[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 55 (Monday, May 8, 2000)]
[House]
[Pages H2644-H2647]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                 TRIBUTE TO D.C. FIRE CHIEF TOM TIPPETT

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of 
January 6, 1999, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) is 
recognized for 60 minutes.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, a terrible tragedy occurred 
on Friday of last week. The District of Columbia fire chief resigned 
his position. I have known Tom Tippett for a number of years. I have 
come to respect him and admire him, as do all of those firefighters, 
men and women, who serve in local 36 of the D.C. Fire Department Union.
  Tom Tippett is a true firefighter. I first met him about 12 years 
ago, shortly after I first came to Congress and decided to try to work 
the issues involving fire and life safety in this country. To create a 
better awareness among our colleagues about the role of the firefighter 
in our inner-city areas, I started a tradition that each year would 
take our colleagues on a volunteer basis and have them run with one of 
the busiest D.C. fire stations.
  Mr. Speaker, one of those nights we assigned a group of Members to 
run with Tom Tippett's station, a truck company and a rescue company 
that was at that time the busiest station in D.C. As Members of 
Congress in their jeans and shirts, with their running gear assigned by 
the Department, sat in the station talking to firefighters and 
responded throughout the evening to drug dealings, shootings, emergency 
trauma situations, fires, accidents, HAZMAT disasters, every kind of 
incident we could think of, all of us were in awe, Democrats and 
Republicans, of the job these people do every day.
  Since that time, I have worked with Tom in a number of capacities. He 
became the President of the local here in the District of Columbia. And 
then when an opening occurred last year, he was offered the temporary 
assignment of serving as the District of Columbia Fire Chief.
  He did an outstanding job, Mr. Speaker. When he took over the role of 
the chief, he said he would do it, but would have as his ultimate goal 
the objective of improving the life safety for the firefighters who he 
now had responsibility for.

                              {time}  2130

  The safety and well-being of fire fighters and EMS personnel across 
America is a major issue, Mr. Speaker. In fact, each year, we lose over 
100 fire and EMS personnel, most of them volunteers, because the bulk 
of our Nation's fire fighters are volunteers, in the course of their 
doing their job. Over 100.
  In fact, the D.C. Fire Department has lost three fire fighters within 
the last 3 years. In fact, Mr. Speaker, following a fire several years 
ago that took the life of one of D.C.'s finest, a fire where that life 
probably should have been able to be saved, a series of recommendations 
were made, recommendations following the death of fire fighter and 
Sergeant John Carter.
  John Carter's widow was at the press conference today where we called 
for action to restore these cuts that were made to the D.C. fire 
department. John Carter was a dedicated professional. He left behind a 
widow and a 10-year-old son. He died in an unfortunate circumstance 
that probably could have been avoided, as did two of his colleagues who 
died almost 1 year ago in May of last year.
  Following the death of John Carter, the Committee on Appropriations 
of this body in its legislative language in last year's bill put in the 
following item, and I will quote from this bill which is actually 
District of Columbia Appropriations bill for the year 2000 passed in 
this body on July 22, 1999. This is what it says, ``The Committee 
encourages the District to provide funding for two critically important 
safety measures that were developed by the fire department internal 
committee following the death of Fire Fighter John Carter 2 years ago. 
These safety measures include restoring the aide to the battalion chief 
within the fire fighting division and increasing staffing levels to at 
least five fire fighters on ladder companies.
  ``The mission of the fire and emergency medical services department 
is to improve the quality of life to those who choose to live, work, 
visit, and do business in the District of Columbia by preventing fires 
before they occur, extinguish those fires that do occur, and providing 
emergency medical and ambulance service.''
  This was in the law that we passed last year in response to the death 
of Fire Fighter Carter.
  Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, last year we saw two additional deaths of 
D.C. fire fighters. In fact, in a fire that occurred on May 30, 1999 at 
3146 Cherry Road in Northeast, two fire fighters paid the ultimate 
price, and they left their families behind.
  In fact, Mr. Speaker, I came down to Washington at the request of the 
local fire department along with the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. 
Hoyer), and we joined the thousands of fire fighters, both locally and 
nationally, who came to pay their respects to these two brave 
individuals.
  There was a second study done, Mr. Speaker, following this fire. I 
will enter into the Record the report of that fire from the 
Reconstruction Committee, as follows:

