[Congressional Record Volume 146, Number 48 (Tuesday, April 25, 2000)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2853-S2856]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY IN COUNTERING PROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, this week the sixth Nonproliferation Treaty
Review Conference opened in New York.
At the last conference five years ago countries agreed to extend
indefinitely the treaty. I recently introduced, along with Senators
Baucus, Kerry, Roth, Bingaman, Kerrey, Kohl, and Schumer, Senate
Concurrent Resolution 107, expressing support for another successful
review conference. A similar bipartisan resolution will be introduced
in the House. I hope my colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee
will consider this resolution as quickly as possible.
Some delegates to the conference have suggested that the United
States is not as strongly committed as it once was to arms control,
citing as examples the Senate failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Administration negotiations with the Russians to
modify the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. I wish, as do many of my
distinguished colleagues, that the CTBT had been ratified. I hope that
it will be. Nevertheless, I believe all my colleagues, regardless of
their position on this issue, share a strong and abiding interest in
pursuing arms control agreements and making the
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world more secure from threats from weapons of mass destruction.
As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright observed in here address to
the delegations to the conference ``the United States is part of the
international consensus on nuclear disarmament.'' We have taken
considerable steps with our allies to reduce our nuclear weapons
arsenal and have made a commitment to further reductions with the
Russians.
I share the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan's concern--
expressed at the Review Conference--that ``nuclear conflict remains a
very real and very terrifying possibility at the beginning of the 21st
century.'' The nuclear weapons testing by India and Pakistan in 1998
are added reasons to be worried.
Equally disturbing are reports that Iran is still pursuing secretly a
nuclear weapon and long range missile program. While we develop a
national missile defense program to protect us against limited attacks,
we must strengthen those arms control regimes which help to contain the
spread of weapons systems to states who may wish to harm us.
One of the steps that the United States and other states can take is
to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) made the IAEA safeguards system the
verification arm of the NPT. While the IAEA does provide some technical
assistance to countries for the peaceful use of nuclear technology, it
also inspects the nuclear inventories of non-nuclear weapon members of
the NPT to ensure there are no diversions to weapons use.
The Gulf War disclosed for the first time an Iraq nuclear weapons
program which was being carried out despite IAEA inspections. This
disclosure provided new impetus to strengthening the IAEA inspection
system. The IAEA has developed a strengthened safeguards program which
consists of more intrusive and aggressive inspections. The agency also
proposes a new inspection protocol giving its inspectors more authority
to collect information. Some 46 countries have signed the protocol
which the United States helped develop.
But the increase in membership in the IAEA and the strengthened
inspection system has meant more demands on IAEA inspectors and
facilities. I asked the Congressional Research Service to prepare a
brief on the IAEA to explain its new functions. Zachary Davis, CRS's
Specialist in International Nuclear Policy, is to be commended for his
work on this subject. I urge my colleagues to read his analysis--
``Nuclear Weapons: Strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency
Inspections.'' I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record
in full, following my remarks. The IAEA deserves our full support and
the NPT Review Conference deserves our full attention. Again, I urge my
colleagues to express their support by co-sponsoring S. Con. Res. 107.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Nuclear Weapons: Strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency
Inspections
(By Zachary S. Davis, Specialist, International Nuclear Policy
Resources, Science and Industry Division)
summary
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an
international organization established to achieve two goals.
First, it operates an international inspection system to
provide assurances that nuclear materials and technology in
use for civilian purposes are not diverted to make nuclear
weapons. Second, the IAEA provides assistance in civilian
applications of nuclear technology for energy, agriculture,
medicine and science. The IAEA is strengthening its
inspection system to cope with countries such as Iraq and
North Korea that established covert nuclear weapons programs
and refused to cooperate with inspections, despite their
membership in the Nonproliferation Treaty.
The strengthened safeguards system provides IAEA inspectors
with greater access to a wider range of nuclear activities.
New technologies will improve inspectors' ability to detect
undeclared nuclear activities. A new protocol to the standard
IAEA inspection agreement gives inspectors more information
and access. However, these improvements will require
additional resources from member states. This report outlines
the IAEA mission and describes efforts to improve it. It will
be updated as events merit.
background: iaea inspections and the ``nuclear bargain''
The IAEA was established in 1957 as part of President
Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program to provide independent
assurances that the spread of civilian nuclear technology did
not also promote the spread of nuclear weapons. Exporters of
nuclear technology such as the United States asked the IAEA
to apply safeguards on nuclear technologies, such as
reactors, and materials, such as nuclear fuel, to make sure
that the purchasers did not use them to make nuclear weapons.
