[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 55 (Monday, May 8, 2000)]
[House]
[Pages H2644-H2647]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
TRIBUTE TO D.C. FIRE CHIEF TOM TIPPETT
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of
January 6, 1999, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) is
recognized for 60 minutes.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, a terrible tragedy occurred
on Friday of last week. The District of Columbia fire chief resigned
his position. I have known Tom Tippett for a number of years. I have
come to respect him and admire him, as do all of those firefighters,
men and women, who serve in local 36 of the D.C. Fire Department Union.
Tom Tippett is a true firefighter. I first met him about 12 years
ago, shortly after I first came to Congress and decided to try to work
the issues involving fire and life safety in this country. To create a
better awareness among our colleagues about the role of the firefighter
in our inner-city areas, I started a tradition that each year would
take our colleagues on a volunteer basis and have them run with one of
the busiest D.C. fire stations.
Mr. Speaker, one of those nights we assigned a group of Members to
run with Tom Tippett's station, a truck company and a rescue company
that was at that time the busiest station in D.C. As Members of
Congress in their jeans and shirts, with their running gear assigned by
the Department, sat in the station talking to firefighters and
responded throughout the evening to drug dealings, shootings, emergency
trauma situations, fires, accidents, HAZMAT disasters, every kind of
incident we could think of, all of us were in awe, Democrats and
Republicans, of the job these people do every day.
Since that time, I have worked with Tom in a number of capacities. He
became the President of the local here in the District of Columbia. And
then when an opening occurred last year, he was offered the temporary
assignment of serving as the District of Columbia Fire Chief.
He did an outstanding job, Mr. Speaker. When he took over the role of
the chief, he said he would do it, but would have as his ultimate goal
the objective of improving the life safety for the firefighters who he
now had responsibility for.
{time} 2130
The safety and well-being of fire fighters and EMS personnel across
America is a major issue, Mr. Speaker. In fact, each year, we lose over
100 fire and EMS personnel, most of them volunteers, because the bulk
of our Nation's fire fighters are volunteers, in the course of their
doing their job. Over 100.
In fact, the D.C. Fire Department has lost three fire fighters within
the last 3 years. In fact, Mr. Speaker, following a fire several years
ago that took the life of one of D.C.'s finest, a fire where that life
probably should have been able to be saved, a series of recommendations
were made, recommendations following the death of fire fighter and
Sergeant John Carter.
John Carter's widow was at the press conference today where we called
for action to restore these cuts that were made to the D.C. fire
department. John Carter was a dedicated professional. He left behind a
widow and a 10-year-old son. He died in an unfortunate circumstance
that probably could have been avoided, as did two of his colleagues who
died almost 1 year ago in May of last year.
Following the death of John Carter, the Committee on Appropriations
of this body in its legislative language in last year's bill put in the
following item, and I will quote from this bill which is actually
District of Columbia Appropriations bill for the year 2000 passed in
this body on July 22, 1999. This is what it says, ``The Committee
encourages the District to provide funding for two critically important
safety measures that were developed by the fire department internal
committee following the death of Fire Fighter John Carter 2 years ago.
These safety measures include restoring the aide to the battalion chief
within the fire fighting division and increasing staffing levels to at
least five fire fighters on ladder companies.
``The mission of the fire and emergency medical services department
is to improve the quality of life to those who choose to live, work,
visit, and do business in the District of Columbia by preventing fires
before they occur, extinguish those fires that do occur, and providing
emergency medical and ambulance service.''
This was in the law that we passed last year in response to the death
of Fire Fighter Carter.
Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, last year we saw two additional deaths of
D.C. fire fighters. In fact, in a fire that occurred on May 30, 1999 at
3146 Cherry Road in Northeast, two fire fighters paid the ultimate
price, and they left their families behind.
In fact, Mr. Speaker, I came down to Washington at the request of the
local fire department along with the gentleman from Maryland (Mr.
Hoyer), and we joined the thousands of fire fighters, both locally and
nationally, who came to pay their respects to these two brave
individuals.
There was a second study done, Mr. Speaker, following this fire. I
will enter into the Record the report of that fire from the
Reconstruction Committee, as follows:
District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department--
Report From the Reconstruction Committee
regarding fire at 3146 cherry road, ne, washington, dc, on may 30, 1999
Incident Commanders need to follow the Incident Command
System and sector every incident immediately upon arrival.