 District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department--
                Report From the Reconstruction Committee


regarding fire at 3146 cherry road, ne, washington, dc, on may 30, 1999

       Incident Commanders need to follow the Incident Command 
     System and sector every incident immediately upon arrival. 
     This will reduce fireground confusion and allow the Incident 
     Commander to quickly contact sector leaders to determine the 
     locations of companies in their sectors.
       The Safety Officer should not conduct roll calls. Instead, 
     a member of the Incident Command Staff (e.g., a battalion 
     chief aide) should conduct roll calls.
       The Training Academy must conduct ongoing training and 
     evaluation of fire fighters and fire officers to ensure that 
     all Department personnel respond properly to roll calls. Roll 
     call training must be part of recruit training, company level 
     drills and training academy refresher courses.


                           fireground command

       Problem--Command Post Location.--Battalion Fire Chief 1's 
     vehicle was not in a position to allow him an adequate view 
     of the incident. Battalion Fire Chief 1 unsuccessfully 
     attempted to relocate the vehicle to obtain a better view, 
     then left his vehicle and proceeded to the front of the 
     building. Battalion Fire Chief 1 never established a fixed 
     command post.
       By leaving his vehicle, BFC-1 abandoned the stronger car-
     mounted mobile radio and was forced to communicate using a 
     weaker portable radio. The use of a single portable radio 
     also caused missed messages, due to switching back and forth 
     between fireground and dispatch channels. In addition, it was 
     impossible to maintain the command chart from a roving 
     position.
       Recommendation.--Incident Commanders must establish fixed 
     command posts. A fixed position allows for better 
     communication, tracking of companies and a better environment 
     for decision making. The Incident Commander should use either 
     his/her vehicle or another emergency vehicle that is more 
     suitably located for this task. The command post should allow 
     a view of the building that includes at least one, and 
     preferably two, sides. The use of a fixed command post allows 
     the Incidence Commander to simultaneously monitor multiple 
     radio channels at greater signal strength as well as access 
     to both mobile and portable radios.
       Problem--Changing Tactics.--Extinguishing this fire 
     involved a change in tactics from a front to a rear oriented 
     attack. This change in tactics required close coordination 
     and communication between BFC-1 and the front and rear fire 
     suppression teams. Battalion Fire Chief 1 was unable to 
     coordinate front and rear teams because he lacked 
     information, particularly the location of engine company 
     crews.
       Recommendation.--Proper management of the fireground 
     requires the assistance of a battalion chief's aide. This 
     position was restored on December 19, 1999. Department should 
     continue the position of battalion chief's aide and their 
     role includes the following: Assist in the coordination of 
     fireground activities; gather critical information for the 
     Incident Commander; allow the Incident Commander to sector 
     the incident sooner; handle specific tasks, such as 
     accountability, as directed by the Incident Commander; 
     improving fireground communications.
       The position of battalion chief's aide is important to 
     fireground safety. All personnel should understand the 
     function of this and other command staff positions through 
     training in the Department's Incident Command System.
       Problem--Sectoring.--Battalion Fire Chief 1 never sectored 
     the fire or properly used a tactical worksheet. He was 
     quickly overwhelmed trying to manage this escalating 
     incident. BFC-2 was assigned to the rear, however, he was 
     never assigned any companies nor were specific companies 
     directed to report to him.
       Recommendation--Incident Commanders must follow the 
     Department's Incident Command System procedures on sectoring 
     an incident and use command charts at all incidents. Sectors 
     must be established in the early stages of all emergency 
     incidents. Sector leaders must be assigned companies for