The IAEA gained new responsibilities in 1970 when the
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) designated the IAEA safeguards
system as the global verification mechanism for the NPT.
The Agency also provides technical assistance for
countries to use nuclear technology for energy, medicine,
agriculture, and scientific research. The balance between
technical assistance and nuclear safeguards is often
referred to as the ``nuclear bargain:'' in return for
receiving civilian nuclear technology, recipient nations
agreed to international safeguards.
Organization. The Director General of the IAEA is Mohomed
ElBaradei, a U.S.-trained, Egyptian diplomat who served many
years as head of the IAEA legal department. The main policy-
making body is the Board of Governors, which has 35 members,
including states with advanced nuclear programs. The General
Conference of all 131 members meets annually to debate Agency
positions, programs and priorities.
Inspections Based on Inventories, Not Risk of Diversion.
All non-nuclear weapon members of the Nonproliferation Treaty
agree to allow the IAEA to inspect their nuclear inventories.
Each country provides an initial declaration and regular
reports on its inventory, which the IAEA then inspects on a
regular basis. The amount of inspection efforts is determined
by how much nuclear material a country has. Under this
formula, countries with large civil nuclear programs such as
Japan, Germany, South Korea, and Canada receive the most
attention, while countries possessing much smaller amounts of
nuclear material such as Iran and Iraq receive much less
attention.
The Agency's members and its founding statutes do not allow
it to shift inspection resources from currently trusted
countries that possess large amounts of nuclear material,
such as Japan, to focus on countries with small but growing
nuclear programs that are considered to be proliferation
risks, such as Iran. One way to address this problem is
through across-the-board increases in the Agency's global
inspection system, although IAEA members have insisted for
many years on maintaining a zero-growth budget.
Weapons States and Non-NPT Members. The five legally
recognized nuclear weapon states (Britain, France, China
Russia, United States) are not obligated to accept
inspections, but in practice do allow some access to some
facilities on a voluntary basis. Nearly all non-weapon states
that possess nuclear capabilities accept comprehensive
safeguards. Only a few countries (India, Israel, Pakistan,
Cuba) have not joined the NPT, but even these are members of
the IAEA and accept safeguards at selected facilities.
Numbers of inspections. The IAEA conducts thousands of
inspections annually. In 1998 the Agency performed 2,507
safeguards inspections at 897 facilities and other locations
worldwide. At the end of 1998, 222 safeguards agreements were
in force in 138 states (and Taiwan). This includes safeguards
agreements with 126 states pursuant to the NPT. (The NPT has
187 member states, but many of these are developing countries
that do not posses nuclear material or facilities that need
to be inspected.) The quantities of nuclear materials and
numbers of facilities under IAEA safeguards are growing
steadily. As a result of growing stocks of nuclear
materials, IAEA resources are being stretched thinner and
may not keep pace with this growing demand.
Successes and Failures
A few NPT member states have violated their obligations and
diverted civilian nuclear technology and materials to covert
weapons programs.
Iraq. Iraq was a party to the NPT for many years, but used
its civil nuclear program to disguise an extensive nuclear
weapons program. IAEA inspectors did not learn the full
nature and extent of Iraq's nuclear weapons program until the
Gulf War, when Allied forces attacked many undeclared nuclear
installations. After the war, the United Nations Security
Council created the Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) to
account for and eliminate Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons and missiles. The IAEA headed the nuclear
inspections. Iraq quit cooperating with UNSCOM in 1999;
efforts to reestablish inspections in Iraq have been blocked
by Russia and France in the Security Council, although IAEA
inspectors were allowed to inspect nuclear material remaining
in Iraq in January 2000.
North Korea. North Korea acceded to the NPT in 1985, but
refused to accept safeguards until 1992. When North Korea
finally allowed safeguards inspections, it provided
incomplete and contradictory information and then blocked
IAEA access to key sites. The IAEA quickly discovered the
discrepancies and reported Pyongyang's noncompliance to the
United Nations Security Council, which urged North Korea to
comply, but took no further action. North Korea refused
access and threatened to quit the NPT. Nevertheless, North
Korea remains obligated under
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the NPT to allow IAEA inspections, despite its noncompliance.
The IAEA has repeatedly called upon North Korea to comply
with its NPT safeguards obligations. Under the 1994 Agreed
Framework between the United States and North Korea, the IAEA
monitors the shut-down of North Korea's declared nuclear
facilities, but is not able to apply full safeguards.