This will reduce fireground confusion and allow the Incident
Commander to quickly contact sector leaders to determine the
locations of companies in their sectors.
The Safety Officer should not conduct roll calls. Instead,
a member of the Incident Command Staff (e.g., a battalion
chief aide) should conduct roll calls.
The Training Academy must conduct ongoing training and
evaluation of fire fighters and fire officers to ensure that
all Department personnel respond properly to roll calls. Roll
call training must be part of recruit training, company level
drills and training academy refresher courses.
fireground command
Problem--Command Post Location.--Battalion Fire Chief 1's
vehicle was not in a position to allow him an adequate view
of the incident. Battalion Fire Chief 1 unsuccessfully
attempted to relocate the vehicle to obtain a better view,
then left his vehicle and proceeded to the front of the
building. Battalion Fire Chief 1 never established a fixed
command post.
By leaving his vehicle, BFC-1 abandoned the stronger car-
mounted mobile radio and was forced to communicate using a
weaker portable radio. The use of a single portable radio
also caused missed messages, due to switching back and forth
between fireground and dispatch channels. In addition, it was
impossible to maintain the command chart from a roving
position.
Recommendation.--Incident Commanders must establish fixed
command posts. A fixed position allows for better
communication, tracking of companies and a better environment
for decision making. The Incident Commander should use either
his/her vehicle or another emergency vehicle that is more
suitably located for this task. The command post should allow
a view of the building that includes at least one, and
preferably two, sides. The use of a fixed command post allows
the Incidence Commander to simultaneously monitor multiple
radio channels at greater signal strength as well as access
to both mobile and portable radios.
Problem--Changing Tactics.--Extinguishing this fire
involved a change in tactics from a front to a rear oriented
attack. This change in tactics required close coordination
and communication between BFC-1 and the front and rear fire
suppression teams. Battalion Fire Chief 1 was unable to
coordinate front and rear teams because he lacked
information, particularly the location of engine company
crews.
Recommendation.--Proper management of the fireground
requires the assistance of a battalion chief's aide. This
position was restored on December 19, 1999. Department should
continue the position of battalion chief's aide and their
role includes the following: Assist in the coordination of
fireground activities; gather critical information for the
Incident Commander; allow the Incident Commander to sector
the incident sooner; handle specific tasks, such as
accountability, as directed by the Incident Commander;
improving fireground communications.
The position of battalion chief's aide is important to
fireground safety. All personnel should understand the
function of this and other command staff positions through
training in the Department's Incident Command System.
Problem--Sectoring.--Battalion Fire Chief 1 never sectored
the fire or properly used a tactical worksheet. He was
quickly overwhelmed trying to manage this escalating
incident. BFC-2 was assigned to the rear, however, he was
never assigned any companies nor were specific companies
directed to report to him.
Recommendation--Incident Commanders must follow the
Department's Incident Command System procedures on sectoring
an incident and use command charts at all incidents. Sectors
must be established in the early stages of all emergency
incidents. Sector leaders must be assigned companies for
[[Page H2645]]
which they are responsible. Sector leaders must give progress
reports to the Incident Commander every five minutes or more
frequently, as necessary. The Department must ensure that all
officers are trained to serve as sector leaders.
Mandatory use of sector assignments will reduce the risk of
exceeding the span-of-control and increase the Incident
Commander's effectiveness. Command Staff should also be
increased to facilitate the sectoring process. Restoration of
the battalion chief's aide will also help alleviate this
problem.
Problem--EMS Command.--The EMS Supervisor established a
separate EMS command structure at this incident.
Recommendation--EMS operations must be incorporated into
the overall fireground operational plan as a sector that
reports to the Incident Commander.
Problem--Mobile Command Unit.--It was too long into the
incident before the Mobile Command Unit arrived on the scene.
Consequently, the command process was hindered because the
additional resources afforded by the Mobile Command Unit were
not available.