[[Page H2645]]

     which they are responsible. Sector leaders must give progress 
     reports to the Incident Commander every five minutes or more 
     frequently, as necessary. The Department must ensure that all 
     officers are trained to serve as sector leaders.
       Mandatory use of sector assignments will reduce the risk of 
     exceeding the span-of-control and increase the Incident 
     Commander's effectiveness. Command Staff should also be 
     increased to facilitate the sectoring process. Restoration of 
     the battalion chief's aide will also help alleviate this 
     problem.
       Problem--EMS Command.--The EMS Supervisor established a 
     separate EMS command structure at this incident.
       Recommendation--EMS operations must be incorporated into 
     the overall fireground operational plan as a sector that 
     reports to the Incident Commander.
       Problem--Mobile Command Unit.--It was too long into the 
     incident before the Mobile Command Unit arrived on the scene. 
     Consequently, the command process was hindered because the 
     additional resources afforded by the Mobile Command Unit were 
     not available.
       Recommendation--The Mobile Command Unit should respond 
     automatically to any incident that the DFC responds or if 
     requested by the Incident Commander.


                             communications

       Problem--Relaying Important Information.--After the Box 
     Alarm was dispatched, Communications Division received an 
     additional phone call, correcting the incident address and 
     reporting that the fire was in the basement. This information 
     was announced on the Fire Channel 1 at the end of a long 
     transmission. Few companies heard this message and the 
     information was not properly acknowledged. Acknowledgment was 
     only received from E-26 on the address change information.
       Recommendation--Communications must follow the established 
     SOPs for relaying pertinent information. Communications 
     Division must require that all responding units acknowledge 
     all pertinent information.
       The Department should also conduct a thorough evaluation of 
     the Communications Division to ensure that its operations 
     meet the Department's needs. Such an evaluation must also 
     include recommendations to improve the Communications 
     Division's performance during emergency incidents.
       Problem--Size-up Reports.--There was no size-up report from 
     the rear. As a result, personnel did not have a description 
     of the building and the conditions found. Also, BFC-1 and 
     company officers did not request important information, which 
     caused them to act without sufficient information.
       Recommendation--Company officers must be trained to give 
     immediate and accurate size-up reports at every incident. 
     Company officers must receive ongoing training in effective 
     fireground communication and SOPs. In addition, Incident 
     Commanders and company officers must be trained to request 
     information, such as size-up progress reports, in the absence 
     of this information. The use of Battalion Chief's Aides 
     greatly improves size-up information.
       Problem--Progress Reports.--The officers from E-26 and E-10 
     made no radio transmissions during their initial attack, nor 
     did they give progress reports. These companies did not 
     respond to repeated attempts by BFC-1 to contact them by 
     radio. As a result, BFC-1 was not fully aware of the interior 
     conditions or the location of these companies in the 
     building. Accordingly, Battalion Fire Chief 1 delayed a rear 
     fire attack out of concern for the safety of these interior 
     crews.
       Company officers were unable to hear all radio 
     transmissions at all times. It is likely that the inability 
     of some officers to hear radio transmissions was due in part 
     to the position of the portable radios of the officers. This 
     contributed to the poor communications at this incident.
       Recommendation--The Incident Commander must be aware of the 
     location, activities and conditions encountered by the 
     companies at an incident. Department SOPs for the Incident 
     Command System requires that companies provide regular 
     progress reports to the Incident Commander. The Department 
     must train personnel through inservice drills and annual 
     training and enforce the existing SOPs for communications at 
     all emergency incidents.
       Speaker microphones should be used or radio pockets should 
     be added to the Department's turnout clothing specification 
     to improve effectiveness of radio transmissions.
       Problem--Deteriorating Conditions.--During rescue 
     operations, personnel noticed that the living room floor was 
     deteriorating, becoming spongy and sloping. This critical 
     information was not relayed to BFC-1.
       Recommendation--Personnel must be trained to immediately 
