[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 51 (Monday, May 1, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3194-S3195]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. DOMENICI:
  S. 2492. A bill to expand and enhance United States efforts in the 
Russian nuclear complex to expedite the containment of nuclear 
expertise that presents a proliferation threat, and for other purposes; 
to the Committee on Armed Services.


             nuclear weapons complex conversion act of 2000

  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, today I'm introducing legislation, the 
Nuclear Weapons Complex Conversion Act of 2000, to dramatically improve 
our programs that deal with non-proliferation risks associated with the 
Former Soviet Union. My legislation will also significantly enhance our 
ability to consider future arms control agreements.
  Today, we face challenges involving the warheads, materials, and 
expertise developed during the days of the Cold War. With that War 
behind us, arguably the greatest global security challenge involves 
containment and management of proliferation threats--many of which are 
in danger of being fueled with former Soviet capabilities.
  Congress has repeatedly demonstrated frustration with the 
Administration's progress in this key area. A significant part of this 
concern arises from today's wide range of uncoordinated programs, all 
dealing with non-proliferation issues. Programs aren't integrated into 
one coherent thrust led by a focused and committed Administration. Our 
non-proliferation programs resemble a patchwork quilt designed and 
executed by several artists.
  The net effect of our non-proliferation programs is far less than it 
could be and needs to be. These programs are begging for coherent 
oversight and inter-agency cooperation. To address this need, which is 
far from new, the 1996 Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation called for 
appointment of a new-level non-proliferation czar.
  This Administration never acted on this law. Without this 
coordination, inter-agency turf fights remain unresolved, potential 
synergies aren't exploited, and redundancy and inefficiency can run 
rampant. My legislation therefore expresses a Sense of Congress that 
the time is long overdue for this coordination.
  My legislation also deals specifically with the largest unmet 
challenges of the former Soviet Russian nuclear weapons complex. That 
complex contains three main challenges: weapons production capacity, 
materials for those weapons, and people.
  Programs associated with the materials, where goals and progress are 
easier to define and measure, are demonstrating credible progress. But, 
the other areas present more complex challenges.
  The ``brain drain'' issue reflects a concern that scientists and 
engineers with critical knowledge might sell their knowledge to rogue 
states. The weapons production issue raises concern about Russia's 
ability to rapidly reconstitute forces that could invalidate future 
arms control agreements. These twin issues then, non-proliferation and 
the credibility of future arms control agreements, urgently need 
improved approaches.
  We already have a Nuclear Cities Initiative within the Department of 
Energy, but it has barely begun to scratch the surface in dealing with 
the problem of their cash-strapped and over-sized nuclear complex. To 
date, NCI has not garnered enough Congressional support to have stable 
and realistic funding, largely because it hasn't set goals and 
milestones against which progress can be documented and measured.
  The concerns on weapon production capabilities highlight very large 
asymmetries. The U.S. has significantly reduced the size of our nuclear 
weapons production complex. These reductions were accomplished openly, 
and are transparent to Russia. Russia, in contrast, has barely started 
to downsize its complex. Their complex is still sized at Cold War 
levels.
  Little information about the Russian complex is shared, and ten of 
its most sensitive cities remain closed. Although the Russian Federal 
Ministry of Atomic Energy has announced its intent to significantly 
downsize its workforce, it has been slow in accomplishing this goal and 
any progress is very closely held.

[[Page S3195]]

  The current Nuclear Cities Initiative was established to assist 
Russia in creating job opportunities for employees who are not required 
to support realistic Russian security requirements and to facilitate 
conversion of the production facilities. It has focused on creation of 
commercial ventures that provide self-sustaining jobs, primarily in 
three of the closed cities. The current program scope, progress, and 
funding are not consistent with the scale of the threats to us.
  I want to significantly advance our progress in the nuclear cities. 
However, to gain sufficient advocacy for a major funding increase, the 
program must demonstrate rapid progress in downsizing and an ability 
for the U.S. to track progress against verifiable milestones that 
support a Russian complex consistent with their future national 
security requirements.

  My legislation substantially increases the funding and scope of our 
programs with the Russian nuclear weapons complex to assist the Russian 
Federation in restructuring its complex, but does this conditioned on a 
commitment from the Russian Federation to measure progress against 
realistic, transparent milestones. Without their commitment, and 
without an ability to track progress against such milestones, it is 
simply not appropriate for us to continue to fund programs within their 
complex.
  My legislation supports the ongoing commercialization programs in 
their complex. In addition, however, it authorizes the federal 
government to contract for research in support of United States 
agencies in cases where the Russians have unique capabilities and 
facilities.
  My legislation demands that funding for this expanded program, for 
the 2002 fiscal year and beyond, be contingent on making significant 
measurable progress on key issues of strategic interest to both 
countries, including:
  Demonstrable conversion from military to civilian activities at the 
four cities participating in the FY 2001 program.
  Development of a ten year plan by the Russian Federation for a 
nuclear weapons complex downsized to reflect the changing national 
security needs of Russia. This plan should reflect a production 
capacity consistent with future arms control agreements.
  Increased transparency of Russian production capacity and nuclear 
materials inventories to eventually match that of the United States.
  In addition, my legislation authorizes funding for educational 
initiatives both in the United States and in the Former Soviet Union 
focused on developing new non-proliferation experts. There are now few 
people who can assist in these difficult downsizing processes while, at 
the same time, minimizing the threat presented by residual weapons 
material or expertise.
  Significant cooperation from the Russian government must occur for 
milestones to be set and met. That won't happen unless they concur that 
these steps are also in their best interests. From interactions with 
senior levels of their Ministry of Atomic Energy, I've learned that 
they share the view that progress in this area is in the best interests 
of both nations.
  It is certainly in our mutual interests to accomplish the transition 
of both nations' nuclear weapons complexes with as much care and as 
little proliferation risk as possible. It is also in each nation's 
interests for the other to maintain a sufficiently credible complex to 
support realistic national security objectives. To the extent that we 
can take these steps in a mutually transparent way, we should be able 
to assure each other of our future intentions.
  Mr. President, this legislation can significantly impact our non-
proliferation and future arms control national security objectives.

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