Recommendation--The Mobile Command Unit should respond
automatically to any incident that the DFC responds or if
requested by the Incident Commander.
communications
Problem--Relaying Important Information.--After the Box
Alarm was dispatched, Communications Division received an
additional phone call, correcting the incident address and
reporting that the fire was in the basement. This information
was announced on the Fire Channel 1 at the end of a long
transmission. Few companies heard this message and the
information was not properly acknowledged. Acknowledgment was
only received from E-26 on the address change information.
Recommendation--Communications must follow the established
SOPs for relaying pertinent information. Communications
Division must require that all responding units acknowledge
all pertinent information.
The Department should also conduct a thorough evaluation of
the Communications Division to ensure that its operations
meet the Department's needs. Such an evaluation must also
include recommendations to improve the Communications
Division's performance during emergency incidents.
Problem--Size-up Reports.--There was no size-up report from
the rear. As a result, personnel did not have a description
of the building and the conditions found. Also, BFC-1 and
company officers did not request important information, which
caused them to act without sufficient information.
Recommendation--Company officers must be trained to give
immediate and accurate size-up reports at every incident.
Company officers must receive ongoing training in effective
fireground communication and SOPs. In addition, Incident
Commanders and company officers must be trained to request
information, such as size-up progress reports, in the absence
of this information. The use of Battalion Chief's Aides
greatly improves size-up information.
Problem--Progress Reports.--The officers from E-26 and E-10
made no radio transmissions during their initial attack, nor
did they give progress reports. These companies did not
respond to repeated attempts by BFC-1 to contact them by
radio. As a result, BFC-1 was not fully aware of the interior
conditions or the location of these companies in the
building. Accordingly, Battalion Fire Chief 1 delayed a rear
fire attack out of concern for the safety of these interior
crews.
Company officers were unable to hear all radio
transmissions at all times. It is likely that the inability
of some officers to hear radio transmissions was due in part
to the position of the portable radios of the officers. This
contributed to the poor communications at this incident.
Recommendation--The Incident Commander must be aware of the
location, activities and conditions encountered by the
companies at an incident. Department SOPs for the Incident
Command System requires that companies provide regular
progress reports to the Incident Commander. The Department
must train personnel through inservice drills and annual
training and enforce the existing SOPs for communications at
all emergency incidents.
Speaker microphones should be used or radio pockets should
be added to the Department's turnout clothing specification
to improve effectiveness of radio transmissions.
Problem--Deteriorating Conditions.--During rescue
operations, personnel noticed that the living room floor was
deteriorating, becoming spongy and sloping. This critical
information was not relayed to BFC-1.
Recommendation--Personnel must be trained to immediately
relay any information about deteriorating structural
integrity of fire buildings to the Incident Commander.
Problem--Radio Interference.--Fire Channel 1 (154.190MHz)
and Fire Channel 4 (154.205MHz) are too close in frequency,
creating interference when either channel is operated
simultaneously. The Channel 4 radio transcript shows many
unintelligible transmissions and microphone clicks that could
not be identified. Fireground personnel may have missed
important Channel 4 transmissions when Channel 1 was active.
Identical problems were documented during the Kennedy Street
reconstruction.
Recommendation--As a short term solution, the Department
should replace Fire Channel 4 with Fire Channel 2 as the
fireground channel. There should be a minimum bandwidth
separation of at least 25 MHz between fire channels. There is
an insufficient bandwidth separation between Fire Channels 1
and 4 to ensure clear communications capability. Fire Channel
2 is a significantly stronger frequency compared to Fire
Channel 4 due to greater bandwidth separation. Fire Channel 2
is currently used by fire units responding on medical calls.
Replacing Fire Channel 4 with Fire Channel 2 will not
eliminate the problem of insufficient bandwidth separation.
Rather, it will shift the communication problems from fire
units responding on fire calls to fire units responding on
medical calls. EMS units will not be affected by this change
because they use a different communications system.
Problem--Truck Company Staffing.--Current staffing of the
Department's truck companies is inadequate. Working fires
require truck company members to perform more work tasks then
can be accomplished by four fire fighters in a timely manner.
At this incident, improper and insufficient ventilation by
truck companies was a critical factor contributing to the
deaths and injuries. Other operational deficiencies include
the following: Aerial ladders were not raised to the roof of
the townhouses, even though it was possible to do so. An
insufficient number of ground ladders were placed on both the
front and rear of the structure. Truck companies did not turn
off the gas or electric utilities at the fire building.