     relay any information about deteriorating structural 
     integrity of fire buildings to the Incident Commander.
       Problem--Radio Interference.--Fire Channel 1 (154.190MHz) 
     and Fire Channel 4 (154.205MHz) are too close in frequency, 
     creating interference when either channel is operated 
     simultaneously. The Channel 4 radio transcript shows many 
     unintelligible transmissions and microphone clicks that could 
     not be identified. Fireground personnel may have missed 
     important Channel 4 transmissions when Channel 1 was active. 
     Identical problems were documented during the Kennedy Street 
     reconstruction.
       Recommendation--As a short term solution, the Department 
     should replace Fire Channel 4 with Fire Channel 2 as the 
     fireground channel. There should be a minimum bandwidth 
     separation of at least 25 MHz between fire channels. There is 
     an insufficient bandwidth separation between Fire Channels 1 
     and 4 to ensure clear communications capability. Fire Channel 
     2 is a significantly stronger frequency compared to Fire 
     Channel 4 due to greater bandwidth separation. Fire Channel 2 
     is currently used by fire units responding on medical calls.
       Replacing Fire Channel 4 with Fire Channel 2 will not 
     eliminate the problem of insufficient bandwidth separation. 
     Rather, it will shift the communication problems from fire 
     units responding on fire calls to fire units responding on 
     medical calls. EMS units will not be affected by this change 
     because they use a different communications system.
       Problem--Truck Company Staffing.--Current staffing of the 
     Department's truck companies is inadequate. Working fires 
     require truck company members to perform more work tasks then 
     can be accomplished by four fire fighters in a timely manner. 
     At this incident, improper and insufficient ventilation by 
     truck companies was a critical factor contributing to the 
     deaths and injuries. Other operational deficiencies include 
     the following: Aerial ladders were not raised to the roof of 
     the townhouses, even though it was possible to do so. An 
     insufficient number of ground ladders were placed on both the 
     front and rear of the structure. Truck companies did not turn 
     off the gas or electric utilities at the fire building. 
     Although not a factor in this incident, this certainly could 
     have been catastrophic.
       In part, the failure of truck companies in completing 
     assigned operations resulted from truck company officers 
     performing fire fighter tasks as well as the role of officer. 
     Management of their companies was, necessarily, a secondary 
     consideration to the primary task of carrying out vital fire 
     fighter operations, such as placing ladders, ventilation, and 
     forcible entry.
       Recommendation--The Department must properly staff and 
     train truck companies to ensure that vital fireground 
     operations are accomplished in a timely manner. Truck 
     companies must be staffed with a minimum of 5 or 6 fire 
     fighters. Such a staffing level is nationally recognized by 
     NFPA 1710, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of 
     Fire Suppression, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special 
     Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments 
     (scheduled for adoption May 2001), for all jurisdictions with 
     tactical hazards, high-hazard occupancies, high incident 
     frequencies, or geographical restrictions. This applies to 
     all fire responses in the District of Columbia. Restoration 
     of such staffing levels on truck companies will allow truck 
     company officers to properly manage the overall operation of 
     their company and ensure that critical tasks are 
     accomplished. Note: December 1999, the Department restored 
     truck company staffing to 4 fire fighters and an officer.


                                 Safety

       Problem--Integrated PASS Devices.--Fire Fighter Phillips 
     wore an SCBA with an integrated PASS device that was 
     automatically activated. Fire Fighter Matthews wore a 
     manually activated PASS device, which he did not activate. 
     Department personnel who entered the building in search of a 
     missing fire fighter reported that they were able to rapidly 
     locate F/F Phillips because they heard his PASS alarm. They 
     were not able to locate F/F Matthews as quickly because his 
     PASS device was not activated. In later interviews, the 
     majority of fire fighters with manually activated PASS 
     devices reported that they had not activated their devices 
     before entering the building.
       Recommendation--The Department must maintain SCBA units 
     with integrated PASS devices for all fire fighters. Note: In 
     December 1999, the Department provided every on duty fire 
     fighter and officer with an SCBA with integrated PASS device.