However, North Korea must fully comply and allow the IAEA to
resolve all outstanding inspection questions before the
Agreed Framework can be fully implemented.
Inspections in Iraq and North Korea provide many lessons
for strengthening the IAEA safeguards system. Inspections in
South Africa after that country declared in 1991 that it had
dismantled its 6 nuclear weapons and joined the NPT also
helped the Agency learn how to improve its ability to detect
hidden nuclear activities and account for undeclared
activities such as those possessed by South Africa. Many
analysts expect the IAEA to be tested next in Iran, which has
a growing nuclear program but denies any interest in
acquiring nuclear weapons.
How Safeguards Work
Each non-weapons member of the NPT signs an agreement with
the IAEA authorizing the Agency to keep track of the nuclear
materials in the country and provides the IAEA with an
inventory of its nuclear materials. IAEA inspectors verify
the declared inventories and make periodic visits to make
sure all the material can be accounted for. Agency inspectors
check records and take samples at reactors, fuel storage
facilities, and other nuclear installations to verify the
accuracy and completeness of each country's declared
inventory. Inspectors take a variety of measurements of
nuclear materials to verify their content (see below). The
Agency has a laboratory near its headquarters in Vienna,
Austria, where samples are analyzed. It also sends samples
to approved laboratories in several countries, including
the United States, for expert analysis. Inspectors attach
seals and tags to critical equipment to detect
unauthorized access. The Agency also installs video
cameras to monitor activities at nuclear facilities
throughout the world.
When questions arise about a country's nuclear inventory,
the Agency can request additional information and/or more
access to facilities. Normally, additional information can
resolve questions. However, in the past, inspectors have not
always pressed member states to resolve outstanding issues,
and states like Iraq and North Korea have attempted to take
advantage of the Agency's disinclination to confront member
states about incomplete or incorrect information. Recent
improvements in IAEA safeguards, however, are intended to
fill gaps and correct past deficiencies.
strengthened safeguards
Since the early 1990s, the IAEA has been upgrading its
safeguards system to prevent a repeat of problems encountered
in Iraq and elsewhere. Most importantly, the Agency is taking
steps to detect undeclared nuclear activities such as found
in Iraq. Strengthened Safeguards, formerly referred to as the
93+2 Program, consists of legal, technical, and political
measures which are outlined below.
Information. Inspectors rely on information provided by the
states themselves, on information collected by the Agency
from the states and from open source information, and
information provided to the Agency by member states. Prior to
the Gulf War, member states had not provided intelligence
information to the IAEA. However, the Agency has increasingly
received and used intelligence provided by member states, as
well as expanding its use of open source information from a
variety of sources. Those types of information were critical
in detecting discrepancies in North Korea's initial
declaration of its inventory of nuclear material and in
uncovering the full extent of Iraq's nuclear program.
Recently the Agency has begun to use commercial satellite
imagery to augment its information data bases.
Access. One problem highlighted by the Agency's failure to
detect Iraq's extensive covert nuclear weapon program was the
limitations that member states put on its access to
facilities. In the past, the IAEA focused almost exclusively
on accounting for nuclear material, and did not pay much
attention to related equipment and installations. The IAEA
has reasserted its authority to gain access to all facilities
housing nuclear activities. However, additional authority is
needed and would be authorized by the new protocol inspection
agreement (see below).
Technology. The Agency is upgrading its inspection
equipment with the help of the United States and other member
states. Upgrades include new cameras and remote monitoring
equipment, more accurate measuring tools, and new methods of
detecting minute quantities of nuclear material in soil,
water, plants and air that can be collected from numerous
locations. The IAEA is also beginning to use commercial
satellite imagery to monitor developments at nuclear
installations.
Political and Financial Support. The IAEA depends on
support from member states to be effective. Contributions to
the regular budget are apportioned on the United Nations
scale of assessments. Most of the technology and equipment it
uses is contributed by members. Its budget is limited and
divided among several missions that are popular with certain
members, such as nuclear safety and technical assistance.
Given its budget constraints, the Agency depends on special
voluntary contributions to support programs of particular
interest to certain members, including advanced safeguards
and arms control.
Enforcement. Even when the IAEA discovers noncompliance, it
can only report to the United Nations Security Council.
Enforcement is a political decision of the Security Council
and its members.
additional safeguards protocol
An important part of the Strengthened Safeguards effort is
a new inspection protocol that gives Agency inspectors more
authority to collect more information about a wider range of
nuclear activities (uranium mining, imports, exports, etc.),
to use more intrusive inspection methods, and to expand their
access to undeclared activities. The additional information
and access is required to reduce the risk of undeclared
nuclear activities going undetected, as they did in Iraq.