Although not a factor in this incident, this certainly could
have been catastrophic.
In part, the failure of truck companies in completing
assigned operations resulted from truck company officers
performing fire fighter tasks as well as the role of officer.
Management of their companies was, necessarily, a secondary
consideration to the primary task of carrying out vital fire
fighter operations, such as placing ladders, ventilation, and
forcible entry.
Recommendation--The Department must properly staff and
train truck companies to ensure that vital fireground
operations are accomplished in a timely manner. Truck
companies must be staffed with a minimum of 5 or 6 fire
fighters. Such a staffing level is nationally recognized by
NFPA 1710, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of
Fire Suppression, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special
Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments
(scheduled for adoption May 2001), for all jurisdictions with
tactical hazards, high-hazard occupancies, high incident
frequencies, or geographical restrictions. This applies to
all fire responses in the District of Columbia. Restoration
of such staffing levels on truck companies will allow truck
company officers to properly manage the overall operation of
their company and ensure that critical tasks are
accomplished. Note: December 1999, the Department restored
truck company staffing to 4 fire fighters and an officer.
Safety
Problem--Integrated PASS Devices.--Fire Fighter Phillips
wore an SCBA with an integrated PASS device that was
automatically activated. Fire Fighter Matthews wore a
manually activated PASS device, which he did not activate.
Department personnel who entered the building in search of a
missing fire fighter reported that they were able to rapidly
locate F/F Phillips because they heard his PASS alarm. They
were not able to locate F/F Matthews as quickly because his
PASS device was not activated. In later interviews, the
majority of fire fighters with manually activated PASS
devices reported that they had not activated their devices
before entering the building.
Recommendation--The Department must maintain SCBA units
with integrated PASS devices for all fire fighters. Note: In
December 1999, the Department provided every on duty fire
fighter and officer with an SCBA with integrated PASS device.
Mr. Speaker, I will again quote from this report, although the text
of it as I provided will be entered into the Record. But these are the
recommendations that were made following two additional deaths of D.C.
fire fighters. ``Proper management of the fireground requires the
assistance of a battalion chief's aid. This position was restored on
December 19, 1999'' at Chief Tippett's request. The ``Department should
continue the position of battalion chief's aide and their role includes
the following: Assist in the coordination of fireground activities,
gather critical information for the incident commander, allow the
incident commander to sector the incident sooner, handle specific
tasks, such as accountability, as directed by the incident commander,
improving fireground communications.
``The position of battalion chief's aide is important to fireground
safety.''
Now, that was an internal recommendation of the D.C. Fire Department
over the past year following the investigation of the cause of the
death of these two fire fighters.
The report goes on to say, ``The use of battalion chief's aides
greatly improves size-up information.''
[[Page H2646]]
On the staffing issue, this same report says the following, ``Current
staffing of the Department's truck companies is inadequate. Working
fires require truck company members to perform more work tasks than can
be accomplished by four fire fighters in a timely manner.'' It goes on
to say, ``Recommendation'', ``Truck companies must be staffed with a
minimum of 5 or 6 fire fighters. Such a staffing level is nationally
recognized by'' the National Fire Protection Association 1710. It goes
on to say, ``This applies to all fire responses in the District of
Columbia.''
Now, Mr. Speaker, here we have the Congress and the internal
investigative arm of the District of Columbia on the record within the
last year saying that we should increase the number of fire fighters on
truck companies to five and that we should reinstate these aides to the
battalion chief incident commander on the scene of a disaster in the
District of Columbia.
The new fire chief put into a temporary position last year, Chief Tom
Tippett, when he was sworn in said that he would protect the lives of
those who he was charged to lead. The mayor supported Chief Tippett in
that declaration, as did this Congress. That is exactly what Chief
Tippett did.
Because there was not enough funding in the District of Columbia
budget, he used money from the reserve account for overtime and excess
dollars that he could find within the D.C. Fire Department budget to
increase the staffing level and bring in these aides. So over the past
several months, the District of Columbia has had better protection.