  Mr. Speaker, I will again quote from this report, although the text 
of it as I provided will be entered into the Record. But these are the 
recommendations that were made following two additional deaths of D.C. 
fire fighters. ``Proper management of the fireground requires the 
assistance of a battalion chief's aid. This position was restored on 
December 19, 1999'' at Chief Tippett's request. The ``Department should 
continue the position of battalion chief's aide and their role includes 
the following: Assist in the coordination of fireground activities, 
gather critical information for the incident commander, allow the 
incident commander to sector the incident sooner, handle specific 
tasks, such as accountability, as directed by the incident commander, 
improving fireground communications.
  ``The position of battalion chief's aide is important to fireground 
safety.''
  Now, that was an internal recommendation of the D.C. Fire Department 
over the past year following the investigation of the cause of the 
death of these two fire fighters.
  The report goes on to say, ``The use of battalion chief's aides 
greatly improves size-up information.''

[[Page H2646]]

  On the staffing issue, this same report says the following, ``Current 
staffing of the Department's truck companies is inadequate. Working 
fires require truck company members to perform more work tasks than can 
be accomplished by four fire fighters in a timely manner.'' It goes on 
to say, ``Recommendation'', ``Truck companies must be staffed with a 
minimum of 5 or 6 fire fighters. Such a staffing level is nationally 
recognized by'' the National Fire Protection Association 1710. It goes 
on to say, ``This applies to all fire responses in the District of 
Columbia.''
  Now, Mr. Speaker, here we have the Congress and the internal 
investigative arm of the District of Columbia on the record within the 
last year saying that we should increase the number of fire fighters on 
truck companies to five and that we should reinstate these aides to the 
battalion chief incident commander on the scene of a disaster in the 
District of Columbia.
  The new fire chief put into a temporary position last year, Chief Tom 
Tippett, when he was sworn in said that he would protect the lives of 
those who he was charged to lead. The mayor supported Chief Tippett in 
that declaration, as did this Congress. That is exactly what Chief 
Tippett did.
  Because there was not enough funding in the District of Columbia 
budget, he used money from the reserve account for overtime and excess 
dollars that he could find within the D.C. Fire Department budget to 
increase the staffing level and bring in these aides. So over the past 
several months, the District of Columbia has had better protection.
  Unfortunately, it came to a showdown that ended in a very unfortunate 
decision last Friday. See, Mr. Speaker, the oversight authority for the 
District of Columbia, the Financial Responsibility and Management 
Assistance Authority, headed by former Clinton OMB director Alice 
Rivlin, told the mayor that they could not continue to fund these 
positions. Even though Chief Tippett found the money within his own 
budget allocation when he went back in for a reprogramming to complete 
this fiscal year, which amounted to over a million dollars, the 
oversight commission said no.
  The mayor supported the chief; and to his credit, Mayor Williams said 
the chief is correct. D.C. fire fighters do not deserve to be treated 
as second-class citizens. They protect the Congress. They protect the 
American people. They protect the White House. They will be out there 
on the streets this coming Sunday when hundreds of thousands of moms 
march on Washington. They were there a few short weeks ago when 
thousands demonstrated in support of gay rights. They are here every 
week when thousands and tens of thousands of citizens from all over 
this country come to our city.
  The fire department responds to medical emergencies, fires, 
disasters, and other problems that confront this city every day.
  Chief Tippett did what he said he would do. He increased the funding 
to allow that support to take place for the D.C. Fire Department. Alice 
Rivlin and her oversight board laid down an ultimatum and told the 
mayor and the chief, ``We will not support your increased funding.'' 
Even though the proposed budget for the District of Columbia for the 
next fiscal year contained an additional $6 million to fund these 
initiatives, the oversight board said it would not provide the 
emergency funding to complete the rest of this fiscal year, which would 
have totaled somewhere less than $4 million.
  When Chief Tippett was backed into a corner after having given his 
word, which unfortunately many in politics do not abide by, but that 
members of the fire service do abide by their word, Chief Tippett did 
what he felt was the honorable thing. On Friday afternoon of last week, 
he resigned. He stepped down from his office because he felt that he 
could not justify nor guarantee the safety of the D.C. fire fighters.