The United States, which played a primary role in
formulating the new inspection protocol, agreed to accept
some of the new measures on selected U.S. activities to
persuade others to sign it. The four other nuclear weapon
states also agreed to sign the protocol and implement it. The
United States, as a nuclear weapons state under the NPT, is
not obligated to open its facilities for inspection and can
exclude any sites it chooses from IAEA inspection. By early
2000, 46 countries had signed the Additional Protocol. The
U.S. version of the Protocol will be submitted to the Senate
for its consent to ratification before taking effect in the
United States.
new inspection missions: excess weapons materials and fissile material
cutoff treaty
In addition to the growing number of civil nuclear
facilities and growing stockpiles of materials under IAEA
safeguards, the IAEA is being assigned new missions to
support arms control agreements.
Excess Weapon Materials: The Trilateral Initiative. The
United States and Russia each have many tons of excess
nuclear weapons materials--highly enriched uranium and
plutonium. The stockpiles of excess materials are growing as
more nuclear weapons are dismantled under the terms of arms
control agreements. The United States and Russia each
declared hundreds of tons of weapons materials as excess and
asked the IAEA to verify that this material is not reused to
make nuclear weapons. The IAEA agreed to work with Russian
and U.S. experts to develop a special verification
arrangement to allow the Agency to verify the materials
without revealing sensitive weapons-related information.
The arrangement, called the Trilateral Initiative, is
funded by the Departments of Energy and State. The
Trilateral Initiative can support arms control agreements
such as START II and a proposed START III by providing
independent verification that weapons materials are
removed from military stockpiles and are not reused for
nuclear explosives.
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). The Clinton
Administration proposed negotiating a multilateral treaty to
stop further production of highly enriched uranium or
plutonium for use in nuclear explosives. Such a treaty would
cap the amount of weapons materials, and therefore limit the
number of weapons that could be made from existing stocks.
The IAEA is widely viewed as the most likely inspection
agency for such a treaty. Although an FMCT has broad
international support, negotiations are stalled at the
Conference on Disarmament, a branch of the United Nations
located in Geneva, Switzerland. New funding would be
required.
iaea budget and budget problems
The IAEA annual budget is about $226 million. The budget is
divided among several major programs including safeguards,
safety, and technical assistance. Member states'
contributions are determined by the United Nations scale of
contributions and are combined in the Agency's annual budget.
The Agency also receives voluntary contributions from member
states targeted to support specific programs or projects.
U.S. Contribution. The United States provides about 25% of
the IAEA regular budget. In 1999 the U.S. assessed
contribution was $49 million. The United States also provided
a voluntary contribution of $40 million, mainly to support
activities related to the Strengthened Safeguards System. The
United States also provided less than $1 million from the
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund to upgrade IAEA
inspection equipment. U.S. contributions to the IAEA are
funded through the State Department's 050 account.
Stretching the Resources. While the members of the IAEA are
tasking it with additional responsibilities, many resist
providing additional funds to pay for Strengthened
Safeguards, expanding inspections, improving nuclear safety,
and for new arms control missions such as the Trilateral
Initiative. The U.S. practice of paying its dues at the end
of the U.S. fiscal year (instead of by calendar year, as
requested by the IAEA) puts further strain on the Agency.
With stocks of nuclear material growing in many countries,
some of which pose proliferation concerns, at some point the
IAEA's resources may be stretched so far that the Agency can
not fulfill all of its functions. Declining credibility of
IAEA safeguards could weaken their deterrent and detection
functions and possibly undermine nuclear nonproliferation
efforts.
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legislation
Congress has consistently supported the IAEA and has
authorized and appropriated funds for the Agency since its
inception in 1956. In recent years Congress has continued
support for strengthening the safeguards system and through
voluntary contributions. However, legislation has also been
proposed to withhold portions of the voluntary U.S.
contribution to the IAEA to signal displeasure with IAEA
programs that benefit particular member states such as Iran
and Cuba.
for additional reading
IAEA documents are available on their web site: http://
www.iaea.org/worldatom.
International Atomic Energy Agency, ``Safeguards and
Nonproliferation,'' IAEA Bulletin, volume 41, number 4, 1999.
Zachary Davis, International Atomic Energy Agency:
Strengthen Verification Authority? CRS Report 97-571, May
1997.
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