Unfortunately, it came to a showdown that ended in a very unfortunate
decision last Friday. See, Mr. Speaker, the oversight authority for the
District of Columbia, the Financial Responsibility and Management
Assistance Authority, headed by former Clinton OMB director Alice
Rivlin, told the mayor that they could not continue to fund these
positions. Even though Chief Tippett found the money within his own
budget allocation when he went back in for a reprogramming to complete
this fiscal year, which amounted to over a million dollars, the
oversight commission said no.
The mayor supported the chief; and to his credit, Mayor Williams said
the chief is correct. D.C. fire fighters do not deserve to be treated
as second-class citizens. They protect the Congress. They protect the
American people. They protect the White House. They will be out there
on the streets this coming Sunday when hundreds of thousands of moms
march on Washington. They were there a few short weeks ago when
thousands demonstrated in support of gay rights. They are here every
week when thousands and tens of thousands of citizens from all over
this country come to our city.
The fire department responds to medical emergencies, fires,
disasters, and other problems that confront this city every day.
Chief Tippett did what he said he would do. He increased the funding
to allow that support to take place for the D.C. Fire Department. Alice
Rivlin and her oversight board laid down an ultimatum and told the
mayor and the chief, ``We will not support your increased funding.''
Even though the proposed budget for the District of Columbia for the
next fiscal year contained an additional $6 million to fund these
initiatives, the oversight board said it would not provide the
emergency funding to complete the rest of this fiscal year, which would
have totaled somewhere less than $4 million.
When Chief Tippett was backed into a corner after having given his
word, which unfortunately many in politics do not abide by, but that
members of the fire service do abide by their word, Chief Tippett did
what he felt was the honorable thing. On Friday afternoon of last week,
he resigned. He stepped down from his office because he felt that he
could not justify nor guarantee the safety of the D.C. fire fighters.
Mr. Speaker, I can tell my colleagues that there are at least three
other next in line officers who were approached about taking the
interim position of D.C. fire chief, and they refused. They refused
because of this common bond of honor between all the fire fighters in
this city and nationwide.
In fact, Mr. Speaker, the irony of this whole incident is that last
Wednesday evening in Washington, for the 12th time, we had over 2,000
leaders of the American fire and EMS community come to Washington for a
celebration of our domestic defenders, our American heroes, our fire
and emergency service providers, volunteers and paid.
Yet 2 days later, Chief Tippett has to resign because of a short-
sighted decision made by a pencil-pushing budget cutter overseeing a
budget in excess of $2 billion that could not find $4 million to help
this city to be properly protected.
Mr. Speaker, within the last 3 years, three D.C. Fire fighters have
given their lives. These fire fighters were burned. In fact, there were
a couple at the fire station today on New Jersey Avenue when we had a
press conference who did live who were burned. These are not pencil
pushers. These are men and women who every day in this city, as their
brothers and sisters do across America, respond to every type of
disaster that one can think of: bomb threats, explosions, stabbings,
drug dealings, because the emergency response community in this city is
the D.C. Fire and Emergency Services Department. Yet tonight, Mr.
Speaker, those in D.C. are less protected. Those who protect the people
of D.C., the brave fire fighters and EMS personnel, are more at risk.
Mr. Speaker, today, at a press conference in front of the fire
station on New Jersey Avenue and in this room tonight, I call for the
resignation of Alice Rivlin. Anyone who is as short-sighted as she must
be, to deny a $4 million request, which I, as a Republican, will
aggressively support in this body, out of a budget in excess of $2
billion to help guarantee the safety of fire fighters and EMS personnel
in this city, in my opinion, is not fit to be the director of the
oversight management authority for this the District of Columbia.
Either she restores the funding or she herself should resign. As I
said today, Mr. Speaker, let her take the money that she makes and the
staff that supports her and give that to the D.C. Fire Department. The
people of D.C. would be safer if that money were being used to protect
them and the people who visit this city.
But, Mr. Speaker, I want to go one step further, because Alice Rivlin
is the hand-picked choice of this administration. Now, President
Clinton and Vice President Al Gore talk a good game when it comes to
supporting the Nation's fire fighters. In fact, Al Gore should talk a
good game because it was the International Association of Fire Fighters
who endorsed the candidacy of the Vice President before any other union
in America.
