state your case and bring them home. That is the purpose of this 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.

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