  Mr. Speaker, I can tell my colleagues that there are at least three 
other next in line officers who were approached about taking the 
interim position of D.C. fire chief, and they refused. They refused 
because of this common bond of honor between all the fire fighters in 
this city and nationwide.
  In fact, Mr. Speaker, the irony of this whole incident is that last 
Wednesday evening in Washington, for the 12th time, we had over 2,000 
leaders of the American fire and EMS community come to Washington for a 
celebration of our domestic defenders, our American heroes, our fire 
and emergency service providers, volunteers and paid.
  Yet 2 days later, Chief Tippett has to resign because of a short-
sighted decision made by a pencil-pushing budget cutter overseeing a 
budget in excess of $2 billion that could not find $4 million to help 
this city to be properly protected.
  Mr. Speaker, within the last 3 years, three D.C. Fire fighters have 
given their lives. These fire fighters were burned. In fact, there were 
a couple at the fire station today on New Jersey Avenue when we had a 
press conference who did live who were burned. These are not pencil 
pushers. These are men and women who every day in this city, as their 
brothers and sisters do across America, respond to every type of 
disaster that one can think of: bomb threats, explosions, stabbings, 
drug dealings, because the emergency response community in this city is 
the D.C. Fire and Emergency Services Department. Yet tonight, Mr. 
Speaker, those in D.C. are less protected. Those who protect the people 
of D.C., the brave fire fighters and EMS personnel, are more at risk.
  Mr. Speaker, today, at a press conference in front of the fire 
station on New Jersey Avenue and in this room tonight, I call for the 
resignation of Alice Rivlin. Anyone who is as short-sighted as she must 
be, to deny a $4 million request, which I, as a Republican, will 
aggressively support in this body, out of a budget in excess of $2 
billion to help guarantee the safety of fire fighters and EMS personnel 
in this city, in my opinion, is not fit to be the director of the 
oversight management authority for this the District of Columbia.
  Either she restores the funding or she herself should resign. As I 
said today, Mr. Speaker, let her take the money that she makes and the 
staff that supports her and give that to the D.C. Fire Department. The 
people of D.C. would be safer if that money were being used to protect 
them and the people who visit this city.
  But, Mr. Speaker, I want to go one step further, because Alice Rivlin 
is the hand-picked choice of this administration. Now, President 
Clinton and Vice President Al Gore talk a good game when it comes to 
supporting the Nation's fire fighters. In fact, Al Gore should talk a 
good game because it was the International Association of Fire Fighters 
who endorsed the candidacy of the Vice President before any other union 
in America.
  Mr. Speaker, I ask myself where is the voice of the Vice President 
calling for the safety of these fire fighters? Where is his outrage 
that a former hand-picked senior manager of this administration would 
make such a disastrous decision? Yet, no word would come out of this 
administration about the impending problems for the safety and well-
being of both the fire fighters, the emergency medical personnel, and 
the people who work and live in D.C.
  Besides calling for the resignation of Alice Rivlin, I have today and 
I am again asking and requesting and demanding that the Vice President 
of the United States say something about the absolutely outrageous 
action that was taken by the oversight board to deny Chief Tippett's 
recommendations. If he does not respond, then I hope every union IAFF 
member in D.C. and around the country understands that that silence 
speaks louder than any words. We are talking about the safety of the 
men and women who protect this city.
  Mr. Speaker, 5 years ago, under a different administration, the New 
Jersey Avenue fire station was closed down, the station that protects 
this Capitol. The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) and I fought that 
decision and got on this floor and tried to pass legislation to restore 
the funding to keep that station operational. We were unsuccessful.
  Five years later, a few short months ago, that New Jersey Avenue 
station was reopened. I could not make the reopening, but the gentleman 
from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) did, and he deserves much credit for his 
support in helping that station be reopened.
  Within the first 30 days of their operation, they responded to 325 
calls on Capitol Hill, 325 calls in 1 month, 30