Mr. Speaker, I ask myself where is the voice of the Vice President
calling for the safety of these fire fighters? Where is his outrage
that a former hand-picked senior manager of this administration would
make such a disastrous decision? Yet, no word would come out of this
administration about the impending problems for the safety and well-
being of both the fire fighters, the emergency medical personnel, and
the people who work and live in D.C.
Besides calling for the resignation of Alice Rivlin, I have today and
I am again asking and requesting and demanding that the Vice President
of the United States say something about the absolutely outrageous
action that was taken by the oversight board to deny Chief Tippett's
recommendations. If he does not respond, then I hope every union IAFF
member in D.C. and around the country understands that that silence
speaks louder than any words. We are talking about the safety of the
men and women who protect this city.
Mr. Speaker, 5 years ago, under a different administration, the New
Jersey Avenue fire station was closed down, the station that protects
this Capitol. The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) and I fought that
decision and got on this floor and tried to pass legislation to restore
the funding to keep that station operational. We were unsuccessful.
Five years later, a few short months ago, that New Jersey Avenue
station was reopened. I could not make the reopening, but the gentleman
from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) did, and he deserves much credit for his
support in helping that station be reopened.
Within the first 30 days of their operation, they responded to 325
calls on Capitol Hill, 325 calls in 1 month, 30
[[Page H2647]]
days. Prior to that, those calls had to be answered by distance
stations traveling much further to reach this Hill to take care of the
citizens of America who visit and work here.
{time} 2145
Today we have to respond to a different call. Chief Tippett, a brave
and honorable man, gave up his profession on Friday based on principle.
Now it is time for this Congress, Members from both sides of the aisle,
to stand with Chief Tippett on principle.
Now, there are many of our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, who are railing
about support for the fire service, about whether or not one is for
this bill or for that bill; whether or not one is for this amendment or
that amendment. Well, here is the chance for all our colleagues to join
together this week and demand that the D.C. Oversight Board do the
right thing and provide the additional $4 million for these brave men
and women to protect this city and the people who live and work here,
but more importantly to protect the lives of the fire and EMS personnel
themselves.
It would be absolutely tragic, Mr. Speaker, if another incident like
3146 Cherry Road, Northeast, took place and additional D.C.
firefighters were put at risk or, heaven forbid, lost their lives. All
of us, Democrats and Republicans, must speak out and speak out loud and
in a very clear and coherent voice.
Mr. Speaker, just a few short weeks ago tens of thousands of
firefighters were joined by the President of the United States and the
Vice President as they traveled to Worcester, Massachusetts, to join
with all of us as we mourned the loss of six firefighters who were
killed during the course of their assignment. They made the supreme
sacrifice, just as the three D.C. firefighters did in the last 3 years.
Mr. Speaker, words are critical to console the families of those when
a loved one is lost, as we all did when those six Worcester
firefighters were killed. Where is the voice of those people today,
before an additional D.C. firefighter is killed? Where is the voice of
the President today? Where is the voice of the Vice President today?
And where is the support for Alice Rivlin and the Oversight Board for
the additional risks that are being put on those firefighters because
they are not being adequately staffed and not being supported to
respond to the incidences they have to face in this city?
Mr. Speaker, I hold those officials accountable. And I encourage all
of our colleagues to join with me and to join with the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), who went to the New Jersey fire station today,
before I did, to state unequivocally that we will support the funding,
but we want a decision made now. Not next week, not next month, not
next year, but now, to restore the full support that Chief Tippett
asked for. And we also want Chief Tippett back in that job.
Because, as I told the mayor 3 months ago when he began his search
for his chief, when I called him on the telephone, I said, ``Mayor, you
know you have a good man there. Your interim chief.'' He said,
``Congressman, I agree with you.'' I said, ``He deserves to be the
chief.'' And he said, ``I agree with you.'' As I sat next to the mayor
last June, as we had this memorial ceremony for those two firefighters
that were killed here in D.C., he said, ``You know, Congressman, my top
priority as the mayor is to guarantee the safety of our emergency
service workers.''
The mayor is then on our side. The chief is on our side. The director
of public safety for the city is on our side. Where is Alice Rivlin?
Where is the oversight board? Where is the White House? And where is
Mr. Gore with his IAFF endorsement? What is he doing to help protect
the lives of these D.C. firefighters?
____________________