[[Page H2647]]

days. Prior to that, those calls had to be answered by distance 
stations traveling much further to reach this Hill to take care of the 
citizens of America who visit and work here.

                              {time}  2145

  Today we have to respond to a different call. Chief Tippett, a brave 
and honorable man, gave up his profession on Friday based on principle. 
Now it is time for this Congress, Members from both sides of the aisle, 
to stand with Chief Tippett on principle.
  Now, there are many of our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, who are railing 
about support for the fire service, about whether or not one is for 
this bill or for that bill; whether or not one is for this amendment or 
that amendment. Well, here is the chance for all our colleagues to join 
together this week and demand that the D.C. Oversight Board do the 
right thing and provide the additional $4 million for these brave men 
and women to protect this city and the people who live and work here, 
but more importantly to protect the lives of the fire and EMS personnel 
themselves.
  It would be absolutely tragic, Mr. Speaker, if another incident like 
3146 Cherry Road, Northeast, took place and additional D.C. 
firefighters were put at risk or, heaven forbid, lost their lives. All 
of us, Democrats and Republicans, must speak out and speak out loud and 
in a very clear and coherent voice.
  Mr. Speaker, just a few short weeks ago tens of thousands of 
firefighters were joined by the President of the United States and the 
Vice President as they traveled to Worcester, Massachusetts, to join 
with all of us as we mourned the loss of six firefighters who were 
killed during the course of their assignment. They made the supreme 
sacrifice, just as the three D.C. firefighters did in the last 3 years.
  Mr. Speaker, words are critical to console the families of those when 
a loved one is lost, as we all did when those six Worcester 
firefighters were killed. Where is the voice of those people today, 
before an additional D.C. firefighter is killed? Where is the voice of 
the President today? Where is the voice of the Vice President today? 
And where is the support for Alice Rivlin and the Oversight Board for 
the additional risks that are being put on those firefighters because 
they are not being adequately staffed and not being supported to 
respond to the incidences they have to face in this city?
  Mr. Speaker, I hold those officials accountable. And I encourage all 
of our colleagues to join with me and to join with the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), who went to the New Jersey fire station today, 
before I did, to state unequivocally that we will support the funding, 
but we want a decision made now. Not next week, not next month, not 
next year, but now, to restore the full support that Chief Tippett 
asked for. And we also want Chief Tippett back in that job.
  Because, as I told the mayor 3 months ago when he began his search 
for his chief, when I called him on the telephone, I said, ``Mayor, you 
know you have a good man there. Your interim chief.'' He said, 
``Congressman, I agree with you.'' I said, ``He deserves to be the 
chief.'' And he said, ``I agree with you.'' As I sat next to the mayor 
last June, as we had this memorial ceremony for those two firefighters 
that were killed here in D.C., he said, ``You know, Congressman, my top 
priority as the mayor is to guarantee the safety of our emergency 
service workers.''
  The mayor is then on our side. The chief is on our side. The director 
of public safety for the city is on our side. Where is Alice Rivlin? 
Where is the oversight board? Where is the White House? And where is 
Mr. Gore with his IAFF endorsement? What is he doing to help protect 
the lives of these D.C. firefighters?

                          